Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
A priori Schopenhauer Korfmacher Schopenhauer zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
I 17
A priori knowledge/Schopenhauer: 1 Law of inertia: every change needs a cause. - 2 Law of Perseverance: matter is eternal. - Matter: is mere imagination. - On the other hand, the brain is a product of matter. - Solution: metaphysics. The organism is not just an idea, but something else. >Metaphysics.

Code Lessig I 81f
Code/Lessig: The issue here is how the architecture of the Net—or ist “code”—itself becomes a regulator. In this context, the rule applied to an individual does not find its force from the threat of consequences enforced by the law—fines, jail, or even shame.
I 82
A locked door is a physical constraint on the liberty of someone to enter some space.
I 93
[This kind of code] is not just written rules; it is not just custom; it is not just the supply and demand of a knowing consuming public.What makes [e.g.] AOL is in large part the structure of the space.You enter AOL and you find it to be a certain universe. This space is constituted by its code. You can resist this code—you can resist how you find it, just as you can resist cold weather by putting on a sweater. But you are not going to change how it is.
I 139
By “open code” I mean code (both software and hardware) whose functionality is transparent at least to one knowledgeable about the technology. By “closed code”, I mean code (both software and hardware) whose functionality is opaque. One can guess what closed code is doing; and with enough opportunity to test, one might well reverse engineer it. But from the technology itself, there is no reasonable way to discern what the functionality of the technology is.
I personally have very strong views about how code should be created. But whatever side you are on in the “free vs. proprietary software” debate in general, in at least the contexts
I will identify here, you should be able to agree with me first, that open code is a constraint on state power, and second, that in at least some cases, code must, in the relevant sense, be “open.”
I 149
The code is regulable only because the code writers can be controlled. […]An unmovable, and unmoving, target of regulation, then, is a good start toward regulability. And this statement has an interesting corollary: Regulable code is closed code.
I 150
To the extent that code is open code, the power of government is constrained.Government can demand,government can threaten, but when the target of its regulation is plastic, it cannot rely on its target remaining as it wants. […] Books are open code: They hide nothing; they reveal their source—they are their source! A user or adopter of a book always has the choice to read only the
I 151
chapters she wants. Closed code functions differently. With closed code, users cannot easily modify the control that the code comes packaged with.Hackers and very sophisticated programmers may be able to do so, but most users would not know which parts were required and which parts were not. Or more precisely, users would not be able to see the parts required and the parts not required because the source code does not come bundled with closed code.Closed code is the propagandist’s best strategy—not a separate chapter that the user can ignore, but a persistent and unrecognized influence that tilts the story in the direction the propagandist wants.
I 152
If the world becomes certificate-rich, regulability still increases. The same conclusion follows if more code were burned into hardware rather than left to exist as software. Then, even if the code were open, it would not be modifiable. (1)
I 175
[…]something fundamental has changed: the role that code plays in the protection of intellectual property. Code can, and increasingly will, displace law as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace. Private fences, not public law.
I 276
My vote in each context may seem to vary. With respect to intellectual property, I argue against code that tracks reading and in favor of code that guarantees a large space for an intellectual commons. In the context of privacy, I argue in favor of code that enables individual choice—both to encrypt and to express preferences about what personal data is collected by others. Code would enable that choice; law could inspire that code. In the context of free speech, however, I argue against code that would perfectly filter speech— it is too dangerous, I claim, to allow perfect choice there. Better choice, of course, is better, so code that would empower better systems of reputation is good, as is code that would widen the legitimate range of broadcasting. The aim in all three contexts is to work against centralized structures of choice. In the context of filtering, however, the aim is to work against structures that are too individualized as well.
I 323
Jean CampVsLessig: Jean Camp, a Harvard computer scientist who taught in the Kennedy School of Government, said that I had missed the point. The problem, she said, is not that “code is law” or that “code regulates. LessigVsVs: Of course, for the computer scientist code is law. And if code is law, then
obviously the question we should ask is:Who are the lawmakers?
I 324
But to a lawyer, both Camp and I, throughout this book, have made a very basic mistake. Code is not law, any more than the design of an airplane is law. (See Internet Law/Lessig).
I 328
Does this mean that we should push for open rather than closed code? Does it mean that we should ban closed code? The best code (from the perspective of constitutional values) is both modular and open. Modularity ensures that better components could be substituted for worse. And from a competitive perspective, modularity permits greater competition in the development of improvements in a particular coding project.
I 329
The law prefers opaque to transparent code; it constructs incentives to hide code rather than to make its functionality obvious. […] Our law creates an incentive to enclose as much of an intellectual commons as possible. It works against publicity and transparency, and helps to produce, in effect, a massive secret government. […] But the inertia of existing law—which gives software manufacturers effectively unlimited terms of protection—works against change. The politics are just not there.

1. I am grateful to Hal Abelson for this point.

Lessig I
Lawrence Lessig
Code: Version 2.0 New York 2006ff

Facts Wright I 243
Fact/state of affairs/Wright: There are situations where it is simply inappropriate to say "he is not aware ..." Such situations and facts point to a certain inertia that corresponds exactly to the inertia of pure abstract objects. We can not use something as a content for which we have no words.
---
I 261
Fact/Wright: evaluating any fact requires a point of view.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Falsification Feyerabend I 74
Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to turn Einstein into a naïve falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the matter" above the "verification by small effects". "... if no light deflection or perihelion movement were known at all, the theory would be convincing because it avoids the inertial system."
I 236
Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations refuted old ones and thus forced the construction of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" is not based on a single principle. ---

II 15
Theory/Feyerabend: confirmed theories are not so much refuted by experiments as by contradictory other theories.
II, 77ff
Falsifiability/FeyerabendVsPopper: the criterion loses its meaning in a world in which ideas are firmly connected with the corresponding facts. Here, the stability of the so designated results (in a fixed framework) takes the place of their falsifiability.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Flux Bigelow I 71
Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: cooperates very well with the Cartesian law of inertia. Thereafter, the same speed is not a change. Defintion law of inertia/Descartes/Bigelow/Pargetter: an object moves at a constant velocity when no forces act on it.
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we assume that any change needs a cause, the Flux doctrine revises the Aristotelian view of the movement. (FluxVsAristoteles).
Change/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Flux-Doctrine states that a change of location is an extrinsic change for a body, because the intrinsic property of speed does not have to change for this.
Flux/explanation: for most changes flux is the better explanation.
---
I 72
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: for a few changes, Ockham's explanation ((s) is not a vector for instantaneous velocity) better: for example twilight, for example, cooling, for example, moral improvement, simply much that people contemplated about in the Middle Ages. Impulse/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: has a body according to the Ockhamists because it had that and that position at the time.
Problem: this requires that, e.g. a meteor has a "memory".
Acceleration/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem becomes more difficult when e.g. the meteor has still an acceleration, because this still needs additional assumptions. Then the movement of the meteor depends on the distances of points in space.
Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: that the movement depends on the prehistory, cannot simply be lead ad absurdum. Only the flux doctrine is more elegant.
Impulse/Shock/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: The meteor has the impulse according to the flux doctrine due to its instantaneous properties.
Prehistory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can play an epistemic role to explain why the body has its instantaneous speed.
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the causal cause, however, is the instantaneous velocity and not the prehistory.
VsOckhamism/VsOckham/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: For example, the perfectly homogeneous, rotating disk.
---
I 73
Motion/Bigelow/Pargetter: the movement of this disk does not lead to any change in the distribution of qualities. Nevertheless, it differs from an inactive disk. The two are distinguished by their causal forces. Explanation: change the material parts. Time sections of the rotating disk provide circles, the ones of the stationary disk do not.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the concept of identity that is used here is controversial. It does not rely on the possibility of qualitative distinction or tracking back in time cannot rely on tracking an identifiable piece of matter. This leads to haecceitas
Haecceitism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is based on the assumption that identity cannot always be based on the same qualities. For example a perfectly rotating homogeneous disk.
Haecceitas: This-ness.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not resist against non-qualitative identity. We accept that the rotating disk has a pattern of changing identities.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not the whole story:
Causal forces: e.g. the rotating disk: are not provided by the non-qualitative identities.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the individual parts of the homogeneous disk have an instantaneous speed.
---
I 74
These lead to the fact that the time sections describe circles. Universals/Physics/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is the reason why we say that instantaneous speed - a vector with magnitude and direction - is a universal that body at a time can possess. It is an intrinsic property.
Property/Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we have to explain what kind of property this is that has a size and direction.
Size/Direction/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to the flux doctrine, the size and direction of a vector are more difficult to explain. We cannot explain the necessary instantaneous velocity by the pattern of the earlier positions.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need a theory of relations between properties.
Size/direction/vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: can simply say that both are given by the previous history of the earlier positions.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Interpretation Feyerabend I 94
Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: mental operations that are so closely linked to the senses that separation is difficult. Natural interpretations are learned! Natural Interpretation/Intellectual History/Feyerabend: depends, either a-priori presuppositions (Kant) or advantages (Bacon).
97
Natural Interpretation/Bacon/Feyerabend: Bacon wanted to remove natural interpretations (which were prejudices for him) like the peels of an onion. He believed the interpretations were simply added to perception.
I 98
Natural Interpretation/Observation Language/FeyerabendVsBacon: without it we would be completely disoriented. We cannot take apart its mesh.
I 105
Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: the new natural interpretations form a new and abstract observation language. They are introduced and hidden so that the completed change is not noticed (method of anamnesis). They contain the notion of ​​the relativity of all motion and the law of inertia of circular motion.
I 123
Natural Interpretation/Earth Movement/Feyerabend: "natural" in a completely new and revolutionary sense: it does not require neither an external nor an internal drive to maintain it! The first kind of movement is necessary to explain the up and down of the stars,
The second kind is used when one wishes to regard the movement as something relative, as depending on the choice of a coordinate system.
I 367
Interpretation/Feyerabend: continuity of formal relations (logic) does not mean continuity of interpretations. E.g. Duhem: the notorious "derivation" of Newton's law of gravitation from Kepler's laws.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Laws Bigelow I 304
Natural Laws/NG/Bigelow/Pargetter: fall into two groups: a) causal laws: they govern forces.
b) non-causal laws: they do not describe relations, but can provide indirect information about forces. Every description of the world imposes restrictions on causal relations.
---
I 306
For example: Kepler's laws of planetary motion: they show us which laws cannot be a correct description! They rule out earlier theories. ---
I 307
Preservation Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. Law of Inertia: explains how, but not why. Indirect indications of the causes are given. For example, when acceleration is observed. However, it does not explain why a body moves at a constant speed if it is not influenced by forces. For example, optical laws: provide even less causal information: e.g. Snell's law: (> refractive index, two materials of different density through which a beam of light moves): the height of a point above the surface is equal to the depth of the corresponding point below the surface, multiplied by a constant. It describes how light behaves, but not why it does so.
---
I 308
On the other hand: For example, the law of the least time (> refractive index): between a point above and a point below the entrance area, the light takes the path for which it needs the least time. Assuming that the light moves more slowly in glass than in the air, for example, the light beam takes exactly the same path that Snell's law predicts.
Snell's law is thus subsumed under a more general law. Or it is derived from it.
Explanation: the law of the least time explains more than just refraction, it explains the path. And the law of reflection (entrance angle = exit angle). Does it also explain Snell's law?
---
I 309
In a sense, yes: it tells us more about the cause of refraction. But still it does not tell us why the light behaves in this way. It seems to explain it when it says that the light takes this path, "so that it" covers the distance in the shortest time. But no one understands that as an indication of a purpose.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Method Galilei Feyerabend I 201
Galileo/Feyerabend: he has introduced refuted theories so that they support each other. He has replaced old facts with novel experience, which he invented straight away! ---
I 203
Method/Galileo/Theory/Science/Feyerabend: Galileo's method also works in other fields. It can, for example, be used to exclude the existing arguments against materialism, thus burying the philosophical body-soul problem (the corresponding scientific problems, on the other hand, remain unaffected). Nevertheless, their universal applicability in the sciences is not yet an argument in their favor. There are both ethical and scientific reasons that occasionally force us to proceed quite differently.
Galileo/Feyerabend: he made progress by changing unfamiliar links between words (he introduced new terms) and between words and perceptions (he introduced new natural interpretations). He also introduced new and unusual principles: the Law of Inertia and the general principle of relativity.


Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Principles Duhem 285
Principles/Poincaré: asserts with regard to the principles of mechanics: never will a new experiment lead to abandon them. The operation which it is to compare with the facts has no meaning.
E.g. principle of inertia. You can only give it a meaning if you consider a certain relationship point to be chosen. Disregarding this definition would deprive the expression of its meaning. There are as many laws as different relationship points! If the principle of inertia were wrong in relation to a certain point, it would become true when another one was chosen. And it would always be free to choose this latter. It is impossible to close this backdoor.
---
I 286
E.g. Principle of equality of action and reaction: (also Poincaré): "The focus of an isolated system can only have a straight and uniform motion." Can this be verified by an experiment? No, the only isolated system is the universe. So the question makes no sense. "We are always free to accept that our principle is correct."
---
I 287
E.g. Chemistry: The Law of multiple proportions: Whatever the results of the analysis may be, it is always certain to find three integers, by virtue of which the law is verifiable with more accuracy than the experiments have. ---
I 288
E.g. Law of the rational indices: crystallography. There are always certain errors during measurements. The crystalographer, who wants to correct the law experimentally, certainly did not understand the meaning of the words he uses. Here as in the case of the multiple proportions, these are purely mathematical expressions, which lack any physical sense. ---
I 289
Duhem: It would only lead to public places, if one were to say that the conditions were almost commensurable: for everything in the world is almost commensurable. Any kind of incommensurable relationship is always nearly commensurable. It would be absurd to want to subject certain principles of mechanics to the direct control of the experiment. Does it follow that these hypotheses cannot be achieved by experimental contradictions? No!
Isolated, these hypotheses have no experimental significance. It cannot be a question of confirming or refuting the experiments. But these hypotheses are used as essential foundations in the construction of theories. These theories (crystallography, mechanics, chemistry) are representations designed to be compared with the facts. The experimental contradiction then always concerns a group as a whole. So it disappears what could have appeared paradoxical in the assertion that certain physical theories are based on hypotheses which cannot be interpreted physically.
Principles/Poincaré: "The experiment can build the principles of mechanics, but not destroy them".
---
I 290
HadamardVs: "Duhem has shown that it is not about isolated hypotheses, but the totality of the hypotheses of mechanics, whose experimental verification can be attempted. ---
I 290
It is up to the physicist's instinct to look for the fault from which the whole system suffers. No absolute principle leads this investigation. If there is a struggle between hypotheses, the healthy commen sense decides after some time. ---
I 292
E.g. According to Foucault's experiment, Biot abandoned the emission hypothesis. Pure logic would not have been enough for this waiver. It was not an experimentum crucis.

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Principles Poincaré Duhem I 285
Principles/Poincaré/Duhem: Poincaré claims regarding the principles of mechanics: never will a new experiment lead to abandon them. The operation which is to compare them with the facts has no meaning. E.g. principle of inertia. You can only give it a meaning if you consider a certain relationship point as chosen ...
See Principles/Duhem.
---
I 289
Duhem: It would only lead to public places, if one were to say that the conditions were almost commensurable: for everything in the world is almost commensurable. Any arbitrary incommensurable relationship is always approximately commensurable. It would be absurd to want to subject certain principles of mechanics to the direct control of the experiment. Does it follow that these hypotheses cannot be achieved by experimental contradictions? No!
Principles/Poincaré: "The experiment can build up the principles of mechanics, but not destroy them".
> Principles/Duhem.


Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998
Quidditism Quidditism, philosophy: comprises the thesis that the relationship between the roles of physical objects such as inertia and the properties such as mass, which realize inertia, is contingent. In other words, quidditism is about the thesis that there is no necessary connection between properties. (See D. T. Locke, Quidditism, 2009). See also causal roles, causal explanation, causality, explanation, best explanation.

Renaissance Flusser Rötzer I 66
Renaissance/Flusser: in the Renaissance, the world is no longer a plant, but something inanimate in which animate and inanimate things move. Its movement is not growing, but is done by inertia. The field of possibilities is inseparable, but not endless, and within it, it is confronted with impossibilities everywhere.

Fl I
V. Flusser
Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996


Rötz I
F. Rötzer
Kunst machen? München 1991
Space Locke Euchner I 44
space / Locke: empty space is possible - II 46 space: idea - mode: e.g. location - modes: shades of ideas.
I 45
Expansion without inertia - unlike body.
I 47
Space / time / Locke: correlation opaque - only ideas, not space and time themselves.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Terminology Vollmer I 81
Definition Transformation/Vollmer: a regular transformation is equivalent to the multiplication of one (or more) characteristic parameters with positive finite real numbers - the factor must not affect any properties that are represented by integers, such as dimension or quantum number. ---
I 95
Invariance/perception/Vollmer: also our perception goes on invariants: Consistency of direction, consistency of size, consistency of shape - objectivity: determines invariance - E.g. charge, mass, spin, etc. Bohr: invariant particles may be called real. ---
I 102
propter hoc/post hoc/Scholastic/Vollmer: E.g. when we say that the stones are getting warm because the sun shines, we say more than if we say that they are getting warm after the sun is shining. ---
II 94
Definition hylemorphism/Vollmer: summarizes the mind as the form of matter (Hyle: Fabric) - the one cannot be without the other - (very general). - simply equates mind with the form. ---
II 109
Notation/Music/Vollmer: only partial isomorphism: it could theoretically include ultrasonic notes. ---
II 114
VsAnalogie: although colors and sounds are wave characteristics, there is no point to make the concept of an octave of colors - triad of colors: no "chord" but uniform 4. color. ---
II 115
Transformability/Vollmer: further than the geometric similarity concept - narrower than the isomorphism concept - one cannot transform an atom model to the size of a planetary system, because there prevail other forces. ---
II 151
Definition Impetus/Buridan/Vollmer: (1300-1385) theory, a body is set in motion, so that one adds a moving force, the impetus - Vs: this proceeds from the Aristotelian assumption that any movement needs a cause - that's wrong - inertia is uniform motion without cause.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Twin Earth Dennett I 572
Twin Earth/Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: he calls for a leap in reference, a leap in intentionality.
I 573f
Dennett: one could now tend to think that the inner intentionality had a certain "inertia". The brain cannot focus on one thing and mean another. (Wittgenstein). Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story under the assumption that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables.
Anything else would be a "living creature that looks like Fury" (but is not Fury).
But if there are "Butterhorses" on the twin earth which are in all aspects like our horses, then Butterhorses are horses - not an earthly sort of horses, but horses after all.
((s) that is why the twin earth water does have a different chemical formula in Putnam: YXZ.
Dennett: of course you can also represented a stricter opinion, according to which the non-earthly horses are a separate species. Both is possible. ((s) VsDennett: it depends on how you define determination). ((s) that only works with "hidden" properties)
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not.
Dennett: But what types are natural? A breed is as natural as a species or a genus.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R. I 27
Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not!
2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible.
3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning).
Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception.
I 45
Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different.
Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia).
Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up!
VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies.
I 52
Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought.
Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have
I 53
given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet.
LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below).
I 54
Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis,
I 55
it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form.
That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach).
Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view.
II 189
Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge.
II 190
Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke).
II 195
Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Descartes, R. Verschiedene Vs Descartes, R. Danto I 191
VsDescartes: that its argumentation is circular has always been the standard criticism. First he proves the existence of God, then he uses the goodness of God to secure his proof.
Duhem I 55
PascalVsDescartes: "arrogant confidence in the unlimited power of the metaphysical method. HuygensVsDescartes: I 56...
Duhem I 160
PascalVsCartesians: There are people who explain a word through themselves: The light is produced by a luminous movement of the luminous bodies. >Moliere: virtus dormitiva.
Kanitscheider I 434
NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space!
Kanitscheider II 38
Matter/NewtonVsDescartes: not expansion, but inertial mass is the key property of matter.
Lacan I 51
LacanVsDescartes: "I think where I am not, so I am where I am not thinking".
Descartes I 10
PascalVsDescartes: "heart logic" instead of mind logic.
Vaihinger I 196
Lamettrie/Vaihinger: similar to Arnobius, against Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas.
LamettrieVsDescartes.





Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Vaihinger I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Kant Vollmer Vs Kant I 25
VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity!
I 84
Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that:
VsKant,
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language
VsPositivism
VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms.
Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences.
I 103
Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge.
He cannot answer the following questions:
How are our categories created?
Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories?
Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others?
Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems:
Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution?
Why can we understand each other?
How is intersubjective knowledge possible?
Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!)
Can they be scientifically justified?
I 193
Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible.
I 196
Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false).
For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws.
I 197
Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to
a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes.
2. Anticipations of Perception
a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes
3. Analogies of Experience
a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances.
4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions).
I 199
VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs).
Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause!
Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs).
Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation.
Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine.
Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them.
VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact.
Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE.
EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct.
2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success.
Kant does not make this distinction.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm.
I 304
Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer).
I 305
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena.
I 306
Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized!
II 48
Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular).

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Milne, E.A. Kanitscheider Vs Milne, E.A. I 345
Space/Space-Time/Geometry/Universe/Metric/Milne: this has the surprising result that Milne's space-time metric has the same shape as the line element of Robertson/Walker, if the function R(t) = ct and the curvature k = 1 is selected. However, the mathematical terms here have a different >meaning (meaning change)
They determine the equivalent observers and not the time-dependent spatial structure. The properties of the three-dimensional equivalence are very different, depending on whether they are viewed from scale t or τ .
The most important difference is that space and time in t measure are not common for all egos. There is no "public space"! But all "private" spaces have an Euclidean structure.
In the τ measure space and time apply to all, but the space itself is hyperbolic.
The preference of the t space forces Milne to indicate how the velocity distribution of the egos, which he then identifies with the nuclei of the galaxies, looks like if there are no preferred reference systems (cosmological principle). (I 346 +).
Substrate/Milne: one demands that the velocities, which are dropped in the component intervals
(u,u +du), v,(v + dv), (w, w + dw) shall be assessed equally by all observers.
Universe/Milne: with increasing distance the escape velocity increases and the density goes towards infinity near the point r = ct.
The edge, which flees from the observer at the speed of light, creates the impression of a horizon. It itself is not occupied by galaxies, the particles (observer = galaxy) thus represent an "open" set, whose boundary prevents the human from looking into the "outer" space. The world has no windows. The weakening of the light of very distant objects acts like a curtain.
The limiting spherical shell can be seen as a counterpart to the initial singularity in a certain way, because here and there the particles lie arbitrarily dense and both are inaccessible.
According to the Lorentz transformation, moving clocks go slower and so every observer, although the clocks are congruent, has the impression that all spatially distant events belong to an earlier epoch.
I 348
Every fundamental observer therefore considers himself to be the "oldest inhabitant" of the universe, because his own clock will indicate a later point in time for an event that takes place at his own place than any clock of another fundamental observer. All distant galaxies will therefore appear younger to us, both because the clocks of these distant objects follow, and because of the time it takes for light to reach us.
If t is the age of the universe, then the most distant galaxies today can have reached
ct. But what we see of them, however, is at most ½ c t away. ("radar method").
The term "age of the universe" in Milne only makes sense for members of the substrate, i.e. for certain fundamental observers. Looked on from the outside, the term is meaningless.
The world is just "appearance", in no sense is it "in itself".
I 348
VsMilne: Hardly anyone has violated the rules of empirical knowledge acquisition as much as he has. KanitscheiderVsMilne: The main criticism must start with the use of the subjective time lapse as the foundation of physical time without establishing a basis for the additive properties of time intervals.
Only because he restricts himself to a comparative conceptual form ("sooner/later") of time, he can claim that his classification of clocks does not require any convention.
He uses a relational, but a subjective time and no relatively objective, physical time.
KanitscheiderVsMilne: also his method is derived because it includes the constancy of the speed of light.
I 351
In other theories, the reference to natural clocks (earth rotation) or the laws of mechanics (law of inertia) are applied.
God/Milne: from the dependence between the dynamic time scale  and the atomic scale t one can see that the world could not have existed before the time t = 0 and therefore must have been created.

GrünbaumVsMilne: the value of τ = minus infinite cannot be assigned real meaning in the same way as a finite value. It is only a "syncategorematic sign", like the transfinite cardinal number Aleph 0 and therefore the singularity of the time scale does not exclude the existence of matter for t < 0. Nor can one deduce any divine intervention from it.
I 353
Substrate/KanitscheiderVsMilne: Question: in which way the substrate in Milne, which provides local rest systems everywhere in the form of continuously distributed fundamental observers, can be identified with the real galaxies.
I 354
Due to the discrete set of galaxies, only a part of the fundamental observers (observation points) can be materialized. Contradiction to its strict homogeneity requirement.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Popper, K. Feyerabend Vs Popper, K. I 74
Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to make Einstein a naive falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the thing" above the "verification by small effects". "... If no light deflection or perihelion were known, the theory would be convincing, because it avoids the inertial system.
I 236
Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations disproved old ones and thus forced the establishment of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" cannot be traced back to a single principle.
I 356
FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper considers science as a problem solution. This overlooks the fact that problems can be formulated incorrectly.
II 82
PopperVsHegel: shows very laboriously that nonsensical consequences are obtained if the propositional logic is combined with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: E.g. This is about as smart as calling for the theory of relativity to be eliminated, just because simple computers are no match for it.
Hegel + propositional logic are nonsense. Why should precisely Hegel be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: incompatible also with the earlier quantum theory and with the differential calculus at the times of Newton...
Explanation/Popper: explains "that the world of each of our theories can be explained by other worlds which are described by other theories." The doctrine of an ultimate reality collapses.
II 119
FeyerabendVsPopper: but only because it does not correspond to his favorite methodology. But if it turns out that the world is finite, then we have an "ultimate reality." FeyerabendVsPopper: Vs "third world": it is populated with just as many different (and often incommensurate) entities as there are beliefs in the "Second World". Does not solve the problem of relativism, but conceals it.
II 201
FeyerabendVsPopper: "mere propagandist." (His former teacher).

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Putnam, H. Dennett Vs Putnam, H. I 571/572
Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality.
Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia".
I 573
Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury).
But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses.
((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.)
Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible.
I 575
Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of ​​what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion.
This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e.

Münch III 379
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural).
DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!.
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate.
The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism.
Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds.

Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Putnam III 31
DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Sciama, D. Kanitscheider Vs Sciama, D. Kanitscheider I 376
Mach's Principle/Sciama: it is impossible to separate gravic and inertial forces, because, equal in essence, they have the same origin. Therefore only stars can be considered as sources of inertial forces in non-inertial systems. By the way, an accelerated star has a different gravitational effect than a resting star. (Newton does not consider this yet).
I 377
Due to the decrease of gravity, which is caused by the acceleration of the stars, the amount of the distant masses is much stronger with 1/r than with a r -2 law, although the total amount is weakened by the expansion. (+ I 377) Thus, 80 % of the total force comes from masses beyond the range of the 200-inch telescope of Mt Palomar.
The total force now depends on the gravitational mass density rhoG G, the expansion rate tau , which determines the gravitational Doppler effect, and on the heavy mass mG of the body itself. The value of the force results in rho G rho²mG (G²mG) x acceleration of the stars and should be equal to the inertial mass mi x acceleration of the stars (special character).
I 378
According to this mi should be = G²mG. This is correct, since the newly defined mi has all the properties of an inert mass and the known proportionality of heavy and inert mass appears here as a derived theorem. Now a relation to the gravitational constant G can be established.
Def Gravitational Constant: shows the strength of the gravitational interaction of two inert masses.
Mach's Principle/Gravitational Constant/Sciama: if in the above formula the gravitational density G is replaced by the inertia density i, and mG/mi = G, the relationship Gi² = 1 is obtained. It is important because it expresses a high degree of connection of the universe.
Gravitational constant: this quantification also explains the apparent irrelevance of the properties of stars for the inertia of matter: the universe manifests itself in both phenomena precisely where Newton's theory contains arbitrary elements: in the choice of inertial systems and gravitational constants.
Theory/Sciama: should describe everything that occurs and should not allow to be possible what does not actually happen.
I 380
KanitscheiderVsSciama: but cosmological applications can also be derived from any local gravitational theory. E.g. Scalar tensor theory by Jordan.
Dirac: also his hypothesis of large numbers led to a new cosmological model. Almost all combinations of cosmic parameters from variable gravitational constants to different mechanisms of origin and annihilation of matter as well as a temporal variation of particle masses are conceivable!

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Sklar, L. Field Vs Sklar, L. I 201
Absolute Acceleration/Substantialism/S/Larry Sklar: (Sklar, 1974): thinks the problem arises (for relationism), because the S understands absolute acceleration as acceleration relative to an entity, namely an inertial frame or ITAR. Relationism/Sklar: cannot do likewise. But: possible solution/Sklar: R must deny that the predicate "is absolutely accelerated" is a relational expression! The term "A is accelerated" is incomplete. To complete it, we must answer the question: "A is accelerated relative to what?" Important argument: but the term "A is absolutely accelerated" is precisely a complete expression! As E.g. "A is red" and not incomplete like "A is north of".
I 202
Absolute Acceleration/Sklar: is no relation to anything! Not even to the "center of mass of the Universe"! (>Absoluteness). And it is also no relation that an object has to substantivalistic (empty) RZ. Because these ultimate "reference objects" do not exist according to R. FieldVsSklar: does it work? The answer is difficult and ambiguous. 1) You can understand his words in a way that we allow de R the use of the 1-digit predicate "is absolutely accelerated". And accordingly, "is absolutely unaccelerated" (in absolute rest). This is a non-relational predicate in which "x is absolutely unaccelerated" is not defined in terms of a relation between x and something else (neither matter nor empty RZ) Rather it would be a primitive term or defined in terms which are themselves not relational. Then the R would be permitted to use such predicates. FieldVsSklar: unfortunately, that does not change the problem of acceleration, because the problem arises, because there are so few things in the ontology of the relationalist that are absolutely unaccelerated. The primitive predicate of acceleratedness only allows sorting out those few trajectories that are unaccelerated. Problem: You cannot define the other predicates with that, such as E.g. "has twice the acceleration as". If we had a sufficient number of unaccelerated trajectories, we could use them to define numerical acceleration (more precisely, the different invariant acceleration predicates). We could simply mimic the substantivalistic definitions by using unaccelerated trajectories instead of ITAR. 2) Sklar/Field: you can read it differently: that you do not only define one single non-relational predicate of unacceleratedness, but infinitely many, perhaps a "has the acceleration (r1, r2, r3) for each triplet of definable reals R1, R2, R3. Or even a more complex family of predicates, which would have the advantage of being independent from co-ordinates and scales. I 203 Vs: infinite ideology (predicates) makes a theory impossible. 3) Skalar/Field: he could be understood as follows: we could allow the R to introduce a primitive numerical (or "vector valued") acceleration functor. (But neither he is independent from the time scale). This is possible if one accepts the Heavy Duty Platonism (HDP). R/Field: but more attractive when it comes to the rejection of the HDP.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Space Descartes, R. Kanitscheider II 38
Matter/Space/Descartes: new: absolutistic conception of space of a special kind: geometry is not imposed on space from outside by objects, but possesses the geometric structure inwardly - NewtonVsDescartes: not expansion, but inertial mass is the key property of matter - Newton: thesis: space is absolute and independent of matter.
II 39
Einstein: there is no "field-empty" space.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Impetus Buridan, J. Vollmer II 151
Def Impetus / Buridan / Vollmer: (1300 - 1385) thesis, a body is thus set in motion, that gives him a moving force, the impetus which moves the body even after the release in the given direction upwards, downwards, also in a circle. This proceeds from the Aristotelian assumption that any movement meeds a cause. That is wrong: inertia is uniform motion without cause.
The impetus decreases during movement until it is used up and the body comes to rest.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Mach Principle Mach, E Kanitscheider I 376
Mach’s Principle / laws / Kanitscheider: fixed stars instead of "absolute space" - (Berkeley: rotation against absolute space unobservable) - Mach thesis: there can only be relative motion - problem: then the matter has its inertia property just because there is other matter - Russell: the laws of nature can be formulated without taking into account existence of matter - Kanitscheider per - it is not part of their meaning, that matter exists.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996