Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 78 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Artworks Eco I 11
Artwork/Eco: an artwork is at the same time a trace of what it wanted to be and what it actually is.
I 12
"Open work of art"/Eco: an "open work of art" is what A. Riegl called "artful" and Panofsky described it (securing it from idealistic suspicions) as the final and definitive sense.
I 16
The model of the open work of art is independent of the actual existence as "openly" definable works of art. It is about a relationship with the recipient.
I 36
Open work of art/Eco: only after the Romantic period did symbolism appear in the second half of the 19th century as a conscious poetics of the "open" work of art. This leads to an aura of the indefinite.
I 60
Open work of art: every work of art, starting with rock paintings, is open to an infinite number of forms of reception.
I 84
Openness/Eco: the impression of openness and totality does not have its reason in the objective stimulus, which is materially determined in itself. Not even in the subject, which is on its own accord disposed for all and no openness:
I 85
It lies in the cognitive relationship in which possibilities are realized that are stimulated and directed by stimuli organized according to an aesthetic intention. There is also openness even if the artist does not strive for ambiguity but unambiguousness.
I 89
Definition Openness/Eco: openness is an increase in information.

Eco I
U. Eco
Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967
German Edition:
Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Eco II
U, Eco
La struttura assente, Milano 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972

Atomism Wittgenstein Hintikka I 25
Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. ---
Hintikka I 175
Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. ---
I 176
Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. ---
II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. ---
II 157
Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. ---
IV 14
Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ---
ad IV 36ff
Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/Use: internal/external.
---
VII 122
Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. ---
VII 124
Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Atoms Quine IX 7f
Atomic schemas: E.g. "Fxy", "Gx" etc: can represent any number of complex statements.
I 218
Atomic Facts/Quine/Cresswell: "Quine has no interest in a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of all others. Quine: correct. See also >Atomism/Quine.
XIII 12
Atom/Atoms/Quine: Worlds/Possible Worlds/Best World/Leibniz/Quine: according to Leibniz we are blessed with the "best of the worlds". But "the best" according to what criteria? He gives a hint:
Def Perfection/perfect/Leibniz/Quine: wealth of purposes and economy of means. The number of components and forces with which the observed wealth of the world is attainable must be as small as possible.
Science: similar procedure.
Theory/Quine: is always more complicated than you want, but the scientist is committed to his/her stubborn data and does what he/she can.
Leibniz/Quine: was himself a scientist, so he came up with it.
Atomism/Atom/Democritus/Leukipp/Quine: also their atomism was motivated by the pursuit of economy. They limited the possible variability of the building blocks of nature. The atoms differed only in shape and size.
XIII 13
Point event/four-dimensionalism/space-time points/Quine: pro: 1. because it turned out that the basic building blocks (quarks, etc.) are not as uniform as one had hoped from the atoms. 2. because there are problems identifying a particle from one moment to another (identity in time, temporal identity, elementary particles).
Individuality/Particle Physics/Quine: the statistical interchangeability of particles threatens their individuality.
Atom/Atomism/Quine: but which decisive move should make a theory atomistic anyway?
XIII 14
Solution/Quine: Thesis: there are an infinite number of particles, but not an infinite number of types of particles. Identity/elementary particles/species/Quine: particles of the same species play an identical role within the laws of theory. Only this allows the theory to be suitable for measuring information.
Def point event/Quine: are atoms whose types are the different states in which a point can be, according to prevailing physics. The atoms are the minimal space-time localizations and the species are the few things that can happen in such a place.
Point/Linguistics/Atom/Quine: for linguists the point is the phoneme. Not the phonemes themselves, (their sound is individual to each speaker) but their classifiability!
Def Phonem/Quine: is not a single sound, but a type of sound. They are then equivalent for all purposes in the particular language, even if they are not phonetically identical!
Atoms/Speeche/Quine: Atoms fall under phonemes.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Axioms Kripke III 389ff
Axioms/infinite/Kripke: not all Tarski sentences are derivable anymore. Proof/Kripke: Kripke only has a finite number of steps and cites only a finite number of axioms - otherwise rule (rule of evidence): "implicit definition" (Hilbert: "Which axioms are valid?"> rules/Kripke).
III 389
Infinitely many axioms/Kripke: one cannot derive Tarski sentences for any kind of f's, from an infinite number of truth sentences T(f) ↔ f, e.g. assuming we add a biconditional to a simple predicate P(x) and take P(0), P(1), P(2)... as number-theoretic axioms. These new axioms have the power that P(x) is valid for every number - does (x)P(x) still follow the normal rules of deduction? No, evidence cites only a finite number of axioms. Reductio ad absurdum: if (x)P(x) was deducible (derivable), it would have to be derived from a finite number of axioms: P(m1)...P(mn). M: m is the number name in the formal language of the biconditional which denotes the number m. It is clear that it cannot be derived from a finite number of axioms. If we define P(x) as true of m1...mn, each of the finite axioms will be true, but (x)P(x) will be false. Every instance is known but not the generalization. This is also applicable to finite systems.
III 390
Solution: we must allow an infinity rule (e.g.> omega rule)
III 391
KripkeVsWallace: the same problems apply to the >referential quantification.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Basic Concepts Field I 32
Basic concept/Field/(s): it is impossible to say of a basic concept if it is, e.g., semantic or proof theoretical. E.g. implication as a basic concept.
I 33
This is the case with natural deduction (ND, Gentzen) (Implication: cannot be considered proof-theoretical innatural deduction, in terms of the derivation procedure, because it occurs in it itself (circular). - Nevertheless, natural deduction is more proof theoretical than semantic. - It is often quite reasonable to consider implication a basic concept.
I 34
Basic Concept/Field: (E.g. implication as basic concept) may be two things: a) primitive predicate - b) primitive operator.
I 197
Theory/Basic Concept/Predicate/Infinity/Davidson/Field: (Davidson, 1965): no theory can be developed from an infinite number of primitive predicates.
I 198
Solution/Field: we can characterize an infinite number of predicates recursively instead by using a final number of axiom schemes.
II 334
Quinean Platonism/Field: as the basic concept a certain concept of quantity from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. - So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Basic Concepts Schiffer I 10
Basic Concept/Infinite/Schiffer: a theory cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts - E.g. therefore "Kripke refers to Kripke" cannot be a primitive, naked fact.
I 216
Basic Concept/Schiffer: for a basic concept there must be an axiom and a set of conditions - problem: therefore, "believes" cannot be a basic concept, because there are infinitely many conditional clauses or axioms needed. - (> propositional attitudes/Schiffer). - "Thinks" is not a basic concept, yet semantically simple, but does not fulfill certain conditions and denotes nothing.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Behavior Millikan Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in: Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (eds.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005

II 202
Behavior/Millikan: why can behavior not be investigated without referring to biological purpose?
I 203
There can be an infinite number of possible descriptions (Cf. >"Is language infinite?") that can be given for a behavior. The mouse runs towards its hole, but also to the north, towards London, or towards the broom. Here, it is clear that only the former description is relevant.
II 204
That mice run away from cats is the key. Because it is a recurring phenomenon. That they are running towards a broom is not a recurring phenomenon.
II 205
Not any output of an animal is relevant behavior. E.g. "Knee twitching" has no survival value. E.g. But sneezing probably has one.
II 207
For example, if my blinking makes you smile, as a biological purpose, I will not recognize this purpose, I will not blink because I think of that purpose.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Beliefs Schiffer I 273
Definition subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. - Schiffer: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. ---
I 26
Belief/Schiffer: problem: so a psychological theory does not create the meaning believes - solution: > psycho functionalism. - Functionalist reduction. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1 element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). ---
I 28
It is already presupposed that they form beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types - the criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. ---
I 150
Belief property/SchifferVs: if they existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd) - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) - This is the cause - then mental proposition in addition. - This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional - counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. ---
I 155
Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled) - i.e. no function of other things. - Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). - Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. ---
I 163
Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role.- E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming - conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" - (benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). - has no causal power - pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... ---
I 164
Belief: (s) Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. - Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. - Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... - SchifferVsEliminativisms/SchifferVsChurchland: should then have the result that nobody believes anything.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Coincidence Field II 50
Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: All the different attributions, e.g. "X believes Russell was bald", "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. - Then we could drop all two-digit predicates, such as "X believes that p", entirely. Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be irrelevant, a mere orthographic coincidence.
Similarly, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald".
FieldVs: this cannot be taken seriously, but suppose it were serious: then it would follow that there do not have to be any physical relations between people and propositions. - Then, since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) Then there must be an infinite number of primitive predicates with complex structure.)
Solution/Field: to avoid the "orthographic coincidence" "X believes that p0" should be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in the manner in which it is correct for "X is in pain." - Conclusion: then we need physical properties and possible worlds.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Compactness Logic Texts Read III 59
Compactness: the classic logical conclusion is compact. To understand this, we must acknowledge that the set of premises can be infinite. Classically, every logical truth (of which there are infinite numbers) is a conclusion from any statement. This can be multiplied, by double negation, the conjunction of itself with its double negation, and so on.
III 60
The classical compactness does not mean that a conclusion cannot have an infinite number of premises, it can. But classically it is valid exactly when the conclusion follows from a finite subset of the premises.
Compactness limits the expressiveness of a logic.

Proof: is performed purely syntactically. In itself, the proof has no meaning. Its correctness is defined based on its form and structure.
III 61
The counterpart of proof is completeness: there should be a derivation. >Incompleteness/logic texts.
III 61
The Omega rule (>Incompleteness/logic texts) is not accepted as a rule of orthodox, classical proof theory. How can I do this? According to classical representation, a rule is valid if the premises are true and the conclusion is false by no interpretation over any range of definition. How can the premises A(0),A(1) etc. was, but be false for each n,A(n)?
III 61/62
The explanation lies in the limitation of the expressiveness. In non-compact logic, there may be a categorical set of formulas for arithmetic, but the proof methods require compactness.

Difference compact/non compact: classical logic is a 1st order logic. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second order logic. ((s) quantifiers also for properties).
For example, Napoleon had all the properties of a great general: "for every quality f, if for every person x, if x was a great general, then x had f, then Napoleon had f".

In reality it is a little more subtle. For syntactically one cannot distinguish whether a formula is like the 1st or 2nd level above. >2nd order logic.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Comparisons Lewis V 5f
Comparison/possible world/similarity/similarity metrics/difference/Lewis: Two possible worlds never differ in only a fact; if at all, then there is immediately an infinite number of differences - Analysis 1: only one most similar world - LewisVs: E.g. Bizet/Verdi: two equally similar worlds: both French/Italian - the next (closest) world does not exist! - Analysis 2: several similar possible worlds - Solution: van Fraassen: Supervaluation: arbitrarily chosen next world. ---
V 21
Comparison/Counter comparison/counterfactual conditional/triple indexing/Lewis: If my yacht had been longer, I would have been happier. - 2nd World j: my yacht is longer than in i (1st World) - 3) every additional world where both is true is closer than one where the yacht is longer, but I am still not happier. - (Always in relation to the 1st World i).

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Complexes/Complexity Wittgenstein Tugendhat I 163
Complex/Wittgenstein: E.g. not: "red circle consists of redness and circularity".
Tetens VII 75
Complex/Image Theory/Tractatus: the complex characters "aRb" do not say that a stands in relation R to b, but that "a" stands in a relation to "b" (!(s) quotation marks) says that aRb. (Here no quotation marks) (3.1432) - ((s) resolution of the sign into its component parts: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relationship on the level of reality).
Hintikka I 53
Mean period/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: relations and properties to the objects. Philosophical Grammar (Philosophische Grammatik): "This is the root of the bad expression: the fact is a complex of objects. Example "Here it is said that an ill person is compared to the combination of two things."
Hintikka: such a far-reaching change of opinion is so unlikely that one should assume that the Tractatus rejects the equation of "objects" with individuals or individual things.
I 68
Tractatus: renounces all complex logical forms conceived in the sense of independent entities, there is nothing left but the forms of the objects (there are no forms corresponding to complex logical propositions).
I 68
Thing/complex object/Terminology/Wittgenstein: a complex object is just a thing. We know the complex objects from the point of view and know from the point of view that they are complex.
I 138 ff
Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences. Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic substitutes.
I 148 et seqq.
Truth Function/Tractatus/Hintikka: Main thesis of the Tractatus: (a.o.) "The proposition is a truth function of the elementary sentences". Wittgenstein/Hintikka: must therefore prove that truth-functional operations (to form complex sets of atoms) have no influence on the image character.
II 39
Complexity/Wittgenstein: since an infinite number of special cases belong to a general sentence, it does not make it more complex than if only three or four special cases were belonging to it. A sentence with four special cases is probably more complex than one with three, but in an infinite number of special cases it is a generality of a different logical kind.
II 314
Simple/Simplicity/Complex/Composite/Sense/meaningless/Wittgenstein: Suppose you are asked whether a drawn square is composed or simple, i.e. whether it consists of parts or not.
II 315
Example "Is this uniformly white object composed or simple?" The answer is "it depends."
III 139
Elementary Theorem/Wittgenstein/Flor: The term elementary theorem is important as an absolute term. Otherwise we deal with ambiguity. What occurs in one context as a simple theorem could be complex in another context. This would also mean that intentional connections between sentences could no longer be excluded.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.
IV 31
Complex/Tractatus: 3.3442 the sign of the complex does not dissolve arbitrarily even during analysis.
IV 86
Complex/Tractatus: 5.5423 perceiving a complex means perceiving that its components relate to each other in such or such a way. This explains why a drawn cube can be perceived as a cube in two ways.
Puzzle: here we really see two different facts.
W VII 75
Complex/Mapping theory/Image theory/Tractatus: not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in relation R to b, but that "a" is in relation to "b" ((s) quotation marks!), says that aRb. (No quotes here!) (3.1432) - ((s) Resolution of the sign into its components: the relation on the level of signs says something about the relation on the level of reality). >Atomism, >Atomic Sentence.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Tetens I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Connectionism Pinker I 128 ff - 145
Neural Networks/Pinker: Learning/Problem: there are incorrect reinforcements with "XOR" (exclusive or; Sheffer stroke) - Solution: we have to interpose internal >representation.
I 142
Neural nets/Rumelhart: neural nets return all errors. - "Hidden levels": several statements that can be true or wrong can be assembled into a complex logical function, the values ​​then vary continuously. - The system can place the correct emphasis itself if input and output are given - as long as similar inputs lead to similar outputs, no additional training is required. ->Homunculi.
I 144f
Connectionism/Rumelhart: the mind is a large neural network. - Rats have only fewer nets. - PinkerVsConnectionism: networks alone are not sufficient for handling symbols - the networks have to be structured in programs. - Even past tense overstretches a network. Precursors: "association of ideas": Locke/Hume/Berkeley/Hartley/Mill >Association/Hume. - 1) contiguity (context): frequently experienced ideas are associated in the mind - 2) Similarity: similar ideas activate each other. >Similarity/Locke.
I 146
Computer variant: is a statistical calculation with multiple levels.
I 147
VsConnectionism: units with the same representations are indistinguishable. - The individual should not be construed as the smallest subclass.
I 151
Connectionism cannot explain compositionality of representation. >Compositionality.
I 158ff
Recursion/Recursive/Neural Networks/Memory/Pinker: recursion solution for the problem of an infinite number of possible thoughts: Separation of short/long-term memory - the whole sentence is not comprehended at once, but words are processed individually in loops. >Recursion/Pinker.
I 159
Networks themselves have to been as recursive processor: for thoughts to be well-formed.
I 166
Neural Networks/Pinker: the networks do not reach down to the rules - they only interpolate between examples that have been put in. >VsConnectionism.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Counterfactual Dependence Bigelow I 315
Counterfactual dependence/causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: the connection between both is narrow but complicated. It goes back to Lewis 1973b, Cause. Lewis: analysis as causation is a special case of counterfactual dependence.
Logical form: a sequence of propositions.
---
I 317
Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: here relations of consequences of propositions are considered, no forces. It is important that these occur only between separate events. It is wider than the definition of the cause of Lewis, for three reasons: 1. It may also consist between propositions which do not concern events, e.g. concerning the number of rats and cats.
2. Overlapping events can also be included here.
---
I 318
E.g. Composite events often depend on their components in a counterfactual manner. E.g. Jaegwon Kim: if I had not written a double r, I would not have written "Harry". (Kim 1973). 3. There is a difference in whether to tell which of these events are happening or whether one of these events happens.
It may be true that these counterfactual conditionals are true
C1 would happen> would e1 happen
C2 would happen> would e2 happen
And yet the following are not true
C1 would not happen> would e1 not happen
C2 would not happen> e2 would not happen
Causation/Lewis: is then not given, but nevertheless counterfactual dependency. For example, it may be that a person hears a sound in an experiment, although none is produced.
---
I 319
Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B.: one can still say here that the sounds that actually reach the ear are the cause of the sensation (no illusion) although Lewis' condition is actually not fulfilled. This shows that we rather rely on the concept of counterfactual dependence than on concept of the causation, as Lewis has defined it. Counterfactual dependence/physics/science/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. Boyles law: (gas pressure depends on volume and temperature): provides an infinite number of counterfactual dependencies.
Similar: E.g. Perception Psychology, Biology.
---
I 320
As well: for example, in the process of concluding counterfactual dependence between conclusion and premisses. E.g. Act according to beliefs and desires.
E.g. Functionalism.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Definability Tarski Berka I 481
Features/Class/Definability/Tarski: a property E of a class is only definable when there is a propositional function, that determines E - then you can show that there are also other characteristics of classes: E.g. emptiness, containing only one element, two , etc. - ((s) cardinality) - Tarski: problem: Containing an infinite number of elements can not be defined.(1)
1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935

Skirbekk I 188
Def definable/Tarski: an object is definable when there is a propositional function that defines it - the term is purely mathematical, it expresses a property (called a class) of mathematical objects.(2)

2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977
Empty Set Quine IX 218
Empty set/zero class/Quine: Λ is not equal to 0! (For Frege 0, namely {L}).
ad IX 226ff
Empty set/zero class/(s): is unlike the definition gap (e.g. divide continuity through zero). Real gap: is when a well-defined condition is not met, e.g. primes between 31 and 37: 5 natural numbers do not satisfy the condition, 0 natural numbers fulfill the condition. For an infinite number of rational numbers and real numbers the condition is not defined. Universal class/(s) if there is nothing that fulfills the condition it is questionable whether we can talk of a set (because it does not match a term). The other way around: what is should be the condition for the universal class?

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Events Lewis V 56
Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. ---
V 166
Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume). ---
V 196
Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. ---
V 240
Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. ---
243 V
Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. ---
V 245
Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration - It must be possible that one occurs without the other - even if some of the laws of nature are violated - for every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other - ((s) independence) - two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds - 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. ---
V 258
Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking - Definition essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event) - but not necessary: ​​events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. ---
V 259
Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect - they are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping) - the whole is not the cause of its parts. ---
V 260
Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs - a sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings - E.g. war is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. ---
V 261
Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause - Constancy: is not always a non-event! - Constancies are needed in causal explanation.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Existence Statements Tugendhat I 462
Identification / Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects is not sufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - assuming a space-time system - reference to space-time locations can not fail - talk of existence without place is pointless - identification only through simultaneous reference to other (possible) objects - therefore existence theorems are general.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Facts Duhem I XII
Fact/Duhem: The concept of facts has lost its independence because facts are always impregnated in theory. Duhem seeks to control between Skylla of inductivism and the Charybdis of apriorism. The concept of the experimental law serves as a steering wheel.
Symbols cannot be called true or false, at best appropriate. This also applies to theories as purely symbolic representations. Duhem, however, assigns empirical content to empirical laws, which purely theoretical laws cannot claim.
An experimentum crucis (whose failure would disprove the whole theory) is rejected. (> Holism).
---
I 180
By increasing the accuracy of measurement, we have reduced the set of theoretical facts. E.g. Geodetic lines on an infinite surface (I 182). There are those who return in themselves, and those who do not, although they do not move away infinitely (surface: infinitely extended ~ bullhorn)
Nevertheless, theoretically, the initial conditions can be determined accurately without obtaining ambiguities, for example when a sphere is to move on a geodetic line.
---
I 183
However, it is quite different when, instead of the theoretical, practical initial conditions are given. Unlimited set of different initial conditions. ---
I 184
If the initial conditions are not mathematically known, but determined by physical methods, and even if they are exact, the question posed will remain unanswerable. ---
I 199
Facts/Duhem: Concrete, very different facts can be confounded when interpreted by the theory that they are only form a single experiment and are represented by a single symbolic expression. One and the same theoretical fact can correspond to an infinite number of practical facts. But also the same practical fact can correspond to an infinite number of theoretical facts, which are logically incompatible with each other. (> Quine,> Quine-Duhem thesis).

An experimenter might say: E.g. An increase of the pressure by 100 atmospheres increases the electromotive force by 0.085 volts. He could have said with the same authority: by 0.0844 or 0.0846 volts. For the mathematician the statements are contradictory. For the physicist, whose possibility of differentiation is limited because of the measurement accuracy, they have the same meaning.

Difference between mathematics and physics: deviating measurement results are no formal contradiction. > distinction analytic/synthetic/Quine.

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Facts Poincaré Duhem I 196
Definition Raw Fact/Poincaré: "The scientific fact is only the raw fact, translated into a comfortable language. Everything that the scholar creates of a fact is the language in which he expresses it."

Z LL 2a

E.g. I observe a galvanometer and ask a layman: does the current flow? He'll try to determine something on the wire. The assistant will understand the question like this: does the light strip move?
The difference between a raw and a scientific fact is the same as that between two expressions in two different languages.
It is not correct that the words "the current flows" are based on a convention, to translate the fact that the magnet strip is distracted! E.g. it may well be that the assistant says: the current is flowing, but the magnet does not move, the galvanometer seems to have a defect.
---
I 197
He can observe the occurrence of gas bubbles or something else on a voltmeter that is also connected to the circuit. "The current flows" does not mean a certain concrete fact in a technical or conventional language, but a symbolic formula. For the theorist, an infinite number of different kinds can be translated into concrete facts, since all these incoherent facts permit the same theoretical interpretation.


Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998
Fictions Cartwright I 204
fictional features / fiction / science / physics / QM / Cartwright. E.g. infinite number of degrees of freedom - E.g.correlation time = 0 - E.g. interaction with an observer - not used in quantum statistics.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Forms Quine V 107
Form/similarity/Quine: E.g. ovate: is something that is more similar in shape to each of two eggs than these are to one another. It is always between two things. (s) Idealization: applies to two arbitrarily chosen things. It cannot differ independently in one direction from both eggs - pomegranate-colored: in the middle between two concrete colors.
V 165
Form/analytic geometry/Quine: are class of classes of pairs of real numbers. ((s) Two-dimensional).
V 184
Form: a variety can only be recognized as a square if it is marked - against this: Colour: Scarlet red, for example, does not need to be marked. Form/Colour/Quine: Difference: the union of squares is usually not a square, while the union of several scarlet areas is scarlet red.
Form/Colour/Ontology/Quine: classic solution: comes down to a double ontology: matter and space.
Spatial diversity: is an aggregate of points, physical objects, particles. Certain particular at a time.
Squares: are spatial manifolds.
For example, a certain cross-section of a physical object will occupy almost exactly a certain square, and it will occupy an infinite number of squares that almost coincide with it almost exactly.
Spatiotemporal Identity/Quine: is then no longer a problem. A square, a certain aggregate of points retains its identity for all times.
V 186
Manifold/Quine: these were merely individual squares, circles, etc. These were not abstract objects like squares - Forms: would be classes of such, i.e. objects of higher abstraction - Forms/(s) i.e. are classes of classes of points. Letter forms: are classes of inscriptions.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Generality Tugendhat I 203
Individual/General/TugendhatVsTradition: seen linguistically-analytically consciousness of the individual is just as sensual as of the Generality - but consciousness of General has in the similarity a sensual preform - Reference to individual therefore more problematic. ---
I 370
Generality/reference/singular Term/Tugendhat: indeed a reference to all objects (of an area) is presupposed with the singular term - but that is no real relation - the variety is somehow present to the consciousness - singular terms do not have to describe perceptible objects, also not indivdual objects. ---
I 462
Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposed: space-time system - reference to space-time locations cannot fail - talk of existence without location pointless - Identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects - therefore existence sentences in general. ---
I 478
Language/Reference/Tugendhat: direct reference by ostension no language. ---
I 479
Also with the demonstrative "here" the reference to all other is already posited.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Generalization Thiel Thiel I 180
Generality/Generalization/Infinity/Mathematics/Statements/Thiel: Who would have ever doubted that the Pythagorean theorem can be applied to an infinite number of cases?
I 181
Problem: that in the formulation of the theorem irrational numbers are allowed as measures for the cathets of the right-angled triangles, for which we do not know any counting as for the rational numbers. If there were one, we could count the totality of the real numbers by combining them with a count of the rational numbers.
Cantor's merit was to show the impossibility of this by his diagonal method.
I 181
Table with columns and columns cut by diagonals.
I 182
Def Dual Sequence/(s): Sequence of (binary) decisions as to whether a point is on the left or right half of a halved course. This leads to any rational number.
I 184
But it leads to a contradiction. Then
1 bii = bii .
the assumption that the dual sequence constructed as "negative" of its diagonals already occurs in the (arbitrary) list considered leads to an absurdity. After that, however, even the totality of all real numbers in the interval 0.1 cannot be recorded in a list (as Cantor also shows, not in an infinite list), it cannot be counted.
I 185
So also not outside the interval.
I 186
Continuum/Russell: (e.g.) sees an arithmetic term in the continuum, others a geometric one.
I 189
New: Modern Mathematics I 189 (Topology) has defined the concept of the "border" of a set of points corresponding to the Aristotelian "border" in such a way that a point can be its own border. > Limits.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Goals Millikan Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in: Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (eds.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005

II 201
Animal/Purpose/Millikan: the anthropomorphism equips animals with plans or human-like purposes, i.e. with cognitions. To do this, one needs a theory, about what is purpose, cognition and human cognition.
I distinguish between
1. Biological,
2. "intentional" purpose direction: this has to do with recognizing purposes and having plans. Thesis: there can be no investigation of the behavior that is not implicitly based on a speculation about what the biological purpose direction is.
The intentional purpose direcetion is more problematic. It is a form of biological purpose.
II 202
Purpose/biological/Millikan: E.g. Heartbeat, e.g. a frog ejecting its tongue. Biological function is the historical survival value. Behavior/Millikan: why can behavior not be investigated without referring to biological purpose?
II 203
There can be an infinite number of possible descriptions ((s) Cf. >"Is language infinite?") that can be given for a behavior. The mouse runs towards its hole, but also to the north, towards London, or towards the broom. Here, it is clear that only the former description is relevant.
II 204
That mice run away from cats is the key. Because it is a recurring phenomenon. That they are running towards a broom is not a recurring phenomenon.
II 205
Not any output of an animal is relevant behavior. E.g. "knee twitching" has no survival value. E.g but sneezing probably has one.
II 207
For example, if my blinking makes you smile, namely as a biological purpose, I will not recognize this purpose; I will not blink because I think of that purpose.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Idealization Cartwright I 105
Approach/Cartwright: deputy.
I 107
They lead away from the theory - but can lead to the truth.
I 111
Idealization/Science/Cartwright: does not only omit, but introduces something that is not prescribed by the fundamental laws. - Approach: We cannot make corrections at the beginning. - We cannot correct backwards and thus assume to come out at a fundamental law -> crossover effects.
I 119
It may be that what is the correct approach is not decided by the facts. ((s)> Non-factualism). - I.e. two approaches (with different results) can be justified by the same facts - the same approach, if applied in different places, can have different results: E.g. Lamb shift: excited atom or in the base state - not a fact prescribes which is to be assumed.
I 121
Accuracy is only apparent if the initial problem is not given exactly.
I 150
Idealization/Distortion/Science/Physics/Cartwright: Example a) interested in atoms: Then distortion in the description of the field (E.g. infinite number of degrees of freedom) - b) if field is examined: then infinite degrees of freedom stored in the walls of the laser cavity, etc. - realistic: is an approach that uses more bridge principles.
Hacking I 361
Approximation/Cartwright: Problem: approximation should lead away from confusing details - but the number of possible approximations itself is confusing - most approximate equations are themselves already simplifications of equations that you could not solve.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954


Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Identification Tugendhat I 395
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrow sense - Tugendhat: my own notion "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this concept - "picking out" (to pick put) is Strawson's expression - (assumed from Searle) - (Quine: "to specify"). ---
I 400 ~
Identification/Identification/Tugendhat: space-time-location: this is an object - Specification: reference, stand for (another term) (in front of background of all other objects). ---
I 415
Identification/particular/TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time-relation not only anchored perceptively but also system of possible perception stand points - thus a system of demonstrative specification (in front of background). ---
I 417
Trough space-time description the perceptible object is specified as more perceptible - an essentially perceptibable cannot be the previous object who it is - Reference: is then to specify a verification situation. ---
I 422
Distinguishing objects only from variable usage situations of perception predicates. ---
I 426
Particular/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice as object to make space-time locations existent - space-time-locations are the most elementary objects - but there must also be something - at least hypothetically, then the corresponding question of verification provides, for which object the singular term stands - top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - bottom-up: if the verification situation for the applicability of the predicate is described by demonstratives. ---
I 436
Localization/identification/Tugendhat: only by several speakers - not zero point, but set of surrounding objects - subjective zero point may be own position. ---
I 462
Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposing space-time system - reference to space-time-points cannot fail - talk of existence without location pointless - identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects - therefore existence sentences are general.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Impredicativeness Quine XIII 93
Impredicativeness/Quine: Previously it was said that you had specified a class without knowing anything about it if you could name the containment condition. Russell's Antinomy: showed that there had to be exceptions.
Problem: was to specify a class by a containment condition by directly or indirectly referring to a set of classes that contained the class in question.
>Classes/Quine.
Russell's Antinomy: here the problematic containment condition was the non-self elementary. Example x is not an element of x.
Paradox: arises from letting the x of the containment condition, among other things, be just the class defined by this containment condition.
Def impredicative/Poincaré/Russell: is just this condition of containment for a class that exists in the class itself. This must be forbidden to avoid paradoxes.
Circular Error Principle/QuineVsRussell: but that was too harsh a term:
Specification/Class/Sets/Existence/Quine: specifying a class does not mean creating it!
XIII 94
Specification/Circle/Introduce/QuineVsRussell: by specifying something it is not wrong to refer to a domain to which it has always belonged to. For example, statistical statements about a typical inhabitant by statements about the total population that contains this inhabitant. Introduction/Definition/linguistic/Quine: all we need is to equate an unfamiliar expression with an expression that is formed entirely with familiar expressions.
Russell's Antinomy/Quine: is still perfectly fine as long as the class R is defined by its containment condition: "class of all objects x, so that x is not an element of x".
Paradox/Solution/Russell/Quine: a solution is to distort familiar expressions so that they are no longer familiar in order to avoid a paradox. This was Russell's solution. Finally, "x is an element of x" ("contains itself") to be banished from the language.
>Paradoxes/Quine.
Solution/Zermelo/Quine: better: leave the language as it is, but
New: for classes it should apply that not every containment condition defines a class. For example the class "R" remains well defined, but "Pegasus" has no object. I.e. there is no (well-defined) class like R.
Circle/George Homans/Quine: true circularity: For example, a final club is one into which you can only be elected if you have not been elected to other final clubs.
Quine: if this is the definition of an unfamiliar expression, then especially the definition of the last occurrence of "final club".
Circle/Circularity/Quine: N.B.: yet it is understandable!
Impredicativeness/impredicative/Russell/Quine: the real merit was to make it clear that not every containment condition determines a class.
Formal: we need a hierarchical notation. Similar to the hierarchy of truth predicates we needed in the liar paradox.
XIII 95
Variables: contain indexes: x0,y0: about individuals, x1,y2 etc. about classes, but classes of this level must not be defined by variables of this level. For example, for the definition of higher-level classes x2, y2 only variables of the type x0 and x1 may be used. Type Theory/Russell/Quine/N.B.: classes of different levels can be of the same type!
Classes/Sets/Existence/Quine: this fits the metaphor that classes do not exist before they are determined. I.e. they are not among the values of the variables needed to specify them. ((s) And therefore the thing is not circular).
Problem/QuineVsRussell: this is all much stricter than the need to avoid paradoxes and it is so strict that it prevents other useful constructions.
For example, to specify the union of several classes of the same level, e.g. level 1
Problem: if we write "Fx1" to express that x1 is one of the many classes in question, then the
Containment condition: for a set in this union: something is element of it iff it is an element of a class x1, so Fx1.
Problem: this uses a variable of level 1, i.e. the union of classes of a level cannot be counted on to belong to that level.
Continuity hypothesis: for its proof this means difficulties.
Impredicativeness/Continuum/Russell/Quine: consequently he dropped the impredicativeness in the work on the first volume of Principia Mathematica. But it remains interesting in the context of constructivism. It is interesting to distinguish what we can and cannot achieve with this limitation.
XIII 96
Predicative set theory/QuineVsRussell/Quine: is not only free of paradoxes, but also of unspecifiable classes and higher indeterminacy, which is the blessing and curse of impredicative theory. (See "infinite numbers", "classes versus sets"). Predicative set theory/Quine: is constructive set theory today.
Predicative Set Theory/Quine: is strictly speaking exactly as described above, but today it does not matter which conditions of containment one chooses to specify a class.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Indeterminacy Davidson I (b) 35/6
See here: Proposition: This "relativism" contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real".
I (b) 36
Strangely, however, these conclusions have been drawn by some: e.g. John Searle: it would be incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to correctly interpret the same thoughts or utterances of one person.
I (b) 36
Just as numbers can capture all empirically significant relationships between weights or temperatures in an infinite number of different ways, a person's utterance can capture all the significant characteristics of the thoughts of another person in different ways. Jerry Fodor also argues that the holism or the indeterminacy of translation is a threat to realism regarding the propositinal attitudes.

Glüer II 49
DavidsonVsFodor: the same mistake: indeterminacy of the translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. The indeterminacy of the translation also applies when all data are available. (Quine). There is in principle more than one translation manual.
Indeterminacy of Interpretation/Davidson: There are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories.
Davidson: Solution: we must cease to regard an utterance as belonging to a particular language and no other. Rather, we should identify languages with truth theories. The indeterminacy loses its scariness.

Davidson I 57
Relativity/Davidson: is not an indeterminateness at all.
Glüer II 46
Translating Indeterminacy/Quine/Davidson/Glüer: also exists when all data are available - there is in principle more than one translation manual.
Glüer II 47
Indeterminacy of interpretation/Davidson: there are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories.
Glüer II 47
Indeterminacy/Davidson/Glüer: there are 3 types: 1. The logical form: empirically equivalent theories (e.eq.th.) can identify predicates, singular terms etc. differently.
2. The reference: empirically equivalent theories can be assigned to different referents.
3. The truth: the same sentence can have different truth values for empirically equivalent theories.
Glüer II 49
Problem: how can both sentences be appropriate? - Solution: we must not regard an utterance as belonging to only one language. - Instead: identify languages with truth theories.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Indeterminacy Duhem I 174
A theoretical fact has nothing indefinite, nothing fluctuating. The body being studied is geometrically defined. Its edges are real lines, without thickness, its corners are real points without dimensions. Each point of a body corresponds to a temperature, and this temperature is, for each point, a number which is sharply distinguished from every other.
This theoretical fact is opposed to the practical fact which is the translation of it. There is nothing more to see of precision here.

The body is no longer a geometric one, but a concrete block, its edges jagged ridges, its points more or less broad, its temperature a medium one in a certain volume. It is also not that definite number, distinctly distinguished from any other number.
---
I 175
Nor could we explain that the temperature is exactly 10°, but only that it does not exceed a certain fraction of the degree which depends on the accuracy of the instrument. An infinite number of different theoretical facts can serve as a translation of the same practical fact.
---
I 222
A law of the ordinary mind is a simple general judgment that is right or wrong. E.g. the sun rises every day in the east. Here we have a real law, without condition, without restriction. On the other hand, e.g. the moon is always full. Here we have a wrong law.
This does not apply to physical laws; they are always symbolic. A symbol is not correct or wrong, but more or less well chosen. The logician would not understand if one asked whether a certain physical law is right or wrong.
---
I 223
The degree of indeterminacy of the symbol is the error limit of the law in question. > Indeterminacy/Duhem.
For the physicist, the discovery of the law of analogous facts means the discovery of a formula containing the symbolic representation of each of these facts. The indeterminacy of the symbols involves the indeterminacy of the formula.

Each of these laws, in order to be accepted, must not correspond to any fact, not the symbol, but any of the symbols from the infinite number which can represent this fact. This is what is meant when one explains that the laws of physics are only approximated.

E.g. Let us imagine that we cannot be content with the law: "The sun is rising in the east": the sun will be replaced by a huge sphere despite its unevenness.
---
I 224
If we want to find the law of motion of the sun, we can apply not only a single formula, but an infinite number of different formulas, to represent a change in length as a function of time. All these laws are equally acceptable to the physicist. The motives by which he chooses between different possibilities are not the same, which force him to prefer truth over error.

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Infinity Field I 93
Infinity/Existence/Field: thesis: there are an infinite number of physical entities: infinitely many spacetime regions. - physical/(s) is not the same as material).
I 99
Modal knowledge/Field: E.g. via an infinite conjunction. - The knowledge shortens the infinite conjunction.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Infinity Kant Strawson V 174
Infinity/StrawsonVsKant: not Kantean: every cosmological series presents an infinite number of possibilities - but that does not mean that the answer involves an infinite number - but each of the infinitely many answers that mentioned a finite number may be true - that questions the term infinity with respect to sets with empirically distinguishable circumstances - this does not question the paradoxes of the concept of infinity, but empirical objects do not have to have these properties.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Infinity Poundstone I 221
Thomson's lamp/Poundstone: light turns on for 1/2 minutes, then off for 1/4 minutes, then 1/8 on ... Total: 1 - question: is it on or off after 1 min? (Sum of infinite elements) - wrong question - analog: if the greatest number is odd/even.
---
I 228 ultimately physical limits: frequency, energy, switches.
---
I 224
Zenon/Achilles/Poundstone: Solution: overtaking after 111,111 ... cm - the "infinity" lies in Zeno's analysis, not in physics - Arrow paradox: even in the relativity theory the moment remains vague - here we also believe in cause and effect: the present determines the future - how does the arrow know, where it must go? - No physical problem, row term no solution. ---
I 235
Infinity/border/Lukrez: wanted to prove infinity of the space: if someone hurls an arrow towards the border, it will either fly over the border, or something stops it - so no border - PoundstoneVsLukrez: error, to accept a "something". ---
I 236
Olbers Paradox: four times the area balances like four times weaker radiation - it would heat up on earth to the average temperature of stars - solution: shift of red. ---
I 237
Multiplicity/ZenonVs: even the shortest line contains an infinite number of points, then the whole universe in a nutshell - also hierarchy of even smaller particles - containing mostly nothing, so there was nothing in 99.99% ... - solution/Poundstone: Blur effect by electrons - we needed X-ray vision, which would be switched on only when straightforward connection - then myriads of electrons and quarks - because you cannot see an infinitly small point, everything would be invisible.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995

Infinity Quine V 165
Infinity/material/Quine: if you need an infinite number of characters (e.g. for natural numbers) you cannot say, a sign is a physical object, because then you will soon come to an end. Also forms are not used as classes of inscriptions. These are again physical realizations of forms.
IX 64
Infinity/Quine: is only necessary for induction - x = {y}, y = {z}, z = {w} ... ad infinitum - this is the case if {,,,x}.
XIII 96
Infinite Numbers/Quine: For example, suppose we randomly assign items to any class, the only limitation is that no object can belong to more than one class. Problem: then there will not be enough items for all classes! A class for which there is no correlate will be the class of all objects that do not belong to their correlated classes. Because its correlate should belong to it, iff it does not belong to it.
Cantor: proved in 1890 that the classes of items of any kind exceed the number of items.
XIII 97
The reason for this has to do with the paradoxes, if the relation, which is mentioned there, is specified correctly. It turns out that there are infinitely many different infinities.
For example, there are more classes of integers than there are integers.
But since there are infinitely many integers, the infinity of infinitely many classes of integers must be of a higher kind.
For example, there are also more classes of classes of integers than there are classes of integers. This is an even higher infinity. This can be continued infinitely many times.
The argument here depended on the class of non-elements of their own correlated classes (nonmembers of own correlated classes).
Russell's Antinomy/Quine: depended on the class of nonelements of selves.
Cantor's Paradox/Quine: if one takes the correlation as self-correlation, Cantor's paradox amounts to Russell's Paradox. That is how Russell came up with it.
Cantor/Theorem/Quine: his theorem itself is not a paradox.
Russell's Antinomy/Solution/Quine: is prevented by excluding a special case from Cantor's theorem that leads to it. (See Paradoxes)
Cantor Theorem/Corollar/unspecifiable classes/Quine: the existence of unspecifiable classes follows as a corollar from Cantor's theorem. I.e. classes for which we cannot specify the containment condition. There is no other identifying move either.
For example, the infinite totality of grammatically constructible expressions in a language. According to Cantor's theorem, the class of such expressions already exceeds the expressions themselves.
Classes/larger/smaller/criterion/Quine: our criterion for larger and smaller classes here was correlation.
Def greater/classes/quantities/Quine: one class is larger than another if not each of its elements can be paired with an element of the other class.
XIII 98
Problem: according to this criterion, no class can be larger than one of its real subclasses (subsets). For example, the class of positive integers is not larger than the class of even numbers. Because we can always form pairs between their elements. This simply shows that infinite sets behave unusually. Infinite/larger/smaller/class/quantities/Quine: should we change our criterion because of this? We have the choice:
a) We can say that an infinite class need not be larger than its real subclasses, or
b) change the criterion and say that a class is always larger than its real parts, only that they can sometimes be exhausted by correlation with elements of a smaller class.
Pro a): is simpler and standard. This was also Dedekind's definition of infinity.
Infinite/false: a student once wrote that an infinite class would be "one that is a real part of itself". This is not true, but it is a class that is not larger than a (some) real part of itself. For example the positive integers are not more numerous than the even numbers. E.g. also not more numerous than the multiples of 3 (after the same consideration). And they are also not less numerous than the rational numbers!
Solution: any fraction (ratio) can be expressed by x/y, where x and y are positive integers, and this pair can be uniquely represented by a positive integer 2x times 3y.
Conversely, we get the fraction by seeing how often this integer is divisible by 2 or by 3.
Infinite/Quine: before we learned from Cantor that there are different infinities, we would not have been surprised that there are not more fractions than integers.
XIII 99
But now we are surprised! Unspecifiable: since there are more real numbers than there are expressions (names), there are unspecifiable real numbers.
Names/Expressions/Quine: there are no more names (expressions) than there are positive integers.
Solution: simply arrange the names (expressions alphabetically within each length). Then you can number them with positive integers.
Real Numbers/Cantor/Quine: Cantor showed that there are as many real numbers as there are classes of positive integers. We have seen above (see decimals and dimidials above) that the real numbers between 0 and 1 are in correlation with the infinite class of positive integers.
>Numbers/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Infinity Russell Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

11
Most numbers are infinitely large, and to infinity one can add additional numbers as often as one wants, without changing the character of the number.
19
Russell: there is also a largest infinite number: this is the number of objects in total, regardless of species and genus. Cantor proved that there is no largest infinite number, and if he were right, the contradictions would appear again in refined form in the concept of infinity.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Infinity Zeno Thiel I 169
Infinity/Zeno/Thiel: Problem of infinitely small quantities. Could a series of infinitely many points linked to each other be produced? Zeno of Elea (5th century BC). It is precisely because of the possibility of an infinite number of divisions that we cannot build the entire route "from the bottom". There are no first building blocks.
Zeno's paradox: the arrow never arrives, it appears to never be able to leave the bow.
---
I 170
In today's usual computational "resolution" it is preceeded as following: Achilles 5m/s, turtle 5cm/s. Lead over 15 m. The lead of the turtle is increased by 5 cm per sec but simultaneously reduced by 20 m. From 1500 + 5t 500t = 0 is obtained as the time t of the overtaking: t = 1500/495 s, slightly more than 3 seconds.
Modern representations use decimal fraction notation: 3.030303 ....
Vs: the essential is hidden, namely
The sequence 3 + (3 divided by 102, 104, 106, etc.).
This sequence can only represent a finite value. But the riddle is only repeated once again for the layman by the decimal fraction.


T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Infinity Axiom Quine IX 205
Def Infinity Axiom/Quine: an infinite number of elements in types should be possible. One possibility is e.g. : Tarski: that there is a non-empty class x², such that each of its elements is a subclass of another element.
Russell: for each x² e N ³ there is a class y1 with x² elements: short L² ε N³.

(1) Ex² (Ey1(y1ε x²) u ∀y1[y1 ε x² › Ez1(y1 ‹ z1 ε x²)]).

Vs: some thought that the question of whether there were infinitely many individuals was more a question of physics or metaphysics. It is inappropriate to let arithmetic depend on it. Russell and Whitehead regretted the infinity axiom and the axiom of choice, and both made special cases dependent on them, as I do most comprehension assumptions.
Frege's Natural Numbers/Quine: are plagued by the necessity of infinity axioms, even if we allow type theory, liberalization and cumulative types, or finally heterogeneous classes.
Because within each type there is a finite barrier to how large a class can be, unless there are infinitely many individuals.
Zermelo's concept of numbers would be a solution here, but brings problems with complete induction.
IX 206
Real Numbers/Quine: for them and beyond, however, infinity axioms are always necessary. Infinity Axiom/Zermelo:

(5) Ex[Λ ε x u ∀y(y ε x › {y} ε x)].

It postulates a class to which at least all natural numbers in Zermelo's sense belong. It is equivalent to "N ε ϑ" because N is itself an x that satisfies (5), and vice versa, if x satisfies (5), then N < x., and thus "N ε ϑ" according to the exclusion scheme.
Unlike Russell's, this infinity axiom says nothing about the existence of individuals.
But it separates the last connections to type theory. Zermelo's and Neumann's numbers are even antithetic to cumulative type theory, because such a class breaks the boundaries of all types.
Axioms of Infinity/Russell: was caused by the law of subtraction "S'x = S'y > x = y".
In other words, it was used so that the natural numbers would not break off. Similarly for the real numbers. But its meaning goes even further: each subsequent type is the class of all subclasses of its predecessor and thus, according to Cantor's theorem, larger than its predecessor.
To accept infinitely many individuals therefore means to accept higher infinities without end.
For example, the power class in (7) says that {x:x < N} ε ϑ, and this last class is greater than N after the theorem of Cantor. And so it goes further up.
Infinity Axiom/Zermelo: breaks the type limits. Quine pro: this frees us from the burden comparable to the type indices, because even in type theory with universal variables we were forced to Frege's version of the natural numbers, which meant recognition of a different 5 in each type (about classes of individuals) of a different 6 in each type, a different N in each type, etc.
In addition there is, throughout the whole hierarchy, a multiplication of all details of the theory of real numbers. 3/5 is something different in every following type and also π, Q, R.
For all these constants it is practically necessary to keep the type indices.
In Zermelo's system with its axiom of infinity such multiplications do not occur with the task of type boundaries.
Zermelo's protection was that he avoided classes that were too large.
For the reverse assurance that classes cannot exist only if they were larger than all existing classes, very little provision has been made in its segregation scheme.
IX 208
Fraenkel and Skolem first did this in their axiom scheme of substitution.
II 93
Infinity Axiom/QuineVsRussell: the Principia Mathematica must be supplemented by the axiom of infinity when certain mathematical principles are to be derived. Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with an infinite number of elements - New Foundations/Quine: instead comes with the universal class of ϑ or x^ (x = x). >Infinity/Quine, >Classes/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Esfeld I 99ff
Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules. Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know that you should say 125, if you intend to act in accordance with your previous answers? There is nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - the term is independent of certain applications.
I 102
Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: dispositions do not help because they are also limited. Why would the act that you are dispositional be the one that should be done? Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)?
I 105f
Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results can only be obtained in assertibility conditions. No truth conditions: means there are no facts which make statements about meaning come true. Esfeld: solution: social practice is the middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and a direct solution which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world. KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition. Whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct. Current dispositions have always a privileged position. Change is not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Language Black II 13
Languages​/Black: different if speakers do not understand each other.
II 16
Talk/Black: prevalence over writing -
II 20
New: no fully articulated thought possible without symbolic representation - Words/Malinowski: the same part and equivalents of the action.
II 31
Language/Black: Text linear - thinking nonlinear
II 30
Linguistics/Black: Tradition: boasts about not considering the "impure meaning".
II 63
BloomfieldVs: phonemes must be compared with respect to meaning - only if the examiner finds out which statements are similar and which different in their meaning, he can learn to recognize the phonemic differences. - Nevertheless, pro purely formal SW/pro Ockham: meanings should not be used without need. - One should rather rely on differences in meaning than on substantive meaning details
II 74f
Language/Black: an infinite number of sentences possible - therefore open system like E.g. chess, chemical compositions, tunes
II 87
Def Language/Black: too complex to be definable - Features: anchored in speech - speech act is targeted and self-regulating. Language is an institution (language community) - system built on units - meaning supporting, effect triggering, pliable
II 130
Language/Locke/Black: for transmission of thoughts - (ideas)
II 161
VsLanguage/Black: Berkeley: knowledge confused and obscured through abuse - Locke: ditto - Whitehead: incomplete, only a transitional stage Risk: false confidence in them - Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language - Swift: Gulliver: abolition of all words ... II 166 Sartre: disgust: Roquentin wants to withdraw into silence.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Language Kripke Rorty II 130f
Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the concept "language" - then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary ones (VsLocke) but it was this precise thesis that was resurrected by Kripke’s revolution against Wittgenstein (KripkeVsLinguistic Turn). ---
III 335
Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": a language must not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the "first language".
III 338
KripkeVsDavidson: we just have to demand that only a finite number of axioms includes "new" vocabulary (weaker).
III 397
Language/infinite/Kripke: if the domain D is countable, the infinite sequences which can be formed from its objects are non-countable and therefore cannot be mapped on to D one-to-one. They can therefore ((s) in the meta language) not even be coded and therefore not be reduced. ...Even then there may be nothing in the vocabulary of the meta language that is sufficient.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Language Peacocke II 166
Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. - ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) - PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine given propositional adjustments must not be attributed before translation.
II 168
Interpreted language/Peacocke: T-scheme T(s) ↔ p - plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences.
II 171
Variant: is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. - Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. (> Prima facie).
II 168
Language/Community/Peacocke: on the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). - Problem: the attribution of the criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker.
II 175
Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond - problem: if English is the actual language, would also E* be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Lists Wittgenstein II 150f
Class/Logical Sum/Logical Product/List/Properties/Wittgenstein: if a class can be specified by a list, it is a logical product or a sum, e.g. tones of an octave. Then the class is not defined by characteristics, but in the grammar. "Tone of an octave" is not a property of a tone. N.B.: it is not necessary to add: "and these are all" - that would apply even if the world consisted only of particulars. By contrast: if a class is defined by properties.
II 265
Ability/Language Game/Circumstance/Wittgenstein:
II 266
For example, a tribe learns certain songs and poems by heart. Before they are performed in public, they are rehearsed in silence. Does "can" mean that the silent rehearsing is successful? The use of "can" is therefore based on this special fact. Without this circumstance it would not have become established. However, the circumstance itself does not enter into the meaning of "can", unless "meaning" means the description of the entire practice of using this word. However, such a description cannot be given, because no list will be long enough. (> Theory of Use of Meaning/Wittgenstein).
II 416
WittgensteinVsRussell: he was looking to get another "entity" besides the list, so he provided a function that uses identity to define that entity. List/Class/Wittgenstein: usually a function is not replaced by a list (class).
Function/List/infinite/Wittgenstein: a harmful consequence of the attempt to exchange function and list results in connection with infinite lists.
For example, the movement of a pendulum can be calculated depending on whether it is attracted by a finite or infinite number of bodies.
II 417
Determining the number of bodies by law is something completely different from counting them.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Logic Genz II 183
Logic/mathematics/Genz: the statements of logic are also based on physics. Every piece of evidence is a physical process. Therefore, it is physics that says what can and cannot be proven. Unity of Sciences/Genz: we achieve the unity of science more easily if mathematics and logic thus also become empirical sciences.
II 209
Logic/Genz: logic is among other things also a consequence of the laws of nature. It is limited by physics.
II 217
Logic/Physics/Genz: For example, "the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words": leads to a relationship between logic and physics. This sentence consists of thirteen words. I. e. there is the number, but it cannot be calculated.
There must be numbers that need more than thirteen words because otherwise it would be possible to express infinite numbers by finite many characters in finite many places.
Incalculability/non-calculability/non-calculable/calculability/Genz: if there are any numbers that can be defined by 13 words, then even a smallest number. However, this can only be defined by exactly 13 words. Therefore, it is unpredictable.
Incalculability/non-calculability/non-calculable/calculability/Chaitin/Genz: if a physical theory provided the statement that a pole is an incalculable number of centimetres long, (i. e. that a natural law would produce this) we would have to change our concept of calculability. This would make an incalculable number measurable.
Incalculability/non-calculability/non-calculable/calculability/Genz: for proof that a number cannot be calculated, its definition by an impracticable rule is not sufficient. For example "the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words": e.g. we define a number called NOPE.
II 218
Definition NOPE/Genz: the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words minus the smallest number that can only be determined by more than thirteen words N.B.: the rule is impracticable, but we still know that NOPE = 0!
II 301
Logic/quantum mechanics/Genz: in order to achieve logical consistency for quantum mechanics, assumptions about nature, which we tend to take for granted, had to be banned from their system.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Maximum Leibniz Holz I 86
World/totality/Leibniz: the construction of the totality corresponds to the calculus. Maximum: is the infinite set of different substanceialities. (World)
Minimum: is the representation of the whole in the individual. (Representation).
---
I 87
LeibnizVsLocke: the connection of the infinite set of predicates and the idea of infinity as unity: that is the exact opposite of the mere addition of manifold. This excludes the idea of infinity from the range of quantity!
There is no "infinite number". Also no infinite line.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Metaphors Goodman III 73
Metaphor/Goodman: "high note" is not a frozen metaphor. The ownership of properties is something factual. No abridged comparison: everything is somehow similar to everything - one side of the comparison is unmetaphorical.
III 81
Max Black: in some cases, it is more illuminating to say that the metaphor produces the resemblance, than to say that it expresses a previously existing similarity.
III 82
The question why predicates apply metaphorically in a certain way and not in a different way, is almost equivalent to the question of why they are literally true. Actually this is not a real question. Why things are as they are, can be left to the cosmologists.
III 82
The truth standards are pretty much the same, whether the scheme is transmitted or not. ---
IV 145
Metaphorical use: "Wilbur is a workhorse" prohibits the derivation: quadruped.
IV 146
It cannot be maintained that the metaphorical meaning is together with the literal meaning in the lexicon. Because there is a potentially infinite number of applications of an expression.
A metaphor is not a "deviating" use. This view is understandable, even if it is wrong.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Mind Body Problem Danto I 252/3
Def epiphenomenalism: (Def epiphenomenon: side effect). Thesis: No effect comes from the mind. The mind is unable to cause any event. Causality only leads from the physical to the physical event or from the physical to the mental but never from the mental to the mental or from the mental to the physical event.
I 253
Def Parallelism: on the contrary, the view that there are parallel series of events that occur in the two independent substances that cannot interact. For example, pain is not an effect of the hot stove, only a coincidence. It is produced through the mediation of God. This presupposes the constant action of God. (Seventeenth century).
I 253
Def Occasionalism: Version of parallelism: two clocks displaying the same time, but without a causal link.
I 253
Def Monades/Leibniz: The world consists of an infinite number of causally separated substances, the monads.
I 254
Spinoza: there can only be one substance of which mind and body (thinking and expansion) are modes. And in such a way that the order and connection of ideas is quite the same as the order and connection of things.
Each of these teachings is completely superfluous if you give up the substance itself. >Substance.

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Modal Realism Bigelow I 165
Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should accept a correspondence theory for modal language. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Possible worlds exist. But we have not yet said anything about what they are made of and what they are. Different kinds of realisms will assume different kinds of possible worlds.
Truthmaker/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have not said anything yet about how modal sentences are made true.
Realism/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: all realisms will say that it is possible that there is a world that represents the actual world as being represented as being in a certain way. ((s) >Stalnaker). Of course, all but one of them represent it wrong.
Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore representations of the actual world. "Representation" is only a technical term,...
---
I 166
... and not exploratory. Possible worlds: represent not only the actual world, but also other possible worlds!
Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: in this way of speaking, we can then differentiate between what they see as possible worlds.
Modal Realism/Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: three varieties:
1. book theories = maximally consistent sets of truthmakers - "books".
2. replica theories = thesis: worlds are not carriers of truth but replicas ((s) i.e. objects).
Substitutes: David Lewis.
3. property theories: = thesis: worlds cannot be understood as books, they are a multitude of books. This means that there is a multitude of truths ((s) within a possible world.
There are three sets of truthmakers here:
(a) set of sentences
(b) set of propositions
(c) sets of beliefs.
---
I 173
Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must be able to explain possible worlds without using any modal basic concepts. And that is harder than it looks at first glance. There is a thesis that this is not possible at all: modalism.
Definition Modalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the thesis that it is not possible to define modal terms in a non-modal way.
Representatives: Lycan 1979, Plantinga 1974,1976,1987, van Inwagen (1984: some modalities do not need to be defined in more fundamental terms.)
BigelowVsModalism.
Modalism: according to Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy (avant la lettre) one could express it with the slogan thesis "No must from the is". That is to say, moral desires cannot be deduced logically and entirely from outer-moral facts. Bigelow/Pargetter: from this we can gain two attitudes:
a) there are no moral truths, (moral nihilism) or
b) some moral truths we must take as undefined basic facts.
Modal logic/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problems with the moral "must" are reflected in the metaphysical "must".
Correspondence theory: is the theory which brings the problems, because without it modal basic concepts would be no problem. But since we want to keep the correspondence theory, we need better access to possible worlds.
---
I 174
Possible solution: cannot we just say that some things cannot be described without modal terms? Analogue: For example, name: a fantasy name like "Gough" could refer to something non-linguistic that is not a carrier of truth. In any case, we have to assume an individual. We are assuming correspondence with this. If we tried a description instead, it would reintroduce a name again. Therefore, we would have to accept some names as undefined basic terms. But that would not yet be a threat to the correspondence theory.
(Question/s): many basic terms would make a correspondence relationship superfluous, because something undefined does not have to be shown?)
Modal Basic Term/Correspondence/Bigelow/Pargetter: analogously, we can assume that modal basic terms are not a threat to correspondence: e.g.
Conchita can play guitar
is true by correspondence between this statement and things in the world.
The property of being able to play the guitar is assumed. (Bigelow/Pargetter pro).
Modal terms/Bigelow/Pargetter: their threat comes not only from the correspondence theory, but also from their supervenience of non-modal properties.
---
I 175
(>Human Supervenience/Lewis). Supervenience/Definability/Definition/Bigelow/Pargetter: a supervenience would guarantee the definition of modal properties in non-modal terms!
Problem: to do so, we would have to allow an infinite number of complex definitions. This would at least allow a characterization of modal terms.
Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the following we will consider attempts to characterize possible worlds in non-modal terms.
Characterization/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): less than a definition, from many individual cases.
Method/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: whenever a theory leads to modal basic concepts, we will put this theory aside. This is because it cannot then play an explanatory role within the Humean Supervenience. Not because the corresponding possible worlds did not exist.
---
I 187
Modal Realism/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his extremely concrete modal realism has the advantage that it would explain many things if it were true. And most people agree on that. Then why has the unbelieving gaze not disappeared? His theory has nothing irrational either. VsLewis: to disprove him, you would have to adopt one of two strategies:
1. the initial probability is 0 (instead of something above)
2. even if the probability increases in the course of time, the increase would be infinitesimal.
Ad 1.: the probability cannot increase from zero. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a probability of 0. Especially not Lewis' theory.
LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma:
(1) the opponents might realize that a greater intelligence has thought longer about it than they did and therefore the probability is > 0 and that he means what he says.
(2) they could assume that he does not mean what he says
(3) they could say that sometimes it is rational,...
---
I 188
... to assign a chance of zero to something, which a serious and intelligent authority has said. Rationality/Bigelow/Pargetter: from Lewis' Trilemma there would only be (3) left, and thus the question of rationality. Rationality should not lead us to the acceptance of (3). But it also remains, however, even if Lewis's position is only considered to be very unlikely.
Problem: to deny someone rationality in an area to which, in principle, one has no better epistemic access than the critizised.
Ad 2. (the probability remains infinitesimal): i.e. it does not matter how much evidence we teach.
BayesVs: this could only happen after the Bayes-theorem,...
I 189
...if the required probability for each future document should be practically 1. And that is unacceptable.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Motion Russell Kursbuch 8; p. 15
Motion/change/Russell: old/Zenon: "state of change" - today/VsZenon: at one time in one place, at another time in another place - wrong, to say that it is in the next moment located in the "adjacent place" - wrong: jump within a moment (Zenon has correctly identified this)
Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

15
Time: The banishment of the infinitely small quantity has peculiar consequences: e.g. there is no longer something like a next moment. (> Time/Russell). If there are to be no infinitely small quantities, no two moments follow one another directly, but there are always more moments inbetween. Consequently, there must be an infinite number of additional moments between two arbitrary moments. If the number were finite, then one would be closer to the first of the two moments and it would be the next! This is precisely where the philosophy of the infinite begins.
Space: the same applies to the space. However small a space is, it can be further subdivided. In this way we never reach the infinitely small quantity. No finite number of divisions leads to a point.
Nevertheless, there are points, but they are not achieved by successive divisions. Points are not infinitely small distances.
Motion, change: strange results: earlier, it was thought that when something changes, it must be in a state of change when it moves, in a state of motion.
This is wrong from today's point of view: If a body moves, one can only say that it is at one time at the place and at another time at a different place.
We must not say that it will be at the next place in the next moment because there is no next moment.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Necessity Peacocke II 313
Necessity/necessary/modification of predicates/Wiggins/Peacocke: Problem: 'big' cannot modify like 'nec' predicates of any fine degree - that means, we get a finite axiomatized theory for 'big' but not for 'nec'. - There can only be an infinite number of modifications here. Problem: 'nec' can be iterated in the object language, but Grandy's representational content cannot treat the iterations because the performance is not defined. - Solution: 1. syntactical variabel 't>' is about series of terms of the form (t1 ... tn)
2. separate recursion for abstracts of the object language in the theory, that specifies inductively the conditions under which a sequence has the property correlated with the abstract('Corr').
II 316
Then the truth conditions turn the predications into sequences - so the theory is not entirely homophonic.
II 324
Necessity/performance/language/Peacocke: the fulfillment and evaluation axioms not only express contingent truths about the language - necessarily in German each sequence fulfils x1 'is greater than Hesperus' in L, if their first element is greater than Hesperus.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Number Theory Quine IX 81
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: this is the theory that can only be expressed with the terms "zero, successor, sum, power, product, identity" and with the help of connections from propositional logic and quantification using natural numbers. One can omit the first four of these points or the first two and the fifth.
But the more detailed list is convenient, because the classical axiom system fits directly to it.
Quine: our quantifiable variables allow other objects than numbers.
However, we will now tacitly introduce a limitation to "x ε N".
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: less than/equal to: superfluous here. "Ez(x + z = y)" - x ε N > Λ + x = x. - x,y ε N >{x} + y = {x+y}.
IX 239
Relative Strength/Proof Theory/Theory/Provability/Quine: Goedel, incompleteness theorem (1931). Since number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems IX 239
(in reality, all the Goedel numbers of theorems) of an existing set theory can be defined in that same set theory, and different things can be proved about it in it.
>Set Theory/Quine.
Incompleteness Theorem: as a consequence, however, Goedel showed that set theory (if it is free of contradiction) cannot prove one thing through the class of its own theorems, namely that it is consistent, i.e., for example, that "0 = 1" does not lie within it.
If the consistency of one set theory can be proved in another, then the latter is the stronger (unless both are contradictory). Zermelo's system is stronger than type theory.
II 178
Elementary number theory is the modest part of mathematics that deals with the addition and multiplication of integers. It does not matter if some true statements will remain unprovable. This is the core of Goedel's theorem. He has shown how one can form a sentence with any given proof procedure purely in the poor notation of elementary number theory, which can be proved then and only then if it is wrong. But wait! The sentence cannot be proved and still be wrong. So it is true, but not provable.
Quine: we used to believe that mathematical truth consists in provability. Now we see that this view is untenable to mathematics as a whole.
II 179
Goedel's incompleteness theorem (the techniques applied there) has proved useful in other fields: Recursive number theory, or recursion theory for short. Or hierarchy theory. >Goedel/Quine.
III 311
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: does not even have a complete proof procedure. Proof: reductio ad absurdum: suppose we had it with which to prove every true sentence in the spelling of the elementary number theory,
III 312
then there would also be a complete refutation procedure: to refute a sentence one would prove its negation. But then we could combine the proof and refutation procedure of page III 247 to a decision procedure.
V 165
Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Numbers/Quine: Dilemma: the substitutional quantification does not help elementary number theory to any ontological thrift, for either the numbers run out or there are infinitely many number signs. If the explanatory speech of an infinite number sign itself is to be understood again in the sense of insertion, we face a problem at least as serious as that of numbers - if it is to be understood in the sense of referential quantification, then one could also be satisfied from the outset uncritically with object quantification via numbers. >Quantification/Quine.
V 166
Truth conditions: if one now assumes substitutional quantification, one can actually explain the truth conditions for them by numbers by speaking only of number signs and their insertion. Problem: if numerals are to serve their purpose, they must be as abstract as numbers.
Expressions, of which there should be an infinite number, could be identified by their Goedel numbers. No other approach leads to a noticeable reduction in abstraction.
Substitutional quantification: forces to renounce the law that every number has a successor. A number would be the last, but the substitutional quantification theorist would not know which one. It would depend on actual inscriptions in the present and future. (Quine/Goodman 1947).
This would be similar to Esenin Volpin's theory of producible numbers: one would have an unknown finite bound.
V 191
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be used are abstract entities as are the numbers themselves.
V 192
NominalismVsVs: one could reduce the ontology of real numbers or set theory to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for substitutional quantification on the basis of Goedel numbers. >Goedel Numbers/Quine.
QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. It is not about the high estimation of the concrete and disgust for the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the rejection of most transcendent numbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are human work".
QuineVs: but even that is not possible, we saw above that the subsitutional quantification over classes is basically not compatible with the object quantification over objects.
V 193
VsVs: one could also understand the quantification of objects in this way. QuineVs: that wasn't possible because there aren't enough names. You could teach space-time coordination, but that doesn't explain language learning.
X 79
Validity/Sentence/Quantity/Schema/Quine: if quantities and sentences fall apart in this way, there should be a difference between these two definitions of validity about schema (with sentences) and models (with sentences). But it follows from the Löwenheim theorem that the two definitions of validity (using sentences or sets) do not fall apart as long as the object language is not too weak in expression. Condition: the object language must be able to express (contain) the elementary number theory.
Object Language: In such a language, a scheme that remains true in all insertions of propositions is also fulfilled by all models and vice versa.
>Object Language/Quine
The requirement of elementary number theory is rather weak.
Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: speaks about positive integers by means of addition, multiplication, identity, truth functions and quantification.
Standard Grammar/Quine: the standard grammar would express the functors of addition, multiplication, like identity, by suitable predicates.
X 83
Elementary Number Theory/Quine: is similar to the theory of finite n-tuples and effectively equivalent to a certain part of set theory, but only to the theory of finite sets.
XI 94
Translation Indeterminacy/Quine/Harman/Lauener: ("Words and Objections"): e.g. translation of number theory into the language of set theory by Zermelo or von Neumann: both versions translate true or false sentences of number theory into true or false sentences of set theory. Only the truth values of sentences like e.g. "The number two has exactly one element",
which had no sense before translation, differ from each other in both systems. (XI 179: it is true in von Neumann's and false in Zermelo's system, in number theory it is meaningless).
XI 94
Since they both serve all purposes of number theory in the same way, it is not possible to mark one of them as a correct translation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Numbers Bigelow I 352
Real Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Real numbers are universals of higher level. ---
I 353
They are relations between relations (or between properties). They are precisely the relations of higher levels or proportions with which we had compared quantities (see above 2.5).
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be identified with real numbers.
Real numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then themselves physical! Like other proportions and relations. They are instantiated by physical quantities such as length.
Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities such as length, mass, speed are in turn instantiated by individuals such as photons, electrons, macroscopic objects.
Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: being instantiated makes a causal difference. They are then abstract as universals, but not abstract in the sense that they would be causally inactive.
Abstraction/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only a process of drawing attention to one or the other universal that are instantiated around us. But this does not create a new thing.
---
I 354
Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is a strong tendency to assume that they are objects that instantiate relations and properties, but are not themselves properties or relations. They seem to be "abstract objects". Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: they can be that without ceasing to be universals.
Numbers/Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theory we are discussing here is about relations of relations. This probably also applies to relations between properties. For example: length comparisons etc.
Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we want to avoid them, we can also compare the endpoints instead of the lengths of two objects.
Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can generally come from properties to relations by saying that there is a relation between objects by virtue of a shared property (e.g. length). For example "smaller than" etc. that is a derived relation.
Derived relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: will then exist between the properties that generate these relations.
Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory is now based on relations between relations. For example, parent relation and grandparent relation. (Lit. Quine 1941,1961).
---
I 355
Parents/Grandparents/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relations are different, but closely related, if two things are connected by the grandparent relation, the same two things will be connected by a chain involving two instances of the parent relation. If a is grandparent of b, there is a c so that a is a parent of c and c is a parent of b.
Notation (see above 2.6): Rn: n-fold relation: e.g.
(s) Grandparents-R = (parents-R)².
X Rn y
Means that we get from x to y through n applications of the relation R
x R x1
x1 R x2
xn-1 R y.
Grandparents/formal/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: if x is grandparent of y then x is parent² of y. Ancestor/Ancestor Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is just a generalization of it.
Descent/predecessors/predecessor relation/ancestor/nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the predecessor relation or ancestor relation was one of the biggest problems for nominalism.
Problem: you have to have a realistic attitude towards relations, there must be relations here.
Frege/Whitehead/Bigelow/Pargetter: get much more out of the parent relation than one could have predicted.
---
I 356
Definition grandparents/Frege/Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: x GE y iff x E² y Definition great-grandparents: x UGE y iff x E³ y
etc.
N.B.: because grandparent relation and great-grandparent relation are connected in different ways with the same basic relation (parents), there is now automatically a relation between these:
If x UGE² y then x GE³ y.
general: given are two relations R and S, we can have a relation between them, by virtue of the
x Rn y iff x Sm y.
Ratio/Proportion/logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: these relations of relations are called ratios or proportions. For example, in the above case, R to S is m:n.
Negative ratios/Bigelow/Pargetter: we obtain by changing the variables x and y:
x Rn y iff y Sm x.
For example, grandchild-relation: has the ratio -2:1 ((s) inverse relation of the grandparents-relation)
x grandchild y iff y E² x.
Recursive rule/relationship/ratio/Bigelow/Pargetter: if R and S have a proportion (ratio) with respect to another relation Q:
If there's a relationship between R and Q,...
---
I 357
...and one between S and Q, then there is a derived relation between R and S. Wiener: (1912) varies the approach of Whitehead: when
The ratio of R to Q is n:1
If the ratio of S to Q is m:1
Then we conclude
the ratio of R to S is n:m.
N.B.: this allows us to set up the ratio n:m between R and S, even if it is not possible to iterate R or S.
For example, your relation to Eva and your mother's relation to Eva. The ratio of these two relations will then be n:(n+1)
N.B.: We cannot simply get such relationships through iteration! For example, because no one stands in relation to them as you stand to Eve (you do not have so many successors).
Solution/Wiener/Bigelow/Pargetter: no iteration of the relation to Eva, but iteration of the basic unit: here the parent relation.
Rational numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: in order to receive them in their full complexity, we must assume that the given relation has the correct patterns of instances. Problem: the parent relation may not have enough instances to generate an infinite number of rational numbers ((s) Parent relation: is linear).
Ratio/ratios/proportions/rational numbers/solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: set theory.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Ontology Davidson Glüer II 94ff
Quine: Ontology is only about physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object VsEvent ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier-theory": no events, not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus.
Jaegwon Kim: Identifying events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of characteristics.
Glüer II 121ff
Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Distinguishing between event token and description. Quine: "No entity without identity"
The radical interpretation does not necessarily lead to uniform ontologies for all speakers.
Ontological categories: for Davidson: persons, material objects, events.
Ontology/Davidson: as a superordinate principle, is necessary whenever we recognize a grammatical category to which we must assign an infinite number of expressions - so we need events and objects: objects allow us to get adjectives under control - events: the same for some adverbs.
Glüer II 134
Ontology/Davidson/Glüer: Thesis: People, material objects, events. Question: could these ontological categories vary? - No, probably not in a way that different sorting makes sense.
Glüer II 137
Ontology/mental/physical/Davidson: is description-independent. - Intentionalist as well as physical discourse are based on the same event ontology.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Ordinal Numbers Russell Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

18
Ordinal numbers: result from counting. Objects can only be counted when some come first, and others come afterwards.
Cardinal numbers: they are the basic numbers of the infinite numbers (not the ordinal numbers). They are not obtained by sorting and counting, but by a different method, which, if necessary, shows whether a quantity is bigger.
This method does not say in the same way as counting how many elements a set has! Each element is linked to a number in pairs. Thus, infinite sets are defined numerically.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Paradoxes Logic Texts Read III 187f
Paradoxes: Hierarchy (Tarski)-problem: Kreter does not know which level his own statement assumes - it is only meaningful if truth attribution takes place at a lower level - it requires knowledge! (> knowledge / >understanding). Self-reference: is not always bad or faulty.
III 192f
Curry paradox: If A and if A. then B, then B - If this conditional sentence is true, then snow is black - ponendo ponens - solution: contraction: two applications are replaced by one - change of logic. Example: If this (conditional) theorem is true, then snow is black.
Consequentia mirabilis: If A, then ~ A, thus ~ A - contraction: If A, then if A, then 0 = 1; So if A, then 0 = 1 - contraction leads to triviality: it makes every statement from the curry paradox true.
III 196
Semantically completed: language contains its own truth predicates - avoidance of paradox: is done by separation of the truth conditions from fallacy conditions. ---
Sainsbury V 17
Zenon/Sainsbury: Zenon's thesis: no area of space is infinitely divisible, so that it has an infinite number of parts, if each part has a certain extent, for then the sum is infinitly large - Zenon tried to show with this, that not really many things exist - overall, no object can have parts, for then it must be infinitely large.
V 19
Sainsbury: infinite division goes only mentally. - Problem: then no composition to space - in the composition, however, the space does not have to grow indefinitely. - e.g. sequences with limit.
V 38f
Arrow/Paradox/Zenon: at any time, the flying arrow takes a space that is identical to it. The arrow cannot move in a moment because movement requires a period of time and a moment is seen as a point - this also applies to everything else: nothing moves. Time/AristotelesVsZenon: Time does not consist of points - SainsburyVsAristoteles: today: we are constantly trying to allow points of time: E.g. acceleration at a point, etc.
V 39
The question of whether the arrow is moving or resting in a moment is also related to other moments - Defininition rest/Sainsbury: an object rests under the condition that it is also at the same point in all nearby moments - no information about the individual moment can determine whether the arrow is moving - the premise is acceptable: no movement at the moment - but the conclusion is unacceptable.
V 184
Sentence/Statement: is only circular at a certain occasion - paradox is therefore not in the meaning, but in the occasion.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993
Parts Zeno Sainsbury V 17
Parts/space/Zenon: Thesis: No region of space is infinitely divisible, so that it has an infinite number of parts, if each part has a certain extension: for then the sum is infinitely large. Sainsbury: Zenon tried to show that there are not really "many things". No object can have parts at all, because then it must be infinitely large.


Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993
Qualities Wittgenstein Hintikka I 113
Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence. Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson).
I 202
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience.
I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only.
These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience.
II 138
Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots: 1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
III 141
Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object! The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Recognition Leibniz Holz I 39/40
Recognition/Definition/Leibniz: the return of the object of knowledge to definitions is an essential and indispensable last moment of recognition. ---
I 40
Recognition/Leibniz: it is not sufficient, however, to merely deduce the unprovability of the identity principle from the nature of the argument. This would suffice, however, to nominally state the reason for any deduction method, whereby the deduction would have to be carried out methodically as a reduction to identical sentences.
But a material knowledge of truth would only be guaranteed if the principle itself were to be regarded as not only nominal, but also material-ontological.
---
I 41
Otherwise it is only a heuristic principle. However, it is immediately intelligble if it is accepted that it is necessary that the opposite of which is impossible. Recognition/Leibniz: the principle of principles is a good use of ideas and experiences.
Good usage is nothing but the combination of the definitions by identical axioms.
The principle is, however, arbitrary and conventional. Perhaps a differently structured logic would be conceivable.
---
I 43
Recognition/Thinking/LeibnizVesDescartes: he needs a true God (who is not a deceiver), so that self-assurance does not remain trapped in the empty "pure thought of itself". Leibniz: instead: justification by factual truths, i.e. it is about the ontological status of the world.
---
Holz I 82
Empiricism/Leibniz/Holz: here, the reduction forbids us to speak of the necessity of the factual, while facing an infinite number of empirical, identical propositions. Even the unity of the world is only a heuristic assumption or an idea of reason.
(> Continuous determination, Kant).
Consistent determination/Kant/Holz: "Everything existing is consistently determined": i.e. in order to recognize a thing completely, one has to recognize everything possible, and thereby determine it, whether it is affirmative or negative.
The consistent determination is therefore a concept which we can never represent in concreto of its totality. It is merely an idea of reason, which prescribes to the mind the rule of its complete use.
Kant's subject-centric solution reduces the world to phenomenality.
---
I 83
Being in itself is inaccessible.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Recursion Pinker I 158 ~
Recursion/Recursive/Neural Networks/memory/Pinker: Not the whole sentence is taken up at once, but words are processed individually in loops - Separation of short/long term memory.
---
I 159
Networks themselves as recursive processor: recursion is a solution for the problem of an infinite number of possible thoughts so that thoughts are well-formed.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Reference Quine Rorty I 219f
Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology. Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning.
RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer.
---
Quine I 273
Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference.
I 166
Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man.
I 273
Theories and things: Prerequisite of an object is not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair.
Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f.
---
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the space time portion, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation.
Putnam II 194
Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations. ---
Quine I 129
Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences. ---
VII (g) 130f
Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes. ---
Lauener XI 175
Reference/Extension/Singular term/General Term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982
Reliability Theory Brandom I 308f
Regularity theories/Regth/Brandom: Assessment of truth based on the correct or incorrect use of concepts - Reliability theories: already presumes the concept of correct asserting and application - Authorisation: derived from accuracy of assertion - VsReliability theory: gerrymandering: there is an infinite number of patterns for explaining a regularity - there must be privileged regularities (uniformities, UF). ---
I 312/313
Reliability/Goldman/Brandom: objective property - it is based on the probabilities, not on the perception. ---
I 324
Reliability theory: E.g. Monique has learned to recognize white beech by its leaves, but is unsure herself - in that case, she has knowledge even though she denies it - the knowledge status is external - SellarsVs, Brandom pro - Reliability theory: Monique has knowledge - Sellars: it is always located in the space of reasons (instead of non-inferential, direct perception) - so it is always about justification. ---
II 59
Reliability theories/Definition "basic insight"/Brandom: reliably formed true beliefs may qualify as knowledge, even though the one who knows cannot justify them - Goldman/Brandom: Attributions of reliability must be qualified to reference classes - Definition "conceptual blind spot": over-generalization of the basic insight of reliability theory to semantics - it is wrongly assumed that one could understand the content of knowledge claims, just because there may be knowledge in cases, in which the one who knows himself does not have an inferential justification - in order to avoid that, he must be shown that inferential significance plays a role for the distinction of representations - Definition "Naturalistic Blind Spot": wants to see the basis of a fully naturalized epistemology that requires no standards or reasons in the reliabtility approach. In order to avoid this it is necessary to recur to interpersonal inference. ---
II 127ff
Reliability theoryVsGettier/Brandom: not whether justified true beliefs are necessary together, but whether they are necessary individually - "basic insight": there are at least some cases of knowledge without justification. ---
II 128f
E.g. chicken sexers (odour) - E.g. country sayings. ---
II 130
Reliability theory/Brandom: externalist, because facts decide whether we know something. ---
II 140
Cases of knowledge without knowledge about are only possible as a local, not as a global phenomenon - otherwise notion of reliability would not be possible - and, a fortiori, not of knowledge. ---
II 144
Reliability itself cannot assume the explanation role ((s) circles).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Satisfiability Tarski Berka I 482
Satisfiability/Tarski: depends only on those terms of the sequence from which (with respect to their indices) correspond to the free variables of propositional functions - in the case of a statement (without free variables) the satisfiability does not depend on the properties of the links - each infinite sequence of class satisfies a given true statement - (because it does not contain free variables) - false statement: satisfied by no sequence - variant: satisfiability by finite sequences: according to this view, only the empty sequence satisfies a true statement (because this one has no variables).
Berka I 483
Satisfiability/sequences/statements/Tarski: (here: by finite sequences): E.g. the statement (not propositional function) L1U2l1,2. i.e. "PxlNPxllNIxlxll" according to Definition 22 (satisfiability) satisfies the propositioinal function L1,2 those and only those sequences f of classes for which f1 Berka I 505
Being satisfied/satisfiability/Tarski: previously ambiguous because of relations of different linking numbers or between object and classes, or areas of different semantic categories - therefore actually an infinite number of different satisfiability-concepts - Problem: then no uniform method for construction of the concept of the true statement - solution: recourse to the class calculus: Satisfiability by succession of objects.(1)


1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Second Order Logic, HOL 2nd order Logic: Predicate logic of the 2nd order goes beyond predicate logic of the 1st level allowing quantification over properties and relations, and not just objects. Thus comparisons of the powerfulness of sets become possible. Problems which are expressed in everyday terms with terms such as "greater", "between", etc., and e.g. the specification of all the properties of an object require predicate logic of the 2nd order. Since the 2nd level logic is not complete (because there are, for example, an infinite number of properties of properties), one often tries to get on with the logic of the 1st order.

Self- Consciousness Castaneda Frank I 211ff
Self-consciousness / Fichte: all consciousness includes a s.-c. - CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves) - CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! - No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections - false problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self.
I 231f
Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations - lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident - postulates an infinite number of aspects.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and
Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Semantic Ascent Quine VI 114/15
Semantic ascent/Science/Quine: E.g. relativity theory: overturned conceptions, but evaluation only based on the old conceptions - petitio principii. - Solution: Semantic ascent: comparison of symbol structures: then select greater simplicity - ((s) distinction between conception and meaning) - ((s) purely behaviorist). ---
VII (a) 1f5f
Semantic ascent/Quine: thus the dispute about what exists is translated into one about words - but that does not mean that existence depends on words. ---
X 31f
Semantic ascent/Quine: solution for generalization where letters replace names of things and at the same time whole sentences. - Wrong: p or not p for all things in such a way that sentences are names for them. - Ascent: only through sentences: correct: every sentence of the form p or not p is true. Generalization: two kinds: a) if names change: from Hans is Hans and from Fritz is Fritz, etc. Every thing is itself: no problem, no semantic ascent necessary. - b) generalization of Hans is mortal or Hans is not mortal: semantic ascent. - ((s) Also because of the logical constant). ---
X 32
Truth predicate/Semantic ascent/Quine/(s): truth predicate quasi reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent) - Quine: it reminds in the ascent that we are targeting the world - by calling the sentence true we call the snow white. - truth predicate: reverses the quotation marks. - Sentence: simply utter it in order to assert it. - Then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. - truth predicate: necessary for generalization about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. all sentences of the form p or not p are true. Truth predicate: reinstates reference to the object that was eliminated by the semantic ascent.
---
X 35
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in a dimension which cannot be grasped by a variable. ---
X 88
Semantic ascent/generalization/Quine: without semantic ascent: if direct quantification possible in object language: E.g. (x)(x =). - (Only if identity predicate = is considered to be a logical particle and not part of the lexicon (normal predicate) - Semantic ascent: If identity is a true predicate, then only indirect generalization possible, through language, not objects.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Set Theory Bigelow I 363
Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a child of the union of arithmetics and geometry. Descartes has done some preliminary work, the meta language was invented in the coordinate system. ---
I 364
It allows us to expand the correlation between points in the coordinate system, a line corresponds to a set of number pairs, etc. Equations: many such quantities can be adequately described by equations.
Example: set of points on a circle line
(x - a)2 + (y - b)² = c².
for fixed numbers a, b and c. This corresponds to a unique set and this is unambiguously equivalent to an equation.
---
I 365
Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: reduces not only geometry to numbers and sets, but also numbers to sets. This cleared pure mathematics from empirical concerns. Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: for each logically consistent universal, there will be possibilia that instantiate it.
Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: guaranteed by logical consistency.
Platonism/modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our platonism is determined by the fact that we allow actualized uninstantiated universals. ((s) Not instantiated in the actual world).
N.B.: then we do not need set theory to guarantee instantiations of geometric proportions a priori. They can be studied whether or not they are instantiated in the real world.
---
I 366
Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, we say that there are sets of numbers that correspond to possible objects. One and the same geometric figure corresponds to an infinite number of different sets of pairs of numbers. ((s) The figure can be moved in the coordinate system). These different sets of number pairs have something in common, even if they do not have two pairs of numbers in common: a universal.
Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: they exist whether or not one detects them.
Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: also exist, e.g. if you discover that two equations are in the same relation to pairs of numbers: they have the same extension.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Set Theory Lorenzen Berka I 269
Inductive Definition/Set Theory/LorenzenVsSet Theory: For example, an inductive definition of a set M by
a(y) › y ε M, x ε M u b(x,y) › y ε M

whereby a (x) and b(x,y) are already defined formulas in which M does not occur, is "explained" set theoretically that M should be the average of all sets N satisfying these implications with N instead of M.
Lorenzen: whoever wants to defend a claim n ε M (sic) will hardly attempt all these sets N. As P, he will rather defend O against either directly a(n), or he will first give an m which he will defend b (m, n) and m ∈ M.
Step number/Lorenzen: in order to determine this procedure as the the dialogical sense of the inductive definition of M, we must also require of P to indicate the number of steps required for complete proof for each assertion of the form x ∈ M.
E.g. suppose, for example, he traces n ε M back to the assertion m ∈ M and has stated the step number v for n ε M...
---
I 270
...so he must specify a step number μ ‹ v for m ε M. Without such information, P could assert "smaller" ‹ for the integers in the following inductive definition
0 ‹ y for positive numbers y

x ‹ y _› x +/ 1 ‹ y +/ 1

e.g. 1 ‹ 0, and begin a "proof" with the aid of 0 ‹ 1, 1 ‹ 2, 2 ‹ 3 .... Of course, the proof could not be finished, but O could not prove this.
Dialogical logic/Lorenzen: in these dialogues, it is never permitted to intervene suddenly in the "free speech" of the opponent. If, on the other hand, P has to specify a step number v, he will have lost his assertion at the latest after v steps.
Step number: the steps are, of course, natural numbers. If one wants to give infinite inductive definitions, i.e. such with an infinite number of premisses, a dialogical meaning, one must allow transfinite ordinal numbers as the step numbers.
Inductive Definition/LorenzenVsHerbrand: For example, a function sequence f1, f2 ... is already defined and the induction scheme

a(y) › y ε M (x)fx(y) ε M › y ε M

is adressed. This definition is by no means "impredicative". But it is also not really constructive either. We have infinitely many premises here
f1 (y) ∈ M, f2 (y) ε M ... which are necessary to prove y ∈ M.
Infinite: in dialogue one cannot defend every premise, one will therefore allow O to select an fm(y) e M. This must then be claimed and defended by P. In addition, P must specify a generally transfinite ordinal number as the step number.
Step number: the step number of a premise must always be specified as less than the step number of the conclusion.
Winning strategy: of P: must provide the step numbers for all opponent's elections.
II. Number-class/second/Lorenzen: set-theoretically one can prove easily the existence of suitable ordinal numbers of the II. number class. One can define transfinite recursion through this:

y ε M0 ‹› a(y) y ε Mλ ‹› (x)fx(y) ε Ux x ‹ λ Mx. .

Then M = Ul l › μ Ml for a suitable μ and if M is to be a set of natural numbers, μ can be taken from the II. number class.
Constructively, if the inductive definition is to be constructive, the ordinal numbers used must also be "constructive". Here it is obvious to limit oneself to the recursive ordinal numbers of Church and Kleene.(1)


1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Singular Terms Brandom I 407
Singular Term/Predicate/Subsentential Expressions/Brandom: this is about objective referencing (reference), not about believed propositions - non-propositional, conceptual contents. ---
I 527ff
Singular Terms - substitution inferences are always symmetrical: equivalence classes. Predicate substitution inferences may be asymmetric: Families (reflexive, transitive).
---
I 512f
Singular Term/Frege: the concept particular cannot be explained independently from the concept singular term - Brandom: not clear what singular terms are, cannot be explained by successful reference - Quine: singular term includes reference, error possible - Brandom: not everyone can be recognized as a singular term: E.g. "root 2", "natural satellite of the Earth" may be more than one thing - Problem: if omniscience of the speaker should be required. ---
I 517
Because sentences are fundamental, it is not clear why there should be any subsentential expressions at all - they cannot have a semantic content in the same respectas sentences - subsentential expressions necessary for the formation of potentially infinite number of sentences. ---
I 528
Singular Term/Brandom: its introduction does not only require application criteria but also identity criteria (for substitutability). ---
I 533
Singular Term/Brandom: are those expressions which play a dual syntactic and semantic substitutional role: 1) SIS: substitution-inferential significance - 2) SSR - substitution-structural role. ---
I 533
Definition singular term/Brandom: an expression that is substituted and whose occurrence is symmetrically inferentially significant - the substitutable (singular term): symmetric - substitution frame (predicates) asymmetrical. ---
I 535
Inversion: Substitutions are not always right: the conclusions are often inferentially weaker than the premises - from "something is a dog" follows "it is a mammal", but not vice versa - singular term: exists, because expressive power of the language would be lost if they were allowed to be asymmetric - Example/(s): if substitution led to weakening of the determination of the object. ---
I 546
Singular term/Brandom: Frames can be regarded as derived singular terms: e.g. "the father of a" may then be substituted into her (FregeVs). - Brandom: they are still subsitutable and therefore they differ from sentences. ---
I 548
There are exceptions in the singular terms that behave differently, but they can only exist, because there are normal singular terms. ---
I 561
They play both the syntactic and semantic substitutional role. ---
I 569
Singular Term/Predicate/Brandom: indispensable in all languages ​​with conditionals - why are objects needed: for the same reason as singular terms: you need something that means what conditionals mean. ---
II 162
Singular Term/Brandom: 1) Obtain - 2) Designate - 3) Name ---
Newen I 165
Singular Term/Brandom: Problem: because it does not have reference as a basic concept, it creates 1) equivalenz classes of syntactically identical terms (substitutability)
2) inferential role: helps to isolate the grammatical entities and identify their role as subject, verb , etc.
Subject Term/Singular Term: here the implications are symmetrical and reversible. - E.g. Franklin/Postmaster. Verb: here the reversal is not symmetrical - E.g. goes for a walk/exercises. - At the same time transcendental argument for the splittedness of the world - (predecessor: Strawson).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Substitutional Quantification Quine V 140
Substitutional quantification/Quine: is open for other grammatical categories than just singular term but has other truth function. - Referential quantification/Referential Quantification: here, the objects do not even need to be specifiable by name. ---
V 141
Language learning: first substitution quantification: from relative pronouns. - Later: referential quantification: because of categorical sentences. - Substitution quantification: would be absurd: that every inserted name that verifies Fx also verifies Gx - absurd: that each apple or rabbit would have to have a name or a singular description. - Most objects do not have names. ---
V 140
Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Truth Function/Quine: referential universal quantification: can be falsified by one single object, even though this is not specifiable by a name. - The same substitutional universal quantification: in contrast, remains true. - Existential quantification: referential: may be true due to a non-assignable value. - The same in substitutional sense: does not apply for lack of an assignable example. ---
V 146f
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Blind spot: substitutional universal quantification: E.g. none of the substitution cases should be rejected, but some require abstention. - Existential quantification: E.g. none of the cases is to be approved, but some abstention is in order.- then neither agree nor abstain. (Equivalent to the alternation). ---
Ad V 170
Substitutional Quantification/(s): related to the quantification over apparent classes in Quine’s meta language? ---
V 175
Numbers/Classes/Quantification/Ontology/Substitutional quantification/Quine: first substitutional quantification through numbers and classes. - Problem: Numbers and classes can then not be eliminated. - Can also be used as an object quantification (referential quantification) if one allows every number to have a successor. - ((s) with substitution quantification each would have to have a name. Class quantifier becomes object quantifier if one allows the exchange of the quantifiers (AQU/AQU/ - EQu/EQu) - so the law of the partial classes of one was introduced.
---
X 124
Substitutional quantification/Quine: requires name for the values ​​of the variables. Referential quantification/(s) speaks of objects at most. - Definition truth/Substitutional Quantification/Barcan/Quine: applying-Quantification - is true iff at least one of its cases, which is obtained by omitting the quantifier and inserting a name for the variable, is true. - Problem: almost never enough names for the objects in a not overly limited world. - E.g. No Goedel numbers for irrational numbers. - Then substitutional quantification can be wrong, because there is no name for the object, but the referential quantification can be true at the same time - i.e. both are not extensionally equal.
---
X 124
Names/logic/substitutional quantification/Quine: Problem: never enough names for all objects in the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by an open sentence, it also has no name. - Otherwise E.g. Name a, Determination: x ε a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be attributed to integers. - (s) > substitution class. ---
XII 79f
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Here the variables are placeholders for words of any syntactic category (except names) - Important argument: then there is no way to distinguish names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. ((s) Does that mean that one cannot distinguish fragments like object and greater than, and that structures like "there is a greater than" would be possible?). ---
XII 80
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: Problem: Assuming an infinite range of named objects. - Then it is possible to show for each substitution result of a name the truth of a formula and simultaneously to refute the universal quantification of the formula. - (everyone/all). - Then we have shown that the range has at least one unnamed object. - ((s) (> not enough names). - Therefore QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification. E.g. assuming the range contained the real name - Then not all could be named, but the unnamed cannot be separated. - The theory can always be strengthened to name a certain number, but not all - referential quantification: attributes nameless objects to itself. - Trick: (see above) every substitution result with a name is true, but makes universal quantification false. ((s) Thus an infinite number of objects secured). - A theory of real names must be based on referential quantification.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Terminology Goodman I 88
Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.)
2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense.
3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts.
4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically.
5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols.
---
III 128
Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions.
Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign.
III 128/129
Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica.
Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy").
There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas.
Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation.
Definition Notation:
1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong).
2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible.
3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous.
Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character.
Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class.
III 133
Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed.
Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet
Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation.
Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks.
Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions.
On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other.
III 213
Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation.
Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated.
III 232 ff
Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts.
Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores.
Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones.
Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Texts Flusser I 105
Texts/Flusser: Thesis: Almost everyone can "write". Texts are getting "cheaper" all the time and less valuable. The world of texts is no longer characteristic of our codified world. Although it is much denser than ever. The level of consciousness that these codes correspond to has not yet been reached. That is why they are so extraordinarily dangerous: they program us without being seen through and threaten us as opaque walls.
I 124ff
Texts/Flusser: The Qualitative Second Jump (Fig. I 107) "Alienation 2". The text tells "everything in an order". Fig.: The stick figures emerge out of the frame, arranged one after the other: sun, male, male, dog. All separate. The symbols of the descriptive text have nothing in common with the symbols of the described text. The orthographic rules are much more complicated.
I 125
The jump out of the picture is a strange gesture: the jump is not performed with the legs, but with the hands, like how one ruffles up a sweater. Not the theoretically infinite number of lines of the surface, but the significant lines of the elements.
I 127
At first glance, it is evident that linear codes can transmit far less information than two-dimensional codes of the surface. Many pages of text are necessary to describe a very simple picture. The importance of the "sublime" is lost.
I 128
Imagination/Descartes/Flusser: Descartes did not have less, but more imagination than a drawer, so he had to translate the two-dimensional geometry into equations. Simply put: all texts mean pictures and without pictures there are no texts.
I 133
Books/Flusser: Wittgenstein shows that they are either tautological, meaningless, or contradictory.
I 134
... and that the apparent meaning of texts is based on "grammatical errors", i. e. on incorrect manipulation of the codes.
I 158 f
Texts/Picture/Flusser: Relationship between picture and text: Diachronic: Texts in function of pictures: e.g. Romanesque churches: conceptual thinking put at the service of magic. If, on the other hand, images are used in function of texts (e.g. in fibulas), then magical thinking has been put into the service of historicization (of literacy). In the cloister one should learn to imagine something in reference to the biblical texts, in the fibula to describe pictures in terms.
I 161
Synchronic: viewed synchronously, the question is posed differently: images have been currently displaced from the center of the codified world. Picture books are either too expensive or too cheap to play a similar role to the cloisters. In our world, a walk through a nocturnal city street is more imaginative than a walk through a picture gallery.
I 164
Text/Technical Image: relation text/technical image: the belief that observation is a "meeting" of the observer with the observed has long been shaken.

Fl I
V. Flusser
Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996

That-Clauses Schiffer I 7
That-clause/relational theory/Schiffer: is a singular term. - E.g. That snow is white has a reference that can be female/male - ((s) the incorrect sentence...). -Paratactic Analysis/Davidson: "that" (without ß) demonstrative, refers to my incident - SchifferVs: leads to the relation theory - (object of belief) - since there is an infinite number of relational predicates, they cannot appear as basic terms - Tradition:> compositionality.
---
I 9
That-clause/Schiffer: no singular term but indirect and partial characterization of what Elmer believes. >Paul and Elmer) ---
I 274
De Dicto/Schiffer: reduction to de dicto is only possible if a way of givenness without reference to objects of which they are about, is possible - ((s)> substitutional quantification?). ---
I 129
That-clause/belief/most authors/Schiffer: the that-clause does not refer to belief - that means to the neuronal Z-token which is the belief - but to entities with truth value and other content-determining characteristics - Problem: then we need (unlike propositions) an independent presentation of the contents of the neural Z-Tokens. ---
I 211
That-clause/Schiffer: Thesis: does not refer. Is no refering expression - problem: how should one explain: E.g. Paul and Elmar believe that ... so there is an attribute that they have in common - for nominalism, which denies any classes of properties, the language must not have compositional semantics.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Translation Duhem I 173
Translation/Measuring/Duhem: The measurement methods are the vocabulary that allows translations. Who translates, falsifies. The Italians say: Tradutore tradittore. There is never a complete consistency between two texts which are translations of one another. The difference between the concrete facts observed by the physicists and the numerical symbols that he uses is extraordinary. ---
I 174
A theoretical fact has nothing indefinite, nothing fluctuating. The body being studied is geometrically defined. Its edges are real lines, without thickness, its corners are real points without dimensions. Each point of a body corresponds to a temperature, and this temperature is, for each point, a number which is sharply defined by every other.
This theoretical fact is opposed to the practical fact whose translation it is. Here nothing more can be seen of precision.
The body is no longer a geometric one, but a concrete block, its edges jagged ridges, its points more or less broad, its temperature a medium one in a certain volume. It is also not the definite number, clearly distinguished from any other number.
---
I 175
Nor could we explain that the temperature is exactly 10°, but only that it does not exceed a certain fraction of the degree which depends on the accuracy of the instrument. An infinite number of different theoretical facts can serve as a translation of the same practical fact.
---
I 178
When translating into concrete language, it is possible to obtain several facts which differ from each other because of the sensitivity of our instruments. E.g. the different values given by our thermodynamic formula v for the ice melting point may have a difference of one-tenth or more of a degree, while our thermometer measures one-hundredth of an inch.

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Truth Searle Perler I 142
True/false/Searle: true and false are meta-intentional predicates. There are not only in the metalanguage.
III 177
Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be asserted without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be asserted without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family similarity, open texture, contextual dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of the theory by the evidence. But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent of representation! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme and not a real inconsistency.
III 185
Truth/Reality/Searle: there is a simple but deep reason why truth and reality cannot coincide as the naive external realist must believe, according to many philosophers. Every representation a forteriori and every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others! They are always within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view. ((s) QuineVs, DavidsonVs). There is an infinite number of different points of view (Searle pro). Each representation has an aspect. But an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view.
III 218
Truth/Searle: truth applies to statements, truth is a term that implies evaluation, trustworthiness and quoting gives us a criterion of trustworthiness.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Perler I
Dominik Perler
Markus Wild
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Truth Leibniz Holz I 44
Truth of reason/Truth of facts/Leibniz: Truth of reason: certain simple and original ideas, such as those of identity, are immediately seen as modes or forms of our sense-perception as categories of the givenness of beings.
They are not mediated by perception, but are the determinateness of perception itself.
---
Holz I 54
Definition Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth appears as a statement relation, in which the identity of different things is determined against each other. Definition Experience/Leibniz/Holz: experience is the return of something different to their connection in such a relation.
Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth is not really in the identity of the subject A = A, but in the return of the predication to the identity of a certain predicate with a certain subject in which it is contained, thereby distinguishing the subject from other subjects.
The truth of a proposition states that it can be traced back to an identical proposition (axiom).
---
I 57
Truth/Leibniz: truth appears only mediated, in the medium of its opposite, of appearance (> Appearance/Hegel). Truth of facts/truth of reason/Leibniz: I gain the certainty of the facts, the vérités de fait only by means of their representation on the level of reason - the vérités de raison.
This can show me the material truth but only as the not wrong. (s)
Double negation: is weaker.
In the reversal of the method of proof in truths of facts, the variety of experience and the unity of reason stand opposite to each other like a mirror image.
---
Holz 63
Truth of facts/Leibniz: the truth of facts must exist, if anything should be said at all about the infinite manifoldness, and knowledge should thus be gained.
Truth of reasons/Leibniz: truth of reasons is necessary, their opposite is impossible.
Truth of facts/Leibniz: truth of facts is contingent, their opposite is possible.
Holz: the difference between the two must not be misunderstood, otherwise Russell would be right:
---
I 64/65
Russell: It is nonsense to say of a true proposition that it is not true in the sense of another, apotictically true proposition. ((s), for example, that a truth of reason contradicts a truth of facts). Holz: the difference lies in the argument.
For the proof of truth of facts, we must examine the preceding chain of connections and because of the infinite divisibility of the bodies an infinite number of sentences. This can only do the infinite mind of God.
Truth of reason/Leibniz: is the generic term for truths of reasons and truths of facts!
The truth attribute of both lies in the fact that in the subject concept all its possible predicates are contained. "Praedicatum inest subiecto".
Inclusion of the predicate in the subject: A is contained in Ax or Ax = A + B + ... X.
---
I 66
This inclusion of the predicate is the foundation of truth. This is, according to structure, a reason of reason. Definition truth/Leibniz/Holz: is then the constitution of that state in which identity comes to a being or a fact when it enters into a distinction between subject/predicate/definiendum/definiens.
This state is where the fact appears as the concept of the fact.
Truth is a reflexion relationship.
---
Holz I 68
"Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Nevertheless, he comprehends both of them analytically!
Holz: in fact, the relationship is not a formal logical one, but a dialectical one.
> Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, is necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason.
---
Holz I 73
Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind.
Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid. For him, everything is a truth of reason, or, one can say as well, everything is a truth of facts for him!
For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts.
Overarching general: the one involves its opposite.
Truth/Cognition/Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: This again has the astounding consequence that Leibniz can only speak sensibly of two kinds of truth (truths of facts/truths of reason) when he comprehends the idea of the infinite mind (for which the two coincide) only as a metaphysical auxiliary construction.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Truth Predicate Quine VI 115
Truth predicate/Quine: is transparent - Quote redemption does not explain the truth predicate, because no eliminability - due to the transparency still information about what it means that a sentence is true. - It is because of the laxity that paradoxes are avoided. ---
X 31
Truth predicate/Quine: shows the reality right through the sentence. - It reminds us that, although sentences are mentioned, it is still reality what this is about. - ((s)> reverses semantic ascent.) ---
X 32
Truth predicate/semantic ascent/Quine/(s): truth predicate quasi-reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent). - Quine: it reminds us in the ascent that we’re taking about the world. - By calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. - Truth predicate: reverses the quote marks. - Sentence: just say it in order to assert it - then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. - truth predicate: necessary for generalizations about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. "All sentences of the form p or not p are true". - Truth predicate: restores reference to the object, which was eliminated by the semantic ascent.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Type Theory Quine VII (e) 91ff
QuineVsType theory: 1) universal class: because the type theory only allows uniform types as elements of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi-universal classes, each for one type - 2) negation: ~x stops including all non-elements of x and only includes those non-elements that belong to the next lower level - 3) Zero class: even this accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes - 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level - 5) Relational calculus: accordingly to be established new at every level - 6) arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform. At each level (type) there is a new 0, new 1, new 2, etc. ---
IX 186
Definition ramified type theory/Russell/Quine: distinction of orders for statement functions whose arguments are of one single order - in order for two attributes with the same extension to be able to differ in terms of their orders, attributes with the same extension must be distinguished and be called attributes and not classes. - New: this becomes superfluous when we drop the branching. Solution: context definition/Russell: we define class abstraction through context, thus "ε" remains the only basic concept apart from quantifiers, variables and statement-logical links. - Context definition for class abstraction: "yn ε {xn: Fxn}" stands for "∃z n + 1["xn(xn ε z n+1 Fxn) u yn ε z n + 1]".
---
IX 191ff
Cumulative types/Set Theory/Quine: Type 0: Only L is of type 0 - type 1: L and {L} and nothing else - Type n: should generally include only this and the 2n sets that belong to type n-1 - in this way, every quantification only interprets a finite number of cases. Each closed expression can be mechanically tested on being true - that no longer works when the axiom of infinity is added. ---
IX 198
Cumulative types/Quine: advantages: if we equate the zero classes of all class types, (~T0x u ~T0y u ∀w(w ε x ↔ w ε y) u x ε z) › y ε z is a single axiom, no longer an axiom scheme - in int "~T0x u ~T0y" avoids that the individuals L are identified with one another - we need individuals, but we identify them with their classes of one (see above) - but one exception: if x is an individual, "x ε x" shall be considered as true, (Above, "x ε y" became false if both were not objects of sequential types). ---
IX 201
Cumulative Type Theory/Quine: individuals: identified with their classes of one - no longer elementless, have themselves as elements - therefore definite identity: a = b if a ≤ b ≤ a - zero classes of all types can now be identified (formerly: "No individuals" , "no classes", etc.) ---
IX 204
Natural numbers/QuineVsRussell: his type theory even has problems with Frege’s numbers: perhaps the successor relation does not bring something new always: Example 5 is then the class of all classes from five individuals, assuming that there are only five individuals in that universe. So 5 in type 2 equals {ϑ1} ,then 6, or S"5, in type 5 equals {z1: ∃y0(y0 e z1 u z1 n _{y0} = ϑ1)}: this equals Λ², because "y ε z u z n _{y} = ϑ" is contradictory - but then 7, or S"6, equals S'Λ², which is reduced to Λ² - i.e. S'x = x when x equals 6 in type 2, provided that there are no more than five individuals - otherwise the theory of numbers would collapse.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Vocabulary Kripke III 335
Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: a language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the first language.
III 338
KripkeVsDavidson: we only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker).
III 338
Truth theory/Kripke: (here): condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.). Condition ii): a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)..., b) there is an equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary. Advantage: the ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. Condition iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. Condition iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). Tarski: Tarski only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (i.e. only old vocabulary).
III 249
Condition (i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary.
III 347
Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. Kripke: this is quite different in Tarski: truth and all semantic terms are explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary. ---
Frank I 32
Mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the distinction mental/physical teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures).

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Zeno Russell Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

13
RussellVsZenon: Zenon only made the mistake of drawing the conclusion (if he drew any conclusions at all) that because there is no state of change, the world would be in the same state at any given time. But this conclusion cannot be drawn according to Weierstrass.
15
Time: The banishment of the infinitely small quantities has peculiar consequences: e.g. there is no longer anything like a next moment. (> Time/Russell). If there are to be no infinitely small quantities, no two moments follow one another directly, but there are always other moments inbetween. Consequently there must be an infinite number of additional moments between two arbitrary moments. If the number were finite, then one would be closer to the first of the two moments and so would be the next! This is precisely where the philosophy of the infinite begins.
19
Zenon/Russell: Everyone who attacked Zenon was not right about it, because they allowed his premisses. Zenon probably invoked the assumption that the whole has more elements than a part. 20
Then Achilles must have been in more places than the turtle. And it followed that he could never catch up with them.
If we allow the axiom that the whole thing has more elements than a part, Zeno's conclusion fits perfectly.
The retention of the axiom leads to other paradoxes of which I call one: the paradox of Tristram Shandy. It is the reversal of the Zenonian paradox and says that the turtle can get everywhere if you give it only enough time. Tristram Shandy needed two years to list the course of the first two days of his life and complained that the material accumulated faster than he could capture it.
Russell: I assert now that if he had lived his life that way further on, he would not have missed any part of his biography. For the hundredth part is written in the thousandth year, and so on.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following 40 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Antirealism Quine Vs Antirealism Field I 64
Infinite/Anti-Realism/Field: the Anti-R can only assume an infinite number of entities if there is an infinite number of physical entities. (E.g. infinitely many parts of a light beam). But it would be inappropriate to want to test the adequacy of the number theory by assumptions about the physical world. Truth/Ontology/Field: sure, the truth of the number theory would require infinitely many objects for the quantifiers, but its conservatism would not! And conservatism is all we need! Physics: How about atypical applications such as differential equations, etc.? Here the existence of many entities such as real numbers, functions, differential operators, etc. seems to be called for. How should nominalistic inferences become easier here? Where ever are the nominalistic premises? We would only have them if we were able to somehow represent the theory of electromagnetism nominalistically, and that seems hardly possible. Indispensability: if it is true that mathematics does not only facilitate inferences, it would theoretically be indispensable. How can indispensability be represented in terms of conservatism? Quine Putnam Argument/VsAnti-Realism: (see above): only by truth! We must assume the truth of mathematics for its usefulness in the extra-mathematical realm. FieldVs: this is certainly an exaggeration. Parts of the usefulness may also be explained by conservatism (but not only).
Field I 65
In the end, I try to show that thesis: mathematics is not just indispensable.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Aristotle Frege Vs Aristotle Berka I 92
Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.(1)
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964

Stepanians I 9
Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths.
I 55
Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11",
Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both
may be replaced with characters.
Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence.
Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z....
Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56
Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused.
I 58
Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Atomism Wittgenstein Vs Atomism II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there are elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives infinity as a number, and assumes there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) They must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
---
II 157
Particular/Atom/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get to the basic elements by logical analysis ("individuals"). Russell believed, in the end subject-predicate sentences and binary relations would arise. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Cantor, G. Russell Vs Cantor, G. B. Russell Mathematics and metaphysicians in Kursbuch 8 p. 19 Frankfurt 1967
Infinity/numbers/Russell: There is a largest infinite number: the number of objects in total, regardless of type or genre. (VsCantor).
Zenon: relied presumably on the assumption that the whole thing would have more elements than a part - "the smallest infinite number": Limit of all integers.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N. SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).

Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.

IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.

VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.


1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Davidson, D. Kripke Vs Davidson, D. III 335
Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": A language cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be "first language".
III 338
KripkeVsDavidson: We only need to demand that only a finite number of axioms possess "new" vocabulary (weaker).
Horwich I 450
Reference/Radical Interpretation/RI/Field Linguist//Davidson/Rorty. Reconciles these two approaches saying that Strawson is right when his approach is seen holistically, i.e. if one places Aristotle’s formulation of the "whole and for the most part" first. Rorty Strawson: Yet his criterion cannot be applied to individual cases while being sure that one is right. Quine/Rorty: Stands between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of both, of the causation and of the reference, is equally a question of the conviction’s coherence of the native and the field linguist.
Reference/Kripke/Rorty: His approach is a "building block" approach: Here we see causal paths of objects leading to individual speech acts.
Conviction/true/Truth/KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: this approach leaves the possibility open that all our convictions could be wrong. Or that one basically does not know what he refers to (because one misunderstands all causal paths).
KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: which makes it possible to completely separate the reference and intentional objects.
DavidsonVsKripke / Rorty: Davidson warns exactly against this: The gap between scheme and content.
Solution/Davidson: Reverse order: We must first maximize coherence and truth, and then the reference, as a byproduct, can be like as it wants to be!
Important Argument: This ensures that the intentional objects of many convictions (the "most direct cases") are their causes.
((s) Vs: it would then still be possible according to Löwenheim that what appears to be direct to us is not the most direct.
DavidsonVsKripke: Kripke’s gaffe, e.g. the Gödel-Schmidt case must remain the exception.
I 451
Because if the gap between references and intentional objects (which one refers to, and the one of which one believes one refers to) would be the rule, then the term "reference" would have no content! He would be as useless for the field linguist as the term "analytic". Gavagai/RI/Communication/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: the field linguist can communicate with the natives when he knows most of his intentional objects.
Therefore:
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The radical interpretation (RI) starts at home. Then we can assume for ourselves as well as for the natives that most of our beliefs are true.
Rorty: Is this an answer for the skeptic or does it only express what JamesVsSkepticism says:that the question is a bad question?
Language/Representation/Intermediary/Medium/Davidson/Rorty:
Davidson rejects "intermediaries" (intermediate members) between the organism and its environment (to be able to perform RI). Intermediate links between the organism and object: e.g. "special meaning", e.g. "intended interpretation", e.g. "what stands before the mind of the speaker" Without them we can say "RI begins at home".
I 453
Solution/Davidson:fulfillment/DavidsonVsSkepticism/DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: For his refutation we need Tarski’s fulfillment ratio (word-world) instead of "correspondence" (which would correspond to the truth of sentences) of the relation proposition world). ((S) Because only whole sentences can be true). RI/Gavagai/Field Linguist/Davidson/Rorty: The field linguist is going to connect individual words of the native with objects (pieces of the world).
Translation/fulfillment/Davidson/Rorty: Problem: The fulfillment relation is not a basis for translations, the fulfillment is rather a byproduct of translations.
Hermeneutical circle/HC/Gavagai/RI//Davidson/RortyVsKripke: To go back and forth in the HC is not a building block-theory. It corresponds more to the "Reflective Equilibrium" of Rawls.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Donnellan, K. Kripke Vs Donnellan, K. Searle VI 179
KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction spokesperson reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation may refer to somethings different than what he is talking about.
VI 179/180
Searle: That is, however, not quite right: e.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfills the description. # Kripke: In a given idiolect the semantic relation (without indexical parts) is determined by a general intention of the speaker.
The reference of the speaker is determined by a specific intention.
SearleVsKripke: This is precisely where the approach gets stuck: In the sense that when I have general as well as specific intentions, I actually have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them.
E.g. (without index): "The man who is eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building at 10 clock on June 6, 53." According to Kripke this is intended in my idiolect through my general intention.
VI 181
Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would need to be if it were correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: Beyond that no general intentions are necessary.
There are also an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intention.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Field, H. Leeds Vs Field, H. Field II 304
Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership.
LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory.
Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility).
Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed.
The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.)
Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context.
Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth.
II 305
Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class"
and
ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language.
Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language.
Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation.
FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found.
Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language.
Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30).
Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear.
FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms!
e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two".
FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.)
Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) :
II 306
e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true.
Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value).
Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation.
1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory.
2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true.
FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum.
The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness.
FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better.

I 378
Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and
b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) .
Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable.
(LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField).
Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....)
Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness!
Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction!
Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language.
Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end.
LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable?
I 379
This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way.
Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction.
Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English.
Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list.
Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English.
Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law.
LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory).
And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization.
Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)).
Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction.
I 386
Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted.
I 380
Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important.
Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world.

Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation!
The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world".
I 381
We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard.
Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic.
LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI:
a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or
b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned).

Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation!
This is an elder form of the correspondence theory.
I 491
He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt.
Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world.
If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it.
LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order.
Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability).

Leeds I
Stephen Leeds
"Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Frege, G. Meixner Vs Frege, G. I 170
Numbers/Frege/Meixner: special properties, i.e. finite number of properties of properties (i.e. functions). Notation of Meixner: F0 (should be 0) is the abbreviation of "01[01 is different from 01]".
Def Equivalence/Frege/Meixner: f is a property equal to the property g, = Def is valid for at least one two-digit relation R:
1. each entity which has f stands for exactly one entity which has g, in the relation R
2. are entities that have f different, then also entities with g
3. inversion of 1: any entity having g.
Number/Meixner: one could therefore define non-circularly:
x is a natural number = Def x is a finite number property.
I 171
Number/MeixnerVsFrege: then you could simplify: the default property used for the definition of 1 λ01[01 is identical to F0] is definitorically the same as the property
λ01[01 is identical with 0].
Then you can simplify (which is a sign that numbers do not stand on ontologically safe feet):
x is a natural number = Def x is a standard property for determining finite numbers
then: f is 0 = Def f is a property that is equal to the property 0.
Meixner: this is simpler, but also has the strange consequence that each natural number is exemplified by all its predecessors.
I 172
FregeVsMeixner: Numbers are (saturated) objects, not properties. Each number is exemplified by an infinite number of entities. Number/Meixner: understood as property, they are untyped functions, i.e. they cannot be placed in any box of the form []

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Functionalism Field Vs Functionalism II 43
Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations.
II 44
Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. Belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82).
Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations.
1) We have not observed the entire behavior.
2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused.
FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief.
Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior.
II 49
Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions.
The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago.
II 50
Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely.
Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence.
Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald".
FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow?
FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed.
((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.)
Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said:
"A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism."
II 51
Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it).
And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property.
Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general).
Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3).
N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Intention Based Semantics Schiffer Vs Intention Based Semantics I 258
SchifferVsIntention-based semantics/SchifferVsIBS: much worse: from normal speakers too much knowledge is required. For example, that he knows the function that maps sentences to propositions. Solution/Lewis: (Lewis 1975):
Actual speech ratio / population / Lewis (Lewis 1975): L is a language in G only if it's common knowledge in G that members of G "never attempt to express a proposition of L, which is not true in L "(p 167). Then Lewis would respond to the above objections:
I 259
Lewis: the normal human being does not need a term of L to expect that his fellows are truthful. He just needs proper expectations about how they should behave. He expects them to act in accordance with a regularity of truthfulness. But we would - and not he - describe this as regularity. He might have an internally represented grammar, and being able to have the potentially infinite number of expectations, but this is not critical. (p. 180f).
Schiffer: Problem: it is not entirely clear how this is to avert the above objection: to know that a fellow human being will never say a false sentence, a member of the population must know the function. And in addition he needs a manner of givenness (givenness, "concept"). And that is too much for the knowledge that can be attributed to normal people.
Lewis: seems to want to attribute the following knowledge:
For all s, p, if L(s) = p, then it is common knowledge, in G, that members of G would not express s, if p is not true.
Schiffer: I do not know whether that's adequate for Lewis, it does not help the IBS: the idea is to redraft IBS definitions in a way so that all references to L are outside of that-propositions. ((s) so that the speaker does not affect the language itself.).
Pointe: then the individual speakers must know only sentences and individual propositions.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Internal Realism Horwich Vs Internal Realism Horwich I 399
Internal Realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all this?. VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows?" After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language).
VSVs: E.g. Suppose God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory.
Problem: there would still be an infinite number of possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the phrase "cow refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then that in this sense of "true" it is true that there is a unambiguous "intended" interpretation? How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a particular set of things as opposed to a particular set of things in any accessible interpretation?.
Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the opposite direction.
Reference/Internal RealismVsVs: the fact that "cow" refers to cows follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism were wrong! Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth.
Unrevisability: it is not absolutely unrevisable, however, that "cow" refers to cows, but in order to revise it you would have to overthrow the entire theory.
Metaphysical RealismVs: that does not answer the question: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Intuitionism Quine Vs Intuitionism VII (a) 14
Set Theory/Fraenkel: classes are discovered. (VsIntuitionism). Quine: this is more than a play on words, it is an essential question. (>Beings).

X 118
QuineVsIntuitionist Logic: it lacks manageability and familiarity. Its sentence links have no truth-functional, but an intuitive meaning which we explain using "refute" and "from ... follows". These explanations become unclear, however, if we want to maintain the difference between uttering a sentence and talking about the sentence (mention/use)! Quine: then you might as well move on to Heyting's axioms and not interpose translation, but
X 119
Apply the direct method of language teacher. Intuitionism: gained more momentum through Godel's proof of incompleteness.
Constructivism/Quine: there is not a correct definition for it.

QuineVsIntuitionist Logic: changes the meanings of quantification and the constants.
Solution: you can follow the constructivist procedure, and still use the orthodox logic: that is what Weyl's constructive set theory does.
Quantifier/Differing Logic/Quine: there are also variations in quantifiers: intuitionistic logic requires knowledge of the proof path.
X 120
Problem: The variables must all (be able to) have a name so that the existential quantification can correspond to the (finite) adjunction of the singular sentences that make them true (see above). Problem: with infinite existential quantification no infinite number of names can be given out.
Variations in the quantification are of course important in terms of ontology.
X 121
Ontology/QuineVsIntuitionism/VsIntuitionist Logic: we might not even see with what the intuitionist declares as existing,. Solution: We need to translate his language into ours first. And not necessarily into our logic, but into our overall language!
Then we can say what he regards as existing (and in our sense of "existing").

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Kant Frege Vs Kant I 30
HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature!
I 30
Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious.
I 41
Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds
I 42
Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!.
I 43
A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity.
I 120
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 121
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.

IV 61
Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic.
I 119
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 120
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection.
I 121
The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.
Stepanians I 34
Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics.
Stepanians I 34
pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view.
I 36
Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic.
Newen I21
Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical.
Quine X 93
Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory.
Tugendhat II 12
"Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable!

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Kripke, S. A. Searle Vs Kripke, S. A. Wolf II 30
Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality.
Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions.

Searle II 292
SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception.
II 293
By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular.
II 294
Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose".
According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for?
Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all.
II 295
Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island?
II 296
Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory.
II 346
A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception.
Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content.
II 297
But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection.
II 298
E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory.
II 346
The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition.
II 300
E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses.
Searle IV 179
KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks.
IV 179/180
Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker.
The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention.
SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them.
E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention.
IV 181
Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary.
There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent.

Stalnaker I 173
SearleVsKripke: (Searle 1969 (1)) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation
I 174
SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969(2)) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense".
I 175
And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that.
Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object.
Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above).



1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 93
2. Ibid. p. 80

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Lakoff, G. Searle Vs Lakoff, G. IV 199
Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean)
IV 201
Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself.
IV 202
They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule.
Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained.
IV 203
Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features.
IV 204
SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?").
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Lewis, C.I. Verschiedene Vs Lewis, C.I. Berka I 168
Modality/BeckerVsLewis, C.I.: Problem of the infinite number of composite modalities arising (impossibly) and (not arising) from the iteration and composition of the signs. VsLewis: his system is here (apparently) not complete.





Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Lewis, D. Verschiedene Vs Lewis, D. Metz II 274
Nida-RümelinVsLewis: this objection is off the table here after we have shown that on the 1st level (Marianna finds a colorfully furnished room with partly wrongly colored prints) the alternatives come into view, which are then excluded on the 2nd level. Real phenomenal knowledge.
Lewis I 9
ShafferVsIdentity Theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neural events are also abstract. Whatever results from considerations about experiences as an argument for nonspatiality should also apply to neural events. - VsLewis: it is nonsense to consider a mere sound chain or character string as a possible carrier of a meaning or a truth value. Meaning/Carrier: Carriers of meaning are only single speech acts!
II 213
LewisVsVs: my assertion is not that sounds and characters are carriers of meaning, but that they carry meaning and truth relatively to a language or population. A single speech act can be the bearer of meaning because in most cases it unambiguously determines the language used in its particular enforcement situation. - VsLewis: A meaning theory recurred to a possible world is circular. - Def Possible World/VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can itself be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical propositions of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. -LewisVs: Possible world cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1. Such a substitution does not work properly: two worlds which are not different in the representing language get (wrongly) assigned to one and the same representation.
II 214 ++
2. Such a replacement would also be completely unnecessary: the concept of possible worlds is perfectly understandable in itself.
II 216
Hypostatization of meaning - VsLewis: not just words, things exist! - VsVs: we can form a grammar
II 221
VsLewis: maybe internal representation? VsVs: that does not help!
II 222
Convention is more than agreement: the others must believe in it!
II 223
VsLewis:Language conventions are no better than our infamous obscure old friends, the language rules. VsVs: A convention of truthfulness and trust could be called a rule.
II 224
VsLewis: Language is not conventional. LewisVs: There may be less conventionality than we originally thought. However, there are conventions of language.
II 225
VsLewis: Only those who are also set theorists can expect others to adhere to regularity. LewisVs: An ordinary person does not need to possess a concept of L in order to be able to expect that the others are truthful and trusting in L. He only needs to have expectations about action.
II 226
VsLewis: Using language is almost never a rational matter. LewisVs: An action can be rational and explainable even if it is done out of habit and without thought.
II 227
VsLewis: Language cannot possibly be traced back to conventions. It is impossible to agree on everything at any time. LewisVs: Admittedly, the first language cannot possibly go back to a convention.
II 227
VsLewis: E.g. Suppose a lifelong isolated person could one day spontaneously start using a language due to his ingenious talent. LewisVs: Even people living in isolation always adhere to a certain regularity.
II 228
VsLewis: It is circular to define the meaning in P of sentences using the assumptions made by the members of P. LewisVs: It may be so, but it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as accepting sentences.
II 229
VsLewis: E.g. Suppose population of notorious liars. LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population!
II 229
E.g. Ironist: these people are actually true in L! But they are not literally true in L! I.e. they are truly in another language, connected with L, which we can call "literal-L".
II 232
VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. LewisVs: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust par excellence. It is in a certain language! Its alternatives are regularities in other languages!
II 233 +
VsLewis: Even truthfulness and trust in L cannot be a convention. Moral obligation/Lewis: a convention continues to exist because everyone has reason to abide by it, if others do, that is the obligation. VsLewis: Why communication when people can draw completely different conclusions from a statement?
II 234
VsVs is quite compatible with my theory. But these are not independent conventions but by-products.
II 235
VsLewis: not only one language, but an infinite number of fragments (e.g. interest in communication etc.) VsVs: this is indeed the case, the language is inhomogeneous e.g. educated/uneducated.
II 237
VsLewis: silence is not untruthful. VsVs: Right expectation of truthfulness, but no trust!
II 238/239
VsLewis: either analytical or not, no smooth transition! VsVs: fuzzy analyticity with the help of gradual conventionality: regarding the strength of assumptions or the frequency of exceptions, or uncertainty as to whether certain worlds are actually possible.
II 240
VsLewis: thesis and anti-thesis refer to different objects: a) semantic (artificial) languages, b) language as part of natural history - VsVs: no, there is only one philosophy of language, language and languages are complementary!





Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Locke, J. Leibniz Vs Locke, J. I 34/35
LeibnizVsLocke: Innate ideas are an ontological problem.
I 44
Innate Ideas [Eingeborene Ideen]/LeibnizVsLocke: Their origin does not lie in the sensory perception, but in the reflection. Reflection: Nothing else than the attentiveness for what is in us. The reflection finds that there is much innate in our mind because we are self innate.
e.g. being, unity, substance,duration, change, activity, perception, lust, and many other objects.
I 45
They are the condition for the objective being to be determined as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us together with the being, and are a formal determination of the being. It is not established how those innate ideas behave when meeting the "initial truths" [erste Wahrheiten], the latter which are derived from sensory perceptions.

I 46
Ideas/Perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (expansion, duration, appearance, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception! They are the "ideas of the pure reason". However, they are connected to the exterior world; as such, they can be defined and proved.

I 86
World/Totality/Leibniz: The construction of totality corresponds to calculus. Maximum: the infinite quantity of different substantialities.(World)
Minimum: Representation of the whole in the individual.(Representation).
I 87
LeibnizVsLocke: The connection of the indefinite quantity of predicates and the idea of the infinite as unity: this is the complete opposite of a pure addition of various things. As such, the idea of infinity is excluded from the realm of quantity!
There is no "infinite number". There also is no infinite line.

I 96
Miracle/Mysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: You should not seek refuge in miracles (God) or accept unexplainable forces.
Vollmer I 17
Leibniz/Vollmer: 1704. New treatise on human reason. LeibnizVsLocke: Vs wax tablet, Vstabula rasa. Even though there might be nothing written on the wax tablet, it has nevertheless a certain structure right from the beginning, particularly a certain surface. It depends on the type and the number of the sensory organs which signals are processed as sensory perceptions.
A propos: "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in some manner in the senses." ["Es gibt nichts im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen war"]: Leibniz: Except the mind itself!
Like Aristotle: Thesis: The mind has particular characteristics right from the beginning.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Metaphysical Realism Putnam Vs Metaphysical Realism VI 390
Truth/metaphysical realism/Putnam: thesis: truth is not radically epistemic. Because we could all be brains in a vat, even the most beautiful and most ideal, simplest and most conservative theory could be wrong. Verification/metaphysical realism: then "verified" implies not "true".
Peircean Realism/Putnam: thesis: there is an ideal theory (weaker: than a regulative idea that is presupposed by the terms "true" and "objective").
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: I criticize precisely the characteristic that distinguishes it from Peirce's realism. E.g.
T1: is an ideal theory as we understand it. We imagine that it has any property except for objective truth; e.g. it is complete, consistent, predicts observations accurately (as we see and meets all "operational restrictions", it is "beautiful", "simple", etc.
Putnam: thesis: T1 may still be wrong.
E.g. WORLD/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Suppose, it can be divided into an infinite number of parts. And T1 says that there are infinitely many parts in it, so that it is "objectively correct" in this regard.
T1: is consistent (by hypothesis) and has only finite models.
Completeness Theorem: according to it, T1 has a model for every infinite cardinality.
M: is a model with the same cardinality as the WORLD. (This is finite.) The particulars of M are mapped one to one to the parts of the WORLD. We use this mapping to define the relations of M directly in the WORLD.
SAT: is then the result of it: a fulfillment relationship, a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of parts of the WORLD. ((s) sets because of the predicates).
Truth: the theory results then in "true" when we interpret "true" as "TRUE(SAT)". (I 403 thereby SAT is of the same logical type as "satisfied" and TRUE(SAT) is defined in terms of SAT like "true" is defined in terms of "satisfied" with Tarski).
VI 391
TRUE(SAT): is then the property of the truth, determined by the relation SAT. ideal theory: Question: what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory could be wrong" in reality"?
Solution: It may be that SAT is not the intended correspondence relation (unintended model).
"Intended"/Putnam: what does it mean in this case? T1 meets all operational limitations. E.g. if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" belongs to T1,
VI 392
then that will naturally appear true when there is a cow in front of me. But SAT is a true interpretation of T.
Definition operational conditions/Putnam/(s): that a sentence can be falsified if the object does not have the properties that the sentence attributes to it.
T1 is TRUE(SAT). Thus, the sentence is "true" in this sense, in the sense of TRUE(SAT).
On the other hand: if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" is operationally "wrong" (falsified), then the sentence is FALSE(/ SAT).
Reference: thus, it meets the "operational conditions".
theoretical conditions: the interpretation of "reference" as SAT meets all theoretical conditions for reference.
N.B.: so the "ideal" theory T1 becomes true. ((s) Problem: We wanted to ask how it can be wrong according to the metaphysical realism).
unintended: question: what additional conditions are there for reference, that could SAT pick out as "unintended" and a different interpretation as intended?
Putnam: thesis, the assumption that even an "ideal" theory could be wrong "in reality", should then be incomprehensible.
Causal theory/reference/metaphysical realism/Putnam: a causal theory of reference would not help here, because how "cause" should clearly refer, is, according to the metaphysical realism, as much a mystery as "cow" can clearly refer.
VI 393
Reference/anti-realism/verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/anti-realism/Dummett: thesis, the theory of understanding should be operated in terms of verification and falsification.
DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (for example, sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses truth-conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood.
Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence is to know what would be its verification.
Analogy: for the intuitionism: knowing the constructive proof, is to understand a mathematical proposition.
Assertibility condition/assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified.
Verification/Dummett/Putnam. N.B.: we say the sentence is verified when it is pronounced > Firth:
Definition self-affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirmative. It is thus verified when it is pronounced. This does not mean that it is incorrigible. It also does not have to be completely determined (bivalent).
Facts/Dummett/Putnam: thesis: in this sense (the "self-affirmation of observation sentences" (Firth)) all facts are "soft".
VI 394
N.B.: thereby, the realistic terms of truth and falsity are not used. N.B.: the problem how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise. Because the term "reference" is not used.
Reference: can we introduce it à la Tarski, but then ""cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and understanding this sentence needs no metaphysical realism.
Facts/verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: one should not operate the verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither the one of sense data). Otherwise you could repeat all objections VsMetaphysical Realism on the level that the meta language gets incomprehensible (which would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein's private language argument). (?).
Solution/Dummett: we need to apply the verificationism also in the meta language and the meta-meta language etc.
Understanding/truth condition/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions.
Problem: then it gets incomprehensible vice-versa in what this knowledge should be.
Meaning/meaning theory/PutnamVsDummett: but I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory.
VI 395
VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (with a theory of reference, not meaning theory). Realism/Putnam: then it is not wrong per se, but only the metaphysical, which was just a picture anyway. (So you could say at least).
Solution:
Internal realism is all we need.
Problem: that is not the whole story:
Peirce: the metaphysical realism collapses at a certain point, and this point tells us something, because it is precisely this point at which the metaphysical realism claims to be distinguishable from Peirce's realism . (That is, from the proposition that there is an ideal theory).
PeirceVsMetaphysical realism/PutnamVsPeirce: is mistaken when he says that the metaphysical realism collapses at this exact spot. And I, myself, was already wrong in this point. > E.g.
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism/PutnamVsPeirce: the metaphysical realism is incoherent elsewhere:
E.g. Suppose, the WORLD is merely a straight line.
Then you can tell 2 stories about the WORLD:
Story 1: there are points. That is, the line has segments which can be infinitely small. The same relation "part of" is valid between points and segments that contain it
VI 396
and between segments and large segments. Story 2: there are no points. Line and all segments have expansion. Thus, it is not claimed that story 1 would be wrong, points are simple logical constructions of segments. Speech about points is derived from speech about segments.
VI 397
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Problem: when you cannot say how the WORLD theory is independent, the speech of all these descriptions will be empty. Putnam: Quine says that in "Ontological Relativity". E.g.
Theory: if we have a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation (AER): "provable co-extensiveness", with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes (Aeki), no model of the theory refers to the referent, while, if they belong to the same equivalence class, they have the same referent in each model.
We take advantage of that.
Now, if our view is correct,
VI 399
then there is a unique reference maintaining "translation", which connects the two languages. Problem: it is known that there are often not equivalent interpretations of a theory within another theory. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2, namely in many different ways. E.g. "points" can be understood as sets of segments with negative power of two. Or sets of segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3.
VsMetaphysical Realism/problem: if that was so, there ought to be a fact about which translation "really" contains the reference.
Putnam: now we can make the picture again more complicated in order to also address the second objection: we allow that the language has more than one way, how it can be applied to the WORLD. (> way of use).
Problem: we can no longer hold onto the image itself. If that, what is a unique set of things within a correct theory, could be "in reality" no definite set, then we have no picture anymore.
Internal realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all of these?
VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "how do you know that "cow" refers to cows"? After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language).
VsVs: E.g. Suppose, God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory.
Problem: there would still be infinitely many possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the sentence ""cow" refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then, that it is true in this sense of "true" that there is a unique "intended" interpretation? "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a certain set of things as opposed to a certain set of things in each accessible interpretation?"
Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the reverse direction.
Reference/internal RealismVsVs: that "cow" refers to cows, follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism would be wrong. Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth.
not revisable: but it is not absolutely unrevisable that "cow" refers to cows, but to revise it you would have to reject the whole theory.
Metaphysical RealismVs: The question is therefore not answered: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question.
VI 401
Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism/Putnam: the metaphysical realism makes it a mystery how there can be truths a priori, even in the contextual sense, even as a limiting case. An a priori truth must be given by a mysterious intuition. Even E.g. "bachelors are unmarried" would only be a priori due to an intuition. But if it is a "verbal" truth ((s)> "analytical", true because of the meaning of the words) then this is an abbreviation for E.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried. And that is an instance of "all AB are A". And why is that true?
VI 404
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism is doomed to a) consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believed, myself) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or b) he must see the logic as a priori in the sense, which cannot be explained by the term of convention.
---
Field IV 414
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (Reason, Truth and History pp 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and the relativism refutes itself. ---
VII 440
Theory Change/truth value/Putnam: not every sentence changes the truth value when it changes from an acceptable theory in another acceptable theory. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: but to set off an image, it suffices to show that his project of a complete description of the world without such sentences that change truth values, is impracticable.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Perry, J. Lewis Vs Perry, J. Lewis IV 70
Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them.
LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I":

Frank I 210
"I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.)
Fra I 402
(Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)).
Lewis IV 70
All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t.
IV 71
And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S.
Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability.
Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant).
Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP).
Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split).
PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR.
It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R.
Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t.
It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time.
Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages:
E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1.
Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined.
Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after.
Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge.
LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons?
"There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages).
IV 72
And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it:
The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person.
Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years.
Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge.
Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons!
Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one.
RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274).
Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity.
Lewis: but he could take it over.
LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing:
This leads to overpopulation again:
For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today.
IV 151
Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject.
The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.).
Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals.
Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case.
IV 152
De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm).
External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ...
Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.)
Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things.
LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Putnam, H. Poundstone Vs Putnam, H. I 95
Quark/Poundstone: are quarks counterfactual? It is impossible to observe an isolated quark. They are what would make a proton split if it could be split, but it cannot be split.
I 96
Reason: the color intensity grows with increasing distance instead of diminishing. Endless energy demand. Even if it was possible to provide this energy, new particles would be produced instead of a quark.
PoundstoneVsPutnam: the answer to whether these assumptions are merely complications lies not in the skies, but in our minds.

I 319
Universe/Turtle/Poundstone: E.g. "The universe rests on the back of a turtle": is to say that the known universe rests on the back of an unknown turtle. We automatically determine the semantic content of "universe" such that it fits into the context of the sentence. Brains in the Vat/PoundstoneVsPutnam: we would do the same with a statement, "We are brains in a vat"! They could say: "I am that which "retort brain" means in the laboratory language". Within the retort language "laboratory language" would be a metaphysical expression without physical equivalent.

I 323
Thought Experiment/PoundstoneVsPutnam: possible or impossible physical realization is of importance in thought experiments! E.g. Twin Earth: a long chemical formula would correspond to a thick, sticky mass! Therefore no confusability with our water, other mental state!
The only other combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O2 hydrogen peroxide) is extremely unstable.
Planets with ammonia atmosphere would have to be much colder. When ammonia is liquid, mercury is solid. That would be a very different world.
((s) PoundstoneVsPutnam/(s): brings a holistic argument then).
I 324
PoundstoneVsPutnam: our brain is largely composed of water, i.e. we also have the meaning of water in our heads. The inhabitants of the Twin Earth would then have XYZ in their heads!
I 326
Twin Earth/Putnam: every experience is ambiguous. The counterparts have made identical experiences, their neuron currents or brain states may be identical, but there is more than one reality to match.
I 336
Model Theory/PoundstoneVsPutnam: a key which provides some kind of meaningful text at all will be the right one! Reason: the infinite number of theoretically possible keys.
I 339
Meaning/Translation/Coding/Cryptography/Poundstone: where is it? In the message, in the key? In the consciousness of those who understand the message? PoundstoneVsPutnam: only few would argue that the meaning is in the consciousness, after all, i.e. in the mind.
Extreme case: if the system puts out "iiii...", then the entire meaning lies in the key. Mostly, the meaning is divided between the text and the key.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
Quantum Mechanics Cartwright Vs Quantum Mechanics I 197
Master equation/QM/Cartwright: when it is derived, the system is coupled to a reservoir. In theory, the two should developed into a superposition of composite space. MarkovVsSuperposition: removes the interference terms and decouples the system. This, in turn, is justified by the large number of degrees of freedom of the reservoir. These lead to short correlation times.
Problem: (of this solution attempt for the characterization problem): 1) the reduction often also takes place in other situations. But our solution is only suitable for a few cases.
2) even if the application could be extended, it would not really solve the characterization problem: Because we postulate two entirely different types of development and want to see then whether a particular physical characteristic ((s)> property) is given if one or the other is present. Problem: this characteristic only exists in the model, not in the real situation!
Interference: in order to eliminate it, the number of degrees of freedom must be infinite, which is obviously not possible. Or accordingly, the correlation time would have to be 0.
We could try the other way around and simply demand that all systems have an infinite number of degrees of freedom.
I 198
Vs: That would not help us to distinguish the two types of development either. Problem: sheer size does not divide the world into parts.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Quietism Wright Vs Quietism Rorty VI 44/45
WrightVsQuietism/Rorty: Davidson, Dewey: aversion to correspondence and representation.
Rorty VI 56
Research/Wright/Rorty (Rorty: "metaphysical activism"): the truth in the sense of a desirable non-causal relationship between the linguistic and the non-linguistic is a goal of research. (DavidsonVs, VsQuietismus). Davidsonians:
a) conventions only,
b) even an infinite number of justifications would not be sufficient.
VI 57
c) therefore, there is nothing that can be clearly identified as an 'objective of research'. Although the desire for justification is of course a motive of research.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Simons Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 60
Ontology/variables/quantification/Lesniewski/Simons: because of his understanding of quantification Lesniewski can quantify over variables (otherwise 2nd order logic).
I 61
But by this he does not enter into any commitment. Quantification/Lesniewski: was described by Quine as substitutional quantification but:
SimonsVsQuine: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions and he also does not assume an infinite number of expressions. That would be for him as nominalists also implausible.
Küng/Canty/solution: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions but on their extensions. Thus abstract entities are still allowed by the back door.
Simons: you could say that Lesniewski developed a combinatorial semantics, that is based on a simple idea of an "extensional" meaning so that an expression of the form "Π ... [__]" is true iff. the matrix is true regardless of the meaning of the variables.
"∏"/Lesniewski/ordinary language translation/Simons: simply "for all".
I 123
Four dimensionalism/Quine: (1960, W. + O.): physical objects in four-dimensional space-time are not distinguishable from events (more concrete: processes).
I 124
Substance/Quine: differs from other physical objects in that there are relatively few atoms that (temporary) lie partly in it partly outside of it. Substance/SimonsVsQuine: this is simply wrong: material substances are not simply those who win or lose few atoms.
I 128
Extension/Quine: Quine called their occupants: "content of a portion of space-time". SimonsVs: instead superposition (different individuals with identical parts in the same place at the same time.
continuants/SimonsVsQuine: if such occupants exist at all, they have to be continuants.
Events/Simons: seem at least to have a chance to meet the extensionalist principle no matter whether arbitrary sums are approved. Here we need definitions of the concepts of temporal and spatial part.
Masses: here we need different meanings of "part" to capture the relations between individuals, between classes or between masses. But this is different than the criticism in the last chapter because here it is about that there may be various analog applications.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Ramsey, F. P. Grover Vs Ramsey, F. P. Horwich I 319
VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: the first two objections assume that the data base is too narrow, i.e. that there are cases that are not covered by the theory. (See Redundancy Theory).
I 320
1)
Index words: (Here: repetition of indices): (14) John: I’m greedy - Mary: That is true Problem: here no mere repetition, or else she would say "I am,..." Problem: there is no general scheme for such cases. 2)
Modification: Here, a translation is absolutely impossible: (here with indirect reference and quantification):
(15) Every thing that Mark said could be true Problem: there is no verb for "could". Similar:
(16) Something that Charlie said is either true or not true.
(17) Everything that Judith said was true then, but none of it is still true today. Of course you can try:
(15’)(p) Mark said that p > It could be the case that p) or
(15’)(p) (Mark said that p > that might p exist) Vs: "being the case" and "existing" are variations of "being true". This would make the redundancy theory a triviality. In this case, Ramsey’s "direct" theory would be wrong. CGBVsRamsey: we improve the redundancy theory by we let by not only allowing propositional quantification for the target language, but also an indeterminate field of links, such as M (for "might"), "P" (for past tense), "~" for negation, etc.
I 321
The reader has likely already assumed that we have introduced the negation long ago. But that’s not true. Then: (16’)(p) (Mark said that p > Mp)
(17’)(Ep) (Charlie said that p & (p v ~p))
(17’)(p) (Judith said that p > (Pp & ~p))
Redundancy Theory/Ramsey/CGB: it is this variant of the theory of Ramsey, enriched by the above links and propositional quantification, which we call redundancy theory (terminology) from now on. The thesis is that "true" thus becomes superfluous. Thesis this allows translations in Ramseyan sense to be found always.
VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey: 3) "About"/Aboutness/Accuracy of the Translation/CGB: some authors: argue that "snow is white" is about snow, and "That snow is white, is true" is about the proposition. And that therefore the translation must fail.
CGB: this involves the paradox of analysis. We do not directly touch upon it. ((s) Paradox of analysis, here: you’d have to act more stupid than you are in order not to realize that both sentences are about snow; to be able to name the problem at all (as the opponents do) you need to have it solved already.)
4)
PragmatismVsRedundancy Theory: even if the translation preserves the alleged content, it neglects other features which should be preserved. Case of recurrence: E.g.
(3) Mary: Snow is white. John: That is true.
(3’) Mary: Snow is white. John: Snow is white. Is that supposed to be a good translation?.
I 322
Strawson: "true" and "not true" have their own jobs to do!. Pro-Sentence/Pronoun/Anaphora/"True"/CGB: "that is true" presupposes that there is an antecedent. But that is not yet taken into account in Ramsey’s translation (3’). So Ramsey’s translation fails in pragmatic terms.
VsPropositional Quantification/PQ/VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/CGB: 4) redundancy: at what price? Propositional quantification is mysterious: it is not consistent with everyday language. It is not shown that "is true" is superfluous in German, but only in a curious ad hoc extension. 5) Grammar: (already anticipated by Ramsey): variables need predicates that are connected with them, even if these variables take sentence position. CGBVsRamsey: unfortunately, Ramsey’s response is not convincing. Ramsey: (see above) "p" already contains a (variable) verb. We can assume the general sentence form as aRb here, then.
I 232
(a)(R)(b): If he says aRb, then aRb). Here,"is true" would be a superfluous addition. CGBVsRamsey: We must assume an infinite number of different sentence forms ((s)> language infinite). Redundancy Theory/CGB: But that does not need to worry us. 1) Propositional quantification can be set up formally and informally proper. 2) Variables which take sentences as substituents do not need a verb that is connected to them. That this was the case, is a natural mistake which goes something like this:
E.g.(4’) (p)(John says p > p).
If we use pronouns that simplify the connected variable:
For each sentence, if John said it, it then it.
Heidelberger: (1968): such sentences have no essential predicate!.
Solution/Ramsey:
(4’) For each sentence, if John said that it is true, then it is true. T-Predicate/CGB: "T": reads "is true".
(4’) (p) (John said that Tp > Tp) Problem: because "T" is a predicate, and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, i.e. it must take a nominal position. I.e. the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables about sentences.
I 335
Disappearance Cases/Pro-Sentence: some of them can be regarded as a translation in Ramsey language. Def Ramsey Language/CGB/(s): Language in which "true" is entirely superfluous. English*/CGBVsRamsey: for the purpose of better explanation. E.g. (26) It is true that snow is white, but in Pittsburgh it rarely looks white.
(27) It is true that there was unwarranted violence by the IRA, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. T-Predicate/CGB: used in (25) and (26) to concede a point in order to determine afterwards by "but" that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. English*.
I 336: E.g.
(26’) There was unwarranted violence by the IRA, that’s true, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. These are all disappearance cases.
I 342
VsProsentential Theory/Spurious Objections/CGB:
I 343
Index Words: Laziness pro-sentences refer to their antecedent. Therefore, the theory must be refined further when it comes to indexical expressions. Otherwise E.g. John: "I’m lazy." Mary: "That’s true." Is not to say that Mary means "I (Mary) am lazy". CGB: but that’s a common problem which occurs not only when speaking about truth: E.g. John: My son has a wart on his nose. Bill: He is the spitting image of his father. E.g. Lucille: You dance well. Fred: That’s new to me. Pragmatics/CGBVsRamsey: our approach represents it correctly, in particular, because we exclude "plagiarism". Ramsey’s theory does not.
I 344
Quote/VsPro-Sentence Theory/VsCGB: The pro-sentence theory is blamed to ignore cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences, is expressed. E.g. (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: We could say with Ramsey, that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: that obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become more apparent when we use a foreign language translation. E.g.
(28) If "snow is white" is true, then... Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then or If snow is white, then... CGB: There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that we want to make clear that the original sentence was said in German. Or it is possible that there is no elegant translation, or we are not sufficiently familiar with German grammar. Or E.g. "snow is white" must be true, because Fritz said it, and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose, English* had a possibility to present a sentence formally: E.g. "consider __".
(29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work just like "Snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: it could be argued that this requires a reference on sentences or expressions, because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation Marks/CGB: we depart from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors.
I 353
Propositional Variable/Ramsey: Occupies sentence position. (Quantification over propositions). CGBVsRamsey: Such variables are of pro-sentential nature. Therefore, they should not be connected to a T-predicate. ((s) otherwise, "true" appears twice). T-Predicate/Ramsey/Redundancy Theory/CGB: this answers the old question of whether a Ramsey language has to contain a T-predicate: see below. Our strategy is to show how formulas can be read in English*, where there is no separable T-predicate. E.g. (4’) For each proposition, if John says it is true, then it is true. CGB: in this case,propositional variables and quantificational pro-sentences do the same job. Both take sentence position and have the cross-reference that is required of them. Important argument: (4’) is just the candidate for a normal English translation of (4’). Problem: this could lead to believing that a Ramsey language needs a T-predicate, as in
(4’) (p)(John said that Tp > Tp). ((s) then, "true" implicitly appears twice).
I 354
But since (4’) is perfect English, there is no reason to assume that the T-predicate is re-introduced by that. Or that it contains a separately bound "it" (them).

Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Fodor Vs Redundancy Theory I 138
Reduction/Fodor: since it is asymmetrical, it should turn out that physics is the fundamental science.  FodorVsReductionism: so it will turn out that reductionism is too strong a basis for the unified science.
Fodor pro token physicalism.
I 141
Def Reductionism/Fodor: the assumption that every natural kind is a physical natural kind or coextensive with it. (Every natural kind is a physical natural kind if bridge laws express characteristic identity).
I 142
 Vs: a) interesting generalizations could be made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common.  b) often it is irrelevant whether physical descriptions have something in common.
 c) the individual sciences deal primarily with generalizations of this kind.
Reductionism/Fodor: more precarious: he asserts that the coextensions are nomologically necessary. Bridge laws are laws. FodorVs. (Davidson ditto)
I 143
FodorVsReductionism: the assumption that every mental event is a physical event does not guarantee that physics can provide a suitable vocabulary for psychological theory.
I 147
Psychology/Neuroscience/Fodor: Of course we can provide evidence that neural events, that otherwise form a heterogeneous mass, have a kind of properties in common.       Such correspondences can now justify token physicalism as well as type physicalism.
FodorVsReductionism: but if this is true, the arguments which infer from token physicalism to reductionism must be wrong.
I 154 +
Reductionism/Tradition: if x and y differ in the descriptions which make them subject to the actual laws of physics, they must also differ in the descriptions by which they fall under any laws.  FodorVs: why would we believe that? Two entities may differ physically and still converge in an infinite number of properties. (> description dependent >Davidson?).
 Fodor: why should there not be some among these properties whose lawful correlation supports the generalizations of the individual disciplines?

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Regularism Brandom Vs Regularism I 308
Regularity theories: attempts to define boundaries of terms, difference between correct and incorrect use - Assessment of truth based on the application of concepts. I 309 Problem: gerrymandering: there is an infinite number of patterns to describe a regularity
Regularity: can only achieve something if some regularities are privileged over others.
I 313
The terms of regularity and reliability cannot do the work alone: The concept of regularity cannot distinguish regularities. And the concept of regularity with respect to the reference classes cannot distinguish reference classes.
I 823
Regularism: (BrandomVs): Conceives implicit standards as mere regularities in practice.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Russell, B. Holz Vs Russell, B. Leibniz I 64f
Facts of Truth/FoT/Leibniz: are contingent - Reason truths: are necessary. HolzVsRussell: the difference lies in the proof. Otherwise Russell would be right: Truth/necessity/contingent/Russell: it is senseless to say of a true sentence that it is not true in the sense of another, apodictically true proposition. ((s) I.e. that a rational truth would contradict a factual truth).
Holz: for the proof of facts of truth we need the preceding chain of links and (because of the infinite divisibility of the body) an infinite number of sentences.

Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Ryle, G. Fodor Vs Ryle, G. II 118
Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking.
Language/FodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.
Rorty I 256
Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here you have make do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it’s just the notion of ​​the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this!. Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned!
Either 1) the infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have a unlearned ability.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Spinoza, B. Leibniz Vs Spinoza, B. I 12
Metaphysics/Holz: Spinoza is an example of the highest level of traditional metaphysics LeibnizVsSpinoza.
I 38
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The world is the infinite diversity of simple substances; for the latter therefore, there can be an infinite number of statements.
I 58
Identity/Multiplicity/Diversity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The origin of identity's evidence does not touch upon the multiplicity of the given. Spinoza, however, reduces everything on the unity of a single substance. The principle of identity is purely logical formal. But:
epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: The ontological quality of identity's principle is not to be found in itself but in the sensory perception.
The senses let see that "A is A" is a sentence, and that the opposite of it, "A is not A", is a formal contradiction.
The senses show that the predicate lives in the subject, and that is a contradiction to deny this.
Holz: However, this is not irrational empiricism: the system of vérités de raison [Vernunftwahrheiten], which necessarily pertain in this possible world, must be possible in the facticity of this world.
But the logical in the facticity is only perpetually given by reason in the course of deduction.
I 59
We do not have a direct access to it. It must be deduced at first. In order to not have pre-predicative evidence transform into irrationality, deduction needs to be firstly grounded in an ontological construction. This is done by identity which shows itself to be the necessary structure of a diverse and changing world. (Reflection).
I 63
VsSpinoza: For Spinoza, the problem cannot be solved if one accepts the existence of the individual. He solves the problem or rather it does not appear in his field of vision because for him the human is formed from particular modifications of God's attributes.
As such, the Cartesian doubt is not considered. The ego cogitans becomes a mere appearance, it is an annex to the self-assured unity of God.
Thus, Spinoza turns back to the realism of the Middle Ages.
Thus, facticity's rationality cannot be established.


I 73
LeibnizVsSpinoza: World's unity is its structure, not a substance, which defines everything.
I 75
Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: However, it is necessary that the ultima ratio is a reason and not a plurality, because the reason is the structure of the whole. Therefore, Leibniz does not need to sacrifice the plurality of things in order to come to a single and only world [die eine und einzige Welt]. Instead of Spinoza's substance, there is the "harmonie universelle".
I 90
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary ens [Seiende] only seems to correspond to Spinoza's substance. In reality, it is only the term for the totality of the inner-worldly [innerweltlich] facts. (Holz: " All that is the case" ["Alles, was der Fall ist"]; Wittgenstein). Der Begriff des als seiend Erfahrenen schließt den Begriff der wirklichen Totalität ein.
I 91
Therefore, if something is, then the one is the being of all, and not of nothing.[Wenn daher etwas ist, dann ist auch das eine Sein aller Seienden und nicht nichts.]

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Steady State Theory Verschiedene Vs Steady State Theory Kanitscheider I 359
Steady State Theory/SST/Bondi/Kanitscheider: Thesis: Priority of cosmology over local physics. Bondi's Thesis: the unclear complexity of the phenomenon world is only one property of the mesocosm.
I 360
VsSST: incompatible with our empiricism: a static universe has long been in thermodynamic equilibrium. All development would already have reached its final state. It would no longer be possible to determine the direction of the time flow. Of the two types of motion allowed by Perfect Cosmological Principle, expansion and contraction, contraction is already eliminated because the necessary excess of radiation in relation to matter is lacking.
For expansion, however, the steady state theory now needs the assumption of constant additional generation of matter. But this overrides the important principle of hydrodynamic continuity!
I 361
However, at the current values for density and recession constant (distance movement of galaxies from each other), the origin of matter would only be one H atom per litre every 5x10 exp 11 years. Conservation of Matter/BondiVsVs: he even believes he can save the conservation of matter. He says that in a certain, observable area, seen globally, the observable amount of matter does not change, i.e. that in a constant eigenvolume matter is preserved, in contrast to the
relativistic models, where the conservation applies rather to the coordinate volume.
The
Def Eigenvolume is the part of space that is fixed by a fixed distance from the observer, while the
Def coordinate volume is given by the constancy of the com mobile coordinates.
I 362
Steady State Theory/SST: here there is always the same amount of matter within the range of a certain telescope, while here the relativity theory assumes a dilution, i.e. the matter remains the same in the expanding volume. At the SST, the new formation ensures that the total amount of all observable matter remains the same.
Observer/SST: when investigating motion, each observer can perceive a preferred direction of motion apart from local deviations, whereby he determines the constant relationship between velocity and distance completely symmetrically within a small range.
In relativistic cosmology this was the starting point for the Weyl principle.
Def Weyl-Principle: Postulate: the particles of a substrate (galaxies) lie in spacetime on a bundle of geodesists that start from a point in the past (Big Bang) and never intersect except at this point.
From this follows the existence of a family of hyperplanes (t = const) orthogonal to these geodesists and the only parameters possessing cosmic time.
I 362/363
Bondi/SST/Steady State Theory: doubts now that in view of the scattering of the fog movement these hyperplanes exist secured. Because of its stationary character, SST does not need Weyl's postulate and can define homogeneity without cosmic time.
Thermodynamic imbalance/universe/SST: Explanation: a photon emanating from a star has a very long free path and reaches areas with strongly changed local motion. This shifts its frequency to red.
However, the thermal energy it gives off on its way to the surrounding matter is only a very small part of that lost by its original star. Thus the universe represents a kind of cosmic sink for radiant energy.
According to the Perfect Cosmological Principle, sources must exist that make up for the loss.
Perfect Cosmological Principle: is logically compatible with three types of universes:
1. Static, without new creation of matter,
2. Expanding, with new development
I 364
3. Collapsing, with destruction of matter SST/Bondi: believes in the strict relationship between distance and speed
R'(t)/R(t) = 1/T. This results in R as an exponential function and the metric of the SST takes the form of the line element of de Sitter. (see above).
Already the self-similarity of the scale function shows the basic metric properties of this model. It is not possible for us to recognize at which point of the curve R = et/T we are. The universe has no beginning and no end.
I 365
Age/Universe/SST: Advantage over relativistic theories where the inverse Hubble constant led to a too low age. Metric/SST: while the de Sitter metric is unusable in Einstein's representation because it can only be reconciled with vanishing matter, this problem does not occur in the SST: here there is no necessary connection between physical geometry and matter content of space!
According to the de Sitter structure, the world has an event horizon, i.e. every clock on a distant galaxy follows in such a way that there is a point in its history after which the emitted light can no longer reach a distant observer.
If, however, a particle has formed within the range that can in principle be reached with ideal instruments, then it can never disappear from its field of view.
I 367
Perfect Cosmological Principle: Problem: lies in the statistical character, which applies strictly on a cosmic scale, but not locally, whereby the local environment only ends beyond the galaxy clusters. Steady State Theory/SST/Hoyle: starts from the classical field equations, but changes them so strongly that all Bondi and Gold results that they have drawn from the Perfect Cosmological Principle remain valid.
Hoyle/SST: Thesis: In nature a class of preferred directions can obviously be observed in the large-scale movements, which makes a covariant treatment impossible! Only a preferred class of observers sees the universe in the same way.
I 368
Weyl Principle/Postulate: defines a unique relationship of each event P to the origin O. It cannot be a strict law of nature, since it is constantly violated in the local area by its own movements! Hoyle: (formula, tensors, + I 368). Through multiple differentiation symmetric tensor field, energy conservation does not apply, matter must constantly arise anew.
Matter emergence/SST/Hoyle: there is an interpretation of matter origin caused by negative pressure in the universe. It should then be interpreted as work that this pressure does during expansion!
VsSST: the synchronisation of expansion and origin is just as incomprehensible from theory as the fact that it is always matter and not antimatter that arises.
(...+ formula, other choice of the coupling constant I 371/72).
I 373
Negative Energy: it has been shown to cause the formation rate of particle pairs to "run away": infinite number in finite region. VsSST/Empiricism: many data spoke against the SST: excess of distant and thus early radio sources, redshift of the quasars indicating a slowdown of expansion, background radiation.





Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Stich, St. Davidson Vs Stich, St. Frank I 663
DavidsonVsStich: our "folkloric psychology" is indeed somewhat unregulated, but indispensable. >Folk psychology. Thoughts/Deception/Error/Knowledge/Davidson: follows from the external identification of mental states as such that we can (sometimes) be mistaken about our own thoughts? It follows for externalism, because every object can be determined by an infinite number of properties outside of the actor. This is also generally admitted.
I 663/664
DavidsonVs: However, I deny these assumptions. >Externalism/Davidson.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Theory Ladenness Wright Vs Theory Ladenness I 204
Fashionable Thought/Realism/Theory/Science/WrightVs: every observation is "theory laden". Perception/Theory:
1. Observation equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensory perception, because it is conceptually coined. (McDowell pro).
This now provides a good basis for the view that the conceptual equipment of the subjects is different.
I 205
2. Every pre-philosophical utterance about the material world reaches beyond experience in an infinite number of ways. 3. The coverage of terms does not consist merely in classifying. They contain the possession of beliefs. (e.g. that things form a species at all).
WrightVs: that is certainly all right. The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not, however, be to question the opposition between data and theory.
I 206
Concept/Wright: a) Beliefs should not be assumed a priori for the concepts. This is not appropriate. Concepts are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. b) The everyday content of experience is not an obstacle for pre-theoretical data. It can always happen that one agrees to an experience pattern against his background beliefs, even if this can be cancelled later again.
Theoreticity of Contemplation/Theory/Wright:
4. The kind of theory ladenness needed to get the distinction data/theory into difficulties is rather the following(see above):
It must be shown that the conditions for assertion (assertibility) are necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experiences, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs.
I 207
WrightVsTheoreticity of Observation/VsTheory Ladenness/Wright: if all observation theory is laden, there are no statements to which any subject is obliged to agree. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). Wright: the justified assertiveness is rather a four-digit relation between:
Statement - Subject - Course of Experience - Background Assumptions.
I 208
Theory/Observation: Example A and B disagree on the stature of a theory Ho based on the observation Oo. B evaluates the same observations under a theory H1.
A agrees that if H1 is accepted, his experience does not give enough reasons to accept Oo.
Then it is not about vagueness, it is about status. This status question continues now, if it is about H1 instead of Ho: B accepts H1 because of O1, but A represents a theory H2...(I 209+) about O1.
I 209
The other agrees that, if the other theory applies, the reaction of the other is appropriate. Divergence on each point, but agreement on conditional acceptability.
I 210
We determine that the respective observation reports are correct in terms of experience and background theory. If everyone works with incorrect data, the result is that they create their reports in the context of an incorrect background theory.
If he works with materially incomplete data, he necessarily works with a true background theory, which he does not agree with!
Problem: can it be certainly considered a priori that there are nevertheless cognitive deficits regarding the theoretical background obligations? (Can only mean that one accepts a wrong theory).
Evidence: whether a theory is erroneous or flawless must now (see above) at least in principle be recognizable!
Such a confirmation, however, could ultimately only be provided by independently credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation).
I 211
However, the example shows the possibility that this remains undecidable. Vs: the relationship between experience and observation reports can plausibly be described as that of a "positive presumption". I.e. it is not as if experience tends to confirm or refute a report only in the context of appropriate empirical background beliefs, there is rather a
Def default relation of confirmation between experiences and statements.
Example "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification insofar as it concerns the color. An appropriate justification by experience can be overridden in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but is otherwise presumably valid.
((s) As long as nothing else "appears").
Question: can one now assume cognitive deficiency after all?
A theorist who accepts O n 1 may either do so because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or he may prejudice the validity of the evidence.
If now there is no other support for Hn, the assumption of Hn by the first theorist remains unjustified, and the denial in law.
I 212
VsVs: this does not take into account that the regress of theories can interlock backwards. Therefore, one cannot claim that both theorists are to blame either for defending unsupported theories or for being cognitively deficient. Problem:
Evidence/Theory/Observation: if the truth is limited by evidence and all observation is theory laden, then differences of opinion cannot certainly be traced back to cognitive deficiencies.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Tractatus Wittgenstein Vs Tractatus Tugendhat I 163
Tractatus/Tugendhat: naive object-theoretical position. Wittgenstein: "what the case, the fact is, is the existence of atomic facts", "the fact is a combination of objects". "In the facts objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain". (2.03). (Later discarded by Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein/late/self-criticism/VsTractatus: Philosophical remarks: "complex is not the same as fact I say of a complex, it is moving from one place to another, but not from a fact." "To say that a red circle consists of redness and circularity, or a complex of these constituents, is an abuse of such words and misleading."
---
I 235 ff
WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/WittgensteinVsTractatus/Hintikka. WWK, 209 f. "unclear to me in the Tractatus was the logical analysis and ostensive definition" ... "thought at this time that it is a connection between language and reality"... ---
I 236
Sign/Meaning/Definition/showing/Waismann ("theses"): "We can give meaning to characters in two ways:. 1. by designation 2. by definition". ---
I 237
Hintikka: deeper reasons: in the Tractatus the thesis of inexpressibility of semantics does not stop Wittgenstein from highlighting the role of the ostensive definition under the guise of showing. Through his move from phenomenology to the physical language it is impossible for him to indicatively define all his not further-back-tracable objects. One and the same gesture may be in the game when one indicatively defines a person's name, a color word, a substance name (mass terminus) a numeral, the name of a compass direction.
The differences apparantly do not seem to belong to the area of the phenomenological, but to the ontology of everyday objects. Philosophical Investigations, PI § 28
For these reasons, Wittgenstein rejects for some time the idea that the ostensive explaining could establish a connection between language and reality.
---
I 297 ff
Image/agreement/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: is the vividness an agreement? ---
I 298
Image/sentence/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/self-criticism: in the Tractatus I said something like: it was an agreement of the form, however, this is a mistake. Hintikka: this could give the wrong impression, that Wittgenstein abandoned the image thoughts. But that is a mistake.
Image/Wittgenstein: the image can represent a possible state of affairs. It does not need to be an image of a de facto state in the world. A command is usually an image of the action that should be performed, but not necessarily an image of the actual completed act. (Also work drawing).
What is the method of projection?
---
I 299
"So I imagine the difference between sentence and reality is offset by the projection beams belonging to the image, the idea and which leave no more room for a method of application. There is only agreement and disagreement." "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality in grammar can be found in the language."
---
II 138
Atomism/VsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there were elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives of infinity as a number, and assumes that there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) they must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
---
III 151
Tractatus/later self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein: he was dealing with two weak points: 1. that the descriptive language is so openly regarded as a model of the actual language. There are many unrecognized forms of speech.
It may be questioned whether the meaning of an utterance can be understood regardless of the context. In addition, doubt, as to whether any meaningful sentence has one and only one logical form.
2. Problem of intersubjectivity disregarded.
---
III 214
WittgensteinVsTractatus (self-criticism): discussions with Ramsey and the Italian economy scientist Piero Sraffa. SraffaVsTractatus: VsImage theory: Vs, that a meaningful sentence must be a projection of a state of affairs. Also denied that any meaningful sentence could be resolved into elementary propositions.
From this critique emerged in 1929 30 Philosophical remarks (PB)
1932 34 Philosophical Grammar (PG)
1933 34 The Blue Book + The Brown Book
Main work of the "Second Period": Philosophical Investigations (Philosophical Investigations).
---
III 217
WittgensteinVsTractatus/Wittgenstein/late/Flor: that can be useful and clear in a specific situation, to give a vague question or a vague description or a vague instruction. ---
VI 95/96
Logical constants/elementary proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: self-criticism: does now no longer assume that one would be able later to specify elementary propositions. In truth, we already have everything, namely at present.
      New: Priority of sentence system over the individual sentence.
      Previously: I believed that we have to do without the logical constants, because "and", "or", "not" do not connect the objects. (I abide by this).
      But I falsely believed that the elementary propositions would be independent from each other because I falsely believed the linking rules of logical constants could have something to do with the internal structure of sentences.
In reality, the logical constants form rather just a part of a comprehensive syntax of which I did not know anything then."
---
VII 148
Language/Tractatus/Tetens: language only serves one purpose here: to map facts. WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/VsTractatus/later Wittgenstein/Tetens: instead there is a variety of language games. To speak sensibly, we must take part in a complicated social life form with its diverse language games.
---
VII 149
The philosopher must describe how we use the expressions in everyday language. ---
VII 150
"... a picture holds us captive. And we could not get out because it was in our language, and it seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." (Philosophical Investigations, PI 82) Descriptive/normative/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein's ignores in the Tractatus the distinction between descriptive and normative sentences. He later calls this the "one-sided diet" ((s) only descriptive sentences). (Philosophical Investigations, PI p. 251, § 593)
---
VII 152
Skepticism/philosophy/Wittgenstein/late: also the philosophers learned the words "error", "doubt", etc., from the everyday language, they have not been invented for the purpose of philosophizing. ---
VII 153
Deception/Wittgenstein/late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything, then he uses the words in a way that he would never use them in everyday life. ---
VII 154
Wittgenstein: E.g. one cannot say that one his mistaken about something in his joy.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Tradition Ryle Vs Tradition Lanz I 275
Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements.
I 276
They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs).
Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others.
I 277
RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them.

Ryle I 373
Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations?
Ryle I 66
Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. ---
I 84
VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems.
I 85
In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause.
I 86
RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances.
RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum.
Ryle I 87
If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will.
Ryle I 182
Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention.
Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities.
VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity.
Ryle I 215
Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them.
I 216
Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth!
1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary.
2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it.
3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena.
RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events.
I 217
There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them.
It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here.
Ryle I 388
Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the
newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality.
Ryle I 391
Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself.
Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises.
Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies.
Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said.
---
Flor I 263
Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies).
Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent!
It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules.
There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio
Flor I 264
Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Type Theory Quine Vs Type Theory III 315
Type Theory/TT/Quine: U1, U2 ... etc. logical types. Meaningless are expressions like "x e x", etc. "e2 may only stand between variables of successive type."
III 316
With that we avoid confusion of constants. Example: we do not identify the number 12, which contains the class A of the Apostles, with the number 12, which contains a certain class  consisting of a dozen classes. Because one is of the type U2, the other of type U3. Every type has a new number 12. ((s) Elsewhere: therefore VsType Theory: infinitely many numbers 1,2,3, etc.).
Number/Existence/Ontology/Quine: that there are these numbers no longer depends on whether there are so many individuals.
Type Theory/TT/Russell/Quine: Reason: we can derive an incorrect sentence without the separation of types: by simplifying the scheme (A) to (A'):
(A’) (Ey)(x)(x ε y . ↔ Fx)
If we then introduce the predicate «[1] ε [1]» for "F": we get the
Russell antinomy/Russell paradoxy/logical form:
(1) (Ey)(x)[x ε y . ↔ ~x ε x)]
(2) (x)(x ε y . ↔ ~(x ε x)] (1) y
(3) y ε y . ↔ ~(y ε y) (2)
(4) (Ey)[y ε y . ↔ ~y ε y)].
Solution/Zermelo/VsType Theory/Quine: simpler: some predicates have classes as extension, others don't. (A') is thus considered as valid for some, but not all sentences. E.g. the predicate "[1] ε [1]" has no class as an extension.
Zermelo: here (A') is assumed for the case in which the sentence has the form of a conjunction "x ε z. Gx" instead of "Fx". Then (A') becomes:
(Ey)(x)( x ε y . ↔ . x ε z . Gx).
Zermelo calls this the Def axiom schema of specification.
To any given class z this law supplies other classes that are all sub-classes of z. But by itself it supplies at first no non-empty classes z. (...)
III 318
Layers/Layered/Zermelo: (...) Sets/Classes/von Neumann/Quine: (...) Classes are not sets...
III 319
Axioms/Stronger/Weaker/Quine: (...) you can seek strength or weakness.
VII (e) 91
QuineVsType Theory: unnatural and uncomfortable disadvantages: 1) Universal class: because the TT only allows uniform types as members of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi universal classes, each for one type.
2) Negation: ~x ceases to comprise all non-elements of x, and only comprises those non-elements that do not belong to the next lower level!
VII (e) 92
3) Zero class: even that accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes. ((s) for each level its own zero class). ((s) Absurd: we cannot distinguish different zero classes.) 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level.
5) Relational calculus: accordingly. to be re-established at each level.
6) Arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform! at each level (type) appears a new 0, new 1, new 2, and so on!
Quine: instead counterproposal:
QuineVsType Theory: Solution: Instead: variables with unlimited range, the concept of hierarchical formulas only survives in one point where we write numbers for variables and, without any reference to type theory, we replace R3 by the weaker:
R3' If φ is stratified and does not contain "x", then
(Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ φ) is a theorem.
Negation: ~x then contains everything that is not part of x.
Zero class: there is only one zero class.
Universal class: there is similarly only one universal class that contains absolutely everything, including itself.
Relation, arithmetic, numbers: everything works out again comes in this way.
VII (e) 93
Only difference between R3 and R3': R3' lacks a guarantee for the existence of such classes as: y^ (y ε y), y^~(y ε y), etc.
In the case of some non-hierarchical formulas the existence of appropriate classes is still to be demonstrated through absurd consequences: R3' results in:
(Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε w)))
and by inserting this results in subsitution inference
(1) (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε z))) through the other rules
What asserts the existence of a class y^ ((z ε y) l (y ε z)) whose generating formula is not hierarchical.
But probably we cannot prove its existence. (From these follows inter alia Russell's paradox).
Within a system, we can explicitly use such contradictions to take their existence ad absurdum.
That (1) can be demonstrated, in turn, shows that the derivation strength of our system "NF" (New Foundations, Quine) exceeds the Principia Mathematica.

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Wittgenstein Carnap Vs Wittgenstein II 203
CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory).
Hempel I 99/100
Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages ​​with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora).
CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose.
CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences.
Carnap II 203
CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages ​​with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora)

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982
Wittgenstein Kripke Vs Wittgenstein I 43
E.g.: Wittgenstein: "Moses does not exist" means that "no human being has done this and that".(KripkeVs). Kripke: This is about the difference between reference and meaning: The theory in question is regarded as a theory of the meaning of the name "Moses" and not simply as a theory of his reference.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: In any case I think it is wrong that "Moses exists" actually holds this meaning (that he has done something).
I 70
KripkeVsWittgenstein: However, if the description has the function to rigidly define a reference, it is clear that this is "not" what the sentence "Moses did not exist" means; because in the counterfactual case, for example that no one led the Israelites out of Egypt, we can then ask: Does it ensue that Moses did not exist in such a situation? It seems that it does not ensue. For surely Moses would have been able to spend days more pleasantly.
NS I 39
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Problem of Infinity: How can a finite number of examples define an infinite number of new cases?
Wrong solution: through meaning
Wrong solution: through disposition
NS I 40
Another pupil obviously has a different disposition, i.e. individual dispositions are not enough. Wittgenstein’s solution: collective dispositions.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: there are no facts (>Problem of Normativity).
2. Problem of Normativity: which facts lay down which is the correct answer?
Kripke: We can establish a new praxis at all times.
New Literature/Newen/Schrenk: Pragmatic solution:
Def Persuasion/New Authors/Newen/Schrenk: To have convictions with a defined meaning you need to take part in social practices and to mutually ascribe convictions with specific meanings. (Solution for Kripke’s Wittgenstein). (Literature. 2-24).

Putnam III 219
Belief/Elisabeth Anscombe: Did once ask Wittgenstein what he would do if one of his friends was believing in faith healing. Would he try to dissuade him? Wittgenstein said yes, not knowing why however. KripkeVsWittgenstein: Classifies it as a distinct proof for Wittgenstein’s relativism.
PutnamVs: Wittgenstein only finds it useless.

Stegmüller IV 35ff
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: The crucial dispositions have been acquired in the past, the difference was already present in the past. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are actually irrelevant a) When I have a hypothesis regarding my disposition, I still do not know whether it is the right one -
IV 37
b) If we wanted to "let the past rest" and were only asking what we consider to be right at this moment, we lose the term "right".
IV 38
Kripke: Important argument: I have always had the same dispositions! – Disposition/VsKripke: a) it could be an idealization of my praxis KripkeVs: fantastic new assumptions will be necessary VsKripke: b) Idealization "if I had the possibility..." KripkeVs: It requires a function/fact or a table that is independent from the disposition.
IV 39f
KripkeVsWittgenstein: No table it is infinite, it is impossible to have checked everything. To mean, to conceive: no happenings in the consciousness but dispositions, dispositions are not happenings as well.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Wittgenstein Searle Vs Wittgenstein Bennett I 192
SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention.
Searle I 24
Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria".
SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it?
I 156
SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world.

I 169
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised.
I 170
SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are.
Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general?
I 171
Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible.
Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states.
I 172
As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other.
II 76
Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use".
SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects.
Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally.

II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein).
E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents.
II 193/194
Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk.
Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule.

III 112
Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance).
III 113
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!).
III 150
Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays.

V 35
Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean.
V 36
Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance.

V 145
Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance.
SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case.
Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations.
SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts.
V 190/191
Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.-
V 245
SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change.
Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names!
Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet).

IV 50
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games.
IV 89
Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie.
Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as
E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement).
IV 90
E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements).

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Bennett I
Jonathan Bennett
"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Transcend. Objects Versus Frank I 462
Castaneda with Kant, Frege Vs. Vstranscendental objects with infinitely many properties / respect to all objects only from within the experience and language - Davidson per Frege: an infinite number of properties.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief,
and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994