Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Dennett | I 497 f Abstraction/Explanation/Dennett: Dan Sperber(1): You must not proceed too abstract intentionally. Abstract objects do not enter directly into the causal relationships. E.g. the excitement of a child is not caused by the abstract story of Little Peter's Journey to the Moon, but by the fact that he understands his mother's words. Dennett: this is no obstacle for science, on the contrary: it can cut the Gordian knot of tangled causal relationships by using an abstract formulation and ignoring all those complications. (>Intentional stance), >Propositional attitudes. I 498 E.g. the excitement of the child does not result from the abstract story, but from the understanding of the words of its mother. 1. Sperber, Dan 1985."Anthropology and Psychology: Towards an Epidemiology of Representations." Man, vol. 20, pp. 73-99. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| As if | Searle | III 156 As if-intentionality/Searle: as if-intentionality does not explain anything, if there is no genuine intentionality. It has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as his "intentional stance" >As-if intentionality. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intentionality | Dennett | Rorty VI 27 Rorty: "Intentional stance"/intentional position/Dennett: The "intentional stance" is made possible through the detection of a Davidsonian pattern. The pattern of this rationality is the same as that of the truth. Neither language without rationality, nor one of them without truth. >Rationality, >Language and Thought, >Truth/Davidson. Dennett I 316f SearleVsDennett: This is only an "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. Def intentional stance/Dennett: An attempt to determine what the designer (or Mother Nature) had in mind. Dennett II 46 It often allows large jumps in the conclusions without the ignorance of the underlying physics disturbing them. E.g. Antikythera mechanism: The fact that it was a planetarium results from the fact that it was a good planetarium! E.g. Martians wonder why there is so much excess capacity in the computer: Reason: chips became so cheap. This is a historical explanation, but it emanates from the intentional stance. E.g. Could archaeopteryx fly? They are not sure, but found that his claws were ideal for sitting on tree branches! So how did it get up there ...? I 321 Def design standpoint/Dennett: e.g. an alarm clock is (as opposed to stone) a designed object and is accessible to a sophisticated kind of predictions. (According to the design standpoint). When I press the buttons, something will happen a few hours later. But I do not need to know the laws of physics for that. Intentional stance/Dennett: E.g. chess computer. Nothing in the laws of physics forces the chess computer to make the next move, but nothing in its design either. >Cf. >Chess programs. Brandom I 109 Intention/Intentionality/Dennett: stance-stance: asserts that one cannot distinguish whether something really is an intentional system and whether it is being treated as such appropriately. I 591ff E.g. freezing/Dennett: E.g. assuming you have yourself frozen in order to be unfrozen in the 25th century. Upon whom can you rely? The example imitates the whole evolution. Dennett I 592ff Intentionality/Real/Derived/Dennett: E.g. freezing: the robot that takes care of you must be able to act independently. - It must believe in reward, but develops self-interest. - Question: is this kind of intentionality still derived? - If so, then our own is also merely derived - but that s splitting hairs. Important Argument: we ourselves are only those survival machines for our genes. I 596 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: No machine, no vending machine either has intentionality. Freezing/DennettVsSearle: At some point intentionality is no longer derived, but real! >As-if-intentionality/Searle. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Intentionality | Proust | I 233 Animal/Mind/Intentionality/Premack/Woodruff/Proust: Premack/Woodruff's famous studies of "Theory of the Mind" in animals, "beliefs and desires", etc. Theory of the Mind, >Premack, >Woodruff, >Beliefs, >Thinking, >Thinking without language, >Desires. Proust: if one speaks of a theory of the mind, one should distinguish it from a social one not from a psychological competence in the strict sense by which social animals try to influence each other. Premack: an animal can deliberately act on what another is doing (social) or thinks (then also psychologically). >Intentions. "Spoilsport version": the explanation of behavior: not intention but only established correlation is intended to explain the behavior of an animal. I 234 Then the psychological side can be dispensed with. Speechless animals simply establish a correlation. Cf. >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking/animal. DennettVs: intentional attitude for explanation. >Correlation, >Animals/Dennett, >Intentional stance. I 234 Intentionality/Dennett: Levels: 1. Desires and beliefs can be attributed. 2. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires 3. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires of the second level, etc. >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 235 ProustVsDennett: opens the door for the human to apply his psychological concepts to apparently concept-less processes: cars, dogs, cats. It is slightly different with primates. >Concepts, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intentions | Dennett | II 39f Intention/action/life/Evolution/Dennett: modes of action within such primitive systems (macromolecules) are similar to intentional actions. The systems are driven by information and strive for goals. Thermometers are similar "pseudo-agents"! They are "intentional systems". In order to understand them we should take the "intentional position" against them. II 57 Purpose/intention/meaning/action/Dennett: the goal of expressing exactly how the actor sees his task is erroneous, a pointless exercise, like reading poems under the microscope. >Intentional Stance/Dennett. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| |||
No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.