Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interactionism | Chalmers | I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Dualism, cf. >Property dualism, >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. >Quantum mechanics. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses. >Wave function. ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant: I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. >Phenomena, >Experience. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them. >Zombies. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal closure, >Consciousness/Chalmers, cf. >Materialism. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Interactionism | Mischel | Corr I 48 Interactionism/Mischel/Asendorpf: If each person’s score depends upon only a few observations for each situation, a large portion of the situation by person interaction will very likely be due to measurement error. Only if the situational differences within persons are reliable (as in the study by Shoda, Mischel and Wright 1994)(1) does it make sense to interpret the person by situation interaction at all. >Interactionism/Asendorpf, >Consistency/Mischel, >Situations/Psychological Theories. 1. Shoda, Y., Mischel, W. and Wright, J. C. 1994. Intraindividual stability in the organization and patterning of behaviour: incorporating psychological situations into the idiographic analysis of personality, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 674–87 Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Interactionism | Asendorpf | Corr I 48 Interactionism/psychology/Asendorpf: In the early days of the so-called interactionism in personality research, researchers tried to identify generalizable estimates of the proportion of variance that can be attributed to persons, situations and person by situation interaction (e.g., Endler and Hunt 1966)(1). Such attempts are in vain because empirical studies which controlled measurement error by aggregating behaviour over time or across similar situations have found that the size of person-situation interaction varies greatly between different traits. For example, Diener and Larsen (1984)(2) found that the interaction component was virtually zero for subjective wellbeing but maximum (equivalent to zero cross-situational consistency) for sociability at work versus in recreational situations. Furthermore, the size of the interaction also varies greatly according to the similarity of the selected situations: the more similar the situations, the smaller the interaction components. >Interaction/Kenny. 1. Endler, N. S. and Hunt, J. McV. 1966. Sources of behavioural variance as measured by the S-R inventory of anxiousness, Psychological Bulletin 65: 336–46 2. Diener, E. and Larsen, R. J. 1984. Temporal stability and cross-situational consistency of affective, behavioural, and cognitive responses, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47: 871–83 Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Descartes, R. | Putnam Vs Descartes, R. | V 108 Definition Interactionism/Putnam: theory according to which mental events interact with physical ones. Whereby the causation direction could run both in the one and in the other direction. Descartes: the mind could affect the matter when it is very, very ethereal (pineal gland). Notorious. --- V 109 Naive version of interactionism: the mind as a kind of ghost, who lives in the bodies. Vs: but it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains, it could be a very simple control mechanism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain are an essential unit. Somehow it should be the mind-brain unit that thinks, feels and represents a personality. That is, what we commonly call the mind, is not the mind, but the unity of the brain (body) and mind. PutnamVsDescartes: obscure: unity of two substances. Cf. >interactionism/Chalmers. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Popper, K. | Vollmer Vs Popper, K. | II 84 VsInteractionism/VsEccles: where does the interaction take place? Eccles: in the "liaison areas" VollmerVsEccles: this is of course only a shift: where are the "liaison areas" located? How does the interaction come about? Eccles/Popper: (monism) Thesis: the self-confident mind is active in reading from the multitude of active centers at the highest level of brain activity...directing its attention to these centers and integrating its selection so that even the most fleeting experiences are brought together into one unit. The self-confident mind also works by changing the spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal processes ...the searchlight offers an analogy. A scanning device, a probe... II 85 VollmerVsEccles/VollmerVsPopper: nothing is gained by vague analogies. Nor does he make any suggestion as to how his hypotheses should be tested. What he thinks is new is the independent activity of the mind, the search for uniform interpretation. But that is exactly what we want to explain! This is reminiscent of the e.g. explanation of the telegraph principle: "It's like a dachshund: if you pinch at the back, it barks at the front". "And what about wireless telegraphy?" "Just like that, but without the dachshund." I 74 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: does not describe the evolution of knowledge (like Popper) but our abilities. I 75 VollmerVsPopper: his theory of world 3 and his body soul dualism are not compatible with the evolutionary epistemology. I 278 LewontinVsPopper: a theory that does not make forecasts can be testable, and thus empirical! VollmerVsPopper: it could be shown that selection theory makes verifiable predictions! Popper has long since withdrawn his criticism of the theory of evolution! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dualism | Popper, K. | Vollmer I 108 Dualism / Vollmer: only one still stated hypothesis: the interactionism (formerly Descartes, today Popper, Eccles, v. Ditfurth). Mind and brain are different substances in active interaction. (In both directions). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 |
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