Disputed term/author/ism  Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Excluded Middle  d’Abro  A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 53 The sentence of the excluded middle/VsBrouwer: the sentence of the excluded middle speaks for the fact that the antinomies occur not only in connection with infinite quantities. E.g. Liar Paradox. Here, too, the principle of the logically excluded middle did not seem to apply.  54 E.g. Russell's barber's paradox, with the barber shaving everyone in town except those who shave themselves. Here, too, the sentence of the excluded middle does not apply without infinite quantities. The intuitionists assert with Poincaré that antinomies without any infinities are lopish. Poincaré: The antinomies of certain logicians are simply circular. 

Fixed Points  Fixed point: a point that satisfies the equation f (x) = x is a fixed point i.e. x is mapped to itself. S.A. Kripke based his alternative theory of truth from 1975 on fixed points in order to resolve the problem of paradoxes when dealing with selfreference. (Kripke, S., 1975. Outline of a Theory of Truth, The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690716.). See also selfreference, paradoxes, liar paradox, truth theory. 

Fixed Points  Logic Texts  Read III 196 Kripke's Fixed Points/Read: 1. Separate truth and falsehood conditions (i.e. falsehood is not equal to nontruth). 2. Two sentence sets S1: true sentences, S2 false sentences. 3. Do evaluation on each level, therefore higher level  in this way, all sentences are "collected". Fixed point/(s): where evaluation is identical to input  Read: Success: then the extension fails  i.e. the meta language does not contain any further truthattributions than the object language^{(1)}. III 197 Kripke's Fixed Points/Kripke: the extension fails: meta language has no further truthattributions  there is a paradox in the fixed point without truth value  falsehood does not equal nontruth! Truthpredicate/Kripke's Fixed Points/Read: we separate the truthpredicates truth and falsehood  the truthpredicate is formed by the pair (S1, S2), whereby S1 contains the true sentences and S2 contains the wrong sentences. 1st level: here, a sentence has, e.g. ""Snow is white" is true" no truth value because evaluation at this stage is not possible  Solution: weak matrices for evaluating compound sentences, some of which are without truth value (without truth value)  (A v B) without truth value if one of A or B has no truth value (partial interpretation). III 198 Fixed point/Kripke's Fixed Points/Kripke/Read: the fixed point is reached by transfinite induction  recursive or successive with partial evaluations  1st transfinite level: all finite partial evaluations of S1 and S2 are collected separately  N.B.: at an early point (before adding all possible sentences), the reinterpretation of the truthpredicate no longer succeeds in adding something new.  Special case of the result about fixed points of normal functions over ordinal numbers.  Phi/f: represents the operation of expanding by allowing new interpretations. The fix point here is f(S1, S2) = (S1, S2). III 200 Unfunded assertions: the separation of S1 and S2 leaves some statements without a truth value  e.g. "this statement is true"  it has no truth value at the minimum fixed point  A level higher we can give it an arbitrary valuebut not to the liar. Paradox/Kripke: follows Tarski: it cannot be expressed in one's own language  the entire discussion belongs to the meta language, as well as the predicates: "paradoxical" and "unfunded". They do not belong to the semantically terminated fixed point  Tarski's truth schema does not work here  (... + ...). 1. Saul Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) in: R.L.Martin (Ed.) Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox Clarendon Oxf/NY 1984 
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II HoyningenHuene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973  German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995  German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 
Impredicativeness  Quine  XIII 93 Impredicativeness/Quine: Previously it was said that you had specified a class without knowing anything about it if you could name the containment condition. Russell's Antinomy: showed that there had to be exceptions. Problem: was to specify a class by a containment condition by directly or indirectly referring to a set of classes that contained the class in question. >Classes/Quine. Russell's Antinomy: here the problematic containment condition was the nonself elementary. Example x is not an element of x. Paradox: arises from letting the x of the containment condition, among other things, be just the class defined by this containment condition. Def impredicative/Poincaré/Russell: is just this condition of containment for a class that exists in the class itself. This must be forbidden to avoid paradoxes. Circular Error Principle/QuineVsRussell: but that was too harsh a term: Specification/Class/Sets/Existence/Quine: specifying a class does not mean creating it! XIII 94 Specification/Circle/Introduce/QuineVsRussell: by specifying something it is not wrong to refer to a domain to which it has always belonged to. For example, statistical statements about a typical inhabitant by statements about the total population that contains this inhabitant. Introduction/Definition/linguistic/Quine: all we need is to equate an unfamiliar expression with an expression that is formed entirely with familiar expressions. Russell's Antinomy/Quine: is still perfectly fine as long as the class R is defined by its containment condition: "class of all objects x, so that x is not an element of x". Paradox/Solution/Russell/Quine: a solution is to distort familiar expressions so that they are no longer familiar in order to avoid a paradox. This was Russell's solution. Finally, "x is an element of x" ("contains itself") to be banished from the language. >Paradoxes/Quine. Solution/Zermelo/Quine: better: leave the language as it is, but New: for classes it should apply that not every containment condition defines a class. For example the class "R" remains well defined, but "Pegasus" has no object. I.e. there is no (welldefined) class like R. Circle/George Homans/Quine: true circularity: For example, a final club is one into which you can only be elected if you have not been elected to other final clubs. Quine: if this is the definition of an unfamiliar expression, then especially the definition of the last occurrence of "final club". Circle/Circularity/Quine: N.B.: yet it is understandable! Impredicativeness/impredicative/Russell/Quine: the real merit was to make it clear that not every containment condition determines a class. Formal: we need a hierarchical notation. Similar to the hierarchy of truth predicates we needed in the liar paradox. XIII 95 Variables: contain indexes: x^{0},y^{0}: about individuals, x^{1},y^{2} etc. about classes, but classes of this level must not be defined by variables of this level. For example, for the definition of higherlevel classes x^{2}, y^{2} only variables of the type x^{0} and x^{1} may be used. Type Theory/Russell/Quine/N.B.: classes of different levels can be of the same type! Classes/Sets/Existence/Quine: this fits the metaphor that classes do not exist before they are determined. I.e. they are not among the values of the variables needed to specify them. ((s) And therefore the thing is not circular). Problem/QuineVsRussell: this is all much stricter than the need to avoid paradoxes and it is so strict that it prevents other useful constructions. For example, to specify the union of several classes of the same level, e.g. level 1 Problem: if we write "Fx^{1}" to express that x^{1} is one of the many classes in question, then the Containment condition: for a set in this union: something is element of it iff it is an element of a class x1, so Fx^{1}. Problem: this uses a variable of level 1, i.e. the union of classes of a level cannot be counted on to belong to that level. Continuity hypothesis: for its proof this means difficulties. Impredicativeness/Continuum/Russell/Quine: consequently he dropped the impredicativeness in the work on the first volume of Principia Mathematica. But it remains interesting in the context of constructivism. It is interesting to distinguish what we can and cannot achieve with this limitation. XIII 96 Predicative set theory/QuineVsRussell/Quine: is not only free of paradoxes, but also of unspecifiable classes and higher indeterminacy, which is the blessing and curse of impredicative theory. (See "infinite numbers", "classes versus sets"). Predicative set theory/Quine: is constructive set theory today. Predicative Set Theory/Quine: is strictly speaking exactly as described above, but today it does not matter which conditions of containment one chooses to specify a class. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Paradoxes  Brandom  I 461 Reference to semantic paradoxes: a naïve substitutional understanding of the quantification of truth claims obliges to interpret the liar paradox. Such paradoxes can also occur with "refers to": e. g. (ω) the square root of 2, which is obtained by multiplying 1 with the one referred to by the expression token designated "ω". (Grover: anaphoric foundation corresponds to Kripke: semantic assignment of a value at the minimum fixed point is the most natural model for an intuitive concept of truth). 
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 
Paradoxes  Putnam  I (i) 232f Paradoxes/truth/PutnamVsTarski: the paradox of his theory is that you have to stand outside the whole hierarchy to say that the hierarchy exists  Charles Parsons: thesis: statements about truth values are made in a higher language  a speech act 'sui generis'. Cf. >Liar paradox. I (i) 234 PutnamVsParsons, Charles: not more 'sui generis' than a sentence in red ink  merely formalistic trick to say, they could then not contain paradoxes  the problem is only shifted: the language in which we express that sentences in red ink ...  solution/Putnam: some forms of discourse can be understood without a prerequisite concept of truth  Rorty: proposes this for all discourses  some: these things could not be "said, but shown"  PutnamVs: the notion that there was a discursive thought that could not be said is incomprehensible  Gödel: takes settheoretic paradoxes to be solved; semantic paradoxes for not solved. 
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 27290 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177  194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen WittgensteinSymposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a readymade world, Synthese 51 (2):205228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 48398 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 3043 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 
Redundancy Theory  Quine  VII (i) 164 Redundancy Theory/Quine: it is doubtful whether the connection of "Fa" with "Fa is true" is analytic. XIII 214 Redundancy Theory/QuineVsRedundancy Theory/truth/Quine: the truth has been said to disappear, because the truth of the sentence is simply the sentence. ("Disapearance theory of truth") This is wrong: the quotation marks must not be taken lightly. We can only say that the adjective "true" is dispensable if it is applied to sentences that explicitly lie before us. Truthpredicate/true/generalization/Quine: is necessary to say that all sentences of a certain form are wrong. Or For example, a sentence that is not literal (not literally passed down) is true or false. Or E.g. that the slander paragraphs cannot be applied to true sentences or E.g. that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. N.B.: if you translate such sentences into the predicate logic, the subject of the truth predicate is not a quotation, but a variable. These are the cases where the truthpredicate is not superfluous. Disquotation/truth/definition/Quine: the disquotational approach may still be useful when it comes to defining truth. TruthDefinition/truth/Quine: it identifies all discernible truths that the truth of the sentence is communicated by the sentence itself. But that is not a strict definition; it does not show us who could eliminate the adjective "true" XIII 215 from all contexts in which it can occur grammatically. It only shows us where we can eliminate it in contexts with quotations. Paradox/Quine: we have seen above (see liar paradox) that definability can contain a selfcontradiction. It is remarkable how easily definable we found truth in the present context. How easy it can be and at the same time possibly fatal. Solution/Tarski: Separation object language/meta language. Recursion/Tarski/Quine: shows how the truthterm is first applied to atomic sentences and then to compositions of any complexity. Problem: Tarski could not yet define truth because of the variables. Sentences with variables can be true in some cases and false in others. (Open Sentences). Only closed sentences (where all variables are bound by quantifiers) can be true or false. Fulfillment/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: what Tarski recursively defines is fulfillment of a sentence by an object; is not truth. These objects are then the possible values of the free variables. After that, truth trivially results as a waste product. Def Truth/Fulfillment/Tarski: a closed sentence is true if it is fulfilled by the sequence of length 0, so to speak. Liar Paradox/Tarski/Quine: Tarski's construction is masterly and coherent, but why doesn't it ultimately solve the paradox? This is shown by the translation into symbolic logic when the sentence is formulated in object language (see paradoxes above, last section). Paradox/logical form/liar/Quine: the word "true" has the context "x is true" in the explicit reconstruction where "x" is the subject of quantifiers. Problem: the recursive definition of truth and fulfillment does not show how to "fulfill x". XIII 216 or "x is true" is eliminated. Solution: this only works if "x is true" or "fulfilled" is predicated by an explicitly given open or closed sentence. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Self Reference  Logic Texts  Sainsbury V 181f Selfreferentiality/circularity/paradox/Sainsbury: you can construct the liar paradoxes without selfreference : V 182 (A) (said by a on Monday) All b will say on Tuesday, is true. (B) (said by b on Tuesday) Nothing of what a said on Monday is true. Circularity: contains no reference, but rather a quantification and therefore no selfreference.  Circularity: No properties of sentences themselves: e.g. (C) (Said by g (instead of b) said on Tuesday) Nothing of what a said on Monday is true. Since (C) and (B) are the same sentence, it can not be the meaning, which is prevented by circularity.  Solution: indexicality? Distinction sentence/statement (use on occasion, utterance). >Sentence, >Statement, >Utterance, >Situation, >Use. 
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II HoyningenHuene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973  German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995  German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 
Semantic Closure  Davidson  Glüer II 23 Def Semantic Closure/Tarski: is a language (object language), if it contains a Tpredicate. Def essentially rich/Tarski: is a language that does not contain variables of a higher logical type. Def semantically closed/Tarski/Glüer: Languages in which one can call one's own statements "true" (i.e. selfreferential). Such languages enable the "liar paradox". A consistent definition of truth is excluded for such languages. It must not be possible to interpret the metalanguage in the object language, otherwise it would be possible to "retranslate" the definition of the W predicate formulated in the metalanguage. this leads to antinomies. The metalanguage must be Def "essentially richer"/Tarski/Glüer: to be more rich than the object language: it must contain variables of higher logical type. (sic). 
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 318 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 6879 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 4554 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 
Truth Definition  Logic Texts  Read III 40 TScheme/Tarski/Read: metaphysically neutral, not facts correlated with statements. Sainsbury V 196 TSchema/LiarParadox/Tarski/Sainsbury: the Tscheme allows the Liar paradox.  Because it does not initially distinguish between levels.  This shows that the daily language is not coherent. 
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II HoyningenHuene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973  German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995  German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 
Disputed term/author/ism  Author Vs Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Brouwer, L.E.J.  Verschiedene Vs Brouwer, L.E.J.  A. d’Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik in Kursbuch IV S. 53 Frankfurt 1967 According to Weyl, the concept of irrational number must either be abandoned or thoroughly modified. Brouwer: in the treatment of infinite sets, the sentence from the excluded middle does not apply. The sentence of the excluded middle/VsBrouwer: speaks of the fact that antinomies do not only occur in connection with infinite sets. Example liar paradox. Here the principle of the logically excluded third party also did not seem to apply. IV 54 E.g. Russell's Barber Paradox, where the barber shaves everyone in town except those who shave themselves. Again, no sentence of the excluded middle without infinite sets. The intuitionists claim with Poincaré that antinomies are ridiculous without infinity. Poincaré: The antinomies of certain logicians are simply circular. 
