Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Unger | Stroud I 75 Absolute Terms/Skepticism/Peter Unger/Stroud: Def absolute terms/Unger: Example "flat", "empty": these are used legitimately (assertibility) in many situations even if they are not literally true. >Literal truth. This shows that there is no obstacle for our use and understanding of these terms. - Also "safe", for example. StroudVsUnger: pro: this relation between meaning and use can defend skepticism, but weaker than Descartes' dream argument. >Descartes, >Skepticism, >Meaning, >Use. StroudVsUnger: the assumption of absolute expressions is superfluous. |
Unger I P. Unger Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Literal Truth | Literally true: a theory can only be literally true when its terms may not be re-interpreted in a given situation. On the other hand, a reinterpretation can make some theories and laws applicable to special cases, without being true or false. |
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| Literal Truth | Field | I 2 Literal Truth/literally/Field: requires existence assumption. - E.g. existence of numbers, so that the propositions of mathematics are literally true -> Idealism: as a mental construction - > fictionalism: instead: "true in a certain sense". Semantic ascent: the statement that something is "true, but not literally true". - (Field per fictionalism). I 4 Goodness: "good as an instrument"- in this case truth is not necessary. I 19/20 We should literally believe in electrons, but not in >mathematical entities, because these are not causally relevant. I 223 Literally true /Fraassen/Field: = the truth value is not eliminated by translation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Literal Truth | Fraassen | I 9 Literally Truth/Fraassen: the term has the function of excluding an addition like "correctly understood". - Because a theory could be literally wrong or meaningless with the addition "well understood". Anti-Realism: Thesis: the goal of science can be achieved without a theory being literally true. >Anti-realism. I 10 Literally true/Fraassen: 1. The language is literally constructed 2. The representation is therefore true. Science/Fraassen: Goal: to be true, but not literally. Fraassen: Thesis: a good theory does not have to be true (Fraassen pro Anti-Realism). - It is literally not equal to truth functional. - If we exclude literary constructions, we also exclude instrumentalism and positivism - these use literally understood formulations. - A literary construction can be elaborated (e.g. to determine referents, e.g. reduction of thermodynamics on statistical mechanics), but it cannot change their logical relationships. I 11 Literally true: excludes metaphors - Problem: the "demythologization" does not get the logical form. I 38 Literally true/Fraassen: Dummett allows a non-literal interpretation for the quantum mechanics when he says that a sentence about the position of a particle cannot have a truth value simultaneously with one over the impulse. Otherwise Strawson: E.g. "The present king of France is bald" here there is no non-literal construction of our language. Again different: in everyday life people tend to "well understood truths". >Everyday language, >Truth, >Theories, >Cognition, >Science. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Literal Truth | James | Fraassen I 24 Literally true/James/Fraassen James: scientific ideas do not have to literally match the reality - "as if" (> Vaihinger) is enough. >As if, >Fictions, >Truth. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Literal Truth | Nietzsche | Danto III 57 Literal Truth/Nietzsche/Danto: if you define the metaphor like Nietzsche (see Metaphor/Nietzsche) and therefore each sentence is considered metaphorical, then - absurdly - each sentence must also be unconventional. Then it's hard to see what we mean by metaphor. Danto: Nietzsche would probably reply: "Metaphors are sentences that are never perceived, or at least never literally true; no sentence is ever to be taken literally in relation to what he is dealing with; therefore, each sentence is metaphorical to a certain degree. In practice (or even rhetoric) it makes little difference whether we say that no sentence is literally true or, as Nietzsche should formulate it even more radically later, that every sentence is literally wrong. The only question is whether our language can help us in life. --- Danto III 58 DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is also just metaphorical, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.). --- Danto III 62 Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Metaphors | Goodman | III 73 Metaphor/Goodman: "high note" is not a frozen metaphor. The ownership of properties is something factual. No abridged comparison: everything is somehow similar to everything - one side of the comparison is unmetaphorical. >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Analogies. III 81 Max Black: in some cases, it is more illuminating to say that the metaphor produces the resemblance, than to say that it expresses a previously existing similarity. III 82 The question why predicates apply metaphorically in a certain way and not in a different way, is almost equivalent to the question of why they are literally true. Actually this is not a real question. Why things are as they are, can be left to the cosmologists. >Literal truth. III 82 The truth standards are pretty much the same, whether the scheme is transmitted or not. --- IV 145 Metaphorical use: "Wilbur is a workhorse" prohibits the derivation: quadruped. IV 146 It cannot be maintained that the metaphorical meaning is together with the literal meaning in the lexicon. Because there is a potentially infinite number of applications of an expression. A metaphor is not a "deviating" use. This view is understandable, even if it is wrong. >Meaning, >Lexicon. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Metaphors | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 41 Metaphor/Concepts/Nietzsche(1): the concepts that built up a rigid and regular world covered a fundamental "drive to metaphor formation" - the anthropomorphic activity, which is also the basis of ... Pfotenhauer IV 42 ...science, but hidden, it then would become productive on the basis of this drive. New "transfers, metaphors, metonymies"(2) would be added. Continually, the desire to redesign the existing world of the awake human being so colorfully and irregularly, incoherently, and eternally new as the world of dreams is. Pfotenhauer: He no longer finds consolation in an art exercise that is above all of them, the aesthetic game has become the moment of a life's fulfilment.... In this conception, the change of emotions and the causality of the mental processes has replaced the exuberant view of aesthetic possibilities. >Aesthetics/Nietzsche, >Literature/Nietzsche, >Language/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW, III, 2, p. 380ff 2. Ibid. p. 381 --- Danto III 53 Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: (cf. Truth/Nietzsche (F. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense(1)). We are talking about metaphors. Cf. >Truth/Nietzsche. Note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible. (See Experience/Nietzsche), cf. >Analogies. Danto III 58 DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is just metaphorical as well, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.). Danto III 62 Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors. 1.F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW1/III, 2, S. 374f. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: Horwich I 493 Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? >Realism, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Truth. Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. >Method, >Reliability. Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods. >Theory dependency. Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism. >Positivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles. >Observation Language. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts". >Science/Kuhn. Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". >Theory ladenness. N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation. >Observation. Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism. Ad. 3. Vs: Horwich I 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept. BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism. Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Cf. >Redundancy theory. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth. >Deflationism. Horwich I 494 Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true. M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically. Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community >Literal truth, >Bare truth. M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today. Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism. >Constructivism. Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths. >Empiricism, >Correspondence. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reality | Fraassen | Hacking I 56 Reality/Theory/Bas van Fraassen: (realist) theory: theories must be interpreted literally. No other possible interpretation - either true or false - it depends on the world - but there is no justification or need to rely on theories about unobservables. Hacking I 76 Existence/ontology: theory: there are simply no electrons nor any theoretical entities. This is only what can be observed - in principle electrons are unobservable - (but measurable). constructive empiricist/theoretical terms: should not be mentioned, only be deduced. - (> mention / > use). Hacking I 92 Adequacy rather than truth of a theory. - VsBest Explanation: - theories are acceptable, even if not literally true. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Return on Investment | Solow | Harcourt I 7 Capital/Measurements/return on investment/Fisher/SolowVsFisher/Solow/Harcourt: Solow [1963a(1), 1966(2), 1967(3), 1970(4)]: Solow's purpose was, in part, to get away from the obstacles of the measurement of capital and its related problems by developing instead the concept of the rate of return on investment. His own contributions were to graft technical progress on to Fisher's analysis and to apply the resulting concepts empirically, in order to obtain estimates of the orders of magnitude of the rates of return on investment in post-war U.S.A. and West Germany. >Irving Fisher. Joan RobinsonVsSolow: It is argued that neither in theory nor in empirical work has Solow been able completely to escape from the need to define and measure aggregate capital and to work within the confines of a one-commodity model. >Aggregate Capital. Harcourt I 94 Return on investment/Solow/Harcourt: What, then, is the rate of return on investment? Consider a planned economy which has a stock of heterogeneous capital goods, produces a certain volume of one consumption good and is at full employment with its inputs efficiently allocated. (Efficient means only that it is impossible to have more of anything without less of something else.) Compare this situation with possible neighbourhood efficient arrangements in which there is a little less consumption and therefore more capital goods (in physical, not necessarily in value terms). Now change over to an alternative arrangement by saving, i.e. reducing consumption. This allows a one-period gain (the next) in consumption over what it would have been. Make sure that the biggest gain is chosen for a given reduction in consumption now. Finally suppose that in the period after the next the economy reaches the position that it intended to be at by that period anyway. That is, the economy over the three periods has had decided for it - we are all technocrats now - a consumption stream C0 -h, C1+j, C2, .. . instead of one of C0, C1, C2, . . . Then a natural definition of the one-period rate of return on investment (R1) is R1 = j-h/ h = j/h -1 . . .perfectly natural usage. For „technocrats“ see >Capital theory/Solow. Harcourt I 95 Saving/prices/implicit assumptions/Harcourt: We should note the vital importance in all these definitions of an implicit assumption either that saving may be transformed into investment without affecting relative prices or that we are analysing a one-commodity model. Without these assumptions, saving, in the sense of consumption forgone, will not necessarily add the additional consumption because, depending on how prices change, it will be associated with different amounts and types of investment. Hence Solow concentrates on small changes - the notional changes of the neoclassical procedure – and the prices corresponding to a switch-point rate of profits: see Solow [1967(5), 1970(6)]. Measurements: Solow claims that calculating the rate of return requires no measure of the stock of capital, not even necessarily a mention of it, although in some of his theoretical examples and in his empirical work he is unfaithful to himself. He also claims that neoclassical theory, in so far as it centres around the rate of return, can escape from the malleability assumption and 'can accommodate fixity of form and proportions both' (p. 27). Malleability: As an aside but very much related to the malleability assumption, he comments that J. B. Clark's jelly assumption (see Stigler [1941](7), chapter xi, and Samuelson [1962](8)) makes the analysis easier (…). Substitution: Moreover it contains the important kernel of truth that substitution possibilities are easier over longer periods of time even though at any moment of time capital goods may be highly specific and substitution possibilities ex post (if not ex ante) limited: see Hicks [1932](9), pp. 19-21. Harcourt I 96 SalterVsSolow: This seems to be literally true only if we are considering the working out in actual time of the possibilities which exist at the beginning of a Marshallian long period, while not allowing anything to change, other han what was expected to change at the start of the period. The application of results from this analysis to real-world happenings is, therefore, suspect, as Salter [1960(10), 1965(11)], for example, has so clearly shown. >Return on investment/Neo-Keynesianism. Harcourt I 96 SolowVsNeo-Keynesianism: Rates of return on investment are calculated by Solow for two 'poles apart' models of planned economies. The first is an all-purpose onecommodity model with a smooth, well-behaved, constant-returns-toscale production function; the second is Worswick's stockade dictator version of Joan Robinson's model of accumulation (see Worswick [1959](12)). One-period and perpetuity rates of return are obtained and these are shown, in the neoclassical case, to equal the net marginal product of capital. Harcourt: The two extreme cases are chosen in order to show '. . . that the rate of return . . . does not depend for its existence and meaning on the possibility of defining "marginal productivities" or having smoothly variable proportions between the factors of production' (Solow [1963a],(13) p. 30). Harcourt I 97 Saving/investments: These results are offered as the answer (or, rather, an answer) to the important question: What is the pay-off to society from an extra bit of saving transformed into capital formation? Harcourt I 110 Return on investment/Solow/Harcourt: Solow uses a Ricardo-Sraffa system with circulating capital; (…) he shows that the rate of interest is an accurate measure of the social rate of return on investment, provided only that the economy is at full employment and uses competitive pricing, and that we are comparing one stationary state with another which has the same labour force but uses, at the given rate of profits, a different equi-viable technique, namely one that requires more circulating capital, commodity by commodity. Both stationary states are in long-run competitive equilibrium; their net products consist entirely of consumption goods. In order for one economy to move (technocratically) from its technology to the other's, consumption must be cut in one period (or for a number of periods in more complicated cases). Solow shows that the extra consumption per period obtained in perpetuity as a result of this move, when expressed in terms of the common set of prices at the given rates of interest (and wages) and as a proportion of the consumption forgone, similarly measured, equals the rate of interest. Harcourt I 111 This ratio, (…) is Solow's measure of the rate of return in perpetuity, R∞ = p/h. 1. Solow, R. M [1963] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 2. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 3. Solow, R. M. [1967] 'The Interest Rate and Transition between Techniques', Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb, ed. by C. H. Feinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 30-9. 4. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 5. Solow, R. M. [1967] 'The Interest Rate and Transition between Techniques', Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb, ed. by C. H. Feinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 30-9. 6. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 7. Stigler, George J. [1941] Production and Distribution Theories: The Formative Period (New York: Macmillan). 8. Samuelson, P. A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 9. Hicks, J. R. [1932] The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan). 10. Salter, W. E. G. [1960] Productivity and Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 11. Salter, W. E. G. [1965] 'Productivity Growth and Accumulation as Historical Processes', Problems in Economic Development, ed. by E. A. G. Robinson (London: Macmillan), pp. 266-91. 12. Worswick, G. D. N. [1959] 'Mrs. Robinson on Simple Accumulation. A Comment with Algebra', Oxford Economic Papers, xi, pp. 125-41. 13. Solow, Robert M. [1963a] (Professor Dr. F. De Vries Lectures, 1963) Capital Theory and the Rate of Return (Amsterdam: North-Holland). |
Solow I Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth Cambridge 1956 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Science | Boyd | Fraassen I 8 Science/Theory/Richard Boyd/Putnam: (attributed to him by Putnam): 1. The terms of a mature science typically refer. 2. Accepted theories in mature science are typically approximately true. 3. The same term can refer to the same in different theories. >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Theories/Boyd. Fraassen: all of these are not definitions. Truth/realism/Fraassen truth must, according to these statements, play an important role for the formulation of the realistic position. After that we can tentatively define: Definition scientific realism/Fraassen: Science aims to deliver a literally true story of how the world is. >Literal truth, >Realism. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Instrumentalism | Field Vs Instrumentalism | II 30/31 FieldVsInstrumentalism: it is inappropriate: belief attributions can be literally true and are not just useful tools that we use for various purposes. The usefulness of the attribution of beliefs and desires does not imply that Brentano’s problem is solvable. (> Quine 1960, § 45). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Field Vs Kuhn, Th. | II 183 Theory Change/Semantic Change/Reference/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962.101): The references of Einsteinian concepts are never the identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. Newton’s mass is maintained, Einstein’s can be converted to energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, because Einstein showed that there is no "Newtonian mass"! Semantic Change/Kuhn/Field: I do not deny that Newton’s "mass" meant something else, but I also do not deny Kuhn’s assertions about meaning, but about reference or denotation. Kuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts have a different meaning and therefore no reference at all. FieldVsKuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts do have different meanings, but they refer to a set of objects where the present terms only refer to a subset of these objects. (see below). II 184 FieldVsKuhn: I deny that there ever was such a thing as "Newtonian mass" or ever will be. And therefore Newton himself can never have referred to "Newtonian mass". Therefore, no further positive analytic hypotheses are possible other than merely (HP) and (HR). (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. Problem: now we have to consider the negative (HA): that Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing, just as "Nicholas" denotes nothing. (HA) Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing at all. Problem: then we have to attribute false truth values to Newton’s (indisputable) sentences (sentence tokens). Nicholas/Unicorn/Solution/Frege: Some phrases have truth value gaps. Newton/Field: E.g. undeniably true statement by Newton with which every physicist agrees: (7) In order to accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of various speeds more force is required if the mass of the body is greater. That certainly seemed to be true in Newton’s time. And the RT agrees with him (both for net mass and relativistic mass). II 195 Theory Change/Denotation/FieldVsKuhn: one should not say that Newton’s "mass" did not denote anything. In that case, a sentence like E.g. "The mass of the Earth is less than that of the Sun" would not have been literally true if Newton had expressed it. Solution/Field: you should at least speak of a "conveyance of information". (Also FieldVsLanguage Rules). |
Hartry Field I Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford 1989 II Field Truth and the absence of facts Wahrheit ohne Tatsachen Oxford, New York 2001 III Field Science without numbers Princeton University Press 1980 |
| Lewis, D. | Verschiedene Vs Lewis, D. | Metz II 274 Nida-RümelinVsLewis: this objection is off the table here after we have shown that on the 1st level (Marianna finds a colorfully furnished room with partly wrongly colored prints) the alternatives come into view, which are then excluded on the 2nd level. Real phenomenal knowledge. Lewis I 9 ShafferVsIdentity Theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neural events are also abstract. Whatever results from considerations about experiences as an argument for nonspatiality should also apply to neural events. - VsLewis: it is nonsense to consider a mere sound chain or character string as a possible carrier of a meaning or a truth value. Meaning/Carrier: Carriers of meaning are only single speech acts! II 213 LewisVsVs: my assertion is not that sounds and characters are carriers of meaning, but that they carry meaning and truth relatively to a language or population. A single speech act can be the bearer of meaning because in most cases it unambiguously determines the language used in its particular enforcement situation. - VsLewis: A meaning theory recurred to a possible world is circular. - Def Possible World/VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can itself be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical propositions of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. -LewisVs: Possible world cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1. Such a substitution does not work properly: two worlds which are not different in the representing language get (wrongly) assigned to one and the same representation. II 214 ++ 2. Such a replacement would also be completely unnecessary: the concept of possible worlds is perfectly understandable in itself. II 216 Hypostatization of meaning - VsLewis: not just words, things exist! - VsVs: we can form a grammar II 221 VsLewis: maybe internal representation? VsVs: that does not help! II 222 Convention is more than agreement: the others must believe in it! II 223 VsLewis:Language conventions are no better than our infamous obscure old friends, the language rules. VsVs: A convention of truthfulness and trust could be called a rule. II 224 VsLewis: Language is not conventional. LewisVs: There may be less conventionality than we originally thought. However, there are conventions of language. II 225 VsLewis: Only those who are also set theorists can expect others to adhere to regularity. LewisVs: An ordinary person does not need to possess a concept of L in order to be able to expect that the others are truthful and trusting in L. He only needs to have expectations about action. II 226 VsLewis: Using language is almost never a rational matter. LewisVs: An action can be rational and explainable even if it is done out of habit and without thought. II 227 VsLewis: Language cannot possibly be traced back to conventions. It is impossible to agree on everything at any time. LewisVs: Admittedly, the first language cannot possibly go back to a convention. II 227 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose a lifelong isolated person could one day spontaneously start using a language due to his ingenious talent. LewisVs: Even people living in isolation always adhere to a certain regularity. II 228 VsLewis: It is circular to define the meaning in P of sentences using the assumptions made by the members of P. LewisVs: It may be so, but it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as accepting sentences. II 229 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose population of notorious liars. LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population! II 229 E.g. Ironist: these people are actually true in L! But they are not literally true in L! I.e. they are truly in another language, connected with L, which we can call "literal-L". II 232 VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. LewisVs: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust par excellence. It is in a certain language! Its alternatives are regularities in other languages! II 233 + VsLewis: Even truthfulness and trust in L cannot be a convention. Moral obligation/Lewis: a convention continues to exist because everyone has reason to abide by it, if others do, that is the obligation. VsLewis: Why communication when people can draw completely different conclusions from a statement? II 234 VsVs is quite compatible with my theory. But these are not independent conventions but by-products. II 235 VsLewis: not only one language, but an infinite number of fragments (e.g. interest in communication etc.) VsVs: this is indeed the case, the language is inhomogeneous e.g. educated/uneducated. II 237 VsLewis: silence is not untruthful. VsVs: Right expectation of truthfulness, but no trust! II 238/239 VsLewis: either analytical or not, no smooth transition! VsVs: fuzzy analyticity with the help of gradual conventionality: regarding the strength of assumptions or the frequency of exceptions, or uncertainty as to whether certain worlds are actually possible. II 240 VsLewis: thesis and anti-thesis refer to different objects: a) semantic (artificial) languages, b) language as part of natural history - VsVs: no, there is only one philosophy of language, language and languages are complementary! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Unger, P. | Stroud Vs Unger, P. | Stroud I 75 Absolute Expressions/Scepticism/Peter Unger/Stroud: (Unger, (Oxford 1975, Journ. of Phil., 1977). Def Absolute Terms/Unger: e.g. "flat", "empty": these are used justifiably (assertiveness) in many situations, even if they are not literally true. This shows that there is no obstacle to our use and understanding of these expressions. N.B./Unger: this also applies to the absolute expression "certain". Because knowledge implies certainty. Thus our use of "certain" etc. would be compatible with the literal truth of skepticism. StroudVsUnger: pro: its relation between meaning and use can be used to defend skepticism. But Unger cannot support skepticism on the basis of "absolute expressions" alone. Descartes/Stroud: but this shows that what this is about is as strong as the dream argument in Descartes. But without the requirement that we do not dream, the absolute expressions "certain" and "I know" would not yield the sceptical conclusion. StroudVsUnger: we do not need his doctrine of "absolute expressions". |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Various Authors | Fraassen Vs Various Authors | Hacking I 93 Best explanation/Fraassen: should be rejected, even if one accepted theories! Theories can clarify something and explain it, but they are not literally true. Hacking I 95 Def best explanation/Peirce: "conclusion to the best explanation". Method of hypothesis or abduction. When there is an explanation that makes otherwise unintelligible things understandable, this should probably be right. Peirce later took refrain. Fraassen I 110 Explanation/James Greeno/Fraassen: makes a proposal in relation to statistical theories: A universal explanation is less problematic and more relevant than an assessment of knowledge with respect to individual cases (individual events). (FN 17). Greeno/Fraassen: adopts as a model of a theory one that assumes a single probability space Q as correct plus two partitions (or ranges of variables) of which one is the explanandum and the other is the explanans. I 111 E.g. sociology cannot explain why a particular rich kid stole a car in San Francisco, but it can claim factors such as income and residential area as explanatory factors. Explanatory force: its level is measured brilliantly in Greeno: I: measures the information that the theory supplies for M: variable for the explanandum on the basis of S: the explanans. Maximum: (of explanatory power) is reached when all related probabilities P (Mi I Sj) are 0 or 1 (the deductive nomological case) and Minimum: is reached if the related probabilities are 0, namely, when S and M are statistically independent of each other. FraassenVsGreeno: that encounters the same old problems: E.g. Suppose S and M describe the behavior of barometers and storms: Suppose the probability that the barometer falls (M1) is equal to the probability that there will be a storm (S1). Namely 0.2 and the probability that there will be a storm, given that the barometer falls is equal to the probability that the barometer falls, given that there will be a storm, namely = 1! In this case, the variable I (information) is at its maximum. Problem: it is also there if we swap storm and barometer!. Explanation: we have none for either case. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Functionalism | Versus | Field II 30 Field: per materialism, per physicalism -FieldVsFunctionalism / FieldVsLewis: not sufficient for Brentano s problem - FieldVsInstrumentalism: belief ascriptions can be literally true and they are not just useful tools. |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Empiricism | Pro | Fraassen I 13 Fraassen: FrassenVsPositivism - Fraassen per empiricism - I 10 - Fraassen per anti-realism: a good theory need not be literally true. I 20 FraassenVsBest Explanation. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Space Time | Field, Hartry | I 70 Spacetime points/Field: thesis: have complete causal action capability. They are not an arena in which electrons act, but one can even do without electrons as independent agents (or entities). I 171 Relationism/R/Spacetime/Time/Field: Thesis: there is no spacetime beyond the accumulation of physical objects or aggregates. This does not mean that there are no spacetime regions. But: Prerequisite: that we find a method how to "logically construct" regions from aggregates of matter. Thesis: spacetime only logical construction. There is no spacetime! Substantivalism/S/Field: thesis: that beyond ("over an above") the physical entities there is an ("empty", for itself existing) spacetime. This also means that the spacetime is not merely "logically constructed" from aggregates of matter. I 175 Def Monadicism/Horwich/Field: (Horwich, 1978): Thesis: denies, like relationism, that space time exists. ((s) empty, for itself existing spacetimes). Spacetime only logical construction! VsRelationalism: no aggregates of matter or relations between them. Instead: primitive monadic properties of spacetime locations. ((s) As basic concept). III 34 Relationism: thesis: that there is no empty spacetime >substantivalismVs). a) reductive relationism: points and regions of spacetime are only set theoretical constructions. b) eliminative relationism: one must not quantify via points and regions of the spacetime at all. FieldVsRelationalism: I support substantivalism: spacetime points (or spacetime regions) are entities in their own right. Def Substantivalism/Field: External: Field I: 13 (Def thesis that speech about space is literally true (independent of physical objects, then (empty) space is self-perceptible, empty space exists). Field pro. |
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| Antirealism | Fraassen, B. van | I 9 Anti-realism: Thesis: the aim of science can be achieved without a theory being literally true. |
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| Literally True | Fraassen, B. van | Hacking I 56 Reality / theory / Bas vvan Fraassen: Thesis: theories must be interpreted literally. No other possible interpretation. Either true or false. That depends on the world. But there is no justification or need to rely on theories about unobservable. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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