Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectives | Logic Texts | Read III 268 ff Tonk/Prior/Read: Do not introduce the link first and then assign meaning. - That cannot have the consequence that another pair of statements is equivalent. >Definition, >Definability, >"Tonk", >Belnap-Prior debate. Important argument: analytic validity cannot show that. Re III 269 The meaning, even that of logic links, must be independent of and be prior to the determination of the validity of the inference structures. - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): Must not define into existence, first show how it works. Re III 271 Classical negation is illegitimate here. >Negation- Negation-free fragment. - Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P". Re III 273 ReadVsBelnap: the true disagreement lies beyond constructivism and realism. - Belnap's condition (conservative extension) cannot show that the classical negation is illegitimate. >Negation. Hoyningen-Huene II 56 Connectives/Hoyningen-Huene: You sometimes read that the truth tables would define the conncetives, i.e. clearly specify them. This is correct if one interprets the connectives in a very specific mathematical sense (namely as illustrations of two statements in the set true, false). If, on the other hand, one understands the connectives as extensional statement links, i.e. as operators that form a new statement from two statements, then the truth tables do not define the connectives. II 66 Binding strength of the connectives: increases in the following order: ,>, v, ∧. II 113 It makes sense to attribute equality and difference to the propositional logical form, because the compelling force of propositional logical inference depends on them. For the same reason, it makes sense to assign the connectives to the propositional logical form. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Definitions | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 56 Def/truth value table/junctor/Hoyningen-Huene: the tables define the junctors only if they are understood mathematically - not if they are understood extensionally. >Extensionality, >Truth table, >Connective, >Logical constant. Hoyningen-Huene II 93 Definition/Hoyningen-Huene: Synthetic: here a concept is created (abbreviation) - it cannot be true/false. Analytical: descriptive or lexical definition: here, an existing concept is analyzed - e.g. bachelor/ unmarried man. Explication: is between analytical and synthetic definition - This can be more fruitful. >Explanation, >Analytic/synthetic. --- Read III 40 The definition of truth is different from the adequacy conditions. III 265 Prior: "tonk": does not define connections first and then meaning. >tonk- Then it cannot cause another pair of statements to be equivalent. - N.B.: "analytical validity" cannot show this - BelnapVsPrior: (pro analytical validity): should not get mixed with the definition of existence, it first has to show how it works -> classical negation is illegitimate here. - Negation-free fragment - > Peirce's law: "If P, then Q, only if P, only if P": --- Salmon I 252 Some words must be defined in non-linguistic ways. I 254 Context definition: many logical words are explained by context definition. E.g. "All F are G" is equal to "Only F are G" This is a definition of the word "only". |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belnap, Nuel | Prior Vs Belnap, Nuel | Brandom I 198 "Tonk": (Belnap) PriorVsBelnap: bankruptcy of definitions of the inferential roles in the style of Gentz. "Network card for arbitrary conclusions". (>"Boche"/Dummett; > conservative extension). Prior: "tonk": Do not start by introducing the link first and then the meaning - cannot have the consequence that another pair of statements is equivalent - Important Argument: "analytical validity" cannot show this - BelnapVsPrior: (per analytical validity): must not define into existence, first show how it works. Normal >negation is illegitimate - >negation-free fragment; - Peirce's law: If P,then Q or, if Q only if P, then R. Prior: thesis: it is absurd to assume an "analytical validity", a "carte blanche", to introduce a possibility link and then to give them a meaning by simply determining it. His well-known example was "tonk". Absurd: how can the simple introduction of a new link have the consequence that any pair of statements (without "tonk") is equivalent? III 269 If we learned what "tonk" meant, we would see that one or another inference is not truth-preserving. But, and that's Prior's point: the representative of the view of the analytical validity cannot say this, because he has no independent explanation of the meaning of "tonk" with respect to which he could show that the conclusions are invalid. Meaning: the meaning, even that of logic links, must be independent of and prior to the determination of the validity of the inference structures! (>BelnapVsPrior). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Belnap, Nuel | Read Vs Belnap, Nuel | Re III 270 Belnap: we have not shown, and cannot show that there is such a link. The same applies for "tonk". Read: One problem remains: why is there ever an analogy between definitions and links. It cannot always be wrong to expand a language with new links. Calculation rules for 'conservative' extensions of languages are conceivable. The old rules must persist. Re III 271 Peirce's Law: (>Peirce): "If P, then Q, or if Q only if P, then R" is negation-free, but still not, as the constructivist claims, part of the negation-free fragment (>Gentzen). The law cannot be proved within the classical calculus without using classic negation rules. Re III 273 The crucial step in all cases is certainly that the implication "If P, then Q or R" from "If P then Q or R" (Note: the comma is missing here) is allowed. A step which foresees the establishment of the multiple conclusion, the LK, and not the establishment of the individual conclusion. (Peirce's Law: "If P, then Q or, if Q only if P, then R") The constructivist objects against such a step, because he introduces a disjunction in a way that does not guarantee that you know which member of the disjunction is the justification! ReadVsBelnap: The true disagreement lies beyond constructivism and realism. Belnap's condition (conservative extension) cannot show that the classical negation is illegitimate. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| |||