Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Conceptualism Tugendhat I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory): States of affairs are taken as objects.
Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects.
Immaterial - but also VsImagination.
Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure).
TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
>Aristotle, >Being.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings".
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis. >Predicates, >Reference.
I 185
Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination. >Nominalism, >Universals.
ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual.
NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.
>Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein.
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable. >Conceptualism/Quine.
Nominalism:
1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous?
2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color". >Imagination, >Colour.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Facts Tugendhat I 250 ~
Fact / states of affairs/Tugendhat: materic correlate of a statement - correspondence theory: the maintained fact that p is true if the maintained fact is a real fact, a state of affairs. (Not two matching issues but one.) - ((s) true / real: double character statement / object). >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory.
TugendhatVs: that is object theory: 1. presupposes that we already understand what a state of affairs, that p, is meant before we understand the sentence. - 2. That there is a property W, which would have to be described as reality or as a criterion.
>Criteria.
Object theory/Tugendhat: Facts are conceived as objects.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Metalanguage Tugendhat ~passim
TugendhatVsMeta language
I 326
Meta language/Tugendhat: typical truth condition of a predicative assertion: is true iff the singular term is an element of the class, for which the predicate stands - then comes the desscription of the object in the meta language. >Truth conditions, >Object language, >Predication, >Truth values,
>Truth.
TugendhatVsMeta language:
1. relapse in the object theory
2. one must understand what a class is
3. one must understand the expression in another language
4. predicate and singular term are not explained as complementary expressions.
>Singular terms, >Predicates, cf. >Predicates/Brandom, >Singular terms/Brandom.
III 213
TugendhatVsMeta language: presupposes that we understand meta language signs - otherwise we would not have gotten beyond the syntax - then ever higher orders needed - regress. Solution: pragmatics (VsCanap).
>Pragmatics.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Object Tugendhat I 37f
Object/Tugendhat: Definition hypokeimenon/Aristotle: object of predications. - Everything is an object: we are unable to verify this by comparing many objects. - We do not learn by abstraction what an "object" is.
I 86
Analytical philosophy/Tugendhat: Vsimagination: the main target of the Analytic Philosophy is the assumption of ideas. >Imagination, >Mental states, >Mental objects, >Mentalism.
I 88
E.g. not: Who do you imagine under "Peter"? - but who do you mean by "Peter"?Objects/Tugendhat: we do not imagine them, we mean them. >Meaning (Intending).
I 102
For that we need singular term instead of pictures. >Singular terms, >Pictures.
I 131
Object/Tugendhat: instead of this offensive term we can also speak of "content", but too unclear. >Content.
I 141
TugendhatVsHusserl: fails at the question of how predicates are to understand - because of his object-orientated approach. False: the sentence would correspond to a situation.
>Edmund Husserl.
I 246
Object theory/Tugendhat: Facts are conceived as objects. Object: using a sentence as a display or presentation of facts.
>Sentences.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Predicates Frege II 47
Frege: e.g. a sentence about a unicorn is a sentence without truth value; predicates cannot be assigned or denied. (>Nonexistence - thought: is the same whether the expression has a reference ("meaning") or not.
Berka I 87
Predicate/Frege: one could live with a single predicate, "is a fact". Then there is no question of subject/predicate.(1)
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964

Brandom I 943
Frege: (great discovery): there must be complex predicates in this sense: so that the inferential role of sentences, e.g. "anyone who admires someone who admires themselves", can be recognized. (x)(y)[Rxy > Rxx]. (Can also occur in a language without quantification)- Strawson: this is the second distinguishing feature of singular terms and predicates: terms can be quantified. Singulär terms, >Quantification.

EMD II 226ff
Predicate/Frege: Function: takes objects as arguments and provides truth values as a value.
Frege II 71
Predicate/Frege: e.g. "falling under the concept of human" - which means the same as "a human". ((s) Later authors: "is a human being". "Is" belongs to the predicate.
Tugendhat I 192
Predicate/Frege/Tugendhat: with Frege the predicate also stands for something, but something non-objective: the concept ("to stand for") - (VsObject Theory).
Tugendhat I 193
Predicate/Frege: the predicate has no reference - not because it were contradictory, but because of indeterminacy. >Reference, >Indeterminacy.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Predicates Husserl Tugendhat I 168f
Predicate/Husserl: the meaning of the predicate could be an object or an attribute. TugendhatVsHusserl: it is not real, the meaning of the predicate is not an object. It is simply drawn up linguistically (VsObject Theory). Instead of standing for an object: the function of the predicate is characterization. Predicates are unsaturated, they are only meaningful in connection with singular terms. >"Unsaturated", >Singular terms, >Predication, >Quantification over properties.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Predicates Tugendhat I 172
Predicate/Tugenhat: VsObject theory: the predicate is not to stand for something - we need a different explanation.
I 208
Quasi-predicates/Tugendhat: assuming primitive language, expression of these predicates only in the presence of the object - no theory of use - concurrence of usage and explanation situation. >Terminology/Tugendhat.
I 209
Predicates/Tugendhat: real predicate must be situation independent (that is, especially independent from the circumstances) - situation independency by connection to singular term. >Circumstances, >Situations, >Singular terms.
I 295
Predicates/Tugendhat: not all are suitable to be reformulated inside the conjunction: E.g. Peter and Paul stand next to each other: that cannot be reformulated to Peter stands next to each other and Paul stands next to each other.
I 332
Predicate/Tugendhat: predicates are not about the rule of use ((s) use, meaning), but about the verification rule (s) Truth). >Verification, >Use, >Use theory.
I 335
The rule of use is not determined by the particular situation - 1. the manner of use of "F "in the special use "this is F" is already the general manner of use of "F" in any sentences "Fa"
2. with that, the word "true" is already explained: with a truth condition in which the word "applies" no longer exists: if one can use the sentence 'this is F' correctly in the situation, in which one can replace "this" for "a", "correct" according to the presupposed explanation of the verification-rule of "F".
I 332
Quasi-predicate/Tugendhat: E.g. in "this is red" "red" could still function as a quasi-predicate - so the essence cannot already lie in the external addition of "this is .. " - but only in the special manner of use (use) of "this"- Predicates: are needed instead of quasi-predicate because we cannot only connect the classification term "F" with other complementary expressions to say something else than "this is F ', but to say the same thing from a different situation.
>Terminology/Tugendhat, >Contextuality, >Generality, >Generalization.
I 483
Attributes/Tugendhat: predicates refer to attributes - not to objects. >Attributes, >Objects.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Qualities Wittgenstein Hintikka I 113
Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence. Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson).
I 202
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience.
I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only.
These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

II 138
Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots: 1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).

III 141
Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object! The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Reference Kripke I 71
Reference/Kripke: the reference of the name is not determined by a description, but by a "causal" chain of communication.
I 109
Kripke: the relevant element is the actual chain of communication, not the way the speaker came about his reference. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >referential/attributive.
I 123
Baptism: baptism has a correct causal chain, but: it has added conditions and no personal knowledge. It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identifying the specific characteristics, through certain properties that the referee alone meets and of which the speaker knows or believes that they apply.
I 147f
Reference: "water is H2O", "light is a photon flux" or "heat is the motion of molecules": if I refer to heat, then I do not refer to an inner sensation someone may have, but to external phenomenon which we perceive through our sense of perception. It caused the characteristic sensation that we call the sensation of heat.
I 149
Reference: we determine what light is by the fact that it is the one thing in the outside world that affects our eyes in a certain way.
I 154
In the case of proper names, the reference can be defined in various ways. Establishing reference: is done a priori (contingent) - not synonymous.
Meaning: meaning is analytic (and required).
Definition: the definition specifies reference and expresses truth a priori.
---
II 211
Reference: e.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Kripke: variant: the (absent) husband is not nice. Then the statement is false for all authors (because of the absent husband). There is a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference.
II 221
Goedel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: description does not determine the reference - we would not withdraw the name when we learn something new.
II 231f
Kripke thesis: Donnellan's distinction referential/attributive. Generalized: a speaker can believe that his/her specific intention coincides with his/her general intention in a situation for one of two reasons: a) "simple" case: his/her specific intention is to refer to the semantic referee, (by definition)(that is Donnellan's attributive use), b) "complex" case: the intentions are different, but the speaker believes that they refer to the same object (referential). VsDonnellan: one must not understand the referential as proper names. The distinction simple/complex is equally applicable to descriptions and names. >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke.
---
Newen I 111
Direct reference/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: Kripke calls the object theory of names the theory of direct reference.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Sentences Tugendhat I 263ff
Theory of objects/object theory: confronts the sentence with a situation - TugendhatVs. >Terminology/Tugendhat.
II 86
Sentence/generality/Tugendhat: e.g. "here is an F" should not be understood as "of all things here is an F". >Demonstratives/Tugendhat, >Specification, >Predication, >Individuation, >Identification.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

States of Affairs Tugendhat I 141
State of Affairs/TugendhatVsHusserl/TugendhatVsObject Theory (= Thesis State of Affairs = object) not every sentence corresponds to state of affairs - false "theory of objects". >Attributes, >Abstract objects, >Abstractness.
I 161
State of Affairs- not composed like an object - State of Affairs: like attributes: "abstract objects".
I 164f
State of Affairs/fact/Husserl/Tugendhat: imperceptible - composition of state of affairs different than of objects - linguistically composed (thinking) - (VsObject theory; >object theory). Def "categorical Synthesis"/Husserl: task: of the real composition of an object of components is a special, not real composition which would be constitutive for the state of affairs to distinguish.
>Edmund Husserl, >Experience/Husserl.
I 167
TugendhatVsHusserl, Vs categorical synthesis: Heidelberg castle is castle and red - even "red" represents object. >Predicates, >Predication, >Properties.
I 176
TugendhatVsObject theory: it fails at the question, how the meaning of the whole sentence is given by the meanings of the phrases. There are no combinations of objects in the sentence. >Compositionality.
I 280ff
State of Affairs/fact/Tugendhat: state of affairs as that what the sentence says: this does not work, due to potential lie. Identification of the states of affairs requires understanding the usage rules. - The same sentence can stand for different situations, and vice versa (like Austin).
The states of affairs in deictic expressions: Classifications principle of incidents - the state of affairs also lacks the contention mode, which is part of the assertion of "p" - VsObject theory.
>Assertions, >Meaning.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Terminology Tugendhat I 72f
Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion.
I 91
VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings".
I 162f
Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact".
I 217
Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language.
I 337
Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object.
I 338
Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions.
I 246
Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases.
I 266
Definition expulsion game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro). >use/Tugendhat, > truth conditions/Tugendhat, >Meaning/Tugendhat.
I 276
The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Bundle Theory Newen Vs Bundle Theory New I 233
Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?).
Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems:
1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined
2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name.
Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato".
Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly.
Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description.
I 234
Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke:

(meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value.
I 235
E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato".
Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory:
E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"."
Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name.
KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is
I 236
the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object.
A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.)
Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable.
Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)".
Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning)
Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object.
Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense.
Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names).
Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition.
I 237
((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Carnap, R. Putnam Vs Carnap, R. Goodman II Putnam Foreword V
Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48).
Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself,
PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate.


Lewis IV 85
Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts.
IV 85/86
Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there.
They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas".

Putnam V 244
Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private.
PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability.
V 250
Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap).
Putnam I (a) 42
Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful.
There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them).
Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions:
1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions.
I 43
2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language".
Putnam I (a) 46
Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence.
PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"!
(I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term).
I (a) 48
Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem.
I (a) 49
Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say!

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Husserl, E. Tugendhat Vs Husserl, E. Habermas I 204
TugendhatVsHusserl: the attempt to make subjective expressions independent of situations is hopeless. Singular terms are examples of genuinely pragmatic meanings like performative expressions.
Tugendhat I 141
TugendhatVsHusserl: fails to answer the question of how predicates are understood because of his object-theoretical approach. (Object Theory: Thesis: The sentence would correspond to a fact).
Tugendhat I 171
TugendhatVsHusserl: the composition must not be understood as real. The only criterion is that the redness in the lock is exactly when the lock is red.
I 172
Predicate/TugendhatVsHusserl: we need a whole new explanation for a predicate that cannot be an explanation of the way that the predicate stands for something. We must completely dispense with the object-theoretical explanatory model. Categorical Act/Husserl/Tugendhat: for their part are not directly demonstrable.
I 173
We can only recognize you by the fact that an expression has a certain semantic form. Relation Statements/Relation/TugendhatVsHusserl: one might think that Husserl's theory could be maintained at least with relation statements, i.e. with multi-digit predictive sentences.
One could put it this way: in the state of affairs, the relation of the real being together is ideally composed with the hammer on the one hand and the pair of objects style and head on the other hand.
This then corresponds exactly to the composition of the attribute with the one real object in the single-digit predictive sentence.
Vs: on the other hand, the same objection applies: when asked for a criterion for presenting this ideal composition, one can only answer that it exists between the real composition and the objects, if the original sentence is true.
Tugendhat I 291
Conjunction/Husserl: "Conjunctive connection of names or statements". (Subject Theoretical). Statements stand for objects (facts). "And": "Together of objects". But no quantity.
I 292
TugendhatVsHusserl: the problem is that we see this as spatial proximity. But we can imagine Peter and Paul as spatially separated and still make a statement that concerns them both.
I 361
Synthesis/Object/Husserl: Syntheses of ways of givenness: he does not mean objects at all, but especially spatial objects. Synthesis of shadows, colors, perspectives. TugendhatVsHusserl: these are not at all ways of givenness of objects as such, but of their predicative determinations!
I 362
Husserl: Object: "The pure X, in abstraction from all predicates". Tugendhat: this is too little.
II 9
TugendhatVsHusserl: lost years of his life with the confrontation, which is ultimately obsolete by analytical philosophy.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Kaplan, D. Newen Vs Kaplan, D. NS I 117
Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA).
NS I 118
E.g.
(1) I am here today.
Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary!
E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum.
It is true because of the expression conditions.
NS I 118
Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan.
VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy.
E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity).
Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that.
NS I 119
Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification).
Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones).
Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be
1) the designated object
2) the description associated by means of language competence
3) cognitive way of givenness.
Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence.
Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role:
E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships.
"This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship".
NS I 120
The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest).
Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object.
Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy.
There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate.

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Kripke, S. A. Newen Vs Kripke, S. A. NSI 106
Causal Chain/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: is formed a) by successive uses b) through a series of speaker intentions Names/Devitt/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the standard meaning of a name is the causal network which is formed by the sketched causal chain of communication.
VsKripke/Newen/Schrenk: his theory, like all object theories, leads to the dilemma that informative identity sentences and negative existential statements and empty names cannot be treated adequately. Solution/Searle: mixed theory between object theory and description theory.

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Object Theory Newen Vs Object Theory NS I 107
Identity/Informative Identity Sentences/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. S1 Maria believes that Peter Bieri is a philosopher
S2 Maria does not believe that Pascal Mercier is a philosopher
(Pascal Mercier is a pseudonym of Bieri).
VsObject theory: by indication of the content
the object theory cannot grasp that Mary has no contradictory beliefs, but that she believes she was dealing with two people.
Negative Existence Sentences/VsObject Theory/Newen/Schrenk: E.g.
Sherlock Holmes does not exist
The object theory cannot even represent the reported information.
Frege: Solution: Description Theory: the relevant contribution of a singular term is not the designated object, but the information that can be expressed by a description.
Dilemma/Object Theory/Description Theory: the state of affairs adequacy requires in turn that in modal contexts the contribution of the singular term to the content is the object.
((s) Because otherwise the description becomes necessary. E.g. it would then be necessary that Plato was the teacher of Aristotle.)

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Pythagoras Quine Vs Pythagoras XII 75
Löwenheim/Skolem/Strong Form/Axiom of Choice/Ontology/Reduction/Ontological Relativity/Quine: (early form): Thesis: if a theory is true and has a hyper-countable object range, then everything except for a countable section is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of the variables, without any sentence becoming false. I.e. all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And these, in turn, to a specific ontology of natural numbers. For that you take the list, as far as it is explicitly known, as SF. And even if the list is not known, it exists. Accordingly, we can interpret all our objects as natural numbers, even though the list number ((s) the name) is not always known.
Ontology: could we not establish a Pythagorean multi-purpose ontology once and for all?
Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either only of numbers or only of bodies, or of sets, etc.
Problem: Suppose we had such an ontology and somebody offered us something that would have appeared as an ontological reduction prior to our decision for the Pythagorean ontology, namely a method by which all things of a certain type A are superfluous in future theories, while the remaining portion would still be infinite.
XII 76
In the new Pythagorean framework his discovery would still retain its essential content, even though it could no longer be called a reduction; it would be only a maneuver in which some numbers - we do not even know which - would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: it shows that an all-engulfing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and more obscure versions of old methods and problems.
Solution: Ontological relativity, relativistic theory. It's simply pointless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms. ((s) i.e. in this case to assert that everything is a number.) (>inside/outside).
The relevant predicates, e.g. "number", "set", "body" or whatever, would be distinguishable in the frame theory, however, by the roles they play in the laws of this theory.
Quine: an ontological reduction is only interesting if we can specify an SF.
If we have the axiom of choice and even a sign for a general selection operator, can we then specify an SF that concretizes the Löwenheim theorem?
1) We divide the object range into a countable number of equivalence classes, each with indistinguishable objects. (Indistinguishability Classes).
We can dispense with all members of every equivalence class, except one.
2) Then we'll make use of the axiom of choice to pick out a survivor from each equivalence class.
XII 77
Quine: if this were possible, we could write down a representative function with Hilbert's selection operator. Löwenheim/Quine: but the proof of the theorem has a different structure: it does not seem to justify the assumption that a representative function could be formulated in any theory that maps a hyper-countable range in a countable one.
At first glance, such an SF is of course impossible: it would have to be reversibly unique to provide different real numbers with different function values. And this contradicts the mapping of a hyper-countable into a countable range, because it cannot be reversibly unambiguous. ((s) Because it has to assign the same value to two arguments somehow.)
Framework Theory/Stronger/Weaker/Theory/Ontology/Quine: there are three strength levels of requirements regarding what is said about the ontology of the object theory within the framework theory.
1) weakest requirement to the framework theory: is sufficient if we do not want any reduction, but only explain about what things the theory is. I.e. we translate the object theory into the framework theory. I.e. we make translation proposals, with which, however, the inscrutability of reference still is to be taken into account.
The two theories may even be identical, e.g. if some terms are explained by definitions by other terms of the same language.
XII 78
2) stronger: in case of reduction by an SF, here the frame theory must assume the non-reduced range. (see above, analogy to raa, reductio ad absurdum). 3) strongest requirements: in case of reductions according to Löwenheim: i.e. from a hyper-countable to a countable range: here, the SF must be from a truly stronger frame theory. I.e. we can no longer accept it in the spirit of the raa.
Conclusion: this thwarts an argument from the Löwenheim theorem in favor of Pythagoreanism.
Ontological Relativity/Finite Range/Quine: in a finite range, ontological relativity is trivial. Since instead of quantification you can assume finite conjunctions or disjunctions, the variables and thus also the question of their value range also disappear.
Even the distinction between names and other signs is eliminated.
Therefore, an ontology for a finite theory about named objects is pointless.
That we have just talked about it is because we were moving in a broader context.
Names/Quine: are distinguished by the fact that they may be used for variables.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Russell, B. Carnap Vs Russell, B. VI 164
Def visual objects/Russell: classes of their possible aspects. CarnapVsRussell: That’s possible, but we begin our constitution much further down! For the "unseen aspects" this is difficult, therefore we constitute the entire visual world at once, not any "experiences for unseen things."
VI 247
CarnapVsRussell: realistic conception that manifests itself by him raising questions regarding whether an object still exists even when it is not observed. Thing in itself/Schlick: real, not given objects. Carnap: that makes them part of the recognizable objects.
Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class.
These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound, while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap, this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Sense Data Carnap Vs Sense Data Wittgenstein I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Structure" is a series of momentary overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble sense data of Russell's conception. CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only designate them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual in the actual sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component which is only determined by quality, as it is represented in the quality class.
These "sensations" therefore resemble Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
Accordingly Carnap: "The sensations belong to the field of psychology, the qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: for Carnap this is limited to a holistic analysis of experience.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Object Theory Pro Newen / Schrenk I 106
Kant: Object theory: per: Kripke (modified) theory: meaning of an expression is the designated object - Devitt - Description Theory: per: Frege / Russell / Carnap: description theories - Searle: bundle theory

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Direct Reference Kaplan, D. Newen/Schrenk I 117
Index Words/indicators/direct reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. This is the case if they only have to satisfy the adequacy of the facts (SA).
I 118
Example
(1) I'm here today.
Truth Condition: are here only adequately indicated, if the content of the sentence is proven as true, but not as necessary. a priori: the sentence is true a priori, but not necessary!
For example, if Carina expresses the sentence in Bochum on New Year's Eve, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum on that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum.
It is true because of the conditions of expression.