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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mind Body Problem | Danto | I 252/3 Def epiphenomenalism: (Def epiphenomenon: side effect). Thesis: No effect comes from the mind. The mind is unable to cause any event. >Epiphenomenalism. Causality only leads from the physical to the physical event or from the physical to the mental but never from the mental to the mental or from the mental to the physical event. >Causality. I 253 Def Parallelism: on the contrary, the view that there are parallel series of events that occur in the two independent substances that cannot interact. For example, pain is not an effect of the hot stove, only a coincidence. It is produced through the mediation of God. This presupposes the constant action of God. (Seventeenth century). I 253 Def Occasionalism: Version of parallelism: two clocks displaying the same time, but without a causal link. I 253 Def Monades/Leibniz: The world consists of an infinite number of causally separated substances, the monads. >G.W. Leibniz. I 254 Spinoza: there can only be one substance of which mind and body (thinking and expansion) are modes. And in such a way that the order and connection of ideas is quite the same as the order and connection of things. >Substance/Spinoza, >B. Spinoza. Each of these teachings is completely superfluous if you give up the substance itself. >Substance,k, cf. >Substrate. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Materialism | Stegmüller Vs Materialism | Stegmüller IV 384 StegmüllerVsMaterialism: (i) It is surprising how well our two-dimensional perceptions are coordinated with each other. Largely Euclidean. (ii) There is a constant interplay of data that Berkeley has to explain with a constant intervention of God (>occasionalism). ...(v) we can trace and explain the sensory physiology of the eye. Such explanations are a problem for Berkeley's theory. How does it deal with it? Stegmüller IV 422 Consciousness/Mind Body Problem/SwinburneVsMaterialism: 1. There must be a clear or ambiguous correspondence between any kind of conscious process and one or more kinds of brain processes. 2. This relationship must be interpreted causally. The materialist must show that all consciousness processes are predictable due to brain states. 3. He must show that causation is based on natural laws simple enough to serve explanatory purposes. Mackie: agrees that we must adopt a dualism of physical and experiential (phenomenal) properties. IV 423 MackieVsSwinburne: this dramatises and distorts materialism: it does not claim that physical explanations are given for everything. Only in principle should this be possible. Supervenience/Stegmüller: Thesis: that there can be no world different from our world without at least one physical difference. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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