Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attributes | Logic Texts | Read III 210 Attributive Adjectives / Read: what is large for a mouse is not large for an elephant - e.g. "great", "few", "high", "good", "beautiful". >Sorites, >Vagueness. Vagueness: Max Black: Vagueness is not ambiguity and also not generality. It can be difficult to draw a line between what is a chair and what is not. This is where vagueness comes in and threatens the sorites. Read III 211 Tarski: separation of the language levels: Suppose we wanted to say that "15 is little" is neither true nor false. According to the T-scheme, "15 is little" is not false" is equivalent to "15 is little". So ""A" is neither true nor false" is equivalent to "15 is both little and not little". This is a contradiction. >Double negation, >Negation, >Description levels, >Levels (Order). Application/Penumbra/Read: to call it a penumbra means that it is not wrong to apply it here. It is then not wrong to say that 15 is little, and not wrong to say that 15 is not little for the same reason. So it seems that it is not wrong to say that 15 is both little and not little, which is a contradiction. >Contradiction. Vagueness/Read: the world itself is not vague. There are no vague objects. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Definiteness | Field | II 226 Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement. Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides. "Determined" as basic concept - rules correspond to those for "necessary" - then the law of the excluded middle applies - it is definitely the case that he is either bald/non-bald. N.B.: it can still be the case then that he is neither definitely bald nor definitely non-bald - because there is no distribution about disjunction. II 229 Definiteness-Operator: is used so that the deflationism can distinguish vagueness from non-vagueness - "strong-true" must be defined with definiteness-Operator. II 231 Vagueness of higher level/Field/VsFine: the definiteness-operator is more natural than the Penumbar - FieldVsPenumbra: this solution is unnatural. >Penumbra. II 228 Limit/Vagueness/definiteness-Operator/Field: We need the definiteness-operator ("determined") to characterize a certain limit from a limit. II 238 Vagueness/deflationism/Field: "definitive-operator": adds additional conditions to the game under which a statement is definitely true. - (s) Not merely literal repetition). - Referential indeterminacy/(s): then a general sentence only applies to a part. - This one is sorted out by the definiteness-operator. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Vagueness | Sainsbury | Sai I 43 Definition "semantic theory" of vagueness/Sainsbury: according to this view vagueness is a semantic phenomenon. Semantics/Sainsbury: a semantic property like this, to be true, combines words with the world. Vagueness would then be a special type of this connection, namely that it is not certain whether the words are true. (SainsburyVs). It is another question whether this property must be explained by the specific nature of the world. (S.U.) Defintion "epistemic theory" of vagueness/knowledge/Sainsbury: recently a new view emerged again: Vagueness is a special kind of ignorance. The terms themselves are precise, however. According to this theory, there are even in borderline cases a fact, of course, one that we cannot know. So there is a last great man in the series before the little men start, except that we do not know who it is. --- Sai I 44 Definition: vagueness: type of property or kind of knowledge. - (hidden) fact or not a fact. Vagueness/Sainsbury: must be distinguished from relativity and ambiguity. Logic V 44 + (VsRead) ...+... >sorites. --- Sai I 51 PositivismVsVerificationism. Sorites: there are sharp limits without us being able to recognize them. Epistemic theory of vagueness. Facts present but not knowable. > Causal theory of knowledge: knowledge must not come about by chance. Tolerant concepts, no knowledge. Nevertheless vague predicates draw sharp boundaries. Tightening Theory: "either a is a pile or not a pile". SainsburyVs: assigns an intuitive false proposition. --- V 58/59 Incorrect interpretation of vagueness: as if the subject were to be associated with three sets: positive, negative, Penumbra. This then is more related to incompleteness. --- V 62/63 + VsTightening Theory: it does not allow "vagueness of higher order": it presupposes that there is a sharp boundary between positive extension and Penumbra. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| |||
No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.