Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Schiffer | I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 --- I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Folk Psychology | Dennett Vs Folk Psychology | Lanz I 300 Dennett: functional explanations make an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to carry on their tasks). Similarly, intentional explanations: the agent is rational: he has goals that he should have due to its constitution and its place in the world. Likewise, the opinions that he should have. Thus, only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. So one asks, what are the causally relevant factors for the behavior that can be explained functionally or intentionally depending on the interest and complexity of behavior, then only the physical explanation of the information remains. It follows that it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of further mental states and causes of actions. Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsFolk Psychology). Pauen I 135 Psycho Functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in the determination of mental states. Because the binding to everyday language is not necessary it can be abandoned. On the other hand, the functional description can go arbitrarily far, practically down to the individual neuron. All properties can be considered, depending on the objective. V 137 Measuring instruments can be used as well. Problem: to recognize simulation: is in principle not impossible. Representatives: Dennett. (DennettVsEveryday Psychology: simulation impossible to include) V 138 Dennett: in cases of conflict neuroscientific data prevail over self-attribution of the first person! We do not have direct access to our mental states (unlike as semantic functionalism and eliminative materialism). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Putnam, H. | Block Vs Putnam, H. | I 179 Pain/Functionalism/Putnam: Thesis: pain is a functional state. Thesis: no organism that can feel pain, allows a decomposition into parts that have separate descriptions. E.g. a swarm of bees as a whole cannot be a single pain feeler. BlockVsPutnam: 1) that could be modified in a way that the parts may not all have one organization that are characteristic of sentient beings. This would not exclude a system with homunculi!. E.g. sense organs have also insentient parts!. 2) Also vice versa it should not be said that no real part may feel: E.g. otherwise, pregnant women and organisms infested with parasites would not be considered as pain feeling beings. Block: what is important is that the sentient beings play a crucial role in giving the thing its functional organization. I 192 Best explanation/Abduction/Block: E.g. Psycho functionalism: you could say: "What else could mental states be, if not psycho-functional states?" (Putnam per psycho functionalism, 1967). "Better explanation than behaviorism or materialism. BlockVsPutnam: this is a dubious use of the inference to the best explanation. Because what guarantees us that an answer to the question "What are mental states?" exists at all?. In addition, the conclusion about the best explanation is not applicable if there are no acceptable explanations. ((s) If nothing is useful, what is available?) |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Block Vs Shoemaker, S. | I 188 Psycho functionalism/Block: (see above I 167): E.g. brains in a vat, paralysis: it is an empirical question of what is regarded as input and output. I 188 Now, diseases might even change the neural input! Then it is a matter of (arbitrary) decision which malfunctions are regarded as changes in mentality, and which are attributed to the periphery!. BlockVsShoemaker: with that ("paradigmatic person") he withdraws to psycho functionalism. No common knowledge tells us anything about what can be paradigmatically embodied "without changing its structure". Sorites/Brains in a vat/BIV/Block: suppose we take away gradually one gram of brain after another. At what point do we get something that can no longer be "a paradigmatically embodied"? This is not only a conceptual issue, but an empirical one!. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Physicalism | Pro | Block I 167 Def functionalism * /a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, per: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. > Psycho functionalism. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| |||