Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Concepts Baudrillard Blask I 104
Concepts/Baudrillard: Baudrillard propagates the revaluation of old concepts.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Maternalism Political Philosophy Gaus I 282
Maternalism/Political theories/Mottier: 'Maternalist' thinkers also reject the liberal contractual conception of citizenship. They place the emphasis on the relational dimension of social life. Ethics: Drawing on the work of Nancy Chodorow (1978)(1) and Carol Gilligan (1982)(2), maternalists argue that the private sphere, in particular the family, is ruled by a relational morality, an 'ethics of care' anchored in mothering activities.
Capacities: As Sara Ruddick (1980)(3) argues, women who are mothers have developed capacities, values and moral judgements that are both little recognized and contrast with the dominant bureaucratic and technological rationality of the modern public sphere. According to maternalists, women bring to the public sphere these relational capacities, including a respect for others and a care for their well-being. They also bring a different use of power since the aim of ethics of care is to empower others, not to control them.
Public Sphere: The public sphere, on the contrary, is seen to be ruled by a masculinist ethics of justice, founded on individual rights.
Ethics of care: For maternalist theorists, the ethics of care is morally superior to the individualist values that dominate the public sphere. They see in the ethics of care of the private sphere a possible source for rethinking both morality in the public sphere and the model of liberal citizenship. Consequently, maternalist theorists such as Ruddick (1980;(3) 1989(4)) and Elshtain (1982)(5) argue for an integration into the public sphere of relational skills such as listening skills, emotions, and recognition of others' needs and vulnerability as a basis for democratic deliberation (Ruddick, 1980;(3) 1989(4); Elshtain, 1982(5); Held, 1990(6)).
Society: Women's experiences from the private sphere are thus taken as a normative model for
behaviour in the public sphere, where women's capacities for love and care for others come to be
seen as a model to be emulated by others, and as a potential basis for public morality. Elshtain (1982)(5) calls for a 'social feminism' as an alternative to the 'amoral statecraft' of the modern bureaucratic state.
Problems: In her critical development of maternalist theory, Selma Sevenhuijsen (1998(7): 20) shares this emphasis on the revaluation of caring activities. However, she emphasizes that social practices of care do not always spring from worthy motives but can also be driven by the desire for control over others, or from 'Christian guilt'. As Sevenhuijsen points out, 'bad' motives can lead to 'good' care, while a 'good' motive, such as attentiveness to vulnerability, is no guarantee of good care but can lead to paternalism or undue protection. >Maternalism/MacKinnon, >Maternalism/Dietz.


1. Chodorow, Nancy (1978) The Reproduction of Mothering. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
2. Gilligan, Carol (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Woman's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Umversity Press.
3. Ruddick, Sara (1980) 'Maternal thinking'. Feminist Studies, 6 (Summer): 342—67.
4. Ruddick, Sara (1989) Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon.
5. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1982) 'Antigone's daughters'. Democracy in the world, 2:48-59.
6. Held, Virginia (1990) 'Mothering versus contract'. In Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest. University of Chicago Press, 288-304.
7. Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1998) Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality and Politics. London: Routledge.

Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Necessity Wright I 259
Necessity/Wright: it is in the world or in the terms? - McDowell’s Wittgenstein: "fully satisfactying intermediate position": both! WrightVs: "Platonic Scylla": absurd revaluation of the rules (>Realism).
"Rule-skeptical Charybdis": no rules at all (> Anti-Realism).
Wright: both are absurd.
McDowell: "fully satisfying intermediate position": thesis: the rules are always within the practice.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Psychology Nietzsche Ries II 79
Psychology/Resentment/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: Basic concept of the Psychology of Christianity. Explains how the hierarchy of power given by nature could turn into the rule of the powerless. ---
Danto III 130
Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche considered himself a born psychologist. DantoVsNietzsche: in his thinking was a whole lot of circular arguments. Our psychological theories are part of our perspective, but our perspective must be explained by psychic phenomena that are part of it. Our moral attitudes are jointly responsible for our (...) perspectives. Psychology, however, is invoked to explain why we take our moral perspectives, and especially why exactly them.
---
Danto III 132
Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: If there is nothing material, then there is nothing immaterial. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 537).
Danto: one could say that there is no substance that would be the task of psychology to explore.
Moral/Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche fought on two fronts at the same time: On the one hand, he hoped to attack morality by exposing the psychology that was attached to it as illogical, on the other hand, he wanted to attack this psychology by attacking the morality assumed by it.
Philosophy/Nietzsche: The attack on the soul or the self - in which he claimed to find the essence of modern philosophy - was at the same time an assassination attempt on the basic premise of Christian doctrine. (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 33).
---
Danto III 134
I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the "I" as being, in the "I" as substance and projects the belief in the ego-substance on all things - it only creates the term 'thing' through this ... Being is thought into everything as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'... (F. Nietzsche: Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 71.) ---
Danto III 200
Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: two terms play a prominent role in Nietzsche's psychology: resentment and bad conscience. Resentment/slave morality: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and plays it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness.
---
Danto III 201
He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's list of values and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Finally, the master will be evil in his own eyes. (See also >revaluation of all values). ---
Danto III 208
Gentlemen/Slaves/Nietzsche: it would be a mistake to ask the beast to suppress its animal instincts. Similarly, people have no choice but to be different from what they are. Nietzsche: Demanding from strength that it does not express itself as strength (...) is just as absurd as demanding from weakness that it expresses itself as strength. (F. Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 293.).
---
Strengths/Nietzsche: the strong are simply actions of strength, not individuals who act in a strong way at their discretion. Just as lightning is not an entity that does something, but the light itself. The strong being is not free to show his strength or not to show it. (ibid. p. 294.)
---
Danto III 209
Humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in politics: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake.
DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality.
NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Reality Parmenides Taureck I 110
Reality/Parmenides/Taureck: his provocation lies in the revaluation of the judgment according to which the human does not represent reality as it is, but deforms and distorts it. ProtagorasVsParmenides/Taureck: what is shown, exists as it appears. The human does not deform the world, but unlocks it knowingly.


Taureck I
B. H.F. Taureck
Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995
Religion Nietzsche Danto III 201
Religion/Slave Moral/Master Moral/Morality/Nietzsche/Danto: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and plays it up: he resents the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness. He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's list of values and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Eventually, the master becomes evil in his own eyes.
Danto: the revaluation of values is made possible by the work of religion. Religion was the reason why the strong were bent under the yoke of a limited number of doctrines, which they had to endure cruelly. Religion acted as a means of revenge that the unwilling humbly took hold of. When he was still powerful, the aristocrat had always held something else in high esteem.
---
Danto III 202
Through his behavior, the aristocrat initially showed contempt for the worldview of the (Christian) religion and for the intentions of the priestly resentment. Now the priests are the worst enemies because they are the most powerless. ((F. Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 280). They cultivate the resentment to its highest degree. Their revaluation of values is ultimately an act of spiritual revenge. (ibid., p. 281).
---
Danto III 221
Religion/Tradition/Danto: many religions claim that we stand before our God as an offspring before their father, claiming that we owe everything we have or are to the divine creator. ---
Danto III 222
Nietzsche: In the birth of the tragedy, Nietzsche develops the idea that the Greek Olympus was invented to alleviate suffering, not to contribute to it in the way that the Christian concept of God has done in the face of human suffering - to reinforce man's will to find himself guilty. (F. Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 348f). ---
Danto III 231
Religion/Nietzsche/Danto: The ascetic ideals are only illustrated by religious life; and religion itself is only illustrated by what one calls religions in the colloquial language. There are forms of religion in the broader sense, which are antireligious in the narrower sense. A person may be religious in the broader sense and antireligious in the narrower sense, if he/she casts doubt on religion in the name of something else; be it reason, science, historical criticism or truth. By adhering to such higher goals, people become disguised ascetics, personae of the religious impulses that only occasionally manifest themselves in real religious forms. (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, VI. 2, p. 429f). ---
Danto III 232
Science/Belief/Religion/Nietzsche/Danto: In the Gay Science Nietzsche asks in 1886 to what extent we are still pious. The answer is that we are pious insofar as we continue to believe in the truth. (F. Nietzsche: Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, KGW V. 2, p. 256). Nietzsche: You can see that science is also based on the belief that there is no science without preconditions. (page 257.)
Danto: According to Nietzsche, it is necessary for science that there is an order and a reality which it must try to discover.
Nietzsche:.... in so far as he affirms this 'other world', does he not have to deny his counterpart, this world, our world...? .... Then it is still a metaphysical belief on which our belief in science is based.... Plato's belief that God is the truth, that the truth is divine... (ibid. p. 259).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Science Romanticism Gadamer I 279
Science/Romanticism/Gadamer: [The] revaluations of romanticism are the source of the attitude of historical science in the 19th century. It no longer measures the past by the standards of the present as if by an absolute; it ascribes its own value to past times and can even acknowledge their superiority in one respect or another. The great achievements of Romanticism, the awakening of the dawn of time, the hearing of the voice of the peoples in songs, the collection of fairy tales and legends, the cultivation of ancient customs, the discovery of languages as
Gadamer I 280
world views, the study of the "religion and wisdom of the Indians" - they all triggered historical research, which slowly, step by step, transformed the foreboding reawakening into distant historical recognition. Historism: The connection of the historical school to Romanticism thus confirms that the Romantic repetition of the original itself is on the ground of the Enlightenment. The historical science of the nineteenth century is its proudest fruit and sees itself almost as the completion of the Enlightenment, as the final step in the liberation of the mind from dogmatic bias, the step towards the objective knowledge of the historical world, which is equal to the knowledge of nature through modern science. >Historism/Gadamer.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
State (Polity) Feminism Gaus I 278
State/feminism/Mottier: For a long time, feminist theory paid scant attention to the role of the state in gender relations. There are obvious historical reasons for this initial 'state-blindness' of gender analysis. At its inception in the 1970s, the new women's movement was deeply suspicious of mainstream politics and the state, which were seen as fundamentally patriarchic in nature. Many feminists intended to avoid conventional strategies and power games in favour of anti-hierarchical action within new social movements outside of the formal political arena (...).
Politics: At the level of practical political action, this critical stance was nevertheless often
combined with an appeal to the state, in key areas of feminist struggles such as abortion, pornography, or anti-rape legislation (Petchesky, 1986(1); Randall 1998(2)).
Theory: The analytical consequence of the movement's distrust of mainstream politics was an
under-theorization of the role of the state. Since the mid 1980s, there has been a revaluation of the central role of the state in the structuration and institutionalization of relations between men and women, and in establishing and policing the frontiers between public and private spheres. Somewhat paradoxically, at a time when the importance of the state itself is eroded by supranational processes, the state has been brought back into feminist theory. >State/Gender theory, >State/MacKinnon, >Welfare state/Gender Theory, >State/Poststructuralism.


1. Petchesky, Rosalind (1986) Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom. London: Verso.
2. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205.

Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Values Nozick II 311
Values/Nozick: four types: 1. Intrinsic value - 2. Instrumental value: is a function or a measure of the intrinsic value and leads to it. (> Expected benefit). Something of instrumental value must not be intrinsically valuable itself. 3. creative value: is a function of the value for something new that is introduced into the world - determinism denies creative values. - Free will: we understand it as it leads to significant differences in value. - Instrumental action: makes a difference, if it would stop, later intrinsic values would not occur. - E.g. brush stroke - The brush stroke itself is not creative.
4. contributors value: what causes the difference. - They are also allowed by determinism. - Determinism does not allow creative values. - Soft determinism: contributing value is sufficient. - Fatalism: Allows no contributing values.
---
II 399
Moral pull/ethics/value/Nozick: my value fixes, what should come from you - Moral Push: Your value fixes, what I should meet with you. ---
II 453
Moral/Nozick: the moral basis is shared by all. So it seems to have nothing interesting to do with you. - It seems to be that we are searching for all values. - Then variant of the categorical imperative: "Do not kill values-seeking egos". ---
II 415
Intrinsic values/ethics/Nozick: intrinsic values occur best with organic unit. - New values occur only in whole, in totalities. ---
II 562 f.
Values/ethics/Nozick: E.g. assuming there is a possible world without values, but with an organic unity (which is just as good) - Then you could live as if there were values. - This suggests that the existence of values lies in their possibility. - We know what values would be, we just have to bring them to life. - That is not made valuable by something previous - (no circle). - Afterwards the choice is good - then values are not external. ---
II 565
External is: That we gain something through it - internal: connection to our motives. ---
II 566
Then there are also different values: E.g. Nietzsche: revaluation. ---
II 567
Values/facts/connections/Nozick: facts do not contain values - (otherwise naturalistic fallacy). - Connection: some facts (of organic unity) are identical with values. - Explanation: the relation is the organic unity. - Values are organically based on own facts.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Values Nietzsche Höffe I 378
Values/Nietzsche/Höffe: [Nietzsche takes] (...) a threefold "revaluation of all values": 1) First of all, values, which are highly valued so far, are devalued, because they either lost their creative power or their right. The main point of criticism is the morality of charity, which is exposed as the morality of the "wayward, disgruntled, and the ones badly off course", as a resentment of the weak. In addition, it is discredited with the argument that, despite its appearance, it springs even from a will to power, namely the will of those who proclaim the morality of slavery, the priests.
2) After the second revaluation, certain traditional values are not devalued, but are given a new reason for appreciation. Even those ideals in which one tends to think of Christianity criticized by Nietzsche, the ascetic ideals, are not rejected all around: "With artists" they mean "nothing or too much; with philosophers and scholars something like weather and instinct for the most favorable preconditions of high spirituality" (1).
3) Finally a previous ranking of values is reversed. On the one hand something, which is highly valued so far in many places, the supernatural, is declared to be untrue. According to Nietzsche, there is no beyond for nature, no more metaphysics. On the other hand, the rank which the hitherto highly esteemed morality, the morality of pity and slavery, deserved, is now given to the "master morality", the "aristocratic equation of value" of good with nobility, power, beauty, and love of God, taken from archaic Greekism.


1. F. Nietzsche, Genealogie der Moral, 3. Abhandlung, Nr. 1



Ries II 51
Revaluation of the values/Nietzsche: first semi-conscious representatives: Sophists, Antisthenes, the Cynics. The twilight begins this task with a "work of depth".
Ries II 75
Values/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: serious equation of truth and good. Illusion: the things of the highest value must have a different, own origin. Illusionary world. ---
Danto III 201
Values/Slave moral/Master's moral/Nietzsche/Danto: Resentment/Slave moral: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and plays it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness. He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's list of values and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Eventually, the master becomes evil in his own eyes.
Danto: the revaluation of values is made possible by the work of religion. Religion was the reason why the strong were bent under the yoke of a limited number of commandments, which they had to endure cruelly. Religion acted as a means of revenge that the unwilling humbly took hold of. When he was still powerful, the aristocrat had always held other things in high esteem.
---
Danto III 202
Through his behavior, the aristocrat initially showed contempt for the worldview of the (Christian) religion and for the intentions of the priestly resentment. Now the priests are the worst enemies because they are the most powerless. (F. Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 280). They cultivate the resentment to its highest degree. Their revaluation of values is ultimately an act of spiritual revenge. (ibid., p. 281).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005