Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Self-Knowledge Aristotle Gadamer I 321
Self-Knowledge/Techne/Aristotle/Gadamer: It is obvious that the human does not dispose of him- or herself in the same way as the craftsman disposes of the material with which he or she works. The human obviously cannot make him- or herself in the same way as he or she can make something else. So it must also be a different knowledge that he or she has of him- or herself in the own moral being, a knowledge that can be distinguished from such knowledge with which one leads a production. Knowing oneself (German: "Sich-Wissen"): Aristotle formulates this difference in a bold, even unique, way, calling this knowledge a knowing-oneself, i.e. a knowledge-for-itself.(1) Thus the knowing-oneself of the moral consciousness is set off (...) against the theoretical knowledge (...). But the demarcation against technical knowledge also lies in it, and it is precisely in order to formulate the demarcation on both sides that Aristotle dares to make the peculiar expression of knowing-oneself. The demarcation against technical knowledge is the more difficult task, if one, like Aristotle, determines the "object" of this knowledge ontologically not as something general, which is always as it is, but as something individual, which can also be different (...). >Generality/Aristotle, >Morality/Aristotle, >Laws/Aristotle.
Gadamer I 327
The knowing of oneself, of which Aristotle speaks, is (...) determined by the fact that it contains the completed application and in the immediacy of the given situation operates its knowledge. It is thus a knowledge of the respective that first completes moral knowledge, a knowledge that is not, however, sensual vision. Even if one must look at a situation and see what it demands of one, this seeing does not mean that one perceives what is visible in this situation as such, but that one learns to see it as the situation of action and thus in the light of what is right.
Gadamer I 328
Moral knowledge is really a knowledge of its own kind. It embraces means and ends in a peculiar way and is thus different from technical knowledge. For this very reason there is no point in distinguishing here between knowledge and experience, as is the case with technical knowledge. For moral knowledge itself contains a kind of experience in itself (...). Understanding/understand: Understanding is introduced as a modification of the virtue of moral knowledge, except when it concerns myself, who must act. Then "synesis" clearly means the ability of moral judgment.


1. Eth. Nic. Z 8, 1.141 1033, 1142 a30; Eth. Eud. 92, 1246 1036. (In my opinion, one misses the
essential methodological unity of Aristotle's ethics and politics, if one does not include the politiki phronesis with Gauthier (see his new introduction to the 2nd edition of his commentary on Nicomachean ethics, Louvain 1970). Cf. also my review, which is reprinted again in vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 304-306).


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Self-Knowledge Burge Frank I 687
Authority/First Person/Self-Knowledge/Burge: (per Descartes) We have "basic self-knowledge". E.g. "I think (with this very thought) that writing requires concentration. Problem:
1. does individualism follow from accepting this Cartesian conception?
2. how is certainty about one's own mental states possible for externalism (anti-individualism)?
Frank I 706
Self-knowledge/Burge: the source of our strong epistemic claim is not that we know a lot about the objects or that we know the circumstances (enabling conditions) particularly well, but arises from the nature and function of self-evaluative judgments. E.g. When we consider that there is no water at all, we are unjustifiably viewing our position from a third person perspective. >Perspective, >Description levels, >Incorrigibility.


Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of
Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Self-Knowledge Robinson Corr I 461
Self-Knowledge/Robinson/Sedikides: Generalized self-knowledge has properties of association consistent with semantic memory networks (Kihlstrom, Beer and Klein 2003(1); Robinson and Clore 2002a(2)). These associative links should, in turn, have systematic implications for understanding how traits function. For example, a greater interconnectivity of positive affective knowledge should render it more likely that one positive thought would trigger another one in daily life (Robinson and Compton2008)(3). In support of this sort of analysis, a series of studies have shown that higher levels of life satisfaction are associated with stronger positive affective priming effects (Robinson and Kirkeby 2005(4); Robinson and von Hippel 2006(5)), whereas higher levels of Neuroticism are associated with stronger negative affective priming effects (Robinson, Ode, Moeller and Goetz 2007)(6).
In short, traits may be profitably viewed as associative memory structures, as assessed within semantic and affective priming paradigms.
>Memory/Robinson/Sedikides.

1. Kihlstrom, J. F., Beer, J. B. and Klein, S. B. 2003. Self and identity as memory, in M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (eds.), Handbook of self and identity, pp. 68–90.New York: Guilford Press
2. Robinson, M. D. and Clore, G. L. 2002a. Belief and feeling: an accessibility model of emotional self-report, Psychological Bulletin 128: 934–60
3. Robinson, M. D. and Compton, R. J. 2008. The happy mind in action: the cognitive basis of subjective well-being, in M. Eid and R. J. Larsen (eds.), The science of subjective well-being, pp. 220–38 New York: Guilford Press
4. Robinson, M. D. and Kirkeby, B. S. 2005. Happiness as a belief system: individual differences and priming in emotion judgments, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31: 1134–44
5. Robinson, M. D. and von Hippel, W. 2006. Rose-colored priming effects: life satisfaction and affective priming, Journal of Positive Psychology 1: 187–97
6. Robinson, M. D., Ode, S., Moeller, S. K. and Goetz, P. W. 2007. Neuroticism and affective priming: evidence for a Neuroticism-linked negative schema, Personality and Individual Differences 42: 1221–31


Michael D. Robinson and Constantine Sedikides, “Traits and the self: toward an integration”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press

EconRobin I
James A. Robinson
James A. Acemoglu
Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Burge, T. Davidson Vs Burge, T. I (d) 74
Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism.
Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything.
DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved
Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves.
I (e) 116
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge.
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses).
Glüer II 167
Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time.

Frank I 665
Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken.
But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that.
Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge.
1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me.
2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents.
Fra I 665/666
DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’.
Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion.
Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me.
DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point:
Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common.
If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically.
We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought.
E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners!
Fra I 667
If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right.
BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis).
DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought.
Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice".
DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show:
a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say!
b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs.
((s) that the meanings are not so).
c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks.
I 667/668
Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis.
Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58

Frank I 710
Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents.
It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude.
Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject.
As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible.
I 711
Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view.
How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent."
But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal).
Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal".
DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved!
We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Burge Vs Descartes, R. Frank I 699
Reliability theoryVsSkepticism/Burge: some want to block the skepticism by denying seclusion principles. BurgeVsDescartes: I think we can be sure that we are not being deceived by any deus malignus. We derive this knowledge from our perception knowledge. This is not transcendental, as some authors believe. BurgeVsDescartes: the second stage judgment (reflective) simply inherits the content of the first-stage thought. E.g. "Water is a liquid": 1) you need the ability to think the empirical thought of the first stage, and 2) to attribute it to yourself at the same time. The knowledge of the content of the thoughts does not require an upstream separate examination of the conditions, just like the knowledge of the contents of perception does not require this.
Fra I 700
One simply knows the thought by thinking it. We have no criterion, no phenomenon and no empiricism.
I 705
BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive one’s own thoughts as objects and to attribute a special faculty of infallibility to oneself. Either you introduce the new entity of an ability or special objects as new entities. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought if they have been fully understood, or ideas whose esse is their percipi. That would be objects about which no mistakes could be made, like items that could be seen at once from all sides.
I 708
BurgeVsDescartes: main error: the difference between a-priori knowledge and authoritative self blurring knowledge of the first person. One has clearly no authority to know whether one of one’s own thoughts can be individuated or to explicated in a certain way. But one does not need this authority to know that one is thinking them. E.g. I can know that I have arthritis, and know that I think that without having clear criteria for arthritis. It is a truism that you have to understand what you think well enough to think of it. But this does not mean that such an understanding brings an ability to explication or substitution with it, nor that such an understanding is immune to errors. So you can know what your own thoughts are, even if you only understand them partially. DavidsonVs: that undermines the authority of the first person. BurgeVsDavidson: that is not necessary if a distinction is made between understanding and the ability to explicate.
I 709
Explication: requires a higher degree of objectification: a conceptual mastery of the conditions that are the basis of your own thoughts and a conceptual mastery of the rules that you follow.

Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of
Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Externalism Newen Vs Externalism I 174
Natural Species/Putnam/Newen: E.g. water, oil, tiger: in doing so, we single out individual specimens, even if we
I 175
are unaware of the essential conditions for the existence of the natural species.
I 176
Meaning/Putnam: is therefore dependent on the surroundings. >Externalism. Externalism/Burge: Transfers Putnam's knowledge to the contents of beliefs.
Twin Earth: shows that beliefs cannot be fully characterized by the internal states.
Arthritis/Shmarthritis/Burge/Newen: Alfred's belief that he had arthritis in the thigh becomes a true statement when changing to a language community in which this is common.
I 177
Point: in this, however, we still assume that the use is determined by experts. I.e. we still can make mistakes! We may use it correctly sometimes, even though we connect false beliefs with it! VsExternalism/Newen: Problem: Supervenience! E.g.
1) beliefs depend on the surroundings
2) brain states are independent of the surroundings
3) beliefs supervene on brain states.
That is impossible, if some are dependent and the others are independent.
I 178
It might so happen that different beliefs are present in the same brain states. VsExternalism/Knowledge/Belief/Newen: 2) argument VsExternalism: it is inconsistent with our self-knowledge. In general, we know what we believe. It might be, however, that the surroundings have such an influence that the content is changed.
There are two positions
a) incompatibility thesis: either the externalism or the everyday intuition is true
b) compatibility thesis: both are compatible at the price that our everyday intuition is significantly attenuated.

NS I 139
VsExternalism: simply saying that you need causal chains for successful reference is not enough. You must also say what kind they need to be. E.g. direct visual contact, hearsay, instrument monitoring, etc. E.g. phlogiston: it was believed to be responsible for combustion processes. Question: Why does "phlogiston" not refer to oxygen? Why did this reference not succeed?
VsExternalism: Problem: it cannot give the following answer, because it brings out the thesis rejected by him:
"Intention determines the extension".
Externalism has to say that the theory is so fundamentally wrong that it is not satisfied by any substance. Therefore, "phlogiston" does not reference.
VsExternalism: thus it cannot show how the causal chains are linked and owes us a theory of causal chains in general.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Frank, M. Pauen Vs Frank, M. Pauen I 249
I/Heidelberg School/Pauen: Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank. It's not about the evidence that the "objects" cited by the traditional notion of I do not exist, but the fact that the traditional model itself is inadequate.
We are not entitled to a "fiction of the I"! However, it has proven indispensable in psychology.
I 250
Subjet/Object/Henrich/Frank/Pauen: both Vs this conception. And regardless of a determination with respect to dualism/monism. The assumption that self-awareness arises from the recognition of the identity of subject and object causes an insoluble problem:
This realization presupposes that the subject is already aware of the fact that it is the object of its own reflection.
The act of reflection presupposes the existence of that self-awareness which, according to the model, is supposed to be the result.
Henrich: it is indeed not necessary that it has in any way conceptual knowledge of itself or is able to give of a description of itself, but it must be able in any case to testify with certainty that it is familiar with itself in the sense of self-awareness.
To arrive at an identification with itself the subject already needs to know under which conditions it can attribute something which it encounters to itself. It can never gain this knowledge through self-relation before everything else (1970).
I 251
Subject/Object/Manfred Frank/Heidelberg School/Pauen: the arguments against the S/O model also speak against the attempt to justify self-awareness as a self-ascription of properties. But if I want to realize that it is me for whom these properties are true, I already need to have self-awareness myself.
Self-Awareness/Frank: can therefore not be explicated as relation of something to something else in general.
I 252
I.e. self-awareness cannot be explained as the knowledge of a state of affairs. Of course, the subject can acquire knowledge, and self-awareness can thus turn into self-knowledge.
Frank Thesis: there must be an upstream pre-reflexive awareness of the self.
1) This is not a form of knowledge.
2) No application of criteria.
3) "Immediate": it is not based on the relation of the subject to anything else.
I 253
VsFrank: 1) Question whether the model does not remain biased in the subject/object thinking. 2) Question whether the concept of "pre-reflexive" can ever be explained coherently.
3) Question to what extent the relation of the subject to itself should be distinguished from other common forms of knowledge.
Pre-Reflexive/Frank/Pauen: this relation of the subject with itself should exist solely in the intimacy with itself. Not content-wise. No knowledge. Thus it can be maintained even during change.
VsFrank: then we cannot speak of an "I" in the interesting sense at all.
TugenhatVsHenrich/Pauen: he recurs as explicitly as one could wish on the subject/object model. The subject is itself the object.

I 258
PauenVsTugendhat/PauenVsHenrich/PauenVsFrank/Pauen: The problem with all approaches is that a state of affairs is only a determined state of affairs when it is different from other states of affairs. The mere absence of doubt whether an object is ugly does not justify the reverse that the person simply considered it to be beautiful. If the doubt never occurs and the person falls otherwise does not make any judgments of taste, this rather suggests that they lack appropriate judgment!
A person can only attribute a state as their own if they are able to recognize foreign states.
I 262
PauenVsHeidelberger School: the "pre-reflexive self" is not a necessary condition: the necessary distinction between self and external perspective can be made without it. On the other hand there is no objection to attributing a pre-reflexive self to subjects that have the ability to self-ascription.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Hegel, G.W.F. Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F. I 16
HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual .
II 87
VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit.
Rorty III 196
HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: understood the difficulty of throwing away the ladder at the end of a story very well. He himself did not want to give a narrative, but a litany.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Internalism Burge Vs Internalism I 687
Deception/Descartes/Burge: Descartes points out a causal gap between world and effects; different external causes can trigger the same effects (all authors pro). Individualism: therefore our thoughts about the world are wrong Anti-individualism (= externalism)/Burge: but we know what thoughts we have, even if they are wrong (even on twin earth) Anti-individualism Thesis: in counterfactual situations we have other thoughts than in the current situation (Twin Earth)
VsInternalism: confuses truth conditions with individuation conditions: the I conditions (indexical) change, however, on Twin Earth, because the thoughts are different. But you can have thoughts without knowing the individuation conditions.
Frank I 688
BurgeVsInternalism/Individualism: incorrect evolution of the Cartesian argument: confusion of truth conditions with individuation conditions. 1) Descartes raises the question of whether our thoughts in counterfactual situations are true: they are not.
Important argument: It is assumed that the thoughts are identical to the corresponding ones from the original situation!
That means the individuation conditions remain constant, the truth conditions change.
Twin Earth/BurgeVs: in fact the reverse is true: the individuation conditions change.
We know what thoughts we have in the current situation and can imagine that they are wrong. We would also know in a counterfactual situation, what thoughts we would have in this situation.
But in the current situation we have no knowledge of the thoughts we would have in counterfactual situations.
Hence Cartesianism cannot support internalism.


Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of
Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Introspection Rorty Vs Introspection Frank I 582
RortyVsIntrospection: Circle: we must already presuppose the concept of the mental. >Introspection, >Self-Knowledge, >Incorrigibility.

Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Introspection Ryle Vs Introspection I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects from it, since its object is a myth - consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same kind as what I can find out about others - The small differences do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Priviledged Access, >Public language. ---
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any phenomena in the inner - there are no such events. ---
I 221
Introspection/Tradition/Ryle: an ideal of a true perception, attentive observation, only executed here and there. Whereas consciousness is an ongoing component of all mental processes. RyleVsIntrospection: assuming there are certain ghostly things that one could perceive, then this observer would always have to do two things at once: to stand up in time for the realization of the plan, he would also have to pay attention to the process of plan compliance. That would become fastly infinitely. (> Regress).
---
I 222
But if one admits that the number of perceivable inner things is limited, it follows that there must be imperceptible inner things. Non-introspective act, namely, the act of introspection, which already contains the greatest possible number of simultaneous attentions acts. This knowledge could not be based on introspection. But then the question arises whether it was ever based on it. Then one would have to postulate another form of privileged access. Scylla and Charybdis. >Mentalism.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Subject Philosophy Habermas Vs Subject Philosophy I 119
Philosophy of the Subject: (HabermasVs, NietzscheVs,) ... the nihilistic domination of subject-centered reason is conceived as result and expression of a perverseness of the will to power.
I 180
...the existence is justified out of itself. Thus, Heidegger conceives the world as a process again only from the subjectivity of the will self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or the question of being. The monological execution of intentions, i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the cognitive relation).
I 309
HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: the attempt to escape the unfortunate alternatives always ends in the entanglements of self-deifying subject consuming itself in acts of futile self-transcendence.  Since Kant, the I simultaneously takes the position of an empirical subject in the world where it finds itself as an object among others. In the position of a transcendental subject it faces is a world as a whole which its constitutes itself as the totality of the objects of possible experiences.
 The attempts to understand these irreconcilable alternatives as self-generation of the mind or of the genus range from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty.
HabermasVsHegel: because these hybrid undertakings pursue the utopia of complete self-knowledge, they keep turning into positivism. (Today: the body-soul problem).
I 435
LuhmannVsSubject Philosophy: "Simple minds want to counter this with ethics." (Habermas: not without scorn.). HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: overall social awareness as a superordinate subject, it creates a zero-sum game in which the room for maneuver of individuals cannot be accommodated properly. ((s) Every social conflict would appear as schizophrenia.)
Habermas: Solution: alternative concept strategy: public communities can be understood as a higher-level intersubjectivities. In this aggregated public there is also an overall social consciousness. This no longer needs to fulfill the precision requirements of the philosophy of the subject to the self-consciousness!
Luhmann II 136
Subject Philosophy/Habermas: Problem: in philosophical discussions, ideological criticism not even survives the simplest self-application. At most, it can explain why someone is wrong, but it cannot show that there is a mistake.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Vollmer, G. Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. Putnam I 196
Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical.
Vollmer I 275
VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation.
However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption).
I 290
DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6)
I 292
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule.
I 293
VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic.
I 298
Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti)
2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus
3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized.
This is a genetic fallacy.
VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused!
The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view!
Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage.
Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails.
I 300
Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently.
Lotze: Validity
Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent
Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc.
Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity.
Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity.
Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity.
I 309
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular.
I 310
Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers.
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks:
Explication of concepts and knowledge
Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems.
Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements.
Illumination of the conditions for cognition.
Demonstration of cognitive boundaries.
I 315
Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature
2. thinking category
3. this category of thinking is the result of selection.
Therefore, causality generates causality via causality.
a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75).
b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6).
I 316
VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience.
I 318
VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology".
The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization".
Vollmer I 313
Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation".
Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself.
I 314
Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception:
I 323
Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself.
I 314
Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles":





Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Externalism Versus Frank I 686
Externalism: also Millikan and Dretske, as Burge - VsExternalism: Searle, Fodor.

Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of
Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Skepticism Austin, J.L. Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) one arrives at the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies.
I 44
Knowledge/Philosophy/Everyday/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers 1961,45) These typical philosophical investigations are carried out from our normal (everyday) practice.
I 45
Austin Thesis: "enough is enough": i.e. not everything has to be said. It is not always necessary to prove that this goldfinch is not a stuffed bird. (OM 52).
I 48
Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about Descartes' strong thesis that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without it, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin's nuclear thesis
Method/Everyday Language/AustinVsDescartes: can it be shown ((s) >Manifestation) that Descartes with his strong thesis violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge?
I 51
Misconception/Deception/Austin: thesis "you cannot always deceive all people".
I 64
StroudVsAustin: the accusation of AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "Knowledge" has been distorted in everyday use can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain usage of language, a certain concept and the relation between them has been misinterpreted. Stroud: that is what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important.
I 76
Stroud: this leads us to the depth and importance of skepticism. It is about much more than deciding if you know something about the world around you, it is about our practice (actions) and reflection of our knowledge (self-knowledge). Can we take a distant position here?
I 82
Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984