Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstractness Wright I 226 f
Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers. Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. ​​that there are no abstract objects). But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. (>Numbers).
---
I 227f
Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is capable of truth, or not. If the "capacity for truth" is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions. ---
I 223 ff
It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner. Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects.
Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference).
---
I 242
Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Conceptual Role Block Fodor IV 163
Meaning/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Semantics/Block: Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its role in a language. Fodor/Lepore: this invites to the conclusion that expressions belonging to different languages ​​have different meanings.
This leads to "translation holism" rather than to content holism.
Lit: Block "Advertisement for a semantics for psychology" is much quoted.
CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory". Theory of the conceptual role, semantics of the conceptual role. Thesis: The meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that a version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one.
In any case, according to Block, it is the only one that satisfies the conditions of cognitive science.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: his arguments for CRT are not the deciding ones. But this does not lead to Semantic Holism anyway. It should be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic.
IV 165
Semantics/Content/Computation/Naturalism/CRT/Block: a semantic theory must satisfy the following conditions to be appropriate to a naturalistic, computational psychology: 1) Explain the relation between meaning/reference
2) What gives meaning to expressions?
3) Explain the dependence of the meaning of representation systems
4) Explain compositionality
5) Explain the relation between meaning mind/brain
6) Explain the relation between autonomous and inherited meaning
7) Explain the connections between knowledge/learning/use of expressions and their meaning
8) Explain why different aspects of meaning are differently relevant to reference and psychology.
IV 168
Semantics of Conceptual Role/CRT/Block Fodor/Lepore: equates meaning with inferential role. (Naturalistic version: causal role).

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Context/Context Dependence Hintikka II 108
Context dependency/context/compositionality/Frege principle/Hintikka: Problem: Context dependency violates the Frege principle. ((s) The meaning of a sentence can change then, although no component changes.) Any/every/he/a/Hintikka: bad solution: (16) analyze as
(20) John does not believe Mary likes him.

(16) (Ex) George knwos, that (w = x).

Problem: (16) says that it is compatible with John's beliefs that Mary does not love one while
(20) is compatible with the fact that John does not believe Mary likes him (John). This is then compatible with the fallacy of (17).

(17) ~John believes, that (Ex)(x is a boy & Mary likes x)

II 109
Any/context dependency/context/Hintikka: what we need is an explanation of how the interpretation of "any x" depends on the context.
II 109
Frege principle/compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside to the inside, we can allow that the Frege principle is violated. (i.e. the semantic role of the constituents in the interior is context-dependent).
II 110
HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: Meanings (meaning entities) should not be produced step by step from simpler in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be used as rules of semantic analysis.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Events Gärdenfors I 65
Event/Semantic Domain/Language Acquisition/Semantics/Gärdenfors: Thesis: I am modeling events with two vectors: a force vector, which typically represents an action, and a result vector that describes a change of a physical movement or an object. ---
I 159
Events/Gärdenfors: there are principally three different approaches: (i) Metaphysical analyzes describing the ontology of events
(ii) Cognitive models that represent how humans (or animals) represent events mentally. See Langacker (1987, sec. 3.3) (1), Givón (2001) (2), Croft & Wood (2000) (3), Langacker, (2008, chap. 3) (4); Croft, (2012a, sec. 1.4) (5).
---
I 160
(iii) Linguistic studies describing the expressions with which events are constructed. E.g.
[[ACT ‹Manner› ] CAUSE [BECOME (Y ‹BROKEN› ]]].

Vectors/event/Gärdenfors: with vectors we can represent changes of objects and distinguish events from their linguistic expressions:
Definition State/Gärdenfors: is a set of points in a conceptual space.
Definition Change/Gärdenfors: a change of a state is represented by a vector.
Definition Path/Gärdenfors: is a continuous sequence of changes. (That is, there are no jumps).
---
I 161
Vectors: not all belong to the acting ones: e.g. opposing forces. Acting/Agent: is not necessarily part of the event.
Gärdenfors: this is about mental representation, not about a scientific representation of what is happening in an event, e.g. physically.
---
I 162
Vectors: an event contains at least two vectors and one object. 1. Result vector: represents the change, 2. Force vector: causes the change. ---
I 164
Event/intransitive/Gärdenfors: Problem: in intransitive constructions (e.g. "Susanna goes") the acting and the changed object (patiens) are identical. Then the conceptual space of the agent and of the object (patiens) coincide. ---
I 165
Partial events/decomposition/parts/Gärdenfors: two ways can be selected when dividing into sub-events: 1. Events can be divided as simultaneously occurring or parallel partial events in the dimensions of the object space (patient space).
2. They can be represented successively by parts of paths.
Agent/Patient/semantic roles/Gärdenfors: both can be represented as points in the category space. The domains of the space then define the properties of both.
---
I 166
Patient/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: can be animated or inanimated, concrete or abstract. It has its own patient space with domains for properties. In contrast to the object categories, the properties usually contain the localization. Agent: has accordingly its agent space, which has at least one force domain.
Dowty (1991): presents prototypical agents and prototypic patients. It is also about volitional involvement in an event. (6)
---
I 171
Event/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: there are three approaches for dealing with events in linguistics: 1. Localist Approach: (Jackendoff, 1976, 1983, 1990) (7) (8) (9): Thesis: all verbs can be constructed as verbs of movement and localization.
GärdenforsVsJackendoff: in his approach...
---
I 172
...force vectors cannot be represented appropriately. 2. Approach on aspects: (e.g. Vendler, 1957) (10): distinguishes between states, activities, achievements and accomplishments. See also Jackendoff, 1991, sec. 8.3; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005, p. 90).
---
I 174
3. Causal Approach: e.g. Croft (2012a, 2012b) (13) (14) three-dimensional representation of causal and aspectual structures of events. Gärdenfors: that comes closest to my own approach. A geometric model is designed here. ---
I 175
The vectors in such models are not in a vacuum, but are always in relation to a domain and its information, e.g. temperature. GärdenforsVsCroft: his approach does not support force vectors.

(1) Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar (Vol. 1). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

(2) Givón, T. (2001). Syntax (Vol. 1). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.

(3) Croft, W., & Wood, E. J. (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 51–78). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

(4) Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford.

(5) Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(6) Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67, 547–619.

(7) Jackendoff, R. (1976). Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic Inquiry, 7, 89–150.

(8) Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

(9) Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

(10) Vendler, Z. (1957). Verbs and times. Philosophical Review, 56, 97 – 121.

(11) Jackendoff, R. (1991). Parts and boundaries. Cognition, 41, 9–45.

(12) Levin, B., & Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(13) Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(14) Croft, W. (2012b). Dimensional models of event structure and verbal semantics. Theoretical Linguistics, 38, 195–203.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Part-of-Relation Gärdenfors I 34
Part-whole-relation/meronomic relations/Gärdenfors: such relations are not only found in the conceptual space of form - they can also occur in other domains: e.g. chord, family, limerick, etc. Semantic roles: for meronomic structures: are often nouns. The corresponding objects often have diverse properties.
On the other hand:
Dimensional conceptual space: e.g. color/color space: here the individual localizations stand for a single property.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Roles Cresswell I 106
Semantical Role/"say"/Lycan/Cresswell/(s): in idiosyncratic language ( "birds" means in L*, what "pigs" means in L) - Solution: The sentence with "pigs" plays in L* the same semantic role such as the sentence with "birds" in L. - Problem: one cannot isolate a class of sentences if this class is in any way relative to the language that is in question ((s) circular). - Say/Cresswell: becomes a three-digit relation between person, sentence and interpreted language. (Cresswell pro) - CresswellVsRelation theory. ---
I 107f
Semantical Role/Conceptual Role/Lycan/Boer: E.g. Cicero/Tullius play the same semantic role but different conceptual roles. - E.g. Hb and Gc play the same sR, iff DEN(b) = DEN(c) and DEN(H) = DEN(G). - This is only relative to DEN - DEN: if H is a predicate, DEN H is the property (the denotated).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Roles Gärdenfors I 167
Roles/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: the numerous semantic roles that linguistics has developed can be largely represented with my approach of the conceptual space of the basic two-vectors model. Semantic role: e.g. counterforce (in an event).

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Verbs Gärdenfors Gärdenfors I 181
Verbs/Croft/Gärdenfors: Croft (2001) (1) Thesis: the role of verbs is described by Croft as a predication. GärdenforsVsCroft/GärdenforsVsFrege: the concept of predication is too abstract (it goes back to Frege) and does not describe the communicative role of verbs. Moreover, verbs are not adequately characterized by predication, since adjectives also predicate.
---
I 182
Verbs/Gärdenfors: have two roles: 1. Describe what has happened or should happen
2. Describe how it happens or should happen.
Thesis on verbs: a verb either refers to the force vector or the result vector - but not to both.
---
I 183
Meaning of verbs: a verb cannot mean something. Solution/Kiparsky: Kiparsky (1997) (2) Thesis: a verb expresses at most a semantic role, e.g. a topic,...
---
I 184
...a direction, a path. Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2010, p. 25) (3) extend this idea by associating semantic roles with argument and modifier position in an event schema. The verb can then only appear as either an argument or a modifier. ---
I 198
Verbs/Gärdenfors: semantic thesis: verbs refer to convex regions of vectors defined by a single semantic domain. Adjectives, however, refer to convex regions of a single domain.

(1) Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(2) Kiparsky, P. (1997). Remarks on denominal verbs. In A. Alsina, J. Bresnan, & P. Sells (Eds.), Complex predicates (pp. 473–499). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information.

(3) Rappaport Hovav, M., & Levin, B. (2010). Reflections on manner/result complementarity. In M. Rappaport Hovav, D. Doron, & I. Sichel (Eds.), Lexical semantics, syntax, and event structure (pp. 21–38). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Conceptual Role Fodor Vs Conceptual Role IV 163
Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "Conceptual Role Theory": Theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one.
Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: his arguments for CRT are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the CRT fulfills them.
IV 166
Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences. (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice Thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (E.g. communicative intentions). (>Position).
IV 169
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between IR than between meanings.
Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension).
Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions.
Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different. (Water/Twin Earth Water).
Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT) is unlikely to work.
Solution/Block: "Two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other:
a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege
IV 170
b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (Twin Earth/water/Twin Earth Water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with CRT. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway:
E.g. Suppose distinction Meaning/Reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it:
Question: what actually holds the two factors together?.
IV 171
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the Twin Earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke.
Conceptual Role/(s): Difference: a) Conceptual role of a particular concept, E.g. water.
b) a word class, E.g. names.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension.
What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"?
Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it.
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept.
Mention/Use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: he seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension.
Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true.
This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory:
E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff
"Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names.
IV 172
Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension!. And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises.
Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles throws no light on the distinction meaning/reference.
A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions.
If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well.
Narrow Content/Categories/TE/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Problem: how to express narrow contents.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Dummett, M. Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M. I 253
Meaning/assertion/Dummett/Tugendhat: Example Game: assertion action, assertion and counter assertion, "yes"/"no" corresponds to "true"/"false" one wins, one loses. This schema should be the basis of every utterance of every assertoric sentence!
I 254
The speaker gives a guarantee, which is doubted by the listener. (Searle quite similar, see above).
I 255
New: it is said vice versa: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is correct. This presupposes: 1. That the conditions in which the expression is used are indifferent to the correctness of the use.
2. That the conditions on which the correctness depends are those the fulfilment of which is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions of its correctness (truth) are fulfilled!
The equivalence "p equi that p is true" is based on the fact that the person who claims something has always asserted its correctness.
I 256
Speaker: Conditions and presence together guaranteed. Listener: separates both and questions it separately. (Asymmetry).
I 256/257
TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or proposition are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a proposition are indicated by a proposition. Of course, this presupposes that for the explanation of a proposition there is always already another proposition available. Meta Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule.
It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used as the second, it is necessary to show under which conditions the one sentence is used.
2. Every assumption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric proposition, which is a pseudo explanation.
II 231
TugendhatVsDummett: "Meaning" in Frege should not be translated with "Reference"!
II 232
Justified only where Frege considers sentences as proper names!
II 247
Reference/Tugendhat: through my criticism of translation, meaning = reference, I have not questioned the primacy of truth over objects. DummettVsTugendhat: it is not enough to explain the meaning of names merely as truth-value potential: 1. The meaning could then be understood as a mere equivalence set of expressions.
TugendhatVsDummett: correct with sentences and predicates, with names one does not have to be content with it.
DummettVsTugendhat: 2. That two names "a" and "b" have the same meaning, if they have the same truth-value potential, applies only to extensional predicates. But with which criterion can extensional ones be distinguished from intensional predicates? It presupposed that we had a criterion for the equality of meanings of names, which is not first determined by Leibniz's law.
II 248
Leibniz's Law/Dummett: cannot be understood as a definition of "=", but is based on the fact that when we predetermine something from an object, the truth value of the assertion must be independent of the way it is given! TugendhatVsDummett: not so with Frege: Dummett himself points out that he understood Leibniz's law as definition of "=".
Tugendhat: we cannot explain what we mean by identity with the law. Tugendhat pro Dummett.
TugendhatVsDummett: with sentences as equivalence classes one has not lost touch with the world: it is only about very specific equivalence sets, which of course are determined by the nature of the world.
Dummett: sentences do not equal names! (VsFrege).
II 249
Reference/Dummett: semantic role. Tugendhat: this is exactly the same as my "truth-value potential". ((s) Cf. > semantic value, >semantic role).
II 250
Reference/Frege: he never spoke of reference Predicate/Frege: he never said that the meanings of predicates must be understood as "quasi-objects".
Dummett/Tugendhat: the justified core of Dummett's criticism: it does not yet follow from the truth-value potential that the meaning of a name is an object.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Dummett, M. Wright Vs Dummett, M. Rorty VI 45
WrightVsDummett/Rorty: it is necessary to say more about the pragmatic use of the terms "realism", "representation" and "agreement" than Dummett. For example, judgments may coincidentally converge for historical reasons. Representation (and thus realism) must be explained by means of a concept that is neither merely logical nor merely sociological. (Rorty pro).
Wright I 225/226
Abstract/"pure abstract objects"/Dummett: (Frege: "logical objects"): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects, whose meaning, however, cannot be represented as consisting in our ability to identify objects as their carriers.
Wright: could be read as Nominalism. (i.e. that there are no abstract objects).
But this is not Dummett's view. Dummett does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but in fact have reference.
I 227
They even play a semantic role! Example the "largest prime number": is an empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role!
Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach after the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. (> Numbers).
Abstract/Moral/Ethics/Wright: this fits well with our attitude to the discourse of morality: the matter of moral realism is not really exhausted in the question of whether the moral discourse is truthful or not.
If the truth ability is affirmed, there are still a number of questions relevant to realism.
I 228
Identification/WrightVsDummett: it is simply unclear what the "identification" of an object should mean, if the recognition of the truth of an identity statement, which contains a term for the object, is not sufficient! It is also not controversial that we use abstract singular terms in a reasonable way.
Wright: there is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. (> Abstractness). Abstract objects can only affect us in this way!
Frege (Platonist) quite rightly claims that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any reasonable sense. (Wright: this is minimalism regarding reference).
Realism/Wright: but then there still remain the considerations that force us to assign concrete things an independent role in an independent world.
I 229
Def Minimalism/Wright: is a better name for Dummett's >"Anti-Realism" or >"Nominalism".

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Frege, G. Hintikka Vs Frege, G. Cresswell I 148
Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure.
CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa.
Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics).
I 149
HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29).
But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231).
I 161.
"is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true!
Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway.

Hintikka II 45
(A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects).
Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects".
Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics).
II 46
Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global.
Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds.
Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5).
Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects.
Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts).
II 47
E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES).
II 48
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent
Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image:
(4) expression >sense >reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.)
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified:
(5) Expression (>) sense (> reference)
Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts.
E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the
identity of morning star and evening star, but the.
identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star".
II 49
Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity.
Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift" and "Grundgesetze") there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself.
(B)
Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds.
new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds.
Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world.
II 50
(C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally.
E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not.
II 51
Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear,
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.
II 53
Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds.
On the other hand:
Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach.
Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments.
Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful.
Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract.
II 54
Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses".
Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem.
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x).
This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts.
Transition from "any" to "some".
E.g. epistemic context:
(10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w)
(11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x)
II 55
Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is.
EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references.
HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w.
Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
II 56
Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w)
to
(14) (Ex) George knows that S(x)
where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts.
Then we need an additional condition.
(15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x).
This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are.
Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George.
Thus, (15) is equivalent to
(16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x).
This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what).
Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity).
E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!)
 Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge)
I 57
Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist).
Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises.
Possible Worlds Semantics:
SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared.
Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds.
Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism).
II 58
World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals.
World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them.
Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity).
II 59
World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world.
Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify".

II 109
Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent).
II 110
HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis.
Wittgenstein I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level.
HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Sententialism Schiffer Vs Sententialism I 120
Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes.
I 120
And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98).
2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring".
Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!.
E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!.
I 123
DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f).
2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts.
I 137
Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist.
Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory.
I 157
Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221).
Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs:
If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And:
Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited.
Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true.
Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad.
I 158
We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory.
(2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine).
(3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible.
SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987