Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Copula | Quine | I 175 The general term is a predicate. It can take on the position of the adjective or the verb just as well as that of a noun. One could even regard the verb as a basic form, because it gets along without "is". ((s) But not "wisdom socratized", see >Things/Strawson, >Names/Strawson). The copula "is" can therefore simply be explained as a prefix. I 211 Copula/Quine: the combination "is a", which we have treated as a copula, can now be treated as particles to form an indefinite singular term: Composition of "is" and "a". E.g. "Agnes is a lamb" is then no longer seen as "Fa" but as "a=b", whereby "b" stands for an indefinite singular term of the form "an F". "Agnes bleats" and "Agnes is docile" retain the form "Fa" and the "is" retains here the status of a copula for the conversion of adjectives into verbs. But the "is" in "is a lamb" becomes "=". The equation "x = a" is now actually analyzed as a predication "x = a", whereby "=a" forms the verb. The "F" of "Fx". What used to mean "x = Socrates" is still called the same now in words but now the "=" or "is" copula as in "is mortal" or "is a human" merely serves to give the verb form to the general term and adapts it to the predicative position. Socrates becomes a general term that applies exactly to an object, but is general in that from now on it is grammatically permitted for the predicative position, but not for positions that are suitable for variables; "Socrates" then plays the role of "F" in "Fa" and no longer that of "a". II 204 Copula: Plural "excl" ("none are"). These are not singular (two-digit general terms which connect pairs of classes). XIII 36 Copula/is/Quine: Example: avoidance of "is": "You green in winter". Color word/Color words/Sentence construction/Word order/Predicate/Japanese/Quine: in Japanese color words are always placed at the beginning. N.B.: this means that Japanese color words coincide in form and grammatical behavior with the multitude of Japanese words that we call verbs when we translate Japanese. (see above: example "greenest"). XIII 37 Adjective/Quine: even in English they do not differ from intransitive verbs, but we use them attributively, e.g. green tree. ((s) instead of "The tree is green"). Semitic languages/Quine: allow forms like "you green in winter": i.e. the predicate stands as a verb without the help of a copula. Copula/Quine: is often used to structure sentence parts clearly. Example: telegram: "How old Gary Grant - Old Gary Grant very well - how you? The copula then serves to distinguish "how old is" from "how is old". Predicative/attributive/predicate/attribute/Quine: the adjective is predicative here, in the other case attributive. In other languages this may be distinguished by the word forms or the sentence order. Predication/Copula/Quine: the "is" of predication has a converse: the ing-form: one transforms adjectives into verbs, the other vice versa. Example "you are reading" to "you read". >Predication/Quine; cf. >Equal sign. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Pegasus Example | Quine | I 306 ff Name: is a general term: > "=Socrates" "Is", the copula, the verb form does not create existence Fx. For us who know that Pegasus does not exist, the phrase "Pegasus flies" may not be true or false. But there are sentences that contain Pegasus, and yet they are neither true nor false for us: For example "Homer believed in Pegasus" but in this case one can be of the opinion that the position is not descriptive. For example in "Pegasus exists" the position of "Pegasus" is purely descriptive: certainly, if something like "Pegasus exists" is true, and then also Pegasus can be replaced by an equivalent description. Measured on this scale, the position is purely indicative but peculiar: I 307 a meaning of "(x)(x exists)" or (Ex)(x exists)" is hardly discernible. Abundance: what embarrasses us here is perhaps too much "abundance" that "exists" if we already have "(Ex)" may not have any independent function in our vocabulary. We understood "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything as well as "x=x". But there are also anomalies in this procedure. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. There is something wrong about granting Pegasus the purely descriptive position. I 312 Pegasus Example/Non-Existence/Quine: (Ex) (x = Pegasus) wrong with Pegasus as a singular term - right: with Pegasus as a general term = Pegasus - but: (Ex) (x is Pegasus) is wrong (for non-existence). >Existence/Quine, >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. VII (a) 3 Pegasus/Existence/Quine: if one denies its existence, one does not negate the idea - not the mental entity - Solution: Russell: are descriptions: the unanalyzed part "Author of Waverley" has not, as Wyman ((s) = Meinong) assumed, an objective reference - a whole sentence, containing a description can still be true or false (but only as a complete sentence). Lauener XI 132 Pegasized/Socratized/Quine/Lauener: it should not be possible to eliminate a name in Russell’s way by paraphrasing it by a description. ((s) But this goes very well with Pegasus.) - One can assume an unanalysed, irreducible attribute of the "being-Pegasus", and re-express this with the verb ’is-Pegasus" or "pegasized" - so that we can use singular terms without having to assume that there are things they designate - ((s) "There is nothing that pegasizes".) "~(Ex) Fx". Stalnaker I 55 Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: could exist - the round square could not. Stalnmaker I 65 Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis. Cf. >Unicorn example. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Quine, W.V.O. | Foster Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 28 Possible Worlds/Quine: are quadruples of real numbers in space-time. Then the worlds are ontologically respectable. "World" can be described purely extensionally. A world is then a set of sets of quadruples of real numbers, so that any two sets it contains represent the same space-time distribution on a relativistic concept of position and distance. Nominalism/GoodmanVsQuine. I 29 Possible Worlds/Foster: my own view on possible worlds is phenomenalistic and not to be presented here in the brevity. Possible Worlds/Quine/FosterVsQuine: Problem: in Quine's possible world neither "Socrates is mortal" (as purely qualitative) nor "Socratized" has place. Each possible world has its own framework in which we can identify and recognize the material objects in it. But not beyond the possible world. No cross-world identity. We do not know how to locate Socrates in another world. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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