Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 127 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Davidson | Glüer II 108 Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation. Glüer II 109 f Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. Brandom I 724 Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent. Brandom I 727 She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow). I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs. Brandom I 957 Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber. I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded. I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine. I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. Glüer II 92 Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object. Glüer II 96 Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted. MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely) Glüer II 110 Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.) ((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.) >Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Adjectives | Gärdenfors | I 116 Adjective/Noun/Word Classes/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the main semantic difference between adjectives and nouns is that adjectives such as "red", "big" and "round" typically refer to a single area and thus represent properties, while nouns such as "dog", "apple" and "city" contain information on several areas and therefore... --- I 117 ...represent object categories. But this is only a rule of thumb. > Categories/Gärdenfors. --- I 135 Adjectives/Word Classes/Functions/Gärdenfors: can A) be regarded as a means of specifying objects B) on a second level (for the coordination of similarities), the adjective has an informative function: e.g. The oven is hot. Logical form: in this case, the adjective is a complement to the copula "is". Problem: it is not clear that these two functions (specification and information) can be exercised by the same word class. (Dixon 2004, p. 30)(1). There are adjectives that can only be used specifically (e.g., alive), and those that are used only informatively (predicatively), e.g. "absolute". (Paradis, 2005)(2) Specification: can also be performed by nouns. --- I 136 Gärdenfors: Thesis on Adjectives: the meaning of an adjective can be represented in a convex region of a single area. E.g. colour words: no language has only one word for what is called "green" and "orange" in German. Conceptual Space/Colour words/Gärdenfors: for my thesis that there is a single area for adjectives, evidence has been found: I 137 See Taft and Sivik (1997)(3), Sivik & Taft (1994)(4), Jäger (2010)(5), Cook, Kay & Regier (2005)(6) Problem: Adjectives like "healthy" are at the limit of many dimensions e.g. having no pain,... --- I 138 ...having no infection, etc. Therefore, the importance of "healthy" of the one-area thesis for adjectives does not seem to apply here. Solution Gärdenfors: a) one can assume an area disease-health. This is how doctors proceed. Vs: Problem: we cannot create a product room here. B) A "health dimension" can be assumed as a diagonal in the product space, which covers all dimensions involved in disease and health. GärdenforsVs: I find this less attractive. 1. Dixon (2004) Dixon, R. M. W. (2004). Adjective Classes in typological perspective. In R. M. W. Dixon & A. Y. Aikhenvald (Eds.) Adjective classes: A cross-linguistic typology (pp. 1-49) Oxford. 2. Paradis, C. (2005) Ontologies and construals in lexical semantics. Axiomathes, 15, 541-573. 3. Taft, C., & Sivik, L. (1997). Salient color terms in four languages. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38, 26–31. 4. Sivik, L., & Taft, C. (1994). Color naming: A mapping in the NCS of common color terms. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 35, 144–164. 5. Jäger, G. (2010). Natural color categories are convex sets. Amsterdam Colloquium 2009, LNAI 6042 (pp. 11–20). Berlin: Springer. 6. Cook, R. S. Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2005) The World Color Survey database: History and use. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of categorization in cognitive science (pp. 223-242). Amsterdam. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Aristotle | Höffe | Höffe I 51 Aristotle/Höffe: Many of the ((s) Aristotelian] terms, such as the distinction between matter and form, between reality ("act") and possibility ("potency") or between theory, practice and poiesis ("technique") become an integral part of the Western world orientation via the Latin translation. Because they have long since penetrated the general educational system, it is easy to overlook the extraordinary effort of thought they owe to. >Concepts, >Language use, >Terminologies, >Theory, >Practice, >Poiesis, >Techne. Concept formation: Aristotle's technical terms are often taken from questions; Categories/Aristoteles: for the categories he says - ti: what, - poson: how big, - poion: which kind, - poû: where; Motion: in the principles of motion, he speaks of what, from what, where and for what purpose. In any case, he does not seek a philosophical language of art, but rather the specification and differentiation, occasionally also the further development of expressions familiar from colloquial language. >Everyday language. Scholasticism: In this way he argues, unlike the later Aristotle scholasticism, in a mobile, thoroughly non-solastic diction. >Scholasticism. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Automation | Feenstra | Feenstra I 4-33 Automation/computers/Feenstra: Measuring computer services and other high-tech capital as a share of the capital stock using ex post rental prices, we see they account for 13% of the shift towards nonproduction labor. Measuring these shares using ex ante rental prices, we see that that computers and other high-tech capital explain only 8% of this shift. >Skilled labour, >Relative wage, >Wage gap. Feenstra I 4-34 In both cases, the contribution of computers and other high-tech capital is less than the contribution of outsourcing. In contrast, when computers are measured by their share of investment (and the high-technology capital share is also included), we see that these variables account for 31% of the shift toward nonproduction labor, which exceeds the contribution of outsourcing. Thus, whether outsourcing is more or less important than computers depends on whether the latter are measured as a share of the capital stock, or as a share of investment. >Capital, >Capital stock, >Capital structure. Regardless of the specification, however, it is fair to conclude that both outsourcing and expenditure on computers and other high technology capital are important explanations of the shift towards nonproduction labor in the U.S., with their exact magnitudes depending on how they are measured. >Outsourcing. Feenstra I 4-43 (…) both outsourcing and capital upgrading contributed to rising wage inequality in the 1980s. Ex ante/ex post: For example, when the share of the capital stock devoted to computers is measured using ex post rental prices, then outsourcing accounts for 15% of the increase in the relative wage of nonproduction workers while computers account for 35% of this increase; thus, computers are twice as important as outsourcing. Feenstra I 4-44 When instead the computer share of the capital stock is measured using ex ante rental prices, then outsourcing explains about 25% while computers explain about 20% of the increase in the relative wage. However, when the computer share of investment is used, then the contribution of outsourcing falls to about 10%, while the contribution of computers rises so much that it explains the entire increase in the relative wage. So as with our results when examining the change in the nonproduction labor share, when we now consider the factors influencing the relative wage, we find that both outsourcing and computer expenditure are important, with their exact magnitudes depending on how these variables are measured. >Nontraded Goods. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Bayesian Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). > Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesian Networks | Russell | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). >Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Behavior | Behavioral Ecology | Corr I 277 Behavior/Behavioral Ecology/Gosling: researchers in Behavioural Ecology and Ethology are primarily interested in learning about the ecological and evolutionary implications of consistent individual differences in behaviour (e.g., Carere and Eens 2005(1); Dall, Houston and McNamara 2004(2); Dingemanse and Reale 2005(3); McElreath and Strimling 2006(4); Nettle 2006(5)). Problem: for [a property] to be identified in a species it is necessary for variation to exist, with different individuals expressing different levels of [this property]; if all individuals in a species had exactly the same levels of [this property] then that trait would be said to be characteristic of the species and would not be considered a personality trait. Problem: The necessity for individual variation raises some theoretical issues within the context of evolutionary processes because selection tends to reduce or eliminate differences. ((s) For the philosophical discussion in relation to the problems with properties, concepts and introduction of concepts for properties see >Introduction/Strawson, >Concepts/Quine, >Properties/Putnam, >Individuation, >Specification). 1. Carere, C. and Eens, M. 2005. Unravelling animal personalities: how and why individuals consistently differ, Behaviour 142: 1149–57 2. Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I. and McNamara, J. M. 2004. The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective, Ecology Letters 7: 734–9 3. Dingemanse, N. J. and Reale, D. 2005. Natural selection and animal personality, Behaviour 142: 1159–84 4. McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2006. How noisy information and individual asymmetries can make ‘personality’ an adaptation: a simple model, Animal Behaviour 72: 1135–9 5. Nettle, D. 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American Psychologist 61: 622–31 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Ethology | Corr I 277 Behavior/Ethology/Gosling: researchers in Behavioural Ecology and Ethology are primarily interested in learning about the ecological and evolutionary implications of consistent individual differences in behaviour (e.g., Carere and Eens 2005(1); Dall, Houston and McNamara 2004(2); Dingemanse and Reale 2005(3); McElreath and Strimling 2006(4); Nettle 2006(5)). Problem: for [a property] to be identified in a species it is necessary for variation to exist, with different individuals expressing different levels of [this property]; if all individuals in a species had exactly the same levels of [this property] then that trait would be said to be characteristic of the species and would not be considered a personality trait. Problem: The necessity for individual variation raises some theoretical issues within the context of evolutionary processes because selection tends to reduce or eliminate differences. ((s) For the philosophical discussion in relation to the problems with properties, concepts and introduction of concepts for properties: >Introduction/Strawson, >Concepts/Quine, >Properties/Putnam, >Individuation, >Specification.) 1. Carere, C. and Eens, M. 2005. Unravelling animal personalities: how and why individuals consistently differ, Behaviour 142: 1149–57 2. Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I. and McNamara, J. M. 2004. The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective, Ecology Letters 7: 734–9 3. Dingemanse, N. J. and Reale, D. 2005. Natural selection and animal personality, Behaviour 142: 1159–84 4. McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2006. How noisy information and individual asymmetries can make ‘personality’ an adaptation: a simple model, Animal Behaviour 72: 1135–9 5. Nettle, D. 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American Psychologist 61: 622–31 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavioral Law | Economic Theories | Parisi I 70 Behavioral Law/Economic theories/Jolls: In the discussion (...) of debiasing through law, the focus is on scenarios in which optimism bias is thought to produce an overall underestimation of the risk of educational loan default. >Cognitive bias/Economic theories, >Risk perception/Economic theories, >Optimism bias/Bibas, >Bounded rationality/Jolls, >Bounded rationality/Simon, >Availability heuristics/Economic theories, >Non-omniscience/Jolls. Biases/legal policy: The legal debiasing strategies discussed here should be distinguished from alterations in the incentives facing decision-makers. In the conception of debiasing through law employed here, debiasing strategies do not involve providing people with improved incentives in the hope of reducing their bounded rationality. In some cases, providing incentives may in fact diminish various forms of bounded rationality, and a broad definition of debiasing might embrace the use of incentives to produce such reductions (for example, Fischhoff, 1982)(1). Vs: A more conservative view, however, is that if boundedly rational behavior is eliminated with the provision of financial incentives, then the apparent boundedly rational behavior was not boundedly rational at all, but instead a mere result of lazy or careless decision-making by an actor who had no reason to be other than lazy or careless. Jolls: Under the latter view, which is adopted here, debiasing occurs when bounded rationality is reduced not as a result of the provision of financial incentives, but rather as a result of intervening in and altering the situation in which the bounded rationality arose. Influence of firms: An important remaining question about debiasing through law concerns the prospects for firms’ influence over consumer perceptions under the proposed legal debiasing strategy. As Glaeser (2004(2), p. 410) writes, “One should expect to see a proliferation of misleading signals and other cues when incorrect beliefs are complements to buying sellers’ commodities.” In the present context, this influence suggests the importance of maintaining Parisi I 71 legal control over the nature and format of the accounts firms are required to provide. It is possible that such firms, influenced by market pressures, would manage to subvert attempts to achieve debiasing through the >availability heuristic. Consumer information: At the same time, with such debiasing as with any informationally oriented strategy, there are important countervailing benefits to limiting the degree of overspecification of required messaging (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981)(3),(...). 1. Fischhoff, Baruch (1982). “Debiasing,” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 422–444. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2. Glaeser, Edward (2004). “Psychology and the Market.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 94: 408–413. 3. Beales, Howard, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop (1981). “The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information.” Journal of Law and Economics 24: 491–539. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Beliefs | Lycan | Cresswell I 112 Lycan/Belief/Conviction/Cresswell: Lycan's solution is quite different, Lycan thesis the sentence to which the belief is related, is not an entity of public language - rather, it is a kind of brain configuration. Cf. >Relation theory, >Belief objects, >Objects of thought, >Brain state. Brain State/Meaning/Lycan: thesis is not something that has a meaning, but I 113 a brain state is something that is a meaning. >Meaning, cf. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Language of thought. Brain State/Meaning/Cresswell: thesis: there is no way to understand a mental event, like e.g. that broccoli is disgusting, differently than based on any specification of its parts. >Understanding, >Analysis. I 114 Solution/Stalnaker/Cresswell: would probably say that mental events should be analyzed in terms of the actions that they have as a result. Then they would again be sets of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Actions. (s) Conclusion: this is about whether a formalization is possible that does not exclude that someone does not know what he thinks. If such a formalization is possible, then the theory from which it follows cannot be right.) >Beliefs, >Self-knowledge, >Knowledge. |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Business Cycle | Ostry | Ostry I 19 Business cycle/tariff policy//Furceri/Hannan/Ostry/Rose: Does the effect of tariff changes vary with the stage of the business cycle? Trade reforms, insofar as they induce resource shifts between industries, occupations and firms, might lead to larger output losses during slack periods of weak domestic economic activity. To test whether the effect of tariff changes is symmetric between expansions and recessions, we use the following setup, which permits the effect of tariff changes to vary smoothly across different stages of the business cycle: Ostry I 20 yi,t+k - yi,t-1 = αi + γt + βL kF(zi,t) iΔTi,t + βH (1- F(zi,t)ΔTi,t + φZi,t + εi,t with F(zi,t) = exp(-θzi,t)/(1+ exp(-θzi,t), θ>0, where zi,t is an indicator of the state of the economy (such as GDP growth or unemployment) normalized to have zero mean and unit variance, and Zit is the same set of control variables used in the baseline specification but now also including F(zit). F(.) is a smooth transition function used recently by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)(1) to estimate the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy shocks in expansions as opposed to recessions. This transition function can be interpreted as the probability of the economy being in a recession; F(zit)=1 corresponds to a deep recession, while F(zit)=0 corresponds to strong expansion - with the cutoff between expansions and contractions being 0.5. Like Auerbach and Gorodichencko, we use θ = 1.5, which corresponds to assume that the economy spends about 20 percent of times in recessions.(2) >Economic cycles, >Tariffs, >Tariff impacts. Ostry I 21 (…) the response of both output and productivity to rises in the tariff is more dramatic during expansions. When tariffs increase by a standard deviation and the economy is enjoying good times, the medium-term loss in output is higher than the baseline by about 1%; the productivity decline is also larger. Consistently, tariff increases during recession seem to increase output and productivity in the mediumterm, though the effects are not statistically significant; protection during recessions may have a mild stimulating effect.(4) Overall, we find that tariff changes have more negative consequences for output and productivity when: tariffs increase (rather than decrease); for advanced economies (not emerging markets and developing economies); and during good economic conditions. While more work needs to be done to understand the channels for these effects better, they do not bode well for the present protectionist climate. One of the reasons why the impact of tariffs depends on the state of the business cycle could be related to the effect of tariffs on inflation and the role of monetary policies. To the extent that the increases in tariffs lead to an increase in inflation during expansions and that monetary policies are tightened in response, the negative impact of tariffs ismagnified due to the contractionary policy shock. Inflation: Our results* on inflation seem to support this reasoning; using the same regression-framework as for the other macroeconomic variables, we find that higher tariffs lead to an increase in inflation after two years (…) Ostry I 22 Furthermore, the effect on inflation is stronger during economic expansions than in recessions (…). These results are consistent with Barattieri, Cacciatore, and Ghironi (2018)(5) who find that protectionism acts as a supply shock by decreasing output and increasing inflation in the short run. They also find that protectionism leads to higher inflation which, in turn, prompts central banks to respond with a contractionary impulse. >Protectionism. * Davide Furceri, Swarnali A. Hannan, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Andrew K. Rose. (2019). Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9. International Monetary Fund. 1. Auerbach, Alan J., and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012, “Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy,” American Economic Journal, vol. 4(2), pp. 1-27. 2. This approach is equivalent to the smooth transition autoregressive model developed by Granger and Terävistra (1993)(3). The results are robust different value of θ, and to substitute F(zit) with a dummy variable which takes value for F(zit) greater than 0.5. 3. Granger, Clive W. J., and Timo Terasvirta, 1993, Modelling Nonlinear Economic Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press). 4. In line with Rose (2013), we find no statistically significant correlation between changes in tariffs and the measure of state of economy used in the paper. In particular, the correlation between changes in tariffs and the smooth transition function F(z,it) is -0.001. 5.Barattieri, Alessandro, Matteo Cacciatore, and Fabio Ghironi, 2018, “Protectionism and the Business Cycle,” NBER Working Paper No. 24353. |
Ostry I Jonathan D. Ostry Davide Furceri Andrew K. Rose, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9.International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2019 |
| Calculability | Church | Thiel I 249 Calculability/Church/Thiel: how close did one get to a concept of "general calculability"? There is the concept of "Turing calculability" of "l-definability in Church, the "canonical systems" in Post. Each function, which is in one of these classes, is also demonstrable in the others. Church: Church has then assumed the presumption that an adequate specification of the general concept of calculability is achieved. ("Church thesis"). >"Church-Thesis". But it means that this is an "non-mathematical" presumption, and is not capable of any mathematical proof. An intuitive term. Whether such a specification is "adequate" cannot be answered by mathematical means. >Adequacy. I 250 Apart from finiteness and constructivity, there remain other questions: none of the definitions for the offered functional classes is finite: (e.g. μ-recursive functions). >Recursion, >Finiteness, >Definitions, >Definability. The attempt to describe effective executability with classical means remains questionable, but if we interpret the existence quantifier constructively, we have already presupposed the concept of constructivity. >Existential quantification, >Quantifiers, >Effectiveness. Thiel I 251 Calculability/Herbrand/Thiel: Due to Herbrand's demands, some of the classical laws of logic lose their validity. >J. Herbrand. For example, the end of ~ (x) A (x) to (Ex) ~ A (x) is not permissible: For example, that not all real numbers are algebraic, does not yet help us to a transfinite real number. For example, from the fact that the statements: "The decimal fraction development of pi contains an uninterrupted sequence of 1000 ones" and "The decimal fraction development of pi does not contain an uninterrupted sequence of 100 ones" both cannot be true (since the second statement follows from the first statement), one cannot conclude that the negation of the first statement or the last statement in the parenthesis is true. I 252 This counter-example, however, shows that the classic conclusion of ~ (a u b) to ~ a v ~ b is not permissible if the adjunction sign is to be used for the expression of a decidable alternative. In particular, as can be seen in the substitution of b by ~ a, we cannot conclude from ~ (a u ~ a) to ~ a v ~~ a, although this is a special case of the classical unrestrictedly valid tertium non datur. >Law of the excluded middle, >Logical constants, >Substitutability. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Calibration | Hogan | Calibration/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Our work indicates that there is good reason to be suspicious of the results of (…) simple calibration exercises. Indeed, policymakers should be extremely cautious in the application of “optimal” trade policies suggested by calibrated models, as the nature of the recommended policies may simply be an artifact of the model specification and calibration procedure. Since the optimal policy resulting from one model can differ dramatically from that of another model, and since use of the “wrong” policies can actually reduce welfare, it is important to specify a flexible form which does not dictate the direction of the results. Even if the optimal policies are found and implemented, the gains from doing so are relatively limited, even without foreign retaliation. Krugman III 14 This result, that only fairly small welfare gains are to be had from optimal tariffs and subsidies, seems common to many such models. Calibration models should thus probably not be used to determine trade and industrial policy without detailed empirical work to guide the model selection. Sufficiently well specified, however, they prove to be a valuable tool in the analysis of imperfectly competitive industries, since many important results are not sensitive to model specification. Guidance from careful empirical work as to the correct demand and cost parametrizations to use in such calibration models is vital for them to serve as useful guides to determine trade policy. >International trade/Kala Krishna, >New trade theory. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Calibration | Krishna | Calibration/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Our work indicates that there is good reason to be suspicious of the results of (…) simple calibration exercises. Indeed, policymakers should be extremely cautious in the application of “optimal” trade policies suggested by calibrated models, as the nature of the recommended policies may simply be an artifact of the model specification and calibration procedure. Since the optimal policy resulting from one model can differ dramatically from that of another model, and since use of the “wrong” policies can actually reduce welfare, it is important to specify a flexible form which does not dictate the direction of the results. Even if the optimal policies are found and implemented, the gains from doing so are relatively limited, even without foreign retaliation. Krugman III 14 This result, that only fairly small welfare gains are to be had from optimal tariffs and subsidies, seems common to many such models. Calibration models should thus probably not be used to determine trade and industrial policy without detailed empirical work to guide the model selection. Sufficiently well specified, however, they prove to be a valuable tool in the analysis of imperfectly competitive industries, since many important results are not sensitive to model specification. Guidance from careful empirical work as to the correct demand and cost parametrizations to use in such calibration models is vital for them to serve as useful guides to determine trade policy. >International trade/Kala Krishna, >New trade theory. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Calibration | Winters | Krugman III 212 Calibration/Winters: Calibration studies are useful for illustrating the mechanisms of the models they treat and for assessing the relative sizes of the effects they postulate, and with sufficient sensitivity analysis they can produce robust results of direct relevance to policymakers. They are, however, only the first step toward the full empirical investigation of strategic trade policy. Baldwin (1989)(1) suggests a second step-namely a more thorough attempt to estimate the relevant parameters from many (or at least several) data points. In this paper(2) I explore a third level of empiricism-an attempt to test directly for the presence of strategic effects. >Strategic trade policy, >Trade policy. At one level, empirical testing could involve estimating the parameters of a fully specified econometric model and then asking whether at a suitable level of significance they fall within the ranges necessary to produce strategic behavior. >Econometrics. There are at least two disadvantages to such an indirect approach. First, it requires the precise specification of a model in terms of parameters and observables, a task of immense complexity and, given our present ignorance, arbitrariness. Second, the circumstances necessary for strategic behavior cannot usually be boiled down to a single parameter, but rather entail the interaction of many parameters and data. The resulting multivariate statistical tests are not only difficult to formulate and interpret, but are also, when confronted with poor data such as trade economists have, prone to be very weak.* >Models, >Economic models, >Model theory. In this paper(2), therefore, I adopt a different, nonparametric, approach. On the basis of verbal reasoning I identify the qualitative changes in trade behavior that would be consistent with strategic responses to import surveillance. >Import surveillance. * In fact, it is actually quite difficult to devise models in which the existence (as opposed to the magnitude) of strategic behavior may be represented parametrically. Certainly the well-known examples of strategic trade models, such as Baldwin and Krugman (1988), presume strategic behavior if markets are not perfectly competitive. 1. Baldwin, R. E. 1989. Taking the calibration out of calibration studies. Columbia University Business School. Mimeograph. 2. L. Alan Winters. „Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. L. Alan Winters. „Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Cambridge Capital Controversy | Harcourt | Harcourt I 119 Cambridge Capital Controversy/Harcourt: (…) [the] discussions, (…), technically, relate to simple (!) questions such as: 'Can factor-price frontiers cross more than once?' and 'What is the shape of the factor-price frontier?' (…) >Factor price frontier, >Neo-neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Production function, >Aggregate production function, >R.M. Solow, >Joan Robinson. Harcourt: The controversies arise because of political and ideological differences between the two sides, differences which are thrown into sharp relief when the implications of the results of certain logical exercises become apparent. Neoclassicals/Keynesians: Both sides of the debate have examined heterogeneous capital-goods models in which any one technique of production does not allow substitution between factors, i.e. fixed input-output coefficients prevail and proportions of factors may vary only by going over to another technique as a result of changing factor prices.* The objects of the exercises differed as between the two groups. Harcourt I 120 Neo-Keynesianism: To the neo-Keynesians they represent an attack on the marginalist method, an attack which has been led, in spirit anyway, by Sraffa, who, (…) subtitled his book(1), Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, by which he meant marginalist theory. >Marginalism, >P. Sraffa. Neo-neoclassicals: To the other side, the object was to justify neoclassical marginalist procedures, an object which is not identical with one of providing a rigorous defence of the concepts of an aggregate production function and the associated input of 'capital'. Idealization/simplification/economic models: A puzzle that arises, nevertheless, is whether the stories associated with smooth, one-commodity, malleable capital models can 'stand in' as analogies for comparisons using these more 'realistic' models. The aggregate production function must now refer to the relationship between value capital and other variables within the whole set of techniques (though Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski [1968](2) have argued recently that the term, 'production function', should be confined to the engineering aspects of each technique, which seems to me a fudge based on hindsight). If the neoclassical stories as told, for example, by Swan [1956](5) and Solow [1957(4)] did in fact hold for heterogeneous capital-goods models, this would be an enormous simplification for economic theory and econometric specification alike (see Brown [1968(6), 1969(7)]). It is to this question that the double-switching debate is especially addressed. >Reswitching, >Economic models, >Idealization. * When input-output coefficients vary as between activities in any one technique, the aggregate factor proportions associated with a given technique may change in value. 1. Sraffa, Piero[1960] Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2. Bruno, M., Burmeister, E. and Sheshinski, E. [1966] 'Nature and Implications of the Reswitching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX, pp. 526-53. 3. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 4. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 5. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 6. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 7. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capital | Brown | Harcourt I 172 Capital/Brown/Harcourt: Brown [1966](1), (…) just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(2),1969(3)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. The tools which he uses are substitution and composition effects (…). „The basic result that emerges from the neoclassical analysis is that the substitution and composition effects (as defined within that system) determine the uniqueness of the relationship between the aggregate labour-capital ratio and relative factor prices. The parallel is then taken: substitution-composition effects (as defined within the linear system) determine CIU as well as other things; and substitution-composition effects (as defined within the marginal productivity system) determine, uniquely, the aggregate capital-labour and factor-price relationship.“ (Brown [1969](3), p. 355.) Harcourt: This leads him to conjecture that answers to certain large questions may not be substantially different, a philosophy and strategy which, for obvious reasons, is akin to those of Solow on his busman's holiday. Solow/Harcourt: The latest statement of Solow's philosophy, one which is entirely consistent with his earlier ones, is as follows: „So far as I know, I have never in rigorous work adopted Pasinetti's 'unobtrusive' postulate - which is intimately connected with his special version of orthodox theory - that if one of two techniques is more profitable than the other at a higher real wage and less profitable at a lower wage it will have a higher value of capital goods per man. It is true that one-capital-good models behave that way, but they are merely cheap vehicles for interpreting data (which seem to behave that way).“ (Solow [1970](4), p. 424.) Harcourt I 173 Pasinetti: Pasinetti [1970](5), p. 429, rightly points out the 'surprisingly high proportion of current economic literature [that is] carried out in terms of "neoclassical production functions" and one-commodity-models', which, whether rigorous or not, certainly do depend for their validity on the 'unobtrusive postulate'. Secondly, he points to the 'ancients' and 'moderns' who also have used the 'unobtrusive postulate' in order to get an index of scarcity in a general equilibrium system, and so a marginal productivity theory of capital. For: „It made 'capital' appear to be like a scarce resource, and the rate of profits to be like any other general-equilibrium price - an index of scarcity. It is this construction that has fallen down. For that unobtrusive postulate was essential to it.“ (Pasinetti [1970](5), p. 429.) Demand/Ferguson/Allen: Ferguson and Allen [1970](6) have carefully analysed the conditions under which the construction does break down when changes in the composition of demand due to changes in relative product prices are taken into account. They derive some comfort from their results. Their approach seems open to at least two criticisms. First, as they candidly admit, they use a model which favours the neoclassical position, as intermediate goods are ignored and the capital good is the only basic. Secondly, they do not investigate whether the changes in the composition of demand are consistent with their assumption of full employment. Moreover, as their analysis consists only of comparisons, their appeal to the facts to decide seems to be beside the point. RobinsonVsBrown/RobinsonVsSolow: Joan Robinson [1970a(7), 1970b(8)], of course, would accept neither Brown nor Solow's approach, nor Samuelson's rationalization of it. To her, Samuelson's surrogate production function, even though it allows the simple parables to be told, does so only in the form of comparisons, so that it remains a spoof-a pseudo-production function. Only when capital is actually jelly (or leets) can substitution and the other neoclassical processes occur and full employment of all factors be maintained in competitive economies. But, in her view, such constructions assume away all the real difficulties associated with the existence of heterogeneous capital goods and the implications of the disappointed expectations of atomistic economic actors in competitive situations. 1. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 2. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 3. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. 4. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 5. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. 6. Ferguson, C. E. and Allen, Robert F. [1970] 'Factor Prices, Commodity Prices, and the Switches of Technique', Western Economic Journal, vin, pp. 95-109. 7. Robinson, Joan, [1970a] 'Capital Theory Up to Date', Canadian Journal of Economics, in, pp. 309-17. 8. Robinson, Joan, [1970b] 'Review of C. E. Ferguson, The Neoclassical Theory of Production and Distribution, 1969', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 336-9. |
BrownMurray I Murray Brown On the theory and measurement of technological change Cambridge 1968 PolBrown I Wendy Brown American Nightmare:Neoliberalism, neoconservativism, and de-democratization 2006 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Capital Reversing | Harcourt | Harcourt I 118 Reswitching/double-switching/reverse capital/Harcourt: (…) the results of neoclassical marginal productivity theory have played a key role in both the theory of economic growth and the econometric studies of the post-war period. >Marginal Product of Capital, >Economic growth/Solow. The easiest illustration of this proposition is the essential part which the equality of marginal products with factor rewards plays in the development of the arguments in Swan's famous model of economic growth (Swan [1956](1)), and in Solow's influential - and equally famous - article on technical progress and the aggregate production function, Solow [1957](2). Double-switching: This methodology has been continuously under attack and the latest (and sharpest) arrows in the quivers of the neo-Keynesian critics are the results of the double-switching debate. Reverse capital: Not all of these are, however, related to the phenomenon of double-switching itself; a related phenomenon, capital-reversing, also plays a key role: see, especially, Garegnani [1970a(3), 1970b(4)], Bliss [1970](5), Pasinetti [1969(6), 1970(7)]. >Neo-neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Production function. Harcourt I 120 If the neoclassical stories as told, for example, by Swan [1956](1) and Solow [1957(2)] did in fact hold for heterogeneous capital-goods models, this would be an enormous simplification for economic theory and econometric specification alike (see Brown [1968(8), 1969(9)]). It is to this question that the double-switching debate is especially addressed. >Economic models, >Idealization. 1. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 2. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 3. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 4. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 5. Bliss, C. J. Comment on Garegnani, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 37, Issue 3, July 1970, Pages 437–438, 6. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. 8. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 9. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Circumstances | Fodor | II 122 Circumstances/Fodor: circumstances cannot be systematized -> FodorVsSpeech Act: therefore it lacks the specification. >Speech Act Theory. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Classification | Mayr | I 133 Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification. Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes. >Species. Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution. >Darwinism, >Evolution. I 134 Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics b) Cladistics. Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species (useful for ecology and biology). >Ecology. Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives. I 173 Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information b) comparative research. Information storage. 1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible 2) Attribution according to most common characteristics, 3) If the differences are too great, create a new class 4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy. I 176 Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy). 2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy). I 177 Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type". Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms. Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). >Similarity. "Typological concept of species: four characteristics: 1) Common "nature". 2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant. 4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind"). >Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism. I 178 MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 178 Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany. E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not. I 187 Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features. I 188 Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change). Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc. >Causal explanation. Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system. I 189 "Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders. >Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects, >Single-case causation. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Homology. I 373 You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. >Evidence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Cognitive Architecture | Matthews | Corr I 403 Cognitive Architecture/Matthews: Whatever the theoretical purpose, the detailed specification of the underlying processes that control behaviour is central to cognitive psychology. It assumes a ‘virtual’ cognitive architecture that can be specified separately from the underlying neural architecture (e.g., Ortony, Norman and Revelle 2005)(1). Individual differences in attention, memory and other cognitive functions are of interest in their own right as attributes of personality traits. The cognitive correlates of traits are more than just expressions of neural functioning; biases in symbolic information-processing may be intrinsic to personality. >Attention, >Selective attention, >Memory, >Performance, >Information processing, >Personality, >Personality traits, >W. Revelle. 1. Ortony, A., Norman, D. A. and Revelle, W. 2005. Affect and proto-affect in effective functioning, in J-M. Fellous and M. A. Arbib (eds.), Who needs emotions? The brain meets the robot, pp. 173–202. New York: Oxford University Press Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Communication Media | Parsons | Habermas IV 385 Communication media/Parsons/Habermas: Question: 1. What is the conceptual status of money as a medium that occupies the internal systemic exchange between real variables such as labour and consumer goods? 2. Do the other social subsystems also regulate the exchange in their environments via similar media?(1) Parsons later regarded his attempt to see power as a control medium anchored in the political system with structural analogies to money as a successful test for the generalizability of the media concept.(2) Habermas IV 386 In the order of money, power, influence and value retention, Parsons has analyzed four media in broad lines, each of which is assigned to one of the social subsystems: Money: the economic, Power: the political system, Influence: the system of social integration Value retention: the system for the preservation of structural patterns. Habermas: in another round of generalization, Parsons introduced four more media: Intelligence, performance, affect and interpretation.(3) >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Values. HabermasVsParsons: the analogies to the medium of money become less clear and even metaphorical during the course of theory formation. This applies all the more to the media that Parsons recently assigned to the subsystems of the all-encompassing system of the human condition: transcendental order, symbolic meaning, health and empirical order. (4) Habermas IV 387 In the end, money is for Parsons only one of 64 socio-theoretically remarkable media. Problem: then one cannot know which of the structural characteristics read off the money medium are characteristic of media at all. Habermas IV 388 Problem: are we dealing here with an overgeneralization, i.e. with the thesis that there is something like a system of control media? Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 393 Media/Parsons/Habermas: serve not only to save information and time, and thus to reduce the effort of interpretation, but also to cope with the risk that the action sequences will break off. Media such as power and money can largely save the costs of dissent because they uncouple the coordination of action from the formation of linguistic consensus and neutralize it against the alternative of agreement and failed understanding. They are not specifications of language, they replace special language functions. Habermas IV 394 Lifeworld/Parsons/Habermas: the conversion of the coordination of actions from language to control media means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts. >Communicative action/Parsons, >Communication theory/Habermas. 1. T.Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S. 128 2. T. Parsons, On the Concept of Power, in: Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967 3. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory, in: J.C. McKinney, E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.), Theoretical Sociology, NY 1970 S. 27ff. 4. T. Parsons, Action, Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 393. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Conceptual Role | Field | II 75 Def "Wide Conceptual Role"/Harman/Field: (Harman 1982)(1): includes causal connections with the environment. It may be part of the conceptual role of "There is a rabbit" that this is typically triggered by rabbits being around. Problem: this is also true then for e.g. "phlogiston is leaking from the cylinder." This could typically be caused by oxygen entering into the cylinder. Field: this shows that this does not introduce any representational properties (reference, truth conditions). >Truth conditions, >Reference, >Truth, >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language. II 76 Conceptual Role/"Not"/Truth Function/Representation/Field: a representational semantics will regard e.g. "not" as a function which reflects the truth on falsehood, and vice versa. Negation/Conceptual Role/Not/Field: but that is not a fact about the conceptual or functional role of "not". >Negation. Conceptual role: is easy to specify here: it is largely given in the inference rules. - But the specification of the conceptual role says nothing about the truth functions. >Truth functions. While there is a sort of supervenience of the representational properties (truth conditions, reference, etc.) on the property of the conceptual role in the logic connections. - But conceptual role and representation cannot be equated. >Representation. II 93 Conceptual Role/Negation/Fact/Field: the fact by virtue of which "it is not the case that" obeys the truth tables, are facts about its conceptual role. II 108 Conceptual Role/Field: includes the verification conditions, but even more, e.g. rules for probability and conceptual consequences that arise from a belief. - But the conceptual role is not enough: it is internalistic and individualistic. - I.e. it does not refer to the outside world and the language community. - We have no "externalist" and no "social" aspects. >Language community. Solution/Field: we could make the (hopefully harmless) assumption that a language user believes something in his own language. Or at least internal analogues thereof without ambiguities. And we assume that this belief relation is possible without a presupposed concept of content. >Content, >Beliefs, >Relation-theory. Deflationism: can agree with that. - Also computational role: describes how beliefs, desires, etc. arise in time. >Computation/Field. II 112 We can say that the conceptual role and the indication relations of the beliefs of other people are relevant to the content of my belief state. - The conceptual role of logic connections is not explained by the truth table. Solution: Reliability: is higher if "or" has the role that corresponds to the truth table. >Reliability theory. Conceptual Role/Logical Operators/Connections: the conceptual role semantics (CRS) can here assume facts or the absence of facts, deflationism cannot. >Deflationism 1. Harman, Gilbert. 1982. "Conceptual Role Semantics". In: Notre dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, pp. 242-56 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Conceptualism | Quine | XI 136 Intuitionism/Quine/Lauener: he compares it with ancient conceptualism: universals are created by the mind. VII (f) 125 ConceptualismVsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries - Problem: Poincaré's "impredicative" definition: Def impredicative/Def Poincaré: "impredicative" means the specification of a class through a realm of objects, within which that class is located. VII (f) 126 Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: conceptualism does not require classes to exist beyond conditions of belonging to elements that can be expressed. Cantor's proof: would entail something else: It appeals to a class h of those elements of class k which are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer. VII (f) 127 But this is how the class h is specified impredicatively! h is itself one of the partial classes of k. >Classes/Quine. Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism. The same fate strikes Cantor's proof of the existence of supernumerary infinity. QuineVsConceptualism: this is a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: e.g. the proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit. VII (a) 14 Universals Dispute/Middle Ages/Quine: the old groups reappear in modern mathematics: Realism: Logicism Conceptualism: Intuitionism Nominalism: Formalism. Conceptualism/Middle Ages/Quine: holds on to universals, but as mind-dependent. ConceptualismVsReduceability Axiom: because the reduceability axiom reintroduces the whole platonistic class logic. >Universals/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Condorcet Jury Theorem | Laplace | Parisi I 495 Condorcet Jury Theorem/Laplace/Nitzan/Paroush: (Laplace, 1815(1)) Specification of the problem faced by the jury: 1) There are two alternatives. 2) The alternatives are symmetric. Specification of the decision rule applied by the team: 3) The team applies the simple majority rule. Specification of the properties of the jury members: 4) All members possess identical competencies. 5) The decisional competencies are fixed. 6) All members share identical preferences. Specification of the behavior of the jury members: 7) Voting is independent. 8) Voting is sincere. Parisi I 496 The core of Laplace’s proof is the calculation of the probability of making the right collective decision (to be denoted by Π), where Π is calculated by using Bernoulli’s theorem (1713). Laplace shows, first, that Π is larger than the probability of making the right decision P by any single member of the team; second, that Π is a monotone increasing function of the size of the team; and third, that Π tends to unity with the size of the team. Of course, besides the above conditions there is an additional trivial condition that the decisional capabilities of decision-makers are not worse than that of tossing a fair coin. Namely, the probability P of making the correct decision is not less than one-half. Other properties of Π are that it is monotone increasing and concave in the size of the team, n, and in the competence of the individuals, P. Thus, given the costs and benefits of the team members’ identical competence, one can find the optimal size of a team and the optimal individual’s competence by comparing marginal costs to marginal benefits. >Jury theorem, >Marginal costs, >Decision theory, >Decision-making processes. 1. Laplace, P. S. de (1815). Theorie analytique des probabilities. Paris: n.p. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constructivism | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 76 Construction/Search/Mathematics/Waismann: e.g. false analogy: we are looking for a man with black hair and this and this appearance. In the case of the man, it would be possible to complete the description more and more without leading to a finding of such a man. I would not have the man yet. In the construction it is so: as long as the construction is not completely described, I cannot be sure if what I am looking for is logically correct, so can be described at all. The imperfect description leaves out just what would be necessary for something to be sought. It is therefore only an apparant description of the desired. E.g. Proof of the Goldbach conjecture. p. 76. e.g. the proof of induction has been rediscovered and not just a combination of simpler conclusions. >Discoveries, >Proofs, >Provability. >Goldbach's Conjecture. 77 To what extent is the search contained in the process of searching? E.g. North Pole: someone shows a point on the plan, which is the specification of the target. E.g. When searching the pentagon with a circle and a ruler, the question is: does the term allow for the search or not? In the case of mathematics the specification of the construction does not allow the search! We can even think of two different terms of construction (a layman concept of the student and a mathematical one). The space is, in reality, only the one that contains what is sought. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Content | Kant | Bubner I 101 Contents/Synthesis/Kant/Bubner: how does consciousness come to its new content? Not by what is given, but by what is done! It is not determined by the present, nor is it "second-level knowledge," as in Plato. Synthesis/Kant: synthesis is a much deeper power of the free unfolding of the possibility of judgment before all specification of the separation: action. (This is Kant's new discovery!) >Synthesis/Kant, >Judgment/Kant, >Consciousness/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Conventions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 192 Convention/Phenomenology/Physics/Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only conventionalism Wittgenstein allows refers to the choice between different phenomenological entities and this is based on the thesis that both phenomenological entities he mentions are secondary in relation to the physical objects. I 264 How do you know someone has a toothache when they hold their cheek? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, i.e. we have reached the conventions. These "conventions" are exactly what Wittgenstein calls "criteria" in other parts of this discussion. They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of the term "toothache". "To use a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. Of course, I do not identify my feeling by criteria, but I use the same expression. I 303 Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the name relationships are conventional, but the essence of the names is not. "In logic we do not express what we want, but the nature of natural signs expresses itself." The non-conventional element of language: "But if we transform all those signs (occurring in a sentence) into variables, there is still such a class. But this does not depend on any agreement, but only on the nature of the sentence. It corresponds to a logical form of a logical archetype." Symbol/Everyday Language/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in everyday language there are all kinds of senseless connections of symbols. In order to maintain the reflection concept, these must be excluded by conventional rules. The nature of our symbols alone does not eliminate them by itself. II 27 Learning/Wittgenstein: we learn/teach the language by using it. The language convention is communicated by combining the sentence and its verification. Def "Understanding"/Wittgenstein: means to be guided by language convention to the right expectation. II 35 Conventions/Wittgenstein: presuppose the applications of language - they say nothing about its applications. For example: that red differs from blue from red from chalk is verified formally, not experimentally. II 75 Convention/Wittgenstein: assessing belongs to (learning) history. And we are not interested in the story here if we are interested in the moves of the game. Learning, >Language Learning/Wittgenstein. II 181 Observation Concepts/Theory/Criterion/Wittgenstein: what is understood in a theory as the reason for a belief is a matter of convention. II 230 Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: Number systems are arbitrary - otherwise a different spelling would correspond to different facts. II 231 Of course you can give meaning to new sentences and symbols - that is why the conventions are arbitrary. II 238 Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the Excluded Third (SaD) and the Contradiction to be excluded (SvW) are arbitrary! To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression. IV 26 Sentence/Tractatus: 3.317 the determination of the values is the variable. It is the specification of the sentence whose common characteristic is the variable. The fixing is a description of these sentences. The fixing will only deal with symbols, not their meaning. Convention: it is only essential that it does not say anything about what is described. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Criteria | Henrich | Habermas IV 158 Criteria/Identity/Conditions of Identity/Henrich/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects. (1) HenrichVsGeach: Henrich distinguishes between identity conditions and identity criteria: "It makes no sense to say that an object appears under one description as (the same) number, under another as (different) lines. The black line on the paper, which denotes the number 8, is not this number itself (...). Definition Identity conditions/Henrich: types of objects are fundamentally different from each other. >Identity conditions. Def Identity criteria/Henrich: Identity criteria can individualize [(s)objects] in the area of an object type in different ways.(2) Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. The additional conditions depend on it, Habermas IV 159 how the person can even be identified as a person. >Person, >Individuation, >Identification, >Particulars, >Specification, >Objects, >Subjects. 1.P. Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 2. D. Henrich, Identität, in: O. Marquard, K. Stierle, Identität, Poetik und Hermeneutik, Bd. VIII, München, 1979, S. 382 |
Henr I Dieter Henrich Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität Frankfurt/M. 2016 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Currency Appreciation | Benguria | Benguria I 1 Currency Appreciation/depreciation/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 2 Across several specifications with various controls, we find a bilateral depreciation of the dollar. This is driven by countries with a floating exchange rate regime, and is statistically significant only in some of our regressions. This goes against what we would expect from existing theory, which indicates that US tariffs would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. If US imports are invoiced in US dollars, we would expect no or small response in the exchange rate. We find that these results are robust to including in our regressions a component capturing the product exclusions in the tariff announcement. >Currency, >Share prices, >Stock prices, >Elasticity. * Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie . (2025) Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 02138 July 2025 |
Benguria I Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 2025 |
| Currency Depreciation | Benguria | Benguria I 1 Currency Appreciation/depreciation/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 2 Across several specifications with various controls, we find a bilateral depreciation of the dollar. This is driven by countries with a floating exchange rate regime, and is statistically significant only in some of our regressions. This goes against what we would expect from existing theory, which indicates that US tariffs would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. If US imports are invoiced in US dollars, we would expect no or small response in the exchange rate. We find that these results are robust to including in our regressions a component capturing the product exclusions in the tariff announcement. >Currency, >Share prices, >Stock prices, >Elasticity. Benguria I 13 Tariffs/currency depreciation/Benguria/Saffie: In the standard model of trade and exchange rates, a US tariff would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. We develop a simple model* which departs from the standard model by changing its assumptions about invoicing currencies and about trade reallocation in response to tariffs. In both regards, our assumptions are guided by well-established empirical facts. This simple variation delivers the opposite result: a US tariff leads to a dollar depreciation. The assumption about invoicing patterns is the following. Exports to the US are invoiced in US dollars. Exports to the rest of the world are invoiced partly in dollars and partly in the currency of the exporting country (producer currency, using the terminology in the literature). This assumption is consistent with the evidence in the literature on invoice currencies in trade [Boz et al., 2022(1), Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008(2)]. Benguria I 14 The assumption about export reallocation is that US tariffs lead to a decline in exports to the US but an increase in exports to the rest of the world. This reallocation can be microfounded by assuming an increasing marginal cost. This mechanism is featured in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) and Almunia et al. [2021](4). Further, Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) show that in there is a substantial amount of trade reallocation in response to trade war tariffs. Combining both assumptions, a tariff imposed by the US on a given country leads to a decrease in exports to the US and an increase in exports to the rest of the world. Because only exports to the rest of the world are invoiced in producer currency, this leads to a higher relative demand for producer currency. This implies an appreciation of the producer currency (i.e., a depreciation of the US dollar). We now provide a mathematical overview. In Appendix Section A.4, we provide the microfoundations for this model by assuming an increasing marginal cost. For this purpose, we extend the model in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) by including assumptions about invoice currencies. Benguria I 15 Stock prices: This model also predicts a decline in stock prices in response to a US tariff. *Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie . (2025) Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. 1. E. Boz, C. Casas, G. Georgiadis, G. Gopinath, H. Le Mezo, A. Mehl, and T. Nguyen. Patterns of invoicing currency in global trade: New evidence. Journal of International Economics, 136:103604, 2022. 2. G. Gopinath and R. Rigobon. Sticky borders. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):531–575, 2008. 3. F. Benguria and F. Saffie. Escaping the trade war: Finance and relational supply chains in the adjustment to trade policy shocks. Journal of International Economics, 152:103987, 2024. 4. M. Almunia, P. Antras, D. Lopez-Rodriguez, and E. Morales. Venting out: Exports during a domestic slump. American Economic Review, 111(11):3611–62, 2021. |
Benguria I Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 2025 |
| Decision Theory | Lewis | V 307f Decision Theory/DT/Lewis: partition/division)/Lewis: is a set of propositions, of which exactly one applies in each world (or each X-world) - provide the most detailed specification of the present actions (options) of the actor. Decision theory: says which options are rational. >Proposition/Lewis. Rational choice: delivers the greatest benefit expected. Maximum benefit: if V(A) is not surpassed by any V(A™). Problem: how do you find out that A applies. That one is living in the world A (= Proposition)?. Important argument: it is in your power, to make the news yourself. That is, you find out what they like best by producing it. V 309f Non-Causal Decision Theory/Newcomb’s Paradox/NP/LewisVs: favors the rejection of small goods as rational - although this later choice does nothing to change the previous state, which favors the evil. Newcomb's Paradox: requires a causal decision theory. >Newcomb's paradox. V 315 Non-causal decision theory: only works, because the beliefs of the actor allow it to function - ... + ... Partition of propositions (sets of possible worlds), expected benefits. >Propositional Attitudes. --- Schwarz I 66 Decision-making procedure/Lewis: the >modal realism ((s) maintaining the existence of possible worlds) is not a decision-making procedure to answer questions about possible worlds. Decision-making procedure/Schwarz: E.g. is not used by behaviorists either: he simply says that statements about mental properties are reducible to statements about dispositions. >Behaviorism, >Disposition. E.g. mathematical Platonism: does not need decision-making procedure for arithmetics. >Platonism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Descriptions | Frege | II 29 Description/Frege: e.g. the expression: "The capital of the German Empire" represents a proper name and means an object. Unsaturated: "capital of" Saturated: "the German Empire" Expression of a function: the expression of a function is e.g. "The capital of x" ((s) Russell: propositional function, PF). Frege: If we take the German Reich as an argument, we obtain Berlin as a function value. >Function, >unsaturated, >Object. II 54 Description/Subordinate Clause: e.g. the discoverer of the planetary orbits = is an object ("meaning" (reference): has no truth value. >Truth values. II 82 Description/Name/Frege "the king of this kingdom" does not refer to anything without a specification of time. ->Description: ((s) Frege implicitly differentiates descriptions of other singular terms already before Russell). >Singular terms. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Description/terminology/Frege: descriptions are "compound proper names" (complex names). >Proper names, >Clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Designation | Designation: ascription of a character to an object that allows the localization within an order, as opposed to naming. See also denotation, individuation, identification, specification. |
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| Distinctions | Millikan | I 272 Definition exclusivity class/Millikan/(s): ("contrary range", see above I 197) Class of properties that can have a substance or individual, as opposed to others. E.g. melting point, e.g. atomic weight etc. One thing cannot have several melting points or several atomic weights. Not every thing can have properties from any exclusivity class. E.g. humans have no atomic weight. Properties: their identity derives from the constellation of exclusivity classes. E.g. living beings: date of birth, age, weight, etc. but not electrical conductivity etc. (Individual/Object/Property/(s): thus, an object is defined by several dimensions: it cannot have a property from all exclusivity classes, but if it has a property from an exclusivity class, then it cannot have a second property from this exclusivity class.) Millikan: correspondingly: if a property of an exclusivity class is present, it is known that 1. all other properties from the same exclusivity class are out of question, 2. that some exclusivity classes are out of question because they cannot belong to the kind of object to which a property from the exclusivity class already established belongs to. E.g. Date of birth and melting point. >Identification, >Specification, >Individuation. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Distribution Theory | Neo-Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 170 Distribution theory/Value theory/Neo-neoclassicalsVsMarx/Harcourt: The neo-neoclassicals have produced a string of rebuttals ((s)to Joan Robinson’s remarks on Value theory). >Distribution/Value theory/Robinson. Rate of profit/demand: First, they argue that no one, these days, tries, or ever did try, to determine the rate of profits or other prices within the production system alone. After all, the neoclassical marginalist 'revolution' was concerned with first the prior, and then the equal, importance of the blade of scissors known as 'demand'. Measurement of capital: Secondly, they could refer to Bliss's arguments (…), and to the statements by Hahn and Matthews [1964](1) at the end of their survey of the theory of economic growth. Thus: „As far as pure theory is concerned the 'measurement of capital' is no problem at all because we never have to face it if we do not choose to. With our armchair omniscience we can take account of each machine separately. Moreover the measurement business has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of whether imputation theory is or is not valid. In an equilibrium of the whole system provided there is perfect competition, no learning by doing and no uncertainty, the neoclassical imputation results hold. Harcourt I 171 This should now be beyond dispute. It is also of little comfort to the empirically inclined.“ (p. 888.) „Returning once more to the question of the validity or otherwise of imputation theory there is a further, purely theoretical, point of some importance to be made. When an economy with many goods is considered, then we must also find the relative equilibrium prices of these goods. Whether these are determined a la Leontief-Samuelson-Sraffa or a la Walras, imputation is at once involved. If we abandon imputation entirely then the whole question of relative prices must be reconsidered afresh. Perhaps it ought to be, but recognition that this problem exists seems desirable“.(p. 889.) >Relative prices. Harcourt: (…) [the neo-neoclassicals] could refer to Samuelson's opening remarks in Samuelson [1962](2), (…) and Solow's closing ones, Solow [1970](3). That is to say, they would dismiss an aggregative approach to a rigorous theory of distribution - and capital - (though not, necessarily, one to econometrics). They could next invoke Swan's appendix, Swan [1956](4), and Champernowne's original paper [1953-4](5). In the latter, when doubleswitching is allowed to occur, the production function is multi-valued, i.e. the same q is associated with two or more values of k. Factors of production/factor price: Nevertheless, factors are paid their marginal products. Labour/capital/ Champernowne: However, 'the question of which (r, w) and hence what income-distribution between labour and capital is paid is left in this model for political forces to decide' (p. 130) - surely one of the most perceptive comments of the whole debate? (At the (double) switch points, one technique is coming in at one point, leaving at the other, as it were; which, then, is the relevant one to determine distribution?) Champernowne adds: 'It is interesting to speculate whether more complex situations retaining this feature are ever found in the real world.' Harcourt I 172 To the neo-neoclassical answer that the existence or not of an aggregate production function or of a well-behaved demand curve for capital at economy (or industry level) has nothing to do with marginal productivity relations, some critics (Kaldor [1966](6), Nell [1967b](7)) might reply: Your logic may be impeccable but your results are, nevertheless, irrelevant for the world as we know it, and especially for an explanation of distribution, i.e. they would reject maximizing behaviour as a fundamental postulate of economic analysis (see Solow [1968](8) also). This raises a puzzle in the analysis of choice of technique where most writers, including Sraffa, explicitly assume maximizing behaviour. Kaldor: Kaldor, of course, does not; his analysis is based upon the implications of businessmen following rules of thumb such as the pay-off period criterion. Brown: Brown [1966](9), on the other hand, just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(10),1969(11)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. >Capital/Brown. 1. Hahn, F. H. and Matthews, R. C. O. [1964] 'The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey', Economic Journal, LXXIV, pp. 779-902. 2. Samuelson, P.A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 3. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 4. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 5.Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 6. Kaldor, N. [1966] 'Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 309-19. 7. Nell, E. J. [1967b] 'Theories of Growth and Theories of Value', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xvi, pp. 15-26. 8. Solow, R. M. [1968] 'Distribution in the Long and Short Run', The Distribution of National Income, ed. by Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros (London: Macmillan), pp. 449-75. 9. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 10. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 11. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Distribution Theory | Piketty | Bofinger I 39 Distribution theory/distribution/Piketty/Krämer: With the exception of the explanation of top managers' incomes, Piketty considers the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution to be “useful” and “natural” when explaining wages and profits (Piketty 2014: 283 ff.)(1). VsNeoclassics/VsPiketty: However, this theory of distribution has some serious logical deficiencies and shortcomings that make it unsuitable as a theoretical explanation for the distribution of income and wealth (...) Marginal productivity/neoclassical: The neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution is used to explain both the micro and macro level. The microeconomic version of marginal productivity theory does not focus on income distribution, which is explained en passant, so to speak. Bofinger I 40 Factors of production/microeconomics: This is primarily about determining the demand for the individual factors of production on the respective factor markets. At the same time as the factor demand is determined, the individual factor prices (wages, interest on capital, basic rent) are also determined. The basic principle of factor price determination is identical for all factors of production. Using various assumptions - including in particular perfect competition and constant returns to scale - each factor of production in market equilibrium is remunerated according to the marginal product of the last unit still employed. In this model framework, the theory of price formation on a factor market is simultaneously a theory of income distribution. >Factors of production, >Factor market, >Production structure. Macroeconomics: The macroeconomic version of the marginal productivity theory of distribution transfers the laws obtained at the microeconomic level to the economy as a whole. The incomes of the factors of production also correspond to their respective factor prices at the macroeconomic level. If, as is generally the case, a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, the income produced is distributed completely among the factors of production involved. The macroeconomic wage rate (profit rate) is equated with the production elasticity of labor (capital). Variations in the wage rate or profit rate have no influence on the proportional distribution of income, as these trigger a corresponding compensating factor substitution. Elasticity: The income ratios change at most if the production elasticities are changed by non-neutral technical progress. >Elasticity. Bofinger I 41 Capital theory/VsPiketty: As has become clear in the context of the so-called capital theory controversy, however, the assumption of the existence of a macroeconomic production function and the specification of a defined “quantity of capital” independent of the prices of the various capital goods and thus of the profit rate prove to be untenable for certain logical reasons (cf. Harcourt 1972)(2)(3). >Capital/Piketty, >Cambridge Capital Controversy/Harcourt. Method: The problem here is that the prices of the individual, heterogeneous capital goods must be known in advance in order to be able to add them up to an overall economic capital stock. However, the prices of the individual capital goods cannot be determined without knowledge of the interest rate on capital (the profit rate) (cf. Kurz/Salvadori 1995)(4). >Heinz D. Kurz, >Neri Salvadori. As Piero Sraffa demonstrated as early as 1960(5), the prices of capital goods and the rate of profit must be determined simultaneously (Sraffa 2014)(5). >Piero Sraffa. Outside of a one-sector model, it is therefore not possible to aggregate the various capital goods into a single variable “capital”. Samuelson: Paul Samuelson and other neoclassicists also conceded this at the end of the long-standing dispute between the critics of neoclassical production and capital theory from Cambridge (England) and its defenders from Cambridge (USA), which Piketty, however, completely misunderstands. >Paul Samuelson. Bofinger I 42 Capital theory: Although the Cambridge-Cambridge controversy has clearly shown that the macroeconomic version of marginal productivity theory is based on a circular argument that calls its theoretical foundation into question, it is still the central building block for neoclassical distribution analysis, on which Piketty also builds. Market power: Another point of criticism of the distribution theory used by Piketty is that the standard approach of the marginal productivity theory of distribution leaves no room for market power, social factors of influence or the consideration of other distributional conflicts that constantly occur in reality. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. 2014. Das Kapital im 21. Jahrhundert. München: Beck. 2. Harcourt, G. (1972): Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 3. Piketty (2014: 305 ff.) is mistaken when he argues that the Cambridge controversy was essentially about the question of the constancy of the capital coefficient. Unfortunately, he is clearly not familiar with this important topic. 4. Kurz, H. D./Salvadori, N. (1995): Theory of Production: a Long-Period Analysis. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 5. Sraffa, P. (2014 [1960]): Warenproduktion mittels Waren. Einleitung zu einer Kritik der ökonomischen Theorie. Marburg: Metropolis. Hagen Krämer. 2015. „Make no mistake, Thomas! Verteilungstheorie und Ungleichheitsdynamik bei Piketty“. In: Thomas Piketty und die Verteilungsfrage. Ed. Peter Bofinger, Gustav A. Horn, Kai D. Schmid und Till van Treeck. 2015. |
Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Bofinger II Peter Bofinger Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments Oxford 2001 |
| Dixit, Avinash | Hogan | Krugman III 12 Avinash Dixit/trade policies/international trade/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Since Dixit’s model (1988)(1) is probably the most influential of [calibration] models to date, we examine how an alternative specification of this model alters the policy recommendations and welfare results of the calibration exercise. As does Dixit, we apply the model to US.-Japan competition in the automobile industry, expanding the years examined to the full range from 1979 to 1985. VsDixit: The specification we employ is richer than Dixit’s in that we allow product differentiation not only between U.S. and Japanese goods, but also between goods made within each of the countries.* >International trade, >Trade policies, >Models, >Economic models, >Calibration, >New trade theory. The advantages of doing so are twofold. First, the richer specification allows us to get estimates for the extent of product differentiation, as well as timevarying behavioral parameters for firms and consumers. Second, it allows us to ask which results from Dixit’s simpler model are robust and which are artifacts of the model specification. Optimal trade policy: The effect of the richer specification is to completely reverse the sign of the resulting optimal trade policy: we find the optimal policy to be a subsidy to rather than a tax on imports. VsDixit: In fact, following the policies recommended by Dixit’s model can result in a welfare loss if the “true” model is as we specify. The more detailed specification also greatly affects the implicit estimates of collusion/competition between firms. >Competition, >Mergers. Competition: Our results suggest that auto industry firms behave more competitively than Bertrand oligopolists**, as opposed to Dixit’s finding of competition somewhere between that of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolists. Dixit’s result is in part a byproduct of his assumption that firms within a nation produce a homogeneous good. Price/marginal cost: With this assumption, the existence of any markup of price above marginal cost implies that behavior is more collusive than Bertrand. On the other hand, some results are robust. For example, the effects on firms’ behavior of trade policies, particularly the voluntary export restraints (VERs) imposed at the end of 1981, correspond to the effects noted by Dixit. Our implicit estimates of demand cross-elasticities are also consistent with other sources. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Krugman III 13 In addition, the targeting of instruments to distortions evident in Dixit’s results seems to carry through. Finally, as is common with most calibrated trade models, the extent of welfare gains from optimal policies, particularly optimal trade policies alone, remains quite limited. As in Dixit (1988)(1), we estimate optimal polices both with and without monopoly (union) labor rents. We then compare our results to Dixit’s. Dixit: Dixit finds that the optimal policy consists of a tariff on imports and a subsidy to domestic production. VsDixit: In contrast, our model indicates a subsidy to both imports and domestic production to be optimal. We suspect that this is related to our demand specification, which increases the importance of consumer surplus in welfare, thereby increasing the attractiveness of import subsidies which raise consumption. In addition, competition in our model appears to be quite vigorous.*** This tends to limit the gains from using the optimal production subsidy, as these gains are largest in the face of less competitive behavior. As does Dixit, we find that the existence of labor rents raises the optimal subsidy to production and reduces, and in some cases reverses, the optimal import subsidy. Cf. >Optimal tariffs. * Dixit (1988)(1), in contrast, assumes that goods produced within a country are perfect substitutes for one another-that a Chevrolet is the same as a Lincoln or a Pontiac. Although our specification allows for imperfect substitution between all products, the separability we impose groups together all U.S. cars and all Japanese cars. That is, our model puts a Chevy in the same group as a Cadillac, and a Civic in the same group as an Acura. ** ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) *** The direction of optimal trade policy is known to he related to the extent of competition, as parametrized by the choice of the strategic variable and thus in our model by the CVs. For example, in Eaton and Grossman’s (1986)(2) simple model of duopolistic competition in third party markets, a tax on exports turns out to be optimal with price competition, while a subsidy is optimal with quantity competition. 1. Dixit, A. K. 1988. Optimal trade and industrial policies for the US automobile industry. In: Empirical methods for international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2. Eaton, J., and G. Grossman. 1986. Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:383-406. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Dixit, Avinash | Krishna | Krugman III 12 Avinash Dixit/trade policies/international trade/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: Since Dixit’s model (1988)(1) is probably the most influential of [calibration] models to date, we examine how an alternative specification of this model alters the policy recommendations and welfare results of the calibration exercise. As does Dixit, we apply the model to US.-Japan competition in the automobile industry, expanding the years examined to the full range from 1979 to 1985. VsDixit: The specification we employ is richer than Dixit’s in that we allow product differentiation not only between U.S. and Japanese goods, but also between goods made within each of the countries.* >International trade, >Trade policies, >Models, >Economic models, >Calibration. The advantages of doing so are twofold. First, the richer specification allows us to get estimates for the extent of product differentiation, as well as timevarying behavioral parameters for firms and consumers. Second, it allows us to ask which results from Dixit’s simpler model are robust and which are artifacts of the model specification. Optimal trade policy: The effect of the richer specification is to completely reverse the sign of the resulting optimal trade policy: we find the optimal policy to be a subsidy to rather than a tax on imports. VsDixit: In fact, following the policies recommended by Dixit’s model can result in a welfare loss if the “true” model is as we specify. The more detailed specification also greatly affects the implicit estimates of collusion/competition between firms. >Competition, >Mergers. Competition: Our results suggest that auto industry firms behave more competitively than Bertrand oligopolists**, as opposed to Dixit’s finding of competition somewhere between that of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolists. Dixit’s result is in part a byproduct of his assumption that firms within a nation produce a homogeneous good. Price/marginal cost: With this assumption, the existence of any markup of price above marginal cost implies that behavior is more collusive than Bertrand. On the other hand, some results are robust. For example, the effects on firms’ behavior of trade policies, particularly the voluntary export restraints (VERs) imposed at the end of 1981, correspond to the effects noted by Dixit. Our implicit estimates of demand cross-elasticities are also consistent with other sources. >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Krugman III 13 In addition, the targeting of instruments to distortions evident in Dixit’s results seems to carry through. Finally, as is common with most calibrated trade models, the extent of welfare gains from optimal policies, particularly optimal trade policies alone, remains quite limited. As in Dixit (1988)(1), we estimate optimal polices both with and without monopoly (union) labor rents. We then compare our results to Dixit’s. Dixit: Dixit finds that the optimal policy consists of a tariff on imports and a subsidy to domestic production. VsDixit: In contrast, our model indicates a subsidy to both imports and domestic production to be optimal. We suspect that this is related to our demand specification, which increases the importance of consumer surplus in welfare, thereby increasing the attractiveness of import subsidies which raise consumption. In addition, competition in our model appears to be quite vigorous.*** This tends to limit the gains from using the optimal production subsidy, as these gains are largest in the face of less competitive behavior. As does Dixit, we find that the existence of labor rents raises the optimal subsidy to production and reduces, and in some cases reverses, the optimal import subsidy. Cf. >Optimal tariffs. * Dixit (1988)(1), in contrast, assumes that goods produced within a country are perfect substitutes for one another-that a Chevrolet is the same as a Lincoln or a Pontiac. Although our specification allows for imperfect substitution between all products, the separability we impose groups together all U.S. cars and all Japanese cars. That is, our model puts a Chevy in the same group as a Cadillac, and a Civic in the same group as an Acura. ** ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) *** The direction of optimal trade policy is known to he related to the extent of competition, as parametrized by the choice of the strategic variable and thus in our model by the CVs. For example, in Eaton and Grossman’s (1986)(2) simple model of duopolistic competition in third party markets, a tax on exports turns out to be optimal with price competition, while a subsidy is optimal with quantity competition. 1. Dixit, A. K. 1988. Optimal trade and industrial policies for the US automobile industry. In: Empirical methods for international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2. Eaton, J., and G. Grossman. 1986. Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:383-406. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Efficiency | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 205 Efficiency/constitutional economics/Voigt: Normative constitutional economics (…) reinterprets the >Pareto criterion in a twofold way: It is not outcomes but rules or procedures that lead to outcomes that are evaluated using the criterion. The evaluation is not carried out by an omniscient scientist or politician but by the concerned individuals themselves: "In a sense, the political economist is concerned with 'what people want' " (Buchanan, 1959(1), p. 137). In order to find out what people want, Buchanan proposes to carry out a consensus test. The specification of this test will be crucial as to which rules can be considered legitimate. In 1959, Buchanan had actual unanimity in mind and those citizens that expect to be worse off due to some rule changes would have to be compensated. This test would thus be equivalent to a modified Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Later in life, Buchanan seems to have changed his position: hypothetical consent deduced by an economist will do in order to legitimize some rule (see, e.g., Buchanan, 1977(2), 1978(3), 1986(4)). VsBuchanan: This position can be criticized because a large variety of rules seem to be legitimizable depending on the assumptions of the scientist who does the process. Scientists arguing in favor of an extensive welfare state will most likely assume risk-averse individuals, while scientists who argue for cuts in the welfare budgets will assume people to be risk-neutral. >Constitutional economics, >Costs/Buchanan, >Constitutions/constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. (1959). "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy." Journal of Law and Economics 2: 124-138. 2. Buchanan, J. M. (1977). Freedom in Constitutional Contract - Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station, TX/London: Texas A&M University Press. 3. Buchanan, J. M.(1978). "A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy," Nomos 19: 29-42 4. Buchanan, J. M. (1986). "Political Economy and Social Philosophy," in: J. M. Buchanan; Liberty, Market and State—political Economy in the 1980s, 261—274. New York: Wheatsheaf Books. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Emission Targets | Economic Theories | Mause I 418 Emission targets/intervention/environmental policy/Economic Theory: if the state intervenes in private sector activities, the extent to which certain environmental impacts are to be permitted must be specified. (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 500 f.)(1) The preservation of so-called protected goods (e.g. safeguarding life and health, guaranteeing ecological sustainability) requires the definition of "emission targets" (environmental quality standards) for their further specification in relation to individual fields of environmental policy (air pollution control, water protection, noise abatement, etc.). "Emission targets" are then derived from these immission targets, which consist of regulations on the level of pollutant emissions at an individual source of pollutants (e.g. in the form of a limit value for fine dust) or the amount of pollutant input into an individual environmental good (e.g. in the form of the maximum permissible quantity of pesticides per hectare of agricultural land). Among other things, a distinction is made here between the polluter-principle and the principle of origin. In connection with compensation issues, there is also the beneficiary principle. See Principles/Economic Theory, Environmental Damage/Economic theory. cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer. 2012. Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, München 2012. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Empty Set | Empty set: an empty set is a set without an element. Notation ∅ or {}. There is only one empty set, since without an existing element there is no way to specify a specification of the set. The empty set can be specified as such that each element of the empty set is not identical with itself {x: x unequal x}. Since there is no such object, the set must be empty. The empty set is not the number zero, but zero indicates the cardinality of the empty set. |
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| Endurantism | Lewis | Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). >Universals. LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory). Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd. Schwarz I 32 Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]). Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times. Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away. Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change. Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change. Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 — [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–359 2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge 3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Environment | Molecular Genetics | Corr I 296 Environment/molecular genetics/Munafò: Main effects of genotype on personality phenotypes appear to be modest (Munafò, Clark, Moore et al. 2003)(1), as discussed above. >Personality traits/molecular genetics, >Extraversion/molecular genetics. One likely reason which may partially account for this is that genes interact with environmental influences to determine risk of any particular outcome, including personality. A gene × environment interaction occurs when the effect of exposure to an environmental risk factor is conditional upon an individual’s genotype, or vice versa (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt et al. 2003)(2). Several studies of emotional disorders have tested for possible gene × environment interactions, which themselves may operate via personality traits given the known associations between personality and risk of psychiatric illness (e.g., Neuroticism and major depression). >Neuroticism, >Depression. Most studies of gene × environment interactions to date have focused on the serotonin transporter gene and stressful life events, with contrasting results. In the original study (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt et al. 2003)(2), the 5-HTTLPR variant moderated the effect of stressful life events on the onset of depression among youngsters. Corr I 297 Problems: One particular difficulty in such studies lies in the accurate specification of environmental effects. While genotype can be ascertained with a high degree of accuracy (subject to appropriate quality control measures), environmental effects are typically ascertained using either self- or parent-report measures. Moreover, the underlying constructs which are so measured (e.g., ‘stressful life events’) may be somewhat vague, and in fact represent a constellation of underlying constructs. >Situations/Mischel, >situations/psychological theories, >Psychological stress. For a recent critical review of gene × environment interactions, see Munafò, Durrant, Lewis and Flint (2009)(3). 1. Munafò, M. R., Clark, T. G., Moore, L. R., Payne, E., Walton, R. and Flint, J. 2003. Genetic polymorphisms and personality in healthy adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis, Molecular Psychiatry 8: 471–84 2. Caspi, A., Sugden, K., Moffitt, T. E., Taylor, A., Craig, I. W., Harrington, H., et al. 2003. Influence of life stress on depression: moderation by a polymorphism in the 5-HTT gene, Science 301: 386–9 3. Munafò, M. R., Durrant, C., Lewis, G. and Flint, J. 2009. Gene × environment interactions at the serotonin transporter locus, Biological Psychiatry 65: 211–19 Marcus R. Munafò,“Behavioural genetics: from variance to DNA“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Events | AI Research | Norvig I 446 Events/AI research/Russell/Norvig: [A] situation calculus represents actions and their effects. Situation calculus is limited in its applicability: it was designed to describe a world in which actions are discrete, instantaneous, and happen one at a time. Consider a continuous action, such as filling a bathtub. Problem: Situation calculus can say that the tub is empty before the action and full when the action is done, but it can’t talk about what happens during the action. It also can’t describe two actions happening at the same time (…). Solution/Event calculus: Event calculus reifies fluents ((s) state variables) and events. The fluent At(Shankar , Berkeley) is an object that refers to the fact of Shankar being in Berkeley, but does not by itself say anything about whether it is true. To assert that a fluent is actually true at some point in time we use the predicate T, as in T(At(Shankar , Berkeley), t). Events are described as instances of event categories. The event E1 of Shankar flying from San Francisco to Washington, D.C. is described as E1 ∈ Flyings ∧ Flyer (E1, Shankar ) ∧ Origin(E1, SF) ∧ Destination(E1,DC) . >Events/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 470 The event calculus was introduced by Kowalski and Sergot (1986)(1) to handle continuous time, and there have been several variations (Sadri and Kowalski, 1995(2); Shanahan, 1997(3)) and overviews (Shanahan, 1999(4); Mueller, 2006(5)). van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005)(6) show how the logic of events maps onto the language we use to talk about events. An alternative to the event and situation calculi is the fluent calculus (Thielscher, 1999)(7). James Allen introduced time intervals for the same reason (Allen, 1984)(8), arguing that intervals were much more natural than situations for reasoning about extended and concurrent events. Peter Ladkin (1986a(9), 1986b(10)) introduced “concave” time intervals (intervals with gaps; essentially, unions of ordinary “convex” time intervals) and applied the techniques of mathematical abstract algebra to time representation. Allen (1991)(11) systematically investigates the wide variety of techniques available for time representation; van Beek and Manchak (1996)(12) analyze algorithms for temporal reasoning. There are significant commonalities between the event-based ontology given in this chapter and an analysis of events due to the philosopher Donald Davidson (1980)(13) (>Events/Davidson). The histories in Pat Hayes’s (1985a)(14) ontology of liquids and the chronicles in McDermott’s (1985)(15) theory of plans were also important influences on the field (…). 1. Kowalski, R. and Sergot, M. (1986). A logic-based calculus of events. New Generation Computing, 4(1), 67–95. 2. Sadri, F. and Kowalski, R. (1995). Variants of the event calculus. In ICLP-95, pp. 67–81. 3. Shanahan, M. (1997). Solving the Frame Problem. MIT Press 4. Shanahan, M. (1999). The event calculus explained. In Wooldridge, M. J. and Veloso, M. (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence Today, pp. 409–430. Springer-Verlag. 5. Mueller, E. T. (2006). Commonsense Reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. van Lambalgen, M. and Hamm, F. (2005). The Proper Treatment of Events. Wiley-Blackwell. 7. Thielscher, M. (1999). From situation calculus to fluent calculus: State update axioms as a solution to the inferential frame problem. AIJ, 111(1–2), 277-299. 8. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123–154 9. Ladkin, P. (1986a). Primitives and units for time specification. In AAAI-86, Vol. 1, pp. 354–359. 10. Ladkin, P. (1986b). Time representation: a taxonomy of interval relations. In AAAI-86, Vol. 1, pp. 360–366. 11. Allen, J. F. (1991). Time and time again: The many ways to represent time. Int. J. Intelligent systems, 6, 341-355 12. van Beek, P. and Manchak, D. (1996). The design and experimental analysis of algorithms for temporal reasoning. JAIR, 4, 1–18. 13. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. 14. Hayes, P. J. (1985a). Naive physics I: Ontology for liquids. In Hobbs, J. R. andMoore, R. C. (Eds.), Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, chap. 3, pp. 71–107. Ablex. 15. McDermott, D. (1985). Reasoning about plans. In Hobbs, J. and Moore, R. (Eds.), Formal theories of the commonsense world. Intellect Books. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Exchange Rates | Rogoff | Feldstein I 441 Exchange Rates/Rogoff: During the macroeconomic chaos of the 197Os, the popular perception among economists was that if governments could only manage to whip inflation, calm in foreign exchange markets would surely follow. In the meantime, the only advice economists could give for dealing with exchange rate volatility was to run for cover. The 1970s view laid the blame for unstable exchange rates squarely at the doorstep of the monetary authorities. If officials’ plans for monetary policy were hard to predict-and during the 1970s, they were hard to predict-then there was no way of ruling out sustained large divergences in countries’ price levels.’ Even a very loose interpretation of the doctrine of “purchasing power parity” suggests that price level instability is incompatible with exchange rate stability. The theoretical case against the hapless monetary authorities was greatly strengthened by Rüdiger Dornbusch’s (1976)(1) celebrated “overshooting” model. >Exchange Rates/Dornbusch. RogoffVsDornbusch: [Dornbusch’s] theory seemed to fit the facts, and it was intrinsically very elegant to boot (a big selling point in any science). Rogoff: Unfortunately today, as inflation con- Feldstein I 442 tinues to subside, it is becoming increasingly clear that monetary instability is at most a piece of the exchange rate volatility puzzle. It certainly cannot carry the full burden-or the blame-attributed to it by monetary models of the 1970s (or 1980s, for that matter). Inflation: One may well ask, has the conquest of inflation brought any drop at all in major-currency exchange rate volatility? Feldstein I 444 Inflation/exchange rates/interest rates/Rogoff: (…) overall, exchange rate volatility has indeed fallen somewhat in recent years ((s) written in 1999). Whether one can attribute this decline to the general fall in inflation, or to the switch in central bank operating procedures toward greater emphasis on smoothing fluctuations in very short-term interest rates, is unclear. But what is clear is that despite great successes in the battle against inflation, exchange rate volatility across the major currencies is still quite significant. Exchange rate volatility/Rogoff: In retrospect, economists should have realized that the elegant theories of the 1970s overstated the important of monetary factors-and ergo the role of central banks-in causing exchange rate volatility. Ever since the early 1980s, well before low inflation had settled in, a steady stream of negative empirical results began to cast doubt on monetary instability and overshooting as the key elements of exchange rate volatility. Feldstein I 445 Predicability: Examples of explanatory variables in structural exchange rate equations are countries’ relative output growth, interest rates, and money supplies. Obviously, if these variables are extremely hard to predict (say because one or both countries have highly erratic monetary policy), then of course it will be difficult to predict exchange rates one year hence. Prediction will be difficult no matter how well a model can explain exchange rate changes after the fact. But the inability of models to forecast exchange rates runs deeper than that. It turns out that even if one gives models the (seemingly prohibitive) advantage of forecasting with actual realized (one year hence) values of outputs, interest rates, and the like, they still fail to outperform the naive random walk model. True, this extreme result breaks down at very long horizons, over two years (see Meese and Rogoff 1983b(2); Mark 1995(3)), but again even this success relies on using out-of-sample information about the explanatory variables. Therefore, it is by no means established that monetary models can forecast exchange rates in any meaningful way. Predicability/Lewis: (…) as Lewis (1995)(4) noted, hundreds of studies have consistently found that, if anything, forward exchange rates tend to point in the wrong direction! Feldstein I 446 Solutions/Rogoff: there is an increasing consensus across a broad number of studies that purchasing power parity (PPP) considerations do matter for long-run exchange rate determination (see Froot and Rogoff 1995(5); Rogoff 1996(6)). (…) newer theoretical models emphasizing nonmonetary factors have increasingly come to supplant the classic Keynesian framework of Mundell, Fleming, and Dornbusch. These “new open economy macroeconomics” models emphasize other factors in addition to money, including government spending and productivity shocks. Whereas it is extremely unlikely that even these newer models will be able to explain very short term fluctuations in exchange rates, early evidence suggests that the other factors they emphasize may be at least as important as monetary factors in medium- to long-run exchange rate determination (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996(7), chaps. 4 and 10). 1. Dornbusch, Rudiger. 1976. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of Political Economy 84 (December): 1161-76. 2. Meese, Richard, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1983b. The out-of-sample failure of empirical exchange rate models: Sampling error or misspecification? In Exchange rates and international macroeconomics, ed. Jacob Frenkel, 67-105. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Mark, Nelson. 1995. Exchange rates and fundamentals: Evidence on long-horizon predictability. American Economic Review 85 (March): 201-18. 4. Lewis, Karen. 1995. Puzzles in international financial markets. In Handbook of international economics, ed. Gene Grossman and Ken Rogoff, 1913-71. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 5. Froot, Kenneth, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1995. Perspectives on PPP and long-run real exchange rates. In Handbook of international economics, ed. Gene Grossman and Ken Rogoff, 1647-88. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 6. Rogoff, Kenneth. 1996. The purchasing power parity puzzle. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (June): 647-68. 7. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of international macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September. Kenneth Rogoff. „Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility.“In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Rogoff I Kenneth S. Rogoff The purchasing power parity puzzle 1996 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Explanation | Cognitive Science | Corr I 416 Explanation/Cognitive Science/Pylyshyn/Matthews: proposed a framework that allows for three qualitatively different levels of expelnation (Pylyshyn 1999)(1): 1. Knowledge = Goals, intentions and personal meaning, supporting adaption to external environments 2. Symbol processing a) Algorithm = Formal specification of program for symbol manipulation b) Functional architecture = Real-time processing operations supporting symbol manipulation 3. Biology = Physical, neuronal representation of processing. >Personality, >Personality traits, >Arousal/neurobiology, >Symbol processing, >Algorithms, >Knowledge, >Goals, >Intentions, >Levels of description, >Levels/order. 1. Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1999. What’s in your mind?, in E. Lepore and Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), What is cognitive science?, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Explanation | Pylyshyn | Corr I 416 Explanation/Cognitive Science/Pylyshyn/Matthews: proposed a framework that allows for three qualitatively different levels of expelnation (Pylyshyn 1999)(1): 1. Knowledge = Goals, intentions and personal meaning, supporting adaption to external environments 2. Symbol processing a) Algorithm = Formal specification of program for symbol manipulation b) Functional architecture = Real-time processing operations supporting symbol manipulation 3. Biology = Physical, neuronal representation of processing. >Personality/Neurobiology, >Arousal/Neurobiology. 1. Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1999. What’s in your mind?, in E. Lepore and Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), What is cognitive science?, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
PsychPyly I Zenon W. Pylyshyn Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World Cambrindge, MA 2011 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Finiteness | Hilbert | Thiel I 245 Finite/Hilbert: in the sense of Hilbert, it is only a question of how statements about infinite objects can be justified by means of "finite" methods. >Infinity, >Circularity, cf. >Recursion, >Recursivity. Hilbert found the finiteness in the "operational" method, especially of the combinatorics, arithmetics, and elemental algebra already exemplarily realized. They were "genetically" (constructively) built up into the second third of the 19th century, while the construction of geometry was a prime example for the axiomatic structure of a discipline. >Constructivism, >Geometry, >Number theory, >Arithmetics, >Axioms, >Axiom systems. I 246 Each finite operation is an area that is manageable for the person who is acting. This area can change during the process. I 247 The fact that the arithmetic functions required for Goedel's proof are even primitively recursive is remarkable in that not all effectively computable functions are primitively recursive, and the primitive recursive functions are a true subclass of the computable functions. >K. Gödel, >Completeness/Gödel, >Incompleteness/Gödel. I 248 An effectively computable, but not primitive, recursive function is e.g. explained by the following scheme for the calculation of their values (not proved) (x 'is the successor of x): ψ(0,n) = n' ψ(m',0) = ψ(m,1) ψ(m',n')= ψ(m,ψ(m',n)). (I 247) If one wants to approach the general concept of comprehensibility, one has to accept the so-called μ operator as a new means of expression. Thiel I 249 Computability/Church/Thiel: how close is this to a concept of "general computability"? There is the concept of "Turing computability", the concept of the "l definability" in Church and the "canonical systems" in Post. >Calculability, >A. Turing, >E. Post. Each function, which is in one of these classes, is also demonstrable in the others. Church has then uttered the presumption that with this an adequate clarification of the general concept of computability is achieved. >Church Thesis. But it means that this is a "non-mathematical" presumption, and is not capable of any mathematical proof. It is an intuitive term: whether such a specification is "adequate" cannot be answered with mathematical means. >Proofs, >Provability, >Adequacy. I 250 Apart from finiteness and constructivity, there remain other questions: none of the definitions for the offered functional classes is finite: e.g. μ-recursive functions. The attempt to describe effective executability with classical means remains questionable, but if we interpret the existence quantifier constructively, we have already assumed the concept of constructivity. >Quantification, >Quantifiers, >Existential quantification. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Forms | Black | II 121 Form/language/Black: the totality of rules for word usage can be understood as a specification of the grammatical form - then two words have the same shape, if they are covered by the same rules - e.g. "red" and "blue", "three" and "five "but not "red" and "three". II 223 Meaning/Carrier/Object/Translation/Black: Problem: E.g. "yellow means jaune" has the same shape as "Mary loves Mopser"- problem what is supposed to be subject and object in the case of yellow/Jaune (> logical form). >Rules, >Content, >Propositional content, >Conceptual content, >Language rules. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Forms of Thinking | Logic Texts | Read III 126 In fact, it seems that the two worlds are identical, except that there is a permutation of identities, that is, of counterparts. This, the anti-Haeccetist replies, is a distinction without distinction! >Haecceitism, >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world, >Identity. --- II 252 Description level: Now, here, all meaning of "truth" and "falsehood" is abstracted, except for their difference. --- Read III 59 "Too much"/"too little": The classical view with the substitution of Bolzano produces too much: it counts conclusions as valid, which are obviously invalid. But it also produces too little by citing arguments as invalid which should be recognized as valid in a plausible manner. III 78 It is disputed whether the production of such a counterexample is a necessary condition for the invalidity. That is, whether the inability to produce one is sufficient for validity. >Sufficiency. III 113 Stalnaker: includes an "impossible world" under his worlds, which he calls lambda, in which every statement is true! All such conditional sentences are found to be true here. ((s) Explanation: in such a world A and not-A would be true at the same time - contradiction.) III 212 If the boundary (interpretation or naming) between two things is indeterminate, one is the other in an undefined way. >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification, >Gaurisankar example. "ad hoc": III 232 But if we were to protest against the introduction of a new link with the sole reason that it leads to a paradox, this objection would be entirely ad hoc. There would be no diagnosis of the problem. III 232f Bluriness (fuzzy): does not help with Sorites - graduation distribution is no possibility distribution. >Sorites, >Vaguenes. --- I 54 Impermissible duplication: the mythical Crete, as different from Greek Crete, the historical Crete, the European Crete, the remembered Crete. >Ontology, >Qua objects. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Fregean Sense | Millikan | I 101 Definition Fregean Sense/Millikan: the Fregean Sense is the mapping relation, in accordance with which the intentional icon is to map the real value. Definition value/real value/intentional icon/Millikan: the "of what" is an intentional icon; it is the real value. >Terminology/Millikan. I 100 Definition intentional icon/Millikan: We determine: (1) P is an imperative intentional icon of the last element of a series of things to which it is to map itself and which it is to produce. (2) P is an indicative intentional icon of all that it must map and which must be stated in the specification of the closest normal explanation explaining the appropriate adapted interpretation. >Intentionality, >Interpretation. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Functional Role | Schiffer | I 21 Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties. 1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. 2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role. Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a state-type which has F. ((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.) Schiffer: Type here is always "physically"). >Type/Token. Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types. E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) >Input/output. I 23 Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions. I 26 The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p. I 29 Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes. I 30 Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. >Generalization. I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. >Brian Loar. I 276 N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p." N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. >Uniqueness condition. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. I 34 All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role. Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat". Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". >Acquaintance. I 38 f Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms). I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles. Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Heckscher-Ohlin Model | Feenstra | Feenstra I 1-1 Heckscher-Ohlin model/Feenstra: (…) the two-good, two-factor model (…) forms the basis of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. We shall suppose that the two goods are traded on international markets, but do not allow for any movements of factors across borders. This reflects the fact that the movement of labor and capital across countries is often subject to controls at the border and generally much less free than the movement of goods. Cf. >Ricardian model, >Economic models, >Tariffs, >International trade, >Import surveillance, >Export restraints. Feenstra I 2-1 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model (HOS)/Feenstra: The basic assumptions of the HOS model (…) [are]: identical technologies across countries; identical and homothetic tastes across countries; differing factor endowments; and free trade in goods (but not factors). For the most part, we will also assume away the possibility of factor-intensity reversals. >Factor intensity reversals (FIR), >Factor price, >Production. Provided that all countries have their endowments within their “cone of diversification,” this means that factor prices are equalized across countries. >Endowments, >Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. We begin by supposing that there are just two countries, two sectors and two factors, (…). We shall assume that the home country is labor abundant, so that L / K > L* / K * . We will also assume that good 1 is labor intensive. The countries engage in free trade, and we also suppose that trade is balanced (value of exports = value of imports). Then the question is: what is the pattern of trade in goods between the countries? This is answered by: Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem: Each country will export the good that uses its abundant factor intensively. Thus, under our assumptions the home country will export good 1 and the foreign country will export good 2. To prove this, let us take a particular case of the factor endowment differences L / K > L* / K * , and assume that the labor endowments are identical in the two countries, L* = L, while the foreign capital endowments exceeds that at home, K* > K .* (…) we proceed by first establishing what the relative product price is in each country without any trade, or in autarky. Feenstra I 2-3 As we shall see, the pattern of autarky prices can then be used to predict the pattern of trade: a country will export the good whose free trade price is higher than its autarky price, and import the other. Demand: We have assumed a representative consumer with homothetic tastes, so we can use indifference curves to reflect demand. Feenstra I 2-6 Trade/factors: In addition to establishing the trade pattern, the HO model has precise implications about who gains and who loses from trade: the abundant factor in each country gains from trade, and the scarce factor loses. This result follows from (…) the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. >Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Factors: With the relative price of good 1 rising at home, the factor used intensively in that good (labor) will gain in real terms, and the other factor (capital) will lose. Notice that labor is the abundant factor at home. The fact that L / K > L* / K * means that labor would have been earning less in the home autarky equilibrium than in the foreign autarky equilibrium: its marginal product at home would have been lower (in both goods) than abroad. However, with free trade the home country can shift production towards the labor-intensive good, and export it, thereby absorbing the abundant factor without lowering its wage. Indeed, factor prices are equalized in the two countries after trade, (…). Thus, the abundant factor, whose factor price was bid down in autarky, will gain from the opening of trade, while the scarce factor in each country loses. Feenstra I 2-7 Examples: the United States is abundant in scientists, so it exports high-tech goods; Canada is abundant in land, so it exports natural resources, etc… VsHeckscher-Ohlin model: (…) it turns out that the HO model is a rather poor predictor of actual trade patterns, indicating that its assumptions are not realistic. It has taken many years, however, to understand why this is the case, (…) considering the earliest results of Leontief (1953)(1). >Leontief paradox. Feenstra I 2-15 Theorem of Leamer: The theorem of Leamer (1980)(2) states that if country 1 is labor-abundant, as illustrated, then the capital/labor ratio embodied in consumption must exceed the capital/labor ratio embodied in production. That is, since the consumption point Adi must lie on the diagonal, it is necessary above the endowment point Vi.** (…) note that it does not depend in any way on whether trade is balanced or not. For example, if country 1 is running a trade surplus (with the value of production exceeding consumption), then we should move the consumption point Adi to the left down the diagonal. This would have not effect whatsoever on the capital/labor ratio embodied in consumption as compared to the capital/labor ratio embodied in production. * Because of the assumptions of identical homothetic tastes and constant returns to scale, the result we are establishing remains valid if the labor endowments also differ across countries. ** For the graphics see Feenstra 2002(3). 1. Leontief, Wassily, W., 1953, Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The American Capital Position Re-examined,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 97, September, 332-349. Reprinted in Readings in International Economics, edited by Richard Caves and Harry. G. Johnson, Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1968. 2. Leamer, Edward E., 1980, “The Leontief Paradox, Reconsidered,” Journal of Political Economy, 88(3), 495-503. Reprinted in Edward E. Leamer, ed. 2001, International Economics, New York: Worth Publishers, 142-149. 3. Robert C. Feenstra. 2002. Advanced International Trade. University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research August 2002. Feenstra I 2-41 Heckscher-Ohlin model/Feenstra: (…) the complete tests of the HOV [Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek] model fail sadly under the conventional assumptions of this model: identical homothetic tastes and identical technologies with FPE across countries. As we begin to loosen these assumptions, the model performs better, and when we allow for unlimited differences in productivities of factors across countries, as in Trefler (1993)(1), then the resulting HOV equations will hold as an identity. Between these two extremes, Trefler (1995)(2) shows that a parsimonious specification of technological differences between countries - allowing for a uniform difference with the U.S. - is still able to greatly improve the fit of the HOV equation. Recent research such as Davis and Weinstein (2001a)(3), which we review in the next chapter, generalizes these technological differences and further explains how we account for the differences between the factor content of trade and relative endowments. Feenstra I 2-42 (…) we can suggest two areas that deserve further attention. First, it is worth making a distinction between accounting for global trade volumes and testing hypotheses related to trade. When we attempt to match the right and left-hand sides of the HOV equation, such as by introducing productivity parameters, we are engaged in an accounting exercise. Second, even if we accept that the HOV equation can fit perfectly by allowing for sufficient differences between technologies across countries, this begs the question: where do these differences in technology come from? In the original work of Heckscher and Ohlin, they rejected the technology differences assumed by Ricardo in favor of a world where knowledge flowed across borders. We have since learned that this assumption of technological similarity across countries was empirically false at the time they wrote (see Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2000(4), 2001(5)), as well as in recent years (Trefler, 1993(1), 1995(2); Davis and Weinstein, 2001a(3)). So we are back in the world of Ricardo, where technological differences are a major determinant of trade patterns. Such differences can hardly be accepted as exogenous, however, and surely must be explicable based on underlying causes. Feenstra I 2-43 Increasing returns to scale might be one explanation, and this has been incorporated into the HOV framework by Antweiler and Trefler (2002)(6) (…). Economy-wide increasing returns are also suggested by the literature on “endogenous growth,” (…). >Exogenous growth, >Endogenous growth. Beyond this, some recent authors have argued that geography/climate (Sachs, 2001)(7), or colonial institutions (Acemoglu, et al, 2001)(8), or social capital (Jones and Hall, 1999)(9), or the efficiency with which labor is utilized (Clark and Feenstra, 2001)(10) must play an important role. 1. Trefler, Daniel, 1993, “International Factor Price Differences: Leontief was Right!” Journal of Political Economy, December, 961-987. 2. Trefler, Daniel, 1995, “The Case of Missing Trade and Other Mysteries,” American Economic Review, December, 85(5), 1029-1046. Reprinted in Edward E. Leamer, ed. 2001, International Economics, New York: Worth Publishers, 151-175. 3. Davis, Donald R. and David E. Weinstein, 2001a, “An Account of Global Factor Trade, American Economic Review, 91(5), December, 1423-1453. 4. Estevadeordal, Antoni and Alan M. Taylor, 2000, “Testing Trade Theory inn Ohlin’s Time,” in R. Findlay, L. Jonung and M. Lundahl, eds. Bertil Ohlin: A Centennial Celebration, 1899-1999, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming. 5. Estevadeordal, Antoni and Alan M. Taylor, 2001, “A Century of Missing Trade?” American Economic Review, forthcoming. 6. Antweiler, Werner and Daniel Trefler, 2002, “Increasing Returns and All That: A View from Trade,” American Economic Review, 92(1), March, 93-119. 7. Sachs, Jeffrey D., 2001. “Tropical Underdevelopment,” NBER Working Paper no. 8119. 8. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, 2001, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91(5), December, 1369-1401. 9. Jones, Charles I. and Robert E. Hall, 1999, “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 83-116. 10. Clark, Gregory and Robert C. Feenstra, 2001, “Technology in the Great Divide,” NBER Working Paper no. 8596. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Icons | Millikan | I 95 Def intentional icon/intentional icons/Millikan: intentional icons are patterns that are "good for something", that are "supposed to". They are there to be interpreted by a co-operation partner. For example, bee dance. >Intentionality, >Intention. I 96 Aboutness/Millikan: thus they show a kind of "aboutness" about "about" being something. For example, everything we call signs are intentional icons. >Aboutness/Millikan. Theorem: but not all the features of sentences are shown by intentional icons. Some are only held by sentences. E.g. Subject-predicate structure. Def Representation/Millikan: representations are intentional icons whose mapping rules are identified by the interpretation partners. >Representation. E.g. bee dance: it is hardly imaginable that bees really identify this. Sentence/intentional icons/Millikan: there are 4 characteristics according to which indicative and imperative sentences are intentional icons: 1. A sentence is an element of a family (reproductively determined family, rfF). For example, a sentence is an element of a family of sentences with the same surface structure. 2. A sentence usually stands between... I 97 ...two cooperating devices: producer and interpreter. 3. The sentence serves that the interpreter can adapt to normal conditions and eigenfunctions that can be exercised under these conditions. 4.a. Imperative: here it is an eigenfunction of the interpreter to produce the conditions himself to which the sentence is mapped. 4.b. Indicative: here the normal conditions refer to which the interpreter adapts in such a way that he can exert his eigenfunction on the fact that the sentence maps the conditions to the world. I 100 Definition intentional icon/Millikan: we do not know yet "of what" it is! We determine: (1) P is an imperative intentional icon of the last element of a series of things on which it has to map itself and which it is to produce. (2) P is an indicative intentional icon of all that it must map and which must be stated in the specification of the closest normal explanation explaining the appropriate adapted interpretation. 1. E.g. P is an imperative intentional icon of either the output pattern or (more likely) something behind it, for example, an aspect of the visual perception that P produces at the end and on which P is to be mapped. 2. E.g. P is an indicative intentional icon not of a retinal stimulus pattern but of an aspect of the world to which it adapts the interpreter to. For the next explanation of how the interpreter fullfills his eigenfunction, it is only necessary to mention that some variables have been mapped in the environment. For example, the explanation of why the heart is pumping blood does not need to mention how oxygen supplied to the muscle. I 101 E.g. It does not have to be explained how historically the mapping relation came about. Cf. >Picture theory. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Identification | Identification: A) Identification is the equivalence of two characterizations of an object in which new properties may be attributed to the object. B) Identification is the discovery that an object is a particular element from a set of objects. In this case, the number of initially assumed properties of the object may be reduced. See also specification, background, information. |
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| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Identification | Tugendhat | I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrow sense. >Frederick Strawson. Tugendhat: my own notion "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this concept. >Specification. "picking out" (to pick put) is Strawson's expression - (assumed from Searle) - (Quine: "to specify"). I 400ff Identification/Identification/Tugendhat: space-time-location: this is an object - Specification: reference, stand for (another term) (in front of background of all other objects). >Reference, >Background. I 415 Identification/particular/TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time-relation not only anchored perceptively but also system of possible perception stand points - thus a system of demonstrative specification (in front of background). >Space, >Spacetime. I 417 Trough space-time description the perceptible object is specified as more perceptible - an essentially perceptibable cannot be the previous object who it is. Reference: is then to specify a verification situation. >Verification. I 422 Distinguishing objects only from variable usage situations of perception predicates. I 426 Particular/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice as object to make space-time locations existent. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Space-time-locations are the most elementary objects - but there must also be something - at least hypothetically, then the corresponding question of verification provides, for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Objects. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - bottom-up: if the verification situation for the applicability of the predicate is described by demonstratives. I 436 Localization/identification/Tugendhat: only by several speakers - not zero point, but set of surrounding objects. - The subjective zero point may be the own position. >Subjectivity. I 462 Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposing space-time system - reference to space-time-points cannot fail. Talk of existence without location is pointless. - Identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects. - Therefore existence sentences are general. >Existence, >Existence statements. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Identification | Wiggins | Tugendhat I 410 Identification/Wiggins: 1st know what it means that "f (a) is true" 2nd know how it is to be verified. >Verification, >Predication, >Classification. Tugendhat: this amounts to verification rules. Vs: "without preliminaries" is unclear and can be omitted. I 410/411 Which is the role of the singular terms cannot be presupposed! Here it is about the term of identification, not about the broad term of specification. Tugendhat: There are singular terms that are not identifying in the strict sense. Thus, depending on the nature of the singular terms, there could be different ways of determining whether the propositions are true. >Singular terms. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Imagination | Evans | Evans I 313 Reference/Significance/General Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we constantly use general terms, of which we have only the darkest idea of the conditions of fulfilment. e.g. chlorine, microbiology etc. But it is wrong to say that we say nothing when we utter sentences containing these general terms. I 314 Evans: For example, to express the idea that there are people with eleven fingers, general terms are sufficient. If the psychological state (mental state) includes an object, a general term will appear in its specification. This could be linked to the concession that there are certain objects to which one could refer more directly: the theory must even accept this, because otherwise it could not allow what appears to be possible: reference in a symmetrical or cyclical universe. EvansVsDescription theory: This idea of psychological attitudes directed towards objects obviously owes a lot to the feeling that there must be something we can say about what is meant, even if no suitable object can be found. >Reference, >Non-existence, >Meaning, >Objects of thought, >Meaning (intending). Frank I 515 Imagination/Evans: regardless of the ways to gain knowledge on the subject. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Implicature | Grice | Graeser I 120 Implication/Grice: implication follows from what is said. Implicature: implicature does not follow from what was said - at least one conversational rule is violated. >Implication. Grice IV 248 Conversational implicature/Grice: the contribution should be informative, appropriate, true, justified, unambiguous and clearly structured - it must be possible to replace the conversational implicature by an argument, otherwise it would be a conventional implicature. >Information, >Communication. IV 264 1. If it is suspected, one must assume cooperation. 2) Conversational implicature is preserved at reformulation. 3) Conversational implicature presumes knowledge of the conventional role of the expression - therefore, conversational implicature is not part of the original specification of the conventional role. 4) Truth of what is said is not necessarily truth of the conversational implicature - bearer of the conversational implicature is therefore the act of saying, not what is said. 5) To get behind conversational implicature means to get behind what is necessary for adoption of maintenance of the cooperation principle. Cohen I 410 Conversational implicature/Grice: if it is not deleted, "if, then" is purely truth-functional. The assumption of non-truth-functional reasons is not transmitted here by the meaning, but by the implicature, e.g. if the government falls, there will be turmoil. >Truth functions. Cohen: here there is nothing stronger/Weaker. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Impredicativeness | Quine | XIII 93 Impredicativeness/Quine: Previously it was said that you had specified a class without knowing anything about it if you could name the containment condition. Russell's Antinomy: showed that there had to be exceptions. Problem: was to specify a class by a containment condition by directly or indirectly referring to a set of classes that contained the class in question. >Classes/Quine. Russell's Antinomy: here the problematic containment condition was the non-self elementary. Example x is not an element of x. Paradox: arises from letting the x of the containment condition, among other things, be just the class defined by this containment condition. Def impredicative/Poincaré/Russell: is just this condition of containment for a class that exists in the class itself. This must be forbidden to avoid paradoxes. Circular Error Principle/QuineVsRussell: but that was too harsh a term: Specification/Class/Sets/Existence/Quine: specifying a class does not mean creating it! XIII 94 Specification/Circle/Introduce/QuineVsRussell: by specifying something it is not wrong to refer to a domain to which it has always belonged to. For example, statistical statements about a typical inhabitant by statements about the total population that contains this inhabitant. Introduction/Definition/linguistic/Quine: all we need is to equate an unfamiliar expression with an expression that is formed entirely with familiar expressions. Russell's Antinomy/Quine: is still perfectly fine as long as the class R is defined by its containment condition: "class of all objects x, so that x is not an element of x". Paradox/Solution/Russell/Quine: a solution is to distort familiar expressions so that they are no longer familiar in order to avoid a paradox. This was Russell's solution. Finally, "x is an element of x" ("contains itself") to be banished from the language. >Paradoxes/Quine. Solution/Zermelo/Quine: better: leave the language as it is, but New: for classes it should apply that not every containment condition defines a class. For example the class "R" remains well defined, but "Pegasus" has no object. I.e. there is no (well-defined) class like R. Circle/George Homans/Quine: true circularity: For example, a final club is one into which you can only be elected if you have not been elected to other final clubs. Quine: if this is the definition of an unfamiliar expression, then especially the definition of the last occurrence of "final club". Circle/Circularity/Quine: N.B.: yet it is understandable! Impredicativeness/impredicative/Russell/Quine: the real merit was to make it clear that not every containment condition determines a class. Formal: we need a hierarchical notation. Similar to the hierarchy of truth predicates we needed in the liar paradox. XIII 95 Variables: contain indexes: x0,y0: about individuals, x1,y2 etc. about classes, but classes of this level must not be defined by variables of this level. For example, for the definition of higher-level classes x2, y2 only variables of the type x0 and x1 may be used. Type Theory/Russell/Quine/N.B.: classes of different levels can be of the same type! Classes/Sets/Existence/Quine: this fits the metaphor that classes do not exist before they are determined. I.e. they are not among the values of the variables needed to specify them. ((s) And therefore the thing is not circular). Problem/QuineVsRussell: this is all much stricter than the need to avoid paradoxes and it is so strict that it prevents other useful constructions. For example, to specify the union of several classes of the same level, e.g. level 1 Problem: if we write "Fx1" to express that x1 is one of the many classes in question, then the Containment condition: for a set in this union: something is element of it iff it is an element of a class x1, so Fx1. Problem: this uses a variable of level 1, i.e. the union of classes of a level cannot be counted on to belong to that level. Continuity hypothesis: for its proof this means difficulties. Impredicativeness/Continuum/Russell/Quine: consequently he dropped the impredicativeness in the work on the first volume of Principia Mathematica(1). But it remains interesting in the context of constructivism. It is interesting to distinguish what we can and cannot achieve with this limitation. XIII 96 Predicative set theory/QuineVsRussell/Quine: is not only free of paradoxes, but also of unspecifiable classes and higher indeterminacy, which is the blessing and curse of impredicative theory. (See "infinite numbers", "classes versus sets"). Predicative set theory/Quine: is constructive set theory today. Predicative Set Theory/Quine: is strictly speaking exactly as described above, but today it does not matter which conditions of containment one chooses to specify a class. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Impulse Response Functions | Ostry | Ostry I 4 Impulse Response Function/Furceri/Hannan/Ostry/Rose: We rely on Jorda’s (2005)(1) celebrated local projection method to estimate impulse response functions, allowing us as to account flexibly for non-linearities without imposing potentially inappropriate dynamic restrictions.(2) >Tariffs, >Method/Ostry. Ostry I 9 (…) we use the well-known local projection method - “LPM” henceforth (Jordà, 2005)(1) - to estimate impulse-response functions. Ostry I 10 This approach has been advocated by Stock and Watson (2007)(3) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013)(4), among others, as a flexible choice that does not impose the dynamic restrictions embedded In models like vector autoregressions or autoregressive-distributed lag specifications; it is particularly suited to estimating nonlinearities in the dynamic responses. The baseline regression is specified as follows: yi,t+k - yi,t-1 = αi + γt + βΔTi,t + νXi,t + εi,t where: • yi,t+k is the outcome variable of interest (log of output, productivity, unemployment rate, Gini coefficient, log real exchange rate, or trade balance/GDP) for country i at time t+k, • {αi} are country fixed effects to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, • {γt} are time fixed effects to control for global shocks, • ∆Ti,k is the change in the tariff rate, • ν is a vector of nuisance coefficients • Xi,t is a vector of control variables, including two lags of each of: a) changes in the dependent variable, b) the tariff, c) log output, d) the log of real exchange rates and d) the trade balance in percent of GDP, and • ε is an unexplained (hopefully well-behaved) residual. Ostry I 11 The coefficients of greatest interest to us are {β}, the impulse responses of our variables of interest to changes in the tariff rate.(5) >Tariffs/Ostry, >Method/Ostry, >Tariff impacts, >Tariff responsivity. 1. Jordà, Oscar, 2005, “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections,” American Economic Review, vol. 95(1), pp. 161-182. 2. We also try to account for potential endogeneity via an instrumental variable strategy, using changes in tariffs in major large trading partners to create instruments. 3. Stock, James, and Mark Watson, “Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast?” Journal of Money, Banking and Credit, vol. 39(1), pp. 3-33. 4. Auerbach, Alan J., and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2013, “Output Spillovers from Fiscal Policy,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, vol. 103(3), pp. 141-146. 5. Since the set of control variables includes lags of output growth as well as the real exchange rate and trade balance, this approach is equivalent to a VAR approach in which tariff shocks do not respond to shocks in other variables within a year. We relax this assumption later as a robustness check. |
Ostry I Jonathan D. Ostry Davide Furceri Andrew K. Rose, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9.International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2019 |
| Index Words | Burge | Frank I 684 Index Words/Indexical Specification/Mental States/Twin Earth/Burge/Bruns: a) the mental states are identified with indexical expressions: e.g. "this is water". (Individuation). b) non-indexically identified: e.g. "water is a liquid". Conclusion: if non-indexical, then they cannot be used to explain behavior, because they do not individuate their content. BurgeVsPutnam: although he does not deal with any beliefs, his argument only works, because he analyzes terms expressing natural kinds like indexical terms. >Indexicality. Frank I, 685 Burge thesis: even in the individuation of non-indexical mental states reference must be made to external objects. "Anti-individualism" (= externalism). Narrow content is not sufficient for individuation, they must rather be defined by "wide content". >Narrow/wide content. Content/Twin Earth/Burge/Bruns: if there is no aluminum on the twin earth, Hermann's conviction that aluminum is a metal has a different content. (DavidsonVs: you can also understand "moon" without ever having seen it). >Content. Neither he nor his doppelganger know the atomic structure of aluminum or twin-earth aluminum. Burge's argument now depends entirely on whether we are ready to attribute convictions about the corresponding light metals to the two. Frank I 707 "Here"/Twin Earth/Burge: I know I am here (differently: on the earth!). My knowledge involves more than the mere knowledge that I know that I am where I am. I have the normal ability to think about my environment. And I have this knowledge, because I perceive my own - and not other imaginable environments. >Twin earth. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Individuals | Mayr | I 205 Formation of Individuals/Biology/Mayr: Def Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate. I 206 Sexuality: increases diversity and thus defense against diseases. I 207 Pangenesis theory: (old) theory, according to which each body cell contributes hereditary material. From Aristotle to the 19th century. PreformationVsEpigenesis (already in Aristotle, then to the nineteenth century). I 208 VsAristotle: Aristotle believed falsely, only female organisms could possess eggs. >Aristotle. I 209 Egg: the actual mammal was discovered only by Karl Ernst von Baer in 1828(1). It was recognized that the ovary is the counterpart to the testis. DNA: discovered by Johann Friedrich Miescher (19th century). I 211 Definition Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. Logical consequence: in this organism all future offspring must again be contained in a miniature edition (nesting). Numerous contemporary pictures did show such small miniature humans (homunculi) in the spermatozoon. I 212 Epigenesis: thought that the development came from an entirely unformed mass. "Vis essentialis." Each species has its own peculiar "essential force". This was completely opposed to the uniform forces described by the physicists, e.g. gravitation. Definition Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny. Nevertheless, the epigenesis prevails in the controversy. Solution only in the 20th century: difference between Definition genotype (genetic constitution of the individual) and Definition phenotype (totality of perceptible characteristics). Cell: how does it come that the nerve cell develops so completely differently as a cell of the digestive tract? I 214 Cell division: Wilhelm Roux (1883)(2) concludes the complex internal differentiation of the cell: Solution: particles must be placed on a thread, and this is divided! Confirmed later. Cell: passes through a differentiation process, only a small part of the genes in the nucleus is active. Cell development: in taxa with regulatory development (e.g. vertebrate animals) there are no fixed early cell lines, but extensive cell migration. Induction (influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues) largely determines the specification of the cells. Cell migration: pigment and nerve cells make extensive migrations through the organism. Often they follow clear chemical stimuli. 1. E. v. Baer (1828). Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere: Beobachtung und Reflexion. Königsberg: Bornträger. 2. W. Roux (1883). Über die Bedeutung der Kerntheilungsfiguren. Leipzig: Engelmann. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Individuation | Evans | I 314 Individuation/Evans: Mind state: a specification always needs a general term when it is directed to an object. Nevertheless, reference to certain objects seems possible more directly than to others. - Otherwise no reference would be identifiable in a cyclic universe. >Identification, >Generality condition. ((s) If there were only general terms, there would be no chance to find out whether we were in an "eternal recurrence".) I 333f Individuation/Information/Evans: Information is individuated by its origin. >Information. Therefore: Identity statements are necessary: if A is the source of information, it could not have been anything else! Demonstratives/Evans: are explained inter alia as follows: no one else can be source of information than this mountaineer, if it is said, "this mountaineer comes to the city today." This is precisely why we can also have false ideas about him. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Inflationism | Inflationism, philosophy: Inflationism, (usually not so-called), requires, in addition to determining whether a statement is true, the specification of conditions under which it is true. From this a truth-definition is to be obtained. The opposite term is the deflationism, that assumes that the truth schema S <> [p] with the example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white sufficient for a truth definition for formal languages. This latter view is also called disquotationalism, because the quotation is deprived of its quotes to the left of the equivalence. |
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| Information | De Geest | Parisi I 445 Information/incentives/carrots/sticks/Dari-Mattiacci/De Geest: (…) that carrots are only superior when the majority of the agents will violate the rule in equilibrium. This raises the question why this would ever be the case in a rational choice framework. If an agent rationally violates a rule, this means that the carrot or stick is not high enough. But in that case, why does the principal not simply increase the carrot or stick until all agents comply? The reason is that the principal my not have enough information on the individual effort costs of all agents to determine which of them should follow the rule. But in the real world, individual effort costs may be difficult to verify. >Marginal costs, >Transcaction costs. This suggests that carrots may be desirable when the principal has specification problems, that is, when the principal does not know what can be reasonably expected from the agent. This may help to explain why in an increasingly complex society, carrots are increasingly used (De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 2013)(1). Volunteer’s dilemma: An extreme case of enforcement with information problems is the volunteer’s dilemma: it is optimal for society that only one of the bystanders (ideally the one with the lowest effort costs) jumps in the water to save a drowning person. In this case, Leshem and Tabbach (2016)(2) show that carrots are superior to sticks in that they minimize the transfers to be made. >Volunteer’s dilemma. 1. De Geest, Gerrit and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (2013). “The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks.” University of Chicago Law Review 80: 341–392. 2. Leshem, Shmuel and Avraham Tabbach (2016). “Solving the Volunteer’s Dilemma: The Superiority of Rewards over Punishments.” American Law and Economics Review 18: 1–32. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit de Geest. “Carrots vs. Sticks”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Input–Output Analysis | Leontief | Kurz I 11 Def Input–output analysis/Leontief/Kurz: Input–output analysis is a practical extension of the classical theory of general interdependence which views the whole economy of a region, a country and even of the entire world as a single system and sets out to describe and to interpret its operation in terms of directly observable basic structural relationships.(1) Objectivism/Leontief/Kurz/Salvadori: According to this statement, input–output analysis is based exclusively on magnitudes that are directly observable and that can be measured, using the ordinary instruments for measurement in economics. This objectivist concern is already present in Leontief’s Berlin PhD thesis, his 1928 paper ‘Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf’ (Leontief, 1928, an abridged English translation of which was published as ‘The economy as a circular flow’, Leontief, 1991)(2) and permeates his entire work. In the 1928 essay, the objectivist approach to economic phenomena is counterposed with the then dominant Marshallian analysis and its stress on subjective factors. Subjectivism: Marshall, it should be recalled, had tried to patch over what was a major breach with the objectivist tradition of the English classical economists, especially David Ricardo and Robert Torrens. >Subjectivism/Alfred Marshall, >D. Ricardo. Kurz I 12 In his 1936 paper(3), Leontief follows Quesnay closely in that he also takes distribution and prices to be given and reflected in the available national accounting system. He is actually forced to do so, because there is no statistical description of the production process of the economy during a year in purely material terms. Kurz I 13 Clearly, the analytical potentialities and practical usefulness of an approach that starts from a description of the production process of the economy as a whole in material terms - a ‘circular flow’ - go beyond conventional input-output analysis. To see this we may start from Paul Samuelson’s (1991)(4) commentary on the abridged English version of Leontief’s 1928 paper, because in it Samuelson places Leontief’s contribution in a wider theoretical context. >Input-Output Analysis/Samuelson. Kurz I 17 In his essay ‘Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf’(2) Leontief put forward a two-sectoral input-output system. Throughout his investigation he assumed single production and constant returns to scale; scarce natural resources are mentioned only in passing. In much of the analysis it is also assumed that the system of production (and consumption) is indecomposable. Much of his analysis focuses on the case of a stationary system characterized by constant technical coefficients. LeontiefVsMarginalism: Leontief premised his analysis on the conviction that economics should start from ‘the ground of what is objectively given’ (Leontief, 1928, p. 583)(2); economic concepts are said to be meaningless and potentially misleading unless they refer to magnitudes that can be observed and measured. He adopted explicitly a ‘naturalistic’ or ‘material’ perspective ([p. 211] p. 622). The starting point of the marginalist approach, homo oeconomicus, he considered inappropriate because it is said to give too much room to imagination and too little to facts (pp. 619–620). Economic analysis should rather focus on the concept of circular flow (…). Kurz I 19 Input-Output/prices/Leontief: „One may vary at will the exchange proportions and consequently the distribution relationships of the goods without affecting the circular flow of the economy in any way“ ([p. 194] pp. 598–599)(2). In other words, the same physical input–output schema can accommodate different price systems reflecting different distributions of income. He related this finding to the classical economists who are explicitly said to have advocated a ‘surplus theory’ of value and distribution ([p. 209] p. 619(2). Hence the exchange ratios of goods reflect not only ‘natural’, that is, essentially technological, factors, but also ‘social causes’. For example, assuming free competition, as the classical economists did in much of their analysis, the surplus is distributed in terms of a uniform rate of return on capital across all industries of the economy. With this specification, the general rate of profit together with relative prices can be determined in terms of the system of production in use and given real wages. ‘But this is the “law of value” of the so-called objective value theory’ ([p. 196] p. 601)(2), Leontief insisted. 1. Leontief, W. (1987) Input–Output analysis, in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (Eds) The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2, pp. 860–864 (London: Macmillan). 2. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 3. Leontief, W. (1936) Quantitative input and output relations in the economic systems of the United States, Review of Economics and Statistics, 18, pp. 105–125. 4. Samuelson, P.A. (1991) Leontief’s ‘the economy as a circular flow’: an introduction, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2, pp. 177–179. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Institutions | Habermas | IV 90 Institutions/development/HabermasVsDurkheim: in order to explain the emergence of institutions from religious rites, as Durkheim wants, we must accept linguistically shaped worldviews as an intermediary between the non-linguistic rites and the communicative action of institutions. We must take into account that everyday profane practice runs through linguistically differentiated processes of communication and requires the specification of validity claims for actions appropriate to the situation in the normative context of roles and institutions.(1) >Validity claims, >Situations, >Appropriateness, >Acceptability, >Context. 1.Talcott ParsonsVsDurkheim setzt an dieser Stelle ein; T. Parsons, (1967b). |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Intensionality | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 39 Intensional statement connections/Hoyningen-Huene: linking two partial statements to form an overall statement in such a way that the truth value of the overall statement is not clearly determined by the truth values of the partial statements alone. >Truth value, >Intension, >Extension. Intension: sense of sentence. Extension: independent of the sense of sentence. Intension requires additional knowledge. II 68 Intensional Interpretation/Hoyningen-Huene: Assignment of statements to sentence letters, the same sentence letters must be assigned to the same statements. Extensional Interpretation: Assignment of truth values instead of statements. Read III 254 Infinite sets can only be treated intensionally: as examples of a general concept. III 255 Def Comprehension Principle/Read: each well-defined term defines a set. The antinomies of Burali-Forti and Russell showed that some restriction had to be imposed on it. Nevertheless, when sets are reconstructed from below, the Axioms of Infinity claim the existence of the extension of the terms "natural number" and "real number" as a definite totality. IntuitionismVsComprehension principle: the intuitionist denies this. These terms correspond to operations, i.e. intensional terms. No extensions. Salmon I 252 Intensional definition: linguistic definition. IV 253 Def Explicit definition: Specification of a word or a combination of words with the same meaning. For example "mendacious" = "dishonest", "bachelor" = "unmarried man". |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| International Trade | Krishna | Krugman III 14 International trade/Kala Krishna/Kathleen Hogan/Phillip Swagel: We extend Dixit (1988)(1) by allowing for product differentiation among home and foreign firms, as opposed to Dixit’s assumption that all firms in a country produce the same good. >Calibration/Kala Krishna, >Dixit/Kala Krishna, >Trade policies/Economic theories. This is important, since Dixit’s results, which suggest that behavior lies between Cournot and Bertrand*, could be a result of this assumption. With homogeneous goods and many firms, any markup over cost implies behavior more collusive than that of Bertrand oligopolists. The richer specification allows changes in the parametrization to affect not only the magnitude of the optimal tariff, but also the sign. In contrast, Dixit’s parametrization restricts tariffs and subsidies to be positive.** >Elasticity/Kala Krishna, >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Krugman III 28 Optimal trade policy/labour rents: compare the jointly optimal subsidy when there are no labor rents to the case with labor rents. The optimal policy with rents involves a higher subsidy on production than without. This is to be expected, as the presence of rents makes domestic production more desirable. Also notice that the optimal tariff changes only very slightly. This suggests a targeting interpretation. The presence of labor rents distorts production, as firms produce too little, both because they have monopoly power and because they do not take labor rents into account in their production decisions. Hence the optimal policy to correct this distortion is a domestic production subsidy, which targets the domestic distortion directly, rather than a trade policy, which targets the distortion only indirectly. Optimal tariff: When the production subsidy is unavailable, the optimal tariff in the presence of labor rents is positive for all years, as opposed to the import subsidy typically optimal in the absence of labor rents. Again this is expected, as the tariff must partly do the job of the unavailable production subsidy, and the higher tariff encourages domestic production. The presence of labor rents thus dramatically changes the nature of the optimal policies. >Optimal tariffs. * ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the Cournot and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) ** In Dixit’s model, welfare increases with a subsidy or a tariff from an initial position of zero tariffs and subsidies. With a well-behaved welfare function this implies that the optimal tariff and subsidy is positive. Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel. „The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The U.S. Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
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| Interpretation | Evans | II 210 Interpretative semantics/interpretational semantics/Evans: these kinds of semantics would have to assume an entity for each type of semantic expression. They would have to provide a set, a truth value, a function of sets on truth values, etc., which could be attributed to the occurrences of this kind, namely under an arbitrary kind of interpretation. Then we could conceive the specification of the nature of the attribution as a specification of the fundamental being that one word has in common with others. II 213 Instead of a single unsorted area, it will be appropriate to divide the area into fundamental types of objects: places, times, material objects, living objects, events ... then we can understand e.g. "a set of pairs of living objects and times" as a verb. >Verbs, >Semantic categories, >Semantic value. --- Frank I 553 Evans: we must not let ourselves be dragged to a purely linguistic or communication-related interpretation level. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Justice | Morris | Gaus I 203 Justice/legitimacy/state/Morris: It may (...) be thought that there is too much disagreement about justice to make justice the basis of legitimacy. >State/Morris, >Legitimacy/Morris. Some have thought that one of the main reasons for states is the absence of agreement about justice or right. And positions like this are popular today both in North America and in Europe. Sovereign states, on this view, may be needed for social order in large part because people have incompatible views about justice. The thought is that where there is little agreement about justice and other moral values, these standards cannot be the basis for legitimation. 'Realist' accounts of legitimacy may be understood thus (see, for instance, Morgenthau, 1978(1)). This sort of position may be most plausible if it is seen as derived from some kind of scepticism about morality or 'right reason'. Hobbes can be read as one of the originators of this idea. >State/Hobbes, >Sovereignty/Morris. If moral disagreement renders justice an inappropriate standard for legitimacy, then the question is what alternative to use. Elsewhere I have considered what I called 'rational justification' (Morris, 1998(2): 114—15, 122—7, 134—6, 160—1). >Justifiation/Morris. Jutice/society/Morris: There certainly is considerable disagreement about justice,(...). But surely to say that there is no agreement about justice is hyperbolic. Often disagreement about justice concerns the specification of widely accepted principles. For instance, all parties to the contemporary controversies about abortion, assisted suicide, and the death penalty presuppose that killing generally is wrong. There is considerable disagreement at the margins, but a significant core agreement seems to exist. Even if many norms require determination or specification - for instance, norms prohibiting theft or trespass will always require application to new and puzzling cases - there are some norms of justice which seem to be widely acceptable and applicable prior to the establishment of familiar legislative and judicial institutions. It seems that we might very well be able to evaluate our states by many of the norms of justice. >State/Morris. 1. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978) Politics among Nations, 5th edn rev. New York: Knopf. 2. Morris, Christopher W. (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Language | Chalmers | I 22 Language/Qualia/Phenomenology/Psychology/Chalmers: we have no special language for phenomenal qualities. We must always describe them in terms of external properties, e.g. Colorful experiences. >Experience, >Qualia, >Everyday Language, >Consciousness/Chalmers. Feeling language/Ryle: he was right: we have no "neat" words for feeling. >G. Ryle, >Sensations. I 23 Sensation/Criterion/Wittgenstein: an inner process needs external criteria. >Sensations/Wittgenstein, >L. Wittgenstein. Chalmers: nevertheless, why should one not assume that ultimately only one property (be it phenomenal or psychological) is involved? ChalmersVs: if a phenomenal property is specified by a psychological concept, it is not a psychological property - it is only a "property specified by a psychological concept". >Psychology/Chalmers. Definition/specification/Chalmers: we must not say, the concept "conscious experience" was defined by the psychological property! The usually common occurrence of circumstances cannot be used for definition. >Correlation, >Definition, >Definability. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Language of Thought | Boer | I 16 Thought language/Mentalese/Boer: if it exist, the singular terms would take over the presentation and the formulas of expressing. We summarize this in (D5): (D5) R is a concept-dependent relation = for each object x and y that x has the relation R to y, entails for a representation z and one I 17 Behavior-determining relation Q: A) a has Q to z and B) either (i) z forms y on x (that is, z is or contains something that represents y for x) or (ii) z expresses y (that is, z is a representation with a fulfillment condition which it has from y) and C) for any representation r which maps y or expresses it whether x has q to r depends on whether r has one or more intrinsic properties of a certain domain (i.e. there is a set F of intrinsic features of x' representations such that, for each representation r which maps y for x, x has Q to r iff r exemplifies a feature from F). E.g. wanting to marry someone. Requires, among other things, certain visual impressions, a behavioral-determining relation, but not certain other visual or auditory impressions. Then we say that the relation exists under a certain specification. This is in perfect agreement with (T2). Problem: from (P2) seems to follow that e.g. Oedipus: (14) The mother of Oedipus exemplifies the property of being a thing that Oedipus wants to marry. I 18 From (P3) we conclude (15) (15) Oedipus wants to marry the mother of Oedipus. Solution: Differentiation of A) Strong/notional reading: reports how Oedipus understands the desired condition B) Weaker/relational reading: shows only which objects are involved, without taking into account what Oedipus thinks of them. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Lists | Lists, theory of science: this is, among other things, about the problem of completeness and how completeness is expressed without proof. The question is whether lists are useful in the treatment of regularities and whether the specification of principles is possible instead. |
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| Logical Proper Names | Tugendhat | I 381 "This"/logical proper names/TugendhatVsRussell: "this" (which of all) will not help us in the specification of objects. It serves no function and could therefore stay away. Specification/Tugendhat: no relation! - It takes place against the background of all objects. - This works with singular terms, but not with logical proper names. >Individuation, >Identification, >Individuals, >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality, cf. >Acquaintance. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mentalese | Boer | I 16 Thought language/Mentalese/Boer: if it exist, the singular terms would take over the presentation and the formulas of expressing. We summarize this in (D5): (D5) R is a concept-dependent relation = for each object x and y that x has the relation R to y, entails for a representation z and one --- I 17 Behavior-determining relation Q: A) a has Q to z and B) either (i) z forms y on x (that is, z is or contains something that represents y for x) or (ii) z expresses y (that is, z is a representation with a fulfillment condition which it has from y) and C) for any representation r which maps y or expresses it whether x has q to r depends on whether r has one or more intrinsic properties of a certain domain (i.e. there is a set F of intrinsic features of x' representations such that, for each representation r which maps y for x, x has Q to r iff r exemplifies a feature from F). E.g. wanting to marry someone. Requires, among other things, certain visual impressions, a behavioral-determining relation, but not certain other visual or auditory impressions. Then we say that the relation exists under a certain specification. This is in perfect agreement with (T2). Problem: from (P2) seems to follow that e.g. Oedipus: (14) The mother of Oedipus exemplifies the property of being a thing that Oedipus wants to marry. --- I 18 From (P3) we conclude (15) (15) Oedipus wants to marry the mother of Oedipus. Solution: Differentiation of A) Strong/notional reading: reports how Oedipus understands the desired condition B) Weaker/relational reading: shows only which objects are involved, without taking into account what Oedipus thinks of them. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Models | Smith | Krugman III 80 Models/Alasdair Smith: When numerically calibrated models are used to analyze economic policy, data are used only to calibrate and not to test the model. Thus much depends on the prior specification of the model, and it is not clear how much confidence one should have in the detailed results. Sensitivity analysis: (…) how firms’ model numbers change in response to policy changes turns out to be very sensitive to the “cost per model” parameter in firms’ cost functions. Thus both the location and the very existence of the “strategic trade policy” effects in this model* depend sensitively on a modeling choice that has to be made with a degree of arbitrariness at the calibration stage. >Sensitivity analysis. * The model ist displayed in A. Smith 1994(1). 1. Alasdair Smith. „Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Alasdair Smith. „Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Motivation | Bostrom | I 162 Motivation/superintelligence/Bostrom: Suppose that an AI were designed to have as its final goal that a particular red button inside a command bunker never be pressed. What is essential is that the AI believes that the button will more likely remain unpressed if the AI continuously acts in the principal’s interest than if it rebels. Rewarding: Instead of trying to endow an AI with a final goal that refers to a physical button, one could build an AI that places final value on receiving a stream of “cryptographic reward tokens.” These would be sequences of numbers serving as keys to ciphers that would have been generated before the AI was created and that would have been built into its motivation system. I 354 Creating a cipher certain to withstand a superintelligent code-breaker is a nontrivial challenge. For example, traces of random numbers might be left in some observer’s brain or in the microstructure of the random generator, from whence the superintelligence can retrieve them; or, if pseudorandom numbers are used, the superintelligence might guess or discover the seed from which they were generated. Further, the superintelligence could build large quantum computers, or even discover unknown physical phenomena that could be used to construct new kinds of computers. Problem: The AI could wire itself to believe that it had received a reward tokens, but this should not make it wirehead if it is designed to want the reward tokens (as opposed to wanting to be in a state in which it has certain beliefs about the reward tokens). [Problem: The AI has to develop an idea of a world it is living in: >Environment/AI Research.] I 176 Motivation selection: -Direct specification: The system is endowed with some directly specified motivation system, which might be consequentialist or involve following a set of rules. -Domesticity: A motivation system is designed to severely limit the scope of the agent’s ambitions and activities. -Indirect normativity: could involve rule-based or consequentialist principles, but is distinguished by its reliance on an indirect approach to specifying the rules that are to be followed or the values that are to be pursued. >Values/superintelligence/Bostrom. -Augmentation: One starts with a system that already has substantially human or benevolent motivations, and enhances its cognitive capacities to make it superintelligent. >AI takeover/Yudkowski, >Control/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Goals/superintelligence/Omohundro. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Necessity | Wiggins | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine. II 292 Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention. Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). >Operators, >Rigidity. II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Nonfactualism | Field | II 183 Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or net weight in the Special Relativity Theory: - no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed. - The laws are, however, in some cases easier to formulate, depending on the choice. >Facts, >Relativity theory. II 224 Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, to which "bare" precisely refers. 2. assessment questions/morality/ethics. 3. sentences with indicators/index words. 4. Subjunctive conditional/counterfactual conditional >Counterfactual conditionals, >Index words, >Indexicality. >Vagueness, >Sorites. II 241 Nonfactualism/Factualism/Reference Framework/Relativity/Field: Nonfactualist: has a relativized T-predicate - but for him there is no "real" time order. Deflationism: distinguishes nonfactualism/factualism on the basis of accepted sentences. >Deflationism. Problem: also the factualist could have a relativized concept by introducing it as a basic concept. - E.g. "cosmically privileged framework". - Then one can no longer distinguish factualism and nonfactualism. Solution: to ask the factualist why his framework is privileged a) if he speaks of scientific exceptions, it is distinguishable from nonfactualism b) if unscientific, then indistinguishable. II 242 Nonfactualism/ethics: does not have to say that the sentences have no truth values. - It can say that the truth value ascriptions do not have the factual status, as the assertions themselves. >Truth values, >Ethics. Problem: if you only have the disquotation scheme, how should you state what is not entirely supported by facts? Solution: everyday language: also contains an (implicit) fact operator. >Everyday language. FieldVs: the rules for this are unclear. II 243 Nonfactualism/Ethics/non-deflationism/Gibbard/Field: (Gibbard 1990)(1): admits that evaluations have a factual component - factual and nonfactual must be connected in one and the same analysis. Sets of ordered pairs of possible worlds and standard systems, so that an utterance is true in this world according to this norm. Possible world: is here a complete specification of factual information. >Norms, >Possible worlds. II 244 But it does not contain any "normative facts". Complete norm: associates with each evaluative predicate a non-evaluative equivalent - E.g. "maximizes utility". >Utilitarianism. Nonfactualism: Thesis: the real world contains no "normative facts". N.B.: this non-existence is not a normative fact on its part. Otherwise, error theory: Thesis: "It is a fact that there are no facts". - Then: E.g.: "We should do this and that, according to norm N": is itself not norm-dependent but factual. II 254 Factualism/Field: Factualism does not postulate here a realm of facts, which the nonfactualist denies. Everything that the factualist asserts can be expressed by the nonfactualist by "~ A v B" (negation and disjunction). ((s) Then there is no antecedent that is made false by the absence of facts and thus creates a trivially true consequence.) 1. Gibbard, Alan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Objectivity | Brandom | I 136f Objectivity/Brandom: naive: from the success of representations - Objectivity is a characteristic of assessment practices regarding the correctness of representation - representation in response to what is representation, not as what the represented is conceived to be - so the status goes beyond the attitude - therefore representation is not a basic semantic concept. >Representation. I 692 Objective: socially instituted, but not intersubjectively. Objectivity: depends on what is true from what assertions and concept applications actually represent or what they are about, and not about what somebody or everybody deems to be true. >Intersubjectivity. I 736 Objectivity consist of the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. I 822 ff What is objectively right and true is determined by the objects being talked about, not by what is said about them; not even by the attitudes of any or all members of the community. >Truthmakers. I 314 Objectivity/Brandom: an objective or naturalistic theory of cognitive authorization cannot be derived only from reliability considerations; not even a naturalistic theory of the proper use of the concept. >Reliability theory. I 823 Objectivity/Standards/Community/Language/Brandom: Vs I-We conception of social practices: Incorrect comparison of the views of the individual with those of the community (inter-subjectivity) - BrandomVsIntersubjectivity as a model for objectivity - Problem: the community as a whole loses the ability to distinguish - that is what the community assimilates to its individuals. I 824 Objectivity/Reality/World/Brandom: that our concepts are about an objective world is partly due to the fact that there is an objective sense of accuracy to which their application is subjected. >Reality, >World. I 825 A propositional or other content may only be specified from one point of view and this is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in the very practical sense (account managing subject) - BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of the accounting practices. I 826 Objectivity consists in the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. >Attribution. I 828 Difference between objective and subjective correct content is allocated between an assigned definition and one that is approved by the speaker - within each perspective there is a difference between status and attitude - objectivity is then a structural aspect of the social-perspective form of conceptual contents. >Conceptual content. I 829 Objective representational content: de-re allocation: he thinks of quinine that... - thereby specification of objects. >Identification, >Individuation. I 831 I-You style/account management/Brandom: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community" - BrandomVsInter-subjectivity (I-We style): cannot grant the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective. Cf. >I-You-relationship/Gadamer. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Ontological Commitment | Kripke | III 379 "There is"/interpretation/ontology/"ontological commitment"/Kripke: can it even be a meaningful question whether someone who says "there are people" is "committed to a viewpoint" that such things as people exist? (KripkeVsBrandom). It is simply the case that "there are people" is true when there are people. What other question is there? (KripkeVsQuineans, epigones of Quine; Quine himself, on the other hand, is about formulations like "there are 3 meters between..."). >"There is"/existence. Kripke: one could perhaps claim that in some rare special cases "there are" is only superficially reminiscent of "there are rabbits" and then brings with it no "ontological commitment", and one could even try substitutional quantification to show this. But it would be something else to say that "there are rabbits" is not true iff there are rabbits. This is analogous to denying that "John is tall" is true, iff John is tall. "Ontological commitment"/Kripke: the ontological commitment was not developed for "there are rabbits". Now someone might think it was developed for first level referential language, and the question is whether English should be translated into such a referential language or into a substitutional one. The latter does not make any ontological specifications. >Substitutional quantification, cf. >Referential quantification. KripkeVs: the question does not make sense: we have not learned a formal language like our mother tongue. In some logic books the crazy notation "(Ex)" is explained either in such a way that one gives an example: "(Ex)Rabbit(x)" means: "there is an x that is a rabbit" or... III 380 ...by a formal definition of fulfillment (as here, see above). Def satisfaction/fulfillment/Kripke: "(Exi) Rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s' that deviates from s at the most i-th place that fulfills "Rabbit (xi)". ((s) Example "cat3 is not on the mat" differs from "cat1-5 is on the mat" in the third place.) Then the quantifiers are assumed to go over a non-empty area and the technical term "non-empty" is explained by saying that D is not empty iff there is an element of D. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Ontological Dependence | Esfeld | I 16f Holism/Esfeld: generic ontological dependence is not existence, but with respect to having some determined characteristics, a thing is ontological generical dependent on that fact that other things exists. The parts have their characteristic properties only as a whole (ontologically or metaphysically (Esfeld pro)). Generic: further specification is available: e.g. nothing has just a mass (without quantity), all physical quantities are generic. The opposite is determined. >Dependence, >Existence, >Relations. I 36 Ontological dependence is necessary instead of mere functional dependence. Isolation does not destroy holism but properties that work in isolation as well, are not holistic properties. No functional definition is sufficient. Instead: there is ontological dependence. >Ontology, >Holism, >Properties, >Isolation. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Order | Order, philosophy: order is the division of a subject area by distinctions or the highlighting of certain differences as opposed to other differences. The resulting order can be one-dimensional or multi-dimensional, i.e. linear or spatial. Examples are family trees, lexicons, lists, alphabets. It may be that only an order makes certain characteristics visible, e.g. contour lines. Ordering spaces may be more than three-dimensional, e.g. in the attribution of temperatures to color-determined objects. See also conceptual space, hierarchies, distinctness, indistinguishability, stratification, identification, individuation, specification. |
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| Particulars | Particular, individual thing, philosophy: this is about the problems associated with the introduction of linguistic expressions for objects that can be specified as individuals. See also individuation, objects, thing, identification, specification, singular terms, general term, universals. |
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| Particulars | Tugendhat | I 422 Particulars/TugendhatVsDonnellan: localizing identifications are fundamental. Cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Individuation, >Identification, >Localization. With these, there is no longer a distinction between referential and attributive use. >Attributive/referential. Attributive is also referential in a broad sense because, although it does not identify the object, it specifies it (distinguishes it against a background). >Specification. I 426 Einzelding/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice to make object and spacetime places existent. >Demonstratives, >Logical proper names. Spacetime places are the most elementary objects. >Ontology. But there must be something there - at least hypothetically, then corresponding question of verification provides for which object the singular term stands. >Singular terms, >Empty space, >Substantivalism, >Relationism. Top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions. Bottom-up: when demonstratives denote the verificational situation for the predicate to be true. >Predicates, >Satisfaction, >Situation. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Perception | Tugendhat | I 203 Perception/Tradition: Perception refers to particulars. TugendhatVs: In reality perception refers neither to singular nor to general, but it is like. The like on the side of the individual and on the side of the general. >Generality. Individuals/Tugendhat: Linguistic-analytically, the consciousness of Einzelnes is just as little sensuous as of generals. Consciousness/Tugendhat: The reference to individuals is much more problematic than the consciousness of generals, which has a sensuous preform in the consciousness of the similarity. I 204 Sameness of Perception/Tugendhat: Here we must distinguish between the introspective and the behaviorist approach. Introspection: the like sensation or conception, does not correspond to the range of use of our ordinary predicates. >Introspection. Therefore, the conceptualist felt compelled to postulate a non-sensory conception, since there is no sensory conception corresponding to all red hues. >Conceptualism. Behaviorism: that an organism perceives in the same way is established in such a way that it reacts to stimuli in the same way. Conceptions are not needed. >Behaviorism. Perception/Tugendhat: Sameness as a psychological basis for the use of a predicate can only be invoked behavioristically. >Equality. I 458 Methodology/Method/Tugendhat: We must not yet presuppose perceptual objects at all. Therefore we must ask: "How is the situation to be established in which it is to be determined whether the predicate is true?" Answer: by distinguishing one space-time location from all other space-time locations. (Specification). >Individuation, >Identification, |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Piketty Formula | Fuest | Fuest I 3 Piketty Model/Fuest/Peichl/Waldenström: The so-called r - g model of Piketty (2014)(1), which relates the difference between the rate of return on capital, r, and the rate of income growth, g, to the level of economic inequality, (…) [i]n its simplest characterisation, (…) says that when existing (‘old’) capital grows faster than new capital is created out of accumulated incomes, then already relatively rich capital owners will become even richer relative to the others not holding capital, and thus inequality will increase. VsPiketty: From a theoretical perspective it is clear r > g is neither necessary nor sufficient for inequality to increase. It is not necessary because inequality may increase due to other reasons like, for instance, inequality of labour income, which has been a key driver of the recent surge in income inequality in the United States. It is not sufficient either, because capitalists may earn much, but save little. MankivVsPiketty: As (…) emphasised by Mankiw (2015)(2), r > g may not lead to increasing inequality because capital income taxes may reduce the net return to capital below g or because capital owners consume part of their income. If capital owners have enough children, wealth concentration will fall as they leave their wealth to the next generation.1 In addition, even if capital owners save a lot, their income cannot grow indefinitely. While the interest rate may indeed be permanently higher than the growth rate of GDP, it is obvious that capital income cannot permanently grow faster than GDP. The marginal productivity will also decline as the capital intensity of production increases.* Fuest I 6 Inequality/Fuest/Peichl/Waldenström: On the whole, the results (…) offer some tentative support for the r - g model as proposed by Piketty (2014)(1) and its proposed links between the r-g differential and wealth inequality. Fuest I 7 Problem: Given the considerable problems at hand related to measurement, data availability and statistical specification, much more effort is naturally needed before we can begin to speak about any stable relationships in these outcomes. Furthermore, the relationship between top wealth shares, financial sector development and economic growth reveals nothing about the direction of causality. For instance, it is perfectly possible that rising wealth concentration causes stronger growth in the financial sector. We therefore conclude that more research is needed to settle the issues at hand, >Capital tax/Piketty. * However, evidence suggests that the number of children decreases with income (Jones and Tertilt 2006)(3). The average number of children per family is below 2 for rich households. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 2. Mankiw, Greg (2015). “Yes, r > g. So What?” In: American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105.5, pp. 43–47. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151059. 3. Jones, L.E. and M. Tertilt (2008). “An Economic History of Fertility in the United States: 1826–1960”, in: Rupert, P. (ed.), Frontiers of Family Economics, Bingley, West Yorkshire: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Clemens Fuest, Andreas Peichl and Daniel Waldenström. Piketty’s r-g Model: Wealth Inequality and Tax Policy. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/forum1-15-focus1.pdf |
Fuest I Clemens Fuest (ed.) George R. Zodrow Critical Issues in Taxation and Development (Cesifo Seminar Series) Cambridge, MA 2013 |
| Platonism | Quine | XII 44 Platonic Idea/Quine: is not the same as a mental idea. >Ideas/Quine. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: is more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about choosing a language. >Language/Quine. VII(f) 125 Conceptualism VsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries. Problem: Poincaré's impredicative definition: Def Impredicative Definition/Poincaré/Quine: the specification of a class by a realm of objects within which this class is located. >Classes/Quine. VII (f) 126 Classes/Platonism/Quine: when classes are considered pre-existing, there is no objection to picking one of them by a move that presupposes their existence. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, however, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Of course, this should not be interpreted in terms of time. VII (f) 127 Platonism/Conceptualism/Quine: both allow universals and classes as irreducible. Conceptualism: allows fewer classes. But rests on a rather metaphorical reason: "Origin". >Conceptualism/Quine. V 126 Platonism/Quine: is opened by form words, not by color words! Reason: a union of color spots has the same color, but a union of spots of a certain shape does not necessarily have the same shape. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Polysemy | Gärdenfors | I 201 Polysemy/Gärdenfors: many words seem to have a large number of different meanings that have little to do with each other. There are two ways to deal with this within the framework of a semantic theory. (Lakoff, 1987, p.420(1), Tyler & Evans, 2001, pp.727-733(2), Zlatev, 2003 (3), Van der Gucht, Klaas, & De Cuypere, 2007(4)). 1. Full specification: every single meaning is listed in the lexicon, but also the semantic relations between them can be specified. (Lakoff, 1987, pro)(1) --- I 202 2. Minimum specification: a word meaning is assumed to be central, the others are derived either by context information or by semantic transformations. Jackendoff: (1983, pp. 118-189)(5): Thesis: The mind does not form abstract concepts out of nothing. Lakoff (1987)(1) Thesis: our mind would be overburdened if it had to store all 24 meanings of "over" individually. Solution: Remembrance of prototypes plus general semantic principles for the formation of other meanings. Gärdenfors dito: I call the means for this semantic transformation. 1. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Tyler, A., & Evans, V. (2001). Reconsidering prepositional polysemy networks: The case of over. Language, 77, 724–765. 3. Zlatev, J. (2003). Polysemy or generality? Mu. In H. Cuyckens, R. Dirven, & J. R. Taylor (Eds.), Cognitive approaches to lexical semantics (pp. 447–494). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 4. Van der Gucht, F., Klaas, W., & De Cuypere, L. (2007). The iconicity of embodied meaning: Polysemy of spatial prepositions in the cognitive framework. Language Sciences, 29, 733–754. 5. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Price | Leontief | Kurz I 18 Price/relative prices/Leontief/Kurz: „In the general circular flow scheme, income from ownership is of course considered alongside other cost items without the slightest direct reference to how it originates (the phenomenon of ownership). It is the task of the theory of interest to investigate these fundamental relationships.“ (Leontief 1928 [p. 196] p. 600)(1). Leontief’s argument resulted in setting up price equations that reflect not only the socio-technical conditions of production, but also the rule that fixes the distribution of the surplus product. This rule is the second key to a determination of relative prices. Only if both the system of production and the sharing out of the surplus between different claimants in terms of wages, profits Kurz I 19 (or interest) and rents is known, can relative prices be determined. Two ‘keys’ are required in order to solve the problem of value and distribution. >Value, >Distribution. „One may vary at will the exchange proportions and consequently the distribution relationships of the goods without affecting the circular flow of the economy in any way“ ([p. 194] pp. 598–599). In other words, the same physical input–output schema can accommodate different price systems reflecting different distributions of income. He related this finding to the classical economists who are explicitly said to have advocated a ‘surplus theory’ of value and distribution ([p. 209] p. 619). Hence the exchange ratios of goods reflect not only ‘natural’, that is, essentially technological, factors, but also ‘social causes’. For example, assuming free competition, as the classical economists did in much of their analysis, the surplus is distributed in terms of a uniform rate of return on capital across all industries of the economy. With this specification, the general rate of profit together with relative prices can be determined in terms of the system of production in use and given real wages. ‘But this is the “law of value” of the so-called objective value theory’ ([p. 196] p. 601), Leontief insisted. 1. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Properties | Carnap | II 200 Features/properties/Carnap: all scientific knowledge can alone affect structures, but not quality. >Structures, >Features, >Qualities. VI 11 Science/Carnap: Aim: science should become a pure description of relationships. (Without specification of characteristics/qualities). >Relations, >Science. VI 35/36 Def Property/Carnap: propositional function with only one argument position. Example "x is a human being". Unsaturated) Def Relation/Carnap: propositional function with several argument positions. Example "x is greater than y". (Unsaturated). >Propositional function, >unsaturated. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Qua-Objects | Qua objects, philosophy: qua objects are objects, explicitly referred to under a particular description, to extract one of several possible functions of this object. E.g. Reagan qua President in contrast to Reagan qua actor. This reduces the amount of possible conclusions resulting from the use of names for this object. In the technical sense, the use of Qua objects prevents an object from being counted multiple times. Problems arise with regard to which "address" e.g. a quote is to be attributed to. See also partition, attribution, individuation, identification, specification. |
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| Reading Acquisition | Stanovich | Slater I 132 Reading Acquisition/Stanovich: (Stanovich 1991(1), p. 78): “The specification of the role of phonological processing in the earliest stages of reading acquisition is one of the more notable scientific success stories of the last decade.” >Reading/Acquisition/Bradley/Bryant, >Reading acquisition/Frith. Cf. Bradley and Bryant (1983)(2). 1. Stanovich, K. E. (1991). Changing models of reading and reading acquisition. In L. Rieben & C. Perfetti (Eds), Learning to read: Basic research and its implications (pp. 19–32). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 2. Bradley, L., & Bryant, P. E. (1983). Categorising sounds and learning to read: A causal connection. Nature, 310, 419–421. Usha Goswami, „Reading and Spelling.Revisiting Bradley and Bryant’s Study“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Reduction | Quine | XII 92 Definition Reduction Sentence/Carnap/Quine: weaker than definition: provides no equivalent sentences without the term in question, but only implications. XII 93 No full explanation but only partial explanation. Implication here: the reduction sentences name a few sentences that are implied by sentences with this term and imply some other sentences, that imply sentences with this term. - This does not provide a genuine reduction, but a fictional story of language acquisition. ((s) > "Rylean Ancestors"). VII (a) 19 Conceptual Scheme/Reduction/Quine: we want to see how far a physicalist scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalist one. The latter has epistemological priority. The choice between conceptual schemes is guided by purposes and interests. XI 143 Reduction/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: for ontological reduction, it is not extensional equality that is decisive, but the preservation of the relevant structure. For example Frege's, v. Neumann's and Zermelo's definitions do not produce equivalent predicates, but are nevertheless suitable for reduction, because all three represent a structure-preserving model of arithmetic. Extensional Equality(s): ensures the uniformity of the quantities considered. The reduction then takes place at the description level. It would not reduce the ontology. XI 146 Reduction/Theory/Quine/Lauener: by the condition that an n-tuple of arguments applies to a predicate exactly when the open sentence is fulfilled by the corresponding n-tuple of values, we avert an impending trivialization. We can do this by determining the proxy function. If the truth values of the closed sentences are preserved, we can actually speak of a reduction to the natural numbers. (Ways of Paradox, p. 203). XI 145 Def Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: is a function that assigns each object of the original theory a function of the new theory. Example "The Goedel number of". This need not be expressed in one theory or another. It is sufficient if we have the necessary means of expression at the meta level. Reduction: from one theory to another: so we need a special function for this XI 146 whose arguments are from the old theory and whose values are from the new theory. Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: does not need to be unique at all. Example: Characterization of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V in such a way that both the objects of U and their proxies are contained in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be defined as background theory, within which its own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is not a reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we may presuppose this for the duration of argument U (>Ontology). Lauener: that brings us to >ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires a super-countable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. This would require a much stronger framework theory, which could no longer be discussed away absurdly as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. XII 60 Specification/Reduction/Quine: we cannot find a clear difference between specifying one item area and reducing that area to another. We have not discovered a clear difference between the clarification of the concept of "expression" and its replacement by that of number. ((s) > Goedel Numbers). And now, if we are to say what numbers actually are, we are forced to reveal them and instead assign a new, e.g. set-theoretical model to arithmetic. XII 73 Reduction/Ontology/Quine: an ontology can always be reduced to another if we know of a reversibly unique deputy function f. Reason: for each predicate P of the old system, there is a predicate of the new system that takes over the role of P there. We interpret this new predicate in such a way that it applies exactly to the values f(x) of the old objects x to which P applied. Example: Suppose f(x): is the Goedel number of x, Old system: is a syntactical system, Predicate in the old system: "... is a section of___" an x New system: the corresponding predicate would have the same extension (coextensive) as the words "...is the Gödel number of a section whose Goedel number is___". (Not in this wording but as a purely arithmetic condition.) XII 74 Reduction/ontological relativity/Quine: it may sound contradictory that the objects discarded in the reduction must exist. Solution: this has the same form as a reduction ad absurdum: here we assume a wrong sentence to refute it. As we show here, the subject area U is excessively large. XII 75 Löwenheim/Skolem/strong form/selection axiom/ontology/reduction/onthological relativity/Quine: (early form): thesis: If a theory is true and has a supernumerable range of objects, then everything but a countable part is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of variables without any sentence becoming false. This means that all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And this in turn can be reduced to a special ontology of natural numbers. For this purpose, the enumeration, as far as it is explicitly known, is used as a proxy function. And even if the enumeration is not known, it exists. Therefore, we can regard all our items as natural numbers, even if the enumeration number ((s) of the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not define once and for all a Pythagorean general purpose ontology? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either of numbers only, or of bodies only, or of quantities only, etc. Problem: suppose, we have such an ontology and someone would offer us something that would have been presented as an ontological reduction before our decision for Pythagorean ontology, namely a procedure according to which in future theories all things of a certain type A are superfluous, but the remaining range would still be infinite. XII 76 In the new Pythagorean framework, his discovery would nevertheless still retain its essential content, although it could no longer be called a reduction, it would only be a manoeuvre in which some numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. We do not even know which numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: this shows that an all-encompassing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and opaque versions of old methods and problems. >Proxy function. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reswitching | Harcourt | Harcourt I 118 Reswitching/double-switching/reverse capital/Harcourt: (…) the results of neoclassical marginal productivity theory have played a key role in both the theory of economic growth and the econometric studies of the post-war period. >Marginal Product of Capital, >Economic growth/Solow. The easiest illustration of this proposition is the essential part which the equality of marginal products with factor rewards plays in the development of the arguments in Swan's famous model of economic growth (Swan [1956](1)), and in Solow's influential - and equally famous - article on technical progress and the aggregate production function, Solow [1957](2). Double-switching: This methodology has been continuously under attack and the latest (and sharpest) arrows in the quivers of the neo-Keynesian critics are the results of the double-switching debate. Reverse capital: Not all of these are, however, related to the phenomenon of double-switching itself; a related phenomenon, capital-reversing, also plays a key role: see, especially, Garegnani [1970a(3), 1970b(4)], Bliss [1970](5), Pasinetti [1969(6), 1970(7)]. >Neo-neoclassicals, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Production function. Harcourt I 120 If the neoclassical stories as told, for example, by Swan [1956](1) and Solow [1957(2)] did in fact hold for heterogeneous capital-goods models, this would be an enormous simplification for economic theory and econometric specification alike (see Brown [1968(8), 1969(9)]). It is to this question that the double-switching debate is especially addressed. >Economic models, >Idealization. 1. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 2. Solow, R. M. [1957] 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', Review of economics and Statistics, xxxix, pp. 312-20. 3. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 4. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 5. Bliss, C. J. Comment on Garegnani, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 37, Issue 3, July 1970, Pages 437–438, 6. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. 8. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University ofNew York at Buffalo. 9. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Roles | Wright | I 250 Def Wide cosmological role: A content plays a wide cosmological role exactly in the case in which the mention of facts, of which it is composed, may occur at least in certain types of explanation of contingencies, explanations, the ability of which is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of discourse. >Truth evaluability. ((s) Truth capacity/truth-apt/truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.) E.g. thesis: morality plays no wide cosmological role (problem for the moral realism). Cosmological role: see >Content/Wright. How can the specification of any facts contribute to explaining? I 248 Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not by our attitudes. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Sanctions Policies | Morgan | Morgan I 16 Sanctions Policies/Morgan/Syropoulos/Yotov: Political scientists have long debated on whether sanctions “work” in the sense of achieving their stated goals. Early research was largely focused on prominent cases, such as the US sanctions on Cuba or the League of Nations sanctions on Italy mentioned earlier, and generally came to the conclusion that sanctions do not bring about significant changes in target state policies (Galtung 1967(1); Hoffmann 1967(2); Doxey 1972)(3). However, it was quickly recognized that this work suffered from a severe selection bias—the reason that the cases under study were “prominent” was precisely because they failed. Early statistical analyses based on the well-known Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990)(4) dataset indicated that sanctions achieve their political objectives in about one-fourth to one-third of the cases. Much of the research into sanctions conducted by political scientists has focused on a puzzle: if sanctions seldom “work,” then why do they continue to be applied, and at an increasing rate? Several broad approaches have been taken to address this puzzle. First, some argued that although sanctions seem ineffective at achieving their stated objectives, they may be relatively effective in achieving their “true” objectives. For example, some sanctions may aim to support domestic interests (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007)(5), while others may aim to serve symbolic (Lindsay 1986) or signaling (Schwebach 2000)(6) purposes. Second, several theoretical arguments suggest that sanctions should not be expected to achieve their objectives except under very specific conditions (Morgan and Schwebach 1997)(7). For example, Wagner (1988)(8) posited that if we applied bargaining theory to the agreements that produced the economic exchanges that sanctions disrupt, we would conclude that sanctions should, in most cases, harm the sender as much as they harm the target. In other words, the leverage provided by sanctions cuts both ways. Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi (2021)(9) offer evidence suggesting that sanctions often “work” at the threat stage; consequently, successful sanctions might not actually be imposed.* Third, even in their worst light, sanctions have been shown to be effective in a modest fraction of cases. Even a 25 percent success rate for sanctions may be considerably higher than doing nothing, and the costs may be substantially lower than other alternatives, like overt military interventions. Perhaps the “sanctions glass” should be viewed as one-quarter full, not three-quarters empty. Finally, it may be possible to identify specific factors that lead to increases in the costs that sanctions impose on targets and thus to determine when sanctions have been ineffective and how to make them more likely to be effective. Morgan I 17 For example, Attia, Grauvogel, and von Soest (2020)(10) suggest that poor economic health and high political volatility in targets are important determinants of sanctions success. Others have found that the extent of the interrupted economic relationship is a significant factor in sanctions success (Bapat et al. 2013)(11). Moreover, the availability of sanctions busters, or “Black Knights,” can enable targets to avoid significant costs (Early 2011)(12). Relatedly, multilateral sanctions, especially when imposed under the auspices of an international organization, increase target costs relatively more than unilateral sanctions (Martin 1992(13); Bapat and Morgan 2009(14); Early 2021)(15). Finally, sanctions are more likely to be effective when imposed on democracies than when imposed on autocracies, because democratic governments are more susceptible to costs felt by their populaces (Allen 2008(16); Lektzian and Souva 2007)(17). However, all of the above findings appear quite sensitive to model specification (Bapat et al. 2013)(18). Indeed, given alternative models and specifications, the weight of the evidence might even turn against these findings (Demena et al. 2021)(19). Conclusion: Overall, the lessons that emerge from the analysis in this section do not seem altogether consistent. Sanctions do seem to cause significant economic damage to the targets across various dimensions. However, although it seems intuitively clear that economic damage and costs to the target states should be key factors affecting the probability for sanctions success, there is no robust evidence for a clear causal link between economic costs and the political success of sanctions. Moreover, while recent trends suggest the presence of an improvement in sanction effectiveness, overall sanctions are still not perceived as particularly successful policy tools. >Sanctions, >Sanctions consequences, >Sanctions debate, >Sanctions effectiveness, >Sanctions evasion, >Sanctions history, >Sanctions policies, >Sanctions theory, >Trade sanctions, >Financial sanctions. 1. Galtung, Johan. 1967. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia.” World Politics 19 (3): 378–416. 2. Hoffmann, Fredrik. 1967. “The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research 4 (2): 140–59. 3. Doxey, Margaret. 1972. “International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa.” International Organization 26 (3): 527–50. 4. Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute. 5. Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg. 2007. “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions.” In Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2, edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 867–911. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 6. Schwebach, Valerie L. 2000. “Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?” In Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, edited by Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury, 187–211. International Political Economy Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie L. Schwebach. 1997. “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises.” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 27–50. 8. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1988. “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence.” International Organization 42 (3): 461–83. 9. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin A. Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi. 2021. “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions Data Project: A Retrospective.” In Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 44–61. Chetenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 10. Attia, Hana, Julia Grauvogel, and Christian von Soest. 2020. “The Termination of International Sanctions: Explaining Target Compliance and Sender Capitulation.” European Economic Review 129: 103565. 11. Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39 (1): 79–98. 12. Early, Bryan R. 2011. “Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (4): 381–402. 13. Martin, Lisa L. 1992. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 14. Bapat, Navin A., and T. Clifton Morgan. 2009. “Multilateral versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A est Using New Data.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 1075–94. 15. Early, Bryan R. 2021. “Making Sanctions Work: Promoting Compliance, Punishing Violations, and Discouraging Sanctions Busting.” In Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, edited by Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, 167–86. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 16. Allen, Susan Hannah. 2008. “Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (3): 255–74. 17. Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2007. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” Journal f Conflict Resolution 51 (6): 848–71. 18. Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39 (1): 79–98. 19. Demena, Binyam A., Alemayehu S. Reta, Gabriela Benalcazar Jativa, Patrick B. Kimararungu, and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk. 2021. “Publication Bias of Economic Sanctions Research: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Trade Linkage, Duration and Prior Relations on Sanctions Success.” In Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, edited by Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, 125–50. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. |
Morgan I T. Clifton Morgan Constantinos Syropoulos Yoto V. Yotov, "Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges." Journal of Economic Perspectives 37 (1): 3–30. 2023 |
| Second Order Logic, HOL | 2nd order Logic: Predicate logic of the 2nd order goes beyond predicate logic of the 1st level allowing quantification over properties and relations, and not just objects. Thus comparisons of the powerfulness of sets become possible. Problems which are expressed in everyday terms with terms such as "greater", "between", etc., and e.g. the specification of all the properties of an object require predicate logic of the 2nd order. Since the 2nd level logic is not complete (because there are, for example, an infinite number of properties of properties), one often tries to get on with the logic of the 1st order. |
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| Self | Brandom | I 776 Definition Self/Brandom: selves are classes of the same responsibility or bundles of deontic status and attitudes. >Score keeping model. I 777 Assigning of beliefs is based on the fact that our bodies have continuous paths in space - specification and performances are divided into classes that correspond to individuals. >Individuals, >Individuation, >Person, >Attribution. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Semantics | Evans | II 210 Interpretive semantics/interpretational semantics/Evans: Interpretive semantics would have to assume an entity for any type of semantic expression. - A set, a truth value, a function of quantities on truth values, etc.- which could be attributed to the events of this kind under any interpretation. Then we could take the specification of the type of attribution as a specification of the underlying system, which has a word in common with others. II 213 Instead of a single unsorted range, it will be appropriate to divide the area into fundamental types of objects: places, times, material objects, living objects, events... Then we can understand e.g. "A set of pairs of living objects and times" as an object. >Object. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Sentences | Tugendhat | I 263ff Theory of objects/object theory: confronts the sentence with a situation - TugendhatVs. >Terminology/Tugendhat. II 86 Sentence/generality/Tugendhat: e.g. "here is an F" should not be understood as "of all things here is an F". >Demonstratives/Tugendhat, >Specification, >Predication, >Individuation, >Identification. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Situation Semantics | Barwise | Cresswell II 169 Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Equivalence, >Double negation. Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ..."). >Situations. Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations. Cresswell I 63 Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations. >Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics. Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete). CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7) Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds. Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations. Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation. >Possible World Semantics. What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds. I 64 Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress. I 65 CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification. >Context. False sentences: describe non-actual situations. I 66 Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. >Interpretation, >Sentence meaning. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true. Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time. I 67 On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks e*: = in I, Mollie, yes. That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?). Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that u[[φ]] e iff e* < e. ((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.) The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context. Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property. >Atomic sentences. Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u. In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely. 1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry 2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293 3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press 4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Skilled Labour | Feenstra | Feenstra I 4-27 Skilled Labour/Feenstra: (…) the decision of companies to purchase intermediate inputs from overseas will most certainly affect their employment at home, and can be expected to differentially affect skilled versus unskilled workers. >Wage gap, >Relative wage. With firms in industrial countries facing a higher relative wage for unskilled labor than that found abroad, the activities that are outsourced would be those that use a large amount of unskilled labor, such as assembly of components and other repetitive tasks. >Outsourcing. Moving these activities overseas will reduce the relative demand for unskilled labor in the industrial country, in much the same way as replacing these workers with automated production. This means that outsourcing has a qualitatively similar effect on reducing the relative demand for unskilled labor within an industry as does skilled-biased technological change, such as the increased use of computers. Thus, determining which of these is most important is an empirical question. Feenstra I 4-33 Automation/computers: Measuring computer services and other high-tech capital as a share of the capital stock using ex post rental prices, we see they account for 13% of the shift towards nonproduction labor. Measuring these shares using ex ante rental prices, we see that that computers and other high-tech capital explain only 8% of this shift. Feenstra I 4-34 In both cases, the contribution of computers and other high-tech capital is less than the contribution of outsourcing. In contrast, when computers are measured by their share of investment (and the high-technology capital share is also included), we see that these variables account for 31% of the shift toward nonproduction labor, which exceeds the contribution of outsourcing. Thus, whether outsourcing is more or less important than computers depends on whether the latter are measured as a share of the capital stock, or as a share of investment. >Capital, >Capital stock, >Capital structure. Regardless of the specification, however, it is fair to conclude that both outsourcing and expenditure on computers and other high technology capital are important explanations of the shift towards nonproduction labor in the U.S., with their exact magnitudes depending on how they are measured. Feenstra I 4-48 Models: The model of intermediates inputs we have investigated has some similarities to the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, but rather than focusing on industries of various skillintensities, we instead suppose that there are activities within each industry that vary in their factor intensities. These activities are modeled as intermediate inputs that are traded between countries and combined into some final product. With this modification from the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, we have found that we can easily generate shifts in relative demand for skilled labor within an industry. >Heckscher-Ohlin. Prices: We have further argued that drop in the price of imported intermediates has effects that are observationally equivalent to the effect of skilled-biased technological change. The relative importance of trade versus technological change must be assessed on empirical grounds. While models of production sharing are starting to take hold within international trade, this concept is already used in economic sociology (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994(1); Kenney and Florida, 1994(2)), geography (Dicken et al, 2001(3); Yeung, 2001(4)) and other social sciences, where production sharing is referred to by the more general name “commodity chains.” Commodity chains: A commodity chain consists of the sequence of activities involved in the manufacture of a product, from initial development through to production, marketing and sales, especially as these activities cross international boundaries. In these disciplines, commodity chains are seen as an integral part of the development process for countries that are still industrializing. Feenstra I 4-49 Using these theoretical insights, we described the labor demand regression arising from a model where capital is fixed in the short run, while skilled and unskilled labor are chosen optimally. Additional terms are included in the demand regressions reflecting trade in intermediate inputs (outsourcing) as well as computer use. We find that both of these explanations can explain a portion of the shift towards skilled labor in the U.S. during the 1980s, with the exact Contribution of each being sensitive to how computer use is measured (i.e. as a share of the capital stock, or as a share of new investment). Factor prices: We also re-visited the link between changes in product prices and factor prices. Contrary to the suggestion of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993)(5), we argued that the movements in product prices (combined with growth in productivity) are fully consistent with the increase in the relative wage of skilled labor in the U.S. Indeed, the zero-profit conditions ensure that, as an identity, the change in relative wages must be explained by product prices and productivity. Productivity: The challenge for researchers is to uncover what structural factors explain the underlying movement in prices and productivity: are these changes due to skill-biased technological upgrades, or due to trade in intermediate inputs? We discussed a “two stage” estimation procedure due to Feenstra and Hanson (1999)(6) that allows this to be determined. As with the labor demand regressions, we find that both outsourcing and computer use can account for a portion of the increase in the relative wage of skilled workers, with the exact contribution of each being quite sensitive to how computer use is measured. Finally, we concluded this chapter with a discussion of nontraded goods. Harrigan and Balaban (1999)(7), Harrigan (2000)(8) and Kumar (2000)(9) have argued that the variables which are most highly correlated with the movement in wages over the 1980s and 1990s are neither trade prices nor outsourcing nor high-technology capital, but rather, a sharp increase in the price of skill-intensive nontraded goods in the U.S. as well as a decrease in the price of unskilledintensive nontradables. Feenstra I 4-50 This finding poses a challenge to those who believe that either trade or technology is responsible for the change in wages, and will no doubt be an important area for further research (see Blum, 2001(10), for example). >Technology, >Production, >Productivity. 1. Gereffi, Gary and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds., 1994, Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 2. Kenney, Martin and Richard Florida, 1994, “Japanese Maquiladoras: Production Organization and Global Commodity Chains,” World Development, 22(1), 27-44. 3. Dicken, Peter, Philip F. Kelley, Kris Olds and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, 2001, “Chains and Networks, Territories and Scales: Towards a Relational Framework for Analyzing the Global Economy,” Global Networks, 1(2), 99-123. 4. Yeung, Henry Wai-chung, 2001, “Organizing Regional Production Networks in Southeast Asia: Implications for Production Fragmentation, Trade and Rules of Origin,” Journal of Economic Geography, 1(3), 299-321. 5. Lawrence, Robert Z. and Matthew Slaughter, 1993, “International Trade and American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 161-226. Reprinted in Edward E. Leamer, ed. 2001, International Economics, New York: Worth Publishers, 177-202. 6. Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson, 1999, “The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the U.S., 1979-1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 114(3), 907-940. 7. Harrigan, James and Rita A. Balaban, 1999, “U.S. Wage Effects in General Equilibrium: The Effects of Prices, Technology, and Factor Supplies, 1963-1991,” NBER Working Paper No. 6981. 8. Harrigan, James, 2000, “International Trade and American Wages in General Equilibrium, 1967-1995,” in Robert C. Feenstra, ed., The Impact of International Trade on Wages, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 171-193. 9. Kumar, Praveen, 2000, “Wage Inequality in the US: What do Aggregate Prices and Factor Supplies Tell?,” The World Bank, manuscript. 10. Blum, Bernardo, 2001, “Decomposing the U.S. Income Inequality into Trade, Technological and Factor Supply Components: Theory and Data,” UCLA, manuscript. |
Feenstra I Robert C. Feenstra Advanced International Trade University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 |
| Sortals | Tugendhat | I 453 Sortal/Aristotle/Tugendhat: E.g. "chair" distinguished through function -> "bottom-up": we ask how singular term must function - sortal: allows to decide what belongs to it and what does not - no temporal, only spatial limits - (>continuant). Life phases of an object are not regarded as parts. >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal identity. I 457f Sortal/Tugendhat: allows new type of temporal-spatial identification - we should not presuppose perceptual object - then identification by distinguishing space-time locations. >Specification. I 460 Sortal: Not just imagination. Sortal predicates: presuppose a specific configuration of spatial or temporal extended - e.g. "the same cat". Conversely: sortal predicates are only explainable through space locations together with equal signs. >Equal sign. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| States of Affairs | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 160 Wittgenstein/State of Affairs: even questions the "state of affairs": once we have seen that there are a variety of circumstances that can lead to the expression "he understood instantly", we will be healed by the urge to invoke to an independent conceivable "state of affairs", by which such a statement could be made true. --- Chisholm II 166 State of Affairs/Wittgenstein: no fact - it is between facts in abstraction from their existence and complexes - an atomic proposition is true if a corresponding complex exists. Cf. >Facts/Wittgenstein. --- Wittgenstein VI 70 Definition state of affairs/Tractatus/Schulte: combination of objects (entities, things). That things behave in a certain way, is a definition fact. - State of Affairs: corresponds to elementary proposition - fact: corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions. ---- Hintikka I 67ff State of Affairs/object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: 2:03 In the state of affairs the objects hang together like the links of a chain. 2.031 In the state of affairs, the objects behave to each other in a certain manner. Image theory/image theory/Wittgenstein/early: if the sentence is a linguistic counterpart to the state of affairs, then: I 68 "Mind, that connection is no relation, but only the existence of a relation." I 73 ff Existence/ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages in Tractatus an ontology of possible state of affairs. According to Wittgenstein it has little sense to speak of a possible existence. That is, that we must regard the actual objects as if every one would exist necessarily. >Sense, >Senseless, >Necessity. Of course, Wittgenstein does not believe that he could say that objects exist necessarily. In this lies for him the transcendence of objects and this forms, according to him, the core of the transcendental logic (6.13). Nevertheless, it is clear that Wittgenstein actually makes the important, but not expressible condition of necessary and necessary completed existence of objects. Result: not only all the actual state of affairs, but also all kinds of state of affairs must be considered as if they were composed of the same objects. Possible world/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 2022 "It is obvious that even one of the real, yet so different worlds must have something - a form - in common with the real world. 2023 "This fixed form consists of the objects." --- Wittgenstein III 141 Definition State of Affairs/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: combination of simple objects without quality features. The state of affairs is completely independent. Example: In the Tractatus there is neither an example for a state of affairs nor for an object. With the account of all objects in proportion to their positions - all situations are covered. All worlds. >Situations, >Possible worlds, >Complex. III 142 There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex. Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: must exist in the specification of an absolute determination of the thinkable and possible. Picture Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: an elementary proposition represents a state of affairs in that it has the same logical form. Each element in the picuture corresponds to one and only one element of the state of affairs shown in the picture. The elements of the elementary proposition, the names correspond to certain objects of the state of affairs. The name is representative for the object. (Proxy). >Proxy, >Representation. The configuration of the picture elements corresponds to the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs. By a mere grouping a state of affairs cannot be established. Such grouping is not true or false. III 149 Sense/Showing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: because all state of affairs are a part of all possible worlds, the sense of the world itself cannot be a state of affairs, a part of the possible world. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Strategic Trade Policy | Smith | Krugman III 68 Strategic Trade Policy/Alasdair Smith: I investigate whether the nature of the strategic policy effects are sensitive to the specification of the model, and find that they are, and whether strategic policy effects are strong enough to overturn “conventional” wisdom about the welfare effects of trade policy, and find that they are not. >Trade policies, >International trade, >Models, >Economic models, >Model theory, >Sensitivity analysis, >New trade theory. Krugman III 80 Even leaving aside the issue of sensitivity, the results presented here cast doubt on the case for strategic trade policy. The effects on increased competition among “home” firms may wipe out the expected benefits of a strengthened strategic position in competition with “foreign” firms. In a many-country world with multilateral trade flows, the beneficiary of one country’s strategic trade policy may be another country’s producer. Finally, in the cases discussed in this paper, the “strategic” effects of trade policy are greatly outweighed by more traditional effects. Alasdair Smith. „Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Structural Modeling | Gelbach | Parisi I 33 Structural modeling/economics/Gelbach/Klick: Econometric studies come in two basic flavors: structural and reduced form. Structural modeling involves writing down an explicit mathematical and statistical representation of the determinants of individual, firm, or organizational behavior, such that these relationships can be captured with a finite collection of parameter estimates. Demand: For example, it is a consequence of Roy’s identity that any parametric specification of individual demand for a good can be converted into a parametric utility function (see, e.g., Hausman, 1981(1); Auerbach and Feldstein, 1985(2)). Thus, if one estimates a parametric demand equation, one is estimating parameters of individual utility functions, which are structural parameters that can be used to estimate the effects of future changes in policies. Structural modeling is an approach that generally has not been used in empirical law and economics. * Reduced form: see >Economic models/Gelbach/Klick. * One exception is in the field of industrial organization ("IO"), the microeconomic field that focuses on understanding how market structure affects consumer and producer welfare. Structural modeling has flourished in IO; see, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)(3); Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015)(4); Roberts and Sweeting (2013)(5). For a non-IO structural example, see Teitelbaum, Barseghyan, and Prince (2011)(6). 1. Hausman, Jerry A. (1981). “Exact Consumer’s Surplus and Deadweight Loss.” American Economic Review 71(4): 662–676. 2. Auerbach, A. J. and M. Feldstein, eds. (1985). Taxes and Labour Supply. Handbook of Public Economics. Vol. I. North-Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 3. Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes (1995). “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63(4): 841–890. 4. Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Town (2015). “Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry.” American Economic Review 105: 172–203. 5. Roberts, James W. and Andrew Sweeting (2013). “Airline Mergers and the Potential Entry Defense.” August 29. Available at: http://public.econ.duke.edu/~jr139/pedef_airline_merger.pdf?new_window=1 6. Teitelbaum, Joshua C., Levon Barseghyan, and Jeffrey Prince (2011). “Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data.” American Economic Review 101: 591–631. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Structures | Luhmann | Baraldi I 184 Structures/Luhmann/GLU: unlike autopoiesis (sic): structures are permanent. - They serve the selection of relations. >Autopoiesis. Also, the selection of selections. - Structures do not consist of elements. - (Element: of systems: without duration). >Events/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 5 Structure/System Theory/LuhmannVsTradition: The structures only work at the moment and for the duration, when the system operates. Tradition: assumed, structures are the enduring, processes pass. Structures are expectations in relation to connectivity of operations. >Operation/Luhmann. If the structure concept defines expectations, the subject/object distinction is insignificant. Cf. >Subject/Object-Problem. --- AU Cas 5 Structure/Luhmann: a system can choose from many structures. - E.g. Language: is not limited to one sentence. - The operations of the system require structures. - Subsequently both are dependent on each other. >Language/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 14 Structure/tradition/Luhmann: earlier, structures were considered as something permanent. - Structuralism/Levi-Strauss: new: there will be a cognitive, analytical element added: structures are also knowledge conditions. Subject of knowledge can also be science. Not everything can be connected to everything. Structures are often defined through expectations, but it would be better if that works differently - but how? - Expectations are too subjective. Cf. >Subjectivity. --- AU Cas 14 Structure/Luhmann: structures should not be assumed as unchangeable. - It is not just about the distinction before/after, but about the determination about processes. How to distinguish structure and process? Structure: is only real in the moment of use. Reality: only the operations themselves. >Reality/Luhmann, >Operation/Luhmann. So the system theory of the distinction between structure/process is taken out. - Advantage: then systems are not composed of two elements (structure and event). >Event/Luhmann. Structure: clarifies how an operation connects to the other. AU Cass 14 Structure/Luhmann: arises from the mixed requirements of specification and generalization. >Generalization, >Specification. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 |
| Synonymy | Cresswell | II 59 Synonymy/Reality/World/Language/Cresswell: the knowledge of some synonyms does not tell us anything about the relation between language and the world - and it is about that when we study meaning. >Language, >World, >World/thinking, >Reality, >Foundation, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence. Equality of meaning is not suitable for definition. >Meaning. II 106 Synonymy/Cresswell: is language-relative - therefore, we cannot say for the attribution of propostional attitudes: "He expressed a sentence that is synonymous with ...". >Language dependence. II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: is attractive for people who do not want any language-independent meanings - But that would not be a real semantic relation. No one has hitherto attempted a recursive specification of a synonymy relation. Synonymy: is always relative to a particular language - ((s) That means you cannot assume any more propositions.) >Propositions. QuineVsSynonymy: you cannot create identity criteria for language. >Synonymy/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Syntax | Quine | VII (a) 15 Syntax/Quine: their rules are meaningful in contrast to their notation. VI 69 Syntax/translation/indeterminacy/Quine: many of my readers have mistakenly assumed that uncertainty also extends to syntax. There was a subtle reason for this: in word and object(1) (pp. 107, 129 136) it says: VI 70 that also the specific apparatus of reification and object reference, which we make use of, is subject to indeterminacy. To this apparatus belong the pronomina, the "=", (equal sign) the plural endings and whatever performs the tasks of the logical quantifiers. But it is wrong to assume that these mechanisms belonged to syntax! >Equal sign, >Quantifiers, >Pronouns, >Indeterminacy. VI 97 Spelling/Quine: resolves the syntax and lexicon of each content sentence and merges it with the interpreter's language. It then has no more complicated syntax than the addition sign. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press VII (a) 15 Syntax/Quine/Goodman: their rules are meaningful as opposed to the notation itself. XI 114 Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be regarded purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) This is not truthful). XI 116 Lauener: it is a mistake to think that the language contributes the syntax but the theory contributes the empirical content. Therefore, one cannot say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: Mathematics is more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. XII 58 The problem of the inscrutability of the reference reaches much deeper than that of the indeterminacy of the translation: e.g. protosyntax. >Inscrutability. Protosyntax/Uncertainty/Quine: the language here is a formalized system of proof theory of the first level, whose subject area consists only of expressions, i.e. of character strings of a certain alphabet. Expressions: are types here, not tokens! (no occurrences). Each expression is the set of all its occurrences. (Summarized due to similarity of inscriptions). For example, the concatenation x^y is the set of all inscriptions that consist of two parts. These parts are tokens of x and y. Problem: it can happen that x^y is the empty set ((s) the combination does not occur) although both x and y are not empty. XII 59 The probability of this problem increases with increasing length of x and y! N.B.: this violates a law of protosyntax that says: x = z, if x^y = z^y. Solution: then you will not understand the objects as sets of inscriptions. But then you can still consider its atoms, the single characters as a set of inscriptions. Then there is no danger that the set is empty. ((s) Because the atoms have to be there, even if not every combination). N.B.: instead of interpreting the strings as sets of inscriptions, they can be regarded as a (mathematical) sequence (of characters). Character String/Expression: is then a finite set of pairs of a sign and a number. Vs: this is very artificial and complicated. Simpler: Goedel numbers themselves (the characters disappear). Problem: Question: How clear is it here that we have just started to talk about numbers instead of expressions? The only thing that is reasonably clear is that we want to fulfill laws with artificial models that are supposed to fulfill expressions in a non-explicit sense. XIII 199 Syntax/Quine: "glamour" and "grammar" were originally one and the same word. XIII 200 Later, the meaning also included magic. Grammar: (in the narrower sense) said which chains of words or phonemes were coherent and which were not. Always related to a particular language. Grammar: (wider sense): "The art of speaking" (in relation to the established use). >Grammar. Syntax/Quine: for the narrower sense we do not really need the word "grammar", but "syntax". It is about which character strings belong to the language and which do not. Problem: this is indefinite in two ways: 1. How the individuals are specified (formally, by components or phonemes) and 2. What qualifies them for the specification XIII 201 Recognizability is too indeterminate (liberal). Problem: ungrammatical forms are used by many people and are not incomprehensible. A language that excludes these forms would be the dialect of a very small elite. Problem: merely possible utterances in imaginable but not actual situations that are not themselves linguistic in nature. Solution: Def ungrammatic/William Haas/Quine: a form that would not make sense in any imaginable fictitious situation. Rules/Syntax/syntactic rules/Quine: are abstractions of the syntactic from long practice. They are the fulfillment of the first task (see above) to recognize which chains are grammatical. XIII 202 Solution: this is mainly done by recursion, similar to family trees. It starts with words that are the simplest chains and then moves on to more complex constructions. It divides the growing repertoire into categories. Parts of speech/Quine: there are eight: Nouns, pronouns, verb, adjective, adverb, preposition, conjunction, sentence. Further subdivisions: transitive/intransitive, gender, etc. But this is hardly a beginning. Nomina: even abstract ones like cognizance (of) and exception (to) are syntactically quite different, they stand with different prepositions. Recursion/syntax/Quine: if we wanted to win the whole syntax by recursion, it would have to be so narrow that two chains would never be counted as belonging to the same speech part, unless they could be replaced in all contexts salva congruitate. >Recursion. Def Replaceability salva congruitate/Geach/Quine: preserves grammaticality, never returns ungrammatical forms. VsRecursion/Problem: if speech parts were so narrowly defined, e.g. Nomina, which stand with different prepositions, they would then have to be counted among different kinds of speech parts. And these prepositions e.g. of and to, should not fall into the same category either! Then there would be too many kinds of speech parts, perhaps hundreds. Of which some would also be singletons ((s) singletons = categories with only one element). Solution: to give up recursion after having the roughest divisions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Syntheticity | Kant | Bubner I 101 Synthesis/Kant/Bubner: much deeper potentiality of the free development of the possibility of judgement before all the specification of separation: action. >Judgment/Kant. This is Kant's new discovery. I 103 Unity of action: 3 moments: 1st given manifold, 2nd connecting, 3rd the unity. No independent unity. The unity is not opposed to the many as an isolated principle - therefore the idealism of the identity of identity and non-identity. >Unity/Kant, >Idealism/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tariff Increases | IMF Working Papers | Ostry I 6 Tariff Increases/Furceri/Hannan/Ostry/Rose: Our results suggest that tariff increases have adverse domestic macroeconomic and distributional consequences. We find empirically that tariff increases lead to declines of output and productivity in the medium term, as well as increases in unemployment and inequality. In contrast, we do not find an improvement in the trade balance after tariffs rise, plausibly reflecting our finding that the real exchange rate tends to appreciate as a result of higher tariffs. The longer-term consequences of tariffs are likely higher than the medium-term effects that we estimate, but we truncate our analysis at the five year horizon to be conservative. Further, we perform considerable sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the robustness of our results. >Method/Ostry, >Tariffs, >Tariff responsivity, >Tariff impacts, >Protectionism, >Sensitivity analysis. Ostry I 14 [Our] results* (…) suggest that a one standard deviation (or 3.6 percentage point) tariff increase leads to a decrease in output of about .4% five years later. We consider this effect to be plausibly sized and economically significant; it is also significantly different from zero in a statistical sense. Why does output fall after a tariff increase? (…) a key channel is the statistically and economically significant decrease in labor productivity, which cumulates to about .9% after five years. Both these key findings make eminent sense; the wasteful effects of protectionism eventually lead to a meaningful reduction in the efficiency with which labor is used, and thus output.(1) Ostry I 16 (…) we have* implicitly assumed that tariff increases and decreases have symmetric effects. Is this assumption warranted? This is a simple matter to examine, since around 40% of our sample consists of tariff rises (with mean of 1.7ppt and standard deviation of 3.3), while 53% of observations consist of tariff falls (with mean of -1.8ppt and standard deviation of 3.4).(2) This variation allows us to test for asymmetry; we extend the baseline specification to allow the response to vary with the sign of the tariff change: yi,t+k - yi,t-1 = αi + γt + + βNP (1- DP i,t) ΔTi,t +νXi,t + εi,t where DP i,t is a binary variable which is equal to unity when the change in tariff is positive, and zero otherwise. Ostry I 17 Manifestly, the decline in output following a one standard deviation increase in the tariff rate is higher than the baseline; this effect is statistically significant, (…) for both output and productivity. In contrast, Panel B shows that the effects of a tariff fall on both output and productivity are much smaller. That is, there are asymmetric effects of protectionism; tariff increases hurt the economy more thanliberalizations help. One of the channels for the asymmetric effects related to tariff increases (as opposed to decreases) is due to intertemporal effects on domestic demand (Irwin, 2014)(2). The decline in tariffs usually results in a slight, immediate increase in demand because purchasers know that lower prices will prevail in the future. On the other hand, tariff increases usually lead to an increase in buying before policy implementation, followed by a collapse afterwards. In other words, the decline in domestic demand following a positive tariff shock is higher than the increase in domestic demand following a negative tariff shock. Ostry I 19 Advanced economies: for advanced economies, the decline in output after tariff increases is larger than in the baseline. Similarly, the effect on productivity is higher than in the baseline for advanced economies, but lower for other economies. One of the reasons for the different effects in advanced and emerging/developing economies could be due to the differential impact of trade liberalization. Leibovici and Crews (2018)(3) provide suggestive evidence that the potential gains from trade liberalization differ based on a country’s income level. Factors like financial development, limited infrastructure, and limited human capital prevent EMDEs from increasing production to sell internationally following trade liberalization. Consequently, EMDEs are disproportionally less affected during trade protectionism episodes, since they reap less benefits from trade liberalization to begin with. * Davide Furceri, Swarnali A. Hannan, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Andrew K. Rose. (2019). Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9. International Monetary Fund. 1. Employment increases by about 0.5 percent but the effect is not statistically significant. 2. Irwin, Douglas A., 2014, “Tariff Incidence: Evidence from U.S. Sugar Duties, 1890-1930,” NBER Working Paper No. 20635. 3. Leibovici, Fernando, and Jones Crews, 2018, “Trade Liberalization and Economic Development,” Economic Synopses, No. 13, Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2018/04/20/tradeliberalization-and-economic-development. Rieth I 2 Tariff increases/Boer/Rieth: (…) we find* that both shocks to trade policy have broad general equilibrium effects. Trade/Investments: Exogenous increases in tariffs reduce imports, exports, and investment strongly and persistently. Rieth I 3 Prices: Consumer prices increase and the exchange rate appreciates. Despite the improvement of the trade balance, output falls persistently below trend because all private domestic demand components contract. We estimate a general equilibrium import elasticity of –0.2 in the short run and of –0.8 after six years. Import prices: The pass-through to import prices is 0.1 upon impact and 0.5 in the medium run. Results from local projections of disaggregated data on the tariff shocks suggest that imports, exports, and investment fall in nearly all sectors. Employment: The employment effects are ambiguous. Uncertainty: Trade policy uncertainty shocks also affect macroeconomic dynamics. They depress imports and investment. However, output is less affected because the exchange rate tends to depreciate and exports to rise, compensating the domestic demand contraction. Across sectors, investment falls, while exports mostly increase. The employment effects are again ambiguous. >Unemployment, >Trade policy, >Tariffs, >Tariff impacts, >International trade, >Free trade, >Prices, >Investments. * Lukas Boer and Malte Rieth (2024). The Macroeconomic Consequences of Import Tariffs and Trade Policy Uncertainty. IMF Working Paper 24/13. International Monetary Fund. |
Ostry I Jonathan D. Ostry Davide Furceri Andrew K. Rose, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9.International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2019 Rieth I Malte Rieth Lukas Boer The Macroeconomic Consequences of Import Tariffs and Trade Policy Uncertainty. IMF Working Paper 24/13. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2024 |
| Tariff Increases | Ostry | Ostry I 6 Tariff Increases/Furceri/Hannan/Ostry/Rose: Our results suggest that tariff increases have adverse domestic macroeconomic and distributional consequences. We find empirically that tariff increases lead to declines of output and productivity in the medium term, as well as increases in unemployment and inequality. In contrast, we do not find an improvement in the trade balance after tariffs rise, plausibly reflecting our finding that the real exchange rate tends to appreciate as a result of higher tariffs. The longer-term consequences of tariffs are likely higher than the medium-term effects that we estimate, but we truncate our analysis at the five year horizon to be conservative. Further, we perform considerable sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the robustness of our results. >Method/Ostry, >Tariffs, >Tariff responsivity, >Tariff impacts, >Protectionism, >Sensitivity analysis. Ostry I 14 [Our] results* (…) suggest that a one standard deviation (or 3.6 percentage point) tariff increase leads to a decrease in output of about .4% five years later. We consider this effect to be plausibly sized and economically significant; it is also significantly different from zero in a statistical sense. Why does output fall after a tariff increase? (…) a key channel is the statistically and economically significant decrease in labor productivity, which cumulates to about .9% after five years. Both these key findings make eminent sense; the wasteful effects of protectionism eventually lead to a meaningful reduction in the efficiency with which labor is used, and thus output.(1) Ostry I 16 (…) we have* implicitly assumed that tariff increases and decreases have symmetric effects. Is this assumption warranted? This is a simple matter to examine, since around 40% of our sample consists of tariff rises (with mean of 1.7ppt and standard deviation of 3.3), while 53% of observations consist of tariff falls (with mean of -1.8ppt and standard deviation of 3.4).(2) This variation allows us to test for asymmetry; we extend the baseline specification to allow the response to vary with the sign of the tariff change: yi,t+k - yi,t-1 = αi + γt + + βNP (1- DP i,t) ΔTi,t +νXi,t + εi,t where DP i,t is a binary variable which is equal to unity when the change in tariff is positive, and zero otherwise. Ostry I 17 Manifestly, the decline in output following a one standard deviation increase in the tariff rate is higher than the baseline; this effect is statistically significant, (…) for both output and productivity. In contrast, Panel B shows that the effects of a tariff fall on both output and productivity are much smaller. That is, there are asymmetric effects of protectionism; tariff increases hurt the economy more thanliberalizations help. One of the channels for the asymmetric effects related to tariff increases (as opposed to decreases) is due to intertemporal effects on domestic demand (Irwin, 2014)(2). The decline in tariffs usually results in a slight, immediate increase in demand because purchasers know that lower prices will prevail in the future. On the other hand, tariff increases usually lead to an increase in buying before policy implementation, followed by a collapse afterwards. In other words, the decline in domestic demand following a positive tariff shock is higher than the increase in domestic demand following a negative tariff shock. Ostry I 19 Advanced economies: for advanced economies, the decline in output after tariff increases is larger than in the baseline. Similarly, the effect on productivity is higher than in the baseline for advanced economies, but lower for other economies. One of the reasons for the different effects in advanced and emerging/developing economies could be due to the differential impact of trade liberalization. Leibovici and Crews (2018)(3) provide suggestive evidence that the potential gains from trade liberalization differ based on a country’s income level. Factors like financial development, limited infrastructure, and limited human capital prevent EMDEs from increasing production to sell internationally following trade liberalization. Consequently, EMDEs are disproportionally less affected during trade protectionism episodes, since they reap less benefits from trade liberalization to begin with. * Davide Furceri, Swarnali A. Hannan, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Andrew K. Rose. (2019). Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9. International Monetary Fund. 1. Employment increases by about 0.5 percent but the effect is not statistically significant. 2. Irwin, Douglas A., 2014, “Tariff Incidence: Evidence from U.S. Sugar Duties, 1890-1930,” NBER Working Paper No. 20635. 3. Leibovici, Fernando, and Jones Crews, 2018, “Trade Liberalization and Economic Development,” Economic Synopses, No. 13, Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2018/04/20/tradeliberalization-and-economic-development. |
Ostry I Jonathan D. Ostry Davide Furceri Andrew K. Rose, Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs. IMF Working Paper. WP/19/9.International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2019 |
| Tariff Responsivity | Benguria | Benguria I 2 Tariff Responsivity/Benguria/Saffie: On April 2, 2025, in a historically unique policy action, the US announced tariffs on imports from nearly all trading partners. In the following hours, financial markets reacted across the globe. In principle, the variation in tariff rates across trading partners constitutes an unprecedented opportunity to measure the effect of these tariffs on financial outcomes. However, a key challenge is the potential anticipation of economic agents. In fact, two months earlier, a presidential memorandum had announced the study of “reciprocal” tariffs with the goal of reducing bilateral trade deficits, and the date for the April 2 tariff announcement had been set and publicized in advance. Thus, part of the impact on financial markets could have been absorbed before the announcement. Solution/method: We overcome this challenge by decomposing these tariffs into a component which is a function of bilateral deficits, which could have been potentially anticipated by markets, and an arguably unanticipated component due to the rounding up of the continuous deficit measure to the nearest next whole number or to the baseline 10% tariff rate. >Method/Benguria, >Tariffs, >International trade. Benguria I 15 We (…) measure the response of exchange rates to tariffs. This is a key elasticity to inform macroeconomic models designed to understand the optimal policy response to tariffs. >Elasticity, >Currency. Again, the impact on exchange rates is driven by the round-up component. Once we distinguish between those countries with a floating exchange rate regime and the rest, our initial results indicate that there is no evidence that higher tariffs are associated with an appreciation of the US dollar relative to the currency of the countries facing these tariffs. The coefficients we find across several specifications go in the opposite direction, and are statistically significant in some cases. Benguria I 16 This goes against what we would expect from international macroeconomic models, which would suggest a dollar appreciation (small if most US imports are invoiced in dollars). These initial results are robust to controlling for the trade structure of each country’s exports, including the shares of intermediate inputs and of commodities in exports to the US, the share of exports to the US in total exports, and the share of total exports invoiced in dollars. |
Benguria I Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 2025 |
| Tariffs | Benguria | Benguria I 1 Currency Appreciation/depreciation/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 2 Across several specifications with various controls, we find a bilateral depreciation of the dollar. This is driven by countries with a floating exchange rate regime, and is statistically significant only in some of our regressions. This goes against what we would expect from existing theory, which indicates that US tariffs would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. If US imports are invoiced in US dollars, we would expect no or small response in the exchange rate. We find that these results are robust to including in our regressions a component capturing the product exclusions in the tariff announcement. >Currency, >Share prices, >Stock prices, >Elasticity. Benguria I 1 Stock prices/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 3 There is (…) recent work that focuses on the link between trade policy and stock prices, in the context of the US-China trade war [Amiti et al.(1), 2024, Huang et al., 2023](2) (…). >International trade, >Trade policy, >Trade wars. * Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie. (2025) Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 02138 July 2025 1. M. Amiti, M. Gomez, S. H. Kong, and D. E. Weinstein. Trade protection, stock-market returns, and welfare. NBER Working Paper No. 28758, 2024. 2. Y. Huang, C. Lin, S. Liu, and H. Tang. Trade networks and firm value: Evidence from the US-China trade war. Journal of International Economics, 145:103811, 2023. Benguria I 13 Tariffs/currency depreciation/Benguria/Saffie: In the standard model of trade and exchange rates, a US tariff would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. We develop a simple model* which departs from the standard model by changing its assumptions about invoicing currencies and about trade reallocation in response to tariffs. In both regards, our assumptions are guided by well-established empirical facts. This simple variation delivers the opposite result: a US tariff leads to a dollar depreciation. The assumption about invoicing patterns is the following. Exports to the US are invoiced in US dollars. Exports to the rest of the world are invoiced partly in dollars and partly in the currency of the exporting country (producer currency, using the terminology in the literature). This assumption is consistent with the evidence in the literature on invoice currencies in trade [Boz et al., 2022(1), Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008(2)]. Benguria I 14 The assumption about export reallocation is that US tariffs lead to a decline in exports to the US but an increase in exports to the rest of the world. This reallocation can be microfounded by assuming an increasing marginal cost. This mechanism is featured in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) and Almunia et al. [2021](4). Further, Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) show that in there is a substantial amount of trade reallocation in response to trade war tariffs. Combining both assumptions, a tariff imposed by the US on a given country leads to a decrease in exports to the US and an increase in exports to the rest of the world. Because only exports to the rest of the world are invoiced in producer currency, this leads to a higher relative demand for producer currency. This implies an appreciation of the producer currency (i.e., a depreciation of the US dollar). We now provide a mathematical overview. In Appendix Section A.4, we provide the microfoundations for this model by assuming an increasing marginal cost. For this purpose, we extend the model in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) by including assumptions about invoice currencies. Benguria I 15 Stock prices: This model also predicts a decline in stock prices in response to a US tariff. >US Import tariffs. *Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie. (2025). Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. 1. E. Boz, C. Casas, G. Georgiadis, G. Gopinath, H. Le Mezo, A. Mehl, and T. Nguyen. Patterns of invoicing currency in global trade: New evidence. Journal of International Economics, 136:103604, 2022. 2. G. Gopinath and R. Rigobon. Sticky borders. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):531–575, 2008. 3. F. Benguria and F. Saffie. Escaping the trade war: Finance and relational supply chains in the adjustment to trade policy shocks. Journal of International Economics, 152:103987, 2024. 4. M. Almunia, P. Antras, D. Lopez-Rodriguez, and E. Morales. Venting out: Exports during a domestic slump. American Economic Review, 111(11):3611–62, 2021. |
Benguria I Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 2025 |
| Tariffs | Trump Administration | Benguria I 1 Currency Appreciation/depreciation/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 2 Across several specifications with various controls, we find a bilateral depreciation of the dollar. This is driven by countries with a floating exchange rate regime, and is statistically significant only in some of our regressions. This goes against what we would expect from existing theory, which indicates that US tariffs would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. If US imports are invoiced in US dollars, we would expect no or small response in the exchange rate. We find that these results are robust to including in our regressions a component capturing the product exclusions in the tariff announcement. >Currency, >Share prices, >Stock prices, >Elasticity. Benguria I 1 Stock prices/tariffs/Benguria/Saffie: We find* that a one percentage point higher tariff is associated with a statistically significant 0.23%decline in stock prices. Further, we find no evidence of a dollar appreciation; if anything, higher tariffs are associated with a dollar depreciation, driven by countries with a floating regime. We show this is consistent with a model that allows for trade reallocation and in which exports to the US are invoiced in dollars while exports to the rest of the world are partly invoiced in producer currency. Benguria I 3 There is (…) recent work that focuses on the link between trade policy and stock prices, in the context of the US-China trade war [Amiti et al.(1), 2024, Huang et al., 2023](2) (…). >International trade, >Trade policy, >Trade wars. * Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie. (2025) Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 02138 July 2025 1. M. Amiti, M. Gomez, S. H. Kong, and D. E. Weinstein. Trade protection, stock-market returns, and welfare. NBER Working Paper No. 28758, 2024. 2. Y. Huang, C. Lin, S. Liu, and H. Tang. Trade networks and firm value: Evidence from the US-China trade war. Journal of International Economics, 145:103811, 2023. Benguria I 13 Tariffs/currency depreciation/Benguria/Saffie: In the standard model of trade and exchange rates, a US tariff would reduce demand for foreign currencies, leading to a dollar appreciation. We develop a simple model* which departs from the standard model by changing its assumptions about invoicing currencies and about trade reallocation in response to tariffs. In both regards, our assumptions are guided by well-established empirical facts. This simple variation delivers the opposite result: a US tariff leads to a dollar depreciation. The assumption about invoicing patterns is the following. Exports to the US are invoiced in US dollars. Exports to the rest of the world are invoiced partly in dollars and partly in the currency of the exporting country (producer currency, using the terminology in the literature). This assumption is consistent with the evidence in the literature on invoice currencies in trade [Boz et al., 2022(1), Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008(2)]. Benguria I 14 The assumption about export reallocation is that US tariffs lead to a decline in exports to the US but an increase in exports to the rest of the world. This reallocation can be microfounded by assuming an increasing marginal cost. This mechanism is featured in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) and Almunia et al. [2021](4). Further, Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) show that in there is a substantial amount of trade reallocation in response to trade war tariffs. Combining both assumptions, a tariff imposed by the US on a given country leads to a decrease in exports to the US and an increase in exports to the rest of the world. Because only exports to the rest of the world are invoiced in producer currency, this leads to a higher relative demand for producer currency. This implies an appreciation of the producer currency (i.e., a depreciation of the US dollar). We now provide a mathematical overview. In Appendix Section A.4, we provide the microfoundations for this model by assuming an increasing marginal cost. For this purpose, we extend the model in Benguria and Saffie [2024](3) by including assumptions about invoice currencies. Benguria I 15 Stock prices: This model also predicts a decline in stock prices in response to a US tariff. >US Import tariffs. *Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie. (2025). Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. 1. E. Boz, C. Casas, G. Georgiadis, G. Gopinath, H. Le Mezo, A. Mehl, and T. Nguyen. Patterns of invoicing currency in global trade: New evidence. Journal of International Economics, 136:103604, 2022. 2. G. Gopinath and R. Rigobon. Sticky borders. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):531–575, 2008. 3. F. Benguria and F. Saffie. Escaping the trade war: Finance and relational supply chains in the adjustment to trade policy shocks. Journal of International Economics, 152:103987, 2024. 4. M. Almunia, P. Antras, D. Lopez-Rodriguez, and E. Morales. Venting out: Exports during a domestic slump. American Economic Review, 111(11):3611–62, 2021. Auray I 1 Tariffs/Neo-Keynesianism/Auray/Devereux/Eyquem: We quantify the macroeconomic effects of the tariff measures announced (but not entirely implemented yet) on Liberation Day (April 2nd, 2025) through the lens of a New-Keynesian two-country model* calibrated to the US and the rest of the world. We study both a unilateral 10pp tariff increase and a global trade war scenario with retalia- tory tariffs of a similar magnitude. In either case, tariffs are always sharply contractionary for US GDP, increasing inflation and widening the trade deficit. Measured in welfare terms a unilateral tariff generates gains for the US due to a large terms of trade appreciation, but these US welfare gains vanish with global retaliation. Three features of the model are critical in the evaluation of the tariff impact - the asymmetry in size and openness between the US and the rest of the world, - the endogenous response of monetary policy to the inflationary effects of tariffs, and - the importance of trade in intermediate goods for the scale of the global response to a tariff shock. Auray I 2 Retaliatory measures taken by trading partners can significantly amplify these effects. Reciprocal tariff hikes raise the cost of traded goods globally, reducing welfare and employment. Recent studies suggest that retaliatory tariffs may entirely offset any initial terms-of-trade gains for the US, leading to welfare losses of up to 1% and a decline in global employment of around 0.5% (Ignatenko et al. (2025)(1); Piermartini and Teh (2005)(2)). Import tax: Tariffs are taxes on imports. They drive a wedge between pre- and post-tariff prices, reducing demand for imports and depressing prices for exporters in partner countries. At the same time, tariffs increase demand for domestically produced goods, raising their prices. As a result, the terms of trade - defined as the relative price of domestic to foreign goods - improve, potentially benefiting local consumers. Whether this benefit outweighs the cost of tariffs depends on several factors. Welfare gain: If tariff revenues are returned to households - either through lump-sum transfers or lower taxes - there may be a net welfare gain from unilateral tariffs. The extent of this gain critically depends on the price elasticity of imports. >Elasticity, >Welfare gain, >Welfare, >Taxation. While this mechanism applies to trade in final goods, trade in intermediate goods - where firms import inputs for production - operates in a similar fashion. However, the resulting effects now bear directly on production costs rather than consumption. Beyond these demand-side considerations, broader general equilibrium effects must be taken into account. First, retaliation by trade partners may negate the initial terms-of-trade improvement, leaving both sides paying more for traded goods and experiencing a negative income effect.(3) >Trade wars. Auray I 3 Second, household responses to tariffs, particularly in terms of labor supply, can affect the overall supply of goods, influencing prices and quantities in equilibrium. Finally, tariff-induced inflationary pressures may lead to monetary tightening, lowering aggregate demand and amplifying the contraction in economic activity.** * Stéphane Auray, Michael B. Devereux, and Aurélien Eyquem. (2025). Tariffs and Retaliation: A Brief Macroeconomic Analysis NBER Working Paper No. 33739 May 2025 ** See Bergin and Corsetti (2023)(4), Bianchi and Coulibaly (2025)(5) for discussions regarding the optimal monetary response to tariff shocks, Bandera et al. (2023)(6) for a discussion of how monetary policy should respond to supply shocks. 1. Ignatenko, Anna, Ahmad Lashkaripour, Luca Macedoni, and Ina Simonovska. 2025. “Making America Great Again? The Economic Impacts of Liberation Day Tariffs.” Manuscript. 2. Piermartini, Roberta and Robert Teh. 2005. “Demystifying Modelling Methods for Trade Policy.” WTO Discussion Paper 10. 3. Auray, Stéphane, Michael B. Devereux, and Aurélien Eyquem. 2024. “Trade Wars, Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy.” Review of Economic Studies Accepted. 4. Bergin, Paul R. and Giancarlo Corsetti. 2023. “The Macroeconomic Stabilization of Tariff Shocks: What is the Optimal Monetary Response?” Journal of International Economics :103758. 5. Bianchi, Javier and Louphou Coulibaly. 2025. “The Optimal Monetary Policy Response to Tariffs.” NBER Working Paper 33560. 6. Bandera, Nicolò, Lauren Barnes, Matthieu Chavaz, Silvana Tenreyro, and Lukas von dem Berge.2023. “Monetary Policy in the Face of Supply Shocks: The Role of Expectations.” ECB Forum conference paper. Aguiar I 2 Tariffs/Economic theories/Aguiar/Amador/Fitzgerald: Prompted by the recent policy events, there are several new papers on the interactions between tariffs and trade deficits. Pujolas and Rossbach (2024)(1) study the welfare effects of trade wars in an Armington model with trade imbalances, where countries have exogenous international net (but not gross) positions. >Trade wars. Ignatenko et al. (2025)(2) quantify the welfare effects of tariffs in a model with trade imbalances where net foreign asset positions are given but trade deficits endogenously respond to policy. Costinot and Werning (2025)(3) analyze a dynamic model with fixed terms-of-trade and study the effects of a permanent increase in tariffs on the trade deficit by affecting the incentives of domestic households to save and consume. In a very related and contemporaneous paper, Itskhoki and Mukhin (2025)(4) argue that absent valuation effects, tariffs do not affect the long-run trade deficit. 1. Pujolas, Pau and Jack Rossbach (Nov. 2024). Trade Wars with Trade Deficits. en. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY. 2. Ignatenko, Anna et al. (2025). “Making America Great Again? The Economic Impacts of Liberation Day Tariffs”. 3. Costinot, Arnaud and Ivan Werning (Apr. 2025). ´ How Tariffs Affect Trade Deficits. Working Paper. 4. Itskhoki, Oleg and Dmitry Mukhin (2025). “Can a tariff be used to close a long-run trade deficit?” Kehoe, Timothy J (1998). “Uniqueness and Stability”. Elements of General Equilibrium Analysis. Ed. by Alan P Kirman. Basil Blackwell, pp. 38–87. |
Benguria I Felipe Benguria Felipe Saffie Rounding up the Effect of Tariffs on Financial Markets: Evidence from April 2, 2025. NBER Working Paper 34036 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 1050. Cambridge, MA 2025 Devereux I Stéphane Auray Michael B. Devereux Aurélien Eyquem, Tariffs and Retaliation: A Brief Macroeconomic Analysis NBER Working Paper No. 33739 May 2025 Cambridge, MA 2025 Aguiar I Mark A. Aguiar Amador Doireann Fitzgerald, Tariff Wars and Net Foreign Assets. NBER Working paper 33743.Doi 10.3386/w33743. May 2025. Cambridge, MA 2025 |
| Twin Earth | Schiffer | I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Folk psychology, >Functional role. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats. - Twin Earth Ralph believes "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). >Reference. So twin earth Ralph does not believe that there are cats, so there are two different beliefs but the same functional role. >Externalism. Twin Earth Ralph is in the same neural state-type N. The specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: E.g. "every token of "cat" is triggered by viewing a cat". Incorrect solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". This cannot be a necessary condition. >Stereotype, >Prototypes. In addition, there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for their own truth. VsDescription: descriptions are no solution: "That thing in front of me". >Indexicality. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Unintended Models | Field | II 264 Unintended/Non-standard model/NSM/Field: Problem: we cannot simply say that the non-standard model is unintended. >Models, >Model theory. II 265 Non-disquotational view: here it is only meaningful to speak of "unintended", if we can state by what facts about our practice these models are unintend - and precisely because these models make each of our sentences just as true, the specification of such facts appears to be impossible. >Disquotationalism. II 267 Applying/Explanation/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - That explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Satisfaction. II 319 Unintended Model/Interpretation/Putnam/Field: there is nothing in our use of the set theoretical predicates. That could make an interpretation "unintended". (VsObjectivity of mathematics). FieldVsPutnam: but this cannot be extended to the number theory. >Number theory. II 320 Not every objective statement is formalizable. - E.g. Consequences with the quantifier "only finitely many". >Formalization. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Value Chains | Economic Theories | Jaumotte I 5 Value chains/Tariff policies/Economic theories/Eugster/Jaumotte/MacDonald/Piazza: Our paper* builds on recent conceptual innovations of how tariffs can affect trade in a globally integrated economy. A first set of papers has emphasized that the effect of tariffs increases as the eventual good crosses international borders at several stages of production. Yi (2003(1), 2010(2)), Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014)(3), Rouzet and Miroudot (2013)(4) and others emphasized that in such a situation there is an accumulation of tariffs (tariff on inputs at each border crossing) as well as a magnification, as the value that is added to a product in the exporting country may only be a share of the good’s total value, on which the tariff is applied. Recent theoretical innovations have incorporated the idea that tariffs can accumulate, providing much of the theoretical foundation for our empirical analysis. Key to tariff accumulation and magnification is the recognition that an important share of international trade is done in intermediate inputs, rather than final consumer goods. Theoretical papers that have studied the influence of trade in intermediates include Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012)(5), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2016)(6), Hsieh and Ossa (2016)(7), and Shikher (2011)(8). Caliendo and Parro (2015)(9) allow for particularly rich heterogeneity across sectors and linkages between them. Vandenbussche, Connell and Simons (2019)(10) go into a similar direction, but also relax the Ricardian assumption that every input is sourced from only one country. In their model, what matters for a given sector is the extent to which its output will be taxed either directly or indirectly, once processed, incorporated in other products and re-exported. The principle of accumulation thus derives naturally from their setup.** In addition, Vandenbussche et al. (2019)(10) also highlights that a bilateral tariff will not only destroy, but also divert trade. The empirical literature has only partially followed suit, focusing mostly on the effects of tariffs imposed by the importing country itself, the “domestic” effects of tariffs. Much of the focus has also been on the effect on productivity. The literature has generally found productivity enhancing effects from tariff reductions both through an increase in competition as well as cheaper and higher-quality inputs. For example, Amiti and Konings (2007)(11) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2010)(12) have estimated the productivity effects on firm level data, while Ahn, DablaNorris, Duval, Hu and Njie (2016)(13) and Furceri, Hannan, Ostry and Rose (2021)(14) perform a similar exercise with international samples at the industry level. Jaumotte I 14 Amiti and Konings (2007)(11), Topolova & Khandelwal (2011)(12) and Ahn et al. (2018)(13) have all found significantly larger productivity gains from a reduction of tariffs on intermediate inputs (their input tariffs) than from reducing tariffs on domestic protection (their output tariff). Similar to our results, Ahn et al. (2019)(13) finds output tariffs to have a statistically insignificant effect in almost all specifications. >Value chain/Jaumotte, >US Import Tariffs, >Tariff responsivity, >Tariff impacts, >Tariffs, >Tariff history, >International trade, >Production, >Production structure, >Production theory, >Production factors, >Productivity. * Johannes Eugster, Florence Jaumotte, Margaux MacDonald, and Roberto Piazza. (2022). The Effect of Tariffs in Global Value Chains. IMF Working paper 22/40. International Monetary Fund. ** In their model, production technology is given, which implies that the relevant accumulation happens downstream in the value chain. This partially contrasts the abundant empirical literature, which focuses on input tariffs, i.e. tariffs imposed higher up in the value chain. 1. Yi, Kei-Mu. 2003. “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” Journal of Political Economy 111 (1): 52–102. 2.Yi, Kei-Mu. 2010. “Can Multistage Production Explain the Home Bias in Trade?” American Economic Review 100 (1): 364–93. 3. Koopman, Robert, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2014. "Tracing Value-Added and Double Counting in Gross Exports." American Economic Review, 104 (2): 459-94. 4. Rouzet, Dorothée, and Sébastien Miroudot. 2013. “The Cumulative Impact of Trade Barriers along the Value Chain: An Empirical Assessment Using the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Model.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris." 5. Arkolakis, Costas & Arnaud Costinot & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 2012. "New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 94-130, February. 6. Eaton, Jonathan & Samuel Kortum & Brent Neiman & John Romalis, 2016. "Trade and the Global Recession." American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3401-3438, November. 7. Hsieh, Chang-Tai & Ossa, Ralph, 2016. "A global view of productivity growth in China," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 209-224. 8. Shikher, Serge (2011). Capital, technology, and specialization in the neoclassical model. Journal of International Economics Volume 83, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 229-242 9. Caliendo, Lorenzo, and Fernando Parro. 2015. “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA.” The Review of Economic Studies 82 (1): 1–44. 10. Vandenbussche, Hylke & William Connell & Wouter Simons, 2019. "Global Value Chains, Trade Shocks and Jobs: An Application to Brexit," CESifo Working Paper Series 7473, CESifo. 11. Amiti, Mary and Jozef Konings. 2007. "Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia." American Economic Review, 97 (5): 1611-1638.v 12. Topalova, P., and A. Khandelwal. 2011. “Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity: The Case of India.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (3): 995-1009, August. 13. Ahn, JaeBin, Era Dabla‐Norris, Romain Duval, Bingjie Hu and Lamin Njie, 2019. "Reassessing the productivity gains from trade liberalization," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 130-154, February. 14. Davide Furceri, Swarnali A Hannan, Jonathan D Ostry, Andrew K Rose, The Macroeconomy After Tariffs, The World Bank Economic Review, 2021 |
Jaumotte I Florence Jaumotte Johannes Eugster Margaux MacDonald, The Effect of Tariffs in Global Value Chains. IMF Working paper 22/40. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C. 2022 |
| Value Theory | Neo-Neoclassical Economics | Harcourt I 170 Distribution theory/Value theory/Neo-neoclassicalsVsMarx/Harcourt: The neo-neoclassicals have produced a string of rebuttals ((s)to Joan Robinson’s remarks on Value theory). >Distribution/Value theory/Robinson. Rate of profit/demand: First, they argue that no one, these days, tries, or ever did try, to determine the rate of profits or other prices within the production system alone. After all, the neoclassical marginalist 'revolution' was concerned with first the prior, and then the equal, importance of the blade of scissors known as 'demand'. Measurement of capital: Secondly, they could refer to Bliss's arguments (…), and to the statements by Hahn and Matthews [1964](1) at the end of their survey of the theory of economic growth. Thus: „As far as pure theory is concerned the 'measurement of capital' is no problem at all because we never have to face it if we do not choose to. With our armchair omniscience we can take account of each machine separately. Moreover the measurement business has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of whether imputation theory is or is not valid. In an equilibrium of the whole system provided there is perfect competition, no learning by doing and no uncertainty, the neoclassical imputation results hold. Harcourt I 171 This should now be beyond dispute. It is also of little comfort to the empirically inclined.“ (p. 888.) „Returning once more to the question of the validity or otherwise of imputation theory there is a further, purely theoretical, point of some importance to be made. When an economy with many goods is considered, then we must also find the relative equilibrium prices of these goods. Whether these are determined a la Leontief-Samuelson-Sraffa or a la Walras, imputation is at once involved. If we abandon imputation entirely then the whole question of relative prices must be reconsidered afresh. Perhaps it ought to be, but recognition that this problem exists seems desirable“.(p. 889.) >Relative price. Harcourt: (…) [the neo-neoclassicals] could refer to Samuelson's opening remarks in Samuelson [1962](2), (…) and Solow's closing ones, Solow [1970](3). That is to say, they would dismiss an aggregative approach to a rigorous theory of distribution - and capital - (though not, necessarily, one to econometrics). They could next invoke Swan's appendix, Swan [1956](4), and Champernowne's original paper [1953-4](5). In the latter, when doubleswitching is allowed to occur, the production function is multi-valued, i.e. the same q is associated with two or more values of k. Factors of production/factor price: Nevertheless, factors are paid their marginal products. Labour/capital/ Champernowne: However, 'the question of which (r, w) and hence what income-distribution between labour and capital is paid is left in this model for political forces to decide' (p. 130) - surely one of the most perceptive comments of the whole debate? (At the (double) switch points, one technique is coming in at one point, leaving at the other, as it were; which, then, is the relevant one to determine distribution?) Champernowne adds: 'It is interesting to speculate whether more complex situations retaining this feature are ever found in the real world.' Harcourt I 172 To the neo-neoclassical answer that the existence or not of an aggregate production function or of a well-behaved demand curve for capital at economy (or industry level) has nothing to do with marginal productivity relations, some critics (Kaldor [1966](6), Nell [1967b](7)) might reply: Your logic may be impeccable but your results are, nevertheless, irrelevant for the world as we know it, and especially for an explanation of distribution, i.e. they would reject maximizing behaviour as a fundamental postulate of economic analysis (see Solow [1968](8) also). This raises a puzzle in the analysis of choice of technique where most writers, including Sraffa, explicitly assume maximizing behaviour. Kaldor: Kaldor, of course, does not; his analysis is based upon the implications of businessmen following rules of thumb such as the pay-off period criterion. Brown: Brown [1966](9), on the other hand, just because he wishes to retain maximizing behaviour, has suggested neoclassical exploitation as a compromise. Moreover, in his later papers [1968(10),1969(11)], while he accepts the logic of the neo-Keynesian critics, as an econometrician, he, possibly rightly and certainly understandably, tries to find common ground between linear models and neoclassical ones. He works out the conditions which ensure capital-intensity uniqueness (CIU) at an aggregate level in two two-sector models, one linear, the other neoclassical, i.e. one in which each sector has a well-behaved production function. >Capital/Brown. 1. Hahn, F. H. and Matthews, R. C. O. [1964] 'The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey', Economic Journal, LXXIV, pp. 779-902. 2. Samuelson, P.A. [1962] 'Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function', Review of Economic Studies, xxix, pp. 193-206. 3. Solow, R M. [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 4. Swan, T. W. [1956] 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', Economic Record, xxxn, pp. 334-61. 5.Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, pp. 112-35 6. Kaldor, N. [1966] 'Marginal Productivity and the Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 309-19. 7. Nell, E. J. [1967b] 'Theories of Growth and Theories of Value', Economic Development and Cultural Change, xvi, pp. 15-26. 8. Solow, R. M. [1968] 'Distribution in the Long and Short Run', The Distribution of National Income, ed. by Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros (London: Macmillan), pp. 449-75. 9. Brown, Murray [1966] 'A Measure of the Change in Relative Exploitation of Capital and Labor', Review of Economics and Statistics, XLvm, pp. 182-92. 10. Brown, Murray [1968] 'A Respecification of the Neoclassical Production Model in the Heterogeneous Capital Case', Discussion Paper No. 29, State University of New York at Buffalo. 11. Brown, Murray [1969] 'Substitution-Composition Effects, Capital Intensity Uniqueness and Growth', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 334-47. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) | Smith | Krugman III 69 Voluntary Export Restraints (VER)/Alasdair Smith: The model* allows there to be a “voluntary” export restraint (VER) which limits the share that firms from one country may have in a particular national market (as Japanese firms are currently restricted in several European national markets. The model can alternatively allow there to be a restriction on the firms’ overall market share in a group of national markets as a whole, as Japanese firms are in the near future to be restricted to a fixed share of the aggregate EC market). Competition: Firms in markets that are not subject to sales restrictions are assumed to behave as Cournot competitors**(…) >Cournot Competition, >Bertrand Competition. Krugman III 70 In the general case, the anticompetitive effect of the VER is less strong but still leads firms to set higher price-cost margins than they would in the absence of the VER. Krugman III 73 Strategic trady policy: (…) I address the question of whether the national VERs on Japnese imports can be seen, from the viewpoint of the European Community as a whole, as an effective strategic trade policy. Krugman III 75 The imposition of the VERs leads to an increase in model numbers by one each by the two French producers, the two “American-European’’ producers, and VW, while each of the Japanese producers reduces its model numbers by two. Krugman III 77 There is a marked effect on con sumer welfare: the increase in model variety combined with price increases that are generally lower than when model numbers are fixed reduces the loss in consumer welfare to 6,000 million ECU per year in table 3.4, compared with 9,000 million in table 3.3. However, not only is this loss still in excess of the gains to European producers, the producers’ gains are actually lower in table 3.4 than in table 3.3. *** Voluntary export restraints/VER: The VERs are counterproductive as a strategic trade policy in shifting profits toward European producers. The reason for this is easy to see. The change in model numbers is optimal for each individual producer, taking the other producers’ model numbers as given, but the change in all producers’ model numbers is profit-reducing, as intensified competition among European producers more than outweighs the beneficial effects of the reduction in Japanese competition. This is an example of the problem identified by Dixit (1984)(2) of the weakening of the strategic case for import restrictions as the number of “home” firms increases. When we look at policy from an EC point of view it might seem more natural to look at an EC-wide strategic trade policy rather than the EC-wide effects of national trade policies. Krugman III 80 A National VER as Strategic Trade Policy: 1) there is no guarantee in a many-country world that the benefits of a strategic trade policy imposed by one country will accrue to that country’s own producers. 2) Second, the location of the strategic effects are quite sensitive to the values (…) chosen in the calibration. The location of the strategic effects is therefore sensitive to an aspect of model specification on which we are ill informed. >Sensitivity analysis, >International trade/Alasdair Smith, >Strategic trade policy/Alasdair Smith, >Competition/Alasdair Smith, >Models/Alasdair Smith, >Economic models, >New trade theory. * The model ist displayed in A. Smith 1994(1). ** ((s) In the economics of oligopoly, the and Bertrand models explore different ways firms can compete. Cournot models focus on quantity competition, where firms choose output levels, while Bertrand models focus on price competition, where firms set prices. In Bertrand competition, firms making identical products often reach an equilibrium where prices are equal to marginal costs, leading to zero economic profits. In contrast, Cournot competition typically leads to higher prices and positive profits for firms, as they limit their output to maximize profits.) ***For the tables see A. Smith 1994(1). 1. Alasdair Smith. „Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2. Dixit, Avinash. 1984. International trade policy for oligopolistic industries. Economic Journal 94 (Supplement): 1-16. Alasdair Smith. „Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market.“ In: Paul Krugman and Alasdair Smith (Eds.) 1994. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 EconKrug I Paul Krugman Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2017 EconKrug II Paul Krugman Robin Wells Microeconomics New York 2014 Krugman III Paul Krugman Alasdair Smith Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994 |
| Volunteer’s Dilemma | De Geest | Parisi I 445 Volunteer’s dilemma/Information/incentives/carrots/sticks/Dari-Mattiacci/De Geest: (…) that carrots are only superior when the majority of the agents will violate the rule in equilibrium. This raises the question why this would ever be the case in a rational choice framework. If an agent rationally violates a rule, this means that the carrot or stick is not high enough. But in that case, why does the principal not simply increase the carrot or stick until all agents comply? The reason is that the principal my not have enough information on the individual effort costs of all agents to determine which of them should follow the rule. But in the real world, individual effort costs may be difficult to verify. This suggests that carrots may be desirable when the principal has specification problems, that is, when the principal does not know what can be reasonably expected from the agent. This may help to explain why in an increasingly complex society, carrots are increasingly used (De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci, 2013)(1). Volunteer’s dilemma: An extreme case of enforcement with information problems is the volunteer’s dilemma: it is optimal for society that only one of the bystanders (ideally the one with the lowest effort costs) jumps in the water to save a drowning person. In this case, Leshem and Tabbach (2016)(2) show that carrots are superior to sticks in that they minimize the transfers to be made. >Incentives/Dari-Mattiacci/De Geest. 1. De Geest, Gerrit and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (2013). “The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks.” University of Chicago Law Review 80: 341–392. 2. Leshem, Shmuel and Avraham Tabbach (2016). “Solving the Volunteer’s Dilemma: The Superiority of Rewards over Punishments.” American Law and Economics Review 18: 1–32. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit de Geest. “Carrots vs. Sticks”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Wholes | Wholes, philosophy: the concept of the whole is unique only in connection with further specification. In the mereology the term avoids paradoxes that occur in connection with the universal class (universal set). The whole is not different from its parts in the way a set is different from its elements. See also unity, one, set, universal class, universal set, mereology, parts, part-of-relation, mereological sum, upper bound, totality. |
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| Absolutism | Harman Vs Absolutism | II 426 Truthfulness/Reason/Motive/Rationality/Harman: Thesis: Suppose a person has reasons to be truthful, then it must be possible to give a neutral assessment of their reasons in non-normative vocabulary that shows why this consideration is a reason for this person (for their truthfulness or honesty). It also seems to me that this is not always feasible. HarmanVsMoral Absolutism: hence the absolutist will fall back to a normative specification by saying the reason that it would be wrong for this person to lie or steal is that it would be wrong for this person. Harman: but that would not be a satisfactory answer. Moral Relativism/Metaphysical Realism/Putnam/Harman: Putnam sees rightly that there is a connection between the two. MR/Harman: because I believe that there is a clear causal order, all reasons for action ((s) motifs) must be localizable in this order. Normative Facts/Standard/Harman: I’m skeptical about facts that can be exclusively normatively specified. ((s) i.e. about which you could not say nothing physicalist or then they would be no facts). Important argument: Internal Realism/Moral Absolutism/Harman: an internal realist like Putnam who says that there is a clear causal order may allow purely normative facts which are not localized in nature. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| ceteris paribus | Schiffer Vs ceteris paribus | I 287 ceteris paribus/SchifferVsceteris paribus-condition: it is simply nonsense to speak of p.c., if at all it is not clear what these "other things" should be or what it is for them "to be "equal". I 160 E.g. the baseball hits the window and "ceteris paribus" it would break. This leads to completions that let the phrase seamlessly pass into laws. The interesting question is why anybody would expect a completion here. Probably because the commonsense explanations for belief would otherwise not be valid. Blame it on the covering laws by Hempel. SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. reason, why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al is flying to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there. covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts which make up a complete explanans and contain the fact that is to be explained. Schiffer: it is clear that Carla does not need to know it! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be polished with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification"(Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxatic representation of complete laws. We don’t need any of this. I 161 For sure Carla does not know any "probalistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story contains the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no belief and desires! "because"/explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as a declaration because of interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Still one could wonder if such "because"-statements are analyzable. Probably no analysis has ever been given. That does not mean, however, that nothing has been said. Solution: Counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone, if he had not had the desire... etc. "because"/Schiffer: I especially doubt that the knowing of such "because" facts is calling for law-like generalizations. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Church, A. | Quine Vs Church, A. | I 368 QuineVsChurch: The subject does not need to speak the language of the object sentence. There is a German phrase of which is true that the mouse, which is afraid of the cat, fears it. But in a certain way they remain language relative (Church). Ex A sentence in a given concrete translation might have a slightly different meaning. For Church this is even likely, because he also accepts all sorts of artificial languages. So we improve: (7) Thomas true-believes in German "Cicero..." I 369 According to Church, we would then have to make all other possible translations as well (8) Thomas believes true in German "Cicero has denounced Catiline." But an Englishman who does not speak German would find other information in (8) than in a full translation. (9) Thomas believes that Cicero denounced Catiline (in English). However, since (8) reflects the meaning of (7), (9) must miss the meaning of (7). QuineVsChurch: not necessarily because a certain concept of meaning is required. Quine: (7) not satisfactory because of the dependence on a language. Such relations of a sentence, a person and a language cannot be linked with the propositional attitudes. I 370 Sheffler + about expressions and degrees XI 55 Identity/Necessity/Church: the values of the variables could be reduced to intensions and thereby make all the true identity statements necessary. QuineVsChurch: it is a mistake to think that the quantified modal logic can tolerate only intentions, but no classes or individuals. Proof: Specification/Quine: every thing x, even an intention is, if it can at all be specified, specifiable in random matching manner. ((s) >indeterminacy of translation, indefinite >reference, >inscrutability of reference). XI 56 Suppose x is determined as the only thing by the condition "φx", so it is also determined as the only one by the conjunction "p u φx". Now you select any truth for "p" that is not implied by "φx", and both specifications contingently turn out to be consistent. So you gain nothing by taking intentions as values of the variables. Should we try again with necessary identity? Identity/Necessary Identity/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: let us consider the following postulate (1) ((w)(Fx w = x) u (w)(Gw w = x))> N(w) (Fw Gw) The demands that if there are always two open sentences that determine the same thing x as the only thing, they should be necessarily equivalent. Although this would repeal the referential opacity of the rules - it would also repeal modal distinctions themselves at the same time! (... + ...) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Dennett, D. | Peacocke Vs Dennett, D. | I 204/205 PeacockeVsDennett: the causal role of beliefs and other propositional attitudes cannot be detected in this derived way (via attribution rules), namely as consequence of an instrumentalist view. VsInternal Instrumentalism/VsInstrumentalism: Dennett's instrumentalist conditions are not sufficient for the attribution of mental states. E.g. Suppose there is a "body" which exactly resembles a human body, except that it has no brain. It is controlled from Mars and the Martians fully understand the human neurophysiology. Their computer can predict nerve stimuli for any given stimulation and past situation. The computer has a specification of the past of the "body", but only a finite set of conditionals that dictate how the "body" should behave. So it can make the "body" to behave in every situation like a human. This behavior is now just as predictable if it is assumed to have intentions. But it is just a puppet. Therefore, Dennett's conditions are insufficient. Peacocke: what have the conditions omitted? Wrong solution: propose that a system would have to be built by another intentional system. That would be too strict. Solution: what is missing is that the belief and the others are not causally caused! E.g. if someone remembers, then there is a state in which he once was... I 206 The computer does not have such states. There will certainly be a history of previous stimulations. But that can hardly be identified with a memory track. PeacockeVsVs: back then, an intention may have formed at the same time that has survived. Then we cannot say that this intention also has the description of this encounter in the past as categorical grounds. The computer explained as folk psychology, conceives beliefs, experience, memory, intention as interrelated. Peacocke: this suggests that having intentions is more than a complex and cohesive family of dispositions (even together with a categorical foundation). The case of the computer shows that Dennett's causal interactions are not always there when the instrumentalist conditions for the attribution of belief are fulfilled. Therefore, Dennett brings so-called "core elements" along. These are not present in the computer case. Peacocke: we can say that the computer does not have any experiences, then it has no propositional attitudes either. Peacocke: this makes it necessary to take a middle position. If it were not for this, it would force us to the side of Mentalese! |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Donnellan, K. | Tugendhat Vs Donnellan, K. | I 422 TugendhatVsDonnellan: Example "The murderer of Hans" it is not easy to determine which predicates apply to him. Example "The author of the "Divina Commedia" was a great poet". Ultimately we have to resort to localizing the terms and perceptual predicates. If none are available, it amounts to: "The so and so, whoever that may be, is so and so". Specification/Tugendhat: Difference: a) identifying and b) non-identifying specification. Example: "The murderer of Hans is insane". a) If I mean Mr. XY, the sentence can be true, even if it turns out that Hans was not murdered at all. (Kripke). b) "attributive" definition: "the one of all who murdered him" then the sentence is not true in every case. (>attributive/referential/Donnellan). TugendhatVsDonnellan: this does not take into account the special role of the localizing descriptions: 1. The non-localizing ones gain their role only in relation to the localizing ones. 2. The distinction between attributive and referential uses can no longer be applied to localising markings. 3. The so-called "attributive" use of a description is also "referential" in a broad sense because it does not identify the object, but specifies it. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dummett, M. | Schiffer Vs Dummett, M. | I 221 Verificanistical semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): verification conditions instead of truth conditions. Dummett: (like Davidson): we must ask what form a meaning theory (m.th.) would have to take to find out what meaning is. This M.Th. should be able to specify the meaning of all words and propositions. (Dummett 1975, p. 97). Dummett: pro compositionality (with Wittgenstein): no systematic meaning theory is possible without explaining the understanding of infinitely many sentences. Therefore one must, like Chomsky and Wittgenstein, accept that we have an implicit capture some general principles. (Dummett 1978, p. 451). DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain any truth theory (tr.th.). Verification condition/verification conditions/Dummett: (for propositions) the verification conditions are also recursively specified. Schiffer: but that does not follow that a compositional truth-theoretic semantics does not exist as well. I 222 Dummett: with the specification of the verification conditions the meaning theory could at the same time specify the truth conditions (Dummett 1978 Foreword). Verification conditions/SchifferVsDummett: it is not clear how the verification conditions should look like. Relation theory/meaning theory/Schiffer: when I argued VsRelation theory, I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics (tr.th.sem.). Otherwise, it would be true!. Verificationist meaning theory/Verif. m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: with a verificationist meaning theory could the relation theory maybe also be true?. I 225 Use theory/Dummett/Schiffer: for Dummett the point of use theory is: "the meaning of a word is uniquely determined by the observable characteristics of its linguistic use". (Dummett 1976, 135). SchifferVsDummett: but what counts as "observable characteristic" and what as "openly shown" ?. Does Dummett think that a description of the use in purely behavioral, non-semantic and non-psychological terms would be sufficient that a word has a specific meaning? That would be too implausible as that Dummett would accept that. Still, he notes that the description should not use any psychological or semantic terms. Meaning/Dummett/Schiffer: should therefore also become understandable for beings who have no semantic or psychological concepts themselves! So even for Marsians. (Also McDowell understands him like this, 1981, 237). McDowellVsDummett: according to Dummett it must be possible to give a description of our language behavior that is understandable for extraterrestrials. That does not work, because the intentional "(content-determining) is not reducible to the non-intentional. Content/McDowellVsDummett/SchifferVsDummett: is not detectable for extraterrestrials. ((s) Not "speechless", but only those who do not share our intentional vocabulary). I 226 Ad. 4: ("To know which recognizable circumstances determine a proposition as true or false"). Schiffer: that means how do we get from behaviorism to anti-realism?. Manifestation/SchifferVsDummett: this one makes do here even with pronounced psychological terms!. 1. Recognizing (that the conditions are met) is itself a form of knowledge, which in turn contains belief. You cannot describe that non-psychologically. 2. How can one then achieve the further conclusion that a purified attribution should ascribe a skill that can only be "openly shown"? (The showing understood behavioristically). Behaviorism/Dummett/Schiffer: However, I am not ascribing any behaviorism to Dummett, I ascribe him nothing, I just wonder what his position is. meaning theory/m.th./Dummett: thinks that natural languages have a m.th.! Their core will be recursively definable verif. cond.. Anti-Realism/Schiffer: here Dummett is uncertain whether the m.th. should have falsification conditions, but that will not affect my subsequent criticism. 1. Whether the knowledge that a state of affair exists, counts as verification of a proposition. I 227 Could depend on extralinguistic knowledge and not by the understanding of the proposition! We usually need background information. Understanding/SchifferVsDummett: then it should not be about verification conditions!. Direct verification conditions/Dummett: has to exist for each single proposition!. QuineVsDummett/Schiffer: (Quine 1953b): direct verification conditions cannot exist for every proposition. ((s) ~Theories are not verifiable proposition by proposition). 2. Surely there are meaningful propositions that have no recognizable conditions that would turn out this proposition as true or false. Dummett/Schiffer: insists, however, that a proposition must be shown as true or false and in fact "conclusively" (conclusive verifiability). (1978, 379). This leads to anti-realism. ((s) Def anti-realism/Dummett/(s): is exactly to demand that the verification must be performed in order to understand a proposition. The realism would waive the verification.) Anti-realism/Dummett: you still should not rely too heavily on the anti-realism! Because often a "conclusive verification" is not to obtain!. Schiffer: so Dummett itself holds the verification conditions contestable!. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett quotes Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behaviors can be refuted. (Dummett 1978, S. XXXV) SchifferVsDummett: then the m.th. needs contestable criteria as well as contestable conditions!. Problem: this applies to most empirical judgments E.g. "That is a dog". 3. We know what kind of semantic values we must attribute to the non-logical constants (predicates and singular term) in the conditional sentences in a truth-theoretic semantics. But how shall that look like in the alternative with verification conditions instead of truth conditions?. Solution/Dummett: the verificationist semantics will make every predicate an effective means available, so that it can be determined for each object whether the predicate applies to the object or the singular term references to the object. I 230 Relation theory/SchifferVsDummett: the by me disapproved relation theory for propositional attitudes (belief as a relation to belief objects) seems inevitable for Dummett. ((s) because of the relation of predicates to objects to which they must apply verifiable). Problem: that can only happen in a finite theory, and for propositional attitude it would have to be infinite, because for each prop the VB would have to be found individually. Relation theory/Schiffer: has to assume propositional attitude as E.g. "believes that Australians drink too much" as semantically primitive - namely, 2-figure predicate between believer and content). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Hempel, C. | Schiffer Vs Hempel, C. | I 160 SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. Reason why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al flies to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there. covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts that add up to the full explanans and contain to explanatory fact. Schiffer: it is clear that the Carla did not need to know! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be refined with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification" (Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxastic representation of complete laws. We do not need any of this. I 161 Surely Carla does not know any "probabilistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story uses the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no faith and desires! "Because"/Explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as an explanation because of the interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Nevertheless, one can ask whether such "because"-statements are analyzable at all. Probably no analysis was ever given. This does not mean that nothing has been said. Solution: counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone if he had not had the desire ... etc. "Because"/Schiffer: I doubt above all that the knowledge of such "because"-facts requires law-like generalizations. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Inflationism | Ramsey Vs Inflationism | Horwich I XIII Truth/Tradition/Inflationism/Horwich: acknowledges Tarski's idea, but considers it insufficient. Example PragmatismVsTarski: this does not explain the usefulness of truth. Inflationism/Horwich: requires attributing truth to additional attributes: "X is true iff X has the attribute P". With this one should be able to specify what truth is. (e.g. usefulness). RamseyVsInflationism: (> Redundancy TheoryVsInflationism): (Chapter 4, AyerVsInflationism, Chapters 8 and 15, StrawsonVsInflationism Chapter 13): Truth needs no additional specification. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. | V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Nietzsche, Fr. | Heidegger Vs Nietzsche, Fr. | Habermas I 180 HeideggerVsNietzsche "Revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: exactly this applied Heidegger now himself as a solution to it! He turns the origin of philosophy upside down, without departing from the problem specifications. Habermas II 87 VsNietzsche: increases the subjectivity by turning the subject as the absolute will to power into a totally mundane phenomenon. Rorty III 68 HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: inverted Platonism: romantic attempt to elevate the flesh above the spirit, the heart above the head, mythical "will" above equally mythical "reason". Rorty III 179 HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: "Reverse Platonist". Urge to join a higher one. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Plato | Aristotle Vs Plato | Bubner I 23 AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king. Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects. Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. I 120 Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé. I 164 Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. I 165 Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. I 184 Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". --- Kanitscheider II 35 Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe. Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position). "Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number". II 36 Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement. First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified. World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time. AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius: Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help". Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum. II 37 Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Putnam, H. | Fodor Vs Putnam, H. | I Lanz 290 Functionalism / Fodor: (FodorVsPutnam) advocates a wider concept of functionalism. (Turing machine as a model of psychological systems is too limited). What makes the state of a living being or of a system to be a state of mind of a particular type are the causal relations, in which this state is in relation to 1st inputs - 2nd to other mental states - 3rd in relation to the output. Various material substrates can bear the same role (> robot, > zombie). Therefore, they are irrelevant to the specification of the nature of mental states. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Quine Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 131 Def Unfounded/Quine: is a class if it contains an element that contains an element.... ad infinitum without ever reaching firm ground. QuineVsQuine: self-criticism: my "New Foundations" and "Mathematical Logic" both contain unfounded classes. I could argue that there is no principle of individuation for such classes. They are identical as long as their elements are identical, and they are identical as long as their elements are identical ..., without stopping. Our study shed light on a strange comparison between three degrees of stringency. a) table, b) with Russell's definition we can define the identity of properties, however, c) the individuation of properties is still not okay. This suggests that a) specification makes the most stringent demands, b) individuation is less strict, and c) the mere definition of identity is even more undemanding. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reichenbach, H. | Fraassen Vs Reichenbach, H. | I 170 Mixture/Probability/prblty/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Fraassen: "mixture" or "mixed state" as opposed to "pure" state: is in quantum mechanics what the difference between micro-state and macro-state is in statistical mechanics. Two problems: (in connection with probability): 1) how mixtures are connected with pure states 2) the relation of pure states to each other. Mixture: is typically introduced in the context of uncertainty. I 171 Ignorance Interpretation/Statistical Mechanics: here you can say likewise that a gas is in macro-state D iff. it is in one of the micro-states which are compatible with D. Problem: VsIgnorance Interpretation, VsReichenbach. Degeneration/QM/prblty/Fraassen: there is usually more than one way to decompose a mixed state, then (1) is compatible with (2) 1/3 w = 1/3 w1 + 1/3 w’2 + 1/3 w’3. VsIgnorance Interpretation: 1) according to it we would now have to come to a probability >1! Namely 1 + 1/3. Because we would have to add up all probabilities of incompatible (disjoint) events. That cannot be: E.g. naive statistical interpretation: says, A) that state w’ cannot be attributed to a single particle, but only to ensembles. And that the number 1/3 expresses the relative size of the sub-ensemble w1, w2, and w3. Problem: we would have to say the same thing also for w’2 and w’3. I 172 With that we end up higher than 1 with 5 x 1/3. That cannot be. They must not overlap, otherwise a particle would simultaneously be in several pure states, which is impossible. Or B) if we may not ascribe any state to particles, we ask: which state belongs to sub-ensemble, which is the common part of the sub-ensemble w2 and w’2? Should not any part of an ensemble that is in a pure state also be in a pure state? Solution/Fraassen: weakening the ignorance interpretation: (FN 10). Then we say that the specification of state w is incomplete, that there is lost information about the nature that has been lost in the attribution of the mixed state. I 172 Metaphysics/QM/Fraassen: Thesis: usually the latter is an unintended metaphysical bonus. There is usually no physical difference. But: VsIgnorance Interpretation: 2) There is another situation in which the mixtures are formed naturally: Interaction: according to this, there are sometimes two separate systems X and Y which are isolated, but we only have one pure state for a complex system. Then it may be inconsistent to attribute a pure state each to X and Y. (Schrödinger: call this "the new specialty of QM"). Solution: certain mixed states are attributed to X and Y ("reduction of the density matrix" (FN 11). VsIgnorance Interpretation: that would make it impossible: because according to it, the attribution of a mixed state contains the assertion that the system is in reality in a pure state! According to it we can ascribe neither a pure nor a mixed state. I 183 Probability/Statements/Reichenbach/Fraassen: Solution: we should think of statements about probability in physics as related to ideal extend indefinitely long series. VsReichenbach: that contradicts his assertion that a probability statement is nothing more and nothing less than a statement about relative frequency in an actual reference class (which then also must be able to be small). Problem: how should we consider the actually finite series, as representing a random sample themselves of a non-actual infinite series? But which non-actual series? Thus a modal element is already introduced. ReichenbachVsModality/Fraassen: his approach of strict frequency is precisely an avoidance of modality. Infinite/Fraassen: let’s assume instead the pure case of an actual very long series. (To avoid modality): But how are we to interpret probability then? Reichenbach: we should focus only on the actual results (of a long series). I 184 Questions: 1) Is it consistent to say that probability is the same thing as relative frequency? I.e. they have the functions P(-) and relative frequency(-, s) the same properties? 2) Even if this is consistent, is the interpretation not too wide or too narrow? I.e. does the relative frequency introduce structures such as probability spaces that do not have the right properties, or vice versa, are some probability spaces not capable of providing a function of relative frequency (rel. Fr.) in the long run? FraassenVsReichenbach: the problem of his approach of strict frequency is that he hardly answers these questions. I 185 FraassenVsReichenbach: ...therefore we cannot say that relative frequencies are probabilities. Law of Large Numbers/Loln/Reichenbach/Fraassen: It is often said that these laws provide a connection between probability and relative frequency. They do that, but they do not allow a strict interpretation of the frequency. (FraassenVsReichenbach). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Speech Act Theory | Fodor Vs Speech Act Theory | II 123 Fodor’s Speech Act Theory: is neccessary because the conditions (circumstances) cannot be systematized. Also the conditions under which an apparently intended action "fails" are part of the situation. The speech act theory always lacks specification, e.g. "I promise to marry you": this can be a way to begin a joke. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. | Wolf II 20 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language. Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 433 Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell). I 384 StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true. I 385 Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year. StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood. RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language. I 386 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.) Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term. "To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify"). I 397/398 TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more. I 399 Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world). I 400 TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.) I 415 TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications. I 419 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Type Theory | Quine Vs Type Theory | III 315 Type Theory/TT/Quine: U1, U2 ... etc. logical types. Meaningless are expressions like "x e x", etc. "e2 may only stand between variables of successive type." III 316 With that we avoid confusion of constants. Example: we do not identify the number 12, which contains the class A of the Apostles, with the number 12, which contains a certain class consisting of a dozen classes. Because one is of the type U2, the other of type U3. Every type has a new number 12. ((s) Elsewhere: therefore VsType Theory: infinitely many numbers 1,2,3, etc.). Number/Existence/Ontology/Quine: that there are these numbers no longer depends on whether there are so many individuals. Type Theory/TT/Russell/Quine: Reason: we can derive an incorrect sentence without the separation of types: by simplifying the scheme (A) to (A'): (A’) (Ey)(x)(x ε y . ↔ Fx) If we then introduce the predicate «[1] ε [1]» for "F": we get the Russell antinomy/Russell paradoxy/logical form: (1) (Ey)(x)[x ε y . ↔ ~x ε x)] (2) (x)(x ε y . ↔ ~(x ε x)] (1) y (3) y ε y . ↔ ~(y ε y) (2) (4) (Ey)[y ε y . ↔ ~y ε y)]. Solution/Zermelo/VsType Theory/Quine: simpler: some predicates have classes as extension, others don't. (A') is thus considered as valid for some, but not all sentences. E.g. the predicate "[1] ε [1]" has no class as an extension. Zermelo: here (A') is assumed for the case in which the sentence has the form of a conjunction "x ε z. Gx" instead of "Fx". Then (A') becomes: (Ey)(x)( x ε y . ↔ . x ε z . Gx). Zermelo calls this the Def axiom schema of specification. To any given class z this law supplies other classes that are all sub-classes of z. But by itself it supplies at first no non-empty classes z. (...) III 318 Layers/Layered/Zermelo: (...) Sets/Classes/von Neumann/Quine: (...) Classes are not sets... III 319 Axioms/Stronger/Weaker/Quine: (...) you can seek strength or weakness. VII (e) 91 QuineVsType Theory: unnatural and uncomfortable disadvantages: 1) Universal class: because the TT only allows uniform types as members of a class, the universal class V leads to an infinite series of quasi universal classes, each for one type. 2) Negation: ~x ceases to comprise all non-elements of x, and only comprises those non-elements that do not belong to the next lower level! VII (e) 92 3) Zero class: even that accordingly leads to an infinite number of zero classes. ((s) for each level its own zero class). ((s) Absurd: we cannot distinguish different zero classes.) 4) Boolean class algebra: is no longer applicable to classes in general, but is reproduced at each level. 5) Relational calculus: accordingly. to be re-established at each level. 6) Arithmetic: the numbers cease to be uniform! at each level (type) appears a new 0, new 1, new 2, and so on! Quine: instead counterproposal: QuineVsType Theory: Solution: Instead: variables with unlimited range, the concept of hierarchical formulas only survives in one point where we write numbers for variables and, without any reference to type theory, we replace R3 by the weaker: R3' If φ is stratified and does not contain "x", then (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ φ) is a theorem. Negation: ~x then contains everything that is not part of x. Zero class: there is only one zero class. Universal class: there is similarly only one universal class that contains absolutely everything, including itself. Relation, arithmetic, numbers: everything works out again comes in this way. VII (e) 93 Only difference between R3 and R3': R3' lacks a guarantee for the existence of such classes as: y^ (y ε y), y^~(y ε y), etc. In the case of some non-hierarchical formulas the existence of appropriate classes is still to be demonstrated through absurd consequences: R3' results in: (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε w))) and by inserting this results in subsitution inference (1) (Ex)(y) ((y ε x) ↔ ((z ε y) l (y ε z))) through the other rules What asserts the existence of a class y^ ((z ε y) l (y ε z)) whose generating formula is not hierarchical. But probably we cannot prove its existence. (From these follows inter alia Russell's paradox). Within a system, we can explicitly use such contradictions to take their existence ad absurdum. That (1) can be demonstrated, in turn, shows that the derivation strength of our system "NF" (New Foundations, Quine) exceeds the Principia Mathematica(1). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Verificationism | Davidson Vs Verificationism | II 18 Davidson: understanding a sentence means: knowing under which conditions it becomes true. For that, you need not to know whether it is true nor how to determine that, but you just have to imagine what would be the case if it were true: >truth-conditional semantics. Accordingly: Interpretation Theory: specification of >truth conditions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Tarski Vs Wittgenstein | Berka I 410 Analytical/Tarski: the division of terms into logical and extra-logical ones also plays an important role in the specification of this term. I 411 Tautology/Tarski: however, some authors see analytical statements as an exact formal correlate of the concept of tautology (i.e. a statement that says nothing about reality). TarskiVsWittgenstein/VsWiener Schule: that seems vague to me. I 412 Foot note Tautology/Wittgenstein/Berka: that T says nothing about reality, stems from Wittgenstein's conception of formal truth: according to this, the expression (p > q) > ((q > r) > p > r)) true by its form alone. (1) Tautology/material/formal/G. Klaus: the difference between formal and material truths does not lie in the fact that one of the two (the material one) requires a reference to reality, and the other does not, but only in the way in which the truth is founded. What representatives of the theory of formal truth call material W is what can be confirmed by practice and experiment. The formal, on the other hand, are merely derived from arithmetic operations. G. KlausVs: but this does not prove the truth, but only leads it back to the truth of other statements, which in turn still require justification. (G. Klaus, (1966), S 117).(2) 1. A.Tarski, „Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. VII, ASI 394, Paris 1936, pp 1-11 2. G. Klaus, Moderne Logik, Berlin 1966 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Wittgenstein | Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein | I 55 CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. --- Hintikka I 133 ... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege. Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski) CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that). --- I 134 But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Meixner Vs Wittgenstein | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: Example "that Regensburg is situated at the Danube" is a name for a factual entity. Example "to be square": Name, but not for an individual or a factual entity, but a name for a property. (Property name). I 32 The names tell us which entities the ontology calculates with. But they are only certain indicators for entities. We do not know if they refer successfully. (> Reference). However, if names were mistrusted in principle, language would lose a large part of its ontological relevance. I 33 Meixner: "ontological basic trust": where there is a name, there is also the corresponding entity". Therefore we can assume that the names tell us something about ontology on the whole. MeixnerVsWittgenstein: had no deeper justification for his skeptical intention of fundamental linguistic criticism. I 125 World/real world/actual world/sum/subject/state of affairs/Meixner: for "the sum of all existing state of affairs par excellence" one can also say: "the real (actual) world", or briefly "the world". (>Wittgenstein: speaks of facts, not of things that form the world). MeixnerVsWittgenstein: but one can also call the world a single large actual individual (namely the sum of all actual individuals). Vs: but the world as state of affairs has the advantage that non-actual, thus possible worlds (poss.w.) must also be state of affairs, and thus belong to the same category. Because it is not possible, since they belong to different ontological categories. Possible Worlds/poss.w./Meixner: what kind of state of affairs do they form? The paradigmatic possible worlds and the non-actual possible worlds must have something designating in common. I 126 Actual World/Real World: maximum consistency state of affairs. And also the possible world. That is what they have in common. ((s) They cannot be contradictory in themselves. That is why we need separate possible worlds.) Maximal Consistent/Meixner: incomparably richer in content than just consistent state of affairs. Possible Worlds: are so rich in content that they are temporally determined and for each state of affairs x, which is temporally determined or time-differentiated, have either this itself or its negation as partial-state of affairs. Part: the partial relationship between state of affairs is the specification of the relational transcendental "part of" for state of affairs. For example that Fritz is taller than Anna is part-state-of-affairs of the state of affairs that Anna is shorter than Fritz. General: If sentence B follows logically from sentence A, then the state of affairs is that B is part of the state of affairs that A. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
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Reference |
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| Physicalism | Pro | Block I 167 Def functionalism * /a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, per: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. > Psycho functionalism. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Functionalism | Block I 167 Def functionalism* / a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, pro: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Compositionality | Cresswell, M.J. | I 113 Brain state / Meaning / Cresswell: thesis: there is no possibility to understand a mental event as e.g. that broccoli are abominable except by virtue of any specification of its parts. |
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