Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deceptions | Avramides | I 51 Deception/Counter-Example/VsGrice: patterns are always important. - We move away from the speaker's intention to the meaning-bearing property of the utterance. >Utterance meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Context, >Situation. We should always accept an intention more. Solution: patterns - (Distribution of intentions). Problem: infiniteness: tjere are always infiniteley many possible intentions. Solution: something that forces the speaker's intention to the line of the utterance. To prevent the intent to deceive. Ultimately communication is something ideal. >Communication, cf. >Ideal speech community/Habermas. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Ideal Speech Community | |||
| Ideal Speech Community | Habermas | IV 163 Communication community/ideal speech community/Habermas: the utopian design of an ideal speech community is misleading if one misunderstands it as a guide to a philosophy of history and misunderstands that the methodological significance of this design can only be limited. The construction of an unlimited and undistorted discourse can only be used for modern societies as a foil with the intention of making indistinct tendencies of development emerge in more garish contours. Following on from Mead and Durkheim, we can say that language not only serves to update, but increasingly also to achieve rationally motivated agreements. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Signals | Mead | Habermas IV 16 Signal/Mead/Habermas: Signals are embedded in such interaction contexts that they always serve to coordinate the actions of different interaction participants: the quasi-indicative and quasi-expressive sense of utterance form a unity with the quasi-imperativist sense. Habermas IV 17 The level of symbolically mediated interaction is characterized by the fact that only signals are available to a speech community. ((s) For the current state of the discussion, see Symbols/Deacon). |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sociology | Mead | Habermas IV 9 Sociology/G. H. Mead/Habermas: G. H. Mead (1863-1931) is one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, along with Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Mead and Durkheim take Werber's concept of rationalization as their starting point. Mead creates a communication-theoretical foundation of sociology. Community: Mead designs the utopia of an ideal communication community. >Ideal speech community. Habermas IV 10 This is the reconstruction of an intact inter-subjectivity that allows individuals to communicate with each other in an informal way, as well as the identity of an individual who communicates informally with himself/herself. >Intersubjectivity. Habermas IV 12 However, Mead did not take note of the linguistic change in philosophy. (1) 1.For introduction and for an extensive bibliography of Mead: D. Käsler, Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens, Bd. 2 München 1978; darin: H. Joas, G. H. Mead S. 17ff. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causal Theory | Evans Vs Causal Theory | I 320 VsCausal Theory/Names/Generic Term/Evans: there are not two mechanisms at play, one for baptism and for the preservation of reference. Generic Terms, unlike names, can change their meaning! E.g. Madagascar: Marco Polo misunderstood the report by Malayan seafarers and transferred the mangled name for an area of the mainland to the island. I 321 EvansVsCausal Theory: It must also be improved for E.g. swapped babies. The man who bears the name bears it, because another baby was given that name! E.g. Suppose Bible scholars argued today that another than Goliath had slain David: Elhannan the Bethlehemite. David is said to have killed another Philistine. Now, if an entire speech community linked no other information than that Goliath was the man who was slain by David, that does not mean, however, that "Goliath" referred to that man in this community. I 334 EvansVsCausal Theory/EvansVsKripke: E.g. a young man A leaves his village in the Scottish Highlands to make his fortune. 50 years later, a man B comes to the village and lives as a hermit behind the hills. Three or four villagers of that time are still alive and mistakenly believe it is the villager who left the place and whom they consequently call "turnip". This name comes into use in the village community. If the error is discovered, they are more likely to express the sentence "It was not Turnip, after all" than to absurdly express the phrase: "it looks as if Turnip did not come from the village". Evans: they had used the name of A to say false things about him. E.g. Should the elderly die, the way would be open for a new use of the name. Evans: It is important that the information that the old villagers give to the young. (E.g. "He was a beautiful type for women"). I 335 As rich, coherent and important for these could be that A might be the predominant source of their information. In this case they could then say "the man is not Turnip, after all". Alternative: "respectfully" the young villagers could continue to use the name respectfully towards the old villagers: Turnip, "whoever it may be". Name/Reference/Evans: reference is determined by sets of information and not by fitting! Nevertheless, the importance of causality is preserved. Also, the logic is not contradicted: identity statements are necessary! Information is individuated by its origin. If A is the source of a set of information, it could have been nothing else. I 336 Consequently, nothing else could have been this a. EvansVsCausal Theory: false hope to be able to leave the intention of the speaker completely aside. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Field, H. | Stalnaker Vs Field, H. | Field II 28 Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning. FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider". Field II 94 StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language. A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant. StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states. Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this: FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that. Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations. 2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms. Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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