Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Communication Theory Habermas Bubner I 196
Habermas/Communication theory/Bubner: Thesis: Thinking of the functioning of the political system according to the model of dialogue. Clear formal conditions which should be transferred to the political system as a whole. 1. Equality of the partners, no relationship between the knowing and the ignorant.
>Interaction, >Master/slave dicalectic.
2. This is not to take place, as in Hegel, by laboriously dealing with the relation of master and servant, but rather as a priori, without which there is no interaction at all.
2. Obligation to refrain from influencing, equal scope.
3. Authenticity postulate: obligation to truth. Since intentions are not to be examined, only the course of the dialogue itself can provide the proof.
>Discourse, >Argumentation.
BubnerVsHabermas: since one builds from the outset on truthfulness, it is obviously more a question of definition, which one wants to allow as a dialogue at all.
>Truthfulness, >Truth.
Bubner I 198
Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in fact, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal.
Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism.
>Ideal speech community.
Bubner I 199
2. the planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet consensus, and consensus is the foundation of collective practice.
>Collectives/Habermas, >Practice.
In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics.
3. It is not clear what is actually the content of the event.
  With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The content becomes playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences.
BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was in the community of action-orientated values is seen as historically overtaken or consumed.
>Values, >The Good/Aristotle.
The signum of modernism, subjectivity, no longer allows the focus on good life, for this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual.
>Subjectivity, >Individuals.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Deceptions Avramides I 51
Deception/Counter-Example/VsGrice: patterns are always important. - We move away from the speaker's intention to the meaning-bearing property of the utterance. >Utterance meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Context,
>Situation.
We should always accept an intention more.
Solution: patterns - (Distribution of intentions).
Problem: infiniteness: tjere are always infiniteley many possible intentions.
Solution: something that forces the speaker's intention to the line of the utterance.
To prevent the intent to deceive.
Ultimately communication is something ideal.
>Communication, cf. >Ideal speech community/Habermas.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Ideal Speech Community
Ideal Speech Community Habermas IV 163
Communication community/ideal speech community/Habermas: the utopian design of an ideal speech community is misleading if one misunderstands it as a guide to a philosophy of history and misunderstands that the methodological significance of this design can only be limited. >Philosophy of history, >Progress, >Historiography.
The construction of an unlimited and undistorted discourse can only be used for modern societies as a foil with the intention of making indistinct tendencies of development emerge in more garish contours.
>Discourse, >Discourse theory.
Following on from Mead and Durkheim, we can say that language not only serves to update, but increasingly also to achieve rationally motivated agreements.

>Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas,
>Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas,
>Communicative rationality/Habermas, >E. Durkheim, >G.H. Mead.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Signals Mead Habermas IV 16
Signal/Mead/Habermas: Signals are embedded in such interaction contexts that they always serve to coordinate the actions of different interaction participants: the quasi-indicative and quasi-expressive sense of utterance form a unity with the quasi-imperativist sense.
Habermas IV 17
The level of symbolically mediated interaction is characterized by the fact that only signals are available to a speech community. ((s) For the current state of the discussion, see Symbols/Deacon).

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Sociology Mead Habermas IV 9
Sociology/G. H. Mead/Habermas: G. H. Mead (1863-1931) is one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, along with Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Mead and Durkheim take Werber's concept of rationalization as their starting point. Mead creates a communication-theoretical foundation of sociology. Community: Mead designs the utopia of an ideal communication community.
>Ideal speech community.
Habermas IV 10
This is the reconstruction of an intact inter-subjectivity that allows individuals to communicate with each other in an informal way, as well as the identity of an individual who communicates informally with himself/herself. >Intersubjectivity.
Habermas IV 12
However, Mead did not take note of the linguistic change in philosophy. (1)
1. For introduction and for an extensive bibliography of Mead: D. Käsler, Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens, Bd. 2 München 1978; darin: H. Joas, G. H. Mead S. 17ff.

Mead I
George Herbert Mead
Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967
German Edition:
Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Validity Claims Habermas III 65
Definition validity claim/Habermas: a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of a statement are fulfilled. While yes/no opinions on claims to power are arbitrary, statements on claims of validity are characterised by the fact that the listener agrees or disagrees with a criticisable statement for reasons. They are an expression of insight. HabermasVsTugendhat: this neglects this distinction in E. Tugendhat 1976(1).
III 66
Examples of claims of validity are those of truth, correctness, appropriateness or comprehensibility (or well-formedness). These claims of validity are usually implicitly raised. >Truth, >Correctness, >Appropriateness, >Understandability, >Well-formedness.
IV 107
Validity Claim/Speech Act/Habermas: a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his/her offer independently of the normative context. >Motivation.
This is not the achievement of an effect with the listener, but a rationally motivated communication with the listener, which comes about on the basis of a criticisable validity claim. This is about a speaker's demand that the listener should accept a sentence as true or as truthful.
>Agreement.
IV 111
Norm validity/truth/Durkheim/Habermas: the idea of truth can only borrow from the concept of norm validity the determination of the impersonality deprived of time (2) of an idealized agreement, an inter-subjectivity related to an ideal communication community. >Norms, >Ideal speech community.
The authority behind knowledge does not (...) coincide with the moral authority behind norms. Rather, the concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with the claim to intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, the idea of correspondence of sentences and facts with the concept of an idealized consensus.
>Consensus, >Intersubjectivity, >Correspondence, >Facts, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Experience.
Validity Claim/Habermas: only from this connection does the term of a criticizable validity claim emerge.


1. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1976, p. 76f, 219ff
2. Vgl. 1.E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, S. 584.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Causal Theory Evans Vs Causal Theory I 320
VsCausal Theory/Names/Generic Term/Evans: there are not two mechanisms at play, one for baptism and for the preservation of reference. Generic Terms, unlike names, can change their meaning! E.g. Madagascar: Marco Polo misunderstood the report by Malayan seafarers and transferred the mangled name for an area of ​​the mainland to the island.
I 321
EvansVsCausal Theory: It must also be improved for E.g. swapped babies. The man who bears the name bears it, because another baby was given that name! E.g. Suppose Bible scholars argued today that another than Goliath had slain David: Elhannan the Bethlehemite. David is said to have killed another Philistine. Now, if an entire speech community linked no other information than that Goliath was the man who was slain by David, that does not mean, however, that "Goliath" referred to that man in this community.
I 334
EvansVsCausal Theory/EvansVsKripke: E.g. a young man A leaves his village in the Scottish Highlands to make his fortune. 50 years later, a man B comes to the village and lives as a hermit behind the hills. Three or four villagers of that time are still alive and mistakenly believe it is the villager who left the place and whom they consequently call "turnip". This name comes into use in the village community. If the error is discovered, they are more likely to express the sentence "It was not Turnip, after all" than to absurdly express the phrase: "it looks as if Turnip did not come from the village". Evans: they had used the name of A to say false things about him. E.g. Should the elderly die, the way would be open for a new use of the name. Evans: It is important that the information that the old villagers give to the young. (E.g. "He was a beautiful type for women").
I 335
As rich, coherent and important for these could be that A might be the predominant source of their information. In this case they could then say "the man is not Turnip, after all". Alternative: "respectfully" the young villagers could continue to use the name respectfully towards the old villagers: Turnip, "whoever it may be". Name/Reference/Evans: reference is determined by sets of information and not by fitting! Nevertheless, the importance of causality is preserved. Also, the logic is not contradicted: identity statements are necessary! Information is individuated by its origin. If A is the source of a set of information, it could have been nothing else.
I 336
Consequently, nothing else could have been this a. EvansVsCausal Theory: false hope to be able to leave the intention of the speaker completely aside.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Field, H. Stalnaker Vs Field, H. Field II 28
Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning.
FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider".

Field II 94
StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language.
A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant.
StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states.
Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this:
FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that.
Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations.
2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms.
Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994