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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attribution | Perry | Frank I 451 f Proposition/propositional attitude/PerryVsFrege: The expressions in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents refer. > Cresswell: structured meanings. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Authors/Titles | Cresswell | M.J. Cresswell Hughes I G.E. Hughes M.J.Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 I Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 II Cresswell Structured Meanings Die Semantik propositionaler Einstellungen 1984 Cambridge Maß, MIT Press Bradford Books |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Predicates | Cresswell | II 64 Def simple Predicate/Cresswell: is a predicate, where the condition for the manner in which it has to be represented, is not part of its meaning. Simple predicates we need for our structured meanings - i.e. those where you can say the meaning is the set of things that satisfy P. >Meaning. II 70 Meaning/Intension/Cresswell: in the case of a simple predicate, the meaning is nothing but the intension. >Intensions. II 70 Def Intension: of the predicate P: what determines the extension in each world. >Extensions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Proper Names | Cresswell | I 174 Name/proper names/Cresswell: Names could also predicates! (1985a(1), 153) maybe Pedro means "is called "Pedro"". >Descriptions, >Predicates. II 44 Names/meaning/bearer/Cresswell: Problem: if the meanings of the name are the bearers, then "Quentin says that Hesperus is Phosphorus" should mean the same as "Quentin says Phosphorus is Phosphorus." (Attribution of propositional attitudes). >Propositional attitudes, >Morning star/evening star, >Identity. II 152 Name/VsDescription-Theory/Cresswell: e.g. a description "the thing that is called "Phosphorus"" singles out a whole class of things. - Therefore it is ambiguous. >Ambiguity, >Definite descriptions, >Phosphorus/Hesperus. 1. Cresswell, M.J. (1985a). Structured Meanings. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Perry | Frank I 451f Proposition / propositional stance / PerryVsFrege: the expressions embedded in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents relate. > Cresswell: structured meanings, >Propositions, >Designation, >Objects, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Identification, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, >Reference. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Situation Semantics | Barwise | Cresswell II 169 Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. >Equivalence, >Double negation. Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ..."). >Situations. Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations. Cresswell I 63 Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations. >Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics. Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete). CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7) Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds. Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations. Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation. >Possible World Semantics. What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds. I 64 Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress. I 65 CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification. >Context. False sentences: describe non-actual situations. I 66 Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. >Interpretation, >Sentence meaning. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true. Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time. I 67 On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks e*: = in I, Mollie, yes. That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?). Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that u[[φ]] e iff e* < e. ((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.) The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context. Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property. >Atomic sentences. Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u. In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely. 1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry 2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293 3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press 4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x |
Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Symbols | Cresswell | I 94 Simple Symbol/Cresswell: Meaning = reference - E.g. if all the singers sing and all the dancers dance, then singing = dancing - (this is insoluble in possible-world-semantics). >Possible world semantics. differently: Structured meaning/complex symbol: here the problem is solvable in the semantics of possible worlds. E.g. extensional: E.g. "inductive"/"finite". E.g. intensional: Singer/Dancer. >Intensions, >Extensions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Truth-conditional Sem. | Katz Vs Truth-conditional Sem. | Cresswell II 145 Semantics/Katz/Cresswell: (Katz 1972 and many other articles). KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics: 1. (Katz 1982): all other approaches except Katz's own reduce meaning to something else, including truth conditions. VsKatz: his own critique depends on the fact that he already knows that truth conditions are something other than meaning. ((s) So the approaches he criticizes cannot be circular). CresswellVsKatz: his semantics are not wrong, but they are incomplete. Semantics/Cresswell: "semantic data": e.g. meaning of sentences, e.g. synonymy of pairs of sentences, etc. Cresswell II 146 KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics/Cresswell: 2. it results in all logically equivalent propositions having the same meaning. Especially in the version of possible world semantics. (1982, 190): Katz acknowledges that there are attempts at a solution. Example Lewis (1972). KatzVsLewis/Cresswell: Katz's approach seems to demand structured meanings. Lexical Decomposition/Katz/Cresswell: this is used by Katz to trace meanings back to semantic basic concepts. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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