Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Superposition | Cartwright | I 194 Decay/superposition: in a component of the superposition the atom is still in the excited state and there are no photons in the other component, the atom is not excited and the field contains a photon in the corresponding frequency. N.B.: the atom is not in the inner nor in the outer orbit and the photon is neither absent nor in the field. Probability: what decreases exponentially in time, is the probability that the system is "found" in a state where the atom is stimulated and no photon is in field. >Quantum mechanics. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Superposition | Simons | I 128 Def Superposition/Simons: when different individuals with identical parts are at the same time in the same place it is called superposition. SimonsVsQuine: instead of "content of one portion space time". >Spacetime, >Four-dimensionalism. Such occupiers must be continuants anyway. Events: among events the extensionality principle is fulfilled. Masses: masses need different meanings of "part". >Parts, >Mass terms. I 211f Superposition instead of coincidence: e.g. ring/gold, e.g. person/body. These are not two individuals, but relation one-many. They are not identical, but take the same space, e.g. ring/gold: have different stories. >Statue/Clay, >Person, >Individuals. I 223 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of material can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) intensionally). Existence conditions: existence conditions are determined by the sortal term (linguistically). Different existence conditions: things can last for different times and still be red at the same time. E.g. (s) an astronaut in the orbit can become uncle. I 237 Superposition/Doepke/Simons: whenever a and b are superimposed, they must have a common part, they must be composed entirely of a third party, c. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burke, Michael | Simons Vs Burke, Michael | I 195 Interrupted Existence/Simons: interrupted existence met us in connection with temporal sums and products and will meet us again below in connection with superposition (to be in the same place at the same time). Anyway, it is not clear to decide if it exists: E.g. an artifact can be taken apart and reassembled, for example for maintenance or repair. Here, we will say that it exists again when it resumes its old function. I 197 E.g. if some parts are scattered and may be lost and must be replaced by other parts it is a matter of chance. Then the question is whether an object exists in the state, not only dependent on the current physical state and on the history but also on the further course of development, and that seems wrong. Artifacts/Simons: of course, the conditions for the survival of artifacts are vague. We certainly allow the replacement of parts. E.g. a machine that is fed with any powder and water and busts of Mozart are made of it. After a while, the busts are crashed and the powder is filled again in the machine. Then again a bust of Mozart is made. Should it be the same? No, because the atoms are in another place. E.g. variant: in the variant Mozart and Beethoven busts are produced alternately. Then the case would be clear anyway. (For the defenders of continuity): there is a new bust every time, despite the complete continuity. Stronger example: Chisholm's toy castle: here the building blocks are always in the same place. E.g. Michael Burke: a table is created with thirty blocks, then disassembled and with the same building blocks a chair and a bird house are created. Then again a table. I 198 Burke: 1. The table ended its existence when being disassembled: 2. The same table is created again. Simons: then the continuity theorists are in trouble no matter what strategies they apply. But Burke leaves the way open for them to deny identity across the gap: they can still claim that the example corresponds to the one of the busts, despite the fixed localization of parts: a new table is always created out of old material. BurkeVs: pro identity. SimonsVsBurke: Burke's arguments for identity are less convincing than for the ends of the existence of the table. His point is rather that so well controlled interruptions are ontologically harmless and not one has to search the traces of parts across the gap. "Continuity Theory"/terminology/Simons: the continuity theory is the thesis that the "old" existence is resumed after the interruption. SimonsVs: it paid a price for it: namely the exaggeration of objects which are broken down into its parts or duplication of objects that do not take place. Simons: but both views seem benign: each has its arguments. The only problem is that the two are contradicting each other. This can be seen with e.g. the Ship of Theseus. I 199 Ship of Theseus/Simons: problem: there are conflicting claims: between a) the "Collector": he places value on substantive continuity and b) the "Pragmatist": he wants functional continuity. Problem: both sides have complementary things that speak for each of them. Wrong solution: "relativized identity": then both sides would virtually no longer "touch" each other but that would not explain why there is a problem at all. SimonsVsBurke: that the type of an object is a function of its properties is regardless of it wrong: e.g. objects that are needed in a community: there are many pairs of objects which are physico-chemically exactly alike but belong to different types: e.g. holy/normal water, real/ perfectly counterfeit banknotes, originals/replicas, wedding rings/other rings, maybe also person/body. Of course, each of these objects falls under a higher sortal. Burke: thesis: various substantive objects cannot be simultaneously embodied in one and the same matter. SimonsVsBurke: on the contrary, e.g. (see above) different boards may have the same members. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Doepke, F.C. | Simons Vs Doepke, F.C. | I 228 Composition/mereology/Doepke: e.g. the Ship of Theseus, but not the wood of the ship is composed of planks. Although each part of the collection of atoms of you is part you and each part of the wood is a part of the ship, you and the ship have additional parts that are not shared by the collection of atoms and of the wood. SimonsVsDoepke: if Cesar (C) and the collection of atoms or matter m to t coincide, that means that C t m then Cesar's heart h is part of m to t. ((s) that means that for every single moment it is no problem). Doepke: relies on intuition to deny it. Simons: we need good reasons to claim that the heart is not part of the matter. Pro CP: CP stands for simplicity but only at first glance. If coincidence is both necessary and sufficient for superposition,... I 229 ...then the relationship between mereological and spatial considerations are very direct. One can, for example, show that spatial extension is part of another, if one finds a continuant that occupied each one, so that the one continuant is part of the other (sic). Conversely, if s1 and s2 are regions, so that s1 < s2, then for every x, y, and t, so that s1 = rtx and s2 = rty: resulting sum x) does not tolerate the loss of a single part. It was a plural sum in the sense of SUM (see above). Problem: then it looks like that the wall may think in particular type changes, and therefore the wall would have to constitute the stones. This applies to everything that can lose parts without dying, e.g. snowball. Problem: then concepts such as "the stones that form the walls (compose) or "the snow that constituted the snowball" (sic) are time-variable designators. Constitution: we want to exclude reciprocal constitution. Solution: Def constitution/SimonsVsDoepke: :x constitutes y to t iff. x could be a substrate of y’s complete destruction. Complete destruction: what this means, however, varies with the context. I 240 Not every part has to be destroyed completely. Constitution/Simons: a constituted object can be destroyed completely by destroying a few components. This ensures the asymmetry of the constitution. |
Peter Simons I P. Simons Parts Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Simons Vs Essentialism | I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same. Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub. Simons: this is the only example of "person and object". I 273 As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table: N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c]) Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...". Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected. Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)! I 275 SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom. I 276 (...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm. SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change. I 278 Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally. Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music"). I 338 Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.) Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori. E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada. Continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms. |
Peter Simons I P. Simons Parts Oxford New York 1987 |
| Everett, H. | Esfeld Vs Everett, H. | I 333 universeller Quantenholismus/QH/Quantenmechanik/QM/Everett: (Dissertation, 1957): These: jedes physikalische System einschließlich makroskopischer Systeme ist ein Quantensystem. I 334 Viele Welten Deutung/QM/EsfeldVsEverett: unklar, wie sich eine Verzweigung von Welten ereignen könnte. Wenn die Verzweigung kein Ersatz für eine Zustandsreduktion sein soll, wird ein universeller QH vertreten. Version von Lockwood (1989): Bewußtsein des Beobachters Teil der Verschränkung: Superposition des Produktzustands: I 335 "Elektron Spin plus, Geräteanzeige +1, Beobachter ist sich Spin plus bewußt" mit dem Produktzustand: " .........minus ......... 1 ........ 1 bewußt". |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Extensionality | Simons Vs Extensionality | I 116 Extensionality/Simons: we leave extensionality with the rejection of ≤. I 117 ≤: the relation ≤ is not antisymmetric, it is a partial order, that means it is reflexive and transitive. In terms of it one can define a symmetric predicate: Def coincidence of parts/mereology/spelling/Simons: SD16 x ≤≥ y ≡ x ≤ y u y ≤ x. Coinciding individuals are perceptually indistinguishable for their period of coincidence. They are in superposition. Def superposition/mereology/Simons: they occupy the same place at the same time. Question: (see below): do all superposed objects coincide mereologically? By rejecting the proper parts principle we receive an abundance of descriptions and explanatory power. SimonsVsExtensionality: extensionality is too ascetic for mereology. I 251 Part/SimonsVsExtensionality/VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: we see which abundance we have to give up if we want to remain extensional, because now we have three concepts of part instead of one, which throws together the SSP and there may be even more. CEM/Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is actually a substantive thesis: individuals who are of the same material are identified. Coincidence-Principle/Simons: 1. For the two more powerful coincidence concepts of identity and the strong coincidence we refuse it. 2. For weak coincidence we allow it, provided we consider only superimposed material individuals. Strictly weak inclusion: e.g. there is no reason to deny that Caesar's heart is weakly included in the matter of Caesar. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Indeterminism | Lewis Vs Indeterminism | V 37 Asymmetry/knowledge/past/future/asymmetry of indeterminism/Lewis: Is it because we imagine that our world is ruled by indeterministic laws that we think that the actual past and present have a nomistic link with different future sequels? LewisVs: Well, I believe that it also fails. Determinism/Lewis: a) it is uncertain whether our world is undetermined. Asymmetry is more certain. >Quantum mechanics (QM) is suited best to make us believe in indeterminism, but then QM needs to give us better explanations regarding the >measurement problem. b) Indeterminism/Lewis: a more feeble reason to believe in it would be indeterministic laws of nature in both ways, i.e. that the actual present and future have a nomistic link with different pasts. e.g. Reduction of a wave packet: In which a given superposition is followed by different eigenstates, but it could also be a process in which a given eigenstate is led by many superpositions. Important Argument: we do not have an asymmetry again! LewisVsIndeterminism: Is neither sufficient nor necessary for the asymmetry we are discussing here. We will ignore him here. Thesis: Asymmetry could maybe also happen under deterministic conditions. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Cartwright Vs Quantum Mechanics | I 197 Master equation/QM/Cartwright: when it is derived, the system is coupled to a reservoir. In theory, the two should developed into a superposition of composite space. MarkovVsSuperposition: removes the interference terms and decouples the system. This, in turn, is justified by the large number of degrees of freedom of the reservoir. These lead to short correlation times. Problem: (of this solution attempt for the characterization problem): 1) the reduction often also takes place in other situations. But our solution is only suitable for a few cases. 2) even if the application could be extended, it would not really solve the characterization problem: Because we postulate two entirely different types of development and want to see then whether a particular physical characteristic ((s)> property) is given if one or the other is present. Problem: this characteristic only exists in the model, not in the real situation! Interference: in order to eliminate it, the number of degrees of freedom must be infinite, which is obviously not possible. Or accordingly, the correlation time would have to be 0. We could try the other way around and simply demand that all systems have an infinite number of degrees of freedom. I 198 Vs: That would not help us to distinguish the two types of development either. Problem: sheer size does not divide the world into parts. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Simons Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 60 Ontology/variables/quantification/Lesniewski/Simons: because of his understanding of quantification Lesniewski can quantify over variables (otherwise 2nd order logic). I 61 But by this he does not enter into any commitment. Quantification/Lesniewski: quantification was described by Quine as substitutional quantification but... SimonsVsQuine: ...Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions and he also does not assume an infinite number of expressions. That would be implausible for him as a nominalist. Küng/Canty/solution: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions but on their extensions. Thus, abstract entities are still allowed through the back door. Simons: you could say that Lesniewski developed a combinatorial semantics, that is based on a simple idea of an "extensional" meaning so that an expression of the form "Π ... [__]" is true iff. the matrix is true regardless of the meaning of the variables. "∏"/Lesniewski/ordinary language translation/Simons: "∏" simply means "for all". I 123 Four-Dimensionalism/Quine: (1960, W. + O.): physical objects in four-dimensional space-time are not distinguishable from events (more concrete: from processes). I 124 Substance/Quine: a substance differs from other physical objects in that there are relatively few atoms that (temporary) lie partly in it partly outside of it. Substance/SimonsVsQuine: this is simply wrong: material substances are not simply those who win or lose a few atoms. I 128 Extension/Quine: Quine called their occupants: "content of a portion of space-time". SimonsVs: instead, we assume superposition (different individuals with identical parts in the same place at the same time). Continuants/SimonsVsQuine: if such occupants exist at all, they have to be continuants. Events/Simons: events seem at least to have a chance to meet the extensionalist principle no matter whether arbitrary sums are approved. Here, we need definitions of the concepts of temporal and spatial part. Masses: here, we need different meanings of "part" to capture the relations between individuals, between classes or between masses. But this is different than the criticism in the last chapter because here it is about that there may be various analog applications. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Reductionism | Verschiedene Vs Reductionism | Metzinger II 471 VsReductionism: if a macro-phenomenon may be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms, the reduction of macro-phenomenon to a single micro-phenomenon is impossible then. ("multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs: Statement/Churchland: Explanations and thus reductions are area-specific. Simons I 214 Reductionist view of Superposition/Chisholm: Thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example: machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontologically superior to their whole! For example, the whole is ontologically subordinate: a heap of pre-existing stones that only remains because it is not destroyed. Example: Whole ontologically predominant: Organism: possesses properties and operates according to laws that are relatively independent of the respective material constituents. I 215 An organism survives many replacements of parts. (>Flux). DoepkeVsReductionism: the existence of the constituted objects, which retain their properties across the flux, makes it superfluous to explain why precisely these successive chemicals assume certain properties. Wright I 202 "Natural Thought"/Realism/Natural Sciences: nothing that constitutes an intuitive scientific realism requires semantic realism. I 203 1. VsReductionism: the theoretical vocabulary of natural science is not a dispensable substitute for a more basic vocabulary. 2. Statements formulated with theoretical vocabulary can be true or false in a meaningful sense, because they have to do with the representation of objective facts. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Simons, P. | Wiggins Vs Simons, P. | Simons I 216 Superposition/Simons: it is not just a pragmatic resistance that lets us assume that two objects cannot be superposed and yet have no common part. Simons: nevertheless pro, WigginsVsSuperposition/WigginsVsSimons: he makes this clear in the following principle: Principle/Wiggins: A and a real part or component B of a third thing C, where A unequal C and A ≠ B and where no part or component of A is a part or component of B or of C, cannot completely occupy the same space at the same time. Simons: where does this lead? rta: be the container from a to t. This means that space can become the object of timeless operators and predicates of extensional mereology. Frame of Reference: we assume it as fixed, so that identity of spaces can be determined. Then we can apply all axioms of CEM (Extensional Mereology), also the Sum-Axiom and the SSP are not contradictory. (…+…) I 217 SimonsVsWiggins: that does not seem particularly frightening. It even seems to be able to be amplified. For example, we can assume a Strong Supplement Principle (SSP) that is relativized to times: (…+…) SimonsVsCoincidence Principle: if it were correct, it would establish a very close conceptual link between mereological relations and spatial relations between continuants. Simons pro Wiggins: in any case we can agree that "space" can only be mapped by reference to its occupants. ((s) >no "empty space"). Thus, the conceptual utility of the part-whole relations between continuants will consist in their necessity for the formation of spatial concepts. Coincidence Principle/Simons: it is neat and it provides a seductive simplification. SimonsVsCoincidence Principle/SimonsVsWiggins: one pays too high a price. I 218 But with his rejection we must also reject one of the premises, WP, PP or SSP. Which one? I would reject SSP (see below). But first we want to test WP against a hypothetical counter-example from Sharvy. I 220 WigginsVsSuperposition/Simons: his argument for WP goes like this: Suppose A and B were distinct and at the same place at the same time. Then they cannot be distinguished by location. Then they have to be distinguished by their properties. Problem: no space region (volume) can be described simultaneously by different predicates (be it color, form, texture etc.). (s) It cannot be spherical and cube-shaped at the same time). I 221 Simons: the latter may be true, but that does not speak against the possibility of a perfect mixture, because its qualities do not have to be those of its ingredients in isolation, which is proved by the imperfect mixtures every day. ((s) Contradiction to above I 218: there mixture of compound is distinguished by the fact that the properties of the ingredients are largely preserved in the mixture.) Superposition/Simons: Assuming that it would be possible that the occupation of space by a mass would be a gradual matter, then it would be possible that different masses occupy the same region Simons: although the occupation would have different intensity distributions. Simons: if this were the case, Wiggins' principle would be wrong and then we would have to doubt its necessity. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Various Authors | Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 433 Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics: Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities. LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today). Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object. I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle. I 435 Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph 0 objects of finite size? Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number. II 102 Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement. II 103 Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche. 2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled. 3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness. 4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states. (Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104). I 423 Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive. I 424 If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative. Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years. KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless. I 296 Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Wiggins, D. | Simons Vs Wiggins, D. | I 130 Event/mereology/relation/Simons: how do the mereological relations between events look like? Here, we do not need to modify the predicates timely like continuants. This makes the event interesting for philosophers who want to preserve the extensionality. Relation currently: is for events direct and narrow. Relation to the space: is for events indirect on the continuants involved in them. Duality/Wiggins: (1980,25-6,n12): events are "dual" to continuants in this regard. SimonsVsWiggins: this is not perfect because continuants occupy space and continue as well. Event/splitting/scattered/Simons: because continuants are involved in them they can be split (to be divided, dispersed, scattered). And therefore they can have both spatial and temporal parts. But not as events involved continuants, e.g. the increase in the intensity of a magnetic field. Field: whether itself is a continuant is controversial. Event/localization: localization is only possible by the continuants involved in them. Entering/time/happening/Simons: the time of the happening (whether continuants are involved or not) can only be calculated by measuring time intervals. We must rely on local cyclic processes. I 221 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: what the superposition of things of the same kind is about is that we have no way to track things ((s) in its coming together and breaking up). I 222 Namely, they are temporarily indistinguishable (this is an epistemic problem). Epistemic/(s): why are epistemic problems at all important or interesting? Because we have to revise our language use in epistemic impossibility: for basically indistinguishable we should not use different words (no distinction without difference). Simons: e.g. two bee swarms unite and separate again. We generally do not know if the two are afterwards the same two as before. This could be, however, clarified by tracking each individual bee. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem. Superposition/Simons: there are apparently cases where things can superimpose in the same way and we can still track them: E.g. moving points of light or shadow, which overlap for a moment. E.g. mutually parallel wavefronts, here we assume this in addition to uniform wave velocity. E.g. (shorter): clouds of water vapor that can be manipulated by a "cloud projector", here we have a means of identification: causal paths. I 223 Wiggin's Principle/WP/Wiggins: pro: space can be displayed only by reference to its occupiers (availability), and spatial facts are conceptually independent of the existence of facts about individual things (particulars) and the identities of these particulars. Now, if space is mapped by reference to permanent particulars the non-identity of the particulars A and B, that are both of the type f, has to be sufficient to determine that the place of A to t is different from the place of B to t. Simons is pro illustration by reference to particulars. SimonsVsWiggins: nevertheless, objects of the same type may coincide: because the requirement of illustration only requires that some specific continuants can impossibly coincide with others of their kind. There are exceptions, though they are a minority: e.g. see above clouds, points of light, shadow, waves, etc. VsSimons: it could be argued that these objects are not material or substances. Simons: they actually are not substances. Just like accidents or disruptions. SimonsVsVs: still the answer is not yet there if two things of a kind can superimpose whether they can be substances. The examples suggest that we can appease Wiggins' fear that we cannot retrace the traces if we find the appropriate means, e.g. separate causes or uniform speed. Wiggins/Simons: Wiggins is only right if everything with which we can trace a continuant is, so to speak, in its own container. If this is the case, his principle (WP) is correct. These cases seem to make out the majority, so we have no problem to map the space (illustrating, mapping). Sortal Concept/Simons: (for a continuant): the sortal concept tells us, inter alia, under which conditions the object continues to exist and under which it ceases. These were the "existence-conditions" ((s) meaning linguistically!). Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of matter can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) meaning intensional). I 260 Neccessary/Nec/Wiggins: "Nec" is a predicate modifier working on λ-abstraction, rather than using the proposition operator "N". QuineVsWiggins: (1977, 236): misleading: "Nec[(λx)(λy)(x = y)]" for "the relation like any r and s have if they are necessary identical" correct: "(λx)(λy)(N(x = y)" (p. 293). SimonsVsWiggins : "Nec" seems to be superfluous and Wiggins suggests this himself. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Superposition | Simons, P. | I 225 .... Superposition/Conclusion: but this does not yet show that Locke's Principle or the stronger thesis is correct, that no two things of the same species can coincide. Maybe piles are just not suitable. We need to address the problem more generally. Locke's Principle/LP: no two things of the same kind (i.e. that fulfill the same sortal term or substance term) can be in the same place at the same time. I 250 Superposition/Doepke: Thesis: Individuals are superposed iff they are both fully composed by the same third party (whatever). Weak coincidence/Simons: in our simple case we say that individuals coincide weakly if there are some building blocks of which both are composed in the just defined sense. |
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| Dissimilarity | Simons, P. | I 213 "Relative Identity"/Geach: ("Theory R"), ("Sortal Theory"): thesis: for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Against it: b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins-™ Thesis that things that are ever different are always different. c) diachronic view of superposition: thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is "replaced" by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. Change/Diachronic view: thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic view: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. Ad (4) reductionist view of superposition/Chisholm: thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontologically superior to their whole! |
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| Part | Simons, P. | I 105f Part / Simons: there is no single meaning of "part". I 210 Part / whole / Simons: we reject the anti-symmetry between part and whole - then different objects can have the same parts - and these are necessarily in the same place at the same time - (superposition). |
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