Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beliefs Searle I 76
Beliefs and desires/Searle: beliefs and desires do not need to be postulated. They are simply experienced consciously and not in question.
II 31
Intentional states/Searle: we must separate the logical properties of intentional states from their ontological ones. Tradition: intentional states are Hume's ideas, or modifications of the Cartesian ego, or causal dispositions to behaviors (SearleVs).
II 32
Belief/Searle: spirit on world orientation. Intentional states/Searle: intentional states are both caused and realized in the structure of the brain.
II 34
Intentional object: not every intentional state has an intentional object. The present King of France does not exist, so the corresponding sentence cannot be true.
II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll other authors: all beliefs are de dicto. Of course, some beliefs are about Santa Claus and others about Napoleon, but the re-beliefs (of Napoleon) are then a subclass.
Quine: much stronger thesis: in addition to the completely individualized de dicto beliefs through content and mode (in the head), there are also beliefs that exist between the believer and the objects. Such beliefs are then not a subclass, but rather irreducible de re.
Brains in a vat: brains in a vat could have beliefs that are purely de dicto. They are independent of the actual nature of the world.
De re-beliefs: de re-beliefs are relations between people and objects. Caution: if the world changed, the beliefs themselves would be different, even if everything in the head remained unchanged!
II 262
For example, assuming George Bush believes Reagan is president of the United States. That is a fact about Bush but is it not just also a fact about Reagan? Furthermore, this fact cannot simply be explained by facts about Bush. Quantification in "belief contexts": quantification in "belief contexts" is allowed in case of such a formulation.
Example de re: "Reagan is such that Bush believes of him that...
Cf. >de re, >de dicto.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Correspondence Theory Logic Texts Read III 27
VsWittgenstein/Read: the correspondence theory is a realistic theory. The realism of the correspondence theory compels us to accept the law of bivalence. There may be statements about which we cannot in principle say whether they are true or false. (>The Present King of France is bald).
Re III 40
VsCorrespondence Theory: The correspondence theory contains a metaphysics of facts and events correlated with statements. That is its fundamental misunderstanding. The truth scheme is neutral on this issue.
Re III 242
Correspondence theory: according to it, the truth predicate a substantive predicate which assigns a relational property to statements. True sentences then have a real property that distinguishes them from false statements. Correspondence Theory: Ontology contains facts - statements are made true by facts, not by things.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Existence Russell Flor III 127
Existence/Russell: the term existence can only be applied usefully to propositional functions. Defintion existence/Russell: There is an argument for a certain propositional function, for which it is true - according to Russell, there are only atomic facts and absolutely simple individuals (> Logical atomism).

Russell VI 76
Predicate/propositional function/Russell: some predicates, for example existence, can only be attributed to statement functions (or classes), but not to statements: E.g. "People are numerous, therefore Socrates is numerous". - Therefore, you also know that there are people in Timbuktu, without knowing them: the existence theorem is about a class, not individuals.
Tugendhat I 377
Existence/Russell/Tugendhat: Russell interprets the singular predicative statement as an existential proposition and this as a general statement. - That was already anticipated by Kant and Frege. - Then e.g. "The present King of France is bald", etc. is always wrong -> Generality/Russell.
Tugendhat II 43
Existence/Russell: one can only talk about existent things - but past and future are also existent.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Existence Statements Millikan I 203
Existence statement/existence sentence/non-existence/existence/representation/Millikan: neither e.g. "x exists" nor e.g. "x does not exist" is a representation. Solution: The attribute "to have a referent" is a protoreferent of "exists".
---
I 204
Existence statement/Existence sentence/Non-Existence/Existence/Millikan: E.g.: "Tigers without stripes exist", e.g. "Girls who like math but do not like history exist" e.g. "Red cows do not exist". Real value: such phrases have a real value, or they have none.
Real value: E.g.: "Albino snakes exist" the embedded sentence "snakes are albino" has as a real value all world conditions, which consist in that an individual snake is albino.
"Albino snakes exist": is an intentional icon, which maps the fact that the term "albino snake", taken on its own, has a
Real value: the expression type "albino snake" is a protoreferent of the token of "albino snakes" (plural) that exists in "albino snakes exist".
But this protoreferent is not identified! It is not its stabilizing function to be translated into an inner term.
Inner sentence: ultimately, there is a corresponding inner sentence, roughly like "Some snakes are albino". This sentence is then representative.
Representation: if "albino snakes exist", understood representationally, "exists" is a dummy predicate.
---
I 205
The present King of France is bald/Millikan: E.g. "The present King of France exists" is not only a false intentional icon and not a representation. It is wrong because, in order to exercise its eigenfunction, it would have to correspond to a state in which "The present King of France" would have to have a referent, and such a fact does not exist.
N.B.: but it does not say "The present King" would have a referent. Like "The Nicholas exists", does not say it. Instead, it has a function.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Incomplete Symbols Grover, D. L. Horwich I 319
Incomplete Symbol/Russell/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: incomplete symbols are e.g. descriptions that are not clear in the translation. E.g. "The present King of France is bald". Incomplete symbol: an incomplete symbol is then the fragment in the source language.
Prosentential Theory/Grover: there is nothing that translates "true", but it is possible to grasp the meaning of the complete expressions which "is true" includes.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

Kamp/Grover/Belnap
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Literal Truth Fraassen I 9
Literally Truth/Fraassen: the term has the function of excluding an addition like "correctly understood". - Because a theory could be literally wrong or meaningless with the addition "well understood" - Anti-Realism: Thesis : the goal of science can be achieved without a theory being literally true.
---
I 10
Literally true/Fraassen: 1. The language is literally constructed - 2. The representation is therefore true - Science: Goal: to be true, but not literally. - Fraassen: Thesis: a good theory does not have to be true (Fraassen pro Anti-Realism) - it is literally not equal to truth functional - if we exclude literary constructions, we also exclude instrumentalism and positivism - these use literally understood formulations - a literary construction can be elaborated (e.g. to determine referents, e.g. reduction of thermodynamics on statistical mechanics), but it cannot change their logical relationships. ---
I 11
Literally true: excludes metaphors - Problem: the "demythologization" does not get the logical form. ---
I 38
Literally true/Fraassen: Dummett allows a non-literal interpretation for the quantum mechanics when he says that a sentence about the position of a particle cannot have a truth value simultaneously with one over the impulse - otherwise Strawson: e.g. "The present king of France is bald" here there is no non-literal construction of our language - again different: in everyday life people tend to "well understood..."

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Negation Millikan I 221
Not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: Thesis: "not" is an operator who operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the sense of the entire sentence. Negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences cannot have non-existent facts as the real value.
Reason: Negative facts do not have causal forces that could play a role in a normal explanation.
Negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. E.g. "not-p" is called "the fact that -p does not exist" In a similar way, Wittgenstein has understood it as well.
N.B.: we had said above, that existence sentences are not representations.
Image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but understood sentences of the form "x
does not exist" are understood in this way as to map a non-existent fact. Then the variable
"x" in "x does not exist" does not go via names of single objects (objects, elementary objects) but via representations of possible states (possible facts).
Meaning/Non-existence/Negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning ((s)> Non-Existence/Meinong).
Millikan: in our terminology it means that they are representations (MillikanVs).
---
I 222
And at the same time, he could claim that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. N.B.: that made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p".
Millikan: could we not maintain at least half of this equivalence? The from "not-p" to "that -p does not exist"?
MillikanVsWittgenstein: No, not even this we can do.
If Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that -p does not exist," then that would mean for my position that negative sentences do not map world states and are not representations.
Millikan: instead, they would represent linguistic facts, "not-p" would then be an icon, but it does not represent, whereby a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant.
Protoreferent/Millikan. "p" would not be a representative of "not-p" but a protoreferent.
Question: would "not-p" be an icon of which the "p is false" ((s) linguistically) explicitly represented?
Vs: then "not" would be no operator anymore!
Not/Negation/Operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: i.e. The mapping rule for "not-p" is a function of the mapping rule for "p".
1. If "not" is not an operator, it might happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p," but still the sense of "not-p" absurd.
2. If "not-p" says "that -p does not exist", "not-p" must also be true if some variant in "p" is not fully determined, i.e. has no adapted meaning. E.g. "Pegasus was not a winged horse" e.g. "The present king of France is not bald" would be true sentences!
3. Certainly, it is the case that "'p' is false" at least maps (icons) that "p" has no real value. Correspondingly, "x does not exist" maps then the fact that "x" does not have referents.
N.B.: if "not-p" says "that -p does not exist" it still maps a negative fact. > Facts/Millikan.
---
I 224
Opposite/Negative Sentence/Representation/Millikan: Thesis: negative sentences, whose opposites are normal representative sentences, must themselves represent positive facts. ---
I 224
Negation/stabilization function/not/representation/Millikan: what is the stabilization function of "not" in normal representing sentences? It is not needed to "erase" the rest of the sentence. "Erase": sometimes occurs, but then it is called "Sorry" or "I did not mean that".
Negation/"not": its function is not to produce no believe. That would not be a function.
Eigenfunction: of "not" is relational. That is, it is a (mathematical) function of the eigenfunction of the sentence without "not".
Sentence: has the function of producing a belief. Likewise, a sentence with "not" has to produce something that has a potential benefit.
Negative sentence: perhaps it should eliminate a false belief? But that would be similar to "does not exist" works.
---
I 224
Negative sentence/"not"/imperative/Millikan: an imperative like "bring no dirt into the house" has very well a positive function. E.g. if you do it anyway, it is not done with an excuse "I did not want it". For the command was not, to do it without purpose.
Not sufficient: "I did not intend it".
Correct: I intended not to do it.
Not sufficient: "I did not know I did it"
Correct: you have to know that you do not do it.
Not/imperative: here the usage is not parallel to the function of "does not exist".
---
I 257
Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence maps a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Non-Existence Strawson Schulte III 434
The present King of France/bald king /Russell: false, because as a conjunction of three sentences (1st there is a king, 2nd no more than one, 3rd no King of france is not bald) - then at least one conjunct is wrong.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Redundancy Theory Foucault II 115ff
Statement/Foucault: at first sight the statement appears as the last, indissociable element, which can be isolated and can enter into a play with other elements. A point without surface. Problem: if the statement is the elementary unity of the discourse, what is it then? What are their distinguishing traits? What limits do you have to recognize? For example redundancy theory: the question of whether in logic "A" and "it is true that A" are interchangeable. Foucault: as statements they are not equivalent and not interchangeable. (FoucaultVsRedundancy Theory). They cannot be in the same place in the discourse.
E.g. the present King of France is bald: can only be analyzed by recognizing in the form of a single statement two different propositions, each of which can be true or false. (Strawson: utterance, point of time).
E.g. "I am lying": can only be true in a relation to a claim at a lower level.
The criteria for the identity of a proposition do not apply to the description of the particular unit of a statement.

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Terminology Kripke I 125
Schmidentical/Schidentity: there is artificial identity between the subject and itself. Kripke: that is quite alright and useful. ---
II 232f
Russell Language/Kripke: the weak form of the Russell language: is like English. The only truth conditions by Russell are: the present king of France must exist in order for the sentence "The present king of France is bald" to be true. Medium form of Russell language: descriptions have Russell’s deep structure: there is exactly one... . Strong form of Russell language: has no descriptions, only there is exactly one... . Champagne e.g.: has the weak and medium form: here the speaker thinks (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are satisfied. Strong form: here the use could become the rule, because the definite article is prohibited. Since the phenomenon occurs in all three languages, there can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 97
Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: the Russell language contains only the attributive reading. (~ Homophone truth conditions). Contrast: D Language/Kripke: the D language includes a referential and attributive reading. KripkeVsDonnellan: e.g. "her husband is kind to her": here you need the referential and the attributive reading at the same time (not alternating). "He is nice, but he is not her husband".

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Frege, G. Newen Vs Frege, G. I 209
Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41).
Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states.
I 211
VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument:
I 212
There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question.

NS I 90
Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content).
This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot.
NS I 91
Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect.
Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true.
RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Russell, B. Searle Vs Russell, B. V 122
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell went as far as to negate that a specific description could ever be used as reference! ((s) This is about fictions.) Description/fiction/SearleVsRussell: of course you can refer to literary figures. Condition: they must exist (in the literature). You cannot refer to the wife of Sherlock Holmes, because he was not married.
V 129
Theory of descriptions/Russell/problem: e.g. "The man insulted me" means that one might assume that only one man exists in the universe. SearleVsRussell: Russell actually asserted something like this in the theory of descriptions.
V 245
Names/descriptions/SearleVsRussell: from the supposed distinction between proper names and certain descriptions the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties is derived.
V 131
Definite article/reference/SearleVsRussell: there is absolutely no use of the definite article, which implies in itself that only one object can be meant.
V 132/133
Definite article: its function is rather to indicate that the speaker intends a singular reference.
V 144
Proposition/Searle: only the expression in a particular context (circumstances) ensures the transmission of a proposition! SearleVsRussell: no class of logically proper names can exist at all (this, now, there). If their expressions gave no descriptive content (Russell). There is no way to establish a relation between the expression and the object. How could one explain that this term refers to that object?
V 238
Searle: a propositional act can never be identical to the illocutionary act of the assertion, since a propositional act can never occur independently but only as part of an illocutionary act. SearleVsRussell: the attempt to equate the specific reference (propositional act) with the setting up of assertions (illocutionary act) was bound to fail.
V 239
Because Russell used the formal notation, complete statements must be prepared for him, even if there is no object.
V 240
But from the fact that a certain type of act can be carried out only under certain conditions, does not simply follow that implementation of such an act in itself already represents the assertion that these conditions were met. Searle: the command "Bring this to the King of France" is neither a statement nor does it contain one. (> E.g. "The present King of France is bald.")

IV 113
Sense/Russell: e.g. pointless: "Four-pageness drinking postponement": SearleVsRussell: this is read by many authors as a metaphorical statement about the Quadripartite Agreement after WW2. But none of the words occurs here literally!

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Russell, B. Strawson Vs Russell, B. Wolf II 17
StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things.
---
Newen/Schrenk I 92
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses
(i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion)
(ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition
(iii) truth value gaps are allowed
(iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects.
(v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties).
Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use.
Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference:
Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand:
Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value.
Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied.
E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness.
Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis.
Newen/Schrenk I 94
He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him.
Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier.
Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis:
Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential.
Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer).
Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...".
In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential.
---
Quine I 447
StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. ---
Schulte III 433
StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language.
"The common language has no exact logic"
Schulte III 434
King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences:
1. There is a king of France.
2. There are no more than a king of France.
3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald.
Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total.
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction.
2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence.
3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning.
---
Schulte III 435
Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied".
Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything.
Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game.
---
VII 95
Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person.
There can also be more than one description in one sentence.
VII 98
StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing.
This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions.
Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense.
VII 99
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful.
VII 100
Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology:
"Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description).
Sentence begins with clear referring description.
Sentences that can start with a description:
(A1) sentence
(A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence
accordingly:
(B1) expression
(B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression.
King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same.
VII 101
Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson:
Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times.
Statement (proposition): ditto
Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition).
VII 102
StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning.
VII 104
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent.
VII 105
Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false.
VII 106
Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use.
It is about conventions, habits and rules.
VII 106/107
King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense.
2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one,
StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim.
2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists.
Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson).
Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object.
VII 110
Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica: (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists".
StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table
VII 111
This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers.
Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table.
Referencing is not the same as claiming.
Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing.
Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name.
You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement.
VII 112
StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names).
He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute.
VII 113
Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use).
They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something.
When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".)
VII 122
StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive.
VII 123
Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..."
StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..."
Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table".
VII 124
Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott).
VII 126
Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Schulte I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Schulte II
J. Schulte
U. J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Schulte III
Joachim Schulte
"Peter Frederick Strawson"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Strawson, P. F. Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. Wolf II 20
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates.
I 387/388
StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.
Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability).
I 389
TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it.
I 433
Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell).
I 384
StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true.
I 385
Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year.
StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood.
RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language.
I 386
TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility.
I 387/388
StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.)
Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability).
I 389
TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it.
I 395
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term.
"To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify").
I 397/398
TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more.
I 399
Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing
b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world).
I 400
TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.)
I 415
TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications.
I 419
TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Wittgenstein Read Vs Wittgenstein Read III 27
Wittgenstein: has a much more substantial view of what a statement is. Facts are facts that refer to objects. So what is characteristic of reality is what kind of facts there are. Objects must be common to all possibilities. Signs: are arbitrary and conventional.
ReadVsWittgenstein: 1. The correspondence theory is a realistic theory. The realism of correspondence theory forces us to accept the law of bivalence. There may be statements about which we cannot in principle say whether they are true or false. (Example: The present King of France is bald).

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Wittgenstein Millikan Vs Wittgenstein I 221
not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining".
Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs.
b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence.
Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist.
Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities.
negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value.
Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation.
negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way.
Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations.
projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts).
Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong).
Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs).
I 222
And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p".
Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"?
MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can.
When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations.
Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant.
Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference
.Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"?
Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator!
Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p".
1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd.
2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements!
3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference.
Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact.
negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles.
non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation.
negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact.
Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist".
negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts).
It is well known how such a thing is done:
Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does.
I 223
This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-".
MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known:
1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist."
Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence.
Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions.
Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts.
meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem:
Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square.
Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense!
Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real.
Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function.
2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value.
real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm?
I 224
Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences).
Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function.
Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves.
I 229
"not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense.
Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense.
sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense.
Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation.
Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense.

I 303
Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005