Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Rorty | VI 9 Truth/Rorty: truth is absolute - in contrast: relative: justification is relative. >Justification. Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - ((s) a criterion for truth is not available. >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion. Truth/Rorty: truth is undefinable (like Davidson). VI 28 Correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the Absolute - so the idealism deprived the term of correspondence of its very substance. >Correspondence theory. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Coherence Theory | Russell | II 65 Russell VsCoherence Theory/Russell: the truth definition presupposes the meaning of "coherence" - many scientific theories are not entirely coherent. Def coherence theory/Russell: Characteristic of the falsity of a thought is: if it does not place itself without contradiction in the totality of our opinions. According to this, the essence of any truth is to be part of a completely closed system which is "The Truth". (RussellVs). RussellVsCoherence Theory/Russell: 1 There is no reason to assume that only a set of coherent opinions is possible at all. Not so unusual in science. VII 66 The definition of truth according to the coherence theory already presupposes the meaning of "coherence", whereas in reality "coherence" presupposes the truth of the laws of logic. If we now wanted to try to subject the proposition of contradiction itself to a coherence test, we would find that - assuming it was wrong - there could be no incoherence at all between propositions! >Contradiction, >Truth/Russell, cf. >Coherence. IV 107 RussellVsCoherence Theory: An imaginative writer could invent a coherent new past that is consistent with everything we know and yet quite different from the real past. IV 109 There is no evidence that there is any one coherent system. Coherence/Russell: is not actually the meaning of truth, but it can provide an important criterion. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Criteria | Carnap | VI 257 Truth / Criterion / Carnap, if our criterion decides on the membership of a field, we have no one that decides on true and false! >Description levels, >Levels, >Truth criterion. VI 258 E.g. "irrational knowledge", "ineffable vision of God": is no relationship to any knowledge within the field- it can not be confirmed or refuted by any knowledge within our field. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Criteria | Kant | Danto I 24 Moral/criterion/Kant: there are no criteria for morally right action - because you could always act correctly from blind chance - nothing guarantees in the behavior itself, that it is morally. >Morals/Kant. --- Horwich I 77 Truth criterion/KantVsCriterion: the search for it is absurd - like to milk a bily goat and to keep a strainer underneath. - The agreement with the subject is given and presupposed here. Ramsey: there can be no truth criterion, because each object is distinguishable from any other object and thus has something that is true in it but not in any other object - therefore there can be no guarantee of the truth which is independent from the referred object. >Truth, >Truth definition. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Criteria | Rorty | III 26 Criteria/Rorty: the search for criteria is the search for a hidden nature. Horwich I 447 Criterion of truth/idealism/Rorty: coherence. >Truth criterion, >Coherence theory, >Coherence. V 25 Criterion/Justification/Rorty: E.g. criteria-less justification: Democracy/Churchill: is the worst form that you can imagine, except for all the others that have been tried - ((s) >Lists instead of criteria.) VI 8f Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth. >Justification. Truth/Rorty: undefinable. (like Davidson). >Truth/Rorty, >Truth/Davidson. VI 58f Criterion/Criteria/Rorty: our criteria are determined by our purposes - not by nature - nature is not divided into inputs. >Definition/Criteria, >Pragmatism, >Purposes. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Criteria | Russell | Horwich I 3 Criterion/definition/truth/truth criterion/Russell: a defined object and criteria for its presence are always different - e.g. when we say that a company has made the article, we do not mean that it has the right stamp. (1) - Russell: (early) I do not believe that truth has such a stamp of authenticity (no outer description). Cf. >Truth criterion, >Definition, >Object/Russell. 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Criteria | Tarski | Horwich I 130 Truth criterion/criteria/Tarski: we will probably never find a critoron for truth. - But equally not for most other concepts including physics.(1) >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 Skirbekk I 177 Criterion of truth/Tarski: there is no tuth criterion that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory. ((s) The criterion cnnot be found in the sttements - these are different.) Tarski: Common feature of true propositions: truth, not a criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow.(2) Cf. >Truth/Quine. 2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 Berka I 492 Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong. That works in the class calculus. A structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite. ((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide). >general criterion of truth. >Definitions/Tarski, >Correctness, >Provability. I 502 Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from §3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope. >Term scope. Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals).(3) >Semantic categories. 3. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Induction | Waismann | I 66 Induction/Poincaré: One can easily pass from one statement to the other, and surrender to the imagination that the legitimacy of the recursive method has been proved. But one will always arrive at an unprovable axiom. RussellVsPoincaré: Induction is a definition and not a principle. There are certain numbers for which it applies, others not (Cantor's infinite cardinal numbers). >Definitions, Definability. >Principles. Waismann (example from Wittgenstein) e.g. Division 1:3 with recurring rest. I 67 We conclude that it always goes on like this. But does it really result in the calculation? Every calculation breaks down after a finite number of places. On the other hand, the first step already shows the return. E.g. fiction: tribe, which possesses our decimal system, but without infinite decimal fractions. Those people break off after the 5th digit. Let us suppose one day somebody discovered that division 1:3 continues. What would be his discovery? One might think first of all that the return of rest was the first thing he noticed. Then one had asked one who did not yet know periodical division, "is the rest equal to the dividend in this division?" He would have said yes. But with this, he would not have necessarily noticed the periodicity. We may perhaps wish to say: Whoever discovers the periodicity sees the division differently from the one who does not know it; he sees an infinite possibility in it. But this sounds as if it were a psychological thing. In reality, the discovery of periodicity is the construction of a new calculus. You can mark them with a line. I 68 This is not a pure outwardness, it points to the law of division. The way in which he draws attention to the periodicity gives the new sign. Once we have discovered the periodicity, we have discovered a new law. The dots do not represent, in a shadowy manner, the digits which are not written in the absence of ink, but are themselves a full-fledged sign in the calculus. A proof by induction is something quite different from what else is called "proof" in the calculation of letters. The induction proof does not lead to the formula to be proved. >Proofs, >Provability. I 69 Is induction only the indication that the sentence applies to all signs? The fact that the sentence applies for y + 1 if it aplies for a does not explain the meaning of the sentence. It gives us no answer to the question, how is this sentence used? What is the criterion of its truth? >Criteria, >Truth criterion, >Truth. We cannot go through all numbers, not because we have too little time and paper, but because it is nothing, because it is logically impossible. In fact, the proof by induction is the only criterion we have. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Realism | Wright | I 104 Realism/Wright: needs bivalence, that is, it is suitable only for certain discourses. - It forces the distinction between the Truth-predicate for discourse and for superassertibility. >Bivalence, >Truth values, >Truth predicate, >Discourse, >Superassertibility. Truth-predicate (realistic): is regardless of evidence. >Evidence. The text should then have a feature that the superassertibility has not. - Then superassertibility is inadequate. >Truth conditions, cf. >Truth criterion. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Redundancy Theory | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 56 E.g. "The house is beautiful" is about a house - B. "It is true that the house is beautiful" does not speak of a house, but of a statement (Hoyningen-HueneVsRedundancy Theory). >Levels (Order), >Description level, >Object language, >Meta language. --- Read III 40 Redundancy theory VsCorrespondence theory: denies that truth is a predicate. Truth is redundant, it says, inasmuch as the predication of truth from a statement says no more than the assertion of that statement itself. "It is true that A" is the same as "A". >Correspondence theory, >Fact. It does not need a theory of truth, because there is no such thing as truth. Tarski's theorems are true because the right and left sides are essentially identical. They differ only by their notation. Redundancy Theory Vs Metaphysical Object. Thesis: Truth is not a property. VsRedundancy Theory: "is true" is grammatically required, truth is more than repetition: it is force and universality. Truth is not a property - true statements have no common characteristic. >Truth criterion. The truth-predicate adds universality to the fact. >Truth predicate, >Truth. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Truth | Ayer | I 21 Truth/Circle/Ayer: true statements are determined by relation to facts - facts determined with true statements - Circle: broken by actions and observations - Ayer separates between truth definition and truth criterion. >Criteria, >Circular reasoning, >Truth definition, >Actions, >Observation. I 297 VsCorrespondence Theory: confuses a method for interpreting the symbols with a truth criterion. >Correspondence theory. I 276 Truth/AyerVsTarski: should not be property of sentences but of propositions (statements expressed by sentences) - E.g. time ratio is relevant. >Propositions. I 278 Truth/Tarski/Ayer: analysis of use (use, no criterion of truth). >Use. III 101 Truth/Ayer: adds nothing to a statement. >Redundancy theory. Truth/Falsehood: their function is to replace negation and assertion signs. >Negation. I 102 They themselves are not real concepts. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Logic Texts | Read III 40 The definition of truth is different from the conditions of adequacy. III 46 Truth/Read: is not a property. - True statements have no common characteristic! (Vs "Big fact") - the truth predicate adds generality to the fact. >Truth criterion, >Adequacy, >Correctness, >Truth definition, >Truth theories. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Truth | Rescher | In Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 I 22 Truth/Rescher: Correspondence: determines the definition. Coherence determines the criterion of truth. Because coherence is not an absolute criterion, it does not also determine the definition. >Truth definition, >Truth criterion, >Definition. I 337 Truth/Rescher: there are two possibilities to explicate truth of proposition: 1. by Def of "true" as characteristic of proposition - 2. Criteria for the test conditions, whether it is justified to use "true". >Verification, >Verification conditions, >Criteria. Criteria do not matter - e. g. acid test does not say what it means to be an acid. - The meaning of "highly intelligent" has little to do with the answers to the test questions. - Knowledge about the atomic structure does not help to know if something is gold - knowing the definition does not help to apply the term. >Meaning, >Knowledge. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Truth | Rorty | II (e) 116f Truth/Rorty: love of truth not as love for something non-human, but as relation to the fellow human beings. Love of truth as affable willingness to talk made the quasi-object as the target of a search (Platonic idea of the natural order or universally valid convictions, Habermas) entirely superfluous. III 100 Truth/Art/ethics/Rorty: with Davidson, I believe that the distinction true/false can also be applied to sentences of the type "Yeats was a great poet" and "democracy is better than tyranny". V 32 Semantic theory of truth/Tarski: Truth leads back to justification. VI 8f Truth: absolute concept: in the following sense: true for me, but not for you... in my culture, but not in yours, true back then, but not today such statements are strange and pointless. It makes more sense: justified for me but not for you. >Truth criterion, >Justification. VI 11 Justification: relative! Justification is a criterion for truth. VI 199 Truth: not a goal of research! A goal is something of which you can know if you are heading towards or coming away from it. >Goals. VI 327 Truth/Rorty: is a property of sentences. Truth/existence/Rorty: Of course it was true in the past that women should not be suppressed, just like the planetary orbits were true! Truth is ahistorical, but this is not so because true statements are made true by ahistorical entities. >Truthmakers. Horwich I 444 Pragmatism/James/Davidson/Rorty: 1) Truth is not used explanatorily. - 2) beliefs are explained by causal relation. - 3) There are no true-makers. - 4) If no true-makers, then no dispute between realism and anti-realism that accepts this true-makers. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of satisfaction or something else. - We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. - So we are rid of the correspondence theory. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Horwich I 456 Truth/Putnam: if they were not a property, the truth conditions would be everything you could know about them. Putnam pro truth as a property. Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts. >Truth conditions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Tarski | Glüer II 22 Truth theory/Davidson: the defined T-predicate (truth predicate) in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and metalanguage should contain the predicate true. >Homophony. Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory. --- Rorty IV (a) 22 True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship. >Tarski scheme, >Equivalence. Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything. Cf. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. --- Berka I 396 Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory. I 399 We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 --- Berka I 475 Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural. Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition. N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences. - E.g. There may be two contradictory statements that are not provable. - All provable statements are indeed content-wise true. Nevertheless the truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences. >Provability, >Definitions. Berka I 482 Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation x ε Wr iff. x ε AS (meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x. >Satisfaction/Tarski. That does not deliver a truth criterion. >Truth criterion. No problem: nevertheless the sense of x ε Wr (x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous. I 486 Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth). As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.(2) 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 111 Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts". - ((s) Quotation marks by Tarski). >Facts. Horwich I 124 Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: truth cannot be eliminated with generalizations if we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property. E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true. Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true. Because we do not have enough historical knowledge.(3) ((s) The designation "the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence. This cannot be converted into the sentence itself. Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.) >Elimination, >Eliminability, cf. >Redundancy theory. 3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 156 Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false. Skirbekk I 158 Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not include the term true at all. Truth almost never coincides with provability. All provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete. >Incompleteness/Gödel). There is even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.(4) 4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Truth | Tugendhat | I 263 Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation. >Timeless sentence. I 267 Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason. - Otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. >Deception. I 285 Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use. >Reference. VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. --- III 190 Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - >Verification, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Tugendhat VsMetalanguage >Metalanguage. Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. III 196 Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. >Judgments. III 208 The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio. >Given, >Correspondence theory. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Verificationism | McDowell | II 47/48 Verificationism/Dummett: Contradictory term to McDowell's sense which is based on truth: the doctrine that mastery of language is acquired only through the acquisition of linguistic behavior. Problem: Bivalence - if we accept it, then no behavior in undecidable sentences is possible - this is typical for the realism. >Realism. Solution/Dummett: justifiable assertion. >Assertibility/Dummett, cf. >Antirealism. II 62 Verificationism/McDowell: Problem: The meaning of the concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be acquired by means of evidence (how one acquires concepts usually). However, evidence for the truth of sentences (so both together). >Truth criterion, >Evidence. McDowellVs: because a non-empirical Tarski theory is included by the theory of sense, it does not follow that susceptibility for evidence is excluded, it is necessary for the attribution of beliefs. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Evolution Theory | Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory | Vollmer I 258 VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context. The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept. I 276 VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition. VsEvolution Theory: not predictable VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory. Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations! I 277 VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.) I 278 VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world! I 279 VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer. I 279 VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance). 3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative. Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution. I 284 But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction). I 285 Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Holism | Neurath Vs Holism | Brendel I125 Definitional Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Representatives: Neurath. (Neurath did not explicitly refer to himself as a coherence theorist NeurathVsCoherence Theory/NeurathVsHolism). I 126 Neurath: pro empiricism. Truth/Neurath: Thesis, the truth definition must be exhausted in a empiricist truth criterion. Log Sentence/Schlick: foundation, unrevisable. "purely observational sentences". Log Sentence/NeurathVsSchlick: revisable. Since they are selected on the basis of decisions. Reality/Neurath/Brendel: Thesis: talking about it is sheer metaphysics. Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Therefore, can only be understood relative to a system of sentences (>coherence theory). NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: "correspondence with reality": is rejected. "True World": pointless. I 127 Selection/Neurath: from several consistent statement sets: without truth criterion, by extralogical moments. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 |
| James, W. | Ramsey Vs James, W. | III 75 Truth/RamseyVsJames: it is a shame that you have to insist on these platitudes but some authors manage to deny them: according to James it is possible, for example, that the earth can be round without it being true that the earth is round. III 76 According to James, it is possible that e.g. a pragmatist can think that Bacon wrote the works of Shakespeare and that the opinion of someone else that Shakespeare wrote them could be "perfectly true for him". III 74 RamseyVsJames: the confusion is that the question "What is Truth" can be understood in at least three different ways. a) as a search for a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood. III 77 Truth Criterion/Kant/Ramsey: the search for it is absurd, because: (KdrV, Transcendental Logic, Introduction III, (A57=B82)) the explanation that truth is the agreement of knowledge with its object is given and presupposed here. But one demands to know what is the general criterion of the truth of every knowledge. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel, E. Vs Metaphysics | Horwich I 128 Ernest NagelVsTarski: (among others) his truth concept (or the whole theoretic semantics) had something metaphysical. (Ernest NagelVsSemantics). I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsVs: the concept as such is too vague. Some cynics say Z, this is how the philosophers called their unborn children. VsMetaphysics: some think it crept in on the way through the definitions, namely, if the definition does not provide us with criteria for deciding whether an object falls within the definition or not. VsTarski: and the concept of truth is simply too general to prevent that. I 130 Truth Criterion/Criteria/TarskiVsVs: it's true, we will probably never find a truth criterion. (see above, Kant ditto). But this is not how the truth concept differs from almost all other concepts, especially in theoretical physics (TT). Metaphysics/Tarski: the concept is used in such a broad sense that it certainly encompasses methods of logic, mathematics or the empirical sciences, and thus a fortiori also semantics! |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Schlick, M. | Ayer Vs Schlick, M. | III 101 SchlickVsCoherence theory: beyond the consistency of a system, one can determine the correspondence with reality. Ayer: per Schlick. AyerVsSchlick: but we have no class of synthetic propositions which are indubitable. III 103 Def Truth criterion/Verification criterion/Ayer: the criterion by which we test the validity of our synthetic propositions is their conformity with reality (= sensation). I.e. the criterion is the agreement with our observations. Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: unfortunately is not content with that, but asserts that the sentences with which we describe our observation sentences, would be absolutely unquestionable. III 104 Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: the only sense in which a sentence can be absolutely sure is that its negation would be self-contradictory. And it is not self-contradictory E.g. saying "that’s not green" if someone says "this is green". Synthetic sentences are just not true because of their form alone. Observation sentence/Schlick: would say that he never asserted this. But that he only talked about the truth of such a proposition at the moment of perception. AyerVsSchlick: yet we must distinguish between false and such propositions that are true but trivial. What Schlick says, is nothing more than p implies p. But it is wrong to say that when I feel pain the sentence that I feel pain is objectively certain. Because that would be a different form: p implies that (p is objectively certain). And that is wrong if it is a synthetic proposition. III 105 Confirmation/Schlick/AyerVsSchlick: that Schlick felt uncomfortable with this himself is due to the vagueness of his concept. "Confirmations", of which he believed they were indubitable. Confirmation/Schlick: is nothing that could be identified with something that can be expressed. This suggests that he thinks of actual perceptions, as opposed to the sentences that describe them. AyerVsSchlick: Dilemma: a) if confirmations are not entences but perceptions themselves, it makes no sense to say that they are indubitable or not indubitable. Because perceptions are not the sort of thing that can be doubted. It simply occurs. b) if they are observation sentences, they cannot be indubitable (see above). |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Criterion | Russell Vs Truth Criterion | Horwich I 3 Truth criterion/criteria/truth/Russell: when we ask what constitutes the truth or falsity of a belief (constitutes), I do not ask for a criterion. Criterion: is a quality (property), which is itself different from the truth that belongs to all, whatever is true, and nothing else, but at the same time is not identical with truth. It is a hallmark (trademark, characteristic), a relatively obvious characteristic which ensures the authenticity. ((s) Criteria: always there, never absent, never at something else, but unidentical:> Carnap "companion". Many authors:. Unequal definition ((s) E.g. Definition being-an-even-number. Divisibility by 2 (definition against: Criterion: last digit 0,2,4,6 or 8) If it says "all and only... have ...". then it is not yet clear whether the criterion or the essential is mentioned). Truth/Truth criterion/Russell: But when we say that this and this company has made the product, we do not mean that the product has the right stamp. ("To mean", mean): I 4 Therefore, there is a difference between truth and truth criterion, and just this distinction is helpful. RussellVsTruth Criterion: I do not believe that truth has such a hallmark. But that is not what I want, I do not want to know which external characteristics truth has, with which we can recognize them but what truth itself is. Truth/mind/judgment/Russell: what relation has truth to mind? Always on judgments. Thus, truth is mind dependent. ((s) So here truth not as the basic concept). Nevertheless, it does not depend on the manner in which a single individual judges. So truth and falsity of judgments has any objective reason. And it is quite natural to ask whether there are not objective truths and falsehoods as objects of judgments (judgment object). Russell: that is plausible in the case of truth, but not in falsehood. (1) 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Various Authors | Vollmer Vs Various Authors | II 169 Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then? II 170 Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method. II 97 DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually! Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage. Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn). II 98 VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated. 2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated". Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence. I 40 VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it. I 293 VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject. VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong. VollmerVsProjection Theory II 90 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory. VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties). II 92 Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing. II 93 VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory: System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure. Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon). II 94 None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Truth Criterion | Dummett, M. | III 17/18 Criterion of truth / truth criterion / Dummett: the thesis that there can be no tr. c. is now commonplace. Reason: we determine the sentence sense on the truth conditions so that we do not first know the meaning of the sentence and then be able to apply a criterion. Just as we do not a criterion for winning the game because that is also taught in learning the game. |
|
| |||