Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 113 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abortion | Thomson | Singer I 132 Abortion/J. J. Thomson/P. Singer: Thought experiment: Imagine that you should be connected to the blood circulation of a seriously ill, famous violinist for 9 months in order to save his life. After that, your help is no longer needed. All the music lovers of the whole world are watching. Thomson: When you wake up in the hospital (kidnapped by music lovers to help the violinist) and find yourself in this situation, you are not morally obliged to let the violinist use your body. It may be a generosity on your part - but it is not morally wrong to reject it.(1) Singer: Thomson's conclusion does not depend on the fact that the violinist came into his circumstances involuntarily. Thomson also expressly states that the violinist has a right to life, but this right does not include the right to use another body, even if one dies without this help. Singer: the parallel to rape is obvious. Singer I 133 For the sake of the argument, we assume that the embryo is considered a fully developed human being. Question: can Thomson's argument be extended to cases of pregnancy that are not based on rape? This depends on whether the theory behind it is well-founded. For example, could I force my favorite movie star to save my life? Thomson/Singer: it does not say that although I have a right to life, I would always be forced to take the best path or to do what would have the most pleasant consequences. Solution/Thomson: instead, it accepts a system of rules and obligations that allows us to justify our actions regardless of their consequences. Cf. >Consequentialism, >Deontology. P. SingerVsThomson/UtilitarianismVsThomson, J. J./Singer, P: in the case of the violinist, the utilitarianism would reject Thomson's theory. Singer I 308 In this way, utilitarianism would also reject Thomson's position on abortion. >Utilitarianism, >Preference utilitarianism. 1. Judith J. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion" in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971. |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Actions | Austin | II 36f Action/Ryle/Austin: actions are very different - szneezing, to win wars: life is not simply a sequence of actions. - Excuse does not match every verb - a way to characterize actions - e.g. "voluntarily". AustinVsRyle: this is not a characteristic of actions such as "truth," not of assertions - rather a name of a dimension. >Voluntarily/Ryle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Actions | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Action/Parsons/Habermas: Like Weber, Parsons proceeds from the categories of "purpose" and "means". He focuses on the most general provisions of the smallest conceivable unit of possible action. (1) Habermas IV 307 HabermasVsParsons: his concept of action is subjective ("voluntaristic"), which follows from his concept of the situation (see Situation/Parsons). Thus, his theory of action excludes objectivism from concepts of action reformulated in behavioral science. Taking normative standards into account, according to Parsons, action bridges the gap between the regions of being and should, facts and values, between the conditions of a given situation Habermas IV 308 and the orientation of the actor determined by values and norms (the ontological dimension: conditions/norms). In doing so, the "effort" that requires an action loses the empirical sense of a striving for gratification: "effort" is here rather „a name for the relating factor between the normative and conditional elements of action. It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not realize themselves automatically but only through action, so far as they are realized at all.“ (2) HabermasVsParsons: the concept of action as a basic unit does not explain what it means that an actor bases its decisions on values. Habermas IV 352 Actions/System/Parsons: Action/Luhmann: "The action is a system due to its internal analytical structure". (3) Habermas: this is about the relations between values, norms, goals and resources. Action system/Parsons: is composed of subsystems that specialize in the production and maintenance of one component of action at a time: Culture: on values Society: on norms Personality: on goals Behavioral system: on means or resources. (4) Habermas IV 353 HabermasVsParsons: with the concept of the action system, the actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which decisions and thus effects of actions are ascribed. Actors come into view as abstract placeholders, namely as aspects of the organism capable of learning, the motivational balance of a person, the roles and memberships of a social system and the action-determining traditions of a culture. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 43f. 2.Ebenda S. 719. 3.N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, S. 8 4. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970, S. 44 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Acts of Will | Geach | I 251f Vs"Acts of Will"/Geach: attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs)-Vs: "ascription theory" ("ascriptivism", Oxford). Ascriptivism/Oxford: Thesis: saying that an action is voluntary is not a description of the action, but an attribution. "All he said"/Oxford: Thesis: this would not be about description but about "confirmation". >Everything he said is true. GeachVs: such theories can be invented by the dozen. - The actual distinction to be observed is the one between naming and predication. >Naming, >Predication. VsAscription Theory: condemning a thing by calling it "bad" must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also be done without condemnation. Neither can "done deliberately" be characterized by attribution of responsibility or "being imposed" without describing the act as such first. Cf. >Prescriptivism, cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Adverse Selection | Barr | Gaus I 213 Adverse Selection/public goods/welfare state//Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998(2): 190—2). 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Alienation | Hegel | Gadamer I 352 Alienation/Reconciliation/Hegel/Gadamer: The life of the spirit consists (...) in recognizing oneself in otherness. The spirit, directed towards its self-knowledge, sees itself divided with what is foreign and must learn to reconcile with it by recognising it as its own and home. By dissolving the hardness of positivity, he is reconciled with himself. Insofar as such reconciliation is the historical work of the spirit, the historical behaviour of the spirit is neither self-reflection nor the mere formal-dialectical suspension of the self-alienation that has happened to it, but an experience that experiences reality and is itself real. >Experience/Gadamer. Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation. (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing onself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle. >G.W.F. Hegel, >Alienation/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Contradiction, >Change. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Alienation | Marx | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation. (voluntary/involuntary). >Alienation/Hegel. Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing oneself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. consists in a permanent struggle. Habermas IV 501 Alienation/Marx/Habermas: in Marx and in the Marxist tradition, the concept of alienation has been applied above all to the way of life of wage workers. With the transition to value theory, however, Marx has already freed himself from the educational ideal determined by Herder and Romanticism(1). Value theory only retains the concept of exchange and thus a formal aspect of distributive justice. With the concept of transforming concrete labour into abstract labour, the concept of alienation loses its certainty. He no longer refers to the deviations from the model of an exemplary practice, but to the instrumentalization of a life presented as an end in itself. See Life/Marx. 1.Ch.Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge1975, S. 5-29; deutsch Frankfurt 1977. Höffe I 364 Alienation/Marx/Höffe: (...) the Paris manuscripts(1) [expand] the critique of national economy into a philosophical anthropology about the nature of the human and his/her work. >National Economy/Marx. Anthropology/Marx: The guiding concept is the concept of alienation known from Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's phenomenology of the mind: that the human becomes alien to his/her nature. Alienation/Hegel: For Hegel, the alienation that the slave experiences in confrontation with the master, nature and him- or herself is a necessary phase in the formation of consciousness. Marx: Marx, on the other hand, plays through Hegel's complex dialectic for the "material", basic economic relationship, for the "hostile struggle between capitalist and worker". Like Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel), Marx also ascribes to the first inferior, the slave, now the worker, the greater possibility of liberating him- or herself from alienation. In a captivating analysis, he blames the main obstacle to a better society, the private ownership of the means of production, for a fourfold alienation: alienation from the product of work, from the nature of work, from oneself as a worker and from society: 1) First, the worker -and in a modified form also the owner of capital- is alienated from his/her product, since the worker does not enjoy the commodity him- or herself; moreover, nature faces the worker as a hostile world. 2) Second, the laborers alienate themselves from themselves, from their life activity, for, since he/she does not affirm labor, he/she feels " with him- or herself when he/she is apart from labor and apart from him- or herself when he/she is working; his/her work is in essence forced labor. Höffe I 365 3) (...) Thirdly, (...) the human alienates him- or herself from his/her being generic, since he/she does not find himself in the work of the genus, the worked nature. 4) (...) he/she still alienates him- or herself from his/her fellow humans, since they do not meet him/her as a human, but merely as laborers, and thus as means for his/her own individual life. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Alienation | Eco | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not differentiate between externalization and alienation (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: Hegel could not do this because as soon as the human objectifies himself/herself in the world of the things he/she has created in nature which he/she has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete getting lost in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle. >G.W.F. Hegel, >Alienation/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Contradiction, >Change. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Anarchism | Diogenes the Cynic | Gaus I 315 Anarchism/Diogenes of Sinope/Diogenes the Cynic/Keyt/Miller: [Diogenes] claimed to be without a polis (apolis) (D.L. VI.38), said that 'the only correct constitution is that in the cosmos' (D.L. VI. 72), and declared himself to be a citizen of the cosmos (kosmopolités) (D.L. VI.63). The second of these sayings entails that no constitution in a polis is correct (and hence just) whereas the first and third may be taken, consonant with this, to disavow citizenship in any polis. In the same spirit the famous anecdote of Diogenes' encounter with Alexander the Great illustrates among other things his scorn for political power. Coming upon Diogenes sunning himself, Alexander asks what he can do for him and draws the reply, 'Stand out of my light' (D.L. VI.38; see also V 1.32, 60, and 68). Diogenes had similar anarchistic ideas about slavery and marriage. 'To those who advised him to pursue his runaway slave, he said, "It would be absurd if Manes can live without Diogenes, but Diogenes cannot without Manes"' (D.L. VI.55). Diogenes implies in this saying that slavery should be a voluntary relation resting on the need of the slave for a master. 'He also said that wives should be held in common, recognizing no marriage except the joining together of him who persuades with her who is persuaded' (D.L. VI. 72). In this saying Diogenes advocates free cohabitation and disavows marriage based on coercion. Literature: (Navia, 1995(1), is an annotated bibliography of over 700 items on the Cynics. Two books on Cynicism that appeared subsequent to the bibliography are Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996(2), an extensive collection of essays, and Navia, 1996(3), an important new study.) Questions: Controversy over Diogenes' political ideas concerns the nature of his anarchism and cosmopolitanism. Is Diogenes a nihilistic or an idealistic anarchist? Is he 'the saboteur of his civilization, the nihilist of Hellenism, the parasite of his culture' or the apostle of a higher law and a higher authority (Navia, 1996(3): 102—3)? In a similar vein, is his cosmopolitanism positive or negative? When he refers to himself as a kosmopolités, a citizen of the cosmos, is he denying all bonds of citizenship or affirming a universal bond? Successor: The latter is the Stoic interpretation. Claiming to be a follower of Diogenes, the first Stoic, Zeno of Citium (335-263 BC), wrote in his Republic that 'we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law' (Plutarch, LA 329a). >Governance/Zeno of Citium. LA: Plutarch: Luck of Alexander 1. Navia, Luis E. (1996) Classical Cynicism: A Critical study. Wes CT: Greenwood. 2 Branham, Robert Bracht and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazc, eds (1996) The Cynics: The cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy for Europe. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 3. Navia, Luis E. (1996) Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Animal Language | Deacon | I 34 Animal language/Deacon: the communication of other species is never a "simpler form" of human language. It is not language at all. Biological explanation/Deacon: is always evolutionary and tries to show continuity. However, there are no animal precursors to the emergence of human language, let alone an ascending scale of complexity. (See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 1997(1); and Dunbar 1992 a(2), b(3)). --- I 54 Animal language/animals/Deacon: the misconception that animal calls and gestures are like words or phrases can be traced back to misunderstandings about the concept of reference. Behaviorism: some behaviorists have suggested that animal cries are just external expressions of internal states and therefore have nothing to do with reference. Cognitive behaviorists saw calls as equivalent to words. One study played a central role in this. Seyfarth/Cheney: Thesis: Warning calls of guenons are like names for predators in the distance. (See Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980(4)). --- I 56 In response to various calls, the monkeys left the trees (warning of eagles) or jumped on trees (leopards) or peeked into bushes (snake). Deacon: this is evolutionary easy to explain. Since the saving behaviour cannot always look the same and is even mutually exclusive, different calls have to be distinguished. (See also Hauser, 1996(5)). Animal calls/Cheney/Seyfarth/Deacon: Cheney and Seyfarth initially assumed that the animal calls were names for the predators. These were accepted instead of a complete sentence, i.e. as "holophrastic" utterances. Holophrastic utterances/Deacon: it is disputed how much syntactic potential lies in them. ((s) See Wittgenstein language game "Platte"). Animal communication: the thesis was put forward that warning cries were different from cries of pain or grimaces by referring to something else... --- I 57 ...than the inner state of the animal. Reference/DeaconVsCheney/DeaconVsSeyfarth: it was implicitly assumed that pain cries, for example, could not be referring. Such assumptions give rise to the idea of a "proto-language" with calls as "vocabulary". Then you could imagine an animal language evolution with grammar and syntax that emerged later. This whole house of cards is falling apart however. (See also Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990(6)). Reference/Deacon: is not limited to language. Symptoms can refer to something other than themselves. For example, laughter: is congenital in humans. It does not have to be produced intentionally and can be simulated in social contexts. But laughter can also refer to things, even to absent ones. In this way alarm calls also refer. --- I 58 Language/DeaconVsSeyfarth/DeaconVsCheney: e.g. laughter differs from speech by the fact that it is contagious. In a room full of laughing people, it is hard to be serious. The idea of a room full of people repeating just one sentence is absurd. Intentionality/Intention/animal calls/Deacon: Animal calls do not fulfil the Grice criterion for messages either: "I think you believe that I believe x". Animal calls are involuntary and contagious. --- I 59 Solution/Deacon: it is more about spreading excitement than sharing information. Reference/Deacon: therefore, reference is not the distinguishing feature between animal calls and words. Both can refer to inner states and things in the outer world. We must therefore distinguish between different types of reference rather than distinguish between referring and allegedly non-referring signals. --- I 65 Animal language/Herrnstein/Deacon: (Herrnstein et al. 1980(7)): Trials with pigeons who had successfully learned an arbitrary sign language and cooperation. --- I 66 Symbolic reference/Deacon: this simple form of reference with the characteristic learned association, randomness of characters, transmission of information between individuals are not sufficient to define symbolic reference. A symbolic reference system does not simply consist of words without syntax. --- I 67 Animal calls: in one sense their understanding is innate, on the other hand the connection to the referent is not necessary. The reference is somewhat flexible. Some connections are built in prenatal, others are learned. --- I 68 Symbolic competence: is that which goes beyond parrot-like expressions. For this purpose, one has to distinguish between contextually determined causes of expression and memorized dictations. 1) Dunbar, R. (1996): Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (2) (3) (4) Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. (5) Hauser, M. D. (1996): The evolution of communication. The MIT Press. (6) Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990): How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. University of Chicago Press. (7) Herrnstein et al. (1980): |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Assertibility Conditions | Searle | VII 101 Searle: assertibility conditions are not the same as truth conditions: e.g. the use of "voluntarily" (> Ryle-Austin-Searle-Hare-Cavell-Fodor; see SearleVsAustin). VsUse Theory: use is too vague. The circumstances are beyond the language. >Truth condition. VII 96 Intention/Searle: thesis: the strangeness or deviation that is a condition for the utterance: "X was done intentionally", provides at the same time a reason for the truth of the utterance of: "X wasn't done on purpose." Condition of assertiveness: it is the condition of utterance for one assertion precisely because it is a reason for the truth of the others. >Assertibility condition. >Truth conditions/Searle, >Conditions of satisfaction/Searle, >Assertibility. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Attentional Control | Cognitive Psychology | Corr I 408 Attentional Control/cognitive psychology/Eysenck/Matthews: the resource metaphor may apply best to the specific neural and cognitive operations of the frontal supervisory executive system. Like other attentional systems, executive operations may be fractionated into more specific processes, including inhibition of strong but inappropriate responses, shifting between different processing operations, and updating the contents of working memory. Attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo 2007)(1) seeks to relate anxiety not to the potentially nebulous resource construct but to these specific operations. Anxiety relates to weaker executive inhibition, evidenced in part by vulnerability to distraction, and also to difficulties in shifting between alternate task sets. In addition to effects of anxiety on executive control of attention, Eysenck et al. (2007)(1) also propose that anxiety increases the influence of stimulus-driven processes, such as involuntary attention to threat. This effect of anxiety is relevant to effects on selective attention, discussed below. Also, Eysenck et al. (2007)(1) point out that anxiety effects on performance are moderated by strategy use. 1. Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R. and Calvo, M. G. 2007. Anxiety and cognitive performance: attentional control theory, Emotion 7: 336–53 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Autonomy | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Autonomy/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests. Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order. Habermas IV 310 This moral compulsion, which is reflected in feelings of obligation as well as in the reactions of guilt and shame - a force that is not only compatible with the autonomy of action, but in a certain way even constitutes it; this force is no longer perceived as external violence but from within by penetrating the motives. Habermas IV 314 Freedom of Choice/Parsons/Habermas: is characterized by moral fallibility for Parsons. Solution/Parsons: normative standards receive the status of non-instrumentalizable value standards or end uses; corresponding value orientations can regulate the determination of purpose themselves. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Capacity Management | Economic Theories | Mause I 462f Capacity management/Economic Theory: e.g. transport policy: At first glance, reducing delays leads to an increase in welfare. Problem: this is thought too short: e.g. allocation of slots at airports: these are divided into: a) caused by the airline (technical problems with the aircraft) Mause I 463 b) caused by the airport (infrastructure), c) deviations from the planned flight route, d) reactionary delays (caused by earlier delays); the latter is the most frequent cause. Reactionary delay: a) rotational: the return flight is delayed due to the delayed outbound flight of the same airline), b) non-rotational: a non-rotational delay occurs when a flight has to wait for passengers on a delayed flight (possibly of another airline). In this way, delays can spread worldwide. Costs: a) Passenger time costs, b) "hard", c) "soft" costs of the airline. Hard costs of the airline: operating and personnel costs, costs for rebooking and refunds. Soft costs of the airline: customer losses due to dissatisfaction. Passenger time costs: can largely be understood as opportunity costs. Opportunity costs: in this case the time evaluated in monetary terms, which could have been used better otherwise. (1) (2) Slots: are managed by the European Union. Capacity bottlenecks can be solved by voluntary coordination. In addition, there are many regional airports that are not fully utilized. Delays can be minimized by reducing the number of approvals and equalizing the flight plan. Problem: from an economic point of view, minimising delays in this way does not increase welfare per se: the maximum number of arrivals and departures is reduced, thereby a) increasing average costs per flight, but also b) reducing network effects at hubs. Network effects: Airlines are interested in hub airports because they can bundle many flights in one time window. There is then a trade-off between the network effects due to additional approvals and the increased susceptibility to delays. Mause I 465 Capacity reduction: makes sense from a theoretical point of view, depending on whether the airport is to the right or left of the optimum value resulting from the total cost curve at the current capacity utilisation. (3) This example can also be applied to rail traffic or platforms at railway stations (see Swaroop et al. 2012, p. 1240). Problem: the existing practice is criticized from an economic point of view, since permits are free of charge and trade with them is prohibited. (See also Emissions Trading). The system is referred to as "off-market". Solution: an auction of slots could generate profits. A secondary market could ensure that the airline with the highest benefit (and thus the highest willingness to pay) would receive an approval. 1. University of Westminster. 2015. The cost of passenger delay to airlines in Europe. http:// ansperformance. eu/ references/ library/ passengerdelayco st. pdf. (Access date 25.11.2016 2. Bratu, Stephane, und Cynthia Barnhart. 2006. Flight operations recovery: New approaches considering passenger recovery. Journal of Scheduling 9( 3): 279– 298. 3. Swaroop, Prem, Bo Zou, Michael O. Ball, und Mark Hansen. 2012. Do more US airports need slot controls? A welfare based approach to determine slot levels. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 46( 9): 1239– 1259. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Carbon Price Strategies | Stavins | Stavins I 153 Carbon Pricing Policy Instruments/Carbon price strategies/Aldy/Stavins: We consider five generic policy instruments that could conceivably be employed by regional, national, or even subnational governments for carbon pricing, including carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reduction. (…) however [there are also] Stavins I 154 conventional environmental policy approaches, namely, command-and-control instruments, which have dominated environmental policy in virtually all countries over the past four decades. Command-and-Control Regulations: command-and-control regulatory standards are either technology based or performance based. Technology-based standards typically require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In the climate policy context, these could require firms to use particular types of energy-efficient motors, combustion processes, or landfill-gas collection technologies. Performance-based standards are more flexible than technology-based standards, specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or allowable emission rates, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels up to regulated entities. >Command-and-Control-Regulations/Stavins. Stavins I 155 Carbon Taxes: In principle, the simplest approach to carbon pricing would be through government imposition of a carbon tax (Metcalf, 2007)(1). The government could set a tax in terms of dollars per ton of CO2 emissions (or CO2-equivalent on greenhouse gas emissions) by sources covered by the tax, or—more likely—a tax on the carbon content of the three fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas) as they enter the economy. The government could apply the carbon tax at a variety of points in the product cycle of fossil fuels, from fossil fuel suppliers based on the carbon content of fuel sales (“upstream” taxation/regulation) to final emitters at the point of energy generation (“downstream” taxation/regulation). >Carbon Taxation/Government policies, >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser, >Carbon Taxation/Stavins. Stavins I 157 Cap-and-Trade Systems: A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emission allowances—in sum equal to the overall cap—and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover their emissions (Stavins, 2007)(2). Cap-and-trade sets an aggregate quantity, and through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s mitigation incentives. >Cap-and-Trade Systems/Stavins. Stavins I 159 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems: An emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system delivers emission mitigation by awarding tradable credits for “certified” reductions. Generally, firms that are not covered by some set of regulations—be they command-and-control or market-based — may voluntarily participate in such systems, which serve as a source of credits that entities facing compliance obligations under the regulations may use. Individual countries can implement an ERC system without having a corresponding cap-and-trade program. While ERC systems can be self-standing, as in the case of the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], governments can also establish them as elements of domestic cap-and-trade or other regulatory systems. These ERC systems—often referred to as offset programs—serve as a source of credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations under the primary system. >Emssion-Reduction-Credit System/Stavins Clean Energy Standards: The purpose of a clean energy standard is to establish a technology-oriented goal for the electricity sector that can be implemented cost-effectively (Aldy, 2011)(3). Under such standards, power plants generating electricity with technologies that satisfy the standard create tradable credits that they can sell to power plants that fail to meet the standard, thereby minimizing the costs of meeting the standard’s goal in a manner analogous to cap-and-trade. Stavins I 161 A clean energy standard represents a de facto free allocation of the right to emit greenhouse gases to the power sector. >Clean Energy Standards/Stavins. Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can represent significant progress toward “getting prices right” for fossil fuel consumption, especially in some developing countries, where subsidies are particularly large. Imposing a carbon price on top of a fuel subsidy will not lead to the socially optimal price for the fuel, but removing such subsidies can deliver incentives for efficiency and fuel switching comparable to implementing an explicit carbon price. >Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies/Stavins. 1. Metcalf, G. E. (2007). A proposal for a U.S. carbon tax swap (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 2. Stavins, R. N. (2007). A U.S. cap-and-trade system to address global climate change (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 3. Aldy, J. E. (2011). Promoting clean energy in the American power sector (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-04). Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Categorization | Gadamer | I 433 Categorization/Gadamer: the logical scheme of induction and abstraction [is] very misleading in that there is no explicit reflection in the linguistic consciousness on what is common between different things, and the use of words in their general meaning does not understand what is named and designated by them as a case subsumed under the general. The generality of the genre and the classificatory formation of concepts are quite far removed from the linguistic consciousness. When someone transfers an expression from one to the other, he or she is looking at something in common, but it does not necessarily have to be a generic commonality. Rather, he or she is following his or her expanding experience, which preserves similarities, be they of factual appearance or of significance to us. This is the genius of the linguistic consciousness that it knows how to express such similarities. We call this its basic metaphor, and it is important to recognize that it is the prejudice of a non-linguistic logical theory when the figurative use of a word is reduced to an improper use.(1) Generalization: (...) thinking [can turn to] a reserve that language has made for it for its own instruction.(2) Plato expressly did this with his "flight into the Logoi"(3). Gadamer: But also the classificatory logic ties in with the logical advance that language has accomplished for them. >Categories/Aristotle. 1. That's what L. Klages saw in particular. Cf. K. Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928, pp. 33ff (and my review in Logos 18 (1929), pp. 436-440; Vol. 4 of the Ges. Werke). 2. This image appears involuntarily and thus confirms Heidegger's statement of the proximity of meaning between legein = to say and legein = to read together (first in "Heraklits Lehre vom Logos" commemorative publication for H. Jantzen). 3rd Plato, Phaid. 99 e. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Censorship | Lessig | I 253 Censorship/filtering/Markets/Lessig: the LAW creates an incentive (…) for sites with “harmful to minors”material to change their ARCHITECTURE (by adding I 254 browser manufacturers (new markets) to add filtering to their code, so that parents can protect their kids. The only burden created by this solution is on the speaker; this solution does not burden the rightful consumer of porn at all. To that consumer, there is no change in the way the Web is experienced, because without a browser that looks for the I 256 But then what about public filtering technologies, like PICS?Wouldn’t PICS be a solution that avoided the “secret list problem” you identified? PICS is an acronym for theWorldWideWeb Consortium’s Platform for Internet Content Selection.We have already seen a relative (actually, a child) of PICS in the chapter about privacy: P3P. Like PICS, is a protocol for rating and filtering content on the Net. In the context of privacy, the content was made up of assertions about privacy practices, and the regime was designed to help individuals negotiate those practices. With online speech the idea is much the same. PICS divides the problem of filtering into two parts—labeling (rating content) and then filtering. I 257 PICS would be neutral among ratings and neutral among filters; the system would simply provide a language with which content on the Net could be rated, and with which decisions about how to use that rated material could be made from machine to machine. (1) Neutrality sounds like a good thing. It sounds like an idea that policymakers should embrace. Your speech is not my speech; we are both free to speak and listen as we want. But PICS contains more “neutrality” than we might like. […] PICS is also vertically neutral—allowing the filter to be imposed at any level in the distributional chain. […] Nothing in the design of PICS, that is, requires that such filters announce themselves. Filtering in an architecture like PICS can be invisible. Indeed, in some of its implementations invisibility is part of its design. (2) I 259 If content is labeled, then it is possible to monitor who gets what without even blocking access. That might well raise greater concerns than blocking, since blocking at least puts the user on notice. I 260 So what values should we choose? Inmy view, we should not opt for perfect filtering. We should not design for the most efficient system of censoring— or at least, we should not do this in a way that allows invisible upstream filtering.Nor should we opt for perfect filtering so long as the tendency worldwide is to overfilter speech. I 261 I would opt for a zoning regime even if it required a law and the filtering solution required only private choice. If the state is pushing for a change in the mix of law and architecture, I do not care that it is pushing with law in one context and with norms in the other. From my perspective, the question is the result, not the means—does the regime produced by these changes protect free speech values? […]The values of speech are different from the values of privacy; For the same reasons that we disable some of the control over intellectual property, we should disable some of the control over speech. A little bit of messiness or friction in the context of speech is a value, not a cost. But are these values different just because I say they are? No. They are only different if we say they are different. In real space we treat them as different. My core argument is that we choose how we want to treat them in cyberspace. 1. Paul Resnick, “PICS-Interest@w3.0rg,Moving On,” January 20 1999, available at link #89; Paul Resnick, “Filtering Information on the Internet,” Scientific American 106 (March 1997), also available at link #90; Paul Resnick, “PICS, Censorship, and Intellectual Freedom FAQ,” available at link #91; Paul Resnick and JimMiller, “PICS: Internet Access ControlsWithout Censorship,” Communications of the ACM 39 (1996): 87, also available at link #92; Jim Miller, Paul Resnick, et al., “PICS 1.1 Rating Services and Rating Systems—and TheirMachine- Readable Descriptions,”October 31, 1996, available at link #93); TimKrauskopf, Paul Resnick, et al., “PICS 1.1 Label Distribution—Label Syntax and Communication Protocols,”October 31, 1996, available at link #94; Christopher Evans, Paul Resnick, et al., “W3C Recommendation: PICS Rules 1.1, REC-PICS, Rules-971229,”December 29, 1997, available at link #95. 2. See Jonathan Weinberg, “Rating the Net,”Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 19 (1997): 453, 478 n.108. |
Lessig I Lawrence Lessig Code: Version 2.0 New York 2006ff |
| Cognitive Biases | Matthews | Corr I 410 Cognitive Bias/selective attention/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Unconscious bias: is bias unconscious or does it reflect a voluntary strategy of active search for potential threats? (See Matthews and Wells 2000(1)). It is plausible that both types of process may be involved. Mathews and Mackintosh (1998)(2) proposed a dual-process approach, within which bias is produced initially by an automatic threat evaluation system, but may be compensated by voluntary effort. Anxiety: Evidence for an automatic process comes from studies showing that anxiety-related bias in attention may be demonstrated even when stimuli are presented subliminally so that they cannot be consciously perceived (Fox 1996)(3). On the other hand, bias appears to be sensitive to conscious expectancies and operates over a longer time period than a simple automatic bias would predict (Matthews and Wells 2000(1); Phaf and Kan 2007)(4). Other studies have confirmed that anxious persons tend to ‘lock onto’ potential sources of threat and are slow to disengage attention (Derryberry and Reed 1997(5), 2002(6)). Anxiety effects are not restricted to slower disengagement, and various other specific attentional mechanisms are implicated (Calvo and Avero 2005(7); Matthews, Derryberry and Siegle 2000(8)). Thus, attentional bias may be a product of several interacting processes, and careful computational modelling may be needed to understand this anxiety effect (Hudlicka 2004)(9). 1. Matthews, G. and Wells, A. 2000. Attention, automaticity and affective disorder, Behaviour Modification 24: 69–93 2. Mathews, A. and Mackintosh, B. 1998. A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety, Cognitive Therapy and Research 22: 539–60 3. Fox, E. 1996. Selective processing of threatening words in anxiety: the role of awareness, Cognition and Emotion 10: 449–80 4. Phaf, R. H. and Kan, K. 2007. The automaticity of emotional Stroop: a meta-analysis, Journal of Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 38: 184–99 5. Derryberry, D. and Reed, M. A. 1997. Motivational and attentional components of personality, in G. Matthews (ed.), Cognitive science perspectives on personality and emotion, pp. 443–73. Amsterdam: Elsevier 6. Derryberry, D., & Reed, A. 2002. Anxiety-related attentional biases and their regulation by attentional control, Journal of Abnormal Psychology 111: 225–36 7. Calvo, M. G. and Avero, P. 2005. Time course of attentional attentional bias to emotional scenes in anxiety: gaze direction and duration, Cognition and Emotion 19: 433–51 8. Matthews, G., Derryberry, D. and Siegle, G. J. 2000. Personality and emotion: cognitive science perspectives, in S. E. Hampson (ed.), Advances in personality psychology, vol. I, pp. 199–237. London: Routledge 9. Hudlicka, E. 2004. Beyond cognition: modeling emotion in cognitive architectures, in M. Lovett, C. Schunn, C. Lebiere and P. Munro (eds.), Proceedings of the sixth international conference on cognitive modeling, ICCCM 2004, Integrating models, pp. 118–23. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Communitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842(1): 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)(2) (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(3), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932(4): 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(5) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)(6). Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)(7), Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)(8), Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)(9), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)(10) - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)(12), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)(13), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)(14) also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983(9): xiv, 5). Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(15) Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses. 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)(16). In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993(17): Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989(18) : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986(19); 1992(20)), Gewirth (1996)(21), and Mason (2000)(22) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992(23): 133; Friedman, 1992(24)). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Community | Nisbet | Gaus I 171 Community/Nisbet/Dagger: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(1) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. Community, on Nisbet's account, is a form of association in which people more or less spontaneously work together to solve common problems and live under codes of authority they have generated themselves. But the free and healthy life of community is increasingly difficult to sustain, he argues, in the face of constant pressure from the modern state, with its impulses toward centralized power and bureaucratic regulation. >Communitarianism/Political Philosophy, >Communitarianism/Dagger, >Community/Tönnies. 1. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Consent | Morris | Gaus I 204 Consent/consensus/legitimacy/state/justification/Morris: Consent can be a necessary condition for legitimacy or merely a sufficient one (or both). Assuming that consent could suffice to legitimate only (reasonably) just governments or states, we should think of consent theory as affirming both the necessity and the sufficiency of consent to legitimacy. The claim that consent is sufficient is the less controversial of the two (see Simmons, 1979(1): 57; 1993(2): 197—8; Green, 1988(3): 161—2; Beran, 1987(4)). Consent theory: Consent theory is a normative account, and it is posSible that all actual states fail to satisfy its conditions for legitimacy. This is what many contemporary consent theorists in fact claim. Consensus/Morris: Consent is to be distinguished from consensus or general agreement. Most forms of political organization depend to some degree on consensus or agreement. But the latter have to do largely with shared beliefs (or values). Sometimes terms like these are used to suggest more, but they essentially refer to agreement in belief or thought (or value).* ((s) >Agreement/Habermas.) Consent/Morris: Consent, by contrast, involves the engagement of the will or commitment. Something counts as consent only if it is a deliberate undertaking. Ideally, an act is one of consent if it is the deliberate and effective communication of an intention to bring about a change in one's normative situation (i.e. one's rights or obligations). It must be voluntary and, to some degree, informed. Consent can be express (direct), or it can be tacit or implied (indirect). Both are forms of actual consent. By contrast, (non-actual) 'hypothetical consent' is not consent. Consent theory should be seen as a distinctive philosophical position, one standing in opposition to other traditions which find the polity or political rule to be natural or would see government and law as justified by their benefits. The mutual advantage, Paretian tradition and different types of consequentialism seek to base full legitimacy in what the polity does for its subjects and others (for the former see J. Buchanan, 1975(5); Gauthier, 1986(6)). Other, more 'participatory' traditions might require active involvement by citizenry for legitimacy. Political consentualism should not be conflated with these other traditions, however closely associated they may be historically (...) and it should certainly not be Gaus I 205 confused with other allegedly 'consensual' theories that base legitimacy on consensus or agreement. >Consensus. Morris: The conclusion of contemporary consent theorists seems to be that virtually no states satisfy the account's conditions for full legitimacy. It is simply that few people, 'naturalized' citizens and officials aside, have explicitly or tacitly consented to their state. It is implausible to interpret voting in democratic elections as expressing the requisite consent, and mere residence and the like do not seem to be the sort of engagements of the will required by consent theorists for obligation. Consequently, most people may not have the general obligation to obey the laws of their states that they are commonly thought to have. VsConsent theories: The adjudication of the challenge posed to state legitimacy by consentualism is a complicated matter (...). Minimal legitimacy: Supposing reasonably just and efficient states to be justified and thus to be minimally legitimate, something more seems required for full legitimacy and obligations to obey the law. The literature on this question is substantial (see Edmundson, 1999(7)), (...) >Legitimacy/Morris, >Citizenship/Morris. * Consent in this sense should also be distinguished from 'endorsement consent' in Hampton (1997(8): 94—7). 1. Simmons, A. John (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 2. Simmons, A. John (1993) On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 4. Green 1988 3. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. Beckenham: Croom Helm. 5. Buchanan, James (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. Edmundson, William A., ed. (1999) The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 8. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Boulder, CO: Westview. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Contracts | Durkheim | Habermas IV 122 Contracts/Law/Durkheim/Habermas: for the transfer of property, inheritance is historically the norm. The competing form of acquisition or divestiture is the contract that is considered a status change. The contract adds new relationships to existing relationships. The contract is therefore a source of variations, which presupposes an earlier legal basis with a different origin. The contract is preferably the instrument with which the changes are implemented. He himself cannot form the original and fundamental foundations on which the law is based. (1) Problem: how can a contract bind the parties when the sacred basis of law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. Habermas IV 123 DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact a part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. (See Legitimacy/Durkheim). Legitimacy/Civil Law/Durkheim/Habermas: Problem: a contract cannot contain its own bases of validity. The fact that the parties voluntarily enter into an agreement does not imply the binding nature of this agreement. The contract itself is only possible thanks to a regulation of social origin. (2) 1. E. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris 1969, S. 203f ; (engl. London 1957). 2. E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, German: Über die Teilung der sozialen Arbeit, Frankfurt, 1977, S. 255. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Creationism | Gould | II 12 Creationism/Gould: since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a revival of the pseudo-science of "creationism" in the USA, which is actually allowed to claim a precisely measured amount of time in schools. II 251 ff Creationism/Gould: the fact that creationism has recently resurrected in the discussion would suggest to outsiders that something new has been discovered. But this is not the case. Definition Creationism/Gould: creationism is the doctrine according to which the world as a whole was created. After discovering the fossils, it was said that the fossils were created together with the world, which was thought to be only a few millennia old. Creationism has the guaranteed privilege of being allowed to take up a certain quota of school lessons in the USA. The recent rise of creationism is quite simply politics as a result of the revived activities of the evangelical group. Reagan supported this. In American vernacular, "theory" means something like "imperfect fact". Thus, the creationists can argue that evolution is "only" a theory among others. This leads to a seemingly democratic gesture of "allowing" different theories to coexist. II 252 Theory/Gould: evolution is indeed a theory but it is also a fact. Facts and theories are different things, they are not levels within a hierarchy of increasing security. >Theories, >Evolution. II 253 The definitive proofs of mathematics and logic gain their ultimate certainty precisely because they do not deal with the empirical world. The evolutionists make no claim to ultimate truth, though creationists generally do that. "Fact" can only mean in the scientific field that "something is confirmed to such an extent that it would be unnatural to withhold complete consent." For example, I suppose that apples could begin to float tomorrow, but this possibility does not justify that in physics lessons this possibility is given the same amount of time. II 254 The representatives of creationism claim that their theory is "scientific" in the sense of Popper, because he tries to destroy evolution. Gould: it is precisely for this reason that "scientific creationism" is a self-contradictory teaching, precisely because it cannot be refuted. II 255 Unbeatable systems are dogmas, not sciences. The creationists have recently streamlined their argumentation: they now say: thesis: that God has created only "basic types" and that he limited deviations within the framework of evolution among these types. Thus, dwarf poodles and Great Danes come from the dog type, but humans will never come from monkeys, just as a dog cannot turn into a cat. Verifiability/verification/Gould: through scientific research, we could not bring out anything about the creative process used by the Creator. IV 81 Creationism/Gould: if Adam was endowed with a navel by God, it was because God endowed us with an orderly past: even if the earth is only a few thousand years old, the fossils give us the image of a much older earth, but only because God wants to give us this image.(1) IV 83 GouldVsGosse: problem: God lied in the creation of the fossils by simulating the impression of a much older earth. Philip Henry Gosse: thesis: all natural processes take place in an endless circle. God, as the Creator, had to break into this circle somewhere. Wherever this happened, his work had to bear the traces of previous stages of the circle. Chicken and egg are present at the same time for God's pleasure, and each with the previous traces of the other. IV 86 Gould: problem: the fossils were created only recently, including the abrasion of the teeth! The hippopotamus could not have closed its mouth without its teeth having been sharpened. IV 90 Creationism: today: creationists reject Gosse because of this. But today's theory is even more ridiculous: all fossils as remains of the flood. IV 91/92 Gosse: surprisingly, we cannot prove that Gosse was wrong, but we cannot prove that he was right either: theories that are not verifiable in principle are rejected in science. Gosse catapulted himself out of science: "There is no visible difference between prochronic and diachronic development".(2) IV 92 J. L. BorgesVsGosse: there is an "involuntary proof that a creation from nothing is absurd: Gosse indirectly proves that the universe is finite and eternal, as imagined by the Vedanta, Heraclitus, Spinoza and the atomists." (3) IV 281 Creationism/art/Gould: creationism believes that each species is endowed with a number of irreducible characteristics. Darwinism, on the other hand: has no fixed characteristics. 1. Philip Henry Gosse. Omphalos: an Attempt to Untie the Geological Knot. 1857. 2. Ibid. 3. J. L. Borges. "The Creation and P.H.Gosse". in: Other Inquisitions, 1937-1952. 1964 University of Texas Press. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Definiteness | Searle | V 226 Determinable/Searle: something that can be determined, corresponds to "classified", "estimates", "evaluate" or "consider". Determined: that something is determined, corresponds to "recommend", "praise", "boast" or "recognize". Searle: we assume relations between words instead of meaning (e.g."voluntary"). Cf. >determinates/determinables, >"voluntarily", >Identification, >Individuation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Descriptions | Cavell | II 212 Description/Action/Language/Cavell: Actions that are normal do not allow any special descriptions. >"Voluntarily", >Voluntarily/Ryle, >Voluntarily/Austin, >Actions, >Intention, >Description levels. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Desert Theories | Lamont | Gaus I 227 Desert Theories/Lamont: Desert theories differ about what should be the basis for desert claims. The three main categories are: Gaus I 228 1) Productivity: people should be rewarded for their work activity with the product of their labour or value thereof (Gaus, 1990(1): 410—16, 485-9; Miller(2), 1976; 1989(3); 1999(4); Riley, 1989(5)). 2) Effort: people should be rewarded according to the effort they expend in contributing to the social product (Sadurski, 1985)(6). 3) Compensation: People should be rewarded according to the costs they voluntarily incur in contributing to the social product (Carens, 1981(7); Dick, 1975(8); Feinberg, 1970(9); Lamont, 1997(10)). Desert theorists in each category also differ about the relationship between luck and desert. All desert theorists hold that there are reasons to design institutions so that many of the gross vagaries of luck are reduced, but theorists diverge with respect to luck in the genetic lottery. >Desert/Political philosophy, cf. >Inequlities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive Justice/Resource-based view (RBV). Desert theorists, because of their emphasis on outcomes being tied to people's responsibility rather than their luck, view with concern how much people's level of economic benefits still depends significantly on factors beyond their control. UtilitarianismVsDesert theories: By contrast, utilitarians consider this of no moral consequence since, for them, the only morally relevant characteristic of any distribution is the utility resulting from it. This gap between the desert and utilitarian theorists, and hence between the general public and utilitarian theorists, is partly attributable to differences in empirical views. Desert theoriesVsUtilitarianism:. Desert theorists are much more likely to view people as signifi- cantly responsible for their actions and want to give effect to that responsibility by reducing the degree to which people's life prospects are influenced by factors beyond their control. Utilitarianism: Utilitarians are more likely to see people as largely the products of their natural and social environment, and so not responsible for many of their actions in the first place. On the latter view, the point of reducing the effect of luck is less attractive. Scheffler: But, as Scheffler (1992)(11) points out, the general population has a noticeably more robust view of the responsibility of people than many academic theorists. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Gaus, Gerald F. (1990) Value and Identification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Miller, David (1976) Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Miller, David (1989) Market, State, and Community. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Riley, Jonathan (1989) 'Justice under capitalism'. In John H. Chapman, ed., NOMOS xrxl: Markets and Justice. New York: New York University Press, 122—62. 6. Sadurski, Wojciech (1985) Giving Desert Its Due. Dordrecht: Reidel. 7. Carens, Joseph (1981) Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8. Dick, James C. (1975) 'How to justify a distribution of earnings'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 248—72. 9. Feinberg, Joel (1970) Doing and Deserving. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 10. Lamont, Julian (1997) 'Incentive income, deserved income, and economic rents'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 5 (1): 26-46. 11. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (4): 299-323. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Distributive Justice | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 213 Distributive justice/welfare economics/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure, >State provision/Moon, >Adverse selection/Barr, >Privatization/Moon, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. Gaus I 214 The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income (...). Efficiency- based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies delib- erately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency.* Privatization/problems: any private system of provision is limited to pooling the shared risks that people face in the future, and so presupposes a 'baseline' of a given distribution of advantages and disadvantages. But from a larger point of view, this restriction to a given status quo is arbitrary. Redistribution: (...) any distribution of 'the advantages of social co-operation' must be justified, whether it results from market transactions or from welfare state policies specifically designed to redistribute income. The presumption that distributions that result from 'government' action must be justified, and that pretax and pretransfer distributions are presumptively just, appears to be widespread at least in America, leading to hostility on the part of some towards the welfare state. Libertarianism/Nozick: Strong libertarians like Nozick hold that taxation to redistribute resources from some taxpayers to others is not only presumptively but actually unjust because it violates citizens' property rights (...) (Nozick 1974(1)). MoonVs: This critique obviously presupposes that the right we have to our property, including income from employment or business activity, is not created by the state, but exists in some sense 'prior' to political life, and so limits what governments may legitimately do. If such a theory of natural or prepolitical rights could be vindicated, it would block redistributive welfare state programmes. >Fundamental rights/Political philosophy. * The argument that the alleviation of poverty is a public good, discussed above, would be an example of justifying redistribution on efficiency grounds. 1. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Distributive Justice | Libertarianism | Gaus I 228 Distributive Justice/Libertarianism/Lamont: in contrast to [desert theories, resource-based view (RBV) and institutional utilitarianism] libertarian theories deny the relevance, for distributive justice, of both luck and utility. In terms of the political institutions affecting distributive justice, libertarians (also known as classical liberals or right libertarians) typically recommend that in ideally just conditions goods and services be distributed in a free market with minimal state intervention, redistributive measures and protectionism (...). These recommendations are usually based on what libertarians see as the normative implications of property rights and liberty (Kukathas, 2003(1); Lomasky, 1987(2); Machan, 1989(3); Machan and Rasmussen, 1995(4); Narveson, 1989(5); Nozick, 1974(6)). Nozick: The starting point for libertarians' strong interpretation of property rights is commonly self-ownership. The most influential libertarian, Robert Nozick (1974)(6), argues that since people own their natural endowments and their labour power, and since they freely exercise these in various ways, they are entitled to the fruits of their labour. Even though outcomes are not justified according to desert (and hence may be the result of luck), Nozick rejects Rawls's description of them as morally arbitrary, since self-ownership gives rise to entitlements (1974(6); ch. 7). Compensation for the influence of luck has no place in the Nozickean conception of justice, nor do any government measures to improve the lives of people or to relieve human suffering. Aid to the less fortunate must result from the indivi-dual voluntary actions of others. Minimal state: Libertarian theories proposing minimal states on the basis of self-ownership have generally encountered two stumbling blocks internal to the theories themselves (Haworth, 1994). VsMinimal state: 1) Self-ownership: one is in defending the argument that self-ownership implies unequal and nearly absolute property rights. Critics of libertarianism are more disturbed with the unequal ownership of material goods and natural resources than with self-ownership per se. The problem of how ownership of oneself extends out to ownership of natural resources has plagued all ownership-based libertarian theories. >Natural resources/Libertarianism. Gaus I 229 2) Injustice: The second problem internal to ownership-based libertarianism is what to do about past injustices. Libertarianism is widely interpreted as advocating a change to a laissez-faire system with government functions limited to minimal taxes for police, defence, and a court system. This interpretation, however, is a mistake for the majority of libertarian theories. Although right libertarians do believe such minimal government is ideal when there has been no injustice, current holdings of goods and land are not morally legitimate under libertarianism if they have come about as a result of past injustices. Given that such past injustices are systemic to any current society, libertarians have difficulty justifying any move towards a more minimal state, unless they can specify some way of recognizing and rectifying past injustices first. >Inequlities/Nozick. 1. Kukathas, Chandran (2003) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Machan, Tibor R. (1989) Individuals and their Rights. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 4. Machan, Tibor R. and Douglas B. Rasmussen eds (1995) Liberty for the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 5. Narveson, Jan (1989) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Emission Reduction Credits | Stavins | Stavins I 159 Emission-Reduction-Credit Systems/ERC/Aldy/Stavins: An emission-reduction-credit (ERC) system delivers emission mitigation by awarding tradable credits for “certified” reductions. Generally, firms that are not covered by some set of regulations—be they command-and-control or market-based — may voluntarily participate in such systems, which serve as a source of credits that entities facing compliance obligations under the regulations may use. Individual countries can implement an ERC system without having a corresponding cap-and-trade program. A firm earns credits for projects that reduce emissions relative to a hypothetical “no project” baseline. In determining the number of credits to grant a firm for a project, calculation of the appropriate baseline is therefore as important as measuring emissions. VsEmission-Reduction-Credit: Dealing with this unobserved and fundamentally unobservable hypothetical baseline is at the heart of the so-called “additionality” problem. While ERC systems can be self-standing, as in the case of the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], governments can also establish them as elements of domestic cap-and-trade or other regulatory systems. These ERC systems—often referred to as offset programs—serve as a source of credits that can be used by regulated entities to meet compliance obligations under the primary system. >Carbon Pricing/Stavins. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Equal Rights | Mill | Höffe I 358 Equal Rights/Mill/Höffe: In his third directly political work, The Subjection of Women(1), Mill demands with particular emphasis that the almost despotic power of men over women be broken. Instead of subjecting women in marriage to strict surveillance, they should be granted the same rights and legal protection. Progress: From the result, the eventual equality of women in family and society, he even expects a progress in moral ethics, which would entail nothing less than a "moral regeneration of humanity". Utilitarianism: This motif, the progress of moral ethics, is not a secondary thought for Mill. On the contrary, it connects the writing on the women's issue with the writing "On Liberty", its commitment of citizens to the common good, and, beyond that, with the utilitarian principle of general utility. >Utilitarianism/Mill. VsEqual Rights: (...) Mill deals (...) with two of the counter-arguments widespread at the time, with the alleged natural inferiority of women and with the supposed voluntariness of their subjugation. MillVsVs: a) Mill exposes the first counter-argument as a product of social circumstances - the alleged nature of women is artificially created, the result of forced degradation; b) and to the second counter-argument he counters the already older liberal thesis that being allowed to give up one's freedom does not belong to freedom. 1. J.St. Mill The Subjection of Women, 1869 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Everyday Language | Cavell | I (a) 39 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: one usually assumes that the reference to the everyday language refutes skepticism. Vs: this can be refuted itself. We have to deal with the everyday language, when it is interpreted as the source of independent data, independently of certain philosophical positions or theories. I (a) 40 Otherwise the skeptic would be accused, in a biased way, that the obvious conflict between words and the world would be unclear to him or that he would not be able to address this conflict. Skepticism/Cavell: a serious refutation must show that the person who is as capable of understanding English as we are and knows everything we know has no real use for the words of the everyday language. >Skepticism. How can you show that? A decisive step would be to be able to show the skeptic (also the one who one has inside oneself) that you know what his words say in his opinion. (Not necessarily what they mean according to his opinion, as if they had a special or technical meaning). So we need to understand his position from within. I (a) 41 Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: the reference to the ordinary language does not refute the skeptic: 1. will not surprise him; 2. one is obviously misunderstanding him. Regarding the use of the language, we agree anyway. >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. --- II 170 Everyday language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say ...." Type II statement: The addition of type I statement by explanations. Type III statement: Generalizations. Ryle: Thesis: when we use the word "voluntarily", it is with an action that we would not normally do. >"voluntarily"/Ryle. II 172 Cavell thesis: Native speakers generally do not need to know what they can say in their language. They, themselves, are the source of such statements. MatesVs intuition and memory in terms of correct speech. CavellVsMates: Intuition is also not necessary at all. I do not need to remember the hour I learned something and not a perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language; it is spoken. >Memory. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (type II statement): for this he is generally also authorized, but precisely in relation to his example "voluntarily", the generalization fails: II 174 E.g. Austin: a voluntary gift. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Experience | Gadamer | I 66 Experience/"Erlebnis"Gadamer: The investigation of the appearance of the word in German literature leads to the surprising result that it has first become commonplace in the 1970s of the 19th century. In the 18th century it is still completely missing, but even Schiller and Goethe do not know it. The earliest proof(1) seems to be a letter by Hegel(2). The word appears just as seldom in the fifties and sixties and only in the seventies [of the 19th century] it suddenly appears frequently(3). Its general introduction into common usage seems to be related to its use in biographical literature. Gadamer: to experience means first of all to be "still alive when something happens". From there, the word carries the tone of immediacy with which something real is grasped - in contrast to that of which one also beliefs to know, but for which the authentication by one's own experience is missing, whether it is taken over from others or comes from hearsay (...) Experience is always self-experience. Content: but at the same time the form "the experienced" is used in the sense that I 67 the lasting content of what is experienced is designated by it. Biography/Gadamer: It corresponds to this double direction of the meaning of "experience" that it is the biographical literature through which the word "experience" first becomes naturalized. The essence of biography, especially the biography of artists and poets in the 19th century, is to understand the work from life. Its achievement consists precisely in conveying the two directions of meaning that we differentiate, or in recognizing them as a productive connection. Something becomes an experience, provided that it has not only been experienced, but that its being experienced has had a special emphasis that gives it lasting meaning. I 69 Historical development of the terms "life"/"experience"/Gadamer: Schleiermacher's appeal to the living feeling against the cold rationalism of the Enlightenment, Schiller's call for aesthetic freedom against the mechanism of society, Hegel's opposition of life (later: of the spirit) - against these things stands the prelude to a protest against modern industrial society, which at the beginning of our century made the words experience and experiencing rise to watchwords of an almost religious sound. The revolt of the youth movement against civic education and its way of life was under this sign. The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson also worked in this direction. In addition an "intellectual movement" such as that around Stefan George and last but not least the seismographic fineness with which Georg Simmel's philosophising reacted to these processes testify the same. Thus the philosophy of life of our days ties in with its romantic predecessors. I 75 Art Experience/Gadamer: The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the very essence of experience. Just as the work of art as such is a world of its own, so the aesthetic experience as an experience is removed from all contexts of reality. It seems to be the very purpose of the work of art to become an aesthetic experience (...). I 76 In the experience of art, a wealth of meaning is present that does not belong to this particular content or object alone, but rather represents the meaning of life as a whole. I 352 Experience/Gadamer: All experience is (...) I 353 only valid as long as it is confirmed. In this respect, its dignity is based on its fundamental repeatability. This means, however, that experience, by its very nature, cancels out its history and thus erases it. This already applies to the experience of everyday life, and even more so to every scientific event of it. In this respect, it is not a coincidental one-sidedness of modern philosophy of science, but rather factually justified that the theory of experience is completely teleologically related to the acquisition of truth that is achieved in it. >Experience/Husserl. I 356 That experience is valid as long as it is not disproved by new experience (ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria) seems to characterize the general nature of experience, whether it is its scientific event in the modern sense or the experience of daily life as it has always been. Thus this characterization corresponds entirely to the analysis of the concept of induction given by Aristotle in the appendix to his second analytics.(4) >Induction/Aristotle. I 358 GadamerVsAristoteles: What Aristotle is interested in experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts. (>Experience/Aristotle). If experience is thus considered in terms of its result, then the Gadamer I 359 the actual process of experience is skipped. Gadamer: Because this process is a much more negative one. It cannot be described simply as the seamless formation of typical generalities. Rather, this formation happens by constantly refuting false generalizations through experience, by de-typing what is seen as typically.(5) Negative experience/Gadamer: (...) the actual experience is always a negative one. If we have an experience with an object, it means that we have not seen things properly up to now and now we know better how things are. The negativity of experience therefore has a peculiarly productive meaning. It is not simply a deception that is seen through and thus a correction, but a far-reaching knowledge that is acquired. Dialectical Experience/Gadamer: So it cannot be an arbitrarily picked up object on which one makes an experience, but it must be such that one gains a better knowledge not only about it, but about what one thought to know before, i.e. about something general. The negation by which it achieves this is a certain negation. We call this kind of negation dialectical. >Experience/Hegel. I 361 (...) the application that Hegel makes to history by seeing it conceived in the absolute self-consciousness of philosophy (>Experience/Hegel), [does not do justice to the hermeneutic consciousness (...)]. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The essence of experience is thought here from the outset from that in which experience is transcended. Experience itself can never be science. It stands in an irrevocable contrast to knowledge and to that instruction that flows from theoretical or technical general knowledge. Openness: The truth of experience always contains the reference to new experience. Therefore, the one who is called experienced has not only become one through experience, but is also open to experience. But in this way the concept of experience, which is now at issue, contains a qualitatively new moment. It does not only mean experience in the sense of the instruction it gives about this or that. It means experience as a whole. I 363 The actual experience is the one in which the human becomes aware of his or her finiteness. This is where the ability to do and the self-confidence of his or her planning reason finds its limits. It turns out to be mere appearance that everything can be reversed, that always for everything is time and everything somehow returns. Rather, the person standing and acting in history constantly experiences that nothing returns. Recognition of what is does not mean here: recognition of what is once there, but insight into the limits within which the future is still open to expectation and planning - or, more fundamentally, that all expecting and planning finite beings is a finite and limited one. Actual experience is thus experience of one's own historicity. >Text/Gadamer, >I-You-Relation/Gadamer. I 372 (...) the negativity of experience [implies] logically the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. >Question/Gadamer. I 421 Experience/Gadamer: Experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. >Language and Thought/Gadamer. I 454 Experience/Discovery/Gadamer: The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to anything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world therefore does not mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, what is the object of cognition and statement is always already enclosed by the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of human experience of the world as such does not mean the objectification of the world. 1. Cf. Konrad Cramer in J. Ritter's „Historischem Wörterbuch der Philosophie“ (Vol. 2, p. 702-711) 2. In the report of a journey Hegel writes "my whole experience" (Letters, ed. Hoffmeister, III 179). One has to keep in mind that this is a letter... 3. In Dilthey's Schleiermacher-Biography (1870), in Justi in the Winckelmann-Biography (1872), in Hermann Grimm's „Goethe“ (1877) and probably more often. 4. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.). 5. This is similarly described by Karl Popper's pair of concepts of trial and error - with the restriction that these concepts start all too much from the voluntary, all too little from the passionate side of human experiential life. GadamerVsPopper: That is justified as far as one has the "logic of research" in mind alone, but certainly not if one means the logic that is effective in the experiential life of humans. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Fairness | Rawls | I 108 Fairness/Principles/Rawls: our principles of justice concerned institutions and the basic structure of a society. When it comes to individuals, the principle of fairness is relevant. --- I 110 Individuals/Principles: this is, among other things, about what obligations we have. However, a certain basic structure of a company to be established is assumed from the outset. Rawls: here it can be interpreted without major distortions in such a way that the duties and tasks presuppose a moral conception of institutions, and that the content of equitable institutions must therefore be determined before demands can be made on individuals. --- I 111 Right/legality/conformity/Rawls: intuitively, we can say that the notion of being right is synonymous with one's being consistent with those principles which, in a society's initial state, would be recognised as being applied to the relevant problems. If we accept that, we can equate fairness with rightness. Individuals/fairness: first of all, we must distinguish between obligations and natural duties. Principle of fairness: requires a person to fulfil his obligations as established by an institution, under two conditions. 1) The institution is fair, i. e. the institution fulfils the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls). --- I 112 2) The arrangement has been voluntarily approved. This means that those who have agreed have a right to expect this from others who benefit from this arrangement(1). It is wrong to assume that justice as fairness or contract theories would generally follow that people have an obligation to unjust regimes. VsLocke/Rawls: Locke in particular was wrongly criticized for this: the necessity of further background assumptions was overlooked(2). (1) See H.L.A. Hart „Are There Any Natural Rights?“, Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, (1955) p. 185f. (2) See Locke's thesis that conquest does not create justice: Locke, Second treatise of Government, pars. 176, 20.) |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Family | Nussbaum | Brocker I 907 Family/Nussbaum: On the one hand, the family is a retreat from the individualistic, competitive society that liberal theories promote; on the other hand, however, families are also a (main) place of oppression of women, where they are not regarded as independent persons but as instruments and appendages of the family. Nussbaum's capabilities approach is not directed against the institution of the family itself, but against its supposedly private character. Consequently, rights of privacy refer only to the individual person and not to the family as an institution. According to Nussbaum, neither the family nor female love and care can be regarded as natural. Brocker I 908 Family/Nussbaum: has always been legally and politically constructed, even stronger than voluntary organizations such as the church or universities.(2) 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p. 242f 2. Ebenda p.261-264 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Free Will | James | Diaz-Bone I 108/160 Definition Voluntarism/James: Voluntarism is the will to believe in Free Will. (This meaning of "voluntaristic" comes from the philosophy of life. >Lebensphilosophie. The will is here the important principle of knowledge (in contrast to reason). Freedom/James: freedom is holding on to a concept A while avoiding the transition to any other concept B, which is equally possible. Belief in free will: could be imposed by some authority! James: the free will is unobservable! The appearance of freedom is a feeling. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Golden Rule | Hobbes | Höffe I 220 Golden Rule/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes' second "Law of Nature", a variant of the Golden Rule, explains: "Everyone should voluntarily renounce his right to everything [in the natural state], if he deems it necessary for the sake of peace and self-defence" (Leviathan, chap. 14). By continuing this law, Hobbes anticipates Kant's principle of mutual restriction of freedom: "and he should be satisfied with as much freedom towards others as he would grant others against himself" (ibid.). >Peace/Hobbes, >Reason/Hobbes, see >Categorical Imperative. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Good Government | Putnam | Gaus I 59 Good Government/Robert Putnam/Forbes: (...) Robert Putnam (1993)(1) argues [that social capital] is a powerful determinant of effective democratic government. This determinant is the number of ‘horizontal’ linkages between individuals of equivalent status and power in voluntary associations such as choral societies, soccer clubs, hiking clubs, birdwatching clubs, literary circles, and the like. The more such linkages in a region, the better was the performance of that region’s government, Putnam found in his celebrated comparative study of the 20 regions of Italy. The relevant correlations were amazingly strong, and they pointed to the conclusion that a dense network of voluntary linkages is a crucial condition for strong, stable, responsive, effective democratic government. Social trust/social capital/Putnam: Putnam maintains that ‘social trust’ (which he also calls social capital) is the variable connecting associational density to democratic performance. Trust is vitally important for a society, he says, because it helps to overcome ‘dilemmas of collective action’ and thus ‘to solve the fundamental Hobbesian dilemma of public order’ (1993(2)). Trusting and trustworthy citizens are more able to... Gaus I 60 ...co-operate with each other, on the basis of voluntary agreements, than are those who lack trust in each other and cannot make credible commitments. >Social capital/Putnam. 1. Putnam, Robert D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Ibid. p.112. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Governance | Xenophon | Höffe I 47 Rule/Governance/Xenophon/Höffe: Xenophon (c. 430-354 B.C.), like Plato a Socrates student, writes a history of Greece, a paper on the constitution of Sparta, one on the ruler ("tyrant") of Syracuse: Hieron, further memories of Socrates. Even more important for political thinking, and also more effective, is the education of Cyrus. Governance/Political Thought/State Form/Xenophon/Höffe: The writing, probably the first "educational novel" of the Occident, is at the same time the first text of an important genre of political thought, namely the mirror of princes dedicated to the behaviour of a good ruler. Obedience: According to Xenophon, Cyrus, whom Herodotus had already portrayed as an exemplary ruler, finds "voluntary" obedience among his subjects, since he is characterized by piety, prudence and an ascetic lack of need, which is combined with comprehensive philanthropy. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Government Debt | Keynesianism | Mause I 235 Government Debt/Keynesianism: if the production potential is already fully exploited, so that higher government spending on goods and services will lead in the long run to lower private spending on goods and services than would be possible without higher government spending, a deficit should be accepted from a Keynesian perspective and expenditure increased to prevent continued weakness in demand and high unemployment. Def Crowding In: Stimulation of private investment activity through government support for overall economic demand. VsKeynesianism: See Government Debt/Neoclassical Theories. Maus I 277 Government Debt/Keynesianism: According to Keynesian interpretations, deficits in public budgets during the recession serve as a stimulus to strengthen overall economic demand and thus help to weaken the economic downturn and reduce the extent of involuntary unemployment. Problem: Multiplying factor: Whether active deficit-spending can fulfil this purpose depends above all on the answer to the empirical question of how high the public spending multiplier is, which provides information on how strong the effect of additional, deficit-financed public spending on gross domestic product is. This question is still controversial today. (1) In a crisis in the financial and banking sector and in economics with flexible exchange rates the factor seems to be clearly higher. (2) 1. Ethan Ilzetzki, Enrique G. Mendoza, und Carlos A. Végh. 2013. How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers? Journal of Monetary Economics 60 (2): 239– 254. 2. Giancarlo Corsetti und Gernot J. Müller. 2015. Fiscal Multipliers: Lessons from the Great Recession for Small Open Economies. Research Report, Stockholm: Swedish Fiscal Policy Council. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Identity Politics | Klein | Brocker I 933 Identity Policy/Naomi Klein: KleinVsIdentity Politics: it has provided capitalist exploitation with "great brand content and excellent marketing strategies": "If diversity was what we wanted, the brands seemed to say, then we would also get diversity"(1). Out of "voluntary blindness" the women's and civil rights movement had renounced its "radical economic foundations" through identity and representation politics: "We were so busy analysing the projections on the wall that we did not notice how the wall itself was sold".(2) 1. Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Toronto 2000. (Tenth Anniversary Edition with a New Introduction by the Author, New York 32010.) Dt.: Naomi Klein, No Logo! Der Kampf der Global Players um Marktmacht – Ein Spiel mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern, Frankfurt/M. 2015 (zuerst 2001) p. 123 2. Ibid. p. 136 Christine Bauhardt, „Naomi Klein, No Logo! (2000)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Imitation | Krastev | Krastev I 8 Imitation/Krastev: (...) we should separate the imitation of means from the imitation of goals. Borrowing technical means does not affect identity, at least not in the short term, while imitating moral ends cuts deeper and can initiate a much more radically transformative process, veering close to a ‘conversion experience’. In rebuilding their societies after 1989, Central Europeans strove to replicate the lifestyles and moral attitudes which they observed in the West. The Chinese, by way of contrast, have taken a path not unlike the one identified by >Veblen, adopting Western technologies to drive economic growth and boost the prestige of the Communist Party for the explicit purpose of resisting the siren song of the West. The imitation of moral ideals, unlike the borrowing of technologies, makes you resemble the one you admire but simultaneously makes you look less like yourself at a time when your own uniqueness and keeping faith with your group are at the heart of your struggle for dignity and recognition. Krastev I 10 An important reason why cosmetically imitative behaviour is so common in political life is that it helps the weak appear stronger than they are – a useful form of mimicry for surviving in hostile environments. It also makes the imitators seem legible to those who might otherwise help, hurt or marginalize them. In the post-Cold War world, ‘learning English, displaying copies of the Federalist Papers, wearing Armani suits, having elections’ – and, to recall Jowitt’s favourite example, ‘playing golf’(1) – enable non-Western elites not only to put their powerful Western interlocutors at ease, but also to make economic, political and military claims upon them. Krastev I 11 Russia: In Moscow, of course, the situation was different. Communism there was never experienced as foreign domination, and thus imitation of the West could not be plausibly presented as a recovery of the country’s authentic national identity. Krastev I 25 Because Central European elites saw imitation of the West as a well-travelled pathway to ‘normality’ (>Revolution/Michnik, >Revolution/Krastev, >Communism/Havel), their acceptance of the post-Cold War Imitation Imperative was wholly spontaneous, voluntary and sincere. >Normality/Krastev. Krastev I 73 Imitation/post-communist countries/Krastev: Because copycat nations are legally authorized plagiarists, they must, on a regular basis, seek the blessings and approval of those who hold the copyright to the political and economic recipes being borrowed and applied second-hand. They must also unprotestingly accept the right of Westerners to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards. The surprising passivity of Brussels in the face of outrageous violations of judicial and press independence in both Poland and Hungary means that this is not a practical issue but a symbolic one. 1.Ken Jowitt, ‘Communism, Democracy, and Golf’, Hoover Digest (30 January 2001). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Imitation | Holmes | Krastev I 8 Imitation/Krastev/Holmes: (...) we should separate the imitation of means from the imitation of goals. Borrowing technical means does not affect identity, at least not in the short term, while imitating moral ends cuts deeper and can initiate a much more radically transformative process, veering close to a ‘conversion experience’. In rebuilding their societies after 1989, Central Europeans strove to replicate the lifestyles and moral attitudes which they observed in the West. The Chinese, by way of contrast, have taken a path not unlike the one identified by >Veblen, adopting Western technologies to drive economic growth and boost the prestige of the Communist Party for the explicit purpose of resisting the siren song of the West. The imitation of moral ideals, unlike the borrowing of technologies, makes you resemble the one you admire but simultaneously makes you look less like yourself at a time when your own uniqueness and keeping faith with your group are at the heart of your struggle for dignity and recognition. Krastev I 10 An important reason why cosmetically imitative behaviour is so common in political life is that it helps the weak appear stronger than they are – a useful form of mimicry for surviving in hostile environments. It also makes the imitators seem legible to those who might otherwise help, hurt or marginalize them. In the post-Cold War world, ‘learning English, displaying copies of the Federalist Papers, wearing Armani suits, having elections’ – and, to recall Jowitt’s favourite example, ‘playing golf’(1) – enable non-Western elites not only to put their powerful Western interlocutors at ease, but also to make economic, political and military claims upon them. Krastev I 11 Russia: In Moscow, of course, the situation was different. Communism there was never experienced as foreign domination, and thus imitation of the West could not be plausibly presented as a recovery of the country’s authentic national identity. Krastev I 25 Because Central European elites saw imitation of the West as a well-travelled pathway to ‘normality’ (>Revolution/Michnik, >Revolution/Krastev, >Communism/Havel), their acceptance of the post-Cold War Imitation Imperative was wholly spontaneous, voluntary and sincere. >Normality/Krastev. Krastev I 73 Imitation/post-communist countries/Krastev: Because copycat nations are legally authorized plagiarists, they must, on a regular basis, seek the blessings and approval of those who hold the copyright to the political and economic recipes being borrowed and applied second-hand. They must also unprotestingly accept the right of Westerners to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards. The surprising passivity of Brussels in the face of outrageous violations of judicial and press independence in both Poland and Hungary means that this is not a practical issue but a symbolic one. 1.Ken Jowitt, ‘Communism, Democracy, and Golf’, Hoover Digest (30 January 2001). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Information Processing | Matthews | Corr I 418 Information processing/cognitive psychology/personality traits/Matthews: The cognitive patternings of traits (i.e., biases in multiple, independent, processing components) support theories that link traits to individual differences in information-processing.the more productive research areas show a progression in three steps. 1) The first step is simply to show that a broadly-defined effect exists, such as an impairment in working memory, or a selective attention bias. 2) The second step is to outline a broad theory that makes some general predictions. For example, the theory that bias in anxiety operates pre-attentively leads to the prediction that it should be evident even when stimuli are subliminally presented. 3) The third step is to develop a detailed computational model, such as building a connectionist network that simulates the phenomenon in detail (Matthews and Harley 1996(1); Mathews and Mackintosh 1998(2)). Problems: information-processing accounts are incomplete. Sometimes, personality effects are strategic in nature; that is, there may be no personality effect on the parameters of information-processing, but different individuals use the functionality provided by the cognitive architecture to pursue different task goals, e.g., in terms of valuing speed over accuracy. To understand how personality impacts voluntary choice of strategy, we must look at high-level self-regulation and the self-knowledge that supports it. Corr I 420 Personality traits: The information-processing attributes of a given trait represent a platform on which the individual builds the skills that support their adaptive specialization. 1. Matthews, G., & Harley, T. A. 1996. Connectionist models of emotional distress and attentional bias, Cognition and Emotion 10: 561–600 2. Mathews, A. and Mackintosh, B. 1998. A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety, Cognitive Therapy and Research 22: 539–60 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Information Production | Benkler | Benkler I 35 Information Production/Benkler: There are no noncommercial automobile manufacturers. There are no volunteer steel foundries. You would never choose to have your primary source of bread depend on voluntary contributions from others. Nevertheless, scientists working at noncommercial research institutes funded by nonprofit educational institutions and government grants produce most of our basic science. Widespread cooperative networks of volunteers write the software and standards that run most of the Internet and enable what we do with it. I 36 Because welfare economics defines a market as producing a good efficiently only when it is pricing the good at its marginal cost, a good like information (and culture and knowledge are, for purposes of economics, forms of information), which can never be sold both at a positive (greater than zero) price and at its marginal cost, is fundamentally a candidate for substantial nonmarket production. I 37 Incentive: Authors and inventors or, more commonly, companies that contract with musicians and filmmakers, scientists, and engineers, will invest in research and create cultural goods because they expect to sell their information products. Over time, this incentive effect will give us more innovation and creativity, creativity, which will outweigh the inefficiency at any given moment caused by selling the information at above its marginal cost. Nonrivalry, (>Information/Arrow) (…) is not the only quirky characteristic of information production as an economic phenomenon. The other crucial quirkiness is that information is both input and output of its own production process. I 38 If we pass a law that regulates information production too strictly, allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high on today’s innovators, then we will have not only too little consumption of information today, but also too little production of new information for tomorrow. >Information/Economic Theories, >Intellectual Property/Benkler, >Intellectual Property/Economic Theories. I 39 Where does innovation and information production come from, then, if it does not come as much from intellectual-property-based market actors, as many generally believe? The answer is that it comes mostly from a mixture of (1) nonmarket sources - both state and non state - and (2) market actors whose business models do not depend on the regulatory framework of intellectual property. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Institutions | Ostrom | Brocker I 735 Institutions/Ostrom: Question: How do institutions emerge in groups and how do they change? For example, groundwater management in the Los Angeles area. Institution theory/tradition: typically assumes a Hobbesian state of nature without contracts and rules. OstromVsTradition: 1. This picture is inaccurate where people regularly meet. 2. Rule freedom must not be confused with the absence of rules. 3. If one starts from a state without any rules, a methodical problem arises that one must examine the actual emergence of institutions as a special process. This would obscure the view for solutions. Brocker I 736 Solution/Ostrom: using the example of the threat to the fresh water supply in Los Angeles from overexploitation and lowering of the groundwater table, Ostrom shows how the conflict between users is structured over a period of 30 years through court rulings and the creation of new administrative institutions. The participants by no means resign to their "dilemma" (OstromVsHardin, see Social goods/Hardin), but rather strive for a further development of overly permissive rules. Levels/administration: here again, as in the self-organization studied by Ostrom (see Self-organization/Ostrom), the interaction of several levels is decisive for the question of institutional procurement. Ostrom: The water reservoirs (basins) are not owned by anyone, they are managed by a polycentric group of dedicated public companies lead by private water companies and voluntary producers' associations. (...) Obviously, solving the problems required neither a central regulatory body nor a system of private property. (...) All parties are provided with the relevant information by a court-appointed water inspector (...) The informal sanctions were modest. Regular meetings of the parties involved offer mechanisms for conflict resolution. The organizational units were embedded in larger units. (1) Brocker I 737 Conclusion: Institutional procurement and change takes place in a process of gathering and exchanging experiences ("accumulation of institutional capital"). (2) The form of these processes is very individual and depends on the problem structure. Commonalities between successful common management systems (see Social Goods/Ostrom) exist in the construction principles (see Self-organisation/Ostrom). 1. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge 1990. Dt.: Elinor Ostrom, Die Verfassung der Allmende. Jenseits von Staat und Merkt, Tübingen 1999, p. 178f 2.Ibid. p. 246. Markus Hanisch, „Elinor Ostrom Die Verfassung der Allmende“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconOstr I Elinor Ostrom Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Cambridge 1990 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Institutions | Barr | Gaus I 212 Institutions/welfare state/Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). >Adverse selection/Barr. 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Insurances | Barr | Gaus I 212 Insurance/welfare state/adverse selection/moral hazard/Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998(2): 190—2). For all of these reasons organizations offering protection will try to limit use, to prevent too many high risk people from joining, and to charge them more in order to hang on to their other members. In the case of voluntary groups, such as neighbourhood-, work- or craft-based mutual aid societies, informal patterns of social surveillance and affinity may function to exclude outsiders and others who are thought to be especially likely to need benefits. Similarly, private firms may use various underwrit- ing mechanisms to screen out high risk individuals or groups. The overall result may well be that certain groups may receive no or inadequate coverage, and the cost of services may be much greater than they would be if they were provided through a compulsory plan that spread risks more widely and rationed services to avoid overuse.* * An example of how a system dominated by private provision both is more expensive, and provides protection to a smaller proportion of the population, may be medical care in the US. The US spends a far higher proportion of its GDP (12.9 percent in 1998 compared with Germany's 10.3 or the UK's 6.8) on medical care than other rich countries, but fails to provide coverage for over 20 percent of its population. Ironically, public provision of medical care in the US is larger than that of the UK (5.8 versus 5.7 percent of GDP), not even counting the implicit subsidy represented by the favourable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance (OECD health statistics). 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Intentions | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 309 Intention/Description/Stegmüller: whether an action is intentional or not, is dependent on the description. - when unintentional, ignorance plays a crucial role. - Voluntary: is an action (not accepted) if it is intended by at least one description directly. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Justice | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 149 Justice/Thomas/Höffe: Thomas Aquinas places [the concept of] justice (iustitia) (...) between prudence (prudentia) and courage (fortitudo). Thomas Aquinas per Aristotle: In terms of content, he follows Aristotle's differentiations made in the book of justice of Nicomachian ethics. >Ethics/Aristotle. In doing so, he introduces two distinctions that have since been canonical and effective far beyond Thomism(), the linguistic origin by Thomas Aquinas is unknown to many: A. General justice: (iustitia generalis, not: universalis) means a comprehensive righteousness which voluntarily fulfills all that is required by law and custom. >Customs/Morality. Iustitia particularis: [here we are concerned] with questions where insatiability threatens, namely questions of honour, money or self-preservation. Distributive justice: Within special justice, the allocation of honor and money, which allows for certain inequalities, distributive justice (iustitia distributiva), is set off against regulatory justice (iustitia commutativa). Iustitia commutativa: (...) is responsible for two areas, voluntary exchange, business transactions and civil law, and can be called "distributive justice" here, but only here. >Inequalities. B. Secondly, there is the criminal law with its restorative or corrective justice (iustitia correctiva). >Laws. 1.Summa IIa Ilae qu. 58 und 61 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Labour | Giddens | Gaus I 219 Labour/Welfare state/Giddens/Moon: [the] obligation to work is not, or is not merely, a demand to be made on the individual, one which he might reasonably wish to resist, for ultimately it is rooted in an ideal of social inclusion and active citizenship through which the individual's own interests and needs can be realized. Anthony Giddens sounds this theme in his call for 'the positive welfare society', in which 'the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the development of self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility become the prime focus' (1998(1): 128). >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Labour/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. Giddens: Replacing the traditional 'welfare state' with the 'social investment state' , the task of government would be to invest in 'human capital' rather than 'the direct provision of economic maintenance' (1998(1): 117). Although he allows that full employment might not be realized, he calls for the redistribution of work to include as many as possible, and various forms of payment for participation in the 'social economy' , the sphere of civil society traditionally maintained by voluntary work. >Labour/Welfare economics. 1. Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Language | Cavell | I 185 Language/Universals/Wittgenstein/Cavell: we project words from one context to the next, but without relying on any definitions or rules. For the most part (not always) we do not need universals as a fundamentalist premise. >Meaning, >Word meaning, >Reference, >Sentence meaning, >Speaking, >Communication, >Universals. Skepticism here would only look for new universals here. >Skepticism. I 186 Language learning/language acquisition: the entry into our culture is not guaranteed by something essential. >Language acquisition. I 187 The projection is instead guaranteed by our agreement in the judgment. >Judgments. Our words occur in an unlimited number of cases and projections, and their variance is not arbitrary. --- II 189 Language Philosophy/Cavell: this is not so much about revengeing sensational offenses against the intellect, as to remedy its civilian misconduct. We must return tyrannizing ideas (such as existence, certainty, identity, reality, truth ...) to their specific contexts in which they function normally, so that they can function normally without corrupting our thinking. >World/thinking, >Language behavior. Language/World/Cavell: the transition from language to the world occurs imperceptibly when Austin says "We can voluntarily make a gift" (general statement) is a "material mode" (Mates) for "The gift was made voluntary" (special case). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Legitimacy | Durkheim | Habermas IV 123 Legitimacy/Civil Law/Durkheim/Habermas: Problem: a contract cannot contain its own bases of validity. The fact that the parties voluntarily enter into an agreement does not imply the binding nature of this agreement. The contract itself is only possible thanks to a regulation of social origin. (1) This regulation, for its part, cannot be an expression of mere arbitrariness, not based on the factuality of state authority. Solution/Durkheim: the rights that have their origin in things were dependent on the religious nature of these things. Thus, all moral and legal relations (...) owe their existence to a sui generis force that is inherent in either the subjects or the objects and that forces respect. Question: how can two decisions originating from two different subjects have a greater binding force, simply because they are identical? (2) Solution/Durkheim: contracts have the binding character due to the legitimacy of the legal regulations on which they are based. And these only apply Habermas IV 124 as legitimate because they express a general interest. Criterion/Durkheim: that the contract is moral is only guaranteed due to the fact that no side is favoured. (3) DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not - like Max Weber - concerned here with material justice, but with the fact that the obligatory character of contracts cannot be derived from the arbitrariness of the interest-led agreement of individuals. 1. E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, German: Über die Teilung der sozialen Arbeit, Frankfurt, 1977, p. 255. 2. E. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris 1969, p. 205. (engl. London 1957). 3. Durkheim (1969) p. 231. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Liability | Calabresi | Parisi I 19 Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)(1) addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred. Parisi I 20 They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ... Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange. Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade. Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers. Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli. Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs. Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains. Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few. * Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts. 1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Liability | Melamed | Parisi I 19 Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)(1) addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred. Parisi I 20 They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ... Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange. Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade. Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers. Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli. Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs. Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains. Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few. * Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts. 1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Macroeconomics | Muth | Mause I 57f Macroeconomics/MacroeconomicsVsMonetarism/MacroeconomicsVsKeynesianism/Muth/Lucas: Problems of monetarism or Keynesianism are the lack of explanation of wage and price rigidities or wage and price formation at all, or the arbitrary approach in modeling the expectations of economic entities. Ultimately, there was a lack of a microeconomic foundation for macroeconomics. The new Classical Macroeconomics, of which John F. Muth (1930-2005) and Robert E. Lucas (born 1937) are the main representatives tried to close this gap. Two assumptions are fundamental to this approach: On the one hand, it is assumed that expectations are rational, i.e. that the modelled economic entities utilize all information inherent in the model and therefore arrive at the same forecasts as the model itself. On the other hand, price flexibility and the permanent equilibrium of the markets are assumed. Accordingly, fluctuations in production and employment are not interpreted as imbalances but as a sequence of equilibrium positions. New Classical Macroeconomics Thesis: There is no involuntary unemployment! VsMuth/VsLucas/VsMacroeconomics: the macroeconomic problems observed were more or less defined away. There was no real foundation through a microeconomic approach. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Cavell | I 14 To mean/meaning/Cavell: There is a difference between the meaning of the words we use and what we mean when we give them a voice. >Speaking, >Implicature. Thesis: Our ability to mean what we say is dependent on two characteristics of our situation: 1. from the everydayness, the ordinariness of the resources at our disposal. 2. from the fact that we are the ones that access these resources. >Convention, >Community, >Understanding. We sometimes achieve or sometimes we do not achieve to mean what we say with our words! --- II 168 Cavell thesis: what we usually say and mean can have a direct and profound control over what we can say and mean in the philosophical sense. II 205 To mean/must/Cavell: this is not about reproducing the meaning as what you "must mean". Intension is not a substitute for intention. >Intension, >Intention. Cavell Thesis: Still, if we say "we must something", we imply that we are convinced of it, although it is not analytically, it is necessarily true! >Analytical, >a priori, >necessarily. Truth/Necessity/Cavell: if truth (with Aristotle) means: From what it is to say that it is, Then necessary truth is From what is, to say what it is. ((s) How it is done). But it is a profound prejudice to mean that it was a matter of content. It does not apply to all statements, but to those who are concerned with actions, and therefore have a rule description complementarity. >Truth. II 207 Necessity/Language/Cavell: 1. it is perfectly correct that the German language could have developed differently. 2. There is no way out when you say "I can say what I want, I do not always have to use the normal forms". You do not want to argue that you can talk without the language providing the possibility for this? II 208 E.g. A baker could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" synonymously. If it then follows that the professor does not understand the baker, then the professor would not understand another professor any more! >Language use, >Speaking. II 208 Method/Mates: Grewendorf/Meggle S 160): two methods: 1. Extensional: one brings out the meaning of a word by finding out what it has in common with other cases of its use. >Extension. 2. Intensive method: one asks the person concerned what he means. >Intension. II 209 Language/Cavell: it is not the case that we always know only by empirical investigations what words mean. We could not then come to generalizations. For example, half of the population could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" without any difference, but it does not show that the two are synonymous, but that both apply to the action of the person in question! II 210 It may be that the baker even insists that the two words mean the same. One could then argue: "You can say it, but you cannot mean it!" "You cannot mean what you would mean if you had chosen the other wording." Why is the baker not entitled to his argument then? >Assertibility. II 211 To a philosopher we would say in this situation (> Humpty Dumpty): 1. That he limits his expressive possibilities. 2. That he has a shortened theory of what it means to do something. Likewise, the philosopher who asks in everything: "analytical or synthetic?" has a shortened concept of communication. >Communication. II 213 Language/Cavell: The error is based on the assumption that the normal use of a word represents a function of the internal state of the speaker. To mean/Cavell: the false assumption that a statement about what we mean is synthetic comes from the fact that we believe that it describes the mental processes of a speaker. In reality, it is about the use of language. >Mental states, >Mind. For example, to a child, we might say, "You do not know, you believe it". The child learns the word usage. II 215 To mean/Cavell: there is no such activity as finding out what I mean with a word. But there is a finding out what a word means. >Language acquisition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Method | Helmholtz | Gadamer I 13 Methods/Humanities/Helmholtz/Gadamer: There is no separate method in the humanities. But with Helmholtz, one can ask how much method means here, and whether the other conditions under which the humanities operate are not perhaps much more important for their working methods than inductive logic. Helmholtz had correctly hinted at this when, in order to do justice to the humanities, he emphasised memory and authority and spoke of the psychological tact that takes the place of conscious inference here. On what is such tact based? How is it acquired? In the end, does the scientific nature of the humanities lie more in it than in its methodology? GadamerVsHelmholtz: The answer that Helmholtz and his century gave to this question cannot be enough. They follow Kant by using the concept of science and knowledge oriented on the model of the natural sciences and the distinguishing Gadamer I 14 Search for the specificity of the humanities in the artistic moment (artistic feeling, artistic induction). Yet the image Helmholtz gives of work in the natural sciences may be one-sided enough if he does not think anything of the "quick flashes of inspiration" (i.e. what are called ideas) and only preserves "the iron work of self-conscious reasoning" in them. He refers to John Stuart Mill's testimony that "in recent times the inductive sciences have done more for the advancement of logical methods" "than all philosophers of subject"(1). They are his model of scientific method par excellence. Nevertheless Helmholtz knows that historical knowledge is determined by an experience quite different from that which serves to investigate the laws of nature. He therefore seeks to explain why the inductive method is under different conditions for historical knowledge than for the study of nature. For this purpose he refers to the distinction between nature and freedom, which underlies Kantian philosophy. Historical knowledge is so different because in its field there are no laws of nature, but voluntary subordination to practical laws, i.e. to commandments. GadamerVsHelmholtz: However, this train of thought is not very convincing. Neither does it correspond to Kant's intentions if one bases an inductive exploration of the human world of freedom on his distinction between nature and freedom, nor does it correspond to his own thought of the logic of induction itself. Method/Mill/Gadamer: Mill had been more consistent by methodically excluding the problem of freedom. See >Humanities/Mill. 1. H. Helmholtz, Vorträge und Reden, 4. Aufl. I. Bd., Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesamtheit der Wissenschaften, S. 167 ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Mill | Feinberg | Gaus I 109 Mill/Feinberg/Gaus: The classic work on the harm principle, and more generally on this Millian approach to political justice, is Joel Feinberg’s masterful four-volume The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1984–90)(1). (1) Precisely what is a harm (1984)(1)? (2) Does Millian morality allow coercion to prevent acts that, while not harmful to others, are offensive to some (1985)(1)? (3) When individuals are unable to make fully voluntary choices, can coercion then be employed to stop them from harming themselves (1986)(1)? And (4) are there any conditions under which liberals justify coercion that Gaus I 110 do not fall into one of the above categories (1990)(1)? Feinberg convincingly shows that, when carefully examined, Mill’s radical proposal – that only harm to others can justify social interference – is implausible, but nevertheless is plausibly construed as the core of a liberal social morality (see further Gaus, 1999(2): Part II). Morality/Feinberg: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984(1): 9). Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs); not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. de Jasay, 1991)(3) have argued that it is a poor grounding for liberal principles as the concept of harm is so malleable: it can be interpreted to encompass the prevention of psychological and culture harms (see e.g. Kernohan(4), 1997), thus justifying extensive and intrusive coercive interventions. >Actions/Benn. 1. Feinberg 1984-90 - Feinberg, Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I, Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. II, Offense to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. III, Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1990) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. IV, Harmless Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1999) Social Philosophy. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. 3. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1997) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Misinformation | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 128 Misinformation/Policy of Russia/Krastev: American offcials could not understand why Putin was claiming that 'It is "citizens' defence groups," not Russian forces, who have seized infrastructure and militaryfacilities in Crimea(1), - or why Putin denied that Russia had anything to do with hacking the emails of the Democratic Party. What sense did it make to say such things when images of Russian Special Forces capturing the public buildings in Crimea were all over the TV and the internet and when the FBI has identified the intelligence offcer who did the hacking? Putin's lies seemed absurd in the age of involuntary transparency. Krastev: So why were Russian offcials lying so blatantly when they knew perfectly well that their lies would be exposed a few hours after they were uttered? Putin's barefaced mendacity ran counter to a basic assumption of realpolitik, namely that 'lying is only effective when the potential victim thinks that the liar is probably telling the truth' and that 'nobody wants to be called a liar, even if it is for a good cause.(1) Solution/Krastev: Every counter-attack provoked by Putin's blatantly mendacious behaviour was, from his perspective, Krastev I 129 a way to remind the world and especially America how often the West had lied to Russia in the past. The goal was less to achieve a strategic advantage than to change the mental state and self-image of the Main Enemy, that is, to make Americans painfully remember what they had so conveniently forgotten. Policy of the USA: James Jesus Angleton, chief of CIA Counterintelligence from 1 9 54 to 1975, would be less scandalized by Putin's behaviour than his successors in charge of America's intelligence agencies today. (...) [he believed that] „the essensce of disinformation ist provocation, not lying.“(2) 1. John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 29, 20. 2. Edward Jay Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War between the KGB and the CIA (Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 17. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Models | Cognitive Psychology | Corr I 401 Models/Cognitive Psychology/Matthews: a basic difficulty inherent in cognitive research: that different models may explain the data equally well (the ‘identifiability problem’). A simple example is that a given effect may equally reflect basic parameters of the cognitive architecture (e.g., speed of execution of a given component) or voluntary strategy choice (e.g., whether to run a check on the output of a given component). Performance data on response time and accuracy are often open to differing interpretations of this kind. >Method/Cognitive Psychology. Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Morality | Feinberg | Gaus I 110 Morality/Feinberg/Gaus: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984(1): 9). >Mill/Feinberg. Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs); not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. de Jasay, 1991)(2) have argued that it is a poor grounding for liberal principles as the concept of harm is so malleable: it can be interpreted to encompass the prevention of psychological and culture harms (see e.g. Kernohan, 1997)(3), thus justifying extensive and intrusive coercive interventions. Moreover, the requirement that the agent give ‘informed consent’ and that her self-harming acts are ‘voluntary’ opens the way to paternalistic interventions (Kleinig, 1983)(4). >Actions/Benn. 1. Feinberg 1984-90 - Feinberg, Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I, Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. II, Offense to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. III, Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1990) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. IV, Harmless Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 3. Kernohan, Andrew (1997) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Kleinig, John (1983) Paternalism. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenhead. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Multiculturalism | Barry | Gaus I 257 Multiculturalism/Barry/Kukathas: According to Barry, multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberalism and a respect for liberal values and should therefore be rejected. (Barry 2001)(1) Galston: [William] Galston has termed 'Reformation liberalism'. Unlike 'Enlightenment liberalism', which emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, 'Reformation liberalism', Galston maintains, values diversity and sees the importance of 'differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature ofthe good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like' (1995(2): 521). BarryVsGalston: Barry rejects this distinction, but is especially critical nonetheless of those who are members of the diversity-promoting liberalism camp. Barry rejects three major arguments advanced in support of Reformation liberalism. 1) The first is that liberal theory values respect for persons and this implies respect for the cultures to which individuals belong. To this Barry replies that illiberal cultures often violate the requirement of equal respect and to that extent they do not deserve respect (2001(1): 128). 2) The second argument is that liberalism values diversity because it increases the range of options available to individuals. To this Barry responds that liberals prize individuality rather than diversity (2001(1): 129). 3) The third argument is that liberalism attaches great importance to the public/private distinction, and so should be committed to nonintervention in the private realm. To this Barry replies that liberalism has historically challenged the sanctity of parental and paternal authority, and sought to protect individuals from the groups to which they belong. Individuals/Barry: Individuals must be free to associate in any way they like (consistent with the law protecting the interests of those outside the association). But there are two important conditions: all participants in the association should be sane adults, and their participation should be voluntary (2001(1): 148). Group rights: Groups may then do as they please, provided those who do not like the way a group's affairs are run are able to exit without facing excessive costs (2001(1): 150). Problems/VsBarry: Barry's view imposes serious constraints, then, on the operation of groups. In the end, what it tolerates is only what Fish calls 'boutique multiculturalism'. (>Multiculturalism/Fish). It requires that illiberal practices not be condoned, that parents be required to send their children to school, and that generally the state ensures that children are appropriately educated and not made the victims of creationists and religious zealots - even if they are their parents. >Religion/education/Multiculturalism. Egalitarianism: In the end, Barry's view amounts to a reassertion of liberal egalitarianism as a doctrine that is simply incompatible with multiculturalism. VsBarry: (For criticisms of Barry see the papers in Kelly, 2002(3); Per Barry: for another defence of liberal egalitarianism see Kernohan, 1998(4).) 1. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 2. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34. 3. Kelly, Paul, ed. (2002) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Cultuæ and Equality and Its Critics. Oxford: Polity. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1998) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Natural Justice | Weber | Habermas III 355 Natural justice/Weber/Habermas: Weber describes the rationality of modern law in such a way that the procedural rational use of legal organizational means is in the foreground. This is shown by his interpretation of rational natural justice. >Rationality, >Purpose rationality. Habermas III 356 Natural Justice/Habermas: in its various versions from Locke and Hobbes to Rousseau and Kant to Hegel, we can understand it as a theoretical framework for attempts to establish legally organized state and social constitutions. (1) >J. Locke, >Th. Hobbes, >J.-J. Rousseau, >I. Kant, >G.W.F. Hegel. Weber: this right of reason links the legitimacy of positive law to formal conditions and ultimately to rational agreement. Laws, >Reason. The basis is the right of freedom, above all the freedom of contract. The voluntary rational contract is either the historical cause of all societies or a regulatory measure of evaluation.(2) >Contracts, >Contract Theory, >Freedom, >Society. 1.L. Strauss, Naturrecht und Geschichte, Stuttgart 1956; C. B. McPherson, Die politische Theorie des Besitzindividualismus, Frankfurt, 1967; W. Euchner, Naturrecht und Politik bei J. Locke, Frankfurt 1969; I. Fetscher, Rousseaus politische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1975. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Ed) J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 637 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Necessity | Cavell | II 177 Language/Necessity/Cavell: Question: are there logical requirements or only empirical findings? (Cavell thesis: (according to Fodor): logical necessities do consist in language philosophy). Cavell: logical necessities do not exist between language and world but only between sentences. The opportunity in which we express a sentence (circumstances) cannot be regarded as part of meaning or logic. >Cicrumstances, >Language use, >Meaning, >Sentence meaning. II 178 To mean/Must/Necessity/Language/Cavell: e.g. "He would not say that unless he meant ..." >Meaning/Intending/Cavell, >Convention, >Implicature. If we assume that the speaker and we already understand the meaning and use of an expression, one could conclude: II 170 1. the pragmatic implications are unrestricted and therefore any deviation is possible. 2. there are restrictions of use, then a) since all necessity is logical, the "pragmatic implications" are "quasi-logical implications", b) then there must be a "third kind of logic", since the pragmatic implications cannot be deductively constructed. c) there is also a non-logical necessity. II 180 Necessity/Language/Cavell: it must now be argued that from the fact that an expression is used in its usual way, something follows: it entitles one to draw certain conclusions. Learning what these implications are is a part of learning the language itself. Full understanding is implicit understanding. >Learning, >Language acquisition. II 200 Must/Cavell: when I say "You must ..." and if that is correct and appropriate, then nothing you can do proves that I am wrong. >Imperative/Cavell. II 201 Should/Cavell: when I say that you should return the borrowed money, it only makes sense if there could be a reason to suppose that the money was perhaps a present. >Sense. This is an analogy to the distinction between a mere execution of an action and a good execution. cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Negation | Searle | V 171 Negation/Searle: the philosophers have long abandoned the idea that there are irreducible negative sentences >Existence statement. V 219 Negation/Searle: the negation of certain sentences such as "He doesn't know if he is in pain" are simply wrong, not as is sometimes assumed, neither true nor false. >Truth value gap. But if they are wrong, does their negation not have to be true? --- IV 113 Negation/metaphor/Searle: the negation is just as metaphorical! >Metaphor/Searle. --- VII 91 Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word (for an activity that one can sensibly call "voluntary") is not again an A-word! For example: I did not buy my car voluntarily, I was forced to do so. I did not come voluntarily, I was dragged here. He doesn't know if the object in front of him is a tree. There is considerable asymmetry between A words and their opposite or negation. >"Voluntarily". VII 95 SearleVsAustin: Austin's thesis ("No modification without aberration”) does not even go over sentences: making an assertion means committing oneself to something that is the case. If the possibility that the facts do not exist is excluded, it is pointless. Austin's slogan should be reformulated too: "No remark that is not remarkable," or "Not an assertion that's not worth asserting." Negation/Searle: the opposite of a standard condition is not itself a standard condition. Therefore, no A condition is required for the utterance of a negation of an A proposition. A-phrases mark standard situations, but their negations do not. A-condition: an A-condition is normally a reason to assume that the negation of the A proposition is true. Generally, only where there is a reason to assume that a standard situation could have been a non-standard situation, the remark that it is a standard situation makes sense. >Sensible/senseless, >truth value gaps. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Objectivism | Gadamer | I 306 Objectivism/GadamerVsObjectivism/Gadamer: Historical objectivism, by referring to its critical methodology, obscures the historical entanglement in the history of effect in which historical consciousness itself is situated. Although it uses its method of criticism to remove the ground from the arbitrariness of actualizing ingratiations with the past, it creates for itself the good conscience to deny the involuntary and not arbitrary but all-carrying preconditions that guide its own understanding, and thus to miss the truth that would be attainable with all the finiteness of our understanding. Historical objectivism resembles in this respect statistics, which is such an excellent propaganda tool precisely because it allows the language of "facts" to speak, thus feigning an objectivity that in reality depends on the legitimacy of its questions. >History of Effect/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Obligations | Rawls | I 113 Obligations/Rawls: 1. unlike moral requirements, obligations arise from voluntary action, whether explicitly or tacitly. 2. the content of an obligation is always defined by an institution. 3. obligations are usually due to an individual, namely those individuals whose cooperation maintains a questionable arrangement. Examples are obligations resulting from a public office or marriage. It may be that someone is entitled to refuse obligations if this follows from the principle of fairness. --- I 115/116 Reciprocity: does not follow from a contractual agreement between individuals, but from the second part of the fairness principle(1): --- I 116 (Note) Commitments/M. Waltz/Rawls: Views to derive political obligations solely from consensus can be found in M. Walzer(2). --- I 350 Duties/Commitment/Rawls: Question: under what conditions are we obliged to comply with an unfair law? It is a mistake that we would never be obliged to do this. --- I 350 Up to certain limits, we are obliged to comply with unfair laws within the framework of our legal system. Problem: where are the limits? Different principles must be weighed here. Additional problem: our principles of justice accept an ideal society in perfect order, including strict compliance with laws. Inequality: when we are dealing with injustice, other principles come into play, including a theory of punishment, equitable justice, fair war, civil disobedience and military resistance. The theory of justice as fairness cannot be applied directly to it. (1) See Rawls I 111: "This arrangement has been approved." (2) M. Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, Cambridge, Mass. 1970, pp. Ix-xvi, 7-10,18-21, and ch. 5. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Order | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Order/Parsons/Talcott ParsonsVsHobbes/Habermas: the question of how social order is possible cannot be solved under empirical conditions. (The Hobbesian problem). Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests. Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order. Habermas IV 310 Order/Parsons: cannot be stabilized by interests alone. Thesis: Orders that are deprived of their normative force lead to anomic states. (1) Habermas IV 315 The Hobbesian Problem: (See Order/Hobbes) If one starts from the concept of purpose-rational action, the actions of others are possible means for one's own purposes. Then it follows from the postulate of rationality that everyone should try to rule over each other. Then power becomes the central concept of the analysis of order. A purely utilitarian society would then be chaotic and unstable. (2) Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a purposive-rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract. (3) ParsonsVsHobbes: A. The model of purpose-rational action cannot explain how actors can make an agreement that is reasonable, Habermas IV 316 i.e. so that the interests of all are taken into account. Solution/Parsons: The concept of purposive rationality must be extended. This leads to a distinction between technical and practical concepts of rationality. (See Order/Locke). Conclusion: commitments must be based on a normative consensus, Habermas IV 317 which alone cannot result from rational considerations. B. Parson's thesis: (like Weber and Durkheim): Hobbes' artificial coercive order cannot be made permanent and is therefore not suitable as a model for an explanation of how social order is possible. Habermas IV 318 Problem: there is a lack of standardization and value orientation. Parsons/Habermas: Parsons constructs a symmetrical relationship between two contrary but equally wrong positions: 1) Sociological materialism reduces norms to externally imposed regulations and ignores the fact that the institutionalisation of expectations of behaviour is based on the orientation of the actor and binds it normatively and not merely de facto. Habermas IV 319 Sociological idealism underestimates the coercion that emanates from the non-normative components of the action situation, from the material substrate of the lifeworld in general. Solution/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons develops an institutional concept that follows the New Kantian model of value realization, i.e. Weber's concept of an order integrating values and interests. (3). 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 404. 2.Ebenda, S. 93f 3. Ebenda S 732. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Papacy | Marsilius of Padua | Höffe I 179 Papacy/Marsilius/Höffe: MarsiliusVsPapacy: According to Marsilius, the governor of God on earth, the Roman bishop, is not a prince of peace, but the main cause of discord. Claim to power: Marsilius' papal criticism continues in the criticism of the claim to primacy of the Popes. Rightly understood, the Roman bishops were no longer merely a representative of Christian unity. The primacy over the other bishops had no biblical authority, it was only due to a historical habit, voluntary agreement and pragmatic considerations. Councils: Consequently, Marsilius, even in the theological field, in all questions of Christian doctrine, declares that the Bishop of Rome is subject to a higher authority and that only this, a general council, is infallible. All the Pope's worldly claims to power, as well as - it must be added - those of a council, are rejected all around. Secular power: The claim to secular power made by the clergy cannot be justified in any way: "If a plurality of governments (Höffe: i.e. the duality of state and church power) is established, then no empire and no city becomes a unity(1). 1. Marsilius, Defensor pacis, I, 17, §7 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Papal Power | William of Ockham | Gaus I 345 Papal power/fullness of power/Ockham/Kilcullen: Ockham (see McGrade, 1974(1); Knysh, 1996(2)) disagreed with Marsilius at many points, though he seems to have taken over from him the idea that the doctrine of fullness of power (or a certain version of it) was the root of much of the trouble in the Church. Ockham's earliest political writing was the Work of Ninety Days (c. 1332), in which he defends the Franciscan theory of voluntary poverty as a religious ideal against Pope John XXII's thesis that no one can justly consume without owning (William of Ockham, 2001(3)). Gaus I 346 Fullness of power: In his Contra benedictum (c. 1335) Ockham began his preoccupation with the Marsilian theme of fullness of power, which he continued in other works written in the later part of his life. William of OckhamVsMarsilius: Ockham rejects two versions of the doctrine of fullness of power. A) He denies that the pope has power from Christ to do whatever is not contrary to divine or natural law: against this he argues that a pope must respect not only rights and liberties under natural law, but also rights and liberties existing under human law, including those conferred on rulers by the law of nations and the civil law and custom, and that he must refrain from imposing excessive burdens (1992(4): 23-4, 51-8).* B) He also rejects a weaker version of the doctrine of fullness of power, according to which the pope has all power necessary to secure the good government of the Christian people. Against this he maintains that securing good government in temporal matters is the concern of the laity, not of the clergy (1974(1): 70—1). However, there is some sense in which Ockham agrees that the pope has fullness of power: in spiritual matters (i.e. matters relating to eternal salvation and peculiar to the Christian religion) that are of necessity (not just useful), the pope regularly has full authority over believers (not unbelievers); in temporal matters he regularly has no authority, but on occasion, in a situation of necessity, the pope may do, even in temporal matters, whatever is necessary if it is not being done by whoever is normally responsible to do it (1992: 62-3; Kilcullen, 1999(5): 313-14). (Note the distinction between what is regularly or ordinarily true and what is true on occasion or extraordinarily; see Bayley, 1949(6).) OckhamVsMarsilius: If Marsilius was the first exponent of the doctrine, later held by many others, notably Hobbes, that in any well-ordered community there must be a single locus of coercive power, Ockham was its first opponent. Ockham argues, as Locke would argue later, that if the community were subjected to one supreme judge in every case, then the supreme judge could do wrong with impunity. To prevent tyranny, it must on occasion be possible for the regularly supreme judge to be coerced by others. At the same time, it does no harm if there are some (for example pope and clergy, or cities or princes) who are regularly exempt from the jurisdiction of the supreme judge provided they can be coerced on occasion, and it does no harm if there are some who have coercive power that they have not received from the supreme judge — again, provided they can be coerced when they do wrong. Secular and spiritual power/Ockham: An emperor coercing a pope for temporal wrongdoing would be exercising his ordinary power, whereas a pope coercing an emperor for temporal wrongdoing would be acting extraordinarily (William of Ockham, 1995(7): 310-31) *As Tierney points out (1997(8): 1 19—20), Ockham did not address the distinction between the subjective sense and other senses of 'right', but like many of his contemporaries he sometimes used the term in its subjective sense (the rights of a person), without confusion with other senses. John of Paris does not use the term, but he uses the concept (1971(9): 102, 213), also to say that the pope must respect the rights of lay people. 1. McGrade, Arthur Stephen (1974) The Political Thought of William of Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Knysh, George (1996) Political Ockhamism. Winmpeg: WCU Council of Learned Societies. 3. William of Ockham (2001) Work of Ninety Days, trans. John Kilcullen and John Scott. Lewiston: Mellen. 4. William of Ockham (1992) A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government Usurped by Some Who Are Called Highest Pontiffs, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Kilcullen, John (1999) 'The political writings'. In Paul Vincent Spade, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Bayley, C. C. (1949) 'Pivotal concepts in the political philosophy of William of Ockham'. Journal of the History ofldeas, 10: 199-218. 7. William of Ockham (1995) A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. and trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Tierney, Brian (1997) The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Chumh Law 1150-1625. Atlanta: Scholars. 9. John of Paris (1971) On Royal and Papal Power, trans. John Watt. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. Kilcullen, John 2004. „Medieval Politial Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Peace | Nietzsche | Höffe I 375 Peace/Nietzsche/Höffe: Even if wars between peoples will continue to exist, peacetime, according to Nietzsche, allows the genius to blossom(1). Later, however, in the volume II of "Human, All Too Human" (No. 284)(2), he mocks the so-called peace that prevailed at that time, imputing to the neighbors an aggressiveness that one denies for oneself. A true peace rests on a "peace of mind," in which a victorious people voluntarily proclaims: "We break the sword". >Politics/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern. 1872. III. „Der griechische Staat“. 2. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches – Ein Buch für freie Geister. 1878-1880 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Planning | Rawls | I 408 Plan/life plan/planning/Rawls: A person's life plan is rational, if and only if 1. it is one of the plans that is consistent with the principles of rational decision when applied to all relevant characteristics of the person's situation. 2. if this plan is one of those that could be chosen by the person voluntarily in the consciousness of all relevant facts, taking into account the consequences. --- I 409 A person's interests and goals are rational if and only if they are communicated to the person through a plan that is rational to the person. It is important that the principles do not always allow for a single plan. The class of approved plans is maximum in the sense that each plan in the quantity is superior to a plan outside the quantity. Good/The good/Rawls: the definition of a rational plan is crucial to defining what can be considered good, because a rational life plan marks the fundamental point of view from which all a person's value judgments arise and must ultimately be consistent. Definition Happiness/happiness/Rawls: someone is happy when their plans are fulfilled or are going to be fullfilled. --- I 410 Planning/Rawls: the structure of plans is characterized by a lack of information and by the mirroring of a hierarchy of needs. In planning we organize our activities in a temporal sequence(1). --- I 411 We must weigh up different needs in terms of their importance and possible incompatibilities. There will then be a hierarchy of subordinate plans. (See Rational Choice/Rawls). --- I 413 It looks as if extreme long-term decisions, such as career choice, are culture-dependent. However, the fact that we all have to make such decisions is culturally independent. The borderline case that we have no plan at all and let things come to us does not have to be irrational. Principle of inclusion/inclusiveness: always choose the plan that covers most objectives. Combined with the principle of efficient resources (see Rational Decision/Rawls), this principle chooses the most comprehensive plan and the most far-reaching resources. Together with the principle of greater probability, the plan chosen is the one that covers most objectives and has a chance of success. --- I 414 Principle of inclusiveness/Aristoteles/Rawls: We can use the Aristotelian principle to argue for inclusiveness: that it corresponds to a higher-order human interest to train and take advantage of the most complex combinations of abilities. --- I 417 Rationality/Sidgwick/Rawls: I take an approach from Sidgwick(2): if we could foresee all the relevant information about our future situation, we would choose what we can then consider as an individual asset. --- I 426 Definition Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more challenging (complex) they are(3)(4)(5)(6). --- I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. --- I 430 Skills/Rawls: if we assume that people gain skills while pursuing their plans, we can adopt a chain by using n-1 skills in the nth activity. According to the Aristotelian principle, people then prefer to use as many skills as possible and tend to ascend in the chain. (1) See J. D. Mabbott,"Reason and Desire", Philosophy, vol. 28 (1953). (2) See H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th. ed., London, 1907, pp. 111f. (3) Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, chs. 11-14, bk X. chs 1-5; (4) See W. F. R. Hardie, Aristote's Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV; (5) G. C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78; (6) R. W. White, "Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory", Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175,180f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Police Interrogations | Social Psychology | Parisi I 133 Police interrogations/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: In the United States, physical force is no longer permitted in interrogations - the law requires confessions to be given voluntarily. Today, about half of all interrogations produce incriminating statements (Kassin et al., 2007(1); Schulhofer, 1987(2); Thomas, 1996(3)). Given that confessing to a crime is "an exceedingly self-defeating proposition, regardless of one's actual guilt" (D. Simon, 2012)(4), social psychologists have been interested in investigating why so many suspects choose to confess. More importantly, why do suspects confess to crimes they did not commit? False confessions: In most cases, the answer lies in the psychological pressures brought to bear in modern interrogation procedures. In one experiment, 36% of guilty suspects and 81 % of innocent suspects agreed to waive their right to remain Parisi I 134 silent and talk to police (Kassin and Norwick, 2004)(5). Of those who agreed to waive their right to remain silent, most guilty suspects did so to avoid looking suspicious. Most innocent suspects did so because they felt they had nothing to hide. Deception: A large body of literature reporting tests of people's ability to detect deception has demonstrated that people on average perform no better than chance, and with few exceptions trained offcers perform at the same level as laypersons, albeit with high levels of confidence (Bond and DePaulo, 2006(6); Kassin, 2008(7); Kassin Meissner and Norwick 2005(8). Meissner and Kassin 2002(9). D. Simon 2012(4). Vrij, Edward, and Bull, 2001)(10). Because police investigators have trouble distinguishing between true and false confessions, they have little reason to stop an interrogation until the confession is obtained. Bias: Generally, once people form an impression, they are motivated to verify it rather than disconfirm it (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968(11); Snyder and Swann, 1978(12)), and the tendency to try to confirm guilt holds true in the interrogation room - when interrogators already believe that a suspect is guilty, they are more likely to use aggressive tactics like the presentation of false evidence and promises of leniency (Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky, 2003)(13). >False confessions/Social psychology. 1. Kassin, S. M., R. A. Leo, C. A. Meissner, K. D. Richman, L. H. Colwell, A.-M. Leach, and D. L. Fon (2007). "Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs." Law and Human Behavior 31 381-400. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5. 2. Schulhofer, S. J. (1987). "Reconsidering Miranda." University of Chicago Law Review 54: 435. 3. Thomas, G. C. I. (1996). "Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A Steady-State Theory of Confessions." UCLA Law Review 43:933. 4. Simon, D. (2012). In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Kassin, S. M. and R. J. Norwick (2004). "Why People Waive Their 'Miranda' Rights: The Power of Innocence." Law and Human Behavior 28(2): 211—221. 6. Bond, C. F. and B. M. DePaulo (2006). "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." Personality and Socia Psychology Review doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003 2. 7. Kassin, S. M. (2008). " The Psychology of Confessions." Annual Review of Law and social science 4(1): 193-217. doi:10.1146/annurev.1awsocsci.4.110707.172410. 8. Kassin, S. M., C. A. Meissner, and R. J. Norwick (2005). "'I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One': A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators." Law and Human Behavior 29(2): 211-227. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-2416-9. 9. Meissner, C. A. and S. M. Kassin (2002). "'He's Guilty!': Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception." Law and Human Behavior 26(5):469-480. doi:10.1023/ A:1020278620751. 10. Vrij, A., K. Edward, and R. Bull (2001). "Police Offcers' Ability to Detect Deceit: The Benefit of Indirect Deception Detection Measures." Legal and Criminological Psychology 6(2): 185-196. doi:10.1348/135532501168271. 11. Rosenthal, R. and L. Jacobson (1968). "Pygmalion in the Classroom." The Urban Review 3(1): 16-20. doi:10.1007/BF02322211. 12. Snyder, M. and W. B. Swann (1978). "Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36: 1202-1212. 13. Kassin, S. M., C. C. Goldstein, and K. Savitsky (2003). "Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt." Law and Human Behavior 27(2): 187-203. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Policy Analysis | Vedung | Mause I 455ff Policy field analysis/Vedung: Def Policy: is intended to help solve a social problem. A widespread classification of policy instruments in political science is based on a tripartite typology of Vedung (1998)(1), according to which the instruments are classified according to their liability to recipients and not according to the nature of the measure itself. Terminology of Vedung: Def Sticks/Vedung: Regulatory instruments (sticks) describe every attempt by the government to regulate the behaviour of the population, companies and other state institutions by reducing available alternatives for action for individuals within society (cf. Meier 1985, p. 1 (2)). Regulatory instruments therefore include both the restrictions and the directives of an action. Def Carrots/Vedung: financial/economic incentives. They differ from regulatory mechanisms in the voluntary nature of their adoption. (Vedung 1998, p. 32.) Def Sermons/Vedung: Persuasive instruments/Information: Influenced by arguments, information or knowledge. (Vedung 1998, p. 33). Def Political addressee/Vedung: Actors who need to change their behaviour in order to solve the problem. A distinction is made between people affected by policy and policy beneficiaries. Mause I 456 Def intervention hypothesis (3): (Unlike causal hypothesis) The intervention hypothesis determines how the causes of a social problem are mitigated by a policy and thus the problem is to be solved. (4) It therefore defines measures. Causal hypothesis: specifies the cause-effect relationships and provides information on the addressees and the final beneficiaries. (5) Performance and effect levels: Def Output: the products of a policy with which one tries to change the behaviour of the actors. Def Outcome: the corresponding change in behaviour of the actors. Def Impact: the total of intended and unintended impacts. (6) 1. Vedung, Evert. 1998. Policy instruments: Typologies and theories. In Carrots, sticks & sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation. Comparative policy analysis series, Hrsg. Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C. Rist und Evert, Vedung, 21-58. New Brunswick 1998. 2. Kenneth J. Meier, Regulation politics, economics and bureaucracy, New York 1985. 3. Rossi, Peter H., Howard E. Freeman, und Gerhard Hofmann, Programm-Evaluation – Einführung in die Methoden angewandter Sozialforschung. Stuttgart 1998 4. D’Agostino, Jerome V. 2001. Increasing the role of educational psychology theory in program development and evaluation. Educational Psychologist 36( 2): 127– 132. 5. Peter Knoepfel & Werner Bussmann, Die öffentliche Politik als Evaluationsobjekt. In Einführung in die Politikevaluation, Hrsg. Werner Bussmann, Ulrich Klöti und Peter Knoepfel, S. 57. Basel/ Frankfurt a. M. 1997 6. Sager, Fritz, und Markus Hinterleitner, Evaluation. In Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse. Lehr- und Handbücher der Politikwissenschaft, Hrsg. Klaus Schubert und Nils C. Bandelow, 3. Aufl., 437– 462. München 2014. |
PolVed I Evert Vedung Policy instruments: Typologies and theories. In Carrots, sticks & sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation New Brunswick 1998 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Policy of Central Europe | Krastev | Krastev I 72 Policy of Central Europe/Krastev: If we accept the testimony of the movement’s leaders, therefore, the rise of Central European illiberalism was due in good measure to pent-up rancour engendered by the centrality of mimesis in the reform processes launched in the East after 1989. When the Cold War division between communists and democrats was replaced by the post-1989 division between imitators and imitated, a moral hierarchy was established that would prove profoundly destabilizing. >Imitation/Krastev. Commenting on the Western media’s coverage of Orbán’s Hungary, Maria Schmidt remarked that they ‘talk down from above to those below like it used to be with colonies’.(1) Krastev: It would be wrong to equate the history of colonial domination and exploitation in the non-Western world with Central Europe’s originally voluntary decision to accept the burdens of harmonization into a post-national EU. To upend the hierarchy implicit in the relationship of imitators to the imitated, Central European leaders now say that the main difference between East and West has once again changed. It is neither the communists versus the democrats nor imitators versus the imitated. It has become, instead, the difference between Krastev I 73 ethnically homogeneous and ethnically pluralistic societies, between countries where traditional majorities rule and countries where a ‘mishmash’ of minorities thwart majority will. This imagined contrast between the pure and the mongrel is obviously meant to turn the tables and establish Central Europe as the true Europe fighting a last-ditch battle to preserve a struggling white Christian identity. >Identity Politics. 1. Maria Schmidt, cited in Oltermann, ‘Can Europe’s New Xenophobes Reshape the Continent?’. Guardian (3 February 2018). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Policy of Central Europe | Holmes | Krastev I 72 Policy of Central Europe/Krastev/Holmes: If we accept the testimony of the movement’s leaders, therefore, the rise of Central European illiberalism was due in good measure to pent-up rancour engendered by the centrality of mimesis in the reform processes launched in the East after 1989. When the Cold War division between communists and democrats was replaced by the post-1989 division between imitators and imitated, a moral hierarchy was established that would prove profoundly destabilizing. >Imitation/Krastev. Commenting on the Western media’s coverage of Orbán’s Hungary, Maria Schmidt remarked that they ‘talk down from above to those below like it used to be with colonies’.(1) Krastev: It would be wrong to equate the history of colonial domination and exploitation in the non-Western world with Central Europe’s originally voluntary decision to accept the burdens of harmonization into a post-national EU. To upend the hierarchy implicit in the relationship of imitators to the imitated, Central European leaders now say that the main difference between East and West has once again changed. It is neither the communists versus the democrats nor imitators versus the imitated. It has become, instead, the difference between Krastev I 73 ethnically homogeneous and ethnically pluralistic societies, between countries where traditional majorities rule and countries where a ‘mishmash’ of minorities thwart majority will. This imagined contrast between the pure and the mongrel is obviously meant to turn the tables and establish Central Europe as the true Europe fighting a last-ditch battle to preserve a struggling white Christian identity. >Identity Politics. 1. Maria Schmidt, cited in Oltermann, ‘Can Europe’s New Xenophobes Reshape the Continent?’. Guardian (3 February 2018). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Political Institutions | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 79 Political institutions/Acemoglu/Robinson: The political institutions of a society are (...) the rules that govern incentives in politics. They determine how the government is chosen and which part of the government has the right to do what. Political institutions determine who has power in society and to what ends that power can be used. Absolutist institutions: If the distribution of power is narrow and unconstrained, then the political institutions are absolutist, as exemplified by the absolutist monarchies reigning throughout the world during much of history. Pluralistic institutions: political institutions that distribute power broadly in society and subject it to constraints are pluralistic. Instead of being vested in a single individual or a narrow group, political power rests with a broad coalition or a plurality of groups. Acemoglu I 86 Absolutism: In an absolutist regime, some elites can wield power to set up economic institutions they prefer. Would they be interested in changing political institutions to make them more pluralistic? In general not, since this would only dilute their political power, making it more difficult, maybe impossible, for them to structure economic institutions to further their own interests. Pluralism: The people who suffer from the extractive economic institutions cannot hope for absolutist rulers to voluntarily change political institutions and redistribute power in society. The only way to change these political institutions is to force the elite to create more pluralistic institutions. ((s) But: for problems in relation to pluralism see >Pluralism/Acemoglu.) |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Political Representation | Barber | Brocker I 682 Political Representation/Barber: Barber's thesis: the concept of representation of liberalism destroys participation and citizenship. (1) This is because liberalism misunderstands democracy as a "policy of keeping predators". See also Democracy/Barber. Brocker I 686 In the various forms of "authoritarian", "juridical" and "pluralistic" democracy, Barber sees fundamental weaknesses in representation. (See Terminology/Barber). Problem: the "reintroduction of independent reasons" (2): neither elites nor philosophers or judges or leaders of associations can lift the controversy over key political ideas. It is precisely the assumption that there are actors with special access to "good reasons" or even a free play of forces that produces the common good almost automatically that leads to arbitrary rule. BarberVsDirect Democracy: direct democracy is what Barber calls "unity democracy": Brocker I 687 This rejects representation in its entirety and replaces it with the consensus of all citizens. According to Barber, it takes on "malicious" characteristics in larger associations at the latest. (3) The reason for this is that community here may no longer be based on voluntary identification and shared norms, but only on repression and manipulation. Solution/Barber: "Strong democracy" (see Democracy/Barber): here conflicts are subjected to an "endless process of consultation, decision and action". (4) 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, S. 13. 2. Ebenda S. 138 3. Ebenda S. 144 4. Ebenda S. 147. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Politics | Mill | Höffe I 357 Politics/Mill/Höffe: Mill rejects [in his reflections on representative government(1)] two basic conceptions of the nature of politics as one-sided, both the voluntaristic conception, which declares the state to be the product of human will for specific purposes, and the historical conception, which sees the community as "a kind of organic structure" that "grows out of the nature and life of the people concerned"(1). (MillVsVoluntarism). Mill (...) seeks (...) a benchmark for exemplary politics and sees it in the per-saldo increase in the intellectual, moral and practical skills of citizens. According to this criterion, i.e. not in principle, but merely in most cases, >democracy is preferable as a form of government. 1.J.St. Mill Considerations on Representative Government, 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Practise | Socrates | Bubner I 25 Ethics/Practise/Socrates/Bubner: no one acts voluntarily badly! Therefore, to act well, means simply: to act with consideration. >The Good/Socrates. Whoever acts badly is subject to deception. Talking about each other is not meant to increase knowledge, but to affect the living people, so that they are strengthened in their original action intentions. Bubner: This argument is not intellectualistic, how many critics of Socrates have objected. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Pragmatism | James | Diaz-Bone I 68 Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. I 70 Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being. I 76 Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision. I 78 We do not live to think, but we think to live. 79 Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability. I 88 PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment). I 102 VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem). |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Price | Thomas Aquinas | Mause I 29 Price/Economy/Thomas Aquinas: Based on the principle of commutative justice in Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas defines the fair price ("ius pretium") as the price at which performance and return service correspond. And, contrary to the current view, this is not necessarily the case with every (voluntary) market transaction, but only if the price covers the work deployed and the other costs. The decisive factor in determining the fair price is therefore supply, whereas demand is irrelevant. Since a cost-covering price is guaranteed and profits are limited, economic structural change (...) is made more difficult. >Money/Thomas. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Privatization | Moon | Gaus I 213 Privatization/welfare state/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure, >State provision/Moon, >Adverse selection/Barr. The recognition that public provision can involve greater costs than voluntary programmes has led to calls for 'privatization' of some welfare state activities during the past 20 or 25 years. Different groups have advocated devolving to private parties those activities once performed by the state, ranging from the sale of nationalized industries to contracting with private firms to provide public services, such as running schools or supplying cleaning services to a government bureaucracy. In a similar vein, recent years have seen efforts to increase choice and simulate market processes within public programmes, such as the use of vouchers in public education, or the 'internal market' in Britain's National Health Service. In all of these initiatives, the hope is to increase efficiency, to make service providers more responsive to clients, and to enable people to receive more individualized services, reflecting their specific needs and interests. Problems: On the other hand, these developments raise the concern that even 'quasi-market' choice in areas such as pensions or education will adversely affect disadvantaged groups. For example, when the successful school in a system relying upon vouchers or other 'parental choice' mechanisms is able to attract more students than it has space for, the fear is that it may Gaus I 214 respond by excluding 'problem' children, possibly leaving them even worse off than before. Whether the issue is pensions, education, health care, or other areas of the welfare state, efficiency arguments for public versus private provision involve a balancing of their relative costs. * *For an excellent range of studies of the 'revolution in social policy' created by the move to 'quasi-markets' in a variety of policy areas and countries, see Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand (1998)(1). 1. Bartlett, Will, Jennifer Roberts and Julian Le Grand, eds (1998) A Revolution in Social Policy: Quasi-Market Reforms in the 1990s. Bristol: Policy. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Promises | Rawls | I 344 Promises/Fairness/Rawls: the principle of loyalty to promises (principle of fidelity, fiduciary duty) is a special case of the principle of fairness. A promise is an action defined by a public system of rules(1). --- I 345 Rule of Promise/Rawls: should be that we keep our promise, unless there are circumstances that justify an apology. It is thus at the same level as game rules as well as legal rules and statutes. Like these, they exist in a society if you keep to them more or less regularly. Justice: whether the rule of promise is just depends on how the excusing circumstances are defined. This includes full consciousness and voluntariness. The principles of justice are applied to the practice of promise as well as to other areas. --- I 346 Definition bona fide promise/Rawls: is present when the rule of promise and the practice it represents are fair. The fidelity principle means that bona fide promises must be kept. Rule: is just a convention - on the other hand, the principle of loyalty is a moral principle that follows from the principle of fairness. The role of promises corresponds to what Hobbes ascribed to the sovereign (ruler): Ruler/promise/Hobbes/Rawls: just as the sovereign stabilizes and maintains the system of social cohesion, so the private individuals stabilize their enterprises through their mutual word. --- I 347 Problem: preliminary work, contracts: here it is the promise that should close the gap between an agreement and fulfilment. Circumstances that are conducive to the company are assumed. Co-operation is being stabilised through this(2). --- I 348 The discussion of promises shows that no moral requirements from institutions follow on their own. Nor does the rule of promise alone lead to moral obligations. For this we still need the principle of fairness as a premise. (1) See R. Searle, Speech Acts, (Cambridge, 1969) pp. 33-42, especially with regard to promises: ch. III, pp. 57-62. (2) See H. A. Prichard, "The Obligation to Keep a Promise", in Moral Obligation (Oxford, 1949), pp. 169-179. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Property | Liberalism | Gaus I 117 Property/traditional liberalism/Gaus/Mack: According to the liberty tradition, respect for the individual and her liberty requires respect for that individual’s control of extra-personal objects – tangible and non-tangible property – that she has acquired in ways that do not infringe upon others’ equal liberty (Lomasky, 1987(1): ch. 6; Mack, 1990(2)). Several related sub-themes are apt to be endorsed by members of the liberty tradition. 1) First, seizing another’s peacefully acquired holdings is itself a violation of her liberty. 2) Second, seizing the fruits of another’s labour or what a person has acquired through voluntary exchange of his labour or the fruits of his labour violates that person’s entitlement or desert (Gaus, 1999(3): ch. 8). 3) Third, a system that allows such seizures renders all other sorts of liberty insecure; secure private property is a background condition for a general regime of liberty (Gray, 1986/4(: ch. 8). Fourth, secure private property is a background condition for economic prosperity. In general, the liberty tradition insists that freedom is only possible given the institutions of private property and the free market. Indeed, for some members of the tradition ‘liberty is property’ (Narveson, 1988(5): 66). 1. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Mack, Eric (1990) ‘Self-ownership and the right of property’. The Monist, 73 (October): 519–43. 3. Gaus, Gerald F. (1999) Social Philosophy. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. 4. Gray, John (1986) Liberalism. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 5. Narveson, Jan (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rationality | Grice | Graeser I 120 Rationality/Grice: rationality is no voluntary behavior and not to be explained by a means-end rationality, but if we see ourselves as what we are as human beings, we have no choice, there are assumptions that we must make as rational beings (cooperation in communication). >Behavior, >Language behavior, >Communication, >Understanding, >Meaning. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Reality | Berkeley | I 217f Matter/material world/outer world/reality/Berkeley: there is no material substance - but probably an outer reality! >Substance. I 232 Involuntary perception is a moment of reality. >Reality. Danto I 202 LockeVsBerkeley: there are objects to be compared. >Objects. Berkeley - Schopenhauer: there are only two kinds of things: consciousness and its contents. >Content. Danto I 206 World/reality/Berkeley/Danto: there is nothing but ideas. - But we do not sit in a cage that shields us from the world. >Exterior/interior. BerkeleyVsPlato: there is no cage because there is no distinction between inside and outside. Science/Berkeley: does not refer to a reality behind the experience, but the experience itself. >Experience. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Religion | Locke | Höffe I 245 Religion/Locke/Höffe: According to Locke, religious communities (...) are voluntary associations of like-minded religious people without any authority. Responsible for the creed and the service, they are allowed to determine the cultic custom, the outward form of the rites that seem to serve the salvation of the believers. They may determine the worship service, church life and pastoral care, and even have the right to Höffe I 246 punish deviant beliefs and heresies through exclusion from the religious community. However, this exclusion, the excommunication, must not have any "civic" consequences; the basic assets of the citizen must remain untouched. Since no religious community is entitled to secular authority, the churches may not make use of the state's monopoly of force and are obliged to coexist peacefully with one another. >Toleration/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Rules | Cavell | II 184 Rules/Cavell: contrary to a widespread idea rules do not always have something to do with commands. Thesis: there is a complementarity of rules and determinations. II 185 You can describe an actual action, or perform it according to rules. II 186 Now one can say according to binding rules that it is wrong (an abuse) to say "I know it" if one is not sure. The only relevant condition is that one speaks grammatically correct. It follows, however, that our statements S, T, and T' are not only non-analytic, but also not synthetic! (not like, for example, the synthetic statement that someone who dresses himself voluntarily dresses himself). For example, the determination in question are similar to "The future will be the past" but: If the future is not "like" the past, no one will be surprised by that. II 196 Rule/determination/Cavell: there is a complementarity between the two. How could we overlook it? Because of the false assumption that a rule must be in imperative ("You should") instead of simply describing how something is done. II 197 Rule/Cavell: I do not deny that they can never be associated with imperatives, but only that this is always possible. E.g. Chess: I probably forget to say "J'adoube", so I have to be brought to do it... II 198 ...but I do not forget how the trains are made. I do not have to be brought to do this. Cf. >Chess. II 201 Rule/Principle/Cavell: Difference: Rules say how to do a thing, Principles tell you how to make a thing good! >Principles, cf. >Laws. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Selective Attention | Cognitive Psychology | Corr I 409 Selective Attention/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Selective attention refers to focusing attention on one of several stimulus sources. Personality may influence the efficiency of selective attention. Furnham and Strbac (2002)(1) found that extraverts were more resistant to background noise than introverts across a range of tasks; extraverts may indeed prefer to study with music or other noise in the background. Anxiety and Neuroticism are also commonly found to be associated with selective attention deficits, a result that may reflect a more general attentional impairment related to these traits. Newton, Slade, Butler and Murphy (1992)(2) found that both Extraversion and low Neuroticism were associated with faster speed of visual search, when subjects were required to find a single letter target in a random display of letters. Schizophrenia: Difficulties in inhibiting aberrant thoughts and images may contribute to the ‘positive symptoms’ of schizophrenia including hallucinations and delusions (Lubow and Gewirtz 1995)(3). Schizotypal individuals may be deficient in inhibition of irrelevant stimuli. Studies using attentional tasks that provide measures of latent inhibition have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., Tsakanikos 2004)(4). Anxiety: A variety of paradigms have been used to demonstrate that anxiety relates to preferential selection of threat stimuli (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin et al. 2007(5); Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews 1997(6) for reviews). Corr I 410 Unconscious bias: is bias unconscious or does it reflect a voluntary strategy of active search for potential threats? (See Matthews and Wells 2000(7)). It is plausible that both types of process may be involved. Mathews and Mackintosh (1998)(8) proposed a dual-process approach, within which bias is produced initially by an automatic threat evaluation system, but may be compensated by voluntary effort. 1. Furnham, A. and Strbac, L. 2002. Music is as distracting as noise: the differential distraction of background music and noise on the cognitive test performance of introverts and extraverts, Ergonomics 45: 203–17 2. Newton, T., Slade, P., Butler, N. M. and Murphy, P. 1992. Personality and performance on a simple visual search task, Personality and Individual Differences 13: 381–2 3. Lubow, R. E. and Gewirtz, C. 1995. Latent inhibition in humans: data, theory, and implications for schizophrenia, Psychological Bulletin 117: 87–103 4. Tsakanikos, E. 2004. Latent inhibition, visual pop-out and schizotypy: is disruption of latent inhibition due to enhanced stimulus salience?, Personality and Individual Differences 37: 1347–58 5. Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. and van IJzendoorn, M. H. 2007. Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study, Psychological Bulletin 133: 1–24 6. Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. and Mathews, A. 1997. Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders, 2nd edn. Chichester: Wiley 7. Matthews, G. and Wells, A. 2000. Attention, automaticity and affective disorder, Behaviour Modification 24: 69–93 8. Mathews, A. and Mackintosh, B. 1998. A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety, Cognitive Therapy and Research 22: 539–60 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Self-Determination | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 259 Self-determination/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: in the nineteenth century, nationalism was allied with Gaus I 260 liberalism as the principle of nationality was invoked as a principle of freedom - and against alien rule. Mazzini: the liberalism of Mazzini, for example, advocated the unification of Italy as a national republic from which French, Austrian and Papal power was expelled. Mill: and John Stuart Mill saw a common nationality as a prerequisite for (liberal) representative government. Liberalism/non-liberalism: in this light, national self-determination might seem unproblematic, as an ideal both liberals and non-liberals alike might readily accept: liberals because they favour self-determination, and non- liberals because they favour national community. Yet matters are not so straightforward. In the first instance, what is always, and inescapably, controversial is the issue of who is the 'self' that is entitled to self-determination. Even if people within a boundary are entitled to govern themselves, how is the boundary to be drawn: who is to be included and who is to be excluded (Barry, 1991(1); 2001(2): 137)? Culture/group membership: theorists such as Raz and Margalit (1990)(3) look to resolve the problem by tying group membership to culture, suggesting that 'encompassing groups' have a number of characteristics that give them a unity which enables them to mount claims to self-hood and therefore self-determination. Central to such groups is a common culture, but no less impor- tant is the fact that people within them recognize each other as members and regard their membership as important for their own self-identification. It is also important to recognize, however, that the right of self-determination can be enjoyed only by a group that is a majority in a territory (1990(3): 441). VsIndividualism: what Raz and Margalit reject, as an undesirable illusion, is the individualist principle of consent: 'It is undesirable since the more important human groupings need to be based on shared history, and on criteria of nonvoluntaristic (or at least not wholly contractarian) membership to have the value they have' (1990(3): 456). Consent/KukathasVsRaz/KukathasVsMargalit: yet it is difficult to see how consent can fail to play a significant role in any account of self- determination if self-determination is to mean some- thing more than the determination of the lives of some by the will of others. And many other theories of self-determination give a substantial role to consent as central to any account of political legitimacy. >Consent. Beran: among the most sustained defences of the importance of consent is that offered in the writings of Harry Beran, particularly in his defence of the right of secession s central to the legitimacy of the liberal state (Beran, 1984(4); 1987(5); but see also Green, 1988(6); and Simmons, 2001(7)) (...). >Political Secession. 1. Barry, Brian (1991) 'Self-government revisited'. Democracy and Power. Oxford: Clarendon, 156-86. 2. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 3.Raz and Margalit 1990 4. Beran, Harry (1984) 'A liberal theory of secession'. Political Studies, 32:21-31. 5. Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. London: Croom Helm. 6. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Simmons, A. John (2001) Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Capital | Putnam | Gaus I 59 Social trust/social capital/Robert Putnam/Forbes: [Robert] Putnam maintains that ‘social trust’ (which he also calls social capital) is the variable connecting associational density to democratic performance. Trust is vitally important for a society, he says, because it helps to overcome ‘dilemmas of collective action’ and thus ‘to solve the fundamental Hobbesian dilemma of public order’ (1993)(1). Trusting and trustworthy citizens are more able to... Gaus I 60 ...co-operate with each other, on the basis of voluntary agreements, than are those who lack trust in each other and cannot make credible commitments. A dense (and closed) network of civic engagements sustains generalized trust because it threatens naturally self-interested individuals with realistic punishments for defecting from their commitments (Coleman, 1988(2); 1990(3)). In looser, more open social networks, individualism or narrow self-interest (opportunism, free riding, etc.) is more likely to flourish, so that all must forgo many opportunities for mutual gain. Trust, and the norm of reciprocity associated with it, serve to reconcile self-interest and solidarity. They ‘lubricate’ co-operation, not just in politics, but also in economics. In short, ‘good government in Italy is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs’ (Putnam, 1993(4). VsPutnam, Robert: since its publication, Putnam’s remarkably suggestive analysis has been exposed to a great deal of critical scrutiny. Some have objected to his depiction of Italian society and politics; others have challenged the application of his theory to other countries, particularly the United States. Putnam, for example, may not have paid sufficient attention to the role that the Communist Party of Italy played in creating good government (operationalized as pollution controls, daycare centres, responsive bureaucrats, etc.) in those regions where it was strong (Tarrow, 1996)(5). Could the crucial independent variable have been, not singing groups and soccer clubs, but communist cells? And how many regions are there really, from a statistician’s standpoint, in Italy? Are there 20 that are distinguished in law and that are the basis for Putnam’s statistics, or are there really just two distinct regions, North and South? The weight of the statistical evidence must evidently depend on the answer to this question. Similar problems appear when the theory is applied to other countries. Pro Putnam, Robert: Some support for its general applicability has been found in studies of the American states, even though the relevant correlations are distinctly weaker (Putnam, 2000(6); Rice and Sumberg, 1997(7); Rice and Arnett, 2001(8)). Cf. >Positive Political Theory/Forbes, >Good government/Putnam. 1. Putnam, Robert D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 112. 2. Coleman, James S. (1988) ‘Social capital in the creation of human capital’. American Journal of Sociology, 94: S 95–120. 3. Coleman, James S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Putnam ibid. p.176. 5. Tarrow, Sidney (1996) ‘Making social science work across space and time: a critical reflection on Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work’. American Political Science Review, 90: 389–97. 6. Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 7. Rice, Tom W. and Alexander F. Sumberg (1997) ‘Civic culture and government performance in the American states’. Publius, 27: 99–114. 8. Rice, Tom W. and Marshall Arnett (2001) ‘Civic culture and socioeconomic development in the United States: a view from the states, 1880s–1990s’. Social Science Journal, 38: 39–51. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Contract | Locke | Höffe I 251 Social Contract/Locke/Höffe: Among the obligations that prevail in Locke's pre-contractual natural state is the right, in the absence of public authority, to punish the violation of the relevant divine and natural commandments itself. Locke sees the only way out of leaving the natural state in the establishment of a political or civil society(1). Cf. >State/Locke. Religious Reasons/Höffe: (...) Locke's legitimation [still contains] pre-modern elements, with which the philosopher, despite his appreciation of reason and experience, methodically never sufficiently emancipated himself from his puritanical origin. State: (...), for the establishment of a state, the concept of contract (...) takes on its most important role. 1) It explains the origin of state power, 2) determines its function and 3) defines its limits. All three tasks are combined in the raison d'être of the state, in the defence against all external and internal Höffe I 252 dangers that threaten the basic goods of citizens, life, freedom and property. >Property/Locke. Liberalism: With its typically liberal purpose of averting danger and the associated protection of property, Locke answers the question he poses himself: What motive induces purpose-rational persons who seek to maximize the benefits defined in terms of freedom to voluntarily renounce their natural freedom and power and submit to the fetters of a legal and state order that henceforth regulates what they do and do not do by force? Locke's answer: To overcome the dangers of partiality and powerlessness, private justice is abolished in favour of a common impartial arbitrator who decides according to fixed rules. Problem: (...) a twofold legal uncertainty (...): people do not always have enough power to enforce their rights and if they do have the power, they run the risk of taking too much. 1. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, Chap. VII. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Goods | Hardin | Shirky I 51 Social goods/Commons/Garrett Hardin/Shirky: Hardin used the term "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1) (The Tragedy of the Commons) for the problem that when it comes to the use of common goods such as fish stocks or pastureland, those who miss out and wait until it is their turn and therefore try to get a bigger share for themselves. This leads to overfishing of fish stocks, for example. One reason for antisocial behaviour is that sheep "do not drive themselves to the market". ((s) An added value must therefore be generated). Shirky I 53 In connection with the tragedy of the common land, there is the fact that no one pays taxes voluntarily. 1. Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (3859), December 13, 1968, pp. 682-83. - www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html). |
EconHardin I Garrett Hardin Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos Oxford 1995 Shirky I Clay Shirky Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations New York 2009 |
| Social Goods | Minimal State | Gaus I 121 Social goods/public goods/Minimal state/Gaus/Mack: the market anarchist and the minimal statist share a crucial premise, namely, that the value to individuals of their receipt of protective services will motivate almost everyone to pay for those services. >Minimal state/Gaus, >Society/Minimal state. Protection/individual liberty: the shared premise is that the protection of rightful claims is a standard economic good which people will voluntarily pay for to the extent that they value it. Unfortunately, however, important parts or aspects of the protection of rightful claims are not like standard economic goods; important parts or aspects of the protection of rightful claims are public goods. Gaus: The crucial feature of a public good is that, if the good is produced, it will not be feasible to exclude individuals who have not paid for that good from benefiting from it. >Social goods. The nonexcludability of these goods provides people with an incentive not to purchase them. Rational individuals confront a multi-person case of the well-known >prisoner’s dilemma (...).The parties thus end up at a Pareto-inferior result (...) .>Pareto-Optimum. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Socialization | Developmental Psychology | Corr I 182 Socialization/Developmental psychology/Rothbart: conscience altered depending on the fearfulness of the child. Beyond the inhibitory control provided by fear, later developing Effortful Control makes a crucial contribution to socialization. Effortful Control is defined as the ability to inhibit a prepotent response and to activate a non-prepotent response, to detect errors and to engage in planning. As executive attention skills develop in the second or third years of life and beyond, individuals can voluntarily deploy their attention, allowing them to regulate their more reactive tendencies (Posner and Rothbart 2007(1); Ruff and Rothbart 1996(2)). In situations where immediate approach is not allowed, for example, children can inhibit their actions directly and also limit their attention to the rewarding properties of a stimulus, resisting temptation and delaying gratification. Research indicates some stability of individual differences in effortful control during childhood. For example, the number of seconds delayed by pre-school children while waiting for rewards that are physically present predicts parents’ reports of children’s attentiveness and ability to concentrate as adolescents (Mischel, Shoda and Peake 1988(3)). A lack of control in pre-school has also been identified as a potential marker for lifecourse persistent antisocial behaviour (Moffitt et al. 1996(4)) and the inattentive-disorganized symptoms of ADHD (Nigg 2006)(5). 1. Posner, M. I. and Rothbart, M. K. 2007. Educating the human brain. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Ruff, H. A. and Rothbart, M. K. 1996. Attention in early development: themes and variations. New York: Oxford University Press 3. Mischel, W., Shoda, Y. and Peake, P. K. 1988. The nature of adolescent competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54: 6687–96 4. Moffitt, T. E., Caspi, A., Dickson, N., Silva, P. and Stanton, W. 1996. Childhood-onset versus adolescent-onset antisocial conduct problems in males: natural history from ages 3 to 18 years, Development and Psychopathology 8: 399–424 5. Nigg, J. T. 2006. Temperament and developmental psychopathology, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 47: 395–422 Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Society | Minimal State | Gaus I 120 Society/revenues/funds/protection/minimal state/Gaus/Mack: (...) the minimal state [is a] monopolistic agency legitimately employing force and the threat of force solely to protect people’s lives, limbs, liberties, estates, and contractual rights against both internal and external threats. Protection/funds: According to its own champions, the minimal state is subject to the same moral strictures that apply to all of us. If it would be criminal for any one of us to seize funds from another, even if that first party proceeded to employ those funds to provide the second party with protection against third parties, then it will also be criminal for the minimal state to seize funds from any of us even if it proceeds to employ those funds to provide us with protection against (other) internal or external threats. >Individuals/Minimal State. Gaus I 121 The minimal state’s acquisition of the resources necessary to provide its services is vindicated as one side of a normal voluntary business transaction. Such a minimal state, of course, cannot require that people buy protection. As a monopoly it can charge consumers, and as a constitutionally unregulated monopoly it can charge consumers whatever the market will bear. But it cannot require anyone to purchase its services. >Taxation/Minimal state. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Society | Neo-Republicanism | Gaus I 175 Society/Neo-republicanism/Dagger: (...) civic virtue is necessary if self-government is to be sus- tained. NeorepublicanismVSLiberalism: But the neorepublicans also tend to believe that civic virtue is either in decline or in jeopardy, and they frequently place the blame on liberalism. As Sandel says, 'the civic or formative aspect of our LAmericanJ politics has largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen' (1996(1): 6). SandelVsRawls: This 'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found in the works of liberal philosophers such as Rawls and the decisions of liberal jurists, has fostered a society in which individuals fail to understand how much they owe to the community. 1. Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy 's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Mill | Höffe I 357 State/Mill/Höffe: Mill rejects [in his reflections on representative government (1)] two basic views of the nature of politics as one-sided, both the voluntaristic view, which declares the state to be the product of human will for specific purposes, and the historical view, which sees in the community "a kind of organic structure" that "grows out of the nature and life of the people concerned" (1). (MillVsVoluntarism). Theoretical justification: According to Mill, a theory that is fair to its object must combine both views. a) In accordance with the voluntaristic view, a community enjoys freedom in shaping its political institutions, but not unlimited freedom. b) Because three conditions must be taken into account, which now speak in favor of the historicist view: 1) The institutions must be recognized by the people; 2) they must make an active contribution to the preservation of the constitution; (...) 3) they require responsible action on the part of public officials. Höffe I 358 Parliamentarism/Mill: In his observations on representative government(1), Mill argues in accordance with the title for an elected parliament -on the basis of popular sovereignty- and for a separation of powers with government control. In contrast to the current understanding of representative democracy, however, parliamentary powers are limited. Parliament delegates the task of not only debating ("parleting") laws but also passing them, i.e., the legislative power, to another institution, a committee that is responsible for drafting and passing laws. 1.J.St. Mill Considerations on Representative Government, 1861 2. Ibid., Chap. 1. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State Provision | Moon | Gaus I 213 State provision/welfare state/institutions/public goods, moral hazard/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure. For example, while mandatory programmes can avoid the problem of adverse selection, by requiring low risk individuals to participate in the risk-sharing scheme, they may exacerbate the problem of moral hazard, by giving individuals incentives not to provide for themselves (e.g. by reducing their savings rate, or not taking a job) and relying upon the public programme of pensions or unemployment compensation to meet their needs. >Moral hazard, >Adverse selection, >Privatization/Moon. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Symbols | Eliade | Ricoeur I 44 Symbol/Cosmic symbolism/religious belief/Eliade/Ricoeur: In his Traité d'histoire des religions(1), Mircea Eliade shows very well that the power of cosmic symbolism lies in the involuntary bond between the visible sky and the order it reveals: he speaks of the wise and the just, of the immeasurable and ordered, thanks to the analogous power that connects the sense with the sense (>Sense/Ricoeur). The symbol is bound, in a double sense: bound to and bound by. The symbol is bound, in a double sense: bound to and bound by. On the one hand, the sacred is bound to its primary, literal, sensual meanings: this is what makes it opaque; on the other hand, the literal meaning is bound by the symbolic meaning that lies within it. Ricoeur: that is what I have called the revealing power of the symbol, which, despite its opacity, is its power. And it is precisely this that brings it in contrast to the technical sign, which designates nothing more than what is set in it, and which for this reason can be emptied, formalized and reduced to a simple calculating object. Only the symbol gives what it says. >Interpretation/Ricoeur, >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Symbol/Ricoeur. 1. Eliade, M. 1953. Traité d’histoire des religions. Paris: Payot |
Eliade I Mircea Eliade mages et symboles. Essais sur le symbolisme magico-religieux German Edition: Images and Symbols. Studies in Religious Symbolism New York 1969 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Taxation | Rousseau | Mause I 47 Taxation/Rousseau: ...such interventions in the property of citizens are legitimate under the condition that the latter have consented to them, i.e. that the taxation is "voluntary"(1) - which is also guaranteed, as Rousseau states, as soon as the volonté générale has so decided, "by a majority of votes, and according to a proportional tariff which leaves nothing arbitrary to taxation". (2). For taxes today see: >Tax avoidence, >Tax competition, >Tax compliance, >Tax evasion, >Tax havens, >Tax incidence, >Tax loopholes, >Tax system, >Taxation. 1. J.-J. Rousseau, Abhandlung über die Politische Ökonomie. In Politische Schriften, Hrsg. Ludwig Schmidts, Bd. 1, Paderborn 1977, S. 47. 2. Ibid. p. 47 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Terminology | Baudrillard | Blask I 11 Seduction/Baudrillard: the term seduction later becomes meaningful to Baudrillard. Contrary to simulation, seduction is pure pretense and not a world of signs. Blask I 11 Fatality/Baudrillard: the fatal strategies include seduction, restoration and ecstasy. Everything is happening anyway. Blask I 26 Simulacra = are artificial worlds of signs. Blask I 34 Implosion/Baudrillard: the disappearance of the poles of cause and effect, of subject and object. Individual and class have no meaning anymore. Masses are only a statistical phenomenon. Implosion of the sense. Start of simulation. Blask I 46 The symbolic exchange resolves the contrast between real and imaginary. Arbitrary interchangeability of the characters. Blask I 47 Crisis: crisis is not a threat, but an attempt to renew confidence. Generated itself by the system. Blask I 47 Symbolic exchange: (following Marcel Mauss): symbolic exchange is a gift without return and beyond the Equivalence Principle. No value law. One inevitably gets something back, but no value system dictates the appropriateness. Baudrillard: the system is to be challenged by a gift to which it cannot answer except through its own death and collapse. Blask I 55 Alfred Jarry: "Pataphysics". In accordance with this, characterized and really his own work. Blask I 57 Seduction: seduction is the bearer of reversibility. "Seduction is a pure pretense and not a sign world." It renounces the principle of representation and already establishes "the other" as opposed to the identical. Against any kind of causality and determination. The law gives way to the rule of the game, the simulation of the illusion, the communication of irony. Seduction is more false than the false, for it uses signs that are already pseudo-forms to remove the meaning of the sign. Blask I 58 Seduction: the starting point is the opposite: truth, results from a convulsive urge for revelation. Pornography, an example of the escalation of truth: more true than the truth. No secret. Even love stands after confession-like truth and ultimately obscenity. Blask I 59 Seduction: seduction has no truth, no place, no sense. The seducer himself does not know the enigma of seduction. Woman: just pretense, she has a strategy of pretense. Seduction: the strength of the seducer is not to desire. Reversibility as a counterforce to the causality principle. Blask I 60 Seduction: seduction does not produce a law, but is based on rules of the game to which one can voluntarily engage. Love: love is individual, one-sided and selfish. Seduction: seduction is two-sided and antagonistic, according to rules which have no claim to truth. Sexuality and love are rather resolutions of seduction. Seduction appreciates distance and is an infinite rescue of an exchange. The female is not the opposite of the male but his seducer. Seduction Blask I 62 The Evil: the evil is not the opposite, but the deceiver of the good. Blask I 67 Fatality/Baudrillard: Ecstasy - irony (overcomes morality and aesthetics) - superiority of the object Principle of evil - at the same time subversion. Blask I 68 Ecstasy/Baudrillard: ecstasy lives in all things of the present. Passion for doubling and increasing. Adopts the dialectic, resolves its opposites. "Either or" no longer exists. E.g. Cancer Cells: growth acceleration, disorder and aimlessness. Blask I 69/70 Ecstasy: ecstasy is simultaneously slowdown, laziness. End before the end and surviving at a standstill. What, dissolution and disaster. The return point has long since been crossed, the catastrophe is without consequences and thus inevitable as the purest form of the event. Small breaks replace the downfall. Blask I 70 Indifference/Baudrillard: according to Baudrillard dreams, utopias and ideas have been played out, they have already been redeemed in reality. Everything has already taken place. The avant-garde has become as meaningless as the revolution. This is the transpolitical. Blask I 78 The Other: is the last way out of the "Hell of the Same." (VsSartre). Blask I 93 Asceticism/Baudrillard: The abundant society tends rather to asceticism because it wants to save what it has achieved. Blask I 95/96 Mythic poles: myth of banality and myth of the desert. "Anything you cross with insane speed is a desert." Blask I 102 Principle of the evil: the whole universe contradicts the principles of dialectics. In their stead, the principle of evil rules: "the malice of the object." Evil: Good and evil are not to be separated, nor distinguished as effects or intentions. Mental subversion by confusion, perversion of things, fundamental inclination to heresy. The principle of evil is the finished counterforce to logic, causality, and signification. "Say," God is evil, "is a tender truth, friendship for death, glide into space, into absence." Blask I 104 Scene: the basis of every illusion, challenge of the real, the opponents of the obscene. Blask I 105 Obscene: "The total obscenity of the money game." Blask I 108 Ceremony of the world: everything is always predetermined. Need for a return. Blask I 110 Virtual catastrophes: Schadenfreude of the machines. Delusion of prophylaxis. The last virus: the virus of sadness. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Terminology | Ryle | Geach I 94 Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. Geach I 255 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations. --- Ryle I 58 E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner. I 93ff Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. I 97 Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. I 174 f Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly. The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this). I 178 Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily". These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion". Knowledge: is an ability word. I 195 Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south. I 199ff Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental. I 245ff Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge. I 248 One cannot answer "How do you know?". I 297 Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. Flor I 267 Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. --- Sellars I 53 Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Terminology | Nietzsche | Ries II 11 Crisis/Nietzsche: is to be pushed forward to revaluate all values. Ries II 11 Amor fati/Nietzsche: the highest state a philosopher can attain: to think Dionysian in relation to existence. Ries II 13 Noon/Nietzsche: A mature old tree, embraced by the rich love of a vine and hidden from itself. At the moment of happiness, the course of time seems to stop. Ries II 16 Nietzsche: Seafaring passion for the "unknown", which lies in a direction "where all the suns of mankind have so far gone down". Ries II 17 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Thesis: the meaning of life is love. Ries II 19 Happiness/Nietzsche: Zarathustra: the happiness of my existence, to express its puzzle form, I have already died as my father, as my mother I am still alive, and I am getting old. Ries II 20 Nietzsche/Biography: Nietzsche met Jacob Burckhardt. During the Franco-German war, he was a voluntary nurse for several months. Ries II 25 "Dark antiquity": The term comes from Jacob Burckhardt. (Not literally!). Ries II 28 Apollonian/Nietzsche: Symbol of the world as an apparition, in the sense of the Schopenhauer concept of imagination. Deceptive liberation from the terrible Dionysian knowledge of "primal pain". Apollonian/Nietzsche: Art medium Dionysian/Nietzsche: Wisdom Apollonian/Dionysian/Nietzsche: in the end, they both speak each other's language. There is no point in a world game circling in itself, which the will in eternal lust plays with itself. Ries II 29 Tragedy: Schopenhauer: Pathos as primal pain - Nietzsche primordial lust. Ries II 30 Nietzsche: Zarathustra: From the smile of Dionysus the Olympic gods were born, from his tears the human was created. Ries II 30 Pessimism/Nietzsche: "Beyond Good and Evil": a philosophy that dares to lower morality itself into the world of appearances, namely appearance as deception, illusion, delusion, error. Ries II 29/30 Nietzsche/Biography/Ries: by the "Birth of the Tragedy" he was scientifically dead as a philologist. Ries II 49 Human/All too human/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Wanderer and his Shadow": "Shadow philosophy"/Shadow/Nietzsche: in which the "objects" lose their physicality. Noon/Nietzsche: Whosoever had an active and stormy morning, whose soul is overwhelmed by a strange quietness around the noon of life... It is a death with awake eyes. Ries II 50 Jesus/Christianity/Nietzsche: Parable "The Prisoners" (The Gay Science): the son of the guard: I will save you, but only those of you who believe that I am the son (Jesus) of the prison guard. Ries II 55 Gay Science/Nietzsche: Science of the free spirit. Ries II 57 Eternal return/Nietzsche: (Zarathustra) the thought invaded Nietzsche in August 1881 at the lake of Silvaplana. Like when one day or at night a demon in your loneliest solitude stalked you and said: "You will have to live this life as you loved it and love it now, once more and countless times. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every desire and every thought and sigh and all unspeakably small and big things of your life must come back to you and everything in the same order and also this spider and this moonlight between the trees... would you not bow down and grind your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like that? >Eternal return/Nietzsche. The question with everyone and everything: 'Do you want to do this again and again and countless times?' would lie as the heaviest weight on your actions!" Ries II 58/ 59 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: as a classic figure, reversal of history, "overcoming morality". Zarathustra, who once created the most fatal error of morality, himself - he is also the first to recognize him the heavyweight has given way from things. The whole divine horizon has been wiped away. Ries II 60/61 The last human/Nietzsche: Opposite image of the superhuman, vegetating at the end of civilization. The last man smells badly! Ries II 62 Three stages: past, present, future: Camel/Nietzsche: idealistic stage, obedience, theological absolutism "thou shalt". Löwe/Nietzsche: idealism turns against itself, against the thousand-years old "great dragon" of the "thou shalt" dominating it: "I will". Ries II 63 Kind/Nietzsche: but the freedom of this "I want" is still constituted by what it denies: morality, metaphysics, religion. Only the third stage brings the innocence of becoming beyond good and evil. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche. Ries II 64 Self-conquest/Nietzsche: Where I found something alive, I found the will to power... life itself spoke to me: I am what must always overcome itself. The will overcomes itself to its purest form: the will to power. Thus constant repetition, thereby circularity, thus return of the same always! Ries II 65 Dionysian/Nietzsche: Existence in Dionysian immediacy remains subject to appearances. Ries II 70 Redemption of the "higher humans": Figures/Equalities/Zarathustra/Nietzsche/Ries: Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer is caricatured by Nietzsche in the Zarathustra as the fortune teller of great fatigue. The two kings/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: 1. despiser of the false representation of the political 2. the Conscientious of the spirit (the scientist). The old Sorcerer/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Richard Wagner. The old Pope/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the pious man mourning for the "dead God" and pious in this grief. The ugliest man/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: "the murderer of God", the great self-loathing and disgusted by humans. The voluntary beggar/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the selfless human. The shadow of Zarathustra: the free spirit. They are all as the "remnant of God" deeply desperate and failed. They all caricature themselves at the donkey festival. The always same Ries II A of the donkey as the Dionysian saying-yes to the whole of being. Ries II 71 Noon/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: through the "noon abyss" Zarathustra falls "into the well of eternity". The ship is no longer being praised for its departure into the unknown, but for its return to the "quietest bay". --- Danto III 207 Terminology/Blonde Beast/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression blonde beast has no direct reference to Germans or Aryans in Nietzsche. This passage refers to "Roman, Arabic, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings".(1) Most likely, the "Blonde Beast" is a literary topos for "Lion", the so-called King of the Animals. Danto III 218 Internalisation/Terminology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls internalisation the phenomenon that a drive still discharges when prohibited, but not against an external object, but rather an internal object, the person himself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness. (2) >Internalization. Danto III 219 Bad conscience: It is possible that people may remain in the state of mere self-aggression or mere self-loathing. That is what Nietzsche calls a guilty conscience. 1. Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 289. 2. Ibid. p. 338 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Understanding | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 53 Understanding/Objects/Developmental Psychology/Upton: substages of the sensorimotor stage of development: Upton, Penney. Developmental Psychology (Critical Thinking in Psychology Series) (p. 54). Learning Matters. Kindle Edition. 1. Reflex schemas (0–6 weeks): Involuntary responses to stimuli, e.g., sucking. – No attempt to locate objects that have disappeared. 2. Primary circular reactions (6 weeks–4 months): Attempts to repeat chance pleasurable actions, on or near the body, e.g. bringing thumb to mouth. - No attempt to locate objects that have disappeared 2. Secondary circular reactions (4–8 months): Attempts to repeat chance pleasurable actions in the environment, e.g. hitting a mobile, picking up a cup - Begins to search for objects that are partially hidden. 4. Coordinated secondary circular reactions (8–12 months): Can put ‘secondary circular reactions’ together to solve new problems, e.g. uncover, then grasp - Searches for completely hidden objects – but makes the A-not-B error 5. Tertiary circular reactions (12–18 months): Will deliberately vary an action pattern, to discover the consequences, e.g. dropping ball from different heights - Can follow visible displacements of an object 6. Beginnings of symbolic representation (18–24 months): Can solve problems using representation, e.g. opening and closing mouth - Can follow invisible displacements of an object. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Unemployment | Moon | Gaus I 212 Unemployment/welfare state/institutions/Moon: (...) private firms and voluntary organizations are poorly equipped to protect individuals from income loss due to unemployment. Non-governmental risk-pooling schemes work best when the chances that one person will suffer a given condition - say disability or death - are more or less independent of anyone else's chances, and when the overall risks facing the group are known. Under these conditions, each individual can pay into the fund, which can accumulate enough to provide beneflts to the unfortunate. But if the risks in question are not independent, if one person's suffering increases the likelihood that others will suffer as well, then a private scheme may collapse, as more and more people shift from being contributors to being claimants, and the group's reserves are depleted. Unemployment is (in part) cyclical, which means that in a downturn some people lose their jobs, and as a result reduce their consumption, thereby leading other firms to lay off workers, in an expanding cycle. Thus, a private firm or voluntary association offering unemployment insurance would run the risk of going out of business as fewer and fewer people held jobs (and so paid into the fund) and more and more people lost their jobs, and so became claimants. Because state-sponsored schemes, unlike private associations, are able to run deficits, and to the extent that these deficits actually contribute to expanding demand and so reducing unemployment and stabilizing the economy, they can deal with problems that non-state schemes cannot. >Welfare state/Political philosophy, >Minimal welfare state/Friedman, >Public goods, >Economic cycles, >Institutions/Barr. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Use Theory | Cavell | II 215 Meaning/Uses/Cavell's Use Theory: what the technical terms of mathematics and sciences mean, cannot be deduced by us from the way we use e.g. "mass" commonly. II 216 To mean/Meaning/Use theory/Cavell: one could still say: "Some actions are voluntary, others are involuntary, so I can call them as I want!" >"voluntarily"/Ryle. CavellVs: what we have to ask ourselves here is: in what kind of situation does it make no difference how I call a thing? It is a difference whether we ask: "What does x mean?" qnd "What does x really mean?". The second is not a profound version of the first, but is expressed in another situation. II 217 The most normal and the most profound utterances can only be understood when expressed in their natural contexts. >Context dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Utilitarianism | Parsons | Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purpose-rational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends"). (1) 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. (See Autonomy/Parsons). Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Welfare State | Giddens | Gaus I 219 Labour/Welfare state/Giddens/Moon: [the] obligation to work is not, or is not merely, a demand to be made on the individual, one which he might reasonably wish to resist, for ultimately it is rooted in an ideal of social inclusion and active citizenship through which the individual's own interests and needs can be realized. Anthony Giddens sounds this theme in his call for 'the positive welfare society', in which 'the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the development of self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility become the prime focus' (1998(1): 128). >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Labour/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. Giddens: Replacing the traditional 'welfare state' with the 'social investment state' , the task of government would be to invest in 'human capital' rather than 'the direct provision of economic maintenance' (1998(1): 117). Although he allows that full employment might not be realized, he calls for the redistribution of work to include as many as possible, and various forms of payment for participation in the 'social economy' , the sphere of civil society traditionally maintained by voluntary work. >Labour/Welfare economics. 1. Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Brocker I 871 Welfare State/Giddens: Giddens adopts important "points of criticism of the right" in the field of the welfare state, which is decisive for the theory and practice of social democracy: "The welfare state is undemocratic in principle, because it is based on a redistribution of resources from top to bottom. Its concern is protection and care, but it does not leave enough room for personal freedom. Some institutions of the welfare state are bureaucratic, alienating and inefficient; moreover, social benefits can partly do the opposite of what they are supposed to achieve. The policy of the third way nevertheless sees these difficulties not as a trigger to dismantle the welfare state, but as an occasion to reshape it".(1) Solution/Giddens: Overcoming the welfare state that subsequently repairs and distributes social services through a strategy of targeted "social investment" in human skills. This involves above all education, training, lifelong learning, retraining in the event of structural job losses and assistance in setting up smaller enterprises. On the one hand, this reduces the tension between economic productivity and the welfare state, which in the old social democracy was always highly strained, both in terms of financing and the passivating consequences of a mere redistribution policy. On the other hand, citizens are "trained" for involvement in civil society, which both presupposes and in turn "trains" the self-responsible involvement of citizens. 1.Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg. Die Erneuerung der sozialen Demokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1999, p. 132. Thomas Meyer, „Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Welfare State | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 210 Welfare state/Political philosophy/Moon: Some of the programmes of the welfare state, such as public schools and old age pensions, were first developed in the nineteenth century, but what might be called the 'institutional' welfare state did not fully emerge until after World War Il, when most democratic countries adopted a more or less integrated range of programmes of welfare provision and policies of economic management. The institutional welfare state is characterized by a range of programmes designed to meet different needs and to provide security against various contingencies. Brian Barry: At least as an ideal, as Brian Barry (1990)(1) points out, the institutional welfare state would not even require a general safety net, since specialized programmes would cover all of the different conditions that prevent people from meeting their needs. In reality, of course, there will always be some who fall between the cracks, and so the welfare state must have a programme of 'social assistance' to cover residual cases. The emergence of the institutional welfare state is reflected in the enormous growth of government expenditures to finance its programmes, both in absolute terms and in relation to national income. In the UK, for example, social expenditure increased from less than 6 percent of GNP in 1920 to 25 percent in 1996—7 (Barr, 1998(2): 171). Political theories on welfare state: tional frameworks. Students of the welfare state have offered a variety of classifications of welfare regimes, and disagree among themselves even about whether particular countries (notably, the US) even qualify as welfare states. Some students of welfare politics emphasize the difference between selective and universal welfare states (e.g. Rothstein, 1998)(3); others discern liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes (e.g. Esping- Andersen, 1990)(4); while yet others distinguish among social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and wage-earner welfare states (Huber and Stephens, 2001)(5). More philosophically oriented theorists place the welfare state in the context of different traditions of political thought, and differ- ent ideals and/or patterns of justification. Thus, some discuss the minimal state and the arguments for and against it (e.g. Nozick, 1974(6); Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998(7)); others consider the 'residual' versus the 'institutional' welfare state (e.g. Barry, 1999)(8); yet others find four distinct strands, laissez-faire, feminism, socialism, and Fabianism (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987(9)). While most recognize that class is a major concern of the welfare state, an increasing number of theorists see that gender is at least as important (Gordon, 1990(10); Fraser, 1997(11)). Moon: As a political formation the welfare state tends todivide theorists who in other respects share a view Gaus I 211 of politics. Thus, defenders and critics of the welfare state include people who identify themselves as (inter alia) >conservatives, >liberals, >communitarians, >socialists, and postmodernists, and so both its critics and its defenders find themselves with strange allies and opponents. Common features: In spite of the great variability mentioned above, welfare states share important features; four of the most important are a democratic political system, a largely private market economy, a wide range of public programmes that provide monetary support or services as a matter of right, and an active role for the state in managing the economy to dampen the business cycle and to regulate economic activities. Efficiency: (...) many welfare services are provided through market transactions, such as the purchase of life or medical insurance. Why, then, should the state be involved in providing welfare, either directly in the form of specific services (such as health care or education) or in the form of resources or income to enable people to meet their own needs? Government programmes, after all, both involve an element of coercion and impose uniformity. Gaus I 212 Market: The alternative to state provision is often taken be the market, where profit-seeking firms provide consumers with goods and services. But this is an oversimplification, as families and voluntary associations also lay key roles. Private provision: The rise of the welfare state with its compulsory programmes has led to the demise of many of these voluntary associations and private firms reducing citizens' autonomy and imposing uniformity on them. The more extensive the welfare state, the more it has displaced other welfare institutions.* Efficiency: One reason for substituting state for private provision is that state provision (either of services or of resources) can sometimes be more effective than private provision, either because it can provide services or resources more cheaply, or because private provision is incapable of providing an optimal (or even adequate) level of services. For Problems: see >Market failure, >Public goods. For a Minimal welfare state: >Welfare state/Friedman. Gaus I 214 Distributional justice: A second line of argument supporting the welfare state appeals to the idea of justice rather than efficiency. The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income. Efficiency-based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies deliberately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency. >Distributive justice/welfare economics. VsEfficency-based approaches: (...) the appeal to e Iciency is itself problematic, in as much as the pretax/pretransfer baseline it takes for granted must be justified. There are some risks which we face, when we think of our lives taken as a whole, that cannot be covered by any form of private provision, because they reflect conditions into which we are born, such as congenital handicaps, genetic predispositions to certain diseases, and the cultural and economic disadvantages one's parents may suffer. >Distributive justice/Welfare economics. * See Paul (1997)(12), particularly the articles by Beito, Davies, and the references cited therein for an account of non-state forms of welfare. 1. Barry, Brian (1990) 'The welfare state versus the relief of poverty'. Ethics, 100 (June): 503-29. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 5. Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2001 ) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 7. Schmidtz, David and Robert Goodin (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 8. Barry, Norman (1999) Welfare, 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 9. Clarke, John, Allan Cochrane and Carol Smart (1987) Ideologies of Welfare. London: Hutchinson. 10. Gordon, Linda, ed. (1990), Women, State, and Welfare. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 11. Fraser, Nancy (1997) Justice Interruptus. New York: Routledge. 12. Paul, Ellen, ed. (1997) The Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Mause I 579ff Welfare State/Political Theories: given the empirical diversity of the structure of the welfare state in the various countries, one must assume that one is dealing with a mixed system in the specific case of an examined country. The term welfare state is criticized as conservative. (Schmidt 2005) (1). For the division into system types see Esping-Andersen 1990(2) and 1999(3). Mause I 581 History of the welfare state: the oldest strand of comparative welfare research used key socio-economic variables such as the state of economic development, the spread of employees in the non-agricultural sector ("employment rate") and other concepts of macro-sociological modernisation. (Customs officer 1963 (4); Wilensky 1975 (5). Functionalistic explanations: here we are concerned, among other things, with the diffusion of social policy effects across territorial borders, e.g. social learning (Hall 1993) (6). Garbage can theory: this is about the contingent interaction of political processes, one example being the multiple streams approach. (Kingdon 1984)(7). Newer approaches, on the other hand, focused on concepts such as power, conflict and institutions and examined decision-making processes. Party Difference Thesis/Hibbs: (Hibbs 1977) (8): The party-political composition of governments is significantly reflected in internationally and historically variable levels of social expenditure. (Castles 1982 (9); Schmidt 2005 ) 1. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 3. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 4. Zöllner, Detlev. Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ein zeitlicher und internationaler Vergleich. Berlin 1963. 5. Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley 1975. 6. Peter A. Hall, 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25( 3): 275– 296. 7. Kingdon, John W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston/ Toronto 1984. 8. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467– 1487. 9. Castles, Francis G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states, Hrsg. Francis G. Castles, 21– 96. London 1982. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Working Memory | Cognitive Psychology | Corr I 405 Working Memory/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Working memory theory posits a capacity-limited supervisory executive system that directs both short-term storage and voluntary attention. It is localized in the prefrontal cortex, the anterior part of the frontal lobes of the brain (Kane and Engle 2002)(1). Problems: advances in understanding executive functioning may help to clarify some of the ambiguities of resource theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo 2007(2)). 1. Kane, M. J. and Engle, R. W. 2002. The role of prefrontal cortex in working-memory capacity, executive attention, and general fluid intelligence: an individual-differences perspective, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9: 637–71 2. Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R. and Calvo, M. G. 2007. Anxiety and cognitive performance: attentional control theory, Emotion 7: 336–53 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Writing | Plato | Gadamer I 396 Scripture/Plato/Gadamer: It is the methodological advantage of writing that the hermeneutical problem emerges in its detachment from all psychological aspects. What in our eyes and for our intention represents a methodological advantage is, of course, at the same time the expression of a specific weakness that is characteristic of everything written even more than of language. The task of understanding arises with particular clarity when one recognizes the weakness of everything written. Plato/Gadamer: We only need (...) to remind us of Plato's example, who saw the peculiar weakness of the written word in the fact that no one could help the written speech if it is the result of deliberate or involuntary misunderstanding(1). Plato, as is well known, saw in the helplessness of the Scriptures an even greater weakness than the speeches have (to asthenes ton logon), and if he demands dialectical help for the speeches in order to remedy this weakness, but on the other hand declares the case of the Scriptures to be hopeless, it is obviously an ironic exaggeration, by which he conceals his own literary work and art. 1. Plato, 7th letter 341 c, 344 c Phaidr. 275. Ricoeur II 38 Writing/Plato/Ricoeur: (Against writing: PlatoVsWriting): The attack against writing comes from afar. It is linked to a certain model of knowledge, science, and wisdom used by Plato to condemn exteriority as being contrary to genuine reminiscence.(1) He presents it in the form of a myth because philosophy here has to do with the coming to being of an institution, a skill, and a power, lost in the dark past of culture and connected with Egypt, the cradle of religious wisdom. The king of Thebes receives in his city the god Theuth, who has inverited numbers, geometry, astronomy, games of chance, and grammata or written characters. Questioned about the powers and possible benefits of his invention, Theuth claims that the knowledge of written characters would make Egyptians wiser and more capable of preserving the memory of things. No, replies the king, souls will become more forgetful once they have put their confidence in external marks instead of relying on themselves from within. This "remedy" (pharmakon) is not reminiscence, but sheer rememoration. As to instruction, what this invention brings is not the reality, but the resemblance of it; not wisdom, but its appearance. The commentary of Socrates is no less interesting. Writing is like painting which generates non-living being, which in II 39 turn remains silent when asked to answer. Writings, too, if one questions them in order to learn from them, "signify a unique thing always the same." Besides this sterile sameness, writings are indifferent to their addressees. Wandering here and there, they are heedless of whom they reach. And if a dispute arises, or if they are injustly despised, they still need the help of their father. By themselves they are unable to rescue themselves. Ricoeur: This Platonic attack against writing is not an isolated example in the history of our culture. Rousseau and Bergson, for example, for different reasons link the main evils that plague civilization to writing. >Writing/Rousseau, >Writing/Bergson. 1. Phaedrus, 274e-277a. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austin, John L. | Searle Vs Austin, John L. | SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs). In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory. IV 17 illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content: R(p). The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions. IV 18 1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong). IV 19 The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa). Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa. IV 20 Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective. IV 21 3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere). Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p" The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act. IV 22 These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised. E.g. "I suggest", "I swear" 5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room. IV 23 6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating 7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude. 8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role E.g. report or forecasts IV 24 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose 10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication IV 25 11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten". 12. differences in style E.g. announcing, entrustment. IV 27 SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act! E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report. A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like. IV 30 Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman IV 36 Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative. VII 86 Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present. Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable. SearleVsAustin: that's amazing. VII 88 SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily". Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use. VII 89 Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty). Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session. VII 90 The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions "A-Conditions". We can create a list. 2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words. E.g. The President is sober today. Hans breathes. etc. VII 91 3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to. I did not volunteer, I was dragged here. He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree. Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation. VII 92 SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true. An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false. SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification. E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily." VII 93 SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions. VII 94 Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation. VII 95 SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to: "No comment, which is not remarkable" or "No assertion that is not worth to be claimed". VII 96 SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by "X was not done intentionally". assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other. SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible. (VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally. Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false! E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc. VII 98 Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ... |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Cavell, St. | Fodor Vs Cavell, St. | III 222 Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 224 FodorVsCavell: fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he/she and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his/her investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before starting with the description of the language, he/she would have to know a whole lot about the language before he/she begins with his/her work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction without difference/Fodor: e.g. differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant ist distinction without reference. III 225 Cavell: empirical are e.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he/she is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation. 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: e.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc. FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice. III 230 FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) It is a wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I. Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations). III 232 FodorVsCavell: e.g. baker/professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers! FodorVsCavell: Cavell is right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions. III 233 FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Foucault, M. | Habermas Vs Foucault, M. | I 317 Will to Knowledge/Foucault: intervenes in the constitution of the scientific discourses. He determines the exception of the rules by which true is distinguished from false. (Power). HabermasVsFoucault: the so disguised origin of the concept of power from the metaphysics-critical concept of the will to truth and to knowledge also explains the systematically ambiguous use of the category "power". On the one hand, the innocence of a concept that can be used descriptively, on the other hand, a constitution-theoretical basic concept which only gives analysis its reason-critical meaning. I 318 HabermasVsFoucault: paradoxical combination of positivist attitude and critical aspirations. I 320 Foucault Thesis: Power and knowledge formations form an indissoluble unity. I 321 HabermasVsFoucault: this strong thesis can certainly not be justified with functionalist arguments alone. Form of Thought Proof: HabermasVsFoucault: he would have to prove that specific power strategies implement themselves in relevant scientific strategies of the reification of everyday language experiences, and thus preempt the sense of using theoretical statements about such constituted object areas. HabermasVsFoucault: he has not taken up this approach later, otherwise he would have noticed that objectivist approaches no longer dominated the field in the human sciences in the seventies. They compete rather with hermeneutical and critical approaches. I 322 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy appears in a confusing double role: on the one hand, the empirical role of an analysis of power technologies, on the one hand, a transcendental role of the same analysis of power technologies that are supposed to explain how scientific discourses are possible at all. The forced connection of the idealistic notion of transcendental synthesis with empiricist ontology is not a way out of the philosophy of the subject: the concept of power is taken from the philosophy of consciousness itself! I 323 HabermasVsFoucault: he turns the truth-dependence of power into the power-dependence of truth without further ado! Power becomes subjectless. HabermasVsFoucault: however, nobody escapes the conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject solely by performing inverse operations of the basic concepts. I 324 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy turns out to be exactly the presentistic, relativistic and normative cryptographic pseudo-science it does not want to be! It ends in hopeless subjectivism. I 325 HabermasVsFoucault: 1) involuntary presenteeism 2) unavoidable relativism of a present-oriented analysis which can only consider itself to be a context-dependent practical enterprise. 3) arbitrary partisanship of a criticism that cannot document its normative foundations. (Foucault is circumstantial enough to admit this. I 326 HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historicist can explain power technologies and domination practices only in comparison with each other and not every single one as a totality of itself. I 327 HabermasVsFoucault: caught up in exactly the self-reference he fought: the truth claims are not limited only to the discourses in which they occur. I 328 Even the basic assumption of his theory of power is self-referencing; it must also destroy the validity, the basis of of the research inspired by it. I 330 HabermasVsFoucault: Foucault’s concept of power does not allow such a privileged notion of counter-power (E.g. the workers). Every counter-power already awakens itself in the horizon of power. I 336 He fights against a naturalistic metaphysics, which reifies a counter-power. HabermasVsFoucault: but therefore he also has to refrain from answering the question of the normative foundations of his criticism. HabermasVsFoucault: undialectical! Leveling of ambiguous phenomena - (Foucault admits weaknesses in earlier works) |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Frankl. V. | Nozick Vs Frankl. V. | II 579 Death/Nozick: it is often assumed that our mortality is a particular problem for the meaning of life. Why? Would this problem not exist if life were infinite? Life/Infinite/Victor Frankl: Thesis: it is death himself who gives meaning to life. Suppose we had an infinite life: then we could legitimately postpone all our actions forever. It would be of no consequence whether we do something now or later. It might then happen that someone voluntarily ends their life to give it meaning. Scientists who discovered a remedy for immortality would probably keep it secret. ((s) Vs: (similar to above): this possible world is so far away from us, and the description is so general and vague that it is hard to say anything about it and hardly any conclusions can be drawn from it: would we not need anything to eat then, would we not need to work for it? Would we not need breathe regularly and would we not stumble into certain conflict situations? Would immortality make our bodies so different that the physiology became incomparable and thus our way of life then would not be comparable to our life now? Would there be no competition for finite resources therefore?) Nozick: perhaps other things would be won that would outweigh the loss of meaning? Frankl/Nozick: our only desire is to get certain things done. II 580 Nozick: also: if we had an infinite life, we could look at it as a whole, as something we could shape ((s) Does infinity not prevent that?. NozickVsFrankl: does not seem to be in question whether infinity did not eliminate the meaning of God's existence! Frankl: just general assumption that restrictions and pre-existing structures are necessary to operate a meaningful organization or store things (in vessels). NozickVsFrankl: even if that were true, death is only one way of limitation, sonatas and sonnets have different restrictions. Death: why should we think that the bad thing about death is the good which it ends, and not the good that it prevents from happening? E.g. a child dies three minutes after birth. II 581 Why does it bother us that after death an infinite amount of time will pass in which we do not exist? Death/Epicurus: is not bad for someone who lives, because this is not dead, and not bad for someone who is dead, because the dead no longer exist. Nozick: is death bad because it makes our life finite? E.g. Suppose our past is infinite, but we have forgotten most of it. If death still bothers you, it is not because it makes life finite! E.g. Inverse situation: infinite future. That does not explain why there is an asymmetry between past and future. II 582 E.g. why do we not mourn our late birth as much as we mourn our early death? Is it because we already accept the past as fixed and the future as malleable? Perhaps a fulfilled past in which we have experienced, seen, and lived through everything would let death appear less serious than an endless monotonous past. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Habermas, J. | Tugendhat Vs Habermas, J. | II 16 TugendhatVsHabermas/Apel: "good" or the entire ethics cannot be justified linguistically. Only voluntarily. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kant | Verschiedene Vs Kant | Kanitscheider I 434 KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Kanitscheider I 441 EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached. Kant I 28 VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause. I 47 Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori." I 49 Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events. I 53 Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object). I 52 For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent. I 66 SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity. I 67 Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68 I 69 MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods". I 104 Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes. Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral constitution of bourgeois society. Menne I 28 Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion. Vaihinger I 333 Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical). Vollmer I XIV World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Lewis, D. | Armstrong Vs Lewis, D. | Armstrong III 70 Def Law of Nature/LoN/Lewis: Iff it occurs as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that unites the best combination of simplicity and strength. Armstrong: "each" is important: Suppose we had L3 and L4 (see E.g. above), both as a law, but both support incompatible counterfactual conditionals. Lewis: then there is no third law. ArmstrongVsLewis: that seems wrong. III 71 The least evil would be to say that an involuntary choice must be made between L3 or L4 as the third law. The price for this is the discovery that in some possible situations the view of Ramsey Lewis does not offer an involuntary response. This may not be a problem for Lewis: Law/Lewis: "vague and difficult concept". ArmstrongVsLewis: if one does not assume the regularity theory, there is a precise distinction between laws and non-laws. Vs Systematic approach/VsRamsey/VsLewis: pro: it is as they say, the manifestations of LoN can be singled out of the Humean uniformities. But: This is not a necessary truth. Their criterion is not part of our concept of LoN. ArmstrongVsLewis: it is logically possible that the uniformities (unif.) in an arbitrarily chosen subclass are manifestations of LoN, while the unif. in the residue class are purely coincidental unif... It is logically possible that every Humean uniformity is the manifestation of a LoN, that none is a manifestation or that any other subclass is this class of manifestations of LoN. Schwarz I 94 Def properties/Lewis: having a property means being a member of a class. ArmstrongVsLewis/Problem/Schwarz: you cannot explain "red" by saying that its bearer is the element of such and such a class. ((s) either, it is circular, or it misses the property, because the object (bearer) can also belong to other classes. E.g. the fact that a tomato is red is not due to the fact that it is an element of the class of red things, but vice versa.) Armstrong 1978a(1), 2,5,2,7) Schw I 95 LewisVsVs: Unlike other representatives of the universals theory, Lewis does not want to explain what it means or why it is that things have the properties that they have. Explanation/Lewis: proper explanations don’t speak of elementness. (1997c(2), 1980b(3)). However, there can be no general explanation of having properties or predication! Because the explanation has to contain predicates if it were circular. Therefore, "Having a property" is not a relation. But there is nothing more to be said about it, either. (2002a(4), 6,1983c(5): 20 24,1998b(6), 219). E.g. "A is F" is to be generally true, because A has this and that relationship with the property F: here, "A is in this and that relationship with the property F" would have to be true again, because A and F are in this and that relation with "having this and that relation", etc. 1. David M. Armstrong [1978a]: Universals and Scientific Realism I: Nominalism & Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 3. David Lewis [1980b]: “Mad Pain andMartian Pain”. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Bd.1, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 216–222 4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. David Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Nozick, R. | Verschiedene Vs Nozick, R. | I 378 Minimal State/Nozick: Rights/Nozick: the human has the right to self-destruction. Other people are untouchable. Taxes/Nozick: there is no abstract total social benefit. Therefore, millionaires should not be taxed. I 379 Utilitarianism/Nozick/Rawls: both reject all utilitarian considerations and calculations! Life: only a creature with the ability to plan its own life can have a meaningful life. Property: the individual is its own property and not that of another. Otherwise one could, for example, remove its kidneys on demand. Reason: the individual would not have worked them out itself. The free market with private property rights will ensure the effective use of scarce resources and encourage inventiveness and new thinking. This is the reason why those who have fewer resources available because they have already used others are not really worse off. I 381 For example, suppose one person's life could only be saved by violating another person's property right, for example over a certain medicine. Nozick: in certain extreme cases, his principle that the property of others is absolutely inviolable can be relaxed. VsNozick: unfortunately, deals nowhere with how the moral status of these rights is founded. Question: if the right to property has the same moral value as the right to self-determination, the plausibility of the starting position is endangered. If the second has priority over the first, the argumentation is inconclusive, because the inviolability of property is a necessary precondition for the rejection of any form of state. I 383 Distribution/Nozick: there is no allocation or distribution of goods just as there is no allocation of spouses in a society. The just distribution therefore depends on the way in which the property came into the hands of the owner, that is, on its prehistory. (Most other theories about distributive justice deal only with the result of distribution or the key: e.g. Rawls' principle of difference). Justice: a) original acquisition: appropriation of "masterless" goods. b) transfer of possessions. I 384 1. Anyone who acquires a property in accordance with the principle of just appropriation shall be entitled to that property. 2. Anyone who acquires a property in accordance with the principle of equitable transfer from someone who is entitled to the property shall be entitled to the property. 3. Claims to possessions arise only through (repeated) application of rules (1) and (2). c) Correction of injustices. Dealing with thieves, fraudsters and perpetrators of violence. Question: how can the sins of the past be corrected again? VsNozick: he deals with this complicated problem on less than one and a half pages. He only says that this is an important and complicated problem. Distributive justice/Nozick: Difference: structured (historical) principles/non-structured (non-historical) principles. I 384/385 "Natural Dimension": distribution according to performance (historical). Historical: according to intelligence or race. E.g. Basketball fans pay completely overpriced prices to see their star. Nozick: this must be seen as completely fair, since it happens voluntarily. The appearance of injustice arises only if, on the one hand, individuals are granted a free right of disposal over their goods and, on the other hand, it is demanded that the distribution resulting from the exercise of this right should have taken place in accordance with the original structured and result-oriented distribution principle. Nozick: there can be no enforcement of result-oriented principles or structural distribution without permanent interference in people's lives! In order to maintain a certain structure, the state would have to intervene again and again. I 386 VsNozick: Question: why does he assume that people in the state of the original distributive justice V1 have absolute freedom to deal with their possessions at their own discretion (to buy overpriced baseball tickets)? A right which, according to the structural theories, they supposedly have based on their assumptions V1, yes, a right they do not even possess! Contradiction. The question is more complicated than it seems: Goods/Nozick: are seen by Nozick as a kind of mass entry to the common catering of all. VsNozick: this systematically ignores the demands of the workers from their own production. Nozick unfortunately gives himself a systematic discussion of this problem of competing demands. |
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| Ordinary Language | Positivism Vs Ordinary Language | Fodor II 118 PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties. II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions. II 124 In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused. Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty! E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?" Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory. II 125 The theory should rather only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules. III 222 Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements) Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations. Type III Statement: Generalizations. Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world). Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language). Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act. Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 223 Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Plato | Hegel Vs Plato | Bubner I 42 PlatoVsSophists: unmethodical. HegelVsPlato: directed the same accusation against him. Do not come beyond the sophistic reasoning. "The dialectic to dissolve the particular and to produce the General is not the true dialectic. (s) stands with the only negatives). The "external reflection" had to yield to the "thing itself".But this makes the voluntary self-task of the reflection necessary! The total mediation must also include mediating itself. (Hegel. logic) --- I 77 HegelVsPlato: stopped halfway. He was moving undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectic, that means the smooth reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability stating a relationship of incompatibility. This is a translation task (of the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be done through the Socratic irony. "General irony of the world". |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Ryle, G. | Austin Vs Ryle, G. | Vendler I 243 Voluntary/Ryle: this word is only used for acts that seem to be the result of a person's guilt. AustinVsRyle: you can also make a gift voluntarily. Voluntarily/Cavell: middle way between Austin and Ryle: the action must at least be suspect. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Searle Vs Ryle, G. | I 118 SearleVsPrivileged Access/SearleVsRyle: this is a spatial metaphor, like a private room, but I would have to distinguish myself from the room which I enter. There is no sort of a room accessible by me. >Priviledged access, >first person. While I can observe another person just like that, I can however not watch their subjectivity! What is worse: I 119 I cannot observe my own subjectivity because every speech observation itself is what should be observed. V 216 "Voluntary"/Ryle: "voluntary" is normally used in connection with any acts of which it is generally believed that they should be avoided. V 217 SearleVsRyle: there are normal or standard situations. The explanation has nothing to do with the analysis of special words, but forms a moment of explanation of the operation of assertions. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ryle, G. | Cavell Vs Ryle, G. | II 170 Everyday Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say..." Type II statement: the addition of explanations to Type I statements. Type III statements: generalizations. II 171 AustinVsRyle: for example a gift can be given voluntarily (without being guilty) but that is not something you should normally not do. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (Type II statement): he is generally entitled to do so, but especially with regard to his example "voluntarily" the generalization goes wrong: II 174 (E.g. Austin: voluntary gift). Austin Thesis: we cannot always say of actions that they are voluntary, even if they were obviously not involuntary either. CavellVsRyle: he has not completely neglected it, his mistake is that he characterizes these actions incompletely and those where the question cannot arise wrongly. He does not see that the condition for the use of the term "voluntarily" applies in general. II 175 He falsely assumes that "not voluntary" means "involuntary". Cavell: this is also overlooked by utilitarianism. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Searle, J.R. | Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R. | I 350 Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior). I 351 PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge. I 352 It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup. SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not. I 353 Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test! Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen. I 354 VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world. We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain. I 355 But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness. I 356 Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are. I 357 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism). I 358 Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition. I 359 SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart. ((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.) I 364 Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter. I 365 Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness! Here, some hair-splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime? I 366 The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"? Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Use Theory | Searle Vs Use Theory | III 64 Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies. Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case! III 64/65 Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it. III 79 Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times. To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use) There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words. Status: here no physical features are available. V 221 Searle: the concept of use is too vague. SearleVsUse theory: 1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case! V 221/222 E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False: 1. What does W mean? 2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!). 4. how are such propositions used? V 223 5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions? The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.) Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy: V 224 SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression. V 229 SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?" V 234 SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger". |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Lewis Vs Various Authors | I (b) 21 Tradition had no problems or disputes in equating water with H2 0 or light with electromagnetic radiation. According to the conventional wisdom, such identifications are made voluntarily. Simply with the help of >bridge laws. Tradition: the equating is made, not found! (LewisVs, Putnam/KripkeVs). I (b) 22 LewisVsTradition (see above): theoretical identifications are not fixed, they follow rather from the theories that make them possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Volitions | Ryle Vs Volitions | 79 Volition/Act of will/Tradition/Ryle: long-term undisputed axiom: that the human mind is three-parted: thought, feeling, will. Tradition/Ryle: also modes: of knowing, of affection, of striving. We refute this, but do not deny that there are will-strong and weak people, voluntary and involuntary acts. Tradition/Ryle: only when my body movement arises from an act of will, I deserve praise or blame. --- I 80 RyleVsVolitions/Ryle: inevitable expansion of the myth of the ghost in the machine. He assumes that there are states of mind and processes, and there are different states of the body and processes for this. An event on the one stage is never identical to an event on the other stage. A causal proposition is necessary, which says that the physical action of pulling the trigger of the pistol is an effect of the mental act of will to pull the trigger. A mental impulse has caused the contraction of the muscles. This is the language of the paramechanic theory of mind. When a theorist believes in acts of will, he believes in the mind as a secondary field of special causes. He will then speak of physical actions as "utterances" of mental processes. RyleVsVolitions: 1 .: nobody ever says (even not the advocates of the theory) that he was busy at ten o'clock in the morning, to want this or that. Or he carried out five fast and light and two slow and heavy acts of will between the breakfast and lunch. If there were acts of will, with what predicates would they be described? Could they be sudden or gradual, strong or weak, pleasant or unpleasant? Can I do two or seven of them at the same time? Can I execute one in a dream, or while I think of something else? Can I mistakenly believe that I had executed one? At what moment did the jumper perform his act of will as he put his foot on the ladder when he took a deep breath when he counted one, two, three but did not jump? What would he answer to these questions himself? Acts of will/Tradition/Ryle: Advocates of the theory say, of course, that the execution of acts of will would be tacitly asserted whenever an action is described as voluntary, deliberate, etc. They also say that one cannot only, but one must know that one carries out an act of will. RyleVsVolitions: but you cannot ask an advocate when he has done his last act of will, or whether he performs one when he recites "Oh, you dear Augustin" backwards. He will admit that he had difficulties in answering these questions, although he should not have any according to his own theory. RyleVsVolitions: 2. It is admitted that one can never observe an act of will. One can only conclude from effects. It follows from this that no judge, father, or teacher ever knows whether the deeds which he judges deserve praise or rebuke. The making of confessions is also just another muscle movement. (The only thing you can observe according to this theory). Nor can it be maintained that the agent himself can know whether any action is the effect of an act of will. Suppose, for example, that he could localize his act of will shortly before pulling the trigger of the pistol due to introspection. Then it would still not prove that the pulling of the trigger was the effect of the act of will. It could still be caused by another event. (Regress) RyleVsVolitions: 3. The connection between the act of will and the movement is admittedly puzzling. It is not, however, an unsolved mystery of a solvable kind, as the problem of recognizing the causes of disease, but of a quite different kind. Tradition/Ryle: The episodes in the life of the mind have supposedly a completely different existence than the episodes in the career of a body. A middle position is not allowed. But interrelationships between the body and the mind need the middle members, where there can be no members. VsVolitions: 4. It is the main function of acts of will to induce body movements, but from the argument to the proof of their existence, as weak as it is, it follows that some mental events must also be caused by acts of will. (Regress). Acts of will/Tradition/Ryle: were postulated to make actions voluntarily, resolutely, laudably or wanton. But predicates of this kind are not only attributed to body movements, but also to those activities that are not physical, but mental, according to the theory. Acts of will/volitions: Ryle: what is the status of the will acts themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary? ((s)> Schopenhauer: We are free to do what we want, but not free to want what we want). VsVolitions/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress). It has been proposed for avoidance that the acts of will can neither be described as voluntary nor involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous," "vicious," "good," or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. --- I 85 In short, the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Modification | Austin, J.L. | III 48 Austin/Thesis: "No modification without deviation": i.e. no modification of the language without deviation in behavior (to normality). One is of the opinion that there must always be at least one modifying expression. Austin: this is completely unjustified for most uses of most verbs! E.g. "eat", "push", "play football" here no modifying expression is necessary or even permissible. Probably also not with "murder". A modifying expression is only permissible in the case of a deviating design. Searle VII 86 Austin: Thesis: The terms used by us to modify descriptions of actions, such as "intentionally", "voluntarily", etc., are only used to modify an action if the action is somehow deviant or cross. "No modification without deviation". VII 93 .... Austin's thesis is not about words but about sentences. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ethics | Hume, D. | Stegmüller IV 243 Ethics/Moral/Hume: Thesis 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. IV 244 Ethics/Morality/Hume: Thesis 3. human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. Humans are vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Determinism | Lewis, D. | V 291 Def soft Determinism/Lewis: the thesis that one sometimes voluntarily does what one is predestined to do and that in such cases one could also act differently, although prehistory and the laws of nature determine that one will not act differently. Def Compatibilism/Lewis: is the thesis that soft determinism could be true. But a compatibilist could still doubt soft determinism because he doubts that there is a physical basis, that we are predetermined to act as we act. Lewis: Thesis: I myself am a compatibilist, but not a determinist. For the sake of the argument, I will pretend to represent soft determinism. V 293 Weak Thesis/Lewis: I am able to do something so that if I did, a natural law would be broken. Strong Thesis: I am able to break natural laws. V 295 Lewis: Thesis: I was able to raise my hand (instead of actual lowering). I acknowledge that a natural law had to be broken for this, but I deny that I would be able to break natural laws because of it. Soft Determinism does not require supernatural forces. Compatibilism/Lewis: in order to maintain it one does not even have to assume that supernatural powers are possible at all! |
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| Voluntarily | Ryle, G. | Searle VII 88 Ryle s thesis: "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts "that you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in ordinary use. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Forgery | Grafton, A. | Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 S 39 Forgery / Grafton, Anthony: (Forgers and Critics, 1990, standard work) thesis: interdependence, competition and complicity, connects philology and forgery, counterfeiting and critics. Voluntary cooperation: in the modification of authenticity criteria. Each work edition has a hypothetical element. Authenticity criteria are timeless GaddisVsGrafton. 309 Forgery / Grafton: It is not true that past eras had a different concept of truth than ours. (Many authors VsGrafton). |
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