Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anaphora | Geach | I 88 "It"/Geach: "it" is a non-referring term: For example, The only one who ever stole a book from Snead made a lot of money selling it. Problem: this cannot be replaced salva veritate by "Robinson", because "it" then becomes senseless. - in the original also not replaceable by "a book", because then it is also senseless. >Senseless. I 110f Fake predicate/fake token/Geach: the philosopher whose disciple (was) Plato was bald - fake: "Plato was bald" - Example: "A philosopher smoked and drank whisky": fake token: "a philosopher smoked"..."and he (or the philosopher (!)) drank... >Predicates, cf. >Pronouns, >Reference. Solution: "casus": two smoking philosophers, one of whom does not drink. The sentence does not show which one is true - but no psychologizing: ("what the speaker thought about") what he said is true, even if not all thoughts were true. Wrong question: to what the subject refers: "he" or "this philosopher" is not a subject at all. "And" (conjunction) combines here two predicates, not two sentences! Def fake predicate/Geach: we have a fake predicate if the question is irrelevant to what it is applied. Example "Everyone loves themselves" can be true, even if "every man loves ---" does not appeal to anyone. - >Anaphora, >Index words, >Indexicality. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Causal Explanation | Schurz | I 227 Causal explanation/Schurz: exists only if there is a natural law connection. No causal explanation: e.g. "All apples in this bag are red, therefore this apple is red". I.e. That this apple is (naturally) red is not an explanation why it is red. ((s) >Dennett: Wrong question: "Why is this car green?"). >Explanation/Dennett, >Why-questions, >Causality, >Laws of nature. Prediction/justification/Schurz: here law-likeness is not required. I 228 Ex "All apples in the bag are red": is a completely sufficient prediction or reason (just not an explanation). Causality/Explanation/Schurz: the majority of authors first tried to explicate the concept of explanation independently of causality. Vs: this does not meet the narrower concept of explanation. Schurz: supplying real reasons ((s) here: = cause) belongs to the core of the concept of event explanation. >Prediction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Chomsky | Deacon | I 35 Chomsky/Deacon: his theory is reminiscent of evolutionary theory by assuming "hopeful monsters": random mutations that produce new abilities. >Hopeful monsters. For example, children's ability to acquire the grammar of the grammar they learned first. Explanation/Chomsky: this can only be explained if we adopt a "universal grammar" that is built into all human brains as a blueprint. >Universal grammar. I 36 Such a "language organ" could explain why no other species has developed a language. It would also explain why there are no intermediate stages between human and non-human language. Other advantages: such a thesis explains why human and non-human communication are not similar, it explains the systematically independent nature of grammatical rules (they are all derived from the neurological interconnection of the brain), it explains the allegedly universal characteristics of language structures, it explains the reciprocal translatability of languages, it explains the ease of language acquisition with lean input and lack of error correction. I 37 DeaconVsChomsky/DeaconVsUniversal grammar: many linguists ask the wrong question: they expect something (the child's ability to learn) and ask how it comes about. The assumption of a universal grammar serves as a placeholder for everything that cannot be learned. >Learning. I 38 To say that only the human brain is able to produce a grammar, takes the problem from the linguists' hands and passes it on to the neurobiologists. >Grammar, >Neurobiology, >Neurobiology as author. Chomsky/Deacon: however, he is not concerned with the emergence of language, but with explaining the origin of language competence. >Competence, >Language acquisition, >Language emergence. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Classes | Wessel | I 360f Class/Wessel: "What is a class?": Wrong question, without circularity it can only be introduced as a logical operator. >Operators. It is also circular as abstraction: requires individual domains. >Circular reasoning. Th concept of class and class logic superfluous, merely different representations of the concept of the propositional function and the classical quantifier logic. >Propositional functions, >Quantifier logic, >Sets, >Set theory. The class of Amazons exists as an empty class. Def Class: if tA is a class term, then A is a class. Problem: the left side is burdened by existence,the right side is not. Solution: instead of identity only meaning equality of terms (t €s P(s) <=> t €s Q(s)) =def As(P(s) ↔ Q(s)). Thus a definition by abstraction becomes a mere facon de parler. >Abstraction, >Class abstraction. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Consciousness | Rorty | Rorty I 60 Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it. III 37/38 RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. >Mental states/Dennett, >Consciousness/Dennett, >Mental states/Ryle, >Consciousness/Ryle. Rorty: there is no medium. VI 176 Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point. Frank I 584 Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 Rorty I 132 Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person. >Mind/Mind state. III 37 Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality. >Mind. III 67 Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. Reason/Kant: general principles FreudVsKant: return to the special. Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic. VI 147 Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Designation | Kripke | III 380 Naming/designation/Kripke: designation has nothing to do with existence: wrong question: "Does ___ live on Mars?" and then insert name. ((s) The substitutional quantification: would be satisfied by a name because it refuses an ontology that goes beyond its expressions.) >Existence/Kripke, >Substitutional quantification/Kripke. --- Kripke I 121 Naming/designation/Kripke: designation does not create identity: Phosphorus/Hesperus has the same epistemic situation named as different celestial bodies - it is quite possible, therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Identity/Kripke, >Morning star/evening star, >Possible world/Kripke. I 134 Geach: designation reflects something important: Nixon = human (a priori). KripkeVs: e.g. Lot’s guests are Angles despite designation. Difference: there is a difference in the use of the name/designation. This is no case of indeterminacy of reference. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability of reference, >Reference/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Ecology | Naess | Singer I 251 Ecology/Naess, Arne/Singer, P.: (A. Naess (1973)(1): Def Shallow Ecology/Naess: is limited to the traditional framework of ethics: this is about not polluting water, for example, in order to have enough drinking water and to avoid pollution, so that one can continue to enjoy nature. On the other hand, Def Deep Ecology/Naess: wants to preserve the biosphere for its own sake, regardless of the potential benefit to mankind. Deep Ecology/Naess/Singer, P.: thus takes as its subject matter larger units than the individual: species, ecosystems and even the biosphere as a whole. Deep Ecology(2): (A. Naess and G. Sessions (1984)(2) Principles: 1. The wellbeing and development of human and non-human life on earth have a value in itself (intrinsic, inherent value), regardless of the non-human world's use for human purposes. 2. Wealth and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are values in themselves. 3. People do not have the right to diminish the wealth and diversity of the world, except when it comes to vital interests. Singer I 252 Biosphere/Naess/Sessions/Singer, P.: Sessions and Naess use the term "Biosphere" in a broad sense, so that rivers, landscapes and ecosystems are also included. P. SingerVsNaess: (see also SingerVsSessions): the ethics of deep ecology does not provide satisfactory answers to the value of the life of individuals. Maybe that is the wrong question. Ecology is more about systems than individual organisms. Therefore, ecological ethics should be related to species and ecosystems. Singer I 253 So there is a kind of Holism behind it. This is shown by Lawrence Johnson (L. Johnson, A Morally Deep World, Cambridge, 1993). Johnson's thesis: The interests of species are different from the sum of individual interests and exist simultaneously together with individual interests within our moral considerations. >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research 1. A. Naess (1973). „The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement“, Inquiry 16 , pp. 95-100 2. A. Naess and George Sessions (1984). „Basic Principles of Deep Ecology“, Ecophilosophy, 6 |
Naess I Arne Naess Can Knowledge Be Reached? Inquiry 1961, S. 219-227 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Explanation | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description. 1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth 2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws 3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. >Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth. I 11 E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models. I 44 E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich). I 47 E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature. I 50 Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation. I 70 E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts. I 73 Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses). I 92 E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation. I 94 f Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L. I 96 Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws. I 103 Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments. I 152 Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge). Hacking I 96~ Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it. I 99 Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological. This is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink. I 137 Explanation/Model/Dennett: models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator. Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible. I 335 We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility. Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > "wrong question". Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that. I 416 Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven. Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 424 Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 102 Explanation/Justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there. The evolution cannot foresee its path. Consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (>epiphenomenon). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Indistinguishability | Wittgenstein | Rorty VI 414 WittgensteinVsAristoteles/Rorty: wrong question: "Which of my distinctions are real distinctions". >Criteria, >Reality, >World, >Perception, >Truth. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Infinity | Poundstone | I 221 Thomson's lamp/Poundstone: light turns on for 1/2 minutes, then off for 1/4 minutes, then 1/8 on ... Total: 1. Question: is it on or off after 1 min? (Sum of infinite elements). TZhis is the wrong question. Analog: the question if the greatest number is odd/even. I 228 ultimately physical limits: frequency, energy, switches. Cf. >Zeno, >About Zeno. I 224 Zenon/Achilles/Poundstone: Solution: overtaking after 111,111 ... cm - the "infinity" lies in Zeno's analysis, not in physics. Arrow paradox: even in the relativity theory the moment remains vague. - Here we also believe in cause and effect: the present determines the future. >Cause, >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Determinism. How does the arrow know, where it must go? This is no physical problem, row term no solution. I 235 Infinity/border/Lukrez: wanted to prove infinity of the space: if someone hurls an arrow towards the border, it will either fly over the border, or something stops it. - So there is no border. PoundstoneVsLukrez: error, to accept a "something". I 236 Olbers Paradox: four times the area balances like four times weaker radiation - it would heat up on earth to the average temperature of stars. Solution: shift of red. >Olbers Paradox. I 237 Multiplicity/ZenonVs: even the shortest line contains an infinite number of points, then the whole universe in a nutshell. - In a hierarchy of even smaller particles containing mostly nothing, so there was nothing in 99.99% ... Solution/Poundstone: Blur effect by electrons. - We needed X-ray vision, which would be switched on only when straightforward connection. - Then myriads of electrons and quarks. - Because you cannot see an infinitly small point, everything would be invisible. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Language | Davidson | I (e) 113 Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them. >Rules, >Conventions, >Explanation. Glüer II 54 Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim. Rorty II 21 Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works." DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation. Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (These are rather provisional theories). There are no conventions how we communicate! Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance. Brandom I 922 Language/Davidson: is merely practical, hypothetical necessity, convenient for the community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations. >Content, >Propositional content, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation. Brandom I 518 Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up. Glüer II 51 Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - this ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language. >Truth theory. Brandom I 454 Language/Davidson/Rorty: is not a conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world. >Conceptual scheme. Rorty III 33 Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?" - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?" >Use. Rorty VI 133 Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs")(1): there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized. Seel III 28 Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them. VsMentalese/language of thought: does not exist. - Language is a part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. >Mentalese. Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow. Medium/Gadamer: is not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought. 1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Language | Wittgenstein | Rorty III 40 Wittgenstein: naturalizes consciousness and language, in which all questions about relations to the universe are transformed in causal questions. (Also Ryle and Dennett). >Causality, >Causal relation, cf. >Naturalism. --- Rorty VI 134 Language/Wittgenstein: You cannot find a method with which it is possible to step between the language and the object. >Reality, >World, >Perception. --- Hintikka I 22 Language/ontology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one cannot specify in the language, how many objects there are. - These are given by name. - ((s) one can well give a list - Wittgenstein: The existence of an object cannot be expressed - only through the use of the name in the language. >Use, >Names. I 41 Language relativism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Could a lion talk, we would not understand him." (I 323 Hintikka: a lion has other sensory data) - Hintikka: in mathematics, there is no "common behavior". - In different systems different sentences are true and false. >Truth values. I 190 Basic physical language/explanation/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "metaphysics" - (> Large typescript) - Instead: phenomenology is grammar. - E.g. one should not decide whether two red circles on a blue background are two objects or one. - Each transcription must depend on the one of the first sentence. - Uncertainty about the grammar - Hintikka: a) the objects are the colors - b) the objects are the spots. - Both phenomenological. - Both are secondary to the language of physical objects and their properties. - Wrong question: how many objects are there. >Grammar, >Metaphysics. WittgensteinVsPhenomenology: this wanted to decide how many objects there are. I 255 Language/Wittgenstein/Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242/Hintikka: language is not a calculus. - It has no concrete defined rules - not that the rules were vague - but the question arises only in the context of language games. >Language game, >Rules. --- II 60 Language/signal/Wittgenstein: E.g. resolution characters in music: is a signal in the strict sense. - Language does not consist of signals. - A signal must be explained. - In the same sense as colors. - In addition to the color word "green" we still need something extra. II 226f Language/Wittgenstein: there are actually no gaps in our language - even if there are not enough words to describe the changes of the sky. - It is also not a shortage of our vision that we cannot count the raindrops. - Also impossibility can be expressed - E.g. that an object would be simultaneously green and red - solution: it is excluded by arbitrary convention. --- VI 74 Language/Tractatus/Schulte: language disguises the thought - from the outer form one cannot infer the form of thought - it can be formed according to quite different purposes. VI 116 Language/purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: one can do anything with the language, but none of these purposes determines the nature of language. Not even such a thing as understanding or "expression of thoughts". >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Thoughts. --- Tetens VII 74 Language/facts/Tractatus/Tetens: Question: Could there also be an irreducible sign for each fact? Then no two fact-signs would have common elements (e.g. words). - Problem: then it could not be shown that an object is found in several situations. >Facts, >Signs. VII 75 Logic: would be impossible. ((s) No conclusions, no syllogisms)> fine-grained/coarse-grained. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Materialism | Searle | I 47 SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization). >Levels(Order), >Description level. I 18 ff "Eliminative materialism": eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965). I 27 Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul. It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites. Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical. I 40 SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >Monism, >dualism, >Cartesianism. What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances. I 53 Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism. I 62 Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all. >Churchland, Patricia, >Churchland, Paul. Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism. I 72 The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity. >Subjectivity. I 112 The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural! >Consciousness, cf. >Identity theory. . Paul Feyerabend (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. In: Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):49-67 2. Richard Rorty !1965). Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. In: Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):24-54 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Naming | Kripke | III 380 Designation/Kripke: designation has nothing to do with existence: wrong question: "Does ___ live on Mars?" and then insert name. ((s) The substitutional quantification: would be satisfied by name, because it refuses an ontology that goes beyond its expressions.) >Existence/Kripke. --- Kripke I 121 Designation does not create identity: Phosphorus/Hesperus has the same epistemic situation named as different celestial bodies - it is quite possible, therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Identity/Kripke, >Morning star/evening star, >Possible world/Kripke. I 134 Geach: designation reflects something important: Nixon = human (a priori). KripkeVs: e.g. Lot’s guests are Angles despite designation. Difference: there is a difference in the use of the name/designation. This is no case of indeterminacy of reference. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability of reference, >Reference/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Number Theory | Kripke | III 383f Substitutional quantification/sQ/number theory/KripkeVsWallace: the object language should be written substitutionally: the substitution class then consists of the number names: 0,0",0""... . The meta language needs a referential variable about the expressions of the object language - could we replace it with Goedel numbers? No, we cannot do this because the question was whether an ontology of numbers was used in the meta language, in addition to the ontology of expressions. We cannot even ask this question if we identify expressions with numbers. The two have asked the wrong question twice: 1) by having treated the object language variables as referential about numbers rather than as a substitutional with number names as substitutes, and 2) by interpreting the referential variables of the meta language as Goedel numbers instead of as symbol chains of the object language. Usually, identification of expressions with their Goedel numbers is harmless but here we must distinguish numbers and expressions. >Substitutional quantification, >Meta language, >Object language, >Gödel numbers, >Referential quantification. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Ontology | Searle | I 33 In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong. >Constructivism. I 40 Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle. I 78f Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else. >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 118 The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity. I 182 The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. I 183 This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following: The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. >Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object. II 68 Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation. >Representation. V 163 Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites? >Criteria. V 164 Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable. Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless. Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.) V 165 Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it. It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one. SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine). >Ontology/Quine. Stalnaker I 181 Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. >Identification principle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Paradoxes | Poundstone | I 47 Ravenparadox/Poundstone: "This herring is red" supports both contra positions: a) "All non-black things are non-ravens" and "all non-white things are non-ravens" (contra position of "All ravens are white") - it follows:. black is white - that is the paradox. I 66 Does not need to be a paradox if the number of objects is finite. >Infinity. I 175 Knowledge paradox/prisoners paradox/Poundstone: (unexpected execution) only works if the other thinks about the situation and draws wrong conclusions. >Knowledge paradox. I 192 Knowledge paradox/prisoners paradox/Quine/Poundstone: (unexpected execution) the "knowledge" here is an illusion. - The first conclusion, after which the prisoners cannot be executed on the last day is not valid. The illogical is better off: he can suspect the right. - The assumption of a specific day causes that the execution can take place on any day. Poundstone: error: the assumption when the impossible is excluded, there should remain something possible. - If the prisoner assumes the impossibility, he can be executed on any day. I 221 Thomson's lamp/Poundstone: the light turns on for 1/2 minutes, then off for 1/4 minutes, then on for 1/8 ... Total: 1. Question: is it on or off after 1 min? (Sum of infinite elements). This is the wrong question. Analog: if the greatest number is odd/even. I 228 Ultimately physical limit: frequency, energy, switchers. Cf. >Zeno, >About Zeno. I 224 Zenon/Achilles/Poundstone: Solution: overtaking after 111,111 ... cm - the "infinity" lies in Zenon's analysis, not in physics. Arrow paradox: even in the relativity theory the moment remains blurry. - Also here we believe in cause and effect: the present determines the future. >Cause, >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Determinism. How does the arrow know, where it must go? - This is no physical problem, the row term is no solution. I 236 Olbers Paradox: four times the area balances four times weaker radiation - it would heat up on earth to the average temperature of stars - solution: redshift. >Olbers Paradox. I 243 Tristram Shandy paradox/Russell/Poundstone: if he lived infinitly long, there would remain no day undescribed because there could be no day mentioned, for which it would be impossible. - A one-to-one allocation is possible but never completed. But not at reversal infinite past: you cannot make an unambiguous assignment of certain days to certain years. - In the last year he cannot have written about one day of this year, - There will be an infinitly long incomplete manuscript. >Time, >Past, >Future, >Present. I 400 Paradox/antinomy/Poundstone: general form: the illusion that all truth is also recognizable. Unexpected execution: the victim is wrong because he thinks he can achieve something through logical reasoning, which is impossible to achieve in that way. Newcomb's paradox: the one who makes the prediction, cannot know his own thoughts. >Newcomb's paradox. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Philosophy | Heidegger | Figal I 101 Philosophy/Heidegger/Figal: also according to the conception of being and time, it is a liberation from the bonds of transmitted concepts, but if this liberation no longer leads to the free attention to the beginning of history, but to the actual structure of existence, the history in its essence is no longer historical. The structure of existence exists as long as existence exists. >Dasein/Heidegger, >History/Heidegger, >History. Figal I 102 Solution: Heidegger succeeds the breakthrough in the winter term 1931/32: interpretation of the cave-parable (Politeia). Liberation from fetters, but metaphor of light (for the time), openness, permeability,"liberate." Figal I 104 Freedom/Heidegger: Being and time: existence makes free - later: light makes free. existence designs: 1. Art 2. Natural science 3. History I 107 Art/Heidegger: neither "expression of experiences" nor pleasure. Instead, "the artist has the essential focus for the possible" to bring the hidden possibilities of beings to work. Figal I 171 HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientificization. --- Cardorff II 13 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's philosophy has no subject. It does not want to organize knowledge, make no statements, but create an event with its speech. "Passion for the useless". His philosophy propagates the domination of an admittedly dialogically unlegitimate speaking. Cardorff II 36 Subject/object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. Instead: "Walten sui generis". (Walten: prevailing). VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Knowledge - Divine/Human - Vs Totality-constituting categories: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself. (HeideggerVsSchopenhauer). Cardorff II 46 Development in Heidegger's work: the process of condensation, the difference between existence and being becomes lesser; the human makes up less as something withstanding and holding to something and more and more as an executing and fitting in. The difference between being and exist (ontological difference) tends to be stronger than the inner action of being itself. Cardorff II 60 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: 1. The thing about which it is can never be guilty of an incomprehension. It reigns as it reigns. 2. Heidegger is never to blame for an incomprehension; he is much too much into the thing. 3. The reader can want to be guilty, but ultimately is never guilty, because it is not he who blocks himself, but the one who is turning away. 4. It can always be assumed that Heidegger has been looking for uncertainty. Cardorff II 69 Philosophy/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's texts draw the reader's attention, inter alia, as both meanings and meaning levels pass into one another. Heidegger is concerned with making it impossible to grasp the subject. Cardorff II 102 Heidegger: all the evaluations of his philosophy are meaningless because they come from wrong questions. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Questions | Gadamer | I 304 Question/Gadamer: The first thing that understanding begins with is (...) that something appeals to us. This is the highest of all hermeneutical conditions. We now know what is demanded by it: a fundamental suspension of one's own prejudices. All suspension of judgements, however, and therefore even more so that of prejudices, has, logically seen, the structure of the question. The essence of the question is the disclosure and keeping open of possibilities. If a >prejudice becomes questionable (...) this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the other is directly brought to the fore in its place. GadamerVsHistorism/VsObjectivism: This is rather the naivety of historical >objectivism: to assume such a relinquishment of itself. In truth, one's own prejudice is actually brought into play by the fact that it is itself at stake. Only by playing itself off it is able to experience the other person's claim to truth at all and enables him or her to play him- or herself off. Cf. >Historism, >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. Historism/Gadamer: The naivety of the so-called historism consists in the fact that it withdraws itself from such a reflection and forgets its own historicity in trusting in the methodology of its procedure. I 368 Question/Gadamer: It is obvious that in all experience the structure of the question is presupposed. One does not experience without the activity of questioning. The realization that the thing is different and not as one first believed, obviously presupposes the passage through the question, whether it is the case or not. The openness that lies in the nature of experience is, logically speaking, precisely this openness of one way or another. It has the structure of the question. And just as the dialectical negativity of experience found its perfection in the idea of a completed experience, in which we are aware of our finiteness and limitedness as a whole, so the logical form of the question and the negativity inherent in it finds its completion in a radical negativity, the knowledge of not-knowing. It is the famous Socratic docta ignorantia that opens up the true superiority of questioning in the extreme negativity of aporia. Meaning: The essence of the question is that it has meaning. But meaning is a sense of direction. The sense of the question is therefore the direction in which the answer alone can take place if it wants to be a meaningful answer. The question puts the respondent in a certain respect. The emergence of a question, as it were, breaks up the being of the respondent. The logos that unfolds this broken being is in this respect always already the answer. Socrates/Plato: One of the greatest insights that the Platonic Socrates account gives us is that asking questions is - quite contrary to the general opinion - more difficult than answering them. I 369 In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, i.e., but know that one does not know. The openness of the questioned person consists in the fact that the answer is not fixed. Every question completes its meaning only when it passes through such limbo, when it becomes an open question. Every real question requires this openness. If it lacks the same, it is basically an illusionary question that has no real meaning. But the openness of the question is not a boundless one. Rather, it includes a certain boundary through the horizon of the question. A question that lacks the same question is void. It only becomes an emergent question when the fluid indeterminacy of the direction in which it points is placed in the specific of one way or another. Wrong question: We call a question a wrong question that does not reach the open, but rather distorts the same by holding on to wrong premises. As a question, it feigns openness and decisiveness. But where the questionable is not - or not correctly - set off against the preconditions that are really fixed, there it is not really brought into the open and therefore nothing can be decided. I 370 Crooked question: We do not call it wrong, but crooked, because there is a question behind it, i.e. an open question is meant - but it is not in the direction that the question has taken. The crookedness of a question consists in the fact that the question does not really follow a direction and therefore does not allow an answer. Similarly, we say of assertions that are not entirely wrong, but also not right, that they are crooked. I 372 Idea: Every idea has the structure of the question. The idea of the question, however, is already a dive into the levelled width of the widespread opinion. (>Doxa/Plato). We also say of the question that it arises or poses itself - much rather than that we rise or ask it. Experience: We have already seen that the negativity of experience logically implies the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. See >Question and Answer/Collingwood. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Space | Field | III 35 Empty Space/Field: would be one without space-time points: senseless! - ((s) only for Platonism). >Platonism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. III 35 Space/time/Field: quantification over space-time points is something other than mere quantification over space points when a space point should be something that exists in time. Because that leads to the wrong question: whether a space point is identical to the same point in time - which in turn leads to the wrong question, if there was absolute rest. >Absolute rest, >Absoluteness, >Time. III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. Then there are no empty areas! Regions then need not be contiguous, or can be measured. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| World/Thinking | Rorty | III 21 Language/world/Rorty: the world contains reasons that our beliefs are true, but that is not to be confused with the (false) claim that a non-linguistic state of the world in itself is an example of truth. (> Metaphysics). --- III 21 Vocabularies: the world does not prefer a vocabulary before others. Newton's vocabulary makes it easier for us to describe the world than Aristotle's vocabulary, but it does not prefer it. The human self is created by vocabularies. III 21 Wrong questions: What place have values in a world of facts? - What place has the intensionality in a world of causality? - What place has the consciousness in a world of molecules? - Are colors more awareness dependent than weights? - What is the relationship between language and thought? --- IV (a) 40 ff Correct Question: (Rorty, Davidson) "Is our use of these words in the way of our use of other words?" It is about whether we use our tools well, not whether our beliefs are contradictory. Perspective/Berkeley: even mass is perspective. This leads to a dead end, that all words are perspective to the same degree with respect to human interests. >Perspective. Solution: One can question according to the correctnes of Wittgenstein's picture of the relationship language/world. Language/world/Wittgenstein: his picture of this relationship has no place for the distinction subjective/objective (important for Nagel) - or "real"/"not real" evaluation. (Michael Williams). >Subjectivity/Nagel, >Objectivity/Nagel, >Michael Williams. --- VI 51 Davidson/Dewey: we do not have the ability to distinguish the contribution provided by "the world" for a process of judgment from our own contribution. >Judgments. --- Horwich I 446 Language/world/Rorty: there is no reason why the progression of our language game should have something to do with the rest of the world. >Language game. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Epistemology | Ryle Vs Epistemology | I 53 RyleVsEpistemology: demands, often wrongly, that dispositions express themselves similarly. Since they have realized that "knowledge" and "belief" are dispositional, they think that consequently there would have to be intellectually uniform processes. E.g. Someone who believes that the earth was round, would have to recognize and judge this repeatedly from time to time. I 174f Success Words/Ryle: absurd, pointless to say: that someone finds a treasure in vain, unsuccessfully wins a race, solves a puzzle wrong, a proves sentence invalidly. For this inability is a logical inability, it says nothing about human abilities, but only that winning unsuccessfully is a contradictory expression. RyleVsEpistemology: we will see later that the longing a guaranteed error-free observation is partly stirred by the fact that we do not recognize that observation is a success verb, so that a "faulty observation" is a contradictory expression like "contradictory evidence" or "unsuccessful healing"(correct would be: unsuccessful treatment), also "inconclusive observation" or futile observation are possible. Difference: whether it is a "search" word, or a "find" word. I 177 Deception/Ryle: we call feigned motives frauds or hypocrites, feigned inclinations are called charlatans and incompetents. Synonymous with the difference of ability and inclination. Knowledge/Belief/Ryle: epistemologists like to engage their readers in the distinction between knowledge and belief. Some say the difference is merely gradual, others that knowledge contains an introspective portion which belief lacks, or vice versa. (RyleVsEpistemology). In part, their confusion is because they consider "knowledge" and "belief" incident names. I 178 But even if they are recognized as a dispositional verbs, you also have to realize that they are dispositional verbs of entirely different kind. "Knowledge" is an ability word. The person can bring something in order or condition. "Belief", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and does not mean that something is ordered or produced. I 395 VsEpistemology/Ryle: epistemologists like to compare theoretical constructions with an act of seeing through, or similar to the teaching of a theory. RyleVs: as if Euclid had been equipped beforehand for what he was equipped for after acquisition of the theory. Conversely, epistemologists describe what Euclid did in teaching his theories as something that would be a revival of the original theory work (but is not). They describe path usage as if it were path construction. I 400 ff (+) Epistemology/Mental Processes/Event/Mental State/RyleVsEpistemology: wrong question, pointless: have you made two or three premises between breakfast and lunch? Have drawn one conclusion during dessert or more? Absurd. How long does a conclusion take? Epistemology/Mental States/Assets/RyleVsEpistemology: a realization is not an episode in the life of an explorer. A special division ability or squaring ability would have been expected of epistemology. It is certainly true, because tautological, that correct expressions have their meaning, but that does not entitle to ask where and when these meanings occur. The mere fact that an expression exists to be understood by anyone, says that the meaning of an expression cannot be marked as if it were an event, or as if it belonged to an event. (...) I 409 Processes end with judgments, they are not made of them. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Various Authors | Dennett Vs Various Authors | I 87 DennettVsDavies, Paul: ("God’s plan"): the human mind cannot be an unimportant byproduct. Dennett: why should it be unimportant or trivial merely because it is a byproduct? Fallacy, error. Why can the most important thing of all not be something that has emerged from something unimportant?. I 192 DennettVsSnow: was wrong when he compared scientific discoveries with Shakespeare: Shakespeare belongs only to himself, scientific achievement belongs to all. E.g. Why is there no copyright on the successful multiplication of two numbers?. I 244 DennettVsSmolin/Parallel Universes: Problem: there are too few limitations on what should be described as obvious variations and why. I 333 GhiselinVsPangloss Principle: is bad because it asks the wrong question: the question of what is good. Instead, we should ask "What happened?". I 692 DennettVsGhiselin: he deceived himself: there is never a clear answer to this question that does not greatly depends on what we like!. General/Particular/AI/Dennett: Donald Symons: there is no "general problem solver", because there are no general problems, only particular problems. DennettVsSymons: What was that? Neither is there a general wound, but only particular wounds. Nevertheless, there is a general healing process. II 23/24 Consciousness/Language/Dennett: There is a view that certain beings could possess a consciousness, but due to their lack of language they cannot inform us about it. DennettVs: why do I think that is a problem? E.g. The computer can also be function if no printer is connected. Our royal road to getting to know the minds of others is language. It does not reach all the way to them, but that’s just a limitation of our knowledge, but not a limitation of their minds. Sai V 77 Identity/Sainbury: no vague relation. DennettVsSainsbury: identity is no relation!. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Meaning | Austin, J.L. | Graeser I 57 Meaning/Austin: Thesis: wrong question: "What is the meaning of a word?" wrong transition from the question "What is the meaning of the word cat" (ok) to the general public. One cannot ask meaningfully: "does he know the meaning of any word? There is no "general meaning", so there is no "meaning". (>Quine: mysterious "half-entity", cannot hide the disrepute of their origin). |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Explanation | Cartwright, N. | I 4 Explanation/Cartwright: thesis: is not a signpost to the truth. I 8 Forecast/Prediction/Success/Cartwright: Thesis: is no help when it comes to saying if the theory is true! I 11 Equations/Science/Physics/Cartwright: thesis: is to ask the wrong question: "What are the right equations?". Different models bring different aspects to the fore, some equations give a rough estimate, but are easier to solve. No single model serves all purposes. We apply these and other equations. Causal Explanation/Cartwright: are different from physical practice: we don't tell a causal story first, then another! I 12 Thesis: if we take the evidence seriously, we must say that the physical laws are wrong! One reason is the tension between causal and theoretical explanation. I 44 CartwrightVsTradition: Thesis: truth and explanation are two completely different functions and should be kept apart, which usually does not happen. I 44 Explanation/Deductive-Nomological Model/Hempel: Thesis: one factor explains the other if the occurrence of the second can be deductively deduced from that of the first from the laws of nature. |
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| Psych./Mental | Sellars, W. | I XXIV Sellars: Thesis: Physical and mental are not in causal relations, but belong to different worldviews. Only related by the structure of worldviews. The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrong question, how impressions and electromagnetic fields tolerate each other. |
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