Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 95 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Language | Austin | Danto I 98 Language/Austin/Danto: Thesis: There are many ways of using language other than for description. - Otherweise "Descriptive fallacy": E.g. Knowledge: "... I know" would then be an act of affirmation - not a description of an inner state. >Use, >Description, cf. >Representation, >Use theory, >Reference. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Language | Berkeley | Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsLocke: no "generalizing forces" - linguistic generalization is no generalization of mind. - Singular names do not have to give rise to the understanding of ideas. >Generalization. It is not the main purpose of language to evoke ideas. Instead: even eliciting of passion discouraging and encouraging of actions, etc. >Ideas, >Understanding. Breidert I 228ff Language/Berkeley: Philosophical errors are often explained linguistically. - Incorrect projection: the idea of a thing. Ambiguity: "something" or "a thing": is applicable to ideas or acts of will. Ideas/Berkeley: ideas of things perceived. Notion/Berkeley: concept of a mind and its activities. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Ber I W. Breidert Berkeley In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Language | Black | II 13 Languages/Black: different if speakers do not understand each other. >Understanding. II 16 Talk/Black: prevalence over writing. >Speaking, >Writing. II 20 New: no fully articulated thought possible without symbolic representation. >Representation. Words/Malinowski: the same part and equivalents of the action. >Actions, >Words. II 31 Language/Black: Text linear - thinking nonlinear. >Texts, >Thinking. II 30 Linguistics/Black: the tradition boasts about not considering the "impure meaning". II 63 BloomfieldVsTradition: phonemes must be compared with respect to meaning - only if the examiner finds out which statements are similar and which different in their meaning, he can learn to recognize the phonemic differences. Nevertheless, Bloomfiled per purely formal linguistics/per Ockham: meanings should not be used without need. One should rather rely on differences in meaning than on substantive meaning details. II 74f Language/Black: an infinite number of sentences is possible. - Therefore language is an open system like e.g., chess, chemical compositions, tunes. ((s) For the discussion whether there are infinitely many possible sentences, see >Researchgate.) II 87 Def Language/Black: too complex to be definable - Features: anchored in speech - speech act is targeted and self-regulating. Language is an institution (language community) - system built on units - meaning supporting, effect triggering, pliable II 130 Language/Locke/Black: for transmission of thoughts - (ideas). >Thoughts, >Imagination. II 161 VsLanguage/Berkeley: knowledge is confused and obscured through abuse. Locke: ditto. Whitehead: incomplete, only a transitional stage. Risk: false confidence in them. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Examples from literature: Swift: Gulliver: abolition of all words ... II 166 Sartre: disgust: Roquentin wants to withdraw into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Brandom | I 238 Language/Brandom: linguistic skills consist of reliable disposition to respond differently to stimuli - more is not necessary. >RDRDs. I 648 You cannot describe a language coherently in which expressions are used demonstratively, but not pronominally. (vice versa it is possible). >Pronouns. I 519 Language/Infinite/Brandom: if there are correct and incorrect uses of phrases that are formed for the first time, there must be some kind of extrapolation. Substitution: if two sentences are substitutional variants, then they are applications of the same function. >Substitution. I 545 Language/Richness/Expressiveness/Brandom: if the language is expressively rich, there must be no asymetrical SMSICs for substitutable expressions (singular terms). >SMSICs, >Singular terms. This would mean that (Vs): for every sentential frame Pa, whenever the interence from Pt to Pt" is correct, but not vice versa, there was a sentence frame P"a in a way that the inference from P"t" to P"t was correct, but not vice versa! It would be impossible to codify inferences in such a language. I 815 Language/Brandom: There are not so many words - the language would be poor if they all had the same meaning in the mouths of different speakers. - Speakers who do not accept the same definition cannot assign every assertion de dicto - E.g. "that scoundrel". >de dicto, >de re. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Language | Carnap | II 203 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. In them he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of" etc. Then he constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to meet certain conditions. The most important one: the logical nature of the elements of this language system must not depend on a non-linguistic factor. That means that relationships are not readily determinable in natural languages, where pronouns like "I" or "this" occur. >Demonstratives, >Pronouns, >Logical proper names, >Definability. II 204 Language/Carnap: 1) object sentences: affect an object from the exact sciences - 2) synthetic sentences: the formal traits of symbols. >Symbols. II 205 3) pseudo-object sentences: E.g. "Five is not an object, but a number" - the contentual manner of speech: Pseudo object sentences. >Material speech. Formal phraseology parallel syntactic sentences. >Formal speech. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Language | Chomsky | I 279ff Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". >Belief, >Knowledge. --- II 319 Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. >Theory. II 330 Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics. - Several analytical hypotheses are not only possible but necessary. >Analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: language is rather associated with actions. VsQuine: it is not evident that similarities can be localized in a room. - Principles, not "learned sentences". >Principles, >Similarity, >Reference. II 333 VsQuine: language cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential. II 343 Perhaps language does not have to be taught. --- Graeser I 121f Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite. >Communication, >Representation. Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them. Meaning/VsGrice: we can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. --- Münch III 320 Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: language is not a natural kind. >Natural kinds. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Language | Cresswell | II 42 Def Language/Cresswell: (in this book): a syntactically specified system of symbols, to which a semantic interpretation can be given. >Semantics, >Interpretation, >Systems, >Syntax, >Symbols, >Meaning, >Code, >Translation, >Word Meaning, >Sentence Meaning, >Subsententials, >Sense, >Communication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Language | Davidson | I (e) 113 Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them. >Rules, >Conventions, >Explanation. Glüer II 54 Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim. Rorty II 21 Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works." DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation. Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (These are rather provisional theories). There are no conventions how we communicate! Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance. Brandom I 922 Language/Davidson: is merely practical, hypothetical necessity, convenient for the community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations. >Content, >Propositional content, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation. Brandom I 518 Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up. Glüer II 51 Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - this ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language. >Truth theory. Brandom I 454 Language/Davidson/Rorty: is not a conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world. >Conceptual scheme. Rorty III 33 Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?" - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?" >Use. Rorty VI 133 Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs")(1): there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized. Seel III 28 Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them. VsMentalese/language of thought: does not exist. - Language is a part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. >Mentalese. Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow. Medium/Gadamer: is not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought. 1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Language | Dennett | I 269 Evolution/molecules/origin of life/Monod/Dennett: "Language" of DNA and its "readers" have gone through a common evolution. Neither works alone. ((s) See T. Deacon on >language and >brain.) I 474 Culture/Language/Dennett: For culture we need language, but language must first develop for its own reasons (because of the impossibility of foreseeing evolution). >Culture. I 516 Animal/Language: is it true, do dolphins and chimpanzees have some kind of language? So you can also call music and politics a kind of language. >Animal language. I 517 Language/Intelligence/Dennett: To what extent does language contribute to intelligence? Which forms of thinking require language? I 528 Language/Darwin: "Prerequisite for the development of long thoughts": Decisive for planning and persevering with long projects. II 23/24 Consciousness/Language/Dennett: There is a view that certain beings may have consciousness, but for lack of language cannot communicate it to us. DennettVs: Why do I think this is problematic? For example, the computer can calculate even if no printer is connected. Our ideal way to get to know the spirit of others is language. It does not reach as far as you, but that is only a limitation of our knowledge, not a limitation of your mind. >Theory of mind. II 185 Think/Human/Dennett: Also we humans do not think many things, brush our teeth, tie our shoes, etc. We even answer questions without thinking. We call fleeting processes that last longer and gain more and more influence thoughts. Some of the (previously existing) mental content gains more influence through language. II 190 Language/thinking/Dennett: Thesis: There is no thinking without language. Cf. >Psychological theories on Language and Thought. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Dummett | I 11 ff Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto). Husted IV 448 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: Language is not an idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Two Dogmas/Dummett). 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition". 2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use". McDowell I 152 Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary. Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. ((s) Cf. >Gadamer.) Dummett III (b) 81 Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences. III (c) 145 Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them. III (c) 150 The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. Horwich I 461 Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) > satisfaction ,not >making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". (1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Evans | Dummett I 11 Language/Evans: Language explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! Modes of thinking are explained by language! (Frege ditto). Language/Evans/Dummett: Gareth Evans argues that language can only be explained with the help of terms for different types of thoughts that are considered independent of their linguistic expression. In his book "Varieties of reference" Evans attempts to analyse different ways of thinking about an object independently of language, in order to then explain different linguistic means of reference with the help of these ways of thinking about the object. DummettVsEvans: therefore Evans is no longer an analytical philosopher for me. Analytical philosophy emerged as soon as the "turn to language" was complete. Earliest example Freges Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884. Example numbers: How can we be given a number if we can't have an idea of it? Frege's answer is based on his well-known contextual principle. However, this is formulated as the defining principle of an exploration of language, not as a guideline for investigating modes of thought (as Evans suggests). DummettVsEvans: If thinking about an object existed only when we think something specific in relation to that object, Frege's answer would have been that the numbers are given by the fact that we capture complete thoughts about them. Context principle: Words only have meaning in a sentence. (Frege: "meaning"). Dummett: For Frege, an epistemological question (which is based on an ontological one) is to be answered by a language-related investigation. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Language | Field | Avramides I 113 Belief/Meaning/FieldVsReductionism: (VsReductive Griceans): it is circular, to want to explain the semantic properties by believe. (This also says the reductionism.) >Semantic properties. Field like Grice: one can explain believe without reference to the sentence. Solution: what makes a symbol a symbol for Caesar is the role in my learning. Field: then there can be no inner language without a public language. SchifferVsField: no problem: Grice (intention based semantics, IBS) does not need to assume that propositional attitudes have been acquired before the public language. Both goes hand in hand. Only there is no logical dependence between them (and to competence). >Intention-based semantics. Armstrong: both are logically connected. ((s) This is stronger than Schiffer's thesis.). >Propositions/Schiffer, >David Armstrong, >Stephen Schiffer. --- Soames I 481 Language/Truth-Definition/Field/Soames: when truth is defined non-semantically (i.e., speaker-independent, i.e. non-physical), language becomes an abstract object. It has its characteristics essentially. >Scott Soames. With other properties, it would be a different language - that is, it could not have been shown that the expressions could have denoted anything else. Then it is still contingent on language, which language a person speaks. But the semantic properties (truth, reference, applying) are not contingent. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Language | Fodor | II 120 Language infinite: ((s) = thesis that there are infinitely many sentences of a natural language): Fodor pro: in any case, artificial production is possible: 1) by a complete grammar, 2) by descriptions, which have a semantic influence on the grammatical forms (e.g. if an adjective is syncategorematic), and 3) by a process that finds out, which of several dictionary entries is true. >Grammar, >Lexicon, >Descriptions. ((s) For the question whether there are infinitely many sentences in a natural language, see the discussion here.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language | Goodman | IV 22 Language/Goodman: systems must not be equated with language. Languages have alphabets, pictorial systems do not. >Systems, >Representations. IV 23 Notations are semantically disjoint. Languages and representational systems are not. In addition, languages and representational systems allow unlimited fine distinctions, notations do not. Refinements are at the expense of certainty. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Language | Habermas | Rorty II 94 Language/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of confidence levels. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Rorty II 94/95 Rorty: if we cease to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy dissolves between reason and feeling. >Authority, >Reason, >I. Kant, >Reason/Kant, >Plato. Rorty II 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" is only useful if one can find a natural, transcultural relevance relation. >Argumentation, >Ultimate justification. --- Habermas IV 41 Language/Habermas: we have to choose between a) Language as a medium of communication and b) Language as a medium for the coordination of action and socialization of individuals between them. IV 42 The formation of identities and the emergence of institutions can be imagined in such a way that the extra-linguistic context of behavioral dispositions and behavioral schemas is, so to speak, linguistically permeated, i.e. symbolically structured. >Identity/Henrich, >Institutions. IV 43 Language functions as a medium not of understanding and the transmission of cultural knowledge, but of socialisation and social integration. These processes do not sediment themselves, like communication processes, in cultural knowledge, but in the symbolic structures of self and society, in competencies and relationship patterns. >Cultural tradition/Habermas, >Background/Habermas, >Competence, >Capabilities. The signal language develops into a grammatical speech, as the medium of communication simultaneously moves away from the symbolically structured self of the interaction participants and the society condensed into normative reality. >Signal language. IV 100 Language/medium/socialization/Habermas: Speech acts are only a suitable medium of social reproduction if they can simultaneously assume the functions of tradition, social integration and socialization of individuals. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act They can only do this if the propositional, illocutionary and expressive elements are integrated into a grammatical unit in each individual speech action in such a way that the semantic content does not break down into segments but can be freely converted between the components. >Content, >Semantic content. IV 135 Religion/Holy/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the propositional elements are combined with the illocutionary and expressive elements in such a way that the semantic content can fluctuate between them. Everything that can be said can also be represented as a statement. This makes it clear to oneself what a connection of religious world views to communicative action means. The background knowledge goes into the situation definitions (...). >Religion/Habermas, >Holiness/Durkheim. Since the semantic contents of sacred and profane origin fluctuate freely in the medium of language, there is a fusion of meanings: the moral-practical and expressive contents are combined with the cognitive-instrumental in the form of cultural knowledge. This is a) as cultural knowledge - b) as a basis for instrumental action. This latter makes religion a world view that demands totality. >Background/Habermas. IV 273 Language/media/control media/communication media/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas). Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Control media, >Communication media. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Hacking | I 228 Language/Hacking: thesis: language was invented out of boredom, to tell each other jokes around the campfire. (The thesis goes back to the Leakey family). Thesis: the first word that was needed was something to express: "real", e.g. "No, not this, but this here is real": The rest could be pointed at. >"Real"/Austin, >Reference, >Pointing. Even before the name (for absent objects) was available one needed logical constants. >Logical constants. Instead of "Me Tarzan, you Jane": "This real". Once a way of representing is found (e.g. pointing), it is followed by a second-order term. >Representation. VsHacking: it is pointless to set up a theory that cannot be confirmed. >Method. >Language evolution. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Language | Harman | Chomsky I 306 Language/Harman: because language is obviously not a "knowing-that", it must be a "knowing-how". >Knowledge, >Knowledge how, >Propositional knowledge, >Competence, >Performance, >Language acquisition. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internal system for the selection of a grammar should be presented in a more fundamental language that would already have to be understood by the child. >Grammar, >VsChomsky. ChomskyVsVs: there is perhaps a more fundamental language, but the child does not have to speak it. The child has to learn the native language, but maybe it already actually masters a grammar. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Language | Heidegger | Figal I 123 Language/HeideggerVsHerder: There is no general language. >Language/Foucault, Language/Davidson. --- Cardorff II 29 Language/Translation/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger is deliberately vague. Cardorff II 65 Language/Thinking/Heidegger/Cardorff: "Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the human. It does not do and effect this reference. Thinking merely offers him what is given to himself by being, to being. In thinking, being is expressed. Language is the house of being." Language/Heidegger: In its essence neither expression nor an activity of human. The language speaks. >Thinking, >Thinking/Heidegger, >World/Thinking, >Thinking without language, >Language use, >Sein/Heidegger, >Language evolution. 1. M. Heidegger. Über den Humanismus. Frankfurt/M. 1943, S. 51. M. Heidegger. Über den Humanismus. Frankfurt/M. 1943, p. 5 |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Language | Kripke | Rorty II 130f Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the concept "language" - then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary ones (VsLocke) but it was this precise thesis that was resurrected by Kripke’s revolution against Wittgenstein (KripkeVsLinguistic Turn). >Positivism, >Linguistic turn, >Consciousness, >Ideas, >Experience. --- III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": a language must not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the "first language". Cf. >Language acquisition. III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: we just have to demand that only a finite number of axioms includes "new" vocabulary (weaker). >Axioms/Kripke. III 397 Language/infinite/Kripke: if the domain D is countable, the infinite sequences which can be formed from its objects are non-countable and therefore cannot be mapped on to D one-to-one. They can therefore ((s) in the meta language) not even be coded and therefore not be reduced. >Meta language. Even then there may be nothing in the vocabulary of the meta language that is sufficient. >Are there infinitely many possible sentences?. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Kuhn | Rorty III 26 Kuhn/Rorty: Our decision was not based on observations with telescopes that the earth is not the center of the universe but it was reflected in a manner of speaking that was taken for granted. --- Kuhn I 156 Language/Science/Kuhn: There can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts. >Observation language, >Observation, >Measuring, Kuhn I 203 Language/Kuhn: Nature and words are learned together. Polanyi: "silent knowledge" - L is acquired through scientific activity and not by acquisition of rules. >Rules. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Lewis | Avramides I 75 Definition language/Lewis: assigns meaning to noise or sign strings - Possible language/Loar: abstract entity which must still be referred to the speaker. --- Loar I 158 Language/Lewis: all possible sentences known in sense diviso, not in sensu composito - ((s) It is not about not learning complete sentences from memory, but known components.) - the building blocks, not the finished structure. --- Lewis II 202 Language/Lewis: thesis: the Convention according to which L is used in the population P is a convention of truthfulness and trust in L. >Convention/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 70 Language/infinite/Lewis: if sentences are finite sign strings from a finite alphabet, there are no more than Aleph1 many sets of sentences, as many as there are real numbers. - But there are many more ways in which a world could have been - at least Aleph2. --- I (b) 28ff Language: It is a popular exercise to reshape a language so that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of predicates. It is just as easy to reshape it in a way that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of names. (Assuming the logical vocabulary includes a copula). This name could be designated by individuals, quantities, properties, types, states, relationships, sizes, phenomena, etc. But they are still names. If we had that, we could replace all theoretical terms by variables of the same sort. I (b) 33 ff If an individual usually deviates, it is no longer part of the usual observation language. --- II 228 f E.g. Assume a population of notorious liars who are often untrue. In this case, there would not even exist regularity. - LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population. The normal use of language in this case is far from being determined. I deny that the entire population uses the language L, but it would be possible that every single liar uses L! Provided that he falsely believes himself to be a member of a population, in which a convention of truthfulness and trust in L exists. II 229 Irony/Ironist: these people are actually true in L. However, they are not true in the literal sense in L! That means that they are true in another language associated with L, which we can call "literally-L". Between L and "literally-L" there is this relation: a good way to describe L is to first determine literally-L and then to describe L itself as a lanugage that resulted from certain discrepancies. This two-step determination of L may be much simpler than any direct determination of L. II 240 There is only one philosophy of language. Language and languages are complementary. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Language | Loar | Avramides I 75 Def possible language/Loar: abstract entity, which must still be based on a speaker. Loar II 146 Language/Loar: Community based. - Therefore intensions are important -> quantification into the semantic content of sentences. >Language community, >Language use, >Intensions, >Content. Problem: the p-position in the Tarski scheme only allows extensions. >Tarski scheme. Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the sentence components are a function of the propositional attitudes of the speakers. >Propositional attitudes, >Semantic properties, >Sentences, >Compositionality. II 149 Language/Loar: maybe a function of sentences on sentence-like intentions (which in turn are functions of possible worlds on truth values). >Truth values, >Possible worlds, >Intentions. Loar: Language is always relative to a community - not reducible to logical and syntactic terms. - Factual use is decisive, so psychological terms come into play. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Language | Locke | Black II 130 Language/Locke/Black: to transmit thoughts - (>ideas). --- Euchner I 33 Language/Locke: 1. recording 2. communication of thoughts 3. ease and speed of communication. Language also is a prerequisite for society. >Communication, >Society. --- Euchner I 170 Language/Locke/Euchner: today: Locke fails to recognize the irreducible linguistic basics of empirical perception - but the correction has already been created: to include also abstract and general ideas among the empirically given, of which each reconstruction of knowledge must start. >Idea/Locke, >Perception/Locke, >Perception/today's theories, >Reality/today's theories, >Language/today's theories. --- Arndt II 181 Language/knowledge/LockeVsPascal/VsPort Royal/Arndt: 1. no necessary relations between concepts 2. It is not clear how their content determination leads to mind independent objects. Language/Descartes/Pascal: subsequent codifying of objects. Locke: actual constitution of objects. II 183 Linguistic expression/Locke: "nodes" in which ideas, summarized in the mind, find their stable expression. We must refrain from words and look at meanings. - But the ideas are something almost finished. Arndt: problem: then indicators more representative than synthetically. Words: signify directly the idea, objects only indirectly. II 188 Ideas/meaning/Locke: analysis of ideas identical to the analysis of the meanings - language: not only a means of communication but also of knowledge. Clarity/LockeVsDescartes: in his view bound to naming. Presupposes the possibility of clear signification. II 199 Language: is signifier at the same time and presupposes objectivity. II 206 Language/Locke: is already finished: no one creates the abstract idea "fame" before he has heard the name. - So independence of the mixed modes of the existence of the signified - thus one can understand names before they were applied to existing things (!) E.g. So punishments can be established for not yet committed acts. Punch line: dependence on community is result of the independence of the existence of the signified. Translation: problem: nominal essence: change from community to community. Language ultimately relates to particular therefore we learn name first. >Translation, >Names. --- Saussure I 34 Language/Locke: These words are signs of ideas in consciousness - ideas in turn are signs for objects outside of consciousness. >Signs, >Words. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Language | Logic Texts | Read III 212f Wittgenstein/early: claimed that there are no vague expressions. What we think needs to be sharp. Where Frege and Russell were searching for an ideal language, Wittgenstein argued that our language had to be already perfect. His argument: "it would be strange if human society would have spoken so far, without forming a correct sentence." >Ideal language, >Meaning, >Reference, >Ambiguity, >Correctness, >Everyday language, >Language and thought, >World/Thinking. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Language | Luhmann | AU Cas 6 Language/Luhmann: language excludes much to include little. Through this it may get complex itself. - Most sounds are not eligible. - Relatively few simple characters in complex linkage. >Form/Luhmann, >Order/Luhmann, >Structure/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 12 Language/structural coupling/psychological/social systems/Luhmann: language is here the mechanism of structural coupling. >Structural coupling. Language: twice: a) mentally b) communicative 1. Also, foreign languages, are easily distinguishable from meaningless noise. Language draws attention to itself - and not to the meaning! 2. Language fixes meaning. - (> Storage, transport). Because language is structural coupling, it is not a system. >System/Luhmann, >Communication/Luhmann. Language does not have an own operational way. >Operation/Luhmann. So no linguistic operation which would not be communication or non-linguistic thinking. - language itself is not communication. - One needs a few participants and an understanding. --- AU Cass 12 Language/Luhmann: that it also has aspects of action (e.g. trigger opposition), is a secondary phenomenon. Operation: The appropriate language operation is communication or comprehending sense. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Language | Maturana | I 56 Language/Maturana: orientation behavior - not denotative. - Otherwise its evolution is not comprehensible. - It would otherwise presuppose denotation. >Language evolution, >Denotation, >Behavior. Language/Maturana: is connotative: Orientation in the cognitive domain - no reference to entities. >Reference, >Operation/Maturana. I 58 No transmitting information. - There is nothing transferred from one organism to another. Instead: influencing an orientation. >Information, >Communication. I 91 Instead: preparation of a reference frame. >Reference systems. I 59 "Message": it is still up to the listener how he orientates himself - in orientation behavior no distinction semantics/syntax possible. I 126 Language/Maturana: must arise as a result from anything else! The fundamental process is the coupling of ontogenetic structures, which leads to the development of a consensual area. >Structural coupling. I 198 Language/coverage/cover/Maturana: with action one makes distinction - with that the act turns into a consensual sign. - So the distinction is covered. >Operation/Maturana. E.g. Object/Subject: arises as a consensual coordination of actions - it covers the action and makes it invisible. - Objects cover actions. - Objects are not given before language. >Objects, >Ontology. I 199 Language: no abstraction but physically. Transmission/symbolization/meaning/denotation: these are always secondary for the observer. >Observation, >Symbols, >Signs, >Meaning, >Denotation. I 255 Language/Maturana: outside language we cannot distinguish anything. - Not even ourselves. - Language presupposes neurophysiology, is therefore no neurophysiological phenomenon itself. Words: = distinctions. >Words, >Word meaning. I 261 Language does not operate with symbols - (these refer to something independent). Signs/sounds/gestures: do not constitute words by themselves - and strings of signs do not constitute language action. Language: coordination of actions. I 282 Object in brackets: considers language as a biological phenomenon. - Changes of structural dynamics are observable. >Objectivity/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | McDowell | I 153 Language/Dummett: 1. Tool of communication, 2. Carrier of meaning. None should be primary. Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primary language is a source of tradition. (McDowell pro Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. >Language acquisition, >Language/Gadamer, >Second nature, >Communication, >Language/Dummett. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Language | McGinn | I 186 Language: from our ability to learn the native language very quickly, does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of learning ability. Reason: as in other areas, the language ability is probably designed modular. There is no reason to believe that our reasoning ability is able to see through the operation of these modules. I 187 There is no reason to believe that we even possess a second-level cognition, which grasps the first level performance. I 232 Gene/McGinn: must include a marking of human grammar, so as to generate an innate language ability. (> Chomsky). Whether linguistics could read this genetic information one day, depends on whether the reason is able to give an account of what represents the genes already, and that is not necessarily true. It could be that the grammatical encryption does not happen de dicto, but only de re. But probably de dicto if the physical realization of the same grammatical properties may vary in different organisms. --- II 53 McGinn pro Chomsky: pro innate language modules. >Chomsky. II 71 Our language is useless when it comes to see the world as it is, as the eye cannot speak. E.g. functional analysis: what makes the kidney efficient as a filter system, it makes it as inefficient as the pumping system at the same time. >Functionalism, >Functional explanation. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Language | Nagel | I 57 NagelVsprimacy of language: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytic philosophy. >Linguistic turn, >Analytic philosophy. Rejection of Frege. Thinking is often not linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. >Thinking without language. I 57 If language reveals principles of thought, this is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar follows a logic. >Logic, >Grammar, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 61 That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no concequences for the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. >Heterophenomenology. Nagel thesis: the sources of philosophy are preverbal, their problems are not dependent on culture. Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsWittgenstein: (according to Rorty): the limits of language are not the limits of thinking! "The content of some thoughts goes beyond any form that they may take in human consciousness." (Per distinction scheme/content). >Scheme/content. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Peacocke | II 166 Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. >Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary. ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation. Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism. II 168 Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme T(s) ↔ p plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences. >Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction. II 171 Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. >Prima facie, >Evidence. II 168 Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention, >Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer. Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker. II 175 Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond. >Truth conditions, >Conjunction. Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p. >Conventions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Language | Pinker | I 94 Language/thinking/Pinker: we do not think in our mother tongue. Language of thought/mentalese. I 451 PinkerVsWhorf: the English have no word for gloating, but they know exactly what is meant. - All the strange feeling words can be acquired. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Vocbulary, >Language and thought, >World/thinking. Margeret Mead: thesis: the people of Samoa are dispassionate. PinkerVsMead: unbelievable - Derek FreemanVsMead: debunked this as misrepresentation. >Margaret Mead. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Language | Prior | I 106 Def well-organized language/Prior: here the overall sentence has no meaning if a clause has no meaning. >Clauses, >Sentences, >Meaning, >Reference. E.g. The name "Baf" shall specify the blackening of the paper: (clause) "something that means x is true" if that does not mean that it is wrong, then it means nothing at all. Solution: a set must be able to have multiple meanings at the same time. >Buridan: truth. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Language | Putnam | Rorty I 323 Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language is seen as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language. Cf. >Language evolution, >Language acquisition, >Understanding, >Intentionality. --- Horwich I 457 Language/Putnam: if language is only noise, then it is nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. Instead: correctness makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities. (Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994.) --- Putnam III 124 Language/intensional/Davidson: e.g. the new minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. This is similar to the use of color predicates. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Language | Rorty | I 16ff Mirror: Language is a tool and not a mirror (Rorty like Wittgenstein). I 206 Language: the particularity of the language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens new perspectives to the consciousness". Its acquisition rather gives us access to a community whose members justify their assertions before each other. >Language community, >Community, >Justification. I 228 Rorty: we can pursue Quine’s goals without useing his resources: we admit that the world can be fully described in a truth-functional language, but at the same time we also admit that parts of it can be described in an intensional language as well. >Truth functions, Intensions. If we were not able to refer to intentions, we would still be able to describe any section of the world. III 25 Vocabularies: the world does not prefer one vocabulary over others. Newton’s vocabulary makes it easier for us to describe the world than that of Aristotle, but it does not prefer it! The human self is created by vocabularies. >Vocabulary, >Self, >World. III 41 Rorty’s thesis: seeing the history of the language and thus of the arts, sciences and the history of morality as a metaphor is to abolish the image in which consciousness or language are always better suited for purposes that God or nature have imposed. Consciousness just happened in evolution, it’s not something at which the whole process was aimed. >Teleology, >Consciousness. III 156 Language: people want to be described in their own terms. III 190 Language/noise/sound/Heidegger/Rorty: for him, philosophical truth depended on the choice of phonemes, the sound of the words themselves. >Phonemes, >Language/Heidegger, >Truth/Heidegger, >Heidegger. III 197 Primordial words/RortyVsHeidegger: such words would be completely useless for people who do not share Heidegger’s associations. III 190 Writing/speech/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: Derrida puts Heidegger upside down: insists on the "priority of the written word". Writing instead of sounds - Thought should become poet-like. "The language speaks". >Writing, >Derrida |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Searle | III 78 Language/language-dependent/Searle: some things can be viewed independent of language: E.g. that the man crossed the line - but not that he makes 6 points with this. Institutional facts are never language independent, e.g. there is no pre-verbal way to represent the pawn as king. (Game) points are not "out there" like men and balls. SearleVsPutnam: > meanings are in the head, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Meaning/Putnam. III 79 Reasons only work because people accept them as reasons. Language independent: are status functions: e.g. one can think that this is a screwdriver because one has seen many times that things are screwed with it. ((s) QuineVsSearle: the network of our beliefs is thoroughly language-dependent.) III 82 Searle: language is necessary if the status changes without a change of the physical state of an object. --- Perler I 143 Language/Searle: language is needed for: 1. intentional states that deal with language, 2. intentional states that deal with facts, e.g. that this is a dollar note, 3. representation of spatially and temporally distant facts, 4. complex states and 5. formulations that contain descriptions, e.g. instead of "today it is warm" the date. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Language | Sellars | Rorty VI 184 Language/world/Sellars/Rorty: Thesis: everything is linguistic. VsSellars: most frequent objection: small children and dogs also have pain without being able to talk about it. >Psychological Nominalism, >Concept/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars, >Pain. Rorty VI 185 Language/Sellars: cannot be verified on the base of non-liguistical things. Rorty: Therefore, the utility is only interesting for pragmatism. >Pragmatism. --- Sellars I 81ff "Our Rylean ancestors" E.g. Primitive language vocabulary for public properties of public goods, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification, and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, vagueness and openness. >Rylean ancestors. SellarsVs: an intersubjective language, must be a Rylean language: that rises from a too simple image of the relationship of intersubjective speech and public objects. >Thinking/Sellars. --- Brandom II 72 Language/Sellars/Brandom: there are languages without theoretical terms - just some terms need to have non-reporting use, so that some may have reporting use. >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Language | Strawson | Meg I 297 Lie/Lying/Strawson: a lie is no correct use of a language. Strawson VII 114 Language/Strawson: two types of conventions: 1st Reference Rules: "About what". >Identification. 2nd attribution rules: "What do you say about it" >Predication. StrawsonVsLocke: the difference was not clear to Locke. Reference: it requires circumstances, time, location, etc. >Reference, >Circumstances, >Time, >Localisation, >Space/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Language | Tugendhat | I 478 Language/Reference/Tugendhat: direct reference by ostension is no language. >Ostensive definition, >Reference, >Pointing. I 479 the demonstrative "here": the reference to all others is already posited. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Language | Wittgenstein | Rorty III 40 Wittgenstein: naturalizes consciousness and language, in which all questions about relations to the universe are transformed in causal questions. (Also Ryle and Dennett). >Causality, >Causal relation, cf. >Naturalism. --- Rorty VI 134 Language/Wittgenstein: You cannot find a method with which it is possible to step between the language and the object. >Reality, >World, >Perception. --- Hintikka I 22 Language/ontology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one cannot specify in the language, how many objects there are. - These are given by name. - ((s) one can well give a list - Wittgenstein: The existence of an object cannot be expressed - only through the use of the name in the language. >Use, >Names. I 41 Language relativism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Could a lion talk, we would not understand him." (I 323 Hintikka: a lion has other sensory data) - Hintikka: in mathematics, there is no "common behavior". - In different systems different sentences are true and false. >Truth values. I 190 Basic physical language/explanation/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "metaphysics" - (> Large typescript) - Instead: phenomenology is grammar. - E.g. one should not decide whether two red circles on a blue background are two objects or one. - Each transcription must depend on the one of the first sentence. - Uncertainty about the grammar - Hintikka: a) the objects are the colors - b) the objects are the spots. - Both phenomenological. - Both are secondary to the language of physical objects and their properties. - Wrong question: how many objects are there. >Grammar, >Metaphysics. WittgensteinVsPhenomenology: this wanted to decide how many objects there are. I 255 Language/Wittgenstein/Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242/Hintikka: language is not a calculus. - It has no concrete defined rules - not that the rules were vague - but the question arises only in the context of language games. >Language game, >Rules. --- II 60 Language/signal/Wittgenstein: E.g. resolution characters in music: is a signal in the strict sense. - Language does not consist of signals. - A signal must be explained. - In the same sense as colors. - In addition to the color word "green" we still need something extra. II 226f Language/Wittgenstein: there are actually no gaps in our language - even if there are not enough words to describe the changes of the sky. - It is also not a shortage of our vision that we cannot count the raindrops. - Also impossibility can be expressed - E.g. that an object would be simultaneously green and red - solution: it is excluded by arbitrary convention. --- VI 74 Language/Tractatus/Schulte: language disguises the thought - from the outer form one cannot infer the form of thought - it can be formed according to quite different purposes. VI 116 Language/purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: one can do anything with the language, but none of these purposes determines the nature of language. Not even such a thing as understanding or "expression of thoughts". >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Thoughts. --- Tetens VII 74 Language/facts/Tractatus/Tetens: Question: Could there also be an irreducible sign for each fact? Then no two fact-signs would have common elements (e.g. words). - Problem: then it could not be shown that an object is found in several situations. >Facts, >Signs. VII 75 Logic: would be impossible. ((s) No conclusions, no syllogisms)> fine-grained/coarse-grained. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Language | Wright | I 280 Language is not a mere clothing of thought. We have no contact to the wordless thought that P. Thoughts have to be mediated symbolically. >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >World/thinking, >Symbols, >Communication, >Language use, >Language community, >Understanding. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Language | Allen | I 333 Language/Evolution/Allen/Saidel: to what extent can different functions of language be separated from each other and be proved in different phylogenetic groups? a) harder line: (stronger separation of man and animal): Homology (common precursors) is necessary, homoplasia (convergent evolution) is not sufficient. Vs: that's premature. Although homology provides more evidence of a common historical path, but also Homoplasia provides relevant information: it presupposes a similar selection pressure. It can also uncover general principles. I 335 Language/Evolution/Allen/Saidel: if they are to be homologous, there must have been a common ancestor with the disposition to it. I 336 To answer this, one needs comparative work on people, apes, monkeys and nonprimates. I 339 Animal/Species/Reference/Allen/Saidel: E.g. Seyfarth, warning calls from long-tailed monkeys offspring must be confirmed (repeated) by adults so that they are taken seriously by the others.(1) I 340 Shared attention/language/animal/Allen/Saidel: if it is present, the utterances of humans and adult animals maintain the same relations to the objects of attention. >Reference, >Animals, >Animal language. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. |
Allen I Colin Allen Eric Saidel "The Evilution of Reference", in: The Evolution of Mind, C. Allen and D. Dellarosa Cummins (Eds.) Oxford 1998, pp. 183-203 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Aristotle | Gadamer I 436 Language/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle criticizes Speusipp's doctrine of the common as well as Plato's dihairetic dialectic from his ideal of proof: As far as science sets up the compelling of proof as ideal, it must go beyond such procedures. Cf. >Analogies/Speusippus. But the consequence of this measurement against the logical ideal of proof is that Aristotelian criticism has robbed the logical performance of language of its scientific legitimacy. It now only finds recognition under the aspect of rhetoric, where it is understood as the art medium of metaphor. Categorization: It is the logical ideal of the superordination and subordination of concepts that now dominates the living metaphorics of language, on which all natural concept formation is based. For only a grammar directed towards logic will distinguish the actual meaning of the word from its transferred meaning. What originally forms the basis of the life of language and constitutes its logical productivity - the ingenious and inventive finding of commonalities through which things are ordered - is now pushed to the margin as the metaphor and instrumentalized to a rhetorical figure. >Meaning/Ancient Philosophy. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Benjamin | Bolz II 13 Language/Benjamin: language is not primarily a means of communication, but the medium in which the world is revealed to us. >World/thinking, >World, >Thinking. Bolz II 41 Language/Benjamin: BenjaminVsEquality of language and communication: Language is not pronouncing thoughts. >Communication, >Thoughts. There is nothing that is not in some sense language. Bolz II 42 Language/Benjamin: Form of all existing, all existing communicates. The communication through the word is only a special case of language. But this does not mean that the mental being is identical with the linguistic communication.(1) >Communication, >Mind, >Being, >Words. Language: there is an unbreakable contrast between linguistic and mental being. The language communicates itself.(2) We must distinguish between "thing" and "language thing". Language: language is not identical with "language at all". >Description levels, >Levels/Order. Bolz II 44 Language/Hamann: "Language is the mother of reason and revelation, its most important thing". >Reason. Names: Jewish custom: everyone has a secret name. >Names, >Judaism. Bolz II 56 Language/Benjamin: Grief and melancholy make speechless, but precisely this speechlessness can represent the essence of language. 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 140 2. Ebenda. S. 145ff |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Language | Brentano | II 264 Language/Brentano/Hedwig: their analysis includes "multiple knowledge". Clarity of language is an expression of the clarity of knowledge. VsBrentano: unclear how the reistic language of the philosopher could become the language of the lifeworld. Cf. >Psychological theories on Language and Thought. II 265 Brentano, however, is concerned with the reverse process. Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 |
| Language | Bubner | K.Glüer Davidson zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 I 122 Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental system of signs whose objective reference is still up for discussion, ... Language has no other function, than to make the world accessible." --- Bubner I 200 Subjectivity/Bubner: after replacing the practice of connecting ethics and politics, the practical concretion is substituted by the cultivation of the individual. That is, that I am not in agreement with everything what concerns the good, but rather disunited with all. This dissolves the "koinonia", in which Aristotle founds house and polis. Language/Ancient/Modern/Bubner: Thesis: therefore, the language now has a completely different task to fulfill. It is no longer a medium for the clarification of objectives, it takes the place of practice itself, and the nature of politics is methodified for social discussion. As long as dialogues are inserted into a practical context, they are in a serving relationship to action, the problems of which they process. If the context disappears, because talking to one another is directly equated with co-operation, then the relationship becomes incomprehensible in which language and politics stand together. (Regardless of whether one adheres to Aristotelian or modern subjective primacy). Whether the polis or the individual appears to be privileged, consequences of a practical concept must be deduced from the chosen concept of politics. This is no longer the case when speech and action coincide. Conflicts occur contingently. Politics cannot be definitively committed to that, but must establish a basic form of collective action in order to solve conflicts according to rules. Cf. >Communication theory, >Communicative action, >Polis, >Collective action. I 213 Language/Bubner: Clarity about language is created in the medium of language. Thinking/Bubner: there is no language-independent thinking form. Cf. >Thinking without language. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Language | Cavell | I 185 Language/Universals/Wittgenstein/Cavell: we project words from one context to the next, but without relying on any definitions or rules. For the most part (not always) we do not need universals as a fundamentalist premise. >Meaning, >Word meaning, >Reference, >Sentence meaning, >Speaking, >Communication, >Universals. Skepticism here would only look for new universals here. >Skepticism. I 186 Language learning/language acquisition: the entry into our culture is not guaranteed by something essential. >Language acquisition. I 187 The projection is instead guaranteed by our agreement in the judgment. >Judgments. Our words occur in an unlimited number of cases and projections, and their variance is not arbitrary. --- II 189 Language Philosophy/Cavell: this is not so much about revengeing sensational offenses against the intellect, as to remedy its civilian misconduct. We must return tyrannizing ideas (such as existence, certainty, identity, reality, truth ...) to their specific contexts in which they function normally, so that they can function normally without corrupting our thinking. >World/thinking, >Language behavior. Language/World/Cavell: the transition from language to the world occurs imperceptibly when Austin says "We can voluntarily make a gift" (general statement) is a "material mode" (Mates) for "The gift was made voluntary" (special case). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language | Chalmers | I 22 Language/Qualia/Phenomenology/Psychology/Chalmers: we have no special language for phenomenal qualities. We must always describe them in terms of external properties, e.g. Colorful experiences. >Experience, >Qualia, >Everyday Language, >Consciousness/Chalmers. Feeling language/Ryle: he was right: we have no "neat" words for feeling. >G. Ryle, >Sensations. I 23 Sensation/Criterion/Wittgenstein: an inner process needs external criteria. >Sensations/Wittgenstein, >L. Wittgenstein. Chalmers: nevertheless, why should one not assume that ultimately only one property (be it phenomenal or psychological) is involved? ChalmersVs: if a phenomenal property is specified by a psychological concept, it is not a psychological property - it is only a "property specified by a psychological concept". >Psychology/Chalmers. Definition/specification/Chalmers: we must not say, the concept "conscious experience" was defined by the psychological property! The usually common occurrence of circumstances cannot be used for definition. >Correlation, >Definition, >Definability. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Language | Dawkins | I 304 Language/evolution/Dawkins: Thesis: In language, there seems to be a "non-genetic evolution". Chaucer, for example, could not have a conversation with a contemporary Englishman, although both are connected by a continuous chain of twenty generations. >Language evolution, >Meaning change. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Language | Dewey | Suhr I 161 Language/Antiquity: The language reflects the structure of things. Antiquity sees the forms of discourse as the forms of things themselves. >Antiquity, >Discourse, >Things, >Forms. I 162 Language/Dewey: Dewey gives a naturalistic interpretation of language and its origin. Gestures and calls are not primarily expressive(!), they are kinds of organic behavior. The baby's cry is organic overflow that happens without any intention but has signaling consequences. >Gestures, >Behavior, >Intentionality, >Intentions. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Language | Duhem | I 194 Language of Physics/Duhem: is not the representation of the observed facts. Technical language: e.g. Seemann says, "remove Bram and Oberbram!" The officer's words are for the crew the names of concrete, clearly defined objects, a well-known maneuver. This is for the initiate the effect of a technical expression. >Observation Language. Quite different is the language of the physicist: For example, when the pressure is increased by a certain number of atmospheres, the electromotive force of the column is increased by a certain number of volts. This can be realized in a myriad of different ways. >Observation, >Physics, >Experiments, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Unobservables. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Language | Dupré | Perler I 325 Language/Evolution/Dupré: three theories: 1. Pinker: thesis: language is younger, there is a difference between human and animal. 2. P. Greenfield: Language and tool use have a common basis. - There are hierarchically structured tasks of object manipulation. - There is neural basis. 3. Ethology (Evolution of behavior): Language as an adaptation to a process - it is still related to animal communication - Both are homologous (have common precursors). - Language is not a reaction to present stimuli - it also does not do information processing. - There is abig difference to humans. Dupré pro: this allows to distinguish between older and younger characteristics. >Language origins, >Language acquisition, >Animals, >Animal language, >Behavior, >Evolution. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Language | Feyerabend | I 295 Language/Whorf/Feyerabend: (Anticipated by Bacon): Thesis: Languages and the behavioral patterns associated with them are not mere means to describe events, but they also constitute events (facts). Whorf/Feyerabend: Thesis: the the "linguistic background system" (grammar) in every language is not merely a productive system for the formulation of thoughts, but forms the thoughts itself. >Sapir-Whorf thesis. I 296 Whorf/Feyerabend: there is a knowledge of "latent classifications" (male/female), intuitive, which can be more rational than manifest ones. Even a phoneme can take over distinct semantic functions. E.g. [th] occurs in English mainly in the definite article. This creates a psychic resistance against this sound in made-up words: (for example, "thob"), it is "instinctively" assigned the unvoiced th sound as in "think". But that is not an instinct. It is the "linguistic report". A formal linguistic group can be related to a chain of events, a formal class turns into a semantic one. In the course of time, it subordinates itself to a basic idea and draws other, semantically fitting words. A formal group becomes a semantic group. I 311 Style/Feyerabend: one must not overlook the possibility that a style provides an accurate representation of the world as seen by the artist and his contemporaries. Perhaps people at that time really did feel like a puppet. This would, however, be a realistic interpretation. It would correspond to Whorf's thesis that languages are not just a means of describing events, but they also shape events. VsWhorf: it seems, however, that there were indeed technical means in place to make "more realistic" art. They seem to have been abandoned intentionally! If that is true, then the influence of style (or language) on cosmology and perceptions requires additional arguments. It is not self-evident. These additional arguments (which can never be mandatory) are related to similar circumstances in other areas. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Language | Foucault | I 66 Language/16th century/Foucault: the real language is not a uniform and smooth whole, but rather an opaque, mysterious, self-contained matter, a fragmented, puzzling mass from point to point. A character network in which each character, in relation to all others, can and actually does play the role of the content or character of the secret or clue. Things themselves hide their puzzles like a language and manifest it at the same time. Language belongs to the great distribution of similarities and signatures. Consequently, it must be examined as a matter of nature itself. Language is not what it is, because it has a meaning. Its representative content does not play any role at all. The original form is given by God. I 74ff Language: In the 17th and 18th centuries, the own existence of language, its old strength of a thing written into the world was dissolved in the functioning of the representation. Every language was considered a discourse. Signs were dispensed to name and then embrace the name in a simultaneously decorative and demonstrative duplication, conceale and hide it, to name it by other names, delayed presence, second sign, shape, rhetorical apparatus. I 114ff Language/Foucault: Classical Age/17th Century: Language unrestricted and restrained: unrestricted, because the words have obtained the power to represent thought, as the thinking represents itself. Classical: nothing is given which would not be given in the rep. Classical language is not an external effect of thought; it is thought itself. (17th century) This makes language almost invisible. Its entire existence consists in the representative role. No place outside the representation anymore and no more value without it. In this way it discovers a certain relation to herself, which up to then was neither possible nor comprehensible at all. 16th century: language was in a position of constant comment towards itself. 17th century: we no longer ask how to solve the great enigmatic word sequence, we ask how the discourse works, the elements that it emphasizes, how it analyzes and composes. Instead of comment now: Criticism. (>Words/Foucault). I 127 Because it has become the analysis of order, language makes connections over time that have not existed before. Languages evolve through population shifts, wars, victories, fashions, exchange of goods. They do not, however, develop by virtue of a historicity which they themselves possess. No internal developmental principle. >Discourse/Foucault, >Archeology/Foucault. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Gadamer | I 383 Language/Gadamer: Gadamer Thesis: The fusion of horizons, which happens in understanding, is the actual achievement of language. >Horizon/Gadamer. I 388 Understanding: Understanding a language is not really understanding in itself and does not include a process of interpretation, but an execution of life. One understands a language by living in it - a sentence that, as is well known, applies not only to living languages but even to dead languages. I 408 Language as form: (...) it is undeniable (...) that linguistics and philosophy of language work under the premise that the form of language is their sole subject. But is the concept of form even relevant here? The language that is alive in speech, that encompasses understanding everything, I 409 also that of the interpreter of texts, is so much involved in the execution of thought or interpretation that we have too little in our hands if we want to disregard what languages pass on to us in terms of content and only think of language as form. The language unconsciousness has not ceased to be the actual mode of being of speaking. Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: It had no word for what we call language. I 421 Ideal Language/GadamerVsLeibniz: [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses. The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides. Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But, on the other hand, this does not mean that the word precedes all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subservient to itself. The experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. I 449 Language/Gadamer: Language [has] its actual being only in conversation, that is, in the exercise of communication (...). This is not to be understood as if the purpose of language is indicated. >Communication/Gadamer. I 453 In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world presents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of existence, because it comprises all being-for-itself I 454 in whatever relationships (relativities) it manifests itself in. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does therefore not mean that the world becomes the object of language. I 461 Language/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: "Centre of the language": (...) we are guided by the hermeneutical phenomenon. But its all-determining reason is the finiteness of our historical experience. In order to do justice to it, we took up the trace of language, in which the structure of being is not simply reproduced, but in whose paths the order and structure of our experience itself is first and forever changing. Language is the trace of finiteness, not because there is the diversity of human language construction, but because every language is constantly being formed and developed, the more it expresses its experience of the world. We have questioned important turning points in Western thought about language, and this questioning has taught us that, in a much more radical sense than Christian thought about what is finite, what happens in language corresponds to the finiteness of man. Cf. >Language/Christianity. It is the centre of language from which our entire experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds. >Experience/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. I 462 "Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word, therefore, as the event of its moment, also makes the unsaid, to which it refers to in responding and waving, be present. I 465 The important thing is that something happens here. Neither is the interpreter's consciousness mastering that what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of Tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and which we have to listen to, really strikes us as if it were addressing us and meant I 466 ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its respective new possibilities of meaning and resonance, newly acquired by the other recipient. >Object/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Genz | II 29 Base sentence/theory language/Genz: base sentences can be derived from the theory language, but not vice versa. II 30 Theory language/Genz: theory language is a product of human imagination that has to prove itself in base sentences. >Theory language. Concept/Einstein/Genz: a concept is logically independent of the sensory experience. They do not behave like soup and beef, but like coat check number and coat. >Concepts, >Experience, >Perception, >Measurement. Freedom: there is freedom here, but not as strong as for the poet, but as for the person who solves a word puzzle. He/she can suggest any word, but in the end there is only one correct word. >Freedom, >Determinism. II 31 Theory language/reality/Genz: to what extent do sentences and terms of the theory language play a role in reality? >Reality. Concepts: if terms could be defined by base sentences, and the sentences of the theoretical language could be derived from observations that can be expressed by base sentences, then the status of the theoretical language would be the same as that of the base sentences. >Definitions. Solution/Genz: the theory language does not only summarize observations, but also generalizes them (by natural laws). >Observation, >Generalization. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Language | Hare | II 149 Language/representation/Hare: the analogy with the e.g. dance points to our possibility of reasoning about our language usage. This is a corrective against the orthodox representation theory, according to which "facts", "characteristics" and other dubious entities such as unreliable diplomats oscillate between language and world. >Language behavior, >Use, >Speech acts, >Representation, >World/Thinking, >World, >Reality. We do not need anything like that. It is simply that people try to understand each other. >Intersubjectivity, >Communication, >Community. II 150 Anamnesis/Platon: anamnesis is not just remembering, but rather "recalling". Hare: we know that we have understood something correctly without being able to cite reasons (knowledge/saying). The only test is to repeat it. >Anamnesis. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language | Hintikka | II 39 Language as a calculus/Hintikka: language as a calculus allows model theory. >Model theory. Language as a Universal Medium/Hintikka: the representative of language as a universal medium is not entirely completed by semantic questions. According to Hintikka, they only cannot be represented in the language. Many philosophers today mingle the two conceptions without knowing where they come from. Hintikka I 15 Wittgenstein/Hintikka: 1. Language as a universal medium: thesis: it is not possible to look at the language from outside - meaning relationships are required. Hintikka I 43 ff Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium has as a consequence the idea of the universality of language. (Universal Language). Philosophical views do not enjoy the privilege of formulating in their own meta-language. As there is no metaphysics, there is no meta logic. The expression 'to understand a sentence' is also not meta logical, but an expression like any other. (Ms 110, 189). Cf. >Metaphysics, >Universal language. Hintikka I 15 Language as a universal medium/LUM/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium (LUM) does not include the impossibility of semantics at all. It is just not possible to articulate. For example Frege has the opinion that the meaning of quantifiers cannot be appropriatly expressed linguistically. >Circular reasoning, >Levels, >Description levels, >Semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Language | Hobbes | Bubner I 194 Language/Hobbes/Bubner: language belongs, on its part, to the arbitrary inventions of civilization, with which the human frees himself from pre-legal existence. If language is not a gift of nature, the question arises as to its utility. Hobbes: threefold utilitas: 1. Counting, measuring. 2. People can teach each other linguistically. 3. Give commands and understand commands. Without these, there would be no community and no peace. The welfare of the Leviathan is identical with the continuity of the legal system. This is, because of the contract, also never controversial. Not even the sovereign can question it. >Contracts/Hobbes, >Law, >Community. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Language | James | Diaz-Bone I 56 Language/James: language supports the nominalistic tendency to dismember the stream of consciousness. >Nominalism/James. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Language | Lacan | Prechtl I 119 Language/Lacan: Row of signifiers: social order - the subject is not sovereign. - It only has access to his experience within the frame of meanings. >Meaning. --- Pagel I 17 Language/Lacan: is the ultimate agent. >Subject/Lacan. I 44 Language/Lacan: Language is not a substance but a form. The human speaks, but he does so because the symbol has made him a human. I 46 Significant/Lacan: the function of the signifier is not to represent the signified! The relatively insignificant can be the actually effective. That which counts and does not tell. Expulsion of the signifier is its effect, not a content severity. I 46 Language/Lacan: neither representation nor instrument. Rather, a "differential articulation". The sense is always a retrospective product. >Sense, >Signs, >Designation. I 48/49 Metonymy/Lacan: displacement of meaning. Middle of the unconscious, to outwit the censorship. (Like Freud). >Metonymy. I 53 Language/Lacan: demands renounce of the narcissistic insistence of "me or you". It requires subordination to a universality of commonality. (Similar to Hegel). I 55 Language/Lacan: with the language, we can persuade ourselves without knowing that we have deceived ourselves, since the language talks to us. Cf. >Persuasion/Aristotle. Gabriele Röttger-Denker Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1989 I 100 Language/Lacan: Language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body. >Body. |
Sau I P. Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 Lacan I Gerda Pagel Jacques Lacan zur Einführung Hamburg 1989 |
| Language | Leibniz | Holz I 38 Language/Leibniz: it is important to understand that the number of the first sentences is infinite, for they are either definitions or axioms. >Definition/Leibniz. I 63 Finite/infinite/Leibniz: the set of possible objects of experience must be assumed to be infinite, because there ought to be a cause for reason why these should not be infinite, and there can be no such thing. >Experience/Leibniz. I 64 Language/infinite/finite/statement/fact/Leibniz: so there must be an infinite set of facts and correspondingly an infinite set of statements! (Factual truths). Understanding/Leibniz: a finite mind, however, is incapable of reducing it to a finite set of identical sentences. One never possesses a (full) proof, although there is always a reason for the truth. The reason can be fully understood by God alone. >Infinity/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Language | Levinas | I 139 Language/Levinas: "the first speaking goes beyond its own powers and its own reason. The original speaking is delirium." Levinas/Judaica: "only the fragmentary in it makes the language speakable. The true language cannot be spoken, as little as the absolute concrete can be accomplished."(1) >The Absolute. 1. Gabriele Röttger-Denker Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1989. p. 139 |
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| Language | Mayr | I 190 Language/Evolution/Mayr: also languages evolve, but not adaptive, but stochastic! E.g. when the Anglo-Saxons colonized the British Isles, they did not have to adapt the language to the climate. The consideration of ecological factors and their effects on the phenotype characterize a Darwinian classification. >Language evolution, >Language use, >Meaning change. I 309 Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Communication systems consist here of exchanging signals. There is no syntax and grammar. >Animal language, >Animals. I 310 Language/brain: could the lack of language be a reason why the Neandertals did not make more use of their brain? >Brain/Deacon, >T. Deacon, >Language/Deacon. Language: evolved from about 300,000 to 200,000 years ago in small groups of hunters and collectors due to a selection advantage. Favorable location for increasing brain size. >Selection, >Brain. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Language | Millikan | I 1 Language/Wittgenstein/Philosophical Investigations/Millikan: at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations (PI), Wittgenstein compares words with tools. Word/Language/Millikan: 1. Tools have functions, but tools can also be used for other purposes. 2. In the case of physical tools, the shape is usually directly tailored to it; in the case of words, the form is known to be random. 3. Although the functions of tools are extremely variable, there is a uniform way how it can be described: A) describe the purpose B) describe how this purpose is achieved. I 31 Language/Reaction/Millikan: we cannot expect listeners to produce the same reactions to the same linguistic actions under the same conditions, no matter what utterances of speakers are typically produced. Cf. >Anomalous monism, >Communication, >Language behavior. Language Patterns/Constance/Millikan: Thesis: Linguistic patterns are maintained or propagated because there is a kind of symbiotic partnership between speakers and listeners. Here there is a node point: certain functions correspond to both: to the purposes of the speaker and the listener. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: because of these common purposes of speakers and listeners speech patterns tend to stabilize and standardize. I 142 Language/Evolution/Millikan: Language did not arise evolutionary, because that would have taken much longer. >Language evolution. I 239 Language/Identity/Millikan: Language has its power from the fact that it maps the world. If so, identity or selfsameness must be objective and thought-independent. Cf. >Picture theory. For example, there must be self-identical facts which can be mapped by different sentences. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Minsky | I 196 Language/thinking/Artificial Intelligence//Minsky: Language builds things in our minds. Yet words themselves can't be the substance of our thoughts. They have no meanings by themselves; they're only special sorts of marks or sounds. If we're to understand how language works, we must discard the usual view that words denote or represent, or designate; instead, their function is control: each word makes various agents change what various other agents do. If we want to understand how language works, we must never forget that our thinking-in-words reveals only a fragment of the mind's activity. >Intentions/Minsky. I 197 For example, all English speakers learn that saying big brown dog is right, while brown big dog is somehow wrong. How do we learn which phrases are admissible? No language scientist even knows whether brains must learn this once or twice — first, for knowing what to say, and second, for knowing what to hear. Do we reuse the same machinery for both? Our conscious minds just cannot tell, since consciousness does not reveal how language works. Thinking: We sometimes seem to think in words — and sometimes not. What do we think in when we aren't using words? And how do the agents that work with words communicate with those that don't? [We make a theory with three levels]: The upper region contains agents that are concerned specifically with words. The lower region includes all the agencies that are affected by words. And in the center lie the agencies involved with how words engage our recollections, expectations, and other kinds of mental processes. There is also one peculiarity: the language-agency seems to have an unusual capacity to control its own memories. I 198 Tradition: Many people have tried to explain language as though it were separate from the rest of psychology. Indeed, the study of language itself was often divided into smaller subjects, called by traditional names like >syntax, >grammar, and >semantics. But because there was no larger, coherent theory of thinking to which to attach those fragments, they tended to lose contact with one another and with reality. Once we assume that language and thought are different things, we're lost in trying to piece together what was never separate in the first place. Artificial Intelligence/language: we'll introduce two kinds of agents that contribute to the power of words. The first kind, called polynemes, are involved with our long-term memories. A polyneme is a type of K-line; it sends the same, simple signal to many different agencies: each of those agencies must learn, for itself, what to do when it receives that signal. When you hear the word apple, a certain polyneme is aroused, and the signal from this polyneme will put your Color agency into a state that represents redness. The same signal will set your Shape agency into a state that represents roundness, and so forth. K-line: see >Terminology/Minsky. Isonome: Each isonome controls a short-term memory in each of many agencies. For example, suppose we had just been talking about a certain apple, and then I said, Please put it in this pail. In this case, you would assume that the word it refers to the apple. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Language | Nietzsche | Ries II 35 Language/On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: Seduction by Language: makes the deception of intellectual judgement performance appear as a natural context. >Predication, >Sentence, >Fiction. Ries II 86 Language/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche:"coarse fetish being": produces reason prejudices: subject, causality and substance. --- Danto III 51 Language/thinking/order/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche draws his pessimistic conclusions from his epistemological analysis (like B. Russell later): according to them, our perceptions cannot be similar to their causes, so that the language we use (...) does not really describe the world. Order/Nietzsche/Danto: At this point Nietzsche assumes that there could be an order or structure in the world which we are not able to comprehend. Danto III 107 Language/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a philosophical mythology hidden in language, which breaks out every moment, however cautious one may be otherwise.(1) Danto III 209 Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak, but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. >Justice/Thrasymachus, >Justice/Nietzsche. Danto III 210 Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not nouns and adjectives. 1. F. Nietzsche: Der Wanderer und seine Schatten, KGW IV, 3. p. 215. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Language | Papineau | I 284 Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution. >Evolution, >Purposes, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed. >Circular reasoning. Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches". >Information. I 285 Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported? >Selection. A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent. B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems: 1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all? 2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking. Cf. >Epiphenomenalism. The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control. >Behavior, >Control mechanism, >Behavioral control, cf. >Self-regulation. I 286 The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter". Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions. >Information processing, cf. >Problem solving. I 286 Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions. >Evolution, >Dispositions. It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection. I 287 But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain. Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. I 290 Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts. >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking. >Communication. Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication. Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action? >Imagination, >Thinking without language. I 291 Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others. >Imitation. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Language | Flusser | I 129 Language/Flusser: Only after the above analysis (see Texts/Flusser, Imagination/Flusser, Code/Flusser) does it become clear that the spoken language is not the meaning of alphabetical texts, but rather the code with which alphabetical texts mean images. E.g. Fig. I 107 in addition spoken language: "two people and a dog go for a walk at noon." This shows that the spoken language forms a "pretext" for the alphabetical text. >Speaking, >Writing. Two conclusions: 1. discussing images is a completely different form of communication from their description. The relationship between alphabetical and linguistic code is much more complicated than one would think. Cf. >Media. The abyss between text and image is skipped by beginning to think "conceptually". >Concepts/Flusser. For Kant, the abyss yawns where he opposes "pure reason" to "practical reason". >Pure Reason, >Practical Reason. I 130 "Reading" comes from "picking". Imagination comes from "touching", this is a composing. Concept is a fragmentation ("rationalization"). >Synthesis, >Analysis, >Rationality, >Rationalism. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Language | Plato | Gadamer I 409 Laguage/Plato/Gadamer: (Ancient philosophy had no word for what we call language.) Gadamer I 411 GadamerVsPlato: Plato [in Cratylos](1-3) obviously retreats from the real relationship between word and thing. Here, he explains the question of how one can recognize existence as something too great, and there, where he speaks of it, where he thus describes dialectic in its true essence, as in the excursus of the 7th letter(4), linguisticity is only envisaged as an external moment of dubious ambiguity. It is one of the pre-walls (pro-teinomena) that precede and that the true dialectician must leave behind, like the sensual appearance of things. Thinking: The pure thinking of ideas, the Dianoia, is mute as a dialogue of the soul with itself (aneu phones). Logos: The Logos(5) is the stream that emanates from such thinking through the mouth (rheuma dia tou stomatos meta phthongou). >Language and Thought/Plato. Gadamer I 412 In any case, even where Plato, prefacing his dialectic, transcends the level of discussion of "Cratylus", we read no other relationship to language than (...) : tool, image and production and evaluation of the same from the original image, the things themselves. Recognition: Thus, even if he does not recognize the area of words (onomata) as having an independent function of recognition, and precisely by calling for the transgression of this area, he adheres to the question horizon in which the question of the "correctness" of the name arises. Correctness: Even if he does not want to know anything about the natural correctness of names (e.g. in the context of the 7th letter), he still holds onto a relationship of equality (homoion) as a yardstick there, too: for him, image and archetype is precisely the metaphysical model in which he thinks all reference to the notion of the noetic. >Word/Plato, >Correctness/Plato. 1. Krat. 384 d. 2. Krat. 388 c. 3. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 4. VII. letter 342ff. 5. soph. 263 e, 264 a. --- Saussure I 60 Language/Cratylus/Plato: Question: is the meaning of a word owed to natural practicing or to social-social genesis? |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Proust | I 230 Animals/Davidson: since animals have no language, they also have no concepts. >Concepts, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. ProustVsDavidson: Davidson uses a Cartesian strategy. >Cartesianism. I 231 Triangulation: triangulation seems impossible in animals, because the absence of a shared symbolic language does not allow access to intersubjectivity. >Triangulation. Concepts/Davidson: concepts are normative because each has its particular application conditions. With this, Davidson takes up Descartes' basic idea. 1. If an organism has the concept of X, it is predisposed to decide whether something is X or not. 2. The term can then be applied to new cases. 3. Concepts form an inferential structure (a theory). >Predication, >True-of. I 232 Concept/Animal/ProustVsDavidson: it is not an overstated assumption that certain animals can form concepts that make important aspects of their environment understandable to them. Possibly social animals (dogs, primates, etc.) have theories for the organization of social relations. These theories contain concepts for dominant animals, offspring, enemies, allies, as well as the inferential and associative links between these categories for sharing food, protection, partnering, etc. Cf. >Theory of Mind. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Bigelow | I 131 Language/Bigelow/Pargetter: the sentences of the language can be divided into two parts: a) Theorems (logically necessary). b) Non-theorems. (These can also be wrong). Non-theorems: even they may be necessary true. For example, that electrons have a negative charge. Metaphysically necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: such sentences can be called "metaphysically necessary". Because its truth is not guaranteed by theorems. (Or does not follow from logic alone). >Metaphysical necessity, >Logical truth, >Truth, >Necessity. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Language | Rousseau | Foucault I 148 Language/Rousseau/Foucault: no language can be based on agreement, since agreements already presuppose language. >Language, >Language evolution, >Community, >Language use, >Foundation, >Circular reasoning, >Ultimate justification. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Frith | I, 15ff Language/sound/sounds/Frith: there are 1120 possibilities to produce 40 sounds in English. Italian: in Italian there are only 33 possibilities to produce 25 sounds. Brain/brain region: when reading, people who have grown up in England use somewhat different brain regions than people who have grown up in Italy. I 194 Speech recognition/computer/Frith: how does the automatic translation of sounds into characters work? Solution: internal models are developed that bridge the gap. >Models, >Reading acquisition, >Language acquisition, >Reading, >Writing. I 233 Language/culture/Frith: without the ability to develop mental models of the world and sharing with others, there would be neither language nor culture. >Culture, >Cultural transmission. Other minds: mental models open up a completely new possibility to influence the behavior of others. >Mental models. Physical world: here behavior is influenced by reward and punishment. Mental world: here behavior is changed by knowledge. >Knowledge, >Behavior, >Actions. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Language | Lyons | I 142 Language/infinite/Lyons: the sentences of a language are numerically unlimited. I 147 Language/infinite/Lyons: no natural language can be considered a finite set of sentences. >Language, >Sentences, >Infinity. ((s) See the discussion on researchgate: "Are there infinitely many possible sentences in a natural language?" ). |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Language | Deacon | I 26 Language/DeaconVsTradition: traditional paradigms are e.g. 1. Explanation by association/associative images: according to that, the architecture of the language originates completely outside our organism 2. Mentalese/inner mental language: according to that it is completely within our organism 3. Innate grammatical knowledge >Chomsky. 4. Inner images triggered by sounds >Behaviorism. Nature/nurture/Deacon/(s): this classical question is about what nature has given us and what we have acquired ("nurture" = food). Depending on whether the answer is closer to the end of innate properties (instinctive knowledge), learning is seen as rather superfluous. >Nature versus nurture. DeaconVsChomsky: despite the amazing language learning skills of children, the origin must be sought elsewhere and other questions must be asked. >Language Acquisition. I 53 Language/Deacon: is a derived characteristic (derived from much longer existing animal communication) and should therefore be analysed as an exception to a rule, not vice versa. Cf. >Animals, >Animal language. Animal communication: is usually wrongly treated as "language minus something". I 54 In fact, language is a dependent stepchild of much richer communication, which also includes gestures, showing, tone of voice, interaction with objects, and so on. >Pointing, >Gestures, >Speaking, >Listening. It is not the case that language has replaced other forms of communication. Rather, it has developed in parallel. >Communication. I 309 Language/Brain/Deacon: Lateralisation (lateralisation, division of tasks between the right and left hemisphere of the brain) is almost certainly an effect and not a cause within the co-evolution of language and brain. I even believe that it is an effect in the language evolution of individuals. This involves a division of tasks,... I 310 ...so that they can be processed more easily in parallel. >Brain/Deacon. I 311 Children with only one cerebral hemisphere can learn all aspects of the language. (Plasticity of the brain) If we want to understand speech processing in the brain, we do not have to investigate so much the individual circumstances that change from individual to individual, but rather what drives individual development. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language | Vygotsky | Deacon I 450 Psychology/Language/Wygotski/Deacon: In the 1930s, Wygotski put forward the theory that many psychic processes in humans can be understood as internalized versions of processes that are actually social. The use of the public language can then be perceived as a means of forming a certain distance from our subjective experiences. In this way, we include a speaker/listener relationship in our cognition and thus a virtual social distance that allows us to reflect on ourselves. So we can talk to ourselves as we talk to others. >Language, >Language use, >Language/Wittgenstein, >Use, >Description levels, >Reflection, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Development/Wygotski: Wygotski sees our psychological development as a process,... I 451 ...by adapting to social norms in this way. >Norms, >Sozialisation. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language | Eco | I 66 Language/Eco: language is not one of many means of communication, it is what justifies any communication. It is the actual foundation of culture. I 115 Language/Eco: language is a system that explains itself in successive systems of conventions that explain each other. >Convention, >Explanation, >Meaning, >Interpretation, >Communication, >Community, >Culture, >Language community. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Language | Humboldt | Gadamer I 442 Language/Humboldt/Gadamer: Modern thinking about language since Herder and Humboldt (...) wants to study how the naturalness of human language - an insight laboriously wrested from rationalism and orthodoxy - unfolds in the breadth of experience of the diversity of human language construction. In recognizing an organism in every language, it seeks to study, in comparative reflection, the fullness of the means which the human spirit has used to exercise its capacity for language. Gadamer I 443 The normative interest under which [Humboldt] compares the language structure of human languages does not (...) cancel out (...) the recognition of individuality, and that means the relative perfection of each individual. It is well known that Gadamer I 444 Humboldt learned to understand each language as a separate view of the world by examining the inner form in which the primordial human process of language formation differentiates itself. Behind this thesis is not only the idealistic philosophy, which emphasizes the subject's part in grasping the world, but also the metaphysics of individuality first developed by Leibniz. Cf. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Relativism, >Cultural relativism. Gadamer I 445 Foreign Languages/Humboldt: (...) Humboldt once said that learning a foreign language must be the acquisition of a new point of view in the previous world view, and continues: "Just because one always, more or less, transfers one's own world view, yes, one's own language view, into a foreign language, the success is not felt purely and completely"(1). >Language Acquisition. Gadamer: What is claimed here to be a limitation and a shortcoming (and rightly so from the standpoint of the linguist who has his or her own path of knowledge in mind), is in fact the fullness of hermeneutic experience. Form/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Linguistic form and traditional content cannot be separated in hermeneutic experience. Culture/World View/Foreign Languages/Humboldt: No matter how much you put yourself in a foreign state of mind, you do not forget your own world view, yes, your own language view. Rather, the other world that confronts us there is not only a foreign one, insofar as it is a relationally different one. It has not only its own truth in itself, but also its own truth for us. Gadamer I 446 [Humboldt] recognized the living execution of speech, the linguistic energeia as the essence of language, and thus broke the dogmatism of the grammarians. From the concept of force, which guides all his thinking about language, he has in particular also put into perspective the question of the origin of language, which was particularly burdened by theological considerations. Origin of language/Humboldt: [Humboldt] rightly emphasizes that language is human from its very beginning(2). World/Gadamer: For mankind the world as a I 447 world is there, as it has no other existence for any living thing in the world. But this existence of the world is linguistically written. This is the actual core of the sentence that Humboldt expresses with a completely different intention, that languages are world views(1). What Humboldt is trying to say with this is that language asserts a kind of independent existence vis-à-vis the individual who belongs to a linguistic community and, as he or she grows into it, simultaneously introduces him or her to a certain world relationship and world behaviour. More important, however, is what this statement is based on: that language, for its part, does not claim an independent existence in relation to the world that is expressed in it. Not only is the world only world, as far as it is expressed - language has its actual existence only in the fact that the world is represented in it. The original humanity of language thus means at the same time the original linguistic nature of the human "being-in the-world". 1. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (zuerst gedruckt 1836),§9. 2. Ebenda, S. 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Parsons | Habermas IV 388 Language/Parsons/System Theory/Habermas: Parsons initially adopted the concept of language in the sense of a medium used by cultural anthropology, which enables intersubjectivity and carries the consensus of values relevant to normative orders. With this, he explained what it means that actors share value orientations. These participations served as a model for the common possession of cultural values and for the collective commitment to a normative order.(1) Habermas IV 389 Problem: if money and power as control media are to represent a generalization of language, the culturalist concept of language is inadequate: 1. It is then no longer about the kind of common ground that represents the inter-subjectivity of linguistic communication, but rather about a structure of code and message. 2. The question of systematic localisation of linguistic communication is not solved. >Control media, >Communication media. For Parsons, language initially seemed to belong to the cultural system: as the medium through which traditions propagate. However, the cross-system mechanisms of institutionalisation and internalisation had already suggested the question of whether language is not generally central to the action system and must be analysed at the same level as the concept of action. IV 390 Two strategies are possible: A. Analysis of language at the level of communicative action: this can be linked to linguistics and language philosophy. >Communicative action. However, this is not possible if you follow the second strategy: B. One undermines the level of language and action theory investigations and analyses the mechanism of linguistic communication only from the functionalist point of view of system formation. Luhmann follows this strategy: one would not construct a theory of the action system from an analysis of action with the addition of general system-theoretical aspects...; one would use general system-theoretical construction considerations to derive from them how...systems constitute actions.(2) >Action Theory. 1. T. Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S.168 2. N. Luhmann, Handlungstheorie und Systemtheorie, Ms Bielefeld 1977. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Bühler | Habermas III 372 Language/Organon model/Language model/K. Bühler/Habermas: Karl Bühler's Organon model is representative of communication theory issues.(1) Bühler proceeds from the semiotic model of the speech sign, which is used by a speaker (sender) with the aim of communicating with a listener (receiver) about objects and facts. >Semiotics. Sign use/Bühler: three functions: 1. cognitive function of the presentation of a fact 2. expressive function of expressing experiences 3. appellative function of requests Speech sign/Bühler: works simultaneously as symbol, symptom and signal. >Signs, >Use, >Language. Def Symbol/Bühler: is a sign by virtue of its assignment to objects and facts. >Symbols. Def Symptom/indication/indices/Bühler: is a sign by virtue of its dependence on the sender whose inwardness it expresses. >Symptoms. Def Signal/Bühler: is a sign by virtue of its appeal to the listener, whose external or internal behaviour it controls.(2) >Communication. 1.K. Bühler, Sprachtheorie, Jena 1934. 2.Ebenda S. 28. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Gandhi | Brocker I 59 Language/Gandhi: Gandhi complains that "our best newspapers are in English" and "we [...] write each other letters in incorrect English. If this state continues for a long time, posterity will[...] curse us". (1) Every educated Indian should know his national language and Hindi, as well as Sanskrit if he is a Hindu, and Arabic if he is a Muslim. Some Hindus should also learn Arabic and Muslims Sanskrit. Indians from the West and North should also learn Tamil. English books that are worth it should be translated into various Indian languages. If that could be done, English could be expelled quickly.(2) Cf. >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Nationalism, >Language Acquisition, >Education, >Educational Policy, >Culture, >Cultural Values, >Cultural Tradition, >Culture Shift, >Governance, >Civil Disobedience. 1. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, Ahmedabad 1938 (zuerst 1909). Dt.: Mahatma Gandhi, Hind Swaraj oder Indische Selbstregierung, in: ders., Ausgewählte Werke. Grundlegende Schriften, herausgegeben von Shriman Narayan, bearbeitet von Wolfgang Sternstein, Göttingen 2011, Bd. 3. p. 149 2. ibid p. 151. Dietmar Rothermund, Mahatma Gandhi in: Brocker, Manfred, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Language | Barber | Brocker I 687 Language/Barber: Politics is always about the question "What should we do? Individual goals would be reformulated through their public theming towards a "mutual language of public goods". (1) ((s)VsBarber: not every problem can be reformulated in a "language of public goods". This should not be the aim of a society form either. E.g. psychotherapy, self-discovery etc. It would be an expression of extreme reification to demand that language should be oriented towards the form of public goods. See Reification. 1. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democary, Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley CA, 1984, Dt. Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie. Über die Teilhabe am Politischen, Hamburg 1994, p. 171. Michael Haus, „Benjamin Barber, Starke Demokratie“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolBarb I Benjamin Barber The Truth of Power. Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House New York 2001 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Language | Psychological Theories | Corr I 90/91 Language/personality traits/psychological theories/Deary: in relation to the assessment of personality traits (see >Five-Factor Model, >Agreeablenes, >Extraversion) there is especially good agreement across some languages. For example, English and German have very similar five factor structures in the lexicons (Saucier and Ostendorf 1999)(1). On the other hand, whereas the Greek lexicon did afford a five factor solution, there were also possible one, two, six and seven factor solutions (Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005)(2). >Personality traits. 1. Saucier, G. and Ostendorf, F. 1999. Hierarchical subcomponents of the Big Five personality factors: a cross-language replication, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 613–27 2. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 134 Language/psychological theories/personality traits/cultural differences/Five-Factor Model/De Raad: Support for (…) [a] sixth factor was observed in several languages (Ashton, Lee, Perugini et al. 2004)(1), but not, or not clearly, in all languages where this sixth factor was studied, as in American-English (Ashton, Lee and Goldberg 2004)(2), Turkish (Somer and Goldberg 1999)(3) and Croatian (Mlačić and Ostendorf 2005)(4). A seventh factor: was assumed by Almagor, Tellegen and Waller (1995)(5) and Benet-Martínez and Waller (1997)(6). Using a so-called ‘non-restrictive’ approach with respect to selecting personality descriptors, Almagor et al. (1995)(5) produced a Big Seven model in Hebrew, that included versions of some of the Big Five factors, and two additional factors, called Negative Valence (e.g., fabricator, envious and corrupted, versus honest, sincere and dependable) and Positive Valence (e.g., sophisticated, sharp and original, versus mediocre). Support for one or both of these factors was found in Spanish (Benet-Martínez and Waller 1997(6)), in Filipino (Church, Katigbak and Reyes 1996)(7) and in Greek (Saucier et al. 2005)(8). An eighth factor: De Raad and Barelds (2008) argued that on this point the psycholexical approach has not made use of its full potential. potential. In their study they not only used adjectives, but also nouns, verbs, adverbs and some standard expressions as the basis for the formulation of trait-descriptive items. Greek: dimensions. Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg (2005)(8) distinguished Morality (considerate, humble, responsible, versus bad-tempered, gross, disrespectful) and Dynamism (dynamic, exciting, energetic, versus gutless, hesitant, boring) when extracting only two factors to structure the Greek trait-language. Dutch: De Raad and Barelds (2008)(9) similarly distinguished at the two-factor level for the Dutch trait-language between Virtue (good, reliable, polite, versus unfair, indecent, annoying) and Dynamism (enthusiasm, energy, vividness). >Cultural differences, >Cultural psychology. 1. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P., De Vries, R. E., Di Blas, L., Boies, K. and De Raad, B. 2004. A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives: solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 356–66 2. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K. and Goldberg, L. R. 2004. A hierarchical analysis of 1,710 English personality-descriptive adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87: 707–21 3. Somer, O. and Goldberg, L. R. 1999. The structure of Turkish trait-descriptive adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 431–50 4. Mlačić, B. and Ostendorf, F. 2005. Taxonomy and structure of Croatian personality-descriptive adjectives, European Journal of Personality 19: 117–52 5. Almagor, M., Tellegen, A. and Waller, N. 1995. The Big Seven Model: a cross-cultural replication and further exploration of the basic dimensions of natural language of trait descriptions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69: 300–7 6. Benet-Martínez, V. and Waller, N. G. 1997. Further evidence for the cross-cultural generality of the Big Seven model: indigenous and imported Spanish personality constructs, Journal of Personality 65: 567–98 7. Church, A. T., Katigbak, M. S. and Reyes, J. A. S. 1996. Toward a taxonomy of trait adjectives in Filipino: comparing personality lexicons across cultures, European Journal of Personality 10: 3–24 8. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 856–75 9. De Raad, B. and Barelds, D. P. H. 2008. A new taxonomy of Dutch personality traits based on a comprehensive and unrestricted list of descriptors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94: 347–64 Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Language | Geriatric Psychology | Upton I 141 Language/memory/Geriatric psychology/Upton: The belief is that, in adulthood, language skills are maintained (Thornton and Light, 2006)(1). However, there is evidence that language development continues even into late adulthood: vocabulary increases (Willis and Schaie. 2006)(2) and older adults often maintain or even improve their knowledge of words and what they mean (Burke and Shafto, 2004)(3). However, some decline in language abilities may appear in late adulthood. This could link to physiological changes that take place in old age, such as hearing difficulties, which can lead to problems in distinguishing speech sounds (Gordon-Salant et al., 2006)(4). >Memory/Geriatric psychology. 1. Thornton, R and Light, LL (2006) Language comprehension and production in normal aging, in Birren, JE and Schaie, KW (eds) Handbook of the Psychology of Aging(6th edn). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 2. Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2006) Cognitive functioning among the baby boomers: longitudinal and cohort effects, in Whitbourne, SK and Willis, SL (eds) The Baby Boomers. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3. Burke, DM and Shafto, MA (2004) Aging and language production. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13: 21-4. Further reading: Salthouse, TA (2009). When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of Aging, 30(4): 507—14. Available online at http :! /faculty.virginia .edulcogage/hnks/publications/. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language | Ricoeur | II 6 Language/RicoeurVsSaussure/Ricoeur: To [the] unidimensional approach to language, for which signs are the only basic entities (>Structural linguistics/Ricoeur), I want to oppose a two-dimensional approach for which language relies on two irreducible entities, signs and sentences. This duality does not coincide with that of langue and parole as defined in Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale(1), or even as that duality was later reformulated as the opposition between code and message. In the terminology of langue and II 7 parole (...). Language/Emile Benveniste/Ricoeur: [according to Benveniste] language relies on the possibility of two kinds of operations, integration into larger wholes, and dissociation into constitutive parts. The sense proceeds from the first operation, the form from the second. >Discourse/Ricoeur. II 20 Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we II 21 have something to say, we have experience to bring to language. >Utterer’s Meaning/Ricoeur. [The] notion of bringing experience to language is the ontological condition of reference, an ontological condition reflected within language as a postulate which has not immanent justification; the postulate according to which we presuppose the existence of singular things which we identify. 1. Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (Paris: Payot, 1971); English trans., by Wade Baskin, Course in General Linguistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966). |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Language | Mbembe | Brocker I 917 Language/Mbembe/Herb: Mbembe is looking for a new "vocabulary" (Mbembe 2016(1), 66) that frees African discourse from the hegemony of Western categories and designs new forms of thought for the African subject. "Postcolony" is the main word of the new vocabulary. Mbembe gives a first definition of this. Def Postcolony/Mbembe: appears here as "epoch", "peculiarity" or "zeitgeist". "As an epoch, the postcolony in fact comprises manifold periods of time, consisting of overlapping, nested and enclosing discontinuities, overturns, inertia, fluctuations" (66). It goes without saying for Mbembe that such an undertaking cannot be mastered with the linear concepts of time of traditional African studies and ethnological field studies. "Commandement." [is] the new basic word of colonial and post-colonial domination. For Mbembe - following Derrida - colonial sovereignty can be defined in three ways: as founding, meaningful and ratifying violence. (2016, 73-125). >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Vocabulary, >Language use, >Theoretical language. Brocker I 922 Postcolonialism/Mbembe: The colonial language is anything but understanding and consensus-oriented. "Its main purpose is to transmit orders, enforce silence, prescribe, censor and intimidate" (2016, 257). Language turns out to be an instrument of rule, it becomes a "guillotine" (260). The colonial vocabulary is used to dress and prepare the victims of the colony. In practice, violence and sex go hand in hand. For Mbembe, colonial rule is phallocracy in the literal sense. Hegel/Mbembe: In the Africa picture in Hegel's The Reason in History (Mbembe 2016(1), 252) he discovers the archetypes of the colonial language. Hegel sees Africa as a continent of drives, its inhabitant, the Negro, as an animalistic driving force. In his character there is "nothing to be found that reminds one of humanity" (253). Admittedly, Hegel with his anticipation of the verbal economy is from the view of Mbembe Brocker I 923 not only an accomplice, but also a commentator on colonialism. With his theory of self-consciousness, Hegel provides the keywords for the postcolonial debate on alterity. (Cf. Fanon 1981(2); Spivak 2013(3)). 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 2. Fanon, Frantz, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981. 3. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Kritik der postkolonialen Vernunft. Hin zu einer Geschichte der verrinnenden Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2013. Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Language | Romanticism | Gadamer I 392 Language/Romanticism/Gadamer: The insight into the systematic meaning, which owns the linguistics of conversation for all who understand, we owe to German Romanticism. It taught us that understanding and interpretation are ultimately one and the same thing. Since Romanticism, it has no longer been possible to think of things as if the interpreting terms were added to the understanding by being drawn from a linguistic storeroom in which they are already available, as needed, when the immediacy of understanding would otherwise be lacking. Rather, language is the universal medium in which understanding itself takes place. The way of execution of understanding is the interpretation. >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Hermeneutics. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Christianity | Gadamer I 422 Language/Christianity/Gadamer: There is (...) a thought which is not a Greek thought and which does better justice to the existence of language (cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy), so that the language-forgetfulness of Western thinking cannot become a complete one. It is the Christian thought of >incarnation. Incarnation is obviously not incarnation (German: "Einkörperung"). I 423 Gadamer: [The incarnation is closely connected with the] problem of the word. The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task facing the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is based on the human relationship between speaking and thinking, already in the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in the university scholasticism. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is a Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from its spirituality, which at the same time signifies its cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). Certainly, human language is only indirectly elevated to the object of contemplation. It is only in the counter-image of the human word that the theological problem of the word, of the verbum dei, namely the unity of God the Father and God the Son, is to emerge. But precisely this is for us the decisively important thing, that the mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language. >Language/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy. Thus, in the beginning, one tries to make use of the stoic concept of the inner and the outer logos (logos endiathetos - prophorikos)(2). This distinction was originally intended to distinguish the stoic world principle of the logos from the outwardness of mere repetition(3). For the Christian faith of revelation the opposite direction now immediately becomes of positive importance. The analogy of the inner and outer word, the utterance of the word in the "vox", now gains exemplary value. >Word/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy, >Creation Myth/Gadamer. 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. I refer in the following to the teaching article "Verbe" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, as well as to Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité. 3. Die Papageien: Sext. adv. math. V Ill, 275. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Trinitarian Doctrine | Gadamer I 427 Thinking/Language/Trinitarian Doctrine/Gadamer: If (...) the doctrine of the inner word means nothing more than the discursivity of human thinking and speaking, how then should the "word" form an analogy to the process of the divine persons of which the Trinitarian doctrine speaks? >Word/Augustine, >Word/Thomas, >Word of God/Gadamer, >Word of God/Scholasticism. Isn't the contrast between intuition and discursivity then in the way? Where is the common ground between this and that "process"? It is true that the relationship of the divine persons to one another should not be temporal. Meanwhile, the succession that is characteristic of the discursivity of human thought is basically also not a temporal relationship. When human thinking passes from one to the other, that is, when it thinks this and then that, it is not taken from one to the other. It does not think one thing and then the other in the mere succession of one after the other - which would mean that it would constantly change itself. If it thinks the one and the other, it rather means that it knows what it is doing with them, and that means that it knows how to connect the one with the other. In this respect there is no temporal relationship here, but rather a spiritual process, an emanatio intellectualis. >Trinity/Thomas. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Stoicism | Gadamer I 436 Language/Stoa/Gadamer: The struggle of philosophy and rhetoric for Greek youth education, which was decided with the victory of Attic philosophy, also has this side, that thinking about language becomes a matter of a grammar and rhetoric which have always recognized the ideal of scientific concept formation. Thus the sphere of linguistic meaning begins to detach itself from the things encountered in linguistic formation. The Gadamer I 437 stoic logic speaks first of those incorporeal meanings by which the speaking of things takes place (to lekton). Topos: It is highly significant that these meanings are put on the same level as topos, i.e. space: see(1). Just as empty space only now, in thinking away the things that arrange themselves to each other in it, comes to the condition for thinking(2), so also the "meanings" as such are only now thought for themselves and a term is coined for them by thinking away the things mentioned by means of the meaning of the words. The meanings are also like a space in which things are ordered to each other. Such thoughts apparently only become possible when the natural relationship, i.e. the intimate unity of speaking and thinking, is disturbed. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy, >Language and Thought/Gadamer. One may mention here, as Lohmann(3) has shown, the correspondence of stoic thinking and the grammatical-syntactic formation of the Latin language. That the incipient bilingualism of the Hellenistic Oikumene has played a promoting role in thinking about language is probably undeniable. But perhaps the origins of this development lie much earlier, and it is the emergence of science in general that triggers this process. Then the beginnings of the same will go back to the early days of Greek science. Gadamer: The fact that this is the case speaks for the scientific concept formation in the field of music, metaphysics and physics, because a field of rational representations is measured there, the constructive creation of which brings into being corresponding relationships that can no longer actually be called words. Signs/Word/Antiquity/Gadamer: Wherever the word takes on a mere sign function, the original connection between speaking and thinking, at which our interest is directed, is transformed into an instrumental relationship. This transformed relationship between word and sign underlies the conceptualization of science as a whole and has become so self-evident to us that it requires its own artistic remembrance that, in addition to the scientific ideal of unambiguous designation, the life of language itself continues unchanged. 1. Stoic. vet. fragm. Arnim Il, S. 87. 2. Cf. the theory of the diaphragm still rejected by Aristotle (Phys. A 4, 211 b 14ff.) 3. J. Lohmann has recently made interesting observations, according to which the discovery of the world of sounds, figures and numbers has led to a unique way of forming words and thus to a first increase in language awareness. Cf. J. Lohmann's works: Arch. f. Musikwiss. XIV, 1957, pp. 147-155, XVI, 1959, pp. 148- 173, 261-291, Lexis IV, 2 and last: Über den paradigmatischen Charakter der griechischen Kultur (Festschrift for Gadamer 1960). (In the meantime, reference should be made to the volume "Musike und Logos" Stuttgart 1970 (...) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Medieval Philosophy | Gadamer I 438 Language/Word/Object/Medieval/Gadamer: (...) the theological relevance of the problem of language in medieval thought [points] back again and again to the problem of the unity of thought and speech and [brings] (...) thereby (...) a moment to the fore (...) that had not been thought in this way in classical Greek philosophy. The fact that the word is a process in which the unity of what is meant is expressed to perfection - as is thought in verbum speculation (>Word of God/Gadamer) - means something new compared to the Platonic dialectic of the one and many. >Unity and Multiplicity. Because for Plato, the Logos itself moves within this dialectic and is nothing but suffering the dialectic of ideas. There is no real problem of interpretation here in so far as the means of interpretation, the word and the speech, are constantly overtaken by the thinking spirit. Trinity/Gadamer: In contrast to this, we found in the Trinitarian speculation that the process of the divine persons includes the Neoplatonic question of unfolding, i.e. the process of coming forth from the one, and therefore also does justice to the process character of the word for the first time. >Trinity/Gadamer. Scholasticism: But the problem of language could only come to a full breakthrough when the scholastic mediation of Christian thought was combined with Aristotelian philosophy through a new moment, which turned the distinction between divine and human spirit into a positive one and was to gain the greatest significance for the modern age. It is the common ground of the creative. (>Creation Myth/Gadamer.) In it, it seems to me that the position of Nicholas of Cues, which has been so much discussed recently,(1) has its real distinction. >Word of God/Nicholas of Cusa, >Language/Renaissance. 1. Cf. K. Volkmann-Schluck, who seeks to determine the historical location of St. Nicholas from the idea of the "image": Nicolaus Cusanus, 1957; especially pp. 146ff. (as well as J. Koch, Die ars coniecturalis des Nicolaus Cusanus (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, issue 16) and my own works "Nicolaus von Cues und die Philosophie der Gegenwart" (Kl. Schr. Ill, p. 80-88; Vol. 4 of the Ges. Werke) and "Nicolaus von Cues in der Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems" (Cusanus-Gesellschaft 11 (1975), p. 275-280; Vol. 4 of the Ges. Werke). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Nicholas of Cusa | Gadamer I 440 Word/concept/Nicolaus von Kues/Gadamer: As unfolding of unity Gadamer I 441 of the mind, the concepts falling into words nevertheless retain the reference to a natural word (vocabulum naturale), whose return receipt is in them all (relucet), however much the individual designation may be arbitrary(1). (impositio nominis fit ad beneplacitum). Gadamer: One may wonder what this reference is and what this natural word should be. But that the individual words of one language have an ultimate correspondence with those of every other in so far as all languages are unfoldings of the one unity of the spirit, has a methodically correct sense. Original language/knowledge/Nicholaus of Cusa: Also the Cusan does not mean with the natural word the word of an original language which still preceded the human language confusion. Such a language of Adam in the sense of a doctrine of difference is quite far from him. Rather, the Cusan assumes the fundamental inaccuracy of all human knowledge. This is, as is well known, his doctrine of knowledge, in which Platonic and nominalistic motives intersect: all human knowledge is mere conjecture and opinion (coniectura, opinio).(2) >Indeterminacy, >Words, >Word meaning, >Reference, >Meaning, >Knowledge. It is this doctrine that he now applies to language. Thus he can acknowledge the diversity of national languages and the apparent arbitrariness of their vocabulary, without therefore already falling prey to a purely conventionalist theory of language and an instrumentalist concept of language. >Translation, >Vocabulary. 1. The most important testimony to which we refer in the following is Nic. Cus., Idiota De Mente Ill, 2: »Quomodo est vocabulum naturale et aliud impositum secundum illud citra praeclslonem. 2.Cf. most recently the instructive account by J. Koch, vgl. S. 438 Anm. 64. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Nominalism | Gadamer I 439 Language/Essence/Nominalism/Gadamer: (...) with the nominalistic dissolution of the classical logic of essence, the problem of language also [enters] a new stage. Suddenly, it is of positive importance that one can articulate things in different ways (though not arbitrarily) in terms of their agreement and difference. If the relationship between genus and species can be legitimized not only from the nature of things - with the model of the "real" species in the self-construction of living nature - but also in another way in relation to the human and his name-giving sovereignty, then the historically grown languages, their history of meaning as well as their grammar and syntax, let themselves be understood as variation forms of a logic of experience, a natural, i.e. historical experience (which itself still includes the supernatural). The division of words and things, which each language does in its own way, represents everywhere a first natural concept formation, which is very far away from the system of scientific concept formation. It follows the human aspect of things completely, the system of its needs and interests. What is essential in one thing for a linguistic community can be assigned with other things, perhaps quite different ones, of a uniform designation I 440 if they all have the same essential side. The naming (impositio nominis) in no way corresponds to the essence of science and its classification system of genus and species. Rather, measured against this system, it is very often accidentals from which the general meaning of a word is derived.Cf. >Language/Renaissance, >Language/Middle Ages. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Renaissance | Gadamer I 440 Language/Renaissance/Gadamer: (...) [it] retains (...) something artificial and adverse to the essence of language, if the contingency of natural concept formation is measured against the true order of essence and understood as merely accidental.(Cf. >Language/Ancient Philosophy). Such contingency is in fact brought about by the necessary and legitimate range of variation in which the human mind is able to articulate the essential order of things. That the Latin Middle Ages, despite the biblical significance of the human confusion of language on this side, did not really pursue the problem of language may be explained above all by the self-evident dominance of scholarly Latin, as well as by the continued influence of the Greek Logos doctrine. It was not until the Renaissance, when the layman became important and the national languages penetrated into scholarly education, that fruitful thought was given to their relationship to the inner word or "natural" vocabulary. Gadamer: One must be careful, however, not to immediately assume the question of modern philosophy of language and its instrumental concept of language. Cf. >Word of God/Nicholas of Cusa, >Language/Medieval Philosophy, >Language/Nominalism,. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Absolutism | Stalnaker Vs Absolutism | I 124 absolute/Possible Worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: but that is not the sense in which we usually speak of properties and relations as absolute! Nobody would argue Vsabsolute simultaneity for the reason that simultaneity is contingent that simultaneous events could have taken place one after another. Suppose we are Vsabsolute identity in Salmons sense. Question: can we still understand the intraworldly or the poss.w.-relative identity relation as "to be the same thing" independent from the description of things? Stalnaker: there is no reason why we could not do so. Def identity/relative to poss.w./Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in every possible world w is the set of pairs so that d is in the domain of w. Nonexistence/predication/predication utterances/Stalnaker: problem: if the object does not exist. Thesis: I prefer a modal semantics that requires that the extension of a predicate is a subset of (things-) domains of their poss.w.. Then x=x is wrong if the value that is attributed to x does not exist (or has no counterparts). Versus: If you drop this condition (which is unusual) you allow that non-existent objects have properties and stand in relations. I 214 "Pessimistic view"/Jackson: e.g. a pessimist Vsabsolute quiescent point: Someone says, there is no absolute quiescent point, everything what we can represent by language are facts about relative position. Suppose we want to refute this: one could specify a coordinate system and a unit. E.g. take the mass centers of the earth, sun and mars, form a plane and in addition the moment of Newton's birth. Then we have an x-y plane then we introduce the units meter and second and define for each axis positive and negative directions. Then we have the means to specify absolute position as quadruples of real numbers, at least if we assume that there are absolute positions that you can specify. With that we ignore that our reference points (sun, mars could be vague). Vs: Jackson's skeptics could argue that this is not really allowed to say how things are absolute but only how they relate to the sun, earth and moon at the time of Newton's birth. VsVs/Stalnaker: but it would not be clear on what basis he replies that. I 215 We did therefore not escape the problem that all our words, even all of our representational resources come from the actual world - there is no point outside where we could look for it. Important argument: but that does not imply that the contents of whose expression we use our words, are inevitably dependent from many of the facts that our words have these contents. I 226 Relationalism/relationism/space/Leibniz/Stalnaker: Thesis: pro conceptual independence of space and time. Stalnaker: I think he is coherent. Thesis: there is no absolute localisation (Position, no absolute quiescent point). That means that the assignment of number triples to space points is arbitrary. RelationismVsAbsolutism/Stalnaker: the point of issue is whether the identification of spatial points is conventionally in time. Relationism: there is no absolute movement. Only change in time of the relative positions of things. Movement/Relationism/Stalnaker: Assertions about movements are totally useful here! But they are always understood in terms of a frame (frame of reference). Analogy/Stalnaker: suppose someone tried to refute relationism with an argument analogous to that of Shoemaker, meaning the one of the gradual change. Interpersonal spectrum: analogous to his denial is the denial of the meaningfulness of the thesis that the universe could also be shifted one meter to the left. Such a poss.w. would only be a conventional new description. I 227 Relationism: but even he has to admit - it is then said - that the chair could be first placed alone one meter to the left, and then gradually all other objects. This is certainly not impossible. And it would turn nonsense, one would say that at the last change the initial state would at a stroke again exist. ((s) In order to meet the thesis that nothing has changed on the whole). Stalnaker: I hope no one takes this argument seriously VsRelationism. Relationism/Stalnaker: has no reason to abandon his view that the overall effect of the series of changes leaves the things as they were. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Abstraction | Prior Vs Abstraction | I 132 Thinking/Grammar/Prior: Othello thinks of Desdemona that she ...becomes ...thinks that... Difference: whether the gap for the verb is filled, but not that for the name. Nominalization: ("old game"): instead of "Desdemona is faithful": "It is true of Desdemona that she is faithful." (Introduction of "that"). That-Sentences: pronouns are almost always through abstracta (quasi-names). (>Cook Wilson): Subject/Predicate/Wilson: E.g. "Jones's musical": here it is not predicated "is musical", or "that he is musical," but "musicality". I 133 PriorVsWilson: but the difference is not very large. Moreover, the true relation is that between "Jones" and "he". Better. Attribution of musicality. The introduction of abstractions such as "ness", etc. is always a trick. Verb/Prior: is like a sentence: its job is to make names of sentences. A verb is a sentence with one or more gaps. Verbs can be composed in the same way as sentences. Every composition of a sentence is ipso facto a composition of the verbs it contains. I 134 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the formal presentation of ordinary language sentences requires abstraction. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Action Theory | Luhmann Vs Action Theory | Reese-Schäfer II 103 LuhmannVsAction Theory/Reese-Schäfer: quite blurred concept of individuals that can only be determined by pointing to people. Thus, habits of speech are presented as factual knowledge: because language requires us to use subjects. >Language/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Adams, R. | Stalnaker Vs Adams, R. | I 32 Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Robert Adams: if there are true sentences in which the existence of non-actual possible worlds is mentioned, it must be possible to reduce them to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned that are not identical with non-actual possibilities. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why that should be necessary. World Stories/Possible Worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world story is a maximum consistent quantity of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent and contradictory. Propositions/Adams/Stalnaker: can be language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: is a property of sets of propositions. They can be defined in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Every subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff {A,B} is not consistent and for each set of consistent propositions Γ either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} is consistent. The theory assumes: (W3) Every proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on the propositions except what is needed for the sake of compatibility, implication and equivalence. And to ensure, for example, that the right kind of implication exists. E.g. implication: Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. This minimal theory is suited to support the view of Adams: Possibility/Robert Adams: Thesis: possibility is rather holistic than atomistic, in the sense that what is possible only exists as part of a possible completely determinate world. ((s) there are no isolated possibilities). Stalnaker: so far, our considerations do not imply that every consistent set of propositions is a subset of a world story. For the following (W4) does not follow from them, but must be added as an addition: (W4) Every consistent set is a subset of a maximum consistent set. I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: in contrast, an analysis of propositions as possible worlds provides definitions of consistency and so on in terms of set-theoretic relations between sets of possible worlds. World Stories Theory/Possible World/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of the world stories is weaker, because it leaves open questions that are clarified by the analysis of propositions as possible worlds. The following two theses are consequences of the possible world theory, but not of the world stories theory: (W5) Closure Condition: For each set of propositions Γ there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. for each set of propositions, there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Ambrose, A. | Stroud Vs Ambrose, A. | I 89 Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both think that skepticism - correctly understood - cannot be refuted empirically - by the senses. Skepticism/Ambrose: Thesis: Skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing could be proof of "There are things in the outside world". There are no describable circumstances in which one could say that someone could be described as knowing that. So the sentence "Nobody knows whether things exist" cannot be falsified (A. p. 402). Skepticism argues for a logical impossibility of knowing from the outside world and not for an empirical fact. Every sentence like "I don't know if there's a dollar in my pocket." I 90 is "necessarily true" for the skeptic. I 91 MalcolmVsMoore/AmbroseVsMoore/Stroud: they are directed against what Moore believes he is doing. He could not do it either! StroudVsAmbrose/StroudVsMalcolm: we will see that these two reviews fail, but for that we have to go a long way with Moore to see how he means his proof and that he even does what he believes, even if he achieves something else. I 92 AmbroseVsMoore: for her, Moore is not in a position to do what he wants to do, which is to give direct empirical evidence. N.B.: Moore wants to point to things that differ from other things in their properties" But he cannot do that because the only things he can point to and intends to point to are "external things" and they all have the same property to be "external". That is, it has no contrast at all to other things, which it would have to have to say at all about external things in general. He can only point to some external things as opposed to other external things to show differences between them, but with that he cannot provide proof of existence for external things in general. (Circular) Proof of Existence/Overview/General/Special/Solution: one can prove the existence of coins by pointing to a penny. MooreVsAmbrose: (Moore p. 672): insists that his proof is empirical and that he proves the sentence "There are no external things" wrong. I 93 For example, like pointing to a penny to prove that there is at least one outer thing. Moore admits that there are differences between the terms "outer thing" and "coin", but not with regard to the possibility of pointing to instances. Pointing/MooreVsMalcolm/MooreVsAmbrose: you can certainly only point to outer things, but you can draw attention to inner objects. So the term "outer thing" probably has a significant contrast to other things that do not fall under this class: they are things you can point to. "Outer Thing"/Moore: is like "coin" simply a more general term. But it is just as empirical as "coin. Moore: the only refutation could be in his eyes that one shows that he has not proved that there is one hand here and another there. Stroud: then the only objection would be that the premises are not really known. Wittgenstein seems to have this in mind in "On Certainty": Moore's Hands/Wittgenstein: "if you know there's a hand here, we will give you the rest". (On Certainty, 1969, §1). MooreVsAmbrose/Stroud: because Moore considers his evidence empirical, he ignores Ambrose's objection that he merely makes a recommendation for the use of language. I 94 He sees himself as proving with one fact - here is one hand - he is proving another: - that there are external things. Language Use/Proof of Existence/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: I cannot have assumed that the fact that I have a hand proves anything about how the term "outer things" should be used. (Moore, 674) Just as nothing is shown about the usage of e.g. "I know there are three misprints here" when I show that there are three misprints on this page. This is about nothing linguistic. Nothing about how words should be used follows from the premises. MooreVsMalcolm/Stroud: then Malcolm's interpretation must also be wrong. That there's a hand here does not prove anything about how any expressions should be used. MalcolmVsMoore: Malcolm believes that Moore did not reject him and actually agrees with him. StroudVsMalcolm: But that cannot be if Moore does what he says. MalcolmVsMoore: another argument: he could not have done what he wanted to do. Skepticism/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: the skeptic may think he has a priori reasons for denying external things or knowledge about them. I 96 But even then, that does not mean he cannot be empirically rejected. Suppose someone claims to have a priori reasons that there are no things in the outside world. Just then he can be refuted by simple empirical showing of such objects. Moore/StroudVsMalcolm/StroudVsAmbrose: the reaction of Ambrose and Malcolm is still that Moore does exactly what he believes he is doing. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Analytic Philosophy | Nagel Vs Analytic Philosophy | Frank I 127 NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy: declares many questions pointless. Nagel: that merely shows that these questions are inaccessible to a particular type of treatment which is required by the respectively favored method. We should rather rely on our intuition, which generates the problems than on the theories that want to explain away these intuitions. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel I 57 Language/NagelVsPrimacy of Language/NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy/Nagel: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytical philosophy. Turning from Frege. Thinking is often non-linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. I 59 We cannot explain reason through naturalistic description of the practical language methods. Because the respects in which language is a vehicle do not allow any naturalistic, psychological or sociological analysis. If language reveals principles of thought, it is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar obeys logic. E.g. there is no language in which the modus ponens is not a logical conclusion or identity is not transitive. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Analyticity | Fodor Vs Analyticity | IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/gradual analyticity/Block/Fodor/Lepore: some authors have concluded from "Two Dogmas" that a certain "gradual analyticity" is not excluded. IV 185 Fodor/LeporeVs: this then presupposes equality of meaning rather than identity of meaning. But we have already seen that for inferences analyticity and compositionality are the same. Then one must live with gradual compositionality as well. Question: is this also possible together with systematicity (systematics: believing related attitudes), isomorphism (see above), and productivity? Would gradual compositionality not only include a finite acquaintance with (infinite) language? So that you only "kind of" understand new concepts? E.g. if you understand aRb, then you "kind of" understand bRa. E.g. the constituents of the sentence S "kind of" express the constituents of the proposition P?. E.g. "John loves Mary" "kind of" expresses that John loves Mary, but only because "John" refers "approximately" to John? 29 IV 185 Analytic/synthetic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: you may wonder how we agree with Quine about the a/s distinction (group), but still stick to compositionality including analyticity and that languages are compositional. This is not a paradox: compositionality licenses structurally determined analyticity: IV 245 E.g. "brown cow", "brown" but not "cow" >Animal. Quine: "Logic is chasing truth up the tree of grammar". IV 178 Fodor/Lepore/QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for conclusions to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might have a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): this one has compositional meaning, but the inferential role is not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!". Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Anscombe, E. | Wittgenstein Vs Anscombe, E. | Hintikka I 163 ff Hintikka: The problem of color incompatibility is solvable. Color/color terms/color terms/logic/AnscombeVsWittgenstein: argues what is not accepted by WittgensteinVsAnscombe that, provided red and green are objects, we know which is their logical type. --- I 164 Color words/color terms/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: incompatible does not mean contradictory: (red/green). E.g. "This patch is red" and "This patch is green" are incompatible, but this incompatibility is not logical, in the sense that it is indicated by the notation (but: see below: 4). Also it does not reduce to a truth-functional contradiction. (Contradiction is for Wittgenstein a precisely defined term in the theory of truth functions (4:46)). "It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time, is a contradiction. Hintikka: but here it is not about the status of colors, but about the status of the color attribution. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein has ever believed color attributions such as "This is red" would have subject predicate form. Wittgenstein: from the use of these forms (meant here are grammatical sentences) we cannot draw, at most vague, conclusions. --- I 165 Sentence/form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. "This lecture is boring", "The weather is nice" are only seemingly sentences of the same form. They have nothing to do with each other. HintikkaVsAnscombe: their argument loses its strength with that: this is about someone who makes very different conditions. Hintikka: if you make other conditions, the situation is obviously quite different: Example: Assume that the general concept of color in the language not to be reproduced by a class of color predicates but by a function c which maps points of the visual space in a color space. The logical incompatibility would then be mirrored by the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. Then, the two sentences are logically incompatible! Due to their logical form a function cannot take two different values for the same argument. Wittgenstein claims even emphatically that attributions of different qualities of perception are essentially clear, that is, can be represented by real functions. --- I 165/166 Color/color words/neccessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colors incompatibility means a breach against Wittgenstein's notion that purely logical necessities are the only necessities, is now moved into a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of color terms. (Or the correct notation). Is a) every single color represented by a predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical type. b) points in a color space: then the incompatibility of various colors cause no illogical necessities. (Wittgenstein is this alternative (but certainly strange to Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of the color space. However, this concept fails to satisfy if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates --- I 341 ff Pain/private experiences/Cartesianism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most surprising thesis of this chapter is probably the thesis of Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, so the assertion that there are really private internal event-like experiences like pain and other such sensations according to Wittgenstein. It is undisputed that the language must be based on a public language game, one is divided what must follow for the private feelings. Implies the neccessity of a public framework that these experiences themselves are now objects, events, or anything not private? That this follows, is represented by many philosophers. e.g. --- Hintikka I 342 Anscombe: "If a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition." Since private ostensive definitions are impossible there can probably be no personal item acording to this view. HintikkaVsAnscombe: but this implication does not apply. Of course we cannot say that sensations and the like are private in our language according to Wittgenstein. But that is not what this is about, this is just one of the consequences of inexpressibility of semantics. Actual question: are the philosophers right who claim that there are no private events according to Wittgenstein? No. PU § 272 provides a counter-example: "The essence of the private experience is actually not that each has its own example, but that no one knows whether the other also has this or something else. So it would be possible, although not verifiable, that one part of humanity has a sensation of red and the other a different one." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Antireductionism | Lewis Vs Antireductionism | Schwarz I 216 Possible Worlds/poss.w./meaning/conditional theory/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. objects can only be a possible world if there is a corresponding object for each mode a world could be. This is why possible worlds cannot be sets of common sentences since there is not enough of them. ((s) >Language has not enough sentences to express all the possibilities.) >Ersatz Worlds as sets of sentences. Possible World/LewisVsAnti-Reductionism/Schwarz: interestingly, he is also using the same argument against anti-reductionist theories for which possible worlds are basic metaphysical facts. The name "possible world in which donkeys are able to talk" can only be given to an object if it somehow represents talking donkeys. Schwarz I 217 Possible World/representation/Lewis/Schwarz: for Lewis, possible worlds are nothing else than 1:1 models. How can this work for irreducible abstract entities? This is why it remains open whether proposed candidates actually could be possible worlds (1986e, 184)(1). Problem: some basic entities do not fulfill those conditions (if reduction failed). Not even in Laws of Nature (LoN) and objective probabilities. Objective probability is characterized by the Principal Principle and therefore implies subjective probability. But why should I assume that an event is going to happen only because I learn that an irreducible element, which is logically independent from the event happening, possesses the value 0.9 (1994a,239)(2)?. This is why something should not be called "chance". Reference/Lewis: reference therefore represents a sort of theory of definite description of the reference. Thesis: terms such as "possible world", "meaning", "pain", "objective probability" are associated with roles which describe what they refer to. How those roles are defined is explained by Lewis in "How to define theoretical terms" (1970c)(3). >Theoretical Terms. 1. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 2. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 3. D. Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Aristotle | Frege Vs Aristotle | Berka I 92 Syllogisms/FregeVsAristotle: his different types of inferences (when deriving one judgment from several) can all be represented by a single one: common form: if M is true, and N is true, A applies as well. Because it is possible to manage with a single type of inference, it is a commandment of clarity, to do just that. In addition: it would otherwise be no reason to remain with the Aristotelian ones, but you could add new ones into the indefinite.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Stepanians I 9 Frege/Stepanians: his main question was: What are numbers? Thesis: they are something purely logical and therefore all propositions of arithmetic must be logically provable. I 10 FregeVsAristotle/Stepanians: not all propositions can be reduced to the form "S is P". Grammar/Frege: Mixes the logical and the psychological. I 11 Language/Philosophy of Language/Frege: ... the task of philosophy is to break the rule of the word over the human mind. Hence my Begriffsschrift. I 53 Quantifier/Quantifiers/Aristotle/Stepanians: even Aristotle had quantifiers: "all", "some", "none". Problem/Logic//VsAristotle: his system reached its limits as soon as the quantifiers occurred not only in the subject, but also in the predicate. E.g. "All the boys love all the girls." Solution/Frege: Begriffsschrift: expression of generality where it does not matter how many quantifiers occur in the subject or in the predicate. I 54 Generality/Frege: E.g. "2x2 = 4": where is the subject where the predicate? Solution/Frege: Letters/Frege: there are two types of characters in arithmetic: letters, each of which either represents a) an number left indeterminate or b) a function left indeterminate. Generality/Frege: is made possible by this indeterminacy! We can use the letters to express generality: E.g. (a+b)c = ac + bc. Ad a) includes characters such as +, - , 0, 1, 2... each of which has a particular meaning. Law/Generality/Frege/Stepanians: if we replace in a real equation as E.g. 3 + 2 = 2 + 3 the special numbers with letters, we get a law. Conversely, by inserting the same numbers for the same letters we can discover an infinite number of truths. I 55 Generality/Frege/Stepanians: Important argument: generality no longer refers either to the subject or to the predicate. E.g. "The number 11 is smaller than the number 13": Subject "The number 11", Predicate "is smaller than the number 13" ((s) VsStepanians: "Number 13" is not the predicate!) Both may be replaced with characters. Generalization/Frege/Stepanians: is an operation on the total content of the sentence. Letters/Variables/Spelling/Frege/Stepanians: where Frege used a, b, c, etc., we use today x, y, z.... Variables/Arithmetic/Logic/Stepanians: while in arithmetic the variables stand for numbers, this limitation to one domain in logic must be abolished. I 56 Domain/Universal Proposition/Conditions/Frege/Stepanians: Frege does not define a scope: E.g. "x is confused" should only apply to the realm of philosophers. Instead: condition: if something is a philosopher, it is confused. I 57 Important argument: this applies for everything, without exception, even for Sam’s goldfish: if x is a philosopher, x is confused. ((s)> counterfactual conditional). Generalization/Generality/FregeVsAristotle: the generalization applies to the whole sentence, not for either the subject or the predicate. Problem: how can the generalized be subjected to other operations E.g. specify exceptions, that not everything is confused? Wrong solution: "not x is confused". At best, "x is not confused", but that boils down to the fact that nothing is confused. I 58 Solution/Frege: external negation (operator that is applied to the whole sentence) ~(X) is confused. Boy/Girl/Aristotle/Frege/Stepanians: Solution/Frege: Whatever X and Y may be, if x is a boy and y is a girl, then x loves y. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Aristotle | Nozick Vs Aristotle | II 145 Relation/Law/Incident/Language/Interpretation/Nozick: Wittgenstein needed people to teach the language with its instances. Nozick: but it cannot be people who teach a natural law with its instances. Causal laws also apply for people, inter alia, and were valid before people existed. The consent of people to something depends on causality and cannot determine causality itself. (FN 22). Law/Nozick: therefore seems to have no own ontological status, because it cannot reach for incidents itself. Nevertheless, if a natural law only determines a pattern, it is merely descriptive. Without ontological status it cannot support counterfactual conditionals beyond actual events and how could laws then be used to explain something? Explanation/Nozick: how does a higher level pattern explain a lower level one? Is every explanation implicitly only a repetition? Explanation/Law/NozickVsAristotle: explanatory laws need not be necessary truths, but do they need to be anything at all? If events proceed according to laws, what is the connection between the event and the law? It can of course not be causal. ((s) recourse). But even any logical connection must be interpreted in turn. Can a lawlike statement interpret itself? I.e. can a law give instructions for the interpretation? Problem: these instructions would have to be interpreted again II 146 If the interpretation was to be fixed, the law would have to include something analogous to reflexive self-reference. This itself is mysterious. Hence, we must not treat laws as related to statements. Gödel: there is no formal system in which all the truths of number theory can be proved. Nozick: that is bad luck for a picture of all the facts from which the statements of fact can be completely derived. Determinism/Nozick: should therefore not rely on derivability from causal laws! (FN 23). NozickVsDeterminism: claims: if the initial state was repeated, the later states would also repeat themselves. Problem: in a re-collapsing universe other laws could apply for another big bang. I.e. the subjunctivist conditional, (subjunction = counterfactual conditional, unlike implication (metalinguistical)) on which determinism is based would be wrong. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Aristotle | Hegel Vs Aristotle | Bubner I 39 HegelVsAristoteles: "speculative spirit of language": the insight into the linguistic and logical roots in speculation is intended to restore to it to the rank of strict method which Aristotle had just denied it because of its connection with the language. Bubner I 183 Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object. Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities. I 190 Logos/Aristotle: through it the elementary natural conditionality is surpassed. In contrast to Hobbes and Rousseau, however, there is no contract, which leads away from nature (natural law). Logos: Aristotle understands it as language and not as reason, which becomes obvious from the comparison with the animals. Language reveals the good and the just in mutual exchange. The good is quite a controversial concept of action, so that it is a matter of debate. The logos is such a means for finding out, but not a set goal and no content in itself. It is only thanks to the submission of joint interests that the dialogue is set in motion. Without polis no function of the logos and without logos no politics. The excessively growing complexity is self-sustaining without forming a political community of action. HegelVsAristoteles recognizes this. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Chomsky Vs Artificial Intelligence | Dennett I 540 Language / ChomskyVsArtificial Intelligence: the child shall later only switch whether it is learning Chinese or English, but it is not a "general problem solver". Even "slow" children "learn" jspeak well! They do not "learn" it, just as birds do not learn their feathers. I 541 Dennett per Chomsky. But if he s right, the phenomena of language are much more difficult to explore. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Assertibility | Brandom Vs Assertibility | I 198 VsJustified assertibility: assertibility conditions do not contain the whole meaning! Just as naïve: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" meaning", and thus giving up any desire for harmony. II 90 Assertibility/Brandom: its representatives also treat the aspect of the conditions (circumstances) as exhaustive and neglect the consequences of the use of the terms. II 91 BrandomVs: assertions can have the same conditions but different consequences. E.g. "I’ll write a book about Hegel" - "I predict that I will write a book about Hegel": same circumstances, different consequences or determination. Meaning/Use/Dummett: if we have learned only the circumstances (conditions) for the use of a predicate, it may be that we have not seen through all connections with other terms. II 242 A philosophical analysis of the concept of truth is therefore not necessarily made by a definition of the word "true". "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 262 ++ BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of the so defined semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as does the alternative language game theory. BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the determination/authorization without the auxiliary means of incompatibilities (negation). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Augustine | Wittgenstein Vs Augustine | I 272 Language/world/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: we reformulate epistemologically: how can an observer recognize the semantic base-links between language and reality? What is the mode of existence of the semantic relationships between language and the world? WittgensteinVsAugustine/Hintikka: learning the language is not the fact that one acquires a number of different names for different entities, (also VsTractatus) but that one learns the language games. There is next to it no other medium in which they exist. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Austin, John L. | Derrida Vs Austin, John L. | Rorty IV 106 DerridaVsAustin/Rorty: he is someone who accepts the traditional notion that meaning is something that is communicated "in a homogeneous element" "in which the unit, the integrity of the sense, would not be substantially affected". RortyVsDerrida: this is an unwarranted assumption. Austin says about language, though not about philosophy, the same as Derrida. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Austin, John L. | Quine Vs Austin, John L. | II 114 Austin's: "How to do Things with Words" afterthought at the end of the book: finishing off a) the true/false fetish b) the values/facts fetish. QuineVsAustin: the whole book would have been different if Austin had been more open-minded in terms of Tarski's concept of truth. Quine: there are two ways to react to problems: a) to wreck your mind over disturbances (for example, planetary motions before Einstein); b) to explain it away with faults in the observation instruments. Austin's attitude was of the negative type, method of overcoming metaphysics. II 115 According to Tarski's theory of truth what is considered true is language. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Austin, John L. | Searle Vs Austin, John L. | SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs). In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory. IV 17 illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content: R(p). The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions. IV 18 1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong). IV 19 The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa). Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa. IV 20 Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective. IV 21 3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere). Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p" The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act. IV 22 These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised. E.g. "I suggest", "I swear" 5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room. IV 23 6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating 7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude. 8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role E.g. report or forecasts IV 24 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose 10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication IV 25 11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten". 12. differences in style E.g. announcing, entrustment. IV 27 SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act! E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report. A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like. IV 30 Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman IV 36 Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative. VII 86 Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present. Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable. SearleVsAustin: that's amazing. VII 88 SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily". Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use. VII 89 Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty). Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session. VII 90 The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions "A-Conditions". We can create a list. 2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words. E.g. The President is sober today. Hans breathes. etc. VII 91 3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to. I did not volunteer, I was dragged here. He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree. Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation. VII 92 SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true. An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false. SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification. E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily." VII 93 SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions. VII 94 Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation. VII 95 SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to: "No comment, which is not remarkable" or "No assertion that is not worth to be claimed". VII 96 SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by "X was not done intentionally". assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other. SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible. (VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally. Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false! E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc. VII 98 Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ... |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Avramides, A. | Davidson Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 97 Method/Theory/Avramidis: Basically, you cannot resolve the difficulty by appealing to counterfactual circumstances in which these problems do not exist. There is simply no actual or possible situation in which the beliefs and intentions of a language user are accessible regardless of language comprehension. This is the full strength of Davidson’s doubt. DavidsonVsAvramides: thus Davidson also doubts the profound epistemic asymmetry: he doubts that we can distinguish observations at the surface of deeper possibilities. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Avramides, A. | Grice Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 164 GriceeansVsAvramides: The analysis in question was that propositional attitudes are relations to sentences in the theory language. This allows seeing semantics and psychology as interdependent and simultaneously attribute thoughts to speechless beings. GriceansVsAvramides: would look at the matter the other way around: the apparent entailment of ontological asymmetry to conceptual asymmetry should be taken as evidence that this type of analysis of propositional attitudes is fundamentally wrong. Because if you can attribute thinking without language (Thw/oL) in a sensible way, then it would seem as if our psychological concepts are independent of semantic ones. Avramides: No side has more than prima facie evidence. Anti-reductionism: can claim conceptual symmetry without being limited to ontological symmetry. And it can accept thinking without language. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Avramides, A. | Reductionism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 90 Radical Interpretation/RI/Avramides: is quite obviously indeed a gradual approach? Avramides: I do not want to deny that, but that we need assumptions about beliefs and meanings simultaneously in early stages. ReductionismVsAvramides: this is the point where my opponent may step in and see an opportunity for an epistemic asymmetry: what is implausible, is not a gradual approach, but the concomitant thesis that radical interpreter needs a complete evidence basis for beliefs and intentions of the unacquainted speaker before he finds out anything about his language. AvramidesVsVs: this implausible thesis notwithstanding, the gradual approach of radical interpretation is as follows: the interpreter forms hypotheses on simple beliefs... (>see Bennett 1985) and all these hypotheses remain revisable until the end. In later stages, we then simultaneously deal with beliefs and meaning. I 158 ReductionismVsAvramides: Subjective Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: is incompatible with the fact that the mind is only contingently connected with behavior. I 159 A subject can never be separated from its very own experience. VsAvramides: Important Argument: such a subjective concept can be constructed, without significant reference to the behavior! VsAvramides: neither is it necessary to make any significant reference to the third person perspective! I.e. reductionism (reductive Gricean) does not automatically lead to the objective mind. I.e. that a subjective concept of mind is therefore compatible with the fact that mind is only contingently connected with behavior. AvramidesVs: I admit that I cannot prove that this objection is incorrect, but is important to me that my approach allows to combine the first person and third person perspectives. I 160 Without connection to behavior there is no proper understanding of the first person perspective. And this leads to an objective Cartesian (or incomplete) picture. (55 +). |
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| Avramides, A. | Cartesianism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 108 CartesianismVsAvramides: could protest against the assumption of a necessary divine position. Avramides: with that he would steal out of the necesity of deep epistemic asymmetry (EA). Cartesianism/Avramides: is, unlike Loar, not committed to any physicalism. For him it is not about future science. Divine Position/Cartesianism: (a variant of Cartesiansim) can even say that the divine position will not in principle be able to recognize the intangible substance within us. That commits him to a realism that evades an epistemic argument. Deep EA/Avramides: precisely to prevent this, I have formulated the deep EA: ((s) see above I 95 counterfactual conditional: if (per impossible) someone else's thoughts were knowable without language, then they would not be constitutive for language). This commits Cartesianism to the fact that if (per impossible) if we could reach this intangible realm, we could also grasp someone else's intentions without understanding the language of the stranger. Thus, the Cartesian, like the physicalist, is committed to deep EA between the semantic and the pychological. |
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| Ayer, A. J. | Sellars Vs Ayer, A. J. | I 16 Sense-data/Ayer: proposal: that the talk about the sense-data is simply another language. Thus, no increase in meaning relative to our everyday speech. I 17 E.g. "The tomato faced S with a curved red sense datum" is actually the same as "The Tomato seems to be red and curved for S." Sense-data/code/Sellars: one could accumulate a code now so much until it is no mere code anymore. Then you have to deny terms such as "quality", "is", "red", "color", "determined", "all" etc. the full status of their counterparts in the everyday speech, if they occur in the speech on the sense-data! They act more as evidence! The expressions from which the two "descriptions" (D) all sense-data is red and I 18 (E) some sense-data is not red exist, remind us thus of the logical inconsistency of propositions like E.g. All elephants are grey and some elephants are not grey. But beware! While it is all right if you derive "Some elephants have a certain "pink shading" from the proposition "Some elephants are pink", it would certainly be wrong wanting to derive from some sense-data is pink" the proposition "Some sense-data have a certain "pink shading". I 20 SellarsVsAyer: a code adds nothing, the understanding of the sense-data language as a code, neither. Data/Sellars: empirical - content/Sellars: theoretical entities. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ayers, M. | Rorty Vs Ayers, M. | VI 408 Philosophy/Rorty: we have distinguish clear clearly between questions of the tasks of philosophy and content-related topics such as e.g. knowledge, and express ourselves as clearly as possible about their mutual relationship. Philosophy/Rorty: the following theses tend to be represented by the same people 1) Realism/Anti-Realism important distinction 2) Dummett is right: these Antirealism/Realism struggles have been decisive in the history of philosophy. >Antirealism, >Realism. VI 409 3) Wilson was right to express doubts about the contingency of problems. 4) Ayers is right to say that we must allow our own metaphysical and epistemological views to be influenced by our politics and morals. 5) Color: the problem of the "essence of color" is not solvable. The same is true, consequently, for the body-mind problem. 6) Descartes' >skepticism is ahistorical. 7) Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the senses merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: revival of empiricism. 8) self-identity is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, non-relational features. Some terms are rigid. 9) Recognition of the unspeakable is laudable intellectual modesty. 10) Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding`" is not a guide, but a work that is yet to be studied and still holds not yet articulated truths. RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I represent diametrically opposed views. VI 410 Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the 10 theses. VI 411 "Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: battle cry of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot it must be established in language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is at all possible. VI 412 This includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". >Cartesianism. This includes the notion of "consciousness" - (As 17th century notion). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Bacon, F. | Feyerabend Vs Bacon, F. | I 97 Natural Interpretation/Bacon/Feyerabend: wanted to remove natural interpretations (which were prejudices for him) like the layers of an onion. He believed that the interpretations were simply added to the perception. I 98 Natural Interpretation/Observation Language/FeyerabendVsBacon: without it we would be completely disoriented. We cannot take its braid it apart. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Barcan, R. | Cresswell Vs Barcan, R. | Hughes I 150 Existence/Modality/Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: there are versions of T, S4 with and without BF (but not of S5). Question: Can we provide an analysis of the validity that matches the versions without BF, namely PK + T and PK + T S4? Barcan formula/Camps: VsBarcan: Prior (1957), Hintikka (1961), Myhill (1958) Defense: Barcan (1962) Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: for our purposes we best consider it in this form (x) Lfx > L(x)fx (notation: (x) L phi x > L(x) phi x). Everyday language translation/Hughes/Cresswell: if everything necessarily has a certain property phi, it is necessarily the case that everything has that property. ((s) i.e. not: "there is necessarily".) VsBarcan/Hughes/Cresswell: because of the fact that everything that exists is necessarily phi the possibility is not excluded that there might be things (or might have been) that are not phi, and in this case it would not be a necessary truth, that everything is phi. Hughes/Cresswell: This objection is based on the assumption that in different possible worlds ) objects may not only have properties that are different from those they have in the real world , but that there may even be objects that do not exist in the real world at all. Semantics of possible worlds/Semantics/Predicate calculus. Modality/Hughes/Cresswell: now it is at least plausible to assume that the semantics that we have given for the modal predicate calculus implicitly negates this condition, since we assumed in each model a single individuals range which is the same for all possible worlds the validity of the BF indeed depends on this property of the semantics. ((s)> LewisVsKripke, KripkeVsLewis). I 151 Then we can gain a semantic in which BF is invalid by allowing models where different possible worlds are assigned different ranges. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
| Behaviorism | Fodor Vs Behaviorism | Danto I 268 Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism. Fodor/Lepore IV 56 VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences. IV 195 Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Behaviorism | Searle Vs Behaviorism | I 30 Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism). I 49 SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition". Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957)(1). I 50 LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966)(2). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being. I 57 Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input, 2. To the various other "mental" states and 3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output. Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions. VIII 428 Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma: a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting! 1. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 2. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Behaviorism | Loar Vs Behaviorism | Content/Belief/Loar: is not delivered through a connection with linguistic behavior. If namely 1. the language behavior is described purely syntactically, the connection is not interlinguistic and not interpersonal either. 2. if it is described semantically, e.g. "utterance which means p": then something outside or inside the theory must distinguish between "means p" and "means q". a) if within, our problem persists b) if outside: the theory does not fully represent the content, because then the source is elsewhere. I 9 Belief Relation/Relation Theory/Loar: so it seems that the only relevant relation between a belief and a sentence in the idiolect of the person is explained by a practical syllogism. Practical Syllogism/Belief/Loar: x' utterance should be explained by x' desire to communicate p and x' belief that his utterance will bring about the result. I.e. our common sense theory uses general behavior. Content/Loar: but this is not enough, we also have to include perception. Propositional Attitude/Attribution/Theory/Loar: we need: a) Generalizations about input in relation to perceptual circumstances, b) Restrictions on the rationality of beliefs, c) Output generalizations for beliefs and intentions. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Belnap, Nuel | Kripke Vs Belnap, Nuel | III 341 Substitutional quantification/SQ/Belnap/Dunn: Here an ontology of terms is not even necessary because the quantifiers of metalanguage (m.l.) could also be constructed by substitution! KripkeVsBelnap: This is a case of purely mechanical acquisition of Quine’s criteria for Ontological Commitment/OC: "referential quantifiers carry a OC with it and nothing else." Substitutional ml/Kripke: There are two possible interpretations: It is assumed that substitution quantification have (structurally descriptive) names for the expressions of the object language (o.l.) as substitutes ((s) The names have have the term for which they stand for, not the part). (see below, III 365). Then: a) the interpretation of m.l. is as such that these terms denote those of the o.l. or b) they do not denote. ad a): If they denote, Wallace is right that the difference between substitutional quantification with names of expressions and referential quantification which work through expressions, is negligible. Both quantifiers carry the same amount of ontological commitment. ad b): then the m.l. has indeed no ontological commitment for expressions of the o.l. But what is the justification then to call M a metalanguage of L? How should a theory which is formulated in M say anything about the semantics of L? Then T(x) is also no predicate anymore, filled with the true sentences of L and only them, but rather a form of M, without any interpretation. KripkeVsBelnap: it is only possible to argue this mechanically if one has lost his or her philosophical goals. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Belnap, Nuel | Read Vs Belnap, Nuel | Re III 270 Belnap: we have not shown, and cannot show that there is such a link. The same applies for "tonk". Read: One problem remains: why is there ever an analogy between definitions and links. It cannot always be wrong to expand a language with new links. Calculation rules for 'conservative' extensions of languages are conceivable. The old rules must persist. Re III 271 Peirce's Law: (>Peirce): "If P, then Q, or if Q only if P, then R" is negation-free, but still not, as the constructivist claims, part of the negation-free fragment (>Gentzen). The law cannot be proved within the classical calculus without using classic negation rules. Re III 273 The crucial step in all cases is certainly that the implication "If P, then Q or R" from "If P then Q or R" (Note: the comma is missing here) is allowed. A step which foresees the establishment of the multiple conclusion, the LK, and not the establishment of the individual conclusion. (Peirce's Law: "If P, then Q or, if Q only if P, then R") The constructivist objects against such a step, because he introduces a disjunction in a way that does not guarantee that you know which member of the disjunction is the justification! ReadVsBelnap: The true disagreement lies beyond constructivism and realism. Belnap's condition (conservative extension) cannot show that the classical negation is illegitimate. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Benacerraf, P. | Field Vs Benacerraf, P. | I 24 VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself. I 25 Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities. I 26 Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I I understand Benacerraf). I 27 VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7). I 29 Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Berkeley, G. | Quine Vs Berkeley, G. | Quine II 213 QuineVsBerkeley: there is more substantial similarity between the knowledges of two people than between person and thing (language, observation terms have inclination to consensus). V 15 Sensation/Quine: primarily structured entities (figures) not light flashes, etc. Space/Depth Dimension/QuineVsBerkeley: not reconstructed from inference, because the two-dimensional data for them are not conscious. Perception/Quine: this is about shape, not about stimulus (they are covered by reception). Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that objects exist at all and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical senses would have appeared to them as circle. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Best Explanation | Schiffer Vs Best Explanation | I 198 Natural language/E.g. Harvey/Analogy to us/Best explanation/Schiffer: I have an analogy to the sensory perception in mind: E.g. a quick look at a typical collie will have us believe that this being is a dog. Nevertheless, I do not believe at the same that a dog-like appearance is sufficient that something is a dog. I would not think that this animal is a dog, if it turns out to be mutant turtles. Problem: now one might assume that there is something like a conclusion to the best explanation here. Vs: does not work anyway with children. (SchifferVsPeirce, SchifferVsAbduction. Solution/Schiffer: you should trust your perceptions, as long as you do not already have contrary beliefs. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Bigelow, J. | Lewis Vs Bigelow, J. | Big I 222 Laws of Nature/LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be described adequately in a non-modal language. And this because NG is not only a regularity. logical form: i.e. a NG cannot only be represented in this form: (x)(Fx > Gx) logical form : a NG will often be a universal generalization (Gen)[universelle Generalisierung (UG)]. But it may also be a different generalization or a different form of sentence. But we are assuming here that laws of nature involve universal generalizations, and will therefore have the following form: I 223 natL(x)(Fx > Gx). (x) Fx would > would Gx) ((s) If something were an F, it would be a G). LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view on NG which we defend. LewisVsBigelow (1979): the theory is circular. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: Vsmodal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: We explain laws through accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility through laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: If Lewis is right, our theory is circular. Lösung/Lewis: s.u. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: We deny that accessibility must be explained through similarity. The world that has the easiest access is not necessarily the world which resembles the other one the most. >Similarity metrics. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Biro, J. | Avramides Vs Biro, J. | Avra I 97 Meaning theory/M.Th./Biro/Avramidis: Biro proposed a test that every theory claiming to be a M.Th. has to pass: I 98 a M.Th. must always give an explanation for how listeners understand utterances. Avramides: he takes that from Dummett’s thesis that a M.Th. is always a theory of understanding. (Biro 1979, p 249). AvramidesVsBiro: does not go deep enough: the Griceans could simply ask why we should say that a M.Th. should be a theory of understanding. A defense of Dummett would simultaneously be one of Davidson’s doubt. Whether we are reductionist or anti-reductionist in this point, would then depend on our concept of mind. The representative of a deep epistemic asymmetry has a certain image of the mind that is rejected by anti-reductionsim. (see below Chapter 4). ((s) that thought is possible without language). Now this is about a different kind of reduction: the one rejected by Nagel and Davidson of the psychological to the physical. ((s) deep epistemic asymmetry is then more of a psychological thesis). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Black, Max | Putnam Vs Black, Max | IV 168 BlackVsFeigl: the set (1) pain is identical to stimulation of C-fibers. This sentence is a >deviating sentence. (See above) Under normal circumstances it cannot be used to make an assertion. It gives words a new meaning. We could begin to only speak of fibers anymore. But this is not understandable, as long as the words retain the meanings that they currently have. PutnamVsBlack: the sentence may be deviating at the moment, but it could become a normal sentence. --- IV 169 Linguistics: Putnam: in reality, it is not about synchronic but diachronic linguistics. It is not easy to see when a change in meaning actually occurred. 1) In any case, the utterance of a sentence never uttered before does not lead to a change in meaning. E.g. "on my desk there is a purple Gilamonster" has certainly never uttered, but does not change the meaning of a single word. 2) A change in meaning does not necessarily have to take place when a formerly divergent sentence slowly gets a standard use. --- IV 169/170 E.g. "I am 1000 km away from you" certainly is a deviating sentence (or its translation into ancient Greek), certainly was a deviating sentence before the invention of scripture or the phone. Of course, it obtained a normal use without being "given" it. a) The new use is not arbitrary. b) The meaning of a sentence is generally a function of the meaning of the individual words. So the the question arises of which word has a different meaning? Change in meaning, concept transformation: of course, new theoretical insights can have an impact on the language. E.g. "he went around the whole world" is a deviating sentence in a culture where it is not known that the earth is round. New scientific findings could lead to a sentence like e.g. "he is half finished with his dream" is no longer a deviating sentence (as it still is today). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Black, Max | Thomson Vs Black, Max | Horwich I 161 Material Equivalent/T-Schema/Thomson: "material equivalent" is itself defined in terms of truth! "Principle of Definition"/PdD/Black/Thomson: we must not confuse it with what we understand when we understand the T-scheme! Also not with a general T-Def, which cannot be formulated. A "principle of definition" probably). Tarski/Black: "we only seem to see that the assertion of a proposition is true, logically equivalent to the assertion of the proposition itself". (see above redundancy theory). ThomsonVsBlack: he makes a mistake when he says this is pointless. It is simply wrong! (Group: ThomsonVs Redundancy Theory? BlackVs Redundancy Theory?). For example, suppose we do not know anything about number theory and someone tells us: (5) 43 ε prime ⇔ any number that divides 43 is either 43 or 1 (ε: epsilon, is element of) Now we could think, either 43 is a prime number and... or 43 would not be a prime number and.... But we would definitely think that (5) is the consequence of some definition of "prime number" (whatever that would be). And then we would say that (5) shows an equivalence between "43 ε prime" and "any number...". And we would not say that this is a coincidence, that 43 and the class of prime numbers are mentioned on the left and 43 again on the right, but not the class of prime numbers. For if it were a coincidence, perhaps we could also get the following: (6) 43 ε Prime ⇔ Ramanujan is dead Thomson: but here we would not assume that there would be a general formula from which this is a consequence. Now we could assume that the rule that is fulfilled in the case of (5) and not in (6) is also fulfilled for (1) and the other T-sentences. And that the T-sentences exemplify a relation of logical equivalence. (see below: but do not make explicit!). Thomson: but this is wrong! Example in (1) "London is a city" is true ⇔ London is a city are right: London and the class of cities (mentioned) left: one sentence and the class of true sentences (mentioned). Thomson: why do we accept (1) as true? Because we assume that "London is a city" is used as the name of the phrase "London is a city". (> name of sentence). And we assume this because we assume that the sentence mentioned to the left is the same sentence, Horwich I 162 that is needed on the right. And that is almost certainly what we are supposed to understand. Problem: whoever expresses (1) cannot tell us what we should assume here! In other words: We assume that (1) is a sentence of the meta-language for which there is a designation rule that states that "London is a city" is the name of the sentence "London is a city". N.B.: (1) itself does not tell us that this rule exists! ((s) because it needed a sentence in meta meta language). |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Block, Ned | Stalnaker Vs Block, Ned | I 222 Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content. E.g. if their experience when they see a ripe tomato is (and always has been) as mine when I see unripe pepper and vice versa, then the same experience that will represent the tomato as red to them will represent the tomato as green to me. We have then different experiences if we look at a ripe tomato but the tomato appears as red to both of us. Representational content/inverted spectra/Stalnaker: but the representational content (of whose ones spectrum is reversed) for the two persons is the same! ((s) Both have the experience "red"). ((s) representational/(s): here: on the word "red". So the language use plays a role. One can, for example, not say that the stimulus represents something neutral.) ((s) Representation/Stalnaker: appearance! ((s) So something more indirect than the phenomal experience "how it is".) Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: if that is correct then we cannot explain the qualitative character of visual experiences in concepts of properties that the things seem to have. Def representationalism/terminology/Stalnaker: thesis: that appearance is the basic, not "how it is". Representation: how things appear to us. Representative: Block. Stalnaker: it is here for me not about to defend the representationalism. StalnakerVsRepresentationalism/StalnakerVsBlock: I do not quite understand how representational content is to fully grasp the phenomenal character of experience. However, I believe that the strategy to explain qualitative content that way is the right one. Thought experiment/th.e./Stalnaker: I am skeptical about th.e. as the reversed spectra that want to separate representational and qualitative content. Inverted qualia/StalnakerVscommon sense-view: the common sense does not speak with one voice on comparison of qualia over time and between people. It can also be interpreted in a way that it supports a conceptual link between qualitative character and appearances (representation). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Bloomfield, L. | Lyons, J. Vs Bloomfield, L. | Lyons I 201 Lexem/Linguistics/Lyons: in this (more abstract) use we have stated above that e.g. "singing" is only a form of another word, while "singer" is a word of its own. Modern LinguisticsVs: neglects this abstract form. E.g.: BloomfieldVsTradition: the school grammar is inaccurate because it designates units such as e.g. book, books, or e.g. do, does, did as different forms of the same word. I 201 LyonsVsBloomfield: but is inaccurate in that it is still up to us how we define "word". Lexem/Lyons: here we introduce the more abstract form of word (neither phonological nor grammatical). It is these abstract units that occur in different flexion forms according to the syntactic rules. Lexem/Writing/Lyons: with capital letters e.g. CUT. Word/Definition/Lyons: Problem: how to define a unit that occupies a middle rank between morpheme and proposition, so that it corresponds to some extent to our intuitions, whereby these intuitions are rather guided by the non-essential orthographic convention? Def Word/Bloomfield/Lyons: (best known modern definition): the word is the "smallest free form" ((s) in the language). Def bound form/Bloomfield/Lyons: forms that never occur alone as whole utterances. Def free form: a form that can occur alone as an utterance. Def smallest free form/Bloomfield: any free form that does not contain a part itself. (= word). LyonsVsBloomfield: this applies more to phonological than to grammatical words. I 205 Bloomfield: did not clearly distinguish between grammatical and phonological words. BloomfieldVsBloomfield/Lyons: Bloomfield himself realized that some words are not covered by his definition like "the" and "a" (indefinite article). This is because they hardly ever occur as independent utterances. Solution/Bloomfield: additional criterion: to treat "the" and "a" like "this" and "that". These sometimes occur freely ((s) in answers) and stand within the sentence in the same environment. LyonsVsBloomfield: the definition has been accepted by many, but it does not serve the main purpose of grammatical description to generate sentences from which actual and possible utterances can be derived. All questions of classification must be subordinated to this goal. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Boole, G. | Frege Vs Boole, G. | Berka I 57 Classical Logic/Berka: bivalent extensional logic: mostly created by Frege. Frege: clear distinction between variables and constants, laws and rules, created the concepts of logic functions (propositional functions) and quantifiers, the semantics of sense and meaning, also the first axiomatic system of classical logic. Russell: was the first to recognize Frege’s importance. Notation/Russell: was rather a follower of Peano. FregeVsBoole: pro clear distinction between statements and class logic. Sets the AL as a foundation. Truth Functions/Frege: their theory is of central importance for the propositional calculus. Truth Value Tables: already known by Boole, Schröder, and Peirce. Systematically elaborated first by Post (1921)(1), Lukasiewicz (1921)(2), and Wittgenstein (1921)(3). First transferred to the PL by Foster (1931)(4), later by Wright (1957)(5). 1. E. L. Post, Introduction to a general theory of elemantary propositions, American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1921) , 163-185 2. J. Lukasiewicz, Logica dwuwartosciowa, PF 23 (1921), 189-205 3. L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, Ann. Naturphil. 14 (1921), 185-262 4. A. L. Forster, Formal Logic in finite terms Ann. Math. 32 (1931) 407-430 5. G. H. von Wright, Logical Studies, London 1957 Frege IV 92 SchröderVsBoole: Vs"Universe of Discourse" (> Quine: "You can still hatch enough..."). Sectors Calculus/Sector Calculus/Manifold/Schröder/Frege: division of an area into sectors, so that no point is at the same time in two sectors. (Boxes). ((s) no overlap). Most important relation between sectors: the containment of one in the others: "classification" (both can simply coincide). This corresponds to the relationship part/whole. IV 93 Instead of "sectors" we can also say "classes". Instead of manifold: "main sector". Manifold/Schröder/Frege/(s): classes of classes. ("main sector" box which comprises one or more boxes). Classes/Individuals/Schröder/Frege: Schröder also refers to an individual as class, but which only contains this single element, the individual. But also a class with several elements (individuals) can be considered a "thought thing" and thus can be presented as an individual. FregeVsSchröder: the difference between individual and class becomes fluent here. IV 9 FregeVsBoole: he tries to "embed abstract logic into the guise of algebraic signs". Frege against: tries to establish a uniform formula language of mathematics and logic. IV 13 FregeVsBoole: discards his concept of "universal class" ("universe", "universe of discourse" coined by de Morgan). SchröderVsBoole: the zero class is contained in every class. I.e. also in the class of the classes that are identical with the universal class. I.e. zero classes (in Boole designated with "0") and universal classes (in Boole designated with "1") are equal. So we have both: 1 = 1 and 0 = 1, and that is not possible. Schröder: the universal class cannot contain classes as elements among themselves, which in turn contain elements of the same manifold. ((s) anticipation of the theory of types). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Brandom, R. | Field Vs Brandom, R. | II 149 Reference/Index/Field: Georgej is identical with the reference from Mary’s Term "George" on occasion Z. This allows me to say ... "what Mary referred to on occasion Z ...". Demonstratives/Field: the approach works accordingly for demonstratives. Problem: I cannot put my own use of "this" in the place of Mary’s use. Solution/Field: an index suh as E.g. "This Mary, Z" Brandom: this is a means of incorporating Mary’s use of the expression into her own language. ((s) What is incorporated is the foreign use). FieldVsBrandom: This looks as if there were a non-deflationary concept of reference, ((s) thus determined by the content?) that could be applied to Mary’s pronoun, and that our anaphorically dependent phrase gets its reference from there. But I believe that his model is very close to ours of incorporation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Brandom, R. | Russell Vs Brandom, R. | Read III 26 Facts/Russell: a fact is different from the corresponding statement. There are false statements, but no "wrong facts". ((s) Brandom: speaks only of true statements as facts). VsRussell: But the cost of this statement is that it undermines the distinction between language and the world. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Brandom, R. | Meixner Vs Brandom, R. | I 115 Proposition/MeixnerVsBrandom: their special proximity to language leads to certain distinctions being made which lead to false identifications when equated with facts (state of affairs). Facts are not "true statements". |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Brandom, R. | Newen Vs Brandom, R. | NS 163 Justification/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: may be an entailment in the opposite direction. E.g. expecting thunder when there was lightning. NS I 164 4) as a contact with the world: language entry rules (entry rules) and exit rules. As inferential roles. a) language exit rule: actions are referred to as adequate practical conclusions, e.g. "The pot is boiling over" >urges for the action of taking it from the stove. b) Entry rule: involves perceptions of both the environment and the own body states. This leads to perception reports. VsInferentialism/VsBrandom/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: 1) People make mistakes or they are differently well-informed or differently clever. Does that then not mean that people must assign different meanings to utterances? Solution: a certain externalism: sentence meanings do not depend on the individual speaker, but is the product of social interaction. Vs: 2) there are certainly known errors related to probabilities for which many people fall. Problem: how to avoid collective errors becoming meaning-constitutive? VsBrandom: Problems: A: how can semantic inferentialism explain compositionality? B: how can it explain the concepts of reference and truth which, after all, still play a central role? NS I 165 Ad A: inferentialism is committed to whole sentences, because only between them there are entailments. To explain the inferential role of the whole sentence Brandom must explain how it arises from the inferential roles of the components, and how these components are identified. E.g. distinguishing singular terms and predicates. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Brentano, Fr. | Chisholm Vs Brentano, Fr. | II 212 Psychology/Analytic philosophy/Marek: question: is the concept of the mental uniform? One can speak of things that are mental: e.g. properties, qualities, phenomena, states, events. And you can say of concepts and theories that they are not mental. II 214 Question: Are there purely logical features that are characteristic of the mental? Brentano: yes, intentionality Other authors VsBrentano: the search for characteristics is in vain, since the mental is not further defined. E.g. as you cannot give specific characteristics for the concept of phenomenal color. You can only specify subspecies (for color as for the mental). I 217 Everyday language to quickly left behind. II 253 Science/Language/Brentano/Hedwig: Thesis: we may think with Copernicus, however, we speak with Ptolemy. E.g. rising of the sun. II 254 VsBrentano: this thesis could put him on the spot himself: it might turn out that in a daily statement, if it were thought in terms of his philosophy, something else would be thought than said. (> concept change, > translation, > meaning, > language/thinking). II 256 Brentano justifies the modern-thinking Copernican who speaks in the Ptolemaic language. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Bühler, K. | Quine Vs Bühler, K. | VII (c) 50/51 Grammar/Quine: objective problem: every speech act is considered an element of K. But to distinguish the individual elements, i.e. to group them into similar acoustic events, he must collect them into bundles of specific density, which qualify them as linguistic (language-related) forms. For this he needs the concept of the phoneme as generally relative term. Thus grammar is based on the two terms "significant" and "phoneme". How can we free grammar and the concept of the phoneme itself from the concept of synonymy? Solution/Bühler, Karl: the continuum of acoustic events can be represented in a three-dimensional diagram in which the frequency of occurrence is taken into account. The biggest bulges would then be the phonemes. QuineVsBühler: there are plenty of reasons to consider neither this over-simplified picture nor anything else a definition of "phoneme". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Burge, T. | Davidson Vs Burge, T. | I (d) 74 Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism. Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything. DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves. I (e) 116 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses). Glüer II 167 Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time. Frank I 665 Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken. But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that. Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge. 1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me. 2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents. Fra I 665/666 DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’. Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion. Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me. DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point: Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common. If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically. We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought. E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners! Fra I 667 If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right. BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis). DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought. Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice". DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show: a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say! b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs. ((s) that the meanings are not so). c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks. I 667/668 Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis. Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58 Frank I 710 Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents. It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude. Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject. As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible. I 711 Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view. How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent." But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal). Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal". DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved! We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Burge, T. | Newen Vs Burge, T. | NS I 129 VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents? |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Carnap Vs Carnap, R. | VI VII Extensionality thesis/Carnap: (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism CarnapVsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: not every extensional statement is translatable into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. Extensional method/Carnap: is basically just to use an extensional language for the whole constitutional system. Self-criticism: (1961) that is not clear: the impression could arise that for the validity of the re-construction of the concept A through a term B it was already sufficient for that B to have the same scope as A. Vs: in reality, the stronger condition must be satisfied that scope equality is not just a coincidence, but a necessity! (Because of logical rules or laws of nature). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Feyerabend Vs Carnap, R. | I 242 Carnap: the physicist assumes that the world contains only consistent theoretical systems. FeyerabendVsCarnap: the only way to decide if a particular property for science is necessary is to examine a functional postfestum. This leads straight back to the story, which provides the data for such an investigation. Then we have no way to assess a particular proposed system. I 362 Carnap: guiding principle: new and abstract languages can not be introduced directly, but must be linked to an existing observation language first. (FeyerabendVs). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Carnap, R. | Fodor Vs Carnap, R. | II 111 Formal Language/ideal language/Carnap: suppose we had three artificial languages L1, L2, and L3, each of which is considered as a possible idealization of the natural language L. The sentence S in the language L should be: - analytic in L1, - synthetic in L2, and - none of both in L3. How do we know whether S in reality is analytic, synthetic, or none? We ask of a theory that it answers this question. FodorVsCarnap: the theory would have to explicate the concepts of analytic in L, synthetic in L, etc. But none of the languages developed by Carnap and his successors does that. Therefore, they are not idealizations of natural languages. II 112 As long as, beyond that, these idealizations use terms that are not interpreted for natural languages, they claim wrongly to explain something. Then we have no way to detect deviations. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Carnap, R. | Goodman Vs Carnap, R. | II 67 GoodmanVsCarnap/Reduction Sentences: the whole thing is pretty absurd. In my opinion, philosophy has the task to explicate, not to describe science (and the everyday language). The explication shall refer to pre-systematic use of the expressions of consideration, but does not need to comply with the order. It s all about economy and standardization. Schurz I 219 Grue/Bleen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observes G*: grue) G*: ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: Emerald. Sample: {a:1 ‹ i ‹ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are equivalent b< definition. If we apply the inductive generalization conclusion both for "green" and for "grue", our sample results in the two universal hypotheses H: = "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are grue". Problem: H and H* imply for all emeralds not observed before t0 conflicting forecasts (green vs red). Schurz: the following relationship exists to subjective inductive exchangeability assumptions: for regular probability functions the exchangeability assumption cannot be valid at the same time for the predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*). Question: according to which criteria should we decide which predicates we consider as exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria were proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947.146 1976, 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "Positional" Predicate/Carnap, that is a predicate that refers to the time t0 in its definition. E.g. grue. Def Qualitative Predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75, 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): through reciprocal re-definition it is possible to move from our own language (with "green" and "red") to a language which is equivalent in its expressiveness and in which "grue" and "bleen"(G * x * x R,) act as basic concepts (basic predicates): Re-Definition/Language Dependence/Logical Form: Language L (Gx, Rx primitive) language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L Definitions in L* G*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 › Rx)) Gx: ‹› ((Bxt0 › G*x) u (~Bxt0 › R*x)) R*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 › Rx) u (~Bxt0 › Gx)) Rx: ‹› ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 › G*x)). Solution/Schurz: it is possible to distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates in terms of ostensive learnability independent of the language! I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: this does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending pattern that were so far observed as consistent into the future. To be able to formulate useful induction rules we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on the qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Important argument: the fact that individuals are "constantly" "grue" means that they change their color from green to red at t0 . In this case, we have carried out "anti-induction" and not induction. That is the reason why we (with Carnap) have basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features for induction rules. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Carnap, R. | Putnam Vs Carnap, R. | Goodman II Putnam Foreword V Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48). Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself, PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate. Lewis IV 85 Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts. IV 85/86 Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there. They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas". Putnam V 244 Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private. PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability. V 250 Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). Putnam I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful. There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them). Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions: 1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions. I 43 2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". Putnam I (a) 46 Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence. PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"! (I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term). I (a) 48 Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem. I (a) 49 Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Sellars Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VI 79 Self Psychological/Carnap: does not require the mediation of physical objects, but happens abruptly. (SellarsVsCarnap: only through the acquisition of language). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Tugendhat Vs Carnap, R. | III 213 Meta Language/Tugendhat: when translating into the meta-language it is assumed that we "understand" the meta language characters. Otherwise we would not have got beyond the syntax. What we then understand, the meaning of the meta language characters, cannot be indicated again by a "translation", otherwise one would remain ad infinitum in syntax. (recourse). We need the rules of use, i.e. pragmatics. (TugendhatVsCarnap). "Absolute" Truth/Tugendhat: here verification remains further excluded and therefore the concept of truth itself remains empty. TugendhatVsCarnap: what does "real state" mean if pragmatics is to be excluded? |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Carnap, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Carnap, R. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would the logical semantics reject in the lump, because it cannot be articulated according to the conception of language as a universal medium. I 194 ff WittgensteinVsCarnap/Wittgenstein/Bio/Hintikka: accuses Carnap, he had used his idea of physicalist base language without permission and without reasonable notice. Neurath has demanded, as the first in the Vienna Circle, one should no longer speak of "experience content" and the "comparison between sentence and reality", but only of sentences. (> Coherence theory). II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: the attempt to construct a logic that should be prepared for any situation, is an absurdity of great importance, such as Carnap's construction of a relation system, but which leaves it open whether something fits to what gives it content. VI 94 WittgensteinVsCarnap/Schulte: one cannot assume a priori that elementary propositions should consist of binary relations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Carnap, R. | Stalnaker Vs Carnap, R. | I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/terminology/Stalnaker: I developed the liberal platonism (LP) earlier to explain the difference between reference to numbers and normal things. But it is not a defense of the MR: thesis: one starts with facts of mathematical discourse e.g. existence of a practice that contains among others assertions, inference, arguments. If we then have Tarskian semantics (and require a domain of goods we are talking about) then this explains the facts about the discourse. Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate it is not a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and the semantics really tells us what the statements say? ((s) >content, >assertion). ((s) short: LP: thesis: practice is sufficiently without immaterial realm). I 44 Problem: then the LP says carelessly, that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. FieldVsStalnaker: that is a kind of linguistic idealism. Field pro Carnap: (Carnap: "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", 1950): as an external issue what numbers are it violates Carnap's principle. Platonism/Field: two theses: 1. numbers, functions and sets exist 2. they are mind-independent. Stalnaker: if I had formulated more cautiously, I would have set up a real platonism. Empiricist sense criterion/Carnap/Stalnaker: would say as we all: if the language did not exist, the statements would not be meaningful. Stalnaker: but that is still compatible with the fact that it still could be true. Internal issues: within a frame External issues: purely practical questions of whether to accept the frame. QuineVsCarnap/Stalnaker: thesis: all questions are asked in any linguistic context, and questions such as "Is it reasonable to accept a frame of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Carnap, R. | Stroud Vs Carnap, R. | I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Carnap, R. | Hempel. Vs Carnap, R. | II 139 Isolated Statements/Hempel: we could establish a criterion for the elimination of isolated statements: Def (4.1) a theoretical system is cognitively significant iff. it is partially interpreted up to at least the degree that none of its primitive statements is an isolated statement. Vs: but that can wrongly exclude well-supported statements. E.g. a system contains the primitive statement (S1) (S1) (x)(P1x > (Qx P2x) wherein P1 and P2 are observation predicates while "Q" is supposed to be a theoretical construction (see above). Now S1 is not a truth or falsity of formal logic. And if further S1 is excluded from the set of primitive statements of T, then the system T’, which is thus obtained, has exactly the same systematic i.e. the same explanatory power as T. The method may be too strict. S1 is an E.g. for what Carnap calls analytical statements! (Of course, it is not a truth of formal logic). Reason: all their consequences are truths of formal logic. II 140 HempelVsCarnap: E.g. Suppose our system T contained the additional statement (S2) (x) (P3x> (Qx P4x)) wherein P3 and P4 are additional observation predicates. From the standpoint that "any bilateral reduction statement is analytical" (Carnap), S2 would then be as analytical as S1. Still, the two statements taken together contain non-analytical consequences that are expressible solely in terms of observation predicates: (O) (x)(~(P1x u P2x u P3x u ~P4x) u ~(P1x u ~P2x u P3x u P4x)). We would hardly want to alow the consequence that the conjunction of two analytical statements may be synthetic. Analyticity/HempelVsCarnap: if the concept can be applied to statements of interpreted deductive systems at all, then it must be relativized with respect to the present theoretical context. It must also be put into perspective with view to the rules of the language at hand. II 141 Isolated Statement/Hempel: if we apply the other strategy and discard S1 as isolated statements, we arrive at an analogous conclusion. Whether a statement is isolated or not depends on the linguistic frame and theoretical context. |
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| Carnap, R. | Chisholm Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VIII 164 Pragmatics/ChisholmVsCarnap: his representation was over-simplified. Carnap: ditto. I have ignored possible effects of uncertainty and actual errors of the speaker. (> Radical Interpretation, RI). Chisholm: the analysis can be simplified by the concept of belief. Carnap pro. Belief/Pragmatics/Carnap: requires a conceptual framework of theoretical pragmatics. The basic concepts of pragmatics are best not behavioristically defined, but introduced as theoretical constructions in the theoretical language connected with the observation language on the basis of postulates and correspondence rules. Def Belief/Church: relationship between a person and a fact. Def Belief/Carnap: relationship between a person and a statement. The concept of Church is not pragmatic: (state which does not necessarily include language). VIII 165 It is neither implied that the person is aware of the belief, nor that they could verbalize it. Carnap: for the statement, verbalization is of course the condition. This corresponds to the believing-to-be-true. The pragmatic concept of intension serves the purpose of linking Churchian belief and believing of a statement. Chisholm II 68/69 Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: there is "no clear sense" in which such a sentence is related to words and their use! SauerVsChisholm: the objection is not severe: Solution: if ’(x) (Fx > Gx)’ is a meaning postulate in S, then one should not depart from this sentence itself, but from " ’(x)(Fx > GX)’ is a meaning postulate in S". That is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. II 71 Analytical/Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: do not secure that the definition of "square" means square is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Soames Vs Carnap, R. | 478 Set Theory/Truth-Definition/Tarski/Soames: ["snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessarily equivalent in elementary set theory. ((s) > Redundancy Theory). Truth-Predicate/Tarski/Soames: Tarski would not accept a predicate as a truth predicate if [ a is T] would not be material equivalent I 480 to any meta-linguistic paraphrase of the object-language sentence named by a. On this basis, Tarski can be interpreted as implicitly assuming that instances of (19) are necessary or a priori. (Soames pro). (19) If "T" is a truth-predicate for L and "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is quite different from claiming that "T" in (20) is replaced by a T-predicate for L, that then the resulting instances of the scheme would be necessary and a priori: (20) If "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is what it takes to claim (17) and (18)! PutnamVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (17/17 Tarski). DummettVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (18/18 Tarski). Putnam/Dummett/Soames: both show that Tarski's truth definition has nothing to do with understanding or semantic interpretation. Davidson/Soames: is best understood as not trying to analyze meaning in terms of truth, but to eliminate the concept of meaning in favor of the concept of truth. Then the defender of Davidson of "Truth and Meaning" would have the following instead of (i): (i) If x knows that what is expressed by the relevant instance of "S" is true in L iff p, for each sentence of L, then x is a competent speaker of L. Soames/Problem: if now "true in L" is understood as an abbreviation for the definition provided by Tarski, then (i) is as absurd as (18Tarski). SoamesVsCarnap: exactly this kind of absurdity lies in the following (which would allow Tarski's definitions to be the central concept in a meaning theory): (T) S is T iff p. Carnap/Soames: this occurs in Carnap in Meaning and Necessity p. 5/6 and section 7 of his Introduction to Semantics). Meaning Theory/M.th./Soames: must not appeal to other semantic terms. Truth-Predicate/Soames: the concept of truth does not play an ostensible role in our original problem. The refinement of the problem leads to the view that an adequate meaning theory must characterize a predicate that fulfills certain conditions. Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true propositions. ((s) That all true propositions have in common). |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Cartwright, N. | Simons Vs Cartwright, N. | I 125 Four Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975, p. 167): "four dimensional objects have different careers." SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants as generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career. Problem: if now continuants should disappear from the ontology then there is nothing from which something can be a career. This is speaking with a "forked tongue": you cannot enjoy the benefits of the old entities when abolishing them. The four-dimensionalism needs a whole new (unfamiliar, everyday language contradictory) manner of speaking. Whitehead/Simons: Whitehead is the only one who sits through this and he is literally obscure. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Cassirer, E. | Quine Vs Cassirer, E. | I 143 It is an illusion to think that our sentences, which can be easily translated into one another, are different linguistic incarnations of a certain intercultural proposition or meaning, they are rather nothing but mere variations of the same intra-cultural word usage. For theoretical propositions like "neutrinos have no mass" applies Wittgenstein's dictum "To understand a proposition is to understand a language." I 144 Ex Certain islanders are said to call pelicans their half-brothers. The islanders have a brief occasion proposition to which an islander always agrees when he is introduced to one of his actual half brothers or a pelican, and probably no comparably short sentence in the event that it is exclusively about the one half brother. The equipment of the German language is the complete opposite of that. Such difference are true cultural differences. Not infrequently (for example, in Cassirer) one comes up against the assertion: Cassirer: profound linguistic differences are ultimately differences of mindset or the way of seeing the world. QuineVsCassirer: this is often an indeterminacy of correlation. I 146 In proportion to how the radical translation is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions about linguistic behavior, also all of our theories and beliefs are forever underdetermined !. Here it may be objected that if two theories match in this way with respect to all possible sensory determinants, in an important sense it is no longer about two, but only about one theory. But nevertheless if two theories contradict with regard to individual sentences, then it is just a conflict betw. the parts. The principle of indeterminacy is noteworthy because translations usually progress step by step. I 147 The indeterminacy of translation has been less appreciated than its Proteus-like intra-linguistic counterpart in private worlds. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Castaneda, H.-N. | Boer Vs Castaneda, H.-N. | Frank I 387 Castaneda: Thesis: both the singular indexical reference of the first person and the quasi indexical reference corresponding to it are conceptually irreducible. Boer/LycanVsCastaneda: I 388 (1) Armand believes that he (himself) is happy. (1.A) [The triadic relation] BELIEF connects Armand, an empty sequence of objects, and [the demonstrative] THAT > [which refers to a type of sentence that has the same general behavioral role in every language as our sentence] "I am happy." Arrow: Showing/pointing action of the speaker In square brackets: the analyst's comment concerning the following expressions. THAT: implements Davidson's theory of indirect speech: it points to a sentence produced by the speaker placed merely phonetically or graphically beside the psychological verb. Role of the sentence: (according to Sellars): in Def "point quotation marks": this signals the role that tokens of this type play in the behavioral economy of the speaker: Example "red" (in dot quotation marks) denotes the same role as a "rouge" placed in dot quotation marks. This is a gain in knowledge. ((s) Language independent! unlike Tarski). This is a nominalistic analysis of "himself". (>Nominalism). Castaneda: Question: 1. (diagonal argument from 3. I 337): propositions have truth values, problem: are there enough propositions to describe infinite properties? 2. Realism: asks: how can objects and cases of behavior be distinguished from each other without qualities or relations providing classification criteria and role characteristics? Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Causal Theory | Leeds Vs Causal Theory | I 370 Reference Schema/Leeds: We should expect that the use in a community leads to a particular R-schema being discarded as the RS for L. We would then like to acquaint ourselves with the particular features of use, e.g. we would like to fill the spaces in: (L)(x)(y)(x refers to y in L iff __). Translation/Solution/Some Authors: We could use the idea of translation if we can already define "referred to in English". We are then able to write "x refers in L to y iff a translation of x in English refers to y in English." LeedsVs: This is not satisfactory since other languages may have words which cannot be translated into our language (English). I 371 This is valid for many proper nouns or theoretical termini (TT) in theories we do not know. E.g. if N were such a word, f.e.g. in Chinese, the following definition would be wrong: "(Ey)(N refers to y)". ((s) It is not the language which is important here but the entity.) Leeds: This is naturally not acceptable. Although we cannot expect that our definition tells us what N refers to, we naturally do not want it telling us that N does not refer to anything. Reference/Leeds: Hence the majority of today's authors have renounced to define reference through ideas of translation. Reference/Causal Theory/Leeds: Today, causal theories are the fashion. LeedsVsCausal Theory/Reference: The problem is well-known in philosophy, e.g. do numbers refer? In some representations yes, in others no. But no representation is convincing, which inevitably leads to the question: T-Def/Def Reference/Leeds: Why do we actually need to assume that a clear definition of truth and reference for random languages is possible?. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Cavell, St. | Fodor Vs Cavell, St. | III 222 Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 224 FodorVsCavell: fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he/she and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his/her investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before starting with the description of the language, he/she would have to know a whole lot about the language before he/she begins with his/her work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction without difference/Fodor: e.g. differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant ist distinction without reference. III 225 Cavell: empirical are e.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he/she is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation. 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: e.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc. FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice. III 230 FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) It is a wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I. Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations). III 232 FodorVsCavell: e.g. baker/professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers! FodorVsCavell: Cavell is right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions. III 233 FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Cavell, St. | Putnam Vs Cavell, St. | V 150/15 Stanley Cavell: (Lit: "Must we mean what we say?"): We could develop a philosophy of "normal language" that would not be limited to the public and "criterial" verification if we were able to develop a conception in which the standards themselves could not be detected by ordinary empirical studies. Such standards could be found through a kind of "self-insight", comparable to insights which are obtained in therapy or through the transcendental insight of phenomenology. Putnam: like Cavell: my knowledge regarding the mother tongue is not "external" inductive knowledge (e.g. I can know without further evidence what the correct plural form of certain nouns is) but, PutnamVsCavell: this privileged access does not extend to generalizations about correct and incorrect. Self-insight is not immune to criticism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Chalmers, D. | Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. | I 194 Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w.. Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context) I 195 defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token). Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference. StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device. Difference: a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning, b) not as meaning. Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth. I 202 Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages. I 210 Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended b) meta-semantically. I 211 Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently. Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts. Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Davidson Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 651 Self-attribution/External attribution/Wittgenstein: External attribution: based on behavioral criteria, self-attribution: without the benefit of such assistance. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: this is not satisfactory in response to skepticism: 1) it is a strange idea that the absence of clues should be better! Fra I 652 2) one would normally say that what is considered a clue will help to define the appropriate concept. Now, if the criteria are different, the concepts must also be different! Externally mental/External attribution/Self-attribution/Language/Error/Deception/Davidson: We should allow that the necessarily public and interpersonal character of language guarantees that we often apply mental predicates correctly to others, and therefore in fact often know what others think. Then the question is, what are the reasons you have for knowing yourself what you think. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: his answer may solve the externally mental, but creates the problem of the self-mental. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Putnam Vs Chisholm, R.M. | IV 178 Ziff: semantics that does not contain "intentionality" as undefined basic concept. ChisholmVsZiff: such a "behaviorist" semantics is impossible. PutnamVsChisholm: even if this were true, it would be irrelevant. Even if any semantic theory is successfully applicable to human language, it must be shown why it would not apply to machines. >Artificial consiousness, >intentionality. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Hintikka Vs Chisholm, R.M. | II 197 Intentionality/Hintikka: I can best show in my criticism HintikkaVsChisholm that it has different dimensions: Various criteria for intentionality by Chisholm turn out to be criteria for different dimensions of intentionality. Terminology: "referential opacity": this is what Chisholm calls the failure of the substitutivity of identity (SI). Non-Extensionality/Chisholm: this is what he calls the failure of substitutivity of sentences on the basis of shared truth values. This is not a criterion of intentionality for him, because the concept of necessity also violates the non-extensionality. Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: at first we look at those criteria of Chisholm’s that are about the order of quantifiers and intentional operators: This is shown by the failure of the following implications: (1) a believes that every individual F-t > a believes of every individual that F-t. (2) vice versa A formalization of (1) would be (3) Ba (x)F(x) > (x)(Ey) (x = y & Ba F(y)) (4) formalization of (2) correspondingly vice versa. II 198 HintikkaVsChisholm: his explanations of his own criteria are not entirely clear. Chisholm: it may be that you mistakenly think of an incomplete set of things that it contains every individual, and vice versa, you can mistakenly believe that complete set does not include all individuals. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is clearer: (i) there may be individuals that do not exist in the world of someone’s beliefs (ii) there may be individuals in the world of someone’s beliefs that do not exist in the real world exist. HintikkaVsChisholm: he does not see that the failure of (1) and (2) can occur in a much deeper way: E.g. the values of the bound variables are politicians in California and I believe that they are all lawyers. Suppose also that I have no beliefs about what kind of other politicians there are, except the ones that I know. In particular, there is no set of politicians of which I believe that they exhaust the class of politicians. Question: does it follow that I believe that every politician in California is a lawyer? No, it does not follow. ((s) The belief of an absence cannot be inferred from the absence of a belief). HintikkaVsChisholm: according to its criteria, that would have to follow! Solution/Hintikka: there is a set of politicians about whom I have no belief, but I do not doubt their existence or their being lawyers. The question of what I do believe about them does not arise. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: here it means that there are elements of the actual world, which are not linked with my belief worlds by any world lines. Important argument: it does not mean that they do not exist in the worlds of belief, only that the question of their existence or nonexistence does not arise there. World lines: cannot be extended in that case: Chisholm: limits himself to nonexistence in doxastic possible worlds (belief worlds). HintikkaVsChisholm: For me, on the other hand, it is about the possibility to draw world lines, namely in this case from alternative possible worlds back to the real world ("home"). II 199 Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: his criteria are a mixture of my criteria (b) (i), (ii) and (d) (i),(ii). They get their plausibility rather from (d) than from (b). Nonexistence/World Lines/Definability/HintikkaVsChisholm: the collapse of world lines represents a much deeper divide between possible worlds than nonexistence. Nonexistence/Hintikka: is considered by contemporary philosophers as much decisive. Def Intentionality/Criteria/Chisholm/Hintikka: Chisholm is an operator intentional p iff. p(S) is contingent for every value of "S". HintikkaVsChisholm: this is unreasonable: then there would be no intentional concepts at all! E.g. p = John believes that S = (S1 & ~S1). I.e. for a belief concept to be intentional, it must be possible, according to Chisholm, to believe an explicit contradiction. Contradiction/Hintikka: you cannot explicitly believe a contradiction, only implicitly. ((s) >Cresswell: if you do not understand what proposition is expressed by a conflicting sentence.) Chisholm/Hintikka: certainly means something else: even if John does not believe an explicit contradiction (S1 & ~ S1), there are many logically equivalent sentences that are logically wrong, but that John can believe. II 200 HintikkaVsChisholm: but even then his criterion is not met: because then it is no longer the contingency of p(S), but the failure of the logical equivalence which is to guarantee the substitutivity of identity (SI). SI/Hintikka: if it is abandoned, I can at the same time assert the logical falsity of (5) John believes that (S1 & ~S1) and assert the contingency of (6) John believes that S2 as well! Intentionality/HintikkaVsChisholm: in contrast, we need a concept of intentionality which excludes logical omniscience. Def Intentional/Hintikka: is then a concept iff. logical equivalence does not guarantee the SI in a context that is governed by this concept. Proposition/Sentence/HintikkaVsChishom: therefore we cannot assume that we can save Chisholm’s criterion by assuming propositions instead of sentences as values of "S" ((s) because propositions are by definition understood sentences, and therefore John would have to have explicitly contradictory beliefs when we attribute propositions to him). Solution/Hintikka: logical equivalence no longer guarantees substitutivity of identity (SI). Hintikka: we can further analyze this corrected version of Chisholm’s criterion ((s) only implicit contradictions credible, no contradictory propositions): Equivalence/Hintikka: we can distinguish between those logical equivalences that allow SI in epistemic contexts, and those who do not (> Lit. Hintikka 1974 Logic and language games). +... |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Chomsky, N. | Dennett Vs Chomsky, N. | I 513 Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even >Fodor. Also >McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian. Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould. I 531 "Cognitive lock"/Independence/Chomsky/McGinn: Spiders can't think about fishing. That's how it is for us: the question of free will may not be solvable for us. McGinn/Fodor: human consciousness is such a mystery. I 533 Cognitive lock/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world. I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today. Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret. I 556 DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for >"Strong Artificial Intelligence". |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Gould Vs Chomsky, N. | Dennett I 544 Language / Gould per Chomsky: to explain at best, as a by-product of the increase in size of the brain. No progress that emanated from grunts. The organ of speech is an exaptation like the wings of the bird. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Harman Vs Chomsky, N. | I 306 Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly. Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist. I 307 ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar. HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary. I 310 Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Chomsky, N. | Luhmann Vs Chomsky, N. | AU Kass 5 Self-organization/Luhmann: a system can only operate with self-assembled structures. No import of structures! Strange: E.g. language learning: it is almost incomprehensible how fast children learn languages. LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered. Instead: modern communication research: rather in the communication itself the language is learned through use, through assumption of understanding the habit to develop asigning sounds. This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization. Otherwise, one would think that the learner is trained in a specific sequence, instead of starting to speak by himself. E.g. dyslexia: the tendency to make mistakes, is extremely variable from person to person. This makes switching to self-organization unavoidable. That does not mean that an external observer might not notice that these are the same words as they appear in the dictionary. But that cannot be explained by structural import, but by structural coupling (s.u.). |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Chomsky, N. | Maturana Vs Chomsky, N. | I 128 Syntax / Grammar: If recursion is possible, a closed area can be made of behavior: E.g. dance, human language. Within such a range, the syntactic or grammatical surface structure may be only the description of regularities. In principle, the surface structure can be arbitrary! Reason: its training is consensual coupling is dependent on the history and not a necessary result of any necessary physiology. I 129 Conversely, the "universal grammar" of linguists (MaturanaVsChomsky) is recursive only in the universality of the process of coupling structures. The causes of the ability to recursive structures coupling are not self-consensually. They are structurally and depend exclusively on the operations of the nervous system together as a closed neuronal network. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Chomsky, N. | Pinker Vs Chomsky, N. | Dennett I 545/546 Steven PinkerVsChomsky: specialization to the grammar is a conventional neo-Darwinist process. The majority of the most interesting properties of the "language organ" must have evolved through adaptation. Pinker: the objections to this position are mostly ridiculous - e.g. the structure of the cell should be "purely physical" and explained without evolution - e.g. language were not designed to communicate, etc. Pinker I 218 Design/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design: E.g. the fact that I have a positive mass prevents me from eloping into outer space, but has nothing to do with selection. Simple physical explanation. Explanation/Selection/PinkerVsChomsky: you usually do not refer to selection to explain utility, but to explain something improbable. E.g. eye. If we calculate the parts of the universe with a positive mass and those equipped with an eye, we need an explanation for this difference. Vs: one might reply: the criterion: seeing/not-seeing was only introduced in retrospect, after we knew what animals are capable of. I 219 Most clusters of matter cannot see, but most cannot "fle" either, and I define that now as the composition, size and shape of the stone, on which I'm sitting now. Def Design/Pinker: If the function cannot be described more economically than the structure, no design is present. The concept of function adds nothing new. Design/Pinker: should not serve the harmony of the ecosystem or the beauty of nature. After all, the replicator must be the beneficiary. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Strawson Vs Chomsky, N. | VI 386 Transformational grammar: two kinds of formative: 1. lexical: correspond to names and general terms whose meaning is not somehow derived syntactically: e.g. "to sing", "to love", "red", "Mary". 2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group: e.g. the formative "pret" for the past tense. There is no mechanical process to find the deep structure. VI 389 Thesis: "Unconscious mastery" or "internal representation" is not enough to explain the linguistic abilities. The rules of transformational grammar provide the basis for the determination of those grammatical relations which are decisive for the semantic interpretation of sentences though not alone determining. VI 390 Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon. StrawsonVsChomsky: there is no general theory of the decisive class of compounds (of grammatical categories and formatives). VI 391 There is only the list of items in the dictionary without any representation of general principles of the allocation. But we should expect just such a theory if the grammar is to satisfy the conditions of transparency. Because we define with the grammatical categories the functions and relations of the sentence elements. That is what everyone understands without having explicitly learned grammar. We combine obvious semantic and syntactic considerations. VI 392 Explanation/Chomsky: this one admits that a "descriptively adequate" grammar must not be "explanation adequate". We need a theory of linguistic universals. In addition, it must be explained how our grammar was selected from other possible grammars. It must be explained: 1. Why do we understand infinitely many new propositions? (> See also the discussion "Is Language infinite?"). 2. The connection of semantics and syntax. VI 393 StrawsonVsChomsky: comments only expressly reserved on semantic considerations. Dictionary/Chomsky: is part of the base and contains far fewer entries than our ordinary dictionary. VI 395 Transformation grammar Vs traditional grammar: it was too unsystematic, no explanation of the traditional terms "verb", "noun", "object" possible. VI 396 PhilosophyVsGrammar/Strawson: is first freed from "empirical" requirements, does initially not need to cope with the actual formal requirements He has just like the grammarian a conception of meaning elements and a conception of semantically significant combination modes of these elements, to which the vocabulary is available in a transparent relationship. With these transparent relations he can consider possible formal arrangements by whom the combining functions could be dispensed. This is reminiscent of the construction of ideal languages. VI 397 Quine: (anywhere): "Do not show more structure than necessary". Grammar/Strawson: one must always distinguish between the actual (essential, crucial) and possible grammars. E.g. the essential grammar must show what elements belong to which, all combinations must be shown and be possible to distinguish. E.g. it must be possible to show when an element describes a non-symmetric relation. But the essential grammar determines in no way how these requirements are to be fulfilled. VI 398 We can choose one of several grammars. If it fulfills the requirements, we have a complete and totally transparent grammar. (Only idealized simplified, that is the price). Vocabulary/Strawson: we need a completely elaborate vocabulary or a set of related vocabularies. 1. Ontological vocabulary e.g. space, time, thing, gen. characteristics 2. Semantic V., for types and individual (abstract) elements, proper names for things, 3. Functional V. for combination or relation types. Deictic elements. 4. Vocabulary of the formal apparatus. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Chomsky, N. | Loar Vs Chomsky, N. | EMD II 158 Complexity/Language/Loar: Thesis: it is not too far-fetched to claim that "incomprehensible" complex sentences are not part of our language! So we could reduce English to a finite fragment of the language we would have mastered if our brains were bigger. Then there is no problem for KD: KD: For each sentence s of LO, if L(S) = M, then all members of P know (implicitly or potentially) then if someone expresses S in circumstances where the sentence is free for M en, the speaker thereby expresses M. Vs: this is extremely controversial, and avoidable. Solution/Loar: two stages: 1. Language/Infinity/Loar: Thesis: the number of sentences we understand is enormous, but still finite! (LoarVsChomsky: also number of understandable sentences is finite). II 159 2. Stage of the solution: no language that is extended (created) by adding random non-English (sentences cum meaning) is excluded by this condition. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Church, A. | Quine Vs Church, A. | I 368 QuineVsChurch: The subject does not need to speak the language of the object sentence. There is a German phrase of which is true that the mouse, which is afraid of the cat, fears it. But in a certain way they remain language relative (Church). Ex A sentence in a given concrete translation might have a slightly different meaning. For Church this is even likely, because he also accepts all sorts of artificial languages. So we improve: (7) Thomas true-believes in German "Cicero..." I 369 According to Church, we would then have to make all other possible translations as well (8) Thomas believes true in German "Cicero has denounced Catiline." But an Englishman who does not speak German would find other information in (8) than in a full translation. (9) Thomas believes that Cicero denounced Catiline (in English). However, since (8) reflects the meaning of (7), (9) must miss the meaning of (7). QuineVsChurch: not necessarily because a certain concept of meaning is required. Quine: (7) not satisfactory because of the dependence on a language. Such relations of a sentence, a person and a language cannot be linked with the propositional attitudes. I 370 Sheffler + about expressions and degrees XI 55 Identity/Necessity/Church: the values of the variables could be reduced to intensions and thereby make all the true identity statements necessary. QuineVsChurch: it is a mistake to think that the quantified modal logic can tolerate only intentions, but no classes or individuals. Proof: Specification/Quine: every thing x, even an intention is, if it can at all be specified, specifiable in random matching manner. ((s) >indeterminacy of translation, indefinite >reference, >inscrutability of reference). XI 56 Suppose x is determined as the only thing by the condition "φx", so it is also determined as the only one by the conjunction "p u φx". Now you select any truth for "p" that is not implied by "φx", and both specifications contingently turn out to be consistent. So you gain nothing by taking intentions as values of the variables. Should we try again with necessary identity? Identity/Necessary Identity/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: let us consider the following postulate (1) ((w)(Fx w = x) u (w)(Gw w = x))> N(w) (Fw Gw) The demands that if there are always two open sentences that determine the same thing x as the only thing, they should be necessarily equivalent. Although this would repeal the referential opacity of the rules - it would also repeal modal distinctions themselves at the same time! (... + ...) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Church, A. | Stalnaker Vs Church, A. | II 127 Belief attribution/belief ascription/foreign-language/foreign language/Stalnaker: if O'Leary speaks another language it makes no difference for the explanation as long as he is somehow familiar with Venus. O’Leary's belief is one about mars and hesperus, not about language. Diagonalization/Stalnaker: works here likewise. Against: Belief on language use/conviction about language/Church/Burge/Stalnaker: Church 1954, Burge 1978): e.g. Alfred believes that "a fortnight" is a period of 10 days. This is then true in all possible worlds with this semantic rule for English and wrong in others. Translation/Church: problem: there is no translation test for it! (if an error is in play). E.g. a translation into German would not express the same because there is an equivalent for "a fortnight" in German. Stalnaker: Church seems to say with this that the proposition cannot express what it seems to express. Solution/Church: metalanguage. StalnakerVsChurch: we can explain the failure of translation tests without this conclusion: II 128 Solution/Stalnaker: diagonalization: translation into another language will change the possible contexts for propositions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Churchland, P. | Dennett Vs Churchland, P. | II 64 Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g. "X is a weight in grams of 144" "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second." DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g. "This goat is worth $ 50". And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc. I Lanz 302 Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b). Instead, P.S. Churchland: >"Neurophilosophy": ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology. I 303 ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Churchland, P. | Fodor Vs Churchland, P. | IV 189 Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 191 FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages! IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account. IV 193 Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies. IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language. IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. IV 196 Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions? IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. >State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. --- Metzinger II 466 "Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true. 2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes. II 467 "Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Churchland, P. | Rorty Vs Churchland, P. | I 138 Science/RortyVsChurchland: that in the future brain states could be measured objectively is really irrelevant. It does not depend on that. The assumption that there is an excellent response, depends on the idea before Quine that there were "necessary and sufficient conditions built in our language" for the use of terminology such as "sensation" etc. I 139 mental/physical/VSeliminative materialism/Rorty: one can hardly say, "mental" in reality means something "that could turn out to be something physical," just as one can not say Ex "criminal behavior" means in reality so much like "behavior that may turn out to be innocent." (> Epiphenomenalism). IV 53 Layman Psychology/RortyVsChurchland: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "convictions" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools. On the other hand elementary particles are certainly the appropriate instrument to talk about tables and make predictions about them. One can not say better "tables are real". VI 169 Layman Psychology/DennettVsChurchland/Rorty: is not so bad, exactly because it is successful. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Churchland, P. | Pauen Vs Churchland, P. | Pauen I 99 Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories. I 100 VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis. All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though. I 101 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states). On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true. Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology. VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved. I 102 Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits... PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level: The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design. In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all. I 103 VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry. In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro). I 104 3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object. I 105 This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination. VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts. He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness. I 188 Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories. Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness": I 189 forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology. Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge. Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other. I 191 Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible! The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Therefore, our methods must fail. I 192 Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties: Levine: then there is a two-stage process: I 193 1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are. I 194 This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Cognition Theory | Searle Vs Cognition Theory | I 8 SearleVsCognition Psychology: Black Box, the cognitive scientists repeat the worst mistake of the behaviorists: they insisted to examine only objectively observable phenomena. So they left the essential characteristics of the mind aside. In the big black box they only found a lot of small black boxes. I 217 cognition theory: Here it is claimed, we would have drawn a conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognition theory: On the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. The background is not a control system. I 222 SearleVs Cognitive Science/VsCognition: the basic assumptions of cognitive science are wrong. Cognitive Science: neither the examination of the brain nor the study of consciousness is of interest or value. Although the cognitive mechanisms are actually in the brain, and some of them refer to the awareness a superficial expression, but we are interested in the intermediate level, where actual cognitive processes happen, which are inaccessible to the consciousness. These processes are not only factually special principle unconsciously. Typical representatives: Chomsky, Marr, Fodor. I 256 Explanation/SearleVsCognitivism: Thesis: many of our cognitive science explanations do not have the explanatory power, we attach to them. To save them, we will have to make a reversal of its logical structure: as it took place during the transition from pre-Darwin biology to the biology à la Darwin. I 256/257 The brain produces states of consciousness, and that is all. As for the mind, this is already the whole story. There are the blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness, otherwise however there is nothing. No rule-following, no mental information processing, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no original drafts, no two and a half dimensional images, no language of the mind, and no universal grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Coherence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory | Horwich I 488 Coherence Theory/M. Williams: has to do with skepticism. The coherence theory says that the analysis of truth in non-epistemic terms makes it inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, disquotationalism, but also the richer correspondence theory, would be excluded. I 489 Truth/justification/acceptability/Arthur Fine: when one sees that the realistic T-concept creates a gap that keeps the epistemic approach ((s) justification) always out of reach, one might be tempted to redefine truth in epistemic terms to literally make it accessible. M. WilliamsVs: as an epistemic thesis, skepticism can only be derived under skeptical premises! Truth/Skepticism/M. Williams: no concept of truth makes it inaccessible by itself: one always needs epistemic premises! Gap/M. Williams: the gap Fine means is probable: even the best justified belief can be wrong. M. WilliamsVs: nevertheless, why should this lead to radical skepticism? ((s) Everyone can be wrong, but not all can be wrong). Correspondence Theory/Skepticism/M. Williams: combined with a Cartesian dualism it leads to skepticism. But if representations can only be compared with other representations, this leads to the coherence theory ((s) Berkeley> Coherence Theory). Correspondence Theory/M. Williams: modern form: tends towards naturalism and physicalism by identifying reference with a causal relation. (Causal Theory of Reference). I 490 Correspondence Theory: argues with the impossibility of an alternative. Coherence theory does the same! M. Williams: both do not answer the question: why not be satisfied with deflationism? Deflationism/M. Williams: can share many of the criticisms of Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory and vice versa. Because he neither shapes the idea of truth as correspondence nor shows that truth is an epistemic property. I 495 Correspondence Theory/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: because the truth of our beliefs explains success, a correspondence theory can explain, I 496 what is the contribution of language behaviour to the success of overall behaviour. Truth/Explanation: this is how success explains it: (i) if we have true beliefs about our goals, we will generally achieve them. (ii) We have true beliefs about how we achieve our goals. (iii) We generally achieve our goals. Horwich: admits that truth actually has an explanatory role here. Putnam would be right if there were no alternative explanation. VsPutnam/VsCorrespondence Theory: yet there is no obvious connection between his argument and a physicalistic correspondence theory: Truth/Law/M. Williams: you can save Putnam's argument by assuming that (i) involves a generalization that may even be lawful. BoydVsPutnam: does not want truth to appear in any laws. ((s) The theory explains success as well as the truth of the theory. Instead, the theories could simply be listed. - Vs: that would only work without generalization.) M. Williams: I do not believe that (i) is a law. That is because it is not really an empirical position. Belief/Content/Truth/Davidson: determining their content is not independent of giving meaning to our general behaviour and therefore most must be true. Ad (i): is then not an empirical law but a reflection of a condition of interpretation. I 497 Correspondence Theory/Putnam: it is not the explanation of our success that motivates the correspondence theory itself, but the consideration of Premise (ii): that most beliefs are true. Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give (ii) meaning if we explain the reliability of learning and only realism can do that. Causal Theory/Correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would present us as reliable signal generators. What would the truth theory contribute? It communicates that the proposition is true iff the state exists. This is the correspondence involved in causal theory, it is exactly the correspondence established by the T-Def. Deflationism/Correspondence/M. Williams: to him this minimal correspondence is also available. I.e. Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or any other substantial theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Compositionality | Fodor Vs Compositionality | IV 64/65 Truth Conditions/tr.cond./holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W. Problem: if it is really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language, i.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But: Non-Compositional Language/non-recursive/recursive/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like: "It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc.", but not: "Snow is white and grass is green" or "Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc. We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences. It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white. So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect). IV 66 E.g. suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary". 1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold" 2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary". We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1. Nevertheless, if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his/her statements. Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound clusters.) Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold? T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence: "Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence "Alfred" is true iff. grass is green. Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none. It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem: IV 178 QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong. IV 178/179 VsFodor/Lepore: then one might do with a reformulated CRT (conceptual role theory): the compositional meaning, but not the inferential role is compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: there is a risk of circularity: if you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!" Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological (>Computation). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Compositionality | Harman Vs Compositionality | Schiffer I 188 Mentalese/HarmanVsCompositionality/Understanding: (Harman 1975, 271): (He was not confused by puns about "use"): even for the understanding of public language compositionality is not needed, provided that thinking takes place in their own public language. He needs two premises: 1) we would only need a compositional semantics if spoken utterances were a matter of decoding language into public Mentalese. 2) But because we think in German, there is no such decoding. Compositionality/Compositional Semantics/Representation/CS Theory/Schiffer: we must also recognize that the compositional semantics theory is not threatened by what I assume about mental representations: (A) Even if we think in Mentalese, there is no true theory of intentionality or of representation as such, which implies that Mentalese has a compositional semantics (B) The truth of (A) does not imply that the public language has no compositional semantics. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Conceptual Relativism | Davidson Vs Conceptual Relativism | Glüer II 134 Conceptual Relativism/DavidsonVsConceptual Relativism/Glüer: his rejection of conceptual relativism applies only to the level of whole languages. There cannot be "global" relativisms for fundamental considerations. Glüer: but "local" relativisms are only possible at all against this backdrop, which assures understanding. Davidson's anti-relativistic arguments provide the background for different perspectives. Cf. >skepticism, >perspective. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow Content/categories/twin earth/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Connectionism | Pinker Vs Connectionism | I 146 Def Connectionism/Pinker: Variant of the computer theory of the mind: the main form of information processing are statistical calculations with multiple levels. Vs: despite the promising name "neuronal" they are not particularly realistic models of the brain. For example, a "synapse" (i.e. the weighting of a link!) can switch between stimulating and inhibiting properties. And information can flow both ways at an "axon" (connection). VsConnectoplasm/VsConnectionism: has major difficulties with 5 tasks of everyday thinking: I 147 1) No individuality: if networks work with the same representations, they are indistinguishable from each other! Only generalities (classes, vegetables) can be represented, but not a specific horse. It is not a solution to let the node for horses become twice as be active, because this state does not differ from the twice as large the belief that the properties of a horse are present or the properties are present in double scope. It would be a mistake to regard the individual as a very, very specific subclass. I 151 VsConnectionism/VsAssociationism: 2) Problem: Def Compositionality/Pinker: the possibility that a representation is made up of parts, while their meaning results from the meanings of the parts and the way they are combined. E.g. Compositionality is the key feature of all the human languages. I 153 Language: E.g. distinction baby saw chicken/chicken saw baby shows that this is not a collection of separate units. Neural Networks/Compositionality/Language: Problem: compositionality is surprisingly hard to cope with for the connectoplasm. When active/passive are distinguished, then at the price that you no longer know who does something to whom. I 154/155 We have the units: Baby eats and snail is eaten. If we wanted to distinguish between poodle and baby, we do not know whether the poodle saw that the baby ate the snail, or vice versa. The unit that the baby eats does not say anything about what it eats, and the (separate) unit for snail is eaten does not say by whom. The problem cannot be solved by weighting again. Solution: the mind needs a representation of the statement itself. Our model therefore needs an extra layer of units. This structure is very similar to normal, language-like Mentalese. The components of the logic, predicate, argument, and statement must adjust themselves again. In addition, quantification to eliminate I 156 E.g. "every 45 seconds someone suffers an accident, poor fellow." "Someone"/Quantification/Pinker/(s): x can be stand for "someone". (Everyday language translation). PinkerVsConnectoplasm: Problem: Interference, "disastrous forgetting": if the weighting for addition is changed, for example is newly introduced for the addition of 2, then it may be that the addition of 1 is forgotten. ("crosstalk"). I 165 PinkerVsConnectoplasm: the connectoplasm is so underprivileged that you often have to build networks with the worst combination: with too many innate structures in conjunction with too much input from the environment. This is how knowledge becomes useless if the question itself changes only a little. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Contextualism | Schwarz Vs Contextualism | Schwarz 184 Contextualism/Schwarz: has the language use on his side. Vs contextualism/Schwarz: his opponents have to explain why we systematically make in either everyday life or in the philosophical seminar false judgments about knowledge. Vscontextualism: it violates certain semantic principles, according to which e.g. propositions of the form "If someone says "S" and is right about it, then S" is always true. contextualism: According to it, this can be violated in the knowledge attribution, if in the original utterance situation other options were relevant were than now. VsVs: it is not clear whether the contextualism must accept this consequence at all. In addition, other types of context-dependency seem to have the same result: no one doubts e.g. that the interpretation of modal words depends on the context, then I can have said yesterday something true with "travelling faster than light is impossible", although travelling faster than light is very well possible - metaphysically possible. Vs contextualism/Schwarz: other authors: he did not refute skepticism: once the skeptics suggests skeptical possibilities, he won. That's true! This is not a disadvantage but an advantage. The more skeptical possibilities an epistemology denies, the less credible it is. There are possible worlds in which inductions always go wrong, where people hallucinate constantly and are deceived by evil demons. Schw I 185 A denial would be naive. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Correspondence Theory | Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory | I 6 Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts. This has an important consequence: Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism. The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected I 7 not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world. I 8 Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple: VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory). Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around: Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!). Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind. I 10 It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"? Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then? Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept. The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning. I 86 Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things. Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty. Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation. This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations. On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied. I 87 Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Correspondence Theory | Rescher Vs Correspondence Theory | I 344 Correspondence Theory/Rescher: can be 1. definition-like 2. criterion-related Verification: "confrontation with the facts" useless: not in all propositions, past, probability, modality, counterfactual conditional RescherVsCorrespondence Theory: kind of correspondence completely unsolved RescherVsWittgenstein VsPicture Theory: language does not work like this. I 345 RescherVsCorrespondence Theory: what kind of "correspondence" is at stake is not even nearly satisfactorily solved. I 382 RescherVsWittgenstein: this theory assumes a reflection or representation theory. Language does not really work that way. I 345 The correspondence theory does not solve the problem of the criterion. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Cresswell, M.J. | Stechow Vs Cresswell, M.J. | I 154 Lambda-Operator/λ-Operator/Stechow: the language used here corresponds pretty much to the λ categorial of Cresswell 1973. Only difference: Cresswell: does not differentiate between syntactic categories and types. The type symbols act at the same time as category symbols. StechowVsCresswell: this is impractical, because different categories can have the same type. For example intransitive verbs as well as nomina are of type ep. Here: we choose a language with meaning*types, so e, p etc. Lambda-Operator/Semantics/Linguistics/Stechow: interprets the motion index. Thus the logical properties of the operator are transferred to the interpretation of the movement. Movement: (on LF) creates a lambda operator that binds its track and thus all the same variables (pronouns) that it commands c. 1. Interpretation: of a closed expression does not depend on the choice of a certain occupancy. This is a consequence of the so-called Def Coincidence Lemma: this means that two expressions, which differ only by free variables, can be interpreted in the same way by suitable assignments. 2. The syntax of the λ language contains the principle of the Def λ conversion, which is our function conversion. The principle says that you can break down a λ operator if you use an expression of the variable type for the variables bound by the operator. This follows from the >transition lemma. (>binding). 3. Bound Renaming/Stechow: if two expressions differ only in the choice of their bound variables, they mean the same thing. ^These are the alphabetical variants. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Cultural Relativism | Quine Vs Cultural Relativism | II 45 Suppose all categorical observation sentences were indeed true, although even that is not known. Other conditions for the truth of one or the other theory can certainly not be made. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible, despite their empirical equivalence, which evokes the scare of >cultural relativism. Because each is apparently true only from its standpoint. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The scare can be easily dispelled: with a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": As the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they must evaluate a particular sentence oppositely. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if they were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to the other one. II 46 We could characterize this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this notation we could settle any conflict of these theories. Both could thenceforth be allowed as terminologically different true descriptions of the same world. The threat of truth relativism is averted. Observation sentences correspond with the theory holophrastically (as whole sentence) regardless of their internal structure except for the possible content of the logical implikation links between formulations and categorical observation sentences. The language needs to be neither divalent nor realistic, it does not even need anything that is clearly recognizable as terms or reference or contain any identifiable ontology. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: self-contradictory. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Ayer Vs Davidson, D. | I 289 Fact: pq always contains p. Thesis: that we finally have only one fact, namely, that which is expressed by the conjunction of all true statements that are independent from each other . (> Big fact). (AyerVs). This can only be avoided if we define certainty differently: Three conditions for statements: 1st they have to be directly testable. 2nd they must be simple, not composed of others. 3rd They must be absolutely specific in terms of the language. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Davidson, D. | Dummett Vs Davidson, D. | Dummett I 28ff DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth. DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!. I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing. I 146 Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use. Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so. I 187 DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions. Avramides I 8 DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability). I 9 This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning. I 87 Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist. DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered. Solution: "Translation without end". II 108 Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom. Putnam I 148 Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in. Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously. VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | Fodor Vs Davidson, D. | IV 68 Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like! IV 69 Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well. Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side. QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT). This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof". This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem. E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives. That seems to be a holistic consequence. Vs: but that is premature. Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation! I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all! Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior: 1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible. IV 74 Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions. From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle). These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc. IV 84 Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language! IV 98 "Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true! IV 100 Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions, 2) are syntactically atomistic. The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts. IV 101 We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable. > Behavior/wish IV 120ff. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Davidson, D. | Harman Vs Davidson, D. | Field II 59 Meaning/HarmanVsCompositionality/HarmanVsDavidson: (1075, p.286): Davidson’s theory would be circular if the speaker, who somehow has to represent that snow is white, used the words "snow is white". If that is to be solved with Mentalese, the problem occurs again with the question about the meaning of Mentalese. Solution: not knowing the truth conditions is important for the semantics of representations, but we must attribute the truth conditions, not their knowledge. Field: we also want to be able to distinguish between beliefs about Caesar and those about quarks. Field: but it is a serious question why we should distinguish these contents of representations at all!. For the purposes mentioned above we only need syntax, no semantics of representations. E.g. Suppose a super-simple psychological theory that only seeks to explain the link ">" in representations legally: II 60 E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1> S2] and wishes S2, then they also want S1. Important argument: although this is explained by a truth value table, we do not need it for our psychological laws (of the super-simple theory). I.e. we do not need to know the meaning of the sentences S1 and S2. ((s) Is this about attribution? Then it is okay. Otherwise it would correspond approximately to: "I wish that the conditions for positive events are realized." And that is too complex and indirect.) Field: however, we must be able to introduce degrees of belief here. The super-simple theory could also include laws such as this: E.g. There is a special class of observation sentences in the representation system, with the property that each of them is connected with a particular type of stimulus. Whenever the stimulus occurs, the organism believes the observation sentence. Important argument: here we do not need to know the meaning of the observation sentence. The psychological theory does not need to assume that the sentence E.g. "there are rabbits in the vicinity" is true. Scientifically nothing is lost if the relation R is assumed to be one between people and meaningless sentences. E.g. in RI: RI: E.g. the native lifts his rifle in the face of the rabbit. This is an overwhelming reason to assume that he beliefs that there are rabbits in the vicinity. Solution: he beliefs a sentence in his language, which in his psychology II 61 plays about the same role as the sentence "there are rabbits in nearby" plays in mine. Semantics/Field: Important argument: is this really a semantic concept? Translation: Is a semantic concept, but a weak one. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Kripke Vs Davidson, D. | III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": A language cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be "first language". III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: We only need to demand that only a finite number of axioms possess "new" vocabulary (weaker). Horwich I 450 Reference/Radical Interpretation/RI/Field Linguist//Davidson/Rorty. Reconciles these two approaches saying that Strawson is right when his approach is seen holistically, i.e. if one places Aristotle’s formulation of the "whole and for the most part" first. Rorty Strawson: Yet his criterion cannot be applied to individual cases while being sure that one is right. Quine/Rorty: Stands between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of both, of the causation and of the reference, is equally a question of the conviction’s coherence of the native and the field linguist. Reference/Kripke/Rorty: His approach is a "building block" approach: Here we see causal paths of objects leading to individual speech acts. Conviction/true/Truth/KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: this approach leaves the possibility open that all our convictions could be wrong. Or that one basically does not know what he refers to (because one misunderstands all causal paths). KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: which makes it possible to completely separate the reference and intentional objects. DavidsonVsKripke / Rorty: Davidson warns exactly against this: The gap between scheme and content. Solution/Davidson: Reverse order: We must first maximize coherence and truth, and then the reference, as a byproduct, can be like as it wants to be! Important Argument: This ensures that the intentional objects of many convictions (the "most direct cases") are their causes. ((s) Vs: it would then still be possible according to Löwenheim that what appears to be direct to us is not the most direct. DavidsonVsKripke: Kripke’s gaffe, e.g. the Gödel-Schmidt case must remain the exception. I 451 Because if the gap between references and intentional objects (which one refers to, and the one of which one believes one refers to) would be the rule, then the term "reference" would have no content! He would be as useless for the field linguist as the term "analytic". Gavagai/RI/Communication/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: the field linguist can communicate with the natives when he knows most of his intentional objects. Therefore: DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The radical interpretation (RI) starts at home. Then we can assume for ourselves as well as for the natives that most of our beliefs are true. Rorty: Is this an answer for the skeptic or does it only express what JamesVsSkepticism says:that the question is a bad question? Language/Representation/Intermediary/Medium/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson rejects "intermediaries" (intermediate members) between the organism and its environment (to be able to perform RI). Intermediate links between the organism and object: e.g. "special meaning", e.g. "intended interpretation", e.g. "what stands before the mind of the speaker" Without them we can say "RI begins at home". I 453 Solution/Davidson:fulfillment/DavidsonVsSkepticism/DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: For his refutation we need Tarski’s fulfillment ratio (word-world) instead of "correspondence" (which would correspond to the truth of sentences) of the relation proposition world). ((S) Because only whole sentences can be true). RI/Gavagai/Field Linguist/Davidson/Rorty: The field linguist is going to connect individual words of the native with objects (pieces of the world). Translation/fulfillment/Davidson/Rorty: Problem: The fulfillment relation is not a basis for translations, the fulfillment is rather a byproduct of translations. Hermeneutical circle/HC/Gavagai/RI//Davidson/RortyVsKripke: To go back and forth in the HC is not a building block-theory. It corresponds more to the "Reflective Equilibrium" of Rawls. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Putnam Vs Davidson, D. | McDowell I 177 PutnamVsDavidson: when the cause-effect description is complete, then the sounds we utter will be far more than mere "expression of our subjectivity". Putnam III 154 Incompatibility/Language/Theories: (Goodman and Davidson find that so exciting): point, line, border, etc. are used differently in the versions. E.g. "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not quantities, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes either there is no world, or we live in more than one. Davidson: the actually recognized phenomenon of equivalent descriptions somehow contained a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. Putnam I (k) 263 PutnamVsGoodman/PutnamVsDavidson: E.g. point: we should just give up the notion that the various sentences about the point as a concentrically shrunken sphere or space portion preserve something that is called their "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. Use Theory/Putnam: here there is no need to decide whether a such a change of use is a change of meaning! ((s) E.g. sinus in analysis or in elementary trigonometry. Kursbuch 8 p. 80, Waismann). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Davidson, D. | Quine Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 42 QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible. Davidson II 92 Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology). II 97 An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences. II 98 Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique. QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates. Quine II 56 Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth. QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world". Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction. Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory. Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas. Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence. VI 57 Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own. VI 58 Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects. VI 59 "Common situations" are too vague for me. VI 62 Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves! VI 63 In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way. VI 136 Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms. VI 137 If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory). In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis. Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts. VI 138 Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true. VI 139 Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory. The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially. VI 140 It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true. XI 156 Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Strawson Vs Davidson, D. | III 189 Truth theory/tr.th./meaning theory/m.th./Strawson: sentences that ascribe actions are sensitive to adverbial modification, for example, if the expressed proposition includes any other proposition if one omits the modifiers. M.th./tr.th./Davidson/Strawson: a theory like his refers to well-understood logical structures that lie beneath the surface of action ascribing sentences. "Adverbial theory"/StrawsonVsDavidson: I prefer a theory which examines the explanation closer to the surface of everyday language, and thus recognizes, however, more complex basal syntax than Davidson's theory. ("Adverbial access"). The contrast between the two theories is a question of depth and universality: StrawsonVsDavidson: if we seek our understanding in logic (surface) structures that differ from the grammar. III 193 VsVs/StrawsonVsDavidson: but it remains mysterious that the actual mastering of the current language would have to be explained by the mastering of a potential language (Davidson's theorems). adverbial access/StrawsonVsDavidson: instead: the adverbial access is much more direct. Here, the success of the claim can also be shown more directly. III 194 This is not to deny that we could take paraphrases as help or equivalent sentences with a different grammatical structure. But by this Davidson's program becomes less attractive, a program that is set from the beginning to explain our grasping by those strongly bounded structures, namely the predicate calculus. III 197 Language forms must of course be taken into account, III 198 when we assess our theory for simplicity, reasonableness and realism. StrawsonVsDavidson: and here his approach has problems. 2. the second reason why it is possible to bring in extra syntactic considerations from outside of linguistic philosophy: Actions and events generally suffer from the identity subordination on substances. Strawson IV 139 StrawsonVsDavidson: one can not expect that an ordinary language speaker masters the predicate calculus. But that is unnecessary. Our conceptual scheme is in space and time. IV 141 Another problem: ontology: nominalization of speech parts e.g. "The Kissing". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Davidson, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson/Aristotle: practical syllogism causes are reasons - WittgensteinVs: Causes not empirical but recognizable through language skills. --- Davidson II 84 All such arguments assume that between reason and act exists such a tight logical-conceptual relation that reasons and actions cannot be understood as two distinct events. Only as numerically different, they could stand in a cause-effect relationship. This would, however, be prevented by the deductive relation. --- II 85 DavidsonVsWittgenstein ("Actions, Reason and Causes") This is false solution: Essential for the relationship is that the agent performs the action because he had reasons. One can also have a reason and not act according to that reason. What interests us is the reason for which the agent did x, not any arbitrary reason. As long as this "because" is not explained, the actual explanation performance of explanations of reasons is not exhausted. This deficit is only avoidable if we assume that "rationalization is a species of causal explanation". --- Dummett I 111 Turning to the language: Wittgenstein's Tractatus principle of analytic philosophy: the only way to the analysis of thought leads via the analysis of language. Davidson always presupposes a theory of meaning, WittgensteinVsDavidson: avoids in his later writings, the formation of a general theory of meaning, because he thinks that any attempt at a systematic explanation of language cannot help but to squeeze various phenomena in a single form of description: distortion. But also Wittgenstein believes that the goal of philosophy is to get us in a working order by overview of the functioning of language and thus on the structure of our thoughts to correctly recognize the world. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Davidson, D. | Avramides Vs Davidson, D. | Avra I 119 Antireductionism/Avramidis: the anti-reductionist does not need to deny thought without language (Thw/oL). But at least one anti-reductionist makes this position incompatible with ontological asymmetry: Davidson: a conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological involves an ontological symmetry. (compare Dav. 1984e and 1982). AvramidisVsDavidson: that does not work: Beliefs/Convictions/Davidson: is essential for all types of thinking. The system (of endlessly interlinked) beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. (94). ((s)> holism). Avramidis: with that he says that there can be no Thw/oL. 1) a being can only have a belief if it has a concept of belief, 2) a being can only have a concept of belief if it is part of a linguistic community. Davidson: more precisely: it does not need to have a concept of a particular belief, only a general one. In order to have a general concept of belief the being must be able to imagine what it is like to be wrong. (Dav 1984e, p. 157) I 120 That requires the idea of an objective public truth (to set up a context of interpretation). (Dav 1984e, p. 157). AvramidisVsDavidson: this can be can denied either by 1) arguing that one does not need the concept of belief to believe or 2) that being a member of a language community is not the only way to obtain the concept of belief. Detecting/Instantiation/Term/Davidson: because of the need of detecting the intersubjective truth we cannot instantiate the concept of belief without grasping itself and having it. I 122 AvramidisVsDavidson: there is a different way to be aware of the distinction subjective/objective I 123 a way which is also open to speechless beings (animals) (106): learning ability in animals. This applies to Bennett’s thesis. Bennett/Avramidis: the awareness of the distinction subjective/objective is sufficient for learning. (correcting things). To do that, speechless beings only have to be able to interact with their environment. VsDavidson; his strict requirement could be interpreted as anthropomorphism. DavidsonVsVs: it comes down to properties of certain concepts, not properties of people. (Dav 1982 S.319). Semantics/Psychology/Davidson: are interdependent. ((s) So no asymmetry but symmetry?). DavidsonVsontological asymmetry. Avramidis: for us, this is a rejection of conceptual asymmetry. (For Davidson as well). I 124 Davidson: rejection of the ontological asymmetry is a consequence of the rejection of conceptual asymmetry. AvramidisVsDavidson: it does not follow. (For the anti-reductionists). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. | Avramides I 115 Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently! Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism. Schiffer I 125 paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna. Ambiguity: E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna. Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here). Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!. false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement. I 126 A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief. (3) Galileo believed that the earth moves First, there are similarities: 1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same. Galileo believed this. The earth moves. 2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative 3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation. Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation. B(x,u) With an actual statement. E.g. Galileo said something If this is true, then (Eu) S(Galileo,u) I 127 But this does not work with Galileo believed something (Eu) B(Galileo, u) LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation. Schiffer I 131 3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types. possible solution: The earth moves Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement. SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties. Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept! Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this". Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here. B. Second problem paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle: I 132 Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“. singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar: (P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x. E.g. assumed I say: Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things. Alternative: Ralph said that she was driving George's car. Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George! SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson: (5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves. From Davidson's theory follows that the second occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence SchifferVsDavidson: 1. principle (P) 2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves." I 133 3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct. C. Third problem paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of (a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude) as (b) Sam PA that. flounders snore cannot be correct because (1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam (2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude. Schiffer: (1) seems correct. Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it. I 134 Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche Donald: Tarski said this. Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…). Schiffer I 135 SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows! I 136 (9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore. Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements. But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people! Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge. I 137 If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Peacocke Vs Davidson, D. | EMD II 164 Davidson: speaks himself of the assimilation of a translation manual. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular). Davidson: suggested himself that if the truth theory becomes empirical, we have to change the convention T so that each sentence of the form pt (true (s, p, t) ↔ A (p.t)). counts as T-sentence, and the modified convention T requires that all T-propositions derived thereof are true. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that's is exactly what is blocking the way to the concept of truth (already presumed). Our question is precisely what the truth conditions for such sentences are. Language/Community/Davidson/Peacocke: Davidson also proposed that a truth theory must maximize for the language of a community the number of sentences considered to be true and do so in the light of our own beliefs about the world. PeacockeVsDavidson: which in turn does not fill the gap, EMD II 165 because "true" in "considered to be true" is not semantically inert (does not transfer itself), and it is here the general concept of truth which must occur in "true", if that is to be a criterion for acceptance of the truth theory for any language. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Castaneda Vs Davidson, D. | Frank I 466 Belief/CastanedaVsDavidson: goes beyond language. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Decomposition | Cresswell Vs Decomposition | II 176 Lexical decomposition/Cresswell: Representatives: Katz (1972) in the disguise of the semantic feature theory. McCawley (1968 and 1971), Lakoff (1971), David Dowty (1979). But this is also about the range of quantifiers ((s) Which absorbs much of the criticism of Cresswell). VsDecomposition/Fodor: (1975, 124-156): there are few adequate definitions in natural language. CresswellVsDecomposition: (like Fodor): There are no adequate definitions in natural language, because most of it is learned through ostension. Emmon Bach: E.g. "beekeeper" and E.g. "unfalsifiable" are non-technical words, but they are learned by definition. CresswellVsBach: I’d rather regard them as a compositional words. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Deflationism | Field Vs Deflationism | I 102 Applicability/Mathematics/VsDeflationism: Problem: (see above): Deflationism cannot explain the benefits of the proof theory without having to assume it truth ((s) and thus the existence of mathematical entities (ME). Two attempts at a solution:. 1) there may be a nominalist proof theory which is just as good as the Platonic one. But that would only be a change of subject, as long as nothing more is explained. 2) trying to the explain Platonic proof th. without assuming that it is true. Field II 126 VsDeflationism/Field: 1) Vs: if one simply accepts the T-sentences, that has nothing to do with the content. ((s) Due to equivalence which requires only equal truth values). So the language is cut off from the world. E.g. "There are gravitational waves" is true iff there are gravitational waves has, disquotationally seen, nothing to do with gravitational waves. So we should have a connection between our use of the term "gravitational waves" and gravitational waves, regardless of the scheme. DeflationismVsVs/Field: but Deflationism allows that precisely: it allows for facts that II 127 Refer sentences on gravitational waves regardless of the disquotational truth. E.g. laws of physics. The use is not the only fact that exists here. 2) VsDeflationism/Field: (most important): it cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions E.g. for explanation of behavior, or the explanation of how far behavior is successful. 3) VsDeflationism/Field: it cannot distinguish between a vague and non-vague discourse or between a discourse which is based on facts and one that is not. The following are less important and are discussed in the following sections. 4) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle truth attributions in other languages. 5) VsDeflationism: it gives "true" false modal properties (s) "necessarily true" or "contingently true"). 6) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle ambiguity, indices and demonstratives. 7) VsDeflationism: it cannot explain how we learn from others. FieldVsVs: 4 - 7 per Deflationism. Here my version of Deflationism is radical. II 135 Index Words/Demonstratives/Truth Conditions/Deflationism/Field: we must distinguish two stages of sentences that contain them: 1) focuses on sentence types: there must be no unrelativized T predicate here E.g. a sentence type like "I do not like her" has no truth value. Solution: we can associate a truth value corresponding to a pair of objects : then the sentence is true relative to if b dislikes x. Field: this is not "strictly disquotational", because it involves a grammatical change. 2) Then we need access of unrelativized truth for sentence tokens. That means we must assign an object to each index element. I/Now: is no problem here: that’s "the author of the utterance" or "the time of the utterance". But that is not possible with the others. VsDeflationism: for assigning "this" or "he" we need semantic terms, i.e. it does not work in a purely disquotational way. II 137 Learning/VsDeflationism/Field: Thesis: you need inflationism to explain the learning from others, because we assume that most of what other people tell us is true. ((s) so it is purely disquotational, not merely a repetition, or "true, if the sentence is repeated, because you do not learn meanings from repetition, you need something like paraphrases.). VsDeflationism/Field: 1) with learning some kind of translation must be involved so that a certain inter-personal synonymy is presumed in the inference. 2) even purely disquotational truth + synonymy is not sufficient: E.g. My friend Charley said that in Alabama (a southern state) there was a feet of snow (which never happens). II 138 VsDeflationism/Solution: the reformulated inference works, because a more substantial property is attributed than merely disquotational truth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dennett, D. | Churchland Vs Dennett, D. | II 477 ChurchlandVsDennett: 1st, the thesis of the language dependency of consciousness depreves children and animals from consciousness. 2nd It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing! 3rd, there is no virtual machine required - a certain class of operations can be the output of a single, albeit highly distributed network. Dennett may well be right, but not this way. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Dennett, D. | Davidson Vs Dennett, D. | Glüer II 136f Event / Davidson: to have reasons - all propositional attitudes - as opposed to physical events that have physical descriptions. These descriptions of the material world can be in everyday language, just not intentionalist (DavidsonVsDennett) - Micro: to have a reason, Macro: body movements. Glüer II 139 The individuation process of the intentionalist and the physicalist discourse have a fundamental incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates inherently have essential normativity. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Derrida, J. | Black Vs Derrida, J. | II 169 Border/BlackVsLacan/BlackVsDerrida/French philosophy: in areas where a crossing is logically impossible it is pointless to assume a border. E.g. "gap between language and reality". |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Putnam Vs Derrida, J. | III 96 ff However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!" PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction? III 97 The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty. PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance. DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether. III 163 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed. III 164 Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate". III 165 Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case. III 168 Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism. By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of the rational justification. Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything." Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified". III 171 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists. I (a) 22 PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous. I (k) 266 Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case. I (k) 273 PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Rorty Vs Derrida, J. | III 222 Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all. Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words. Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers. IV 9 Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification. IV 118 Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause IV 119 arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy IV 120 and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses". IV 121 SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases! RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy. IV 122 RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object! IV 123 RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle. Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically. DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.). IV 126 Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language. IV 127 This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog". IV 129 RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal. IV 130 But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again. IV 129 sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra. IV 49 World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.). IV 131 Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced. IV 135 Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time. IV 136/137 RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being. IV 138 Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? IV 139 "Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept. IV 140 Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time. RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics. IV 142 RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. VI 475 Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.) VI 476 Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space. RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen! Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents". VI 477 RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played. Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot. VI 480 Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)! VI 500 Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Descartes, R. | Austin Vs Descartes, R. | Stroud I 42 AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) Thesis: the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion is obtained by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies. --- I 43 StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes much deeper than the example doctors in New York with its simple redefinition. It is also not about linguistic errors concerning the meaning of the terms dream and knowledge. But: Suppose that Descartes was wrong and there was no need to know that you were not dreaming to know that you know something about the world: Problem: how could we know that this is true? What would show that Descartes is misunderstood? Knowledge/VsDescartes/Stroud: if his critics are right that the term "knowledge" does not require what Descartes claims (not to dream and to know that), then A) Knowledge is not "closed under logical consequence", or B) The word "knowledge" does not penetrate all the logical consequences of what we know, or C) It does not penetrate to what we know as logical consequences (of our knowledge) or even D) To what we know, what the logical consequences of this are in turn. --- I 44 Stroud: But how are these assertions supported? --- I 47 Method/Verification/Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: Austin does not say much about these "procedures", he seems satisfied with the idea that they must exist because otherwise our language usage could not always differentiate between the terms ("here" always "words"). --- I 64 StroudVsAustin: The accusation AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "knowledge" in everyday use would have been distorted can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain linguistic usage, a certain concept, and the relation between them was misunderstood. This would be much more than reproaching a simple "redefinition" of a single concept, namely, of knowledge. Stroud: Thesis: that's what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important. --- I 74 ... .Stroud: something similar could be applied to Austin's question: "How should we use the words "wakefulness" and "sleep" if we have unrecognized methods to say in certain situations that we are not dreaming?" StroudVsAustin: that fails because it does not take into account how and why these terms are used in these situations. (Why question). Dream/StroudVsAustin: there could be easily distinguishable characteristics for different situations and we could apply a term or its negation due to these characteristics. Stroud pro Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: N.B.: (analog to the plane-example): if there are widespread but untested methods (like the manual of the soldiers) then it could be that the distinction we make is not the distinction between situations in which S is true in those in which it is not true. Then again we have no knowledge. Correctness/Plane-Example: "He does not know it" is definitely correct. --- I 75 But this distinction was not between knowledge and non-knowledge. Because even the careful spotter can be wrong, "he knows it is an F" is wrong as long as he did not see the plane on the ground. Conclusion/skepticism/usage theory/StroudVsAustin: we cannot draw an anti-skeptical conclusion from the mere fact that we use the terms "I know ..." and "I do not know ..." as we use them. ((s) It does not follow from the language use that we know when we know something (>plane-example), because we can still have information without knowing that they are missing). --- I 76 Platitudes/StroudVsAustin/N.B.: if one would disprove skepticism by arguing that it changes the meaning of the term "knowledge" must show that the most common platitudes are false, and these appear to be obvious truths. (... + ...) Moore's hands/Stroud: so Moore's proof gains philosophical importance and power. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Brandom Vs Descartes, R. | Brandom I 40 BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought. I 131 BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding. II 13 Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes. II 17 BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto). II 69 Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. II 213 Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Carnap Vs Descartes, R. | VI 226 Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18). Stroud I 196 KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question. Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable. Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility. General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular. Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument. VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious. CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself. Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special. StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question). Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Descartes, R. | Quine Vs Descartes, R. | I 56 The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method. Stroud I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects. Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts. Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) science is true and gives us knowledge or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 514 I/Body/Descartes: our I-thoughts leave the possibility open that we might be nothing more but mind. I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: a) Object use: E.g. "My arm is broken", "I have a bump on my forehead", b) subject use: E.g. "I hear so and so" meaningless: to ask. "Are you sure that you are in pain?" (> Certainty). But: the statement, "I am in pain" is no more a statement about a particular person, as a groan. But the reference is clear, it refers to the speaker. Frank I 523 WittgensteinVsDescartes/oral/Evans: when someone says "I think it will rain soon, therefore I am" then I do not understand him. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 --- Wittgenstein II 226 I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: the word "I" is one of several symbols with practical use, and if it was not necessary for language practice, you could drop it. It does not take any prominent position among the other words. Unless we begin to use it as Descartes did. I have just tried to demonstrate convincingly the opposite of Descartes' emphasis on the 'I'. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Description Theory | Kripke Vs Description Theory | Evans I 310/311 Reference/Description/Acquaintance/Kripke: Although the reference is set by the standard meter of Paris, not every speaker must know it or even know that it exists (according to Evans). Strawson: "the mean of different opinions". KripkeVsDescription Theory/Evans: His attacks were only directed against the first variant (speaker designation). They ignore the social character of naming. Field II 117 Reference/Deflationism/Field: Deflationism seems to make the hard work of recent years regarding the study of the reference insignificant. For if truth conditions do not play a central role, neither do the references. E.g.: KripkeVsDescription Theory/Name/Field: (Kripke 1972): This is not correct. Field: At least if they do not use metalanguage. Reference/Deflationism/Field: Problem: When the truth condition does not matter, then it is also valid for the reference since the relevant scheme is: (R) if b exists, "B" refers to b and nothing else; if B does not exist, "b" refers to nothing. Problem: It this is all that can be said about reference, what is the meaning of Kripke’s critique on Description Theory? Description Theory/Gödel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: e.g. Gödel = proves the "Incompleteness Theorems" Then e.g. Schmidt did actually prove it, but was murdered. Everyone would say that "Gödel" nevertheless refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt. Deflationism/Field: Problem: If deflationism is unable to explain this, then something is wrong with it! But it is actually able to: Reference/Deflationism/Field: The reference is not the actual basis, but observations about our practice of closing. That is actually what Kripke shows. Stalnaker I 15 KripkeVsDescription Theory/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metasemantics. Anti-Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metaphysics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Description Theory | Verschiedene Vs Description Theory | Stalnaker I 211 Def Causal Descriptivism/Terminology/Stalnaker: a description theory of names that incorporates the causal chain into the description that is the content of the name. Thus it also incorporates a stiffening operator that ensures that the identifiers for which the names are an abbreviation (>Russell) have wide range. Counter Position/VsDescriptivism/VsDescription Theory: causal theory of the reference. VsCausal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: moves the meta semantic Black Peter from the names to the common terms. We need to know how their reference is established. Jackson: For example, suppose we have a language in which the reference definition of names is excluded. It would still have the expressiveness "to a certain extent to say how things are". Stalnaker: if there was such a thing, it would make sense to say that the reference definition is part of the descriptive content of names. Possible Languages/Stalnaker: we can make up any semantics we want. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Descriptivism | Lewis Vs Descriptivism | Stalnaker I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: Is simply a way to describe a part of the language vi another part.((s) The only possibility,according to Lewis and Stalnaker.) The broader paradigm of Kaplan corresponds to: Def Global Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: (Lewis 1984, 224) The entirety of a speaker's language is taken as a description of the world. (Theory). All terms of the language are interpreted at the same time, and statements on the world are made by establishing the theory. i.e. the terms refer to "whatever things", characteristics and relations render the theory true, as much as it is possible. LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: This cannot work because it is then impossible to explain how statements can be wrong. This is Putnam's Paradox. Def Putnam's Paradox/Stalnaker/(s): If a language is taken as a whole in order to explain all terms (and to set all its references) at the same time, then statements refer to "whatever things". And then relations and characteristics are always going to be what renders the theory the most truthful. Language/Thinking/World/Reality/Lewis/Stalnaker: Additional condition for global descriptivism: The easy terms must split the word "at its joints". ((s) But this is not given with one language.) LewisVsGlobal Descriptivism. StalnakerVsGlobal Descriptivism/StalnakerVsLewis: Such a metasemantic theory is not going to work, but if it were, the theory would give us quite a different depiction of our thoughts' contents. 1. Were the theory holistic, whatever somebody thinks depends from everything else he/she is thinking 2. Were the theory solipsistic, causal relations would depend on the use of the person. Then "Tullius" would mean something different for each person using it. Problem: We would then only speak about the language in the highest degree of generalization. We would not only be unable to refer to singular things which are different from the others, we would also describe the things not by their basic characteristics, but only in terms of characteristics and relations which fit the best, in order to render our theory, which is not interpreted, true. Vs: Representatives of the broader paradigm of Kaplan (semantic, not meta-semantic) could reply: The built-in two-dimensional frame in language allows us to express propositions which convey more direct statements on the world because Secondary propositions: which are set by our thoughts and utterances, are singular propositions and propositions which express basic characteristics and relations. However: primary propositions: they represent the cognitive values of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic//broader frame of Kaplan: based on him, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. ((s) mentioned, not used/Mention/Use). Secondary proposition/semantic: they are clearly set as a function of the facts. Problem: we do not have a cognitive access to them. Bsp Propositions, which we only know because of descriptions: "The sentence which is cited in Frank Jakson's "From Metaphysics to Ethics"on page 26, lines 3-4". E.g. The content of the first sentence Napoleon spoke to Josephine after his coronation. However: these propositions cannot be claimed by saying, e.g. "I hereby claim the proposition which fulfills the following condition." Secondary Proposition/semantic/Stalnaker: By semantically (not meta-semantically) interpreting the two-dimensional frame, the secondary propositions seem to be like these examples. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Devitt, M. | Rorty Vs Devitt, M. | Horwich I 463 Making True/True Maker/Davidson: the totality of evidence makes sentences or theories true. But no thing, no experience, no surface stimuli, not even the world makes sentences true. Rorty: I interpret this so that the inferential relations between beliefs have nothing in particular to do with the relation of "being about something" (aboutness relation) to objects. ((s) >Holism). Reference/Empiricism/Evidence/Davidson/Rorty: the lines of the confirmation (evidential force) are not parallel to those of reference. That is due to the epistemic holism. Knowledge of the former is knowledge of the language, knowledge of the latter is an empirical theory about meaning in language use. This is also a story about the causal roles within language behavior in the interaction with the environment. Confirmation/Justification/Causality/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: linking justification (by confirmation, evidence) with the causal story is the old metaphysical urge Wittgenstein helped to overcome by warning against "meanings" as entities. I 464 "Meanings" as entities: were then to play a double role as a cause and at the same time as justification. (>Explanation). E.g. sense data, e.g. surface stimuli. ((s) reductionism: question: does every reductionism assume double roles?) RortyVsDevitt/RortyVsField: Devitt succumbs to the pre-Wittgensteinean temptation if he follows Field by saying that we the "intuitive idea of a correspondence to an outside world" by wanting to make truth dependent on "true reference relations between words and objective reality". (DavidsonVsDevitt, DavidsonVsField, WittgensteinVsField: "real reference" pre-Wittgenstein). RortyVsDummett: he succumbs to the same temptation if he thinks that a state of the world can verify ((s) make true) a conviction. This corresponds to the idea rejected by Davidson that pieces of the world make beliefs true. ((s) Contradiction to the above: I 461: here relation with inferential relations: "piece by piece", "stone by stone", Davidson pro). Realism/Semantics/Devitt/Rorty: Devitt is right when he says that if we give up on Dummett's anti-holism, the question of "realism" is de-semanticized. RortyVsDevitt: it is thus also trivialized. Because then you cannot distinguish realism from the banal anti-idealistic thesis that physical objects exist independently of mind. Devitt thinks that this is an interesting and controversial thesis. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Dewey | Rorty Vs Dewey | VI 428 Phenomenon/Manifestation/Reality/Dewey/Rorty: a large part of Dewey's work is dedicated to the desperate and futile attempt to abolish this distinction. Instead, he wanted to distinguish more and less strongly targeted forms of empiricism. VsDewey/Rorty: the attempt was fruitless, because his colleagues insisted on the possibility of discussing losing "contact with reality". >Appearance. VI 429 Animal/RortyVsDewey: Dewey should have realized that a wide gap yawns between sensation and cognition. Cognition is not possible without language. >Cognition. VI 434 Purpose/Darwin/Rorty: Darwin banished purpose from nature as far as it goes beyond the needs of a specific organism. Purpose/RortyVsDewey: but as soon as purpose disappears from nature, there is no philosophical problem anymore, that would affect the "possibility of science" (of insight)! For then the reconciliation of the purposes of the subject with those of the object is no longer a problem. VI 435 The object is no longer the embodiment of a telos (of nature, Aristotle), but simply an object of handling. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Discourse Representation | Partee Vs Discourse Representation | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse, Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 I 21 Discourse Representation/Discourse Representation Theories/DRT//File Change Semantics/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: (Heim 1982, 1983, Kamp (1981, with Reyle: 1993): Thesis the analysis should go beyond the individual sentence. Anaphora/DRT/FCS/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: should be able to go beyond the boundaries of sentences. NP: are not quantifier expressions, but precisely anaphorical. They can also refer to "virtual" objects. File/Terminology/Heim/Heusinger: the possibly virtual objects of discourse. Discourse Reference/Terminology/Karttunen: like Heim's files. I 22 Anaphora: anaphoric relations take place between files and certain operators can the bind files or give them a certain "lifetime". Discourse Representation/Heusinger: is displayed on a model only in the model-theoretic interpretation. Def Meaning/FCS/DRT/Heim/Kamp/Heusinger: is a dynamic concept here, it is not the truth condition of sentences, but the information-changing potential of sentences. (Therefore terminology: file change) NP: new: they are discourse references here (with possibly changing correspondences) and more referential than quantifying. Referential/Heusinger: referring to particular properties. Quantifying/Heusinger/(s): not referring to properties. I 23 Discourse Representation Theory/Heusinger: Solution: there is no anaphora paradox (because NP, like pronouns, are interpreted as a discourse reference) and the problem of the wide range of the existential quantifier is resolved. Problem/VsDiscourse Representation Theories: the problem of compositionality remains. Problem: the texts can then only obtain a truth value in their entirety. Chrysipp Sentences/Heusinger: New: the conditional is represented not as a material implication, but as unselective all-quantification over cases in the sense of Lewis (1975) Adverbs of Quantification. I 24 Proportion Paradox/Partee/ParteeVsHeim/ParteeVsDiscourse Representation Theory/Donkey Sentence/Heusinger:(Partee 1984): Problem (40) can only be represented as (40a), but that becomes incorrect if out of 6 farmers who each have a donkey, five beat theirs, while the sixth farmer has 10 donkeys, all of which he treats well. Problem: the quantification over cases only considers farmer-donkey pairs. I 25 Dynamic Logic/Groenendijk/Stokhof/Dekker/Heusinger: (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991, Dekker 1993): VsDiscourse Representation Theory: departs from a dynamic concept of meaning, like this one, which is not incorporated in the representation, but is coded in a new interpretation of the well-known logical inventory. Sentence meaning: no longer truth conditions, but contribution to the change of the context or information. Relevant information: is that on the variable assignment. Sentence meaning: is then the relation between two variable assignments. Discourse references: do not exist here. Dynamic Logic/Heusinger: Inspired by computer languages. I 42 Epsilon AnalysisVsDiscourse Representation/VsHeim/VsKamp/Heusinger: here, NP are not introduced as discourse referents on the additional semantic level of the discourse representation structure, but directly refer to selected objects of the model according to the principle of selection. |
Part I B. Partee Mathematical Methods in Linguistics (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) New York 1990 |
| Disposition Theory | Kripke Vs Disposition Theory | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule? No distinction possible between correct/incorrect. Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein). I 103 Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite. VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition? Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones! I 104 Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to. Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position I 105 and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dogmas (Quine) | Quine Vs Dogmas (Quine) | QuineVsSecond Dogma: Instead holism. Science is, considered collectively, dependent on both language and experience. But this double character cannot reasonably be pursued down to the individual statements of science. (s) We cannot ask: what in this sentence corresponds more to the world and what more to language? Dogmas/McDowell: the first could only be correct if the second was also correct. Now, if "empirical meaning" cannot be assigned to single sentences, the idea of a "sentence without empirical meaning" is called into question. McD I 158 |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Donagan, A. | Rorty Vs Donagan, A. | Horwich I 452 Explanation/Truth/Causality/Donagan/Rorty: Although it could be said that the fact that most of the beliefs of the natives and field linguists are true is an explanation for the fact that they can communicate. RortyVsDonagan: but that is not an explanation that requires a causally effective property. Explanation/Rorty: this is like an explanation of communication by the fact that, e.g., people populate the same spacetime region. Problem: we do not know what it would be like for these people if it were not like this, just as we do not know, e.g., what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong. Causal Explanation/Rorty: the only candidates for causally effective properties are such properties that we can think away! ((s) >it must be possible to abstract from properties). >Causal explanation. Important argument: therefore "truth" ("true") has no explanatory use. Truth/DavidsonVsPragmatism/VsJames: but besides the normative use it also has disquotational use. Truth/RortyVsTradition: it mixes disquotational and normative use and tries to explain both through the use of "true" to designate a non-causal relation of "correspondence". This is a false attempt to have "inside" and "outside" of the language game at the same time. Rorty I 120 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Donagan/Rorty: Wittgenstein clarified the situation by conceding "that sensations are private, non-dispositional concomitants of the behavior, which is their natural expression", but refusing "to subsume processes under these concomitants, which can be explored regardless of the circumstances that produced them." I 121 RortyVsDonagan: that is correct, but you have to go one step further: a "private, non-material medium" is obscure. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Donnellan, K. | Newen Vs Donnellan, K. | NS I 96 Referential/Description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions! It is possible and with it communication can succeed, but it belongs to pragmatics (and is therefore dependent on context). But it is only parasitically to the attributive reading that exclusively indicates the actual meaning of descriptions correctly. NS I 97 Speaker Reference/KripkeVsDonnellan/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: instead of referential use of descriptions. What the speaker meant on one occasion. We also need the concept of the intended object. This may even differ from the actually referenced object! ((s) Unlike the Godel Schmidt example). On the other hand: Semantic Meaning/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: is only specified correctly by Russell's truth conditions (tr.cond.): E.g. Schmidt's killer is insane iff. the killer of Schmidt is insane. Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: only contains the attributive interpretation. On the other hand: D-Language/Kripke: contains referential and attributive interpretation. Russell Language: Russell's truth conditions NS I 98 Referential/Deception/Russell Language: there is also a referential use here, but only if someone erroneously thinks that he refers to someone in particular. He is mistaken to believe that Russell's truth conditions are fulfilled. The speaker only says pragmatically and not semantically that the predicate is satisfied. D-Language/Kripke: E.g. in the cafe: "Her husband is kind to her." difference: a) "No, he is not kind, but this is not her husband." b) "He (this one!) is kind to her, but he is not her husband." ((s) twice "he"). D-Language/Kripke: although the D-language can handle b) (it would say that this is the referential interpretation), a) is difficult to explain, because here the description would have to be used both referentially and attributively at the same time. NS I 99 KripkeVsDonnellan: if both interpretations are embedded in the semantics, we must assume, therefore, that e.g. "her husband" had two meanings simultaneously here. Newen/Schrenk: but there are new approaches that allow for both. Pragmatics/Semantics/Newen/Schrenk: their border demarcation is controversial. VsKripke: the referential use is still common. Thus pragmatics moves closer in the vicinity of semantics again. Neale, Stephen/Newen/Schrenk: ("Descriptions") pro Russell semantics ((s) meaning through homophonic truth conditions). |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Dualism | Ryle Vs Dualism | Pauen I 82 Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance. I 84 RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events. Ryle I 226 ff Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them. I 228 We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while. The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts? Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine? I 229 Questions of this kind are not a mystery! I 230 In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide). Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Duhem, P. | McDowell Vs Duhem, P. | I 188 Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex here is a black swan) can not be distributed among the sets of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning! McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our language of experience is distinguishable from the language of theory, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory. I 189 Language of theory/language of observation/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are in fact distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But from that we could derive a general indeterminacy of meaning! If we try that, we face the third party dogma. Then we are facing a borderline case of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into theory and don't allow experience to speak any language at all. Then, of course, a rational relationship is missing. However, we need this rational relationship for Duhem's argument. It can only be of a local character. By paving our way through the third dogma, we lop Duhem's thoughts to the right size. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Dummett, M. | Brandom Vs Dummett, M. | I 202 BrandomVsDummett: if he see the problematic aspect of the concept "boche" in that it causes a non-conservative extension of the remaining language, it is not right. The non-conservativity merely shows that the concept has a substantial content which was not already included in other concepts. E.g. Temperature: was introduced with certain criteria, with the introduction of new measurement methods, the complex inferential definition developed that determines the significance of today (> Measuring). Introduction: it is not to be asked if the conclusions were already accepted, but whether this conclusion is one that should be accepted! The problem with "boche" and "nigger" is not the novelty, but the unwanted conclusions. Brandom II 173 But there are other ways of justification than showing that we’ve already been on them determined implicitly, even before the term was introduced. Background of material inferential practices. Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: this disregards the specific nature of the sentences of being able to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregian power). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dummett, M. | Davidson Vs Dummett, M. | Brandom II 15 Concept/DavidsonVsDummett: relational view. Use of the concept is not understandable in a context that does not include the language, but language can only be made intelligible by recourse to beliefs. Brandom II 16 Brandom pro Davidson: Asserting and believing are two sides of a coin, one cannot be made understandable without the other. Davidson I (c) 58 Putnam and Dummett show that the concept of truth itself can be given a knowledge-related twist. Yet all three have given evidence precedence over the truth (as the primary status of the meaning determination) Davidson I (c) 59 DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsPutnam: I think this is a mistake: This leads to the difficulties of the proximal theories: to a concept of truth relativized to individuals and to skepticism. The proximal theories are always somehow Cartesian. DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: skepticism, relativism on individuals Evidence: The only insightful concept of evidence is that of a relationship between sentences. Or between beliefs. >Proximal theory. Glüer II 167 Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words, it depends very much on how the community uses those words. >Externalism. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Pretty much nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Dummett, M. | McDowell Vs Dummett, M. | I 152 Language/Dummett: 1st tool of communication 2nd carrier of meaning. None should be primary. I 153 Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondarily. Primarily language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Dummett, M. | Putnam Vs Dummett, M. | VI 394 Understanding/truth conditions/WB/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. PutnamVsWittgenstein, DummettVsWittgenstein. Cf. >Understanding/Wittgenstein. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible when reversed, what this knowledge should be. Meaning/Meaning Theory/PutnamVsDummett: I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (Through a theory of reference, not meaning theory). --- III 48/49 Proto-thoughts/PutnamVsDummett: terms for animals: dogs have just as little a preconception of meat, like gazelles have a preconception of running fast. ---- I (d) 124 Realism/anti-realism/PutnamVsDummett: Problem: We argue that the understanding of sentences would be knowing the truth conditions. But how can we say at all what this knowledge is? Putnam: We have seen that "mentalese" does not help. I (e) 151 Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to Dummett, but: truth is not identified according to him with justification, but with an idealization of justification. Putnam: Truth should be a property of statements that cannot get lost contrarily to the justification. Justification is also gradual as opposed to the truth. The "ideal justification" corresponds to the "frictionless surfaces" of physics. It has "pure value". Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification, Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (e) 152 Truth is independent of justification here and now, but not of any justification. (> Assertibility). Like Quine: the conditions of justification change with the development of our corpus of knowledge. ---- I (f) 161 Truth/justification/PutnamVsDummett: to reject the divine point of view, does not mean to identify truth with rational acceptability as Dummett says that we should do it. Truth: cannot get lost. Justification: can very well do this. E.g. "The earth is a disk." E.g. also that it is a ball, is not a "gradual truth" but it is gradually justified. Truth/Putnam: an idealization of rational acceptability. (Under epistemically ideal conditions). I (f) 162 Truth/Putnam: 1. independent of the justification here and now, but not independent of any justification. 2. supposed to be stable and convergent. --- I (h) 214 Truth/Dummett: (1976, 1991) is justification. PutnamVsDummett: 1. this is misleading in many ways, it is likely that one cannot specify the conditions of the justification for the sentences of a natural language. (But Dummett believes that). 2. Dummett believes in a final verification, I only in an idealized one (based on the current evidence, so context-sensitive). Assertibility conditions/PutnamVsDummett: are not manageable for an arbitrary sentence. How do we learn them? By appropriating a practice. But this is not an algorithm (how reductionist philosophers believe). I (h) 215 The assertibility conditions cannot be formalized and therefore not the human rationality. ((s) They may well be independent of situations, but not of our entire practice.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Dummett, M. | Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M. | I 253 Meaning/assertion/Dummett/Tugendhat: Example Game: assertion action, assertion and counter assertion, "yes"/"no" corresponds to "true"/"false" one wins, one loses. This schema should be the basis of every utterance of every assertoric sentence! I 254 The speaker gives a guarantee, which is doubted by the listener. (Searle quite similar, see above). I 255 New: it is said vice versa: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is correct. This presupposes: 1. That the conditions in which the expression is used are indifferent to the correctness of the use. 2. That the conditions on which the correctness depends are those the fulfilment of which is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions of its correctness (truth) are fulfilled! The equivalence "p equi that p is true" is based on the fact that the person who claims something has always asserted its correctness. I 256 Speaker: Conditions and presence together guaranteed. Listener: separates both and questions it separately. (Asymmetry). I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or proposition are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a proposition are indicated by a proposition. Of course, this presupposes that for the explanation of a proposition there is always already another proposition available. Meta Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used as the second, it is necessary to show under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every assumption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric proposition, which is a pseudo explanation. II 231 TugendhatVsDummett: "Meaning" in Frege should not be translated with "Reference"! II 232 Justified only where Frege considers sentences as proper names! II 247 Reference/Tugendhat: through my criticism of translation, meaning = reference, I have not questioned the primacy of truth over objects. DummettVsTugendhat: it is not enough to explain the meaning of names merely as truth-value potential: 1. The meaning could then be understood as a mere equivalence set of expressions. TugendhatVsDummett: correct with sentences and predicates, with names one does not have to be content with it. DummettVsTugendhat: 2. That two names "a" and "b" have the same meaning, if they have the same truth-value potential, applies only to extensional predicates. But with which criterion can extensional ones be distinguished from intensional predicates? It presupposed that we had a criterion for the equality of meanings of names, which is not first determined by Leibniz's law. II 248 Leibniz's Law/Dummett: cannot be understood as a definition of "=", but is based on the fact that when we predetermine something from an object, the truth value of the assertion must be independent of the way it is given! TugendhatVsDummett: not so with Frege: Dummett himself points out that he understood Leibniz's law as definition of "=". Tugendhat: we cannot explain what we mean by identity with the law. Tugendhat pro Dummett. TugendhatVsDummett: with sentences as equivalence classes one has not lost touch with the world: it is only about very specific equivalence sets, which of course are determined by the nature of the world. Dummett: sentences do not equal names! (VsFrege). II 249 Reference/Dummett: semantic role. Tugendhat: this is exactly the same as my "truth-value potential". ((s) Cf. > semantic value, >semantic role). II 250 Reference/Frege: he never spoke of reference Predicate/Frege: he never said that the meanings of predicates must be understood as "quasi-objects". Dummett/Tugendhat: the justified core of Dummett's criticism: it does not yet follow from the truth-value potential that the meaning of a name is an object. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dummett, M. | Avramides Vs Dummett, M. | Avra I 8 AvramidesVsDummett/AvramidesVsDavidson: the approach of the "theory makers" is too pessimistic, their pessimism is premature and unwarranted. I 10 AvramidesVsDummett: his reasons are not convincing, the fact remains that he merely expresses a preference. The "knowing of a language" is therefore more complex than just knowing of meanings. Meaning/Dummett: What are the linguistic or non-linguistic means which we can use to determine the meaning of an expression without determining it explicitly? Or perhaps one should not ask at all how we express something in a situation, but rather how we should analyze sentences that include the concept of meaning. AvramidesVsDummett: this might apply to other terms as well. Analysis/Avramides: is a harmless means, if we meet Wisdoms demand. (And clearly capture the subject matter). I 12 AvramidesVsDummett: he does not say why we should proceed like this in the case of the concept of knowledge (providing a theory that explains all knowledge of the actors (the users of the term)). Avra I 143 Dummett/Avramides: shows three things: 1) Locke’s idealistic theory is not irreparable. It can be completed. I 144 2) Dummett moves from the question "What associates a concept or idea with a word or phrase?" to the question: "What does it mean to understand a concept or idea?" AvramidesVsDummett: he could just as easily have started with both questions at the same time; if both are not answered, the ideational theory of meaning only wastes time. 3. AvramidesVsDummett: he has not developed his view of how we grasp a concept or an idea in a way that it also permits the attribution of thoughts to speechless beings. (Thw/oL). I would therefore like to propose an extension. Thinking without Language/Thw/oL/AvramidesVsDummett: if we allow Thw/oL (> See Dummett: W.James Lectures No. 8, pp. 48), how do we understand this kind of (speechless) thoughts? We could say, we attribute them through the behavior. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Dummett, M. | Schiffer Vs Dummett, M. | I 221 Verificanistical semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): verification conditions instead of truth conditions. Dummett: (like Davidson): we must ask what form a meaning theory (m.th.) would have to take to find out what meaning is. This M.Th. should be able to specify the meaning of all words and propositions. (Dummett 1975, p. 97). Dummett: pro compositionality (with Wittgenstein): no systematic meaning theory is possible without explaining the understanding of infinitely many sentences. Therefore one must, like Chomsky and Wittgenstein, accept that we have an implicit capture some general principles. (Dummett 1978, p. 451). DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain any truth theory (tr.th.). Verification condition/verification conditions/Dummett: (for propositions) the verification conditions are also recursively specified. Schiffer: but that does not follow that a compositional truth-theoretic semantics does not exist as well. I 222 Dummett: with the specification of the verification conditions the meaning theory could at the same time specify the truth conditions (Dummett 1978 Foreword). Verification conditions/SchifferVsDummett: it is not clear how the verification conditions should look like. Relation theory/meaning theory/Schiffer: when I argued VsRelation theory, I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics (tr.th.sem.). Otherwise, it would be true!. Verificationist meaning theory/Verif. m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: with a verificationist meaning theory could the relation theory maybe also be true?. I 225 Use theory/Dummett/Schiffer: for Dummett the point of use theory is: "the meaning of a word is uniquely determined by the observable characteristics of its linguistic use". (Dummett 1976, 135). SchifferVsDummett: but what counts as "observable characteristic" and what as "openly shown" ?. Does Dummett think that a description of the use in purely behavioral, non-semantic and non-psychological terms would be sufficient that a word has a specific meaning? That would be too implausible as that Dummett would accept that. Still, he notes that the description should not use any psychological or semantic terms. Meaning/Dummett/Schiffer: should therefore also become understandable for beings who have no semantic or psychological concepts themselves! So even for Marsians. (Also McDowell understands him like this, 1981, 237). McDowellVsDummett: according to Dummett it must be possible to give a description of our language behavior that is understandable for extraterrestrials. That does not work, because the intentional "(content-determining) is not reducible to the non-intentional. Content/McDowellVsDummett/SchifferVsDummett: is not detectable for extraterrestrials. ((s) Not "speechless", but only those who do not share our intentional vocabulary). I 226 Ad. 4: ("To know which recognizable circumstances determine a proposition as true or false"). Schiffer: that means how do we get from behaviorism to anti-realism?. Manifestation/SchifferVsDummett: this one makes do here even with pronounced psychological terms!. 1. Recognizing (that the conditions are met) is itself a form of knowledge, which in turn contains belief. You cannot describe that non-psychologically. 2. How can one then achieve the further conclusion that a purified attribution should ascribe a skill that can only be "openly shown"? (The showing understood behavioristically). Behaviorism/Dummett/Schiffer: However, I am not ascribing any behaviorism to Dummett, I ascribe him nothing, I just wonder what his position is. meaning theory/m.th./Dummett: thinks that natural languages have a m.th.! Their core will be recursively definable verif. cond.. Anti-Realism/Schiffer: here Dummett is uncertain whether the m.th. should have falsification conditions, but that will not affect my subsequent criticism. 1. Whether the knowledge that a state of affair exists, counts as verification of a proposition. I 227 Could depend on extralinguistic knowledge and not by the understanding of the proposition! We usually need background information. Understanding/SchifferVsDummett: then it should not be about verification conditions!. Direct verification conditions/Dummett: has to exist for each single proposition!. QuineVsDummett/Schiffer: (Quine 1953b): direct verification conditions cannot exist for every proposition. ((s) ~Theories are not verifiable proposition by proposition). 2. Surely there are meaningful propositions that have no recognizable conditions that would turn out this proposition as true or false. Dummett/Schiffer: insists, however, that a proposition must be shown as true or false and in fact "conclusively" (conclusive verifiability). (1978, 379). This leads to anti-realism. ((s) Def anti-realism/Dummett/(s): is exactly to demand that the verification must be performed in order to understand a proposition. The realism would waive the verification.) Anti-realism/Dummett: you still should not rely too heavily on the anti-realism! Because often a "conclusive verification" is not to obtain!. Schiffer: so Dummett itself holds the verification conditions contestable!. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett quotes Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behaviors can be refuted. (Dummett 1978, S. XXXV) SchifferVsDummett: then the m.th. needs contestable criteria as well as contestable conditions!. Problem: this applies to most empirical judgments E.g. "That is a dog". 3. We know what kind of semantic values we must attribute to the non-logical constants (predicates and singular term) in the conditional sentences in a truth-theoretic semantics. But how shall that look like in the alternative with verification conditions instead of truth conditions?. Solution/Dummett: the verificationist semantics will make every predicate an effective means available, so that it can be determined for each object whether the predicate applies to the object or the singular term references to the object. I 230 Relation theory/SchifferVsDummett: the by me disapproved relation theory for propositional attitudes (belief as a relation to belief objects) seems inevitable for Dummett. ((s) because of the relation of predicates to objects to which they must apply verifiable). Problem: that can only happen in a finite theory, and for propositional attitude it would have to be infinite, because for each prop the VB would have to be found individually. Relation theory/Schiffer: has to assume propositional attitude as E.g. "believes that Australians drink too much" as semantically primitive - namely, 2-figure predicate between believer and content). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Dummett, M. | Peacocke Vs Dummett, M. | EMD II 165 Assertion/Dummett: in the strict sense, it can then be characterized as a quasi-assertion whose justification criterion coincides with the truth conditions for the corresponding thought. PeacockeVsDummett: that brings him into the circle! We must remember that it is an adequacy condition that each approach provides the connection between truth and assertion (better: statement): a statement is true if things are as he says in the statement. How to proceed then? Parallel to the game: Def Winning/Peacocke: if you meet the goals that you have qua player. So we have to show that in the language of a community one game is played instead of another. And in the analysis we must not use any such terms as "winning" or "goals qua player". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Emotivism | Newen Vs Emotivism | New I 137 VsRelativism/Ethics/Newen: Solution: Non-descriptivism: it searches for new ways. Emotivism: denies that properties are attributed in moral statements. I 138 emotional statements: have no truth conditions! Rationality: a rational dispute is not possible then. VsEmotivism/Newen: it is precisely the dispute over values that is part of the political discourse in democratic societies. Non-Descriptivism/Hare/Newen: New variety: universal prescriptivism. (Literature: The Language of Morals). I 139 Universal Prescriptivism/Hare/Newen: the link between should-sentence and instruction is to be thought as narrow as possible conceptually. Conceptual contradiction: E.g "You should do X, but don't do it anyway". Moral/Imperative: E.g. "Get me a beer!" is not a moral statement. Moral Statement/Hare: for that, it must be possible to apply the statement universally. Universalizability/Newen: was first recognized by Kant as an essential characteristic of moral statements. Hare: Thesis: in the logic of should-sentences a universalizability is implicitly contained. I.e. you cannot say of two individuals that a should perform a certain action in a given situation, which is described in universal terms, but individual b should not. Should-Sentence/Hare: implicitly contains a principle according to which the statement is applicable to all similar situations. HareVsVs/Newen: there are three misunderstandings to be avoided here: I 140 1) the similarity includes similarity of desires and beliefs. I.e., there may be people with different desires and beliefs in similar situations. 2) Universalizability does not mean that the rules have to be simple 3) They can also refer to a single individual. E.g. "You should take care of your mother." |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Empiricism | James Vs Empiricism | I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language / James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, Vsempiricism that is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: to be radical empiricism must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Radical empiricism / James: 1st Only those issues can be discussed, that are based on categories of observation. 2nd The relationships between the objects of experience are just as accessible as the objects themselves. 3rd connection as a result of the sequence of partial experience is itself an object of experience. The experience of this relationship is the power of consciousness. 4th No upfront construction of subjective consciousness. |
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| Empiricism | Quine Vs Empiricism | IV 397 British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social. IV 398 The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism). IV 402 QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages and theories. VI 11 "Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism). Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not! We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence. VI 11/12 Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut. Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical. QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack. V 189 Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism. V 190 Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise. Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses. Simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning. Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies. V 191 Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low. QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data. Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same. Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates. Stalnaker I 3 QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Endurantism | Lewis Vs Endurantism | Schwarz I 32 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points. Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd. Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116). Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time. Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5) e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away. Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation. Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation. Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance. Schwarz I 33 Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them. 1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42. 3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] 4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. 5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Ersatz World | Lewis Vs Ersatz World | Schwarz I 69 Linguistic Ersatzism/Schwarz: LewisVs: If possible worlds (poss.w.)are a set of propositions, why is the actual world not a set of propositions? (1973b(1),16,90) Schwarz I 70 VsVs: Because it is ersatzism which actually denies that things of the same form are like the actual world.(> ersatz worlds/Lewis). LewisVs Ersatzism: natural languages do not have enough sentences at their disposal in order to build a poss.w. for each mode how a world could be: Language/Infinity/Lewis: If propositions are finite chains of signs from a finite alphabet,there are at the utmost Aleph 1 of a set of propositions, as many as real numbers. But there are many more modes how a world could have been. (see above paragraph 3.2), at the least Aleph2.(1973b(1),90,1986e(2), 143) Schwarz I 71 Possibilia/LewisVsErsatzism/Schwarz: 4. (Inhabitants of poss.w.): persistent problem: singular statements about them are something akin to descriptions or open sentences in linguistic ersatzism. Problem: as such, things, which are described in exactly the same way, cannot be differentiated. ((s) e.g. A particles, which is different than above: we were talking about identical characteristics, not identical things.) e.g. two dragons may live in a symmetrical world which can be described in an identical way (as long as there are no haecceities). Then, descriptions are identical, but not the dragons. (1986e(2),157f). VsErsatzism/linguistic/Lewis/Schwarz: 5. Not every set of propositions corresponds to a possibility, e.g. if Kripke necessarily is a human, and cannot be totally red and totally green at the same time, sets of propositions which state the contrary need to be excluded as well as sets in which the elements are incompatible. E.g. particular propositions regarding the distribution of microphysical structures are incompatible with the statement that there is a donkey. Problem: How can this be determined without using modal terms, e.g. purely syntactical. 1. D. Lewis [1973b]: Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell Stalnaker I 28 Ersatz World/LewisVsErsatzism/LewisVsModerate modal realism: This is why every moderate theory stumbles: it sees possible worlds as ways which represent the actualized [ersatz] world as a special one. This world shall be special because it is the only one to represent the concrete one. And as such it is shall not only be special from the own point of view, but from each and every one. So, not contingent special (extraordinary). ((s) Ersatz world/((s): an ersatz world is a set of propositions.) ((s) As such, it is necessary that the world has exactly the elements it has in the set, because if not, it would be a different set. It is not contingent that the set {0,1} (as an example)has the elements which it has. But it is contingent that the poss.w. has some of its objects.) StalnakerVsLewis: The cursive sentence ("...from each and every [point of view]) is wrong. But this is a special fact about the actual world: it alone corresponds to the only concrete world. But this is a contingent fact, i.e. it is not even a fact from the point of view of other possible worlds. Problem: Does it not mean that only from an objective point of view possible persons and their surroundings are as real as we are? Only if the objective or absolute point of view is identified with a neutral point of view outside of all possible worlds. Such a point of view does not exist. I 29 Objectivity/absolute/Stalnaker: the absolute, objective point of view is the view from our actual world. Fiction: We concede that fictional characters have, from their point of view, exactly the same right to determine their reality, as we do. But their point of view is fictional. Semantic thesis: Is the thesis that the deictic analysis of "actual" is the correct one. Metaphysical thesis: defines that the actual world's actuality is nothing more than the relation between the actual world and the things that exist in it. The semantic thesis can therefore be accepted, and exclude any universes from the ontology. I 63 …naturally, there are inconsistent sets of propositions. Metaphysics: Metaphysics cannot be obtained by calling such sets of propositions poss.w. ((s) > LewisVsErsatz Worlds). Possible worlds/Louis: Our main contentious point is about the role of poss.w. in the explanations of possibility, and more generally, in the explanation of propositions and relations Question: Should we analyze possible worlds with the terms of propositions or analyze them the other way round? VsErsatz worlds/Lewis/Louis: We should not identify poss.w. with sets propositions, since I believe, that propositions are sets of possible worlds. I 64 Content: It deals with a term of content which is not tied to modal realism. The starting point is the familiar idea that the intentional content of a sentence or a thought are the truth conditions (tr.cond.). It is about a concept of content that is not at all bound to modal realism. The starting point is the familiar thought that the intentional content of a sentence or thought is the truth conditions. tr. cond.: are the ways how the world should be in order for the sentence to be true. It is known what the sentence means if it is known which poss.w. makes it true and which one does not. Possible/Possibility/Louis: If one has a term of a possible world which, if realized, would render the proposition true, then it will be shown that the proposition is possible. Then the following will be true,regardless which metaphysics one follows: Modal operator/Quantification/Louis: If there is one domain of all poss.w., all the modal operators can be interpreted in terms of unrestricted quantification in this domain. Necessity is truth in all poss.w., possibility in at least one. metaphysical necessary/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: this is what I mean when I say "metaphysical possible". (Quantification of the set of all possiible worlds). This is also possible with unrestricted quantification without ruining the terms "possible", "could", etc. Restriction: It should be known what the basis of the restriction should be. Impossible world/imposs.w./LouisVsImpossible world: In any case the conclusion will inevitable come that at least some impossible statements are impossible because they are not true in any possible world. And this because of compositionality, which you will surely agree to as well. This is why there are propositions that are neither true in all the possible worlds nor in all the impossible worlds. Possibility/Error/Not knowing[Unwissen]/Louis: Naturally,one can be wrong what is possible in this unrestricted sense. One can also be wrong whether a possibility has been rightly conceived. Solution: Statements complexly represent possibilities. I 65 As such, it is possible to discover that a proposition is impossible. It would be wrong to state that a term creates a situation that renders a statement true, and then judge afterwards that this sort of situation does not fulfill a metaphysical condition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Essentialism | Simons Vs Essentialism | I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same. Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub. Simons: this is the only example of "person and object". I 273 As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table: N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c]) Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...". Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected. Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)! I 275 SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom. I 276 (...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm. SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change. I 278 Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally. Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music"). I 338 Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.) Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori. E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada. Continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Parsons Vs Essentialism | Cresswell I 58 Essentialism/Cresswell: Part of the problem is characterizing it at all. Def Essentialism/Terence Parsons/Cresswell: (Parsons 1969): the doctrine that some things necessarily have a property that other things do not necessarily have. Limited to single-digit predicates: logical form: the following applies for a 8.1 (E.g.) N x and (E.g.)~N x (Parsons also has several-digit predicates): Cresswell: in a complex wff a (where only x is free) which is supposed to be a modal essentialist formula, we can sipmly extend the language by forming an extra predicate and adding the following formula to L(T): 8.2 (x)(a ↔ (x)). ParsonsVsEssentialism/Parsons: an essentialist proposition is false in a maximum model. And for any consistent set of closed non-modal formulas (i.e., for the models of L(T)), there is a maximum model. Point: i.e. that no physical theory contians essentialism with regard to its predicates. Provided, of course, that W consists of all models of L(T). |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Evans, G. | Dummett Vs Evans, G. | Davidson I 58 In a distal theory, the meaning is directly linked to the conditions which make sentences intersubjectively true or false. Here Quine sides with Dummett (DummettVsEvans) and opposes to aligning the meanings with the truth conditions. QuineVsEvans, DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions. Dummett I 11 Language/Evans: New Current: Gareth Evans argues that language could only be explained by means of concepts for different types of thoughts that are considered regardless of their linguistic expression. I 115 In his book "Varieties of reference" Evans tries to analyze language-independently different ways of thinking about an object in order to explain various linguistic means of referencing with the help of these ways of thinking about the object. DummettVsEvans: therefore, Evans is no analytical philosopher for me anymore. The anal. ph. came about as soon as the "turn to language" was completed. Earliest Example: Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884. DummettVsEvans: If thinking about an object only existed if you think something specific with regard to this object, then Frege’s answer would have been that the numbers are only given ,because we grasp complete thoughts about them. Evans: Language explainable by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (also Frege) Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is still the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different from inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you want to turn around the priority of the language over the thought like Evans and others. (Risk of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable.) I 131 The meanings cannot depend on what happens in our consciousness. They could not if these inner processes were communicable! DummettVsEvans: at risk of deriving such an unauthorized view. The meaning is objective, because it is included in the use which a competent speaker has to make of this expression. Stalnaker II 1 Def Analytische Philosophie/Dummett/DummettVsEvans/Stalnaker: Thesis: die Philosophie des Denkens kann nur über die Philosophie der Sprache erfasst werden. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Evans, G. | Grice Vs Evans, G. | EMD II XXI Evans/McDowell: normal linguistic behavior is just as unconscious. (Only deviations are noticed). Then only two factors remain: 1) X’s belief about what S means from the lips of Y about t, 2) X’s beliefs about the relevant facts in the context. GriceVsEvans/VsMcDowell: a Gricean could say that we set too much store by the unreflected behavior and postulate smoothly functioning super beings that mimic our unconscious behavior. (>Platonism). We behave in an unreflected way as if we behaved very reflected. EMD II XXII And a proper understanding of this behavior depends on us recognizing this fact. Evans/McDowellVs: this seems very attractive, but we reject it: we find the question extremely difficult and our following considerations are insufficient. The appeal lies in the special phenomenological duplicity of language that makes Wittgenstein say: Signs/"Bestowing"/Wittgenstein: every sign in itself is dead, what bestows life upon them? |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Evolution Theory | Luhmann Vs Evolution Theory | AU Cass 14 Theory of Evolution / system theory/ST / Luhmann: e. th. takes the chance to explain the totality, which ST can not. Selection / Luhmann: is not provided in the system, but arises from the context. Therefore, conceptually weak concept - becaus e.th. uses statistics instead of causality. Explanation / theory / Luhmann: other theories explain the background noise ("order from noise") as a matter for a transformation into order within the system. LuhmannVs: here is not said exactly how this is done. This is the idea that information is a native product. But how the transformation happens is not explained. Therefore we need Structural coupling. (Cass.6) Double contingency: > theory of evolution: Parallel: somehow there is a split between variation and selection and thus structural changes are encouraged, evolution suggests itself to the establishment of order. And that can not be explained from the primordial soup or "initial conditions" (also not from language or social order) alone. (No "initial conditions." This is double contingency, the invention of a reference problem for rational analysis. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Explanation | Wittgenstein Vs Explanation | I 255 Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is, to look for an explanation where we should seee the facts as "primary phenomena"." In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things. --- I 256 PU §§ 143-242 First: Wittgenstein states that the language is not like a calculus with precisely defined rules. One cannot even ask if it is sometimes so similar to the use of a formula. The question itself is already a mistake. (HintikkaVs most other authors). Also Wittgenstein does not want to go further into the fact that the rules are not exact, but he thinks that the question exact or not? can only be asked in the context of language games. --- VI 60/61 Declaration/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Schulte: "All explanation must be left behind, description must take its place." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Extensional Language | Prior Vs Extensional Language | I 96 Operator/Sentence Variable/Functor/Sentence Operator/Propositional Operator/Prior: "δ" in (E) forms sentences from sentences, "φ" in (D) forms sentences only from names it cannot have both sentences and names as an argument. "N" cannot have names as an argument. ((s) Russell: names or objects cannot be negated). PriorVsCohen: therefore, there is no possibility for our simplification of (F) in his system. I 96 PriorVsCohen/PriorVsExtensional Language: E.g. brown cow: in his axioms it is not essential that the pregnant animal should be a brown cow, it is not mentioned in the evidence. Paradox like in the foreword: no use is made here of the assumption that ψx, i.e. something in the book is wrong. I 97 Despite the large difference this makes, it could simply be omitted. The other constituents do all the work. I.e. it would make no difference for Cohen's theorem whether the thing in the book did not mean that something in the book is wrong, but that it meant that the sky is blue, for example. The only thing that is necessary is that the thing in the book should be true iff. something in the book is wrong and that it is not determined by ψx, but by the other component: ETx∑yKφyNTy. It is strange that the two components are indeed absolutely irrelevant for each other! For Cohen, it would be the same if we wrote: "For an x, x means that the sky is blue, and x is true iff. grass is green." Reason: "iff." is an extensional propositional function. PriorVsCohen/PriorVsExtensional Language/Extensionality: but it would be extremely strange if you wanted to say "the book says that grass is green." (If in fact you only mean that the book contains a true statement). But that is indeed the reason why this extra determination occurs in Cohen's symbolism. (ψx). PriorVsCohen: my theorems (A) through (G) apply no matter what statement functions we insert for δ, both extensional and intensional. E.g. if we leave "δ": "it is not the case that __" or "grass is green and __", we still have Cd∑pKδpNp∑pKδpNp. For all these theorems tell us that there could possibly only be extensional statement functions! |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Extensionalism | Verschiedene Vs Extensionalism | Lewis IV 256 Lewis: I really do not know what the Intensionalist (I) Vs Extensionalism (E) should say! I know several unsatisfactory arguments. ("I" in the English text also for "I, Lewis") (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 1. one could say that the extensionalism is more complicated. It needs two more categories and one more lexicon object. VsVs: this is bad for two reasons: a) Extensionality itself is generally regarded as an important dimension of simplicity. b) I agree with E that a complete approach must also take into account the speaker's pause at the beginning of the sentence. E has already done this with its syntax and semantics! The intensionalist still has to find a place for it. (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 2. One could object that it goes against our paradigm that extensions must be shared: Example "Boston" simply names Boston and not instead a function of indices. Problem: this paradigm applies to English, Polish, German, etc. but not necessarily to unexplored indigenous languages. Even if the intensionalist suspected that the language is very related to ours, one cannot expect E to agree that the paradigms are applicable! For E and I do not agree which language is theirs! Tarski's convention W: does not help here: because the native language does not correspond by the way not uncontroversially to our metalanguage of their language. Therefore the only versions of these principles that are applicable are stated in translations of these terms. Example E and I may agree that a meta-linguistic sentence of the form "_____ designates ___ in their language" or IV 256/257 "_____ is a name that has ____ as an extension in your language." should be true whenever the first blank space is filled with a name (in our language) with a name of the native language and the second with a translation of into our language. But that does not lead us anywhere, because we do not agree at all about names and what their correct translations are! (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 3. I could try to argue that native language cannot be extensional because in it some inference patterns are invalid that are valid in any extensional language. For example, identity: inferences with Leibniz's identity (Leibniz' Law) or existential generalization lead from true premises to false conclusions in native language. Extensionalist/VsLewis: should agree that Leibniz's law receives truth in every extensional language and that it is not preserved in my counter-examples (which?). But he should not agree that such inferences are cases of Leibniz identity! Identity/Leibniz/Lewis: an inference with Leibniz' law needs an identity premise and how to identify it? Not by looking at three or four horizontal lines! Semantic: an expression with two gaps expresses identity, if and only if 1. the result of inserting names into the gaps is a sentence, 2. the sentence thus formed is true if the names are coextensive, otherwise false. Def Identity Premise: is a sentence thus formed. Problem: since E and I disagree on what the coextensive names are, they disagree on what the expressions are that express identity, which propositions are the identity premises, and which inferences are real instances of Leibniz's law. We are ignoring the difference of opinion here about whether a phrase S must be introduced by a pause to be a sentence at all. To be precise, if ",/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Li, then " ,/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Le. The original version without is no inference at all in Le, because its "premises" and "conclusions" are S names and not sentences. ((s) Extensional Language/(s): how is it possible at all, if no predicates (properties) are allowed - then is not the form subject predicate at all?) Vs: the form is then: a is an element of the set B. (in vain) VsExtensionalism: 4. I could argue ad hominem that E has not really escaped intentionality because the things he takes as extensions are intensional entities. Functions of indices to truth values are usually identified with propositions (especially if the indices consist of possible worlds and little more). And these functions are identified equally with individual terms. How can such intensional entities then be extensions? LewisVsVs: this is just a mix-up! Intension is relational! ((s) It depends on the consideration whether something is an intension or an extension). Intensions are things ((s) entities) that play a certain role in semantics and not things of a certain sort. E and I agree that in a suitable language the same thing that is the intention of one expression is also the extension of another. For example, when we speak technical English in a fragment that is suitable as the meta-meta-language of a smaller fragment, we agree that one and the same thing is both, the intention of expression in the object language "my hat" IV 258 and the extension of the metaphorical expression "intension of "my hat"". ((s) The same thing, not the same expression). Lewis: the thing itself is neither extension nor intension. It is true that some entities can only serve as extensions, while other functions of indices can serve as both. But there is no thing that would be unsuitable to be an extension. Ontology/(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 5. one might think that the extensionalist attributes an extravagant ontology to the natives: For example, if the intensionalist says that a word of the natives designates a concrete material mountain, then E says he designates something more esoteric: a set-theoretical object, formed from a realm of individuals that includes unrealized possibilities. But also E and I believe in esoteric things if they do not want to contradict themselves. We have no doubt that we can name them. We agree that the natives have names for even more far-fetched things like gods (according to the Intensionalist) or functions of indices to such gods (according to the Extensionalist). Ontology/Vs Extensionalism: I should perhaps argue better that certain unesoteric things are missing! Ontology/Kripke: (conversational, 1972): it is wrong to attribute to someone an ontology that contains sets without elements or functions without arguments and values, etc. LewisVsVs: this is a plausible principle. But did E violate it by saying that the names of the natives are functions of indices and not names of concrete things? I do not think so. The ascribed ontology is not the same as the ascribed set of name carriers. For example, if our language is attributed an ontology, it contains all natural numbers, not just the small minority of them that actually bear names! It is not significant that the amount of name carriers violates Kripke's closure principle unless it can be shown that this is the totality of the attributed ontology. But it is difficult to say what ontology, if any, is attributed by the use of Le. One should look at the range of quantifiers, but Le has no quantifiers at all! Quantifiers: make sentences. But in Le only the predicate does that and that is not a quantifier. The transformation Lp of Parsons is different: it has a range. The set D, so that we get intended truth conditions for the propositions of Lp that transform the propositions of Li, then and only when D is included in the range of bound variables. (This assumes that the predicates of Lp have intended interpretations). The set D is the same as the set of extensions of expressions in Le. It violates Kripke's closing principle ((s) that no empty sets should be attributed, see above), so it cannot be attributed to anyone as ontology. ((s) because there are no bound variables in Le.). I.e. if an extensionalist claims that the native speaks Lp, veiled by transformations, we have a remedy against him. But E himself does not represent that! Perhaps one can show that if it is bad to attribute the use of Lp, IV 259 that it is also bad to attribute the use of Le? But I do not see that yet. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Externalism | Putnam Vs Externalism | V 75 Putnam: per internalism. (Coherence) VsCorrespondence. Thesis: it is about compliance with our belief system, not with mental independent or speech independent "issues". (Metaphysical realism). --- V 76 Brains in a Vat/BIV/internalism/Putnam: the whole problem will be solved when you look at it from internalism. From whose point of view is the story actually told? Obviously not from the viewpoint of the sentient beings in this world. Externalism (PutnamVs): viewed from here, the problem cannot be so easily solved. --- V 77 Nevertheless: if we are really brains in a vat, we cannot think that we are, except in the bracketed sense, and this bracketed thought does not have reference conditions that would make it true. So it is not possible here that we are brains in a vat. Magical theory of reference: we would have to presuppose "noetic rays" or "self-identifying objects", and the realism does not want that, of course. --- V 78 Externalism: popular answer today: although there is no sign that corresponds necessarily with certain things, there are contextual (causal) connections. PutnamVs. E.g. "Electron" is contextually related to textbooks, but it does not refer to textbooks. The externalism will respond that this was no causal chain of the appropriate type. PutnamVs: but how can we have intentions that determine which causal chains are "appropriate", if we do not already refer to something? Internalism: here the situation is quite different: characters are used within the conceptual scheme of a community. Objects and characters are equally internal elements of the scheme, so it is possible to specify what corresponds to what. (> conceptual scheme). Within a language, it is trivial, what "rabbit" refers to: to rabbits, of course. --- V 79 Externalism: is of course also of the opinion that "rabbit" refers to rabbits, and "alien" to an element of the set of aliens. But this is no information for him what reference is. For him, it is a problem to find out what reference actually is. PutnamVsExternalism: the idea that a causal connection is necessary, is refuted by the fact that "alien" certainly refers to aliens no matter if we have ever been interrelated with them or not. Yes, even in such simple words as "horse" or "rabbit" the externalist could have noted that the extension includes many things with which we are not causally related (E.g. future horses or rabbits that live in the deep forest and have not seen a human yet). --- I (f) 158 PutnamVsExternal Realism/VsExternalism: E.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of "electron" does not refer to textbooks. RealismVs: this is not the "correct causal chain". VsRealism: but how could we have intentions that determine which causal chains: are of the right kind, if we were not already be able to refer? I (f) 160 InternalismVsExternalism: "of the same kind" does not make sense outside the category system. In some respects, finally everything is "of the same kind" as anything else. The whole apparatus of "correct causal chains and facts that make that future horses belong to the same kind" as the "with whom I have interacted" are far too complicated. There are simply horses. (Metaphysical position). InternalismVsExternalism: in a certain sense, the world is actually made of "self-identifying objects" but not in a sense that is accessible to the externalists. If "objects" are made as discovered, as well as products of our conceptual invention as the "objective" factor in the experience, then objects belong intrinsically to certain labels. I (f) 161 Because these labels were initially our tools to construct a version of the world with such objects. But this kind of "self-identifying objects" is not mentally independent. Realism/externalism: wants to imagine a world of objects that are at the same time mentally independent and self-identifying. Internalism/VsExternalism: one cannot do that. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Externalism | Newen Vs Externalism | I 174 Natural Species/Putnam/Newen: E.g. water, oil, tiger: in doing so, we single out individual specimens, even if we I 175 are unaware of the essential conditions for the existence of the natural species. I 176 Meaning/Putnam: is therefore dependent on the surroundings. >Externalism. Externalism/Burge: Transfers Putnam's knowledge to the contents of beliefs. Twin Earth: shows that beliefs cannot be fully characterized by the internal states. Arthritis/Shmarthritis/Burge/Newen: Alfred's belief that he had arthritis in the thigh becomes a true statement when changing to a language community in which this is common. I 177 Point: in this, however, we still assume that the use is determined by experts. I.e. we still can make mistakes! We may use it correctly sometimes, even though we connect false beliefs with it! VsExternalism/Newen: Problem: Supervenience! E.g. 1) beliefs depend on the surroundings 2) brain states are independent of the surroundings 3) beliefs supervene on brain states. That is impossible, if some are dependent and the others are independent. I 178 It might so happen that different beliefs are present in the same brain states. VsExternalism/Knowledge/Belief/Newen: 2) argument VsExternalism: it is inconsistent with our self-knowledge. In general, we know what we believe. It might be, however, that the surroundings have such an influence that the content is changed. There are two positions a) incompatibility thesis: either the externalism or the everyday intuition is true b) compatibility thesis: both are compatible at the price that our everyday intuition is significantly attenuated. NS I 139 VsExternalism: simply saying that you need causal chains for successful reference is not enough. You must also say what kind they need to be. E.g. direct visual contact, hearsay, instrument monitoring, etc. E.g. phlogiston: it was believed to be responsible for combustion processes. Question: Why does "phlogiston" not refer to oxygen? Why did this reference not succeed? VsExternalism: Problem: it cannot give the following answer, because it brings out the thesis rejected by him: "Intention determines the extension". Externalism has to say that the theory is so fundamentally wrong that it is not satisfied by any substance. Therefore, "phlogiston" does not reference. VsExternalism: thus it cannot show how the causal chains are linked and owes us a theory of causal chains in general. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P. | V 156 Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." >Incommensurability, >observation language. Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true. V 156/157 According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail. Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there. However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so. PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same. How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual? --- V 158 Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference. V 160 Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference. --- I (c) 83 Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. I (c) 84 Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Fictionalism | Schwarz Vs Fictionalism | Schwarz I 72 Fictionalism/Possible worlds/Poss.w./Lewis/Black: Thesis: propositions of possibilities and possible worlds function as propositions on absences, the average citizen or Holmes. That means they may be true, although the objects do not exist. Question: Can you rephrase propositions about possible world, so the modal words (MO) are eliminated? Yes: E.g. "possibly donkeys can speak": Problem: the modality here is still provided. Problem: much of what we want to know about possible worlds, cannot be translated in the language with rhombus and square: E.g. whether there are two worlds which differ only in that fundamental properties that play roles. Fictionalism: propositions about possible worlds analogue to propositions about Holmes: because Holmes is indeed a possible thing itself. (simple form: Rose, 1990(1), Sider 2002(2) nested: Armstrong 1989a(3), intermediate forms: Fine 1976(4), 2003b(5)). Thesis: propositions of the form: there is a world in which ... "interpreted as "it is possible that there is a world ... "((s) Solves the quantification in favor of modal operators). Fiction/Rosen: then Lewis' tales of possible worlds along with a description of the actual world. Then there is "according to Lewis" a possible world in which donkeys can speak. ((s) but not: "The actual world is such that speaking donkey may exist in a possible world. That would be a property of the actual world and not the possible world, and the actual world may not have as many properties as they is at least in parts exclude themselves). Vs: Lewis provides no full description of all possible worlds. He consciously leaves many open. Pointe: after Rose then propositions, which Lewis does not specifically agree to, would be wrong!. Problem: because Lewis says nothing about 17 dimensional possible world, the proposition that there is at least one and the proposition that there is none are both wrong. Schwarz I 73 VsVs: you could try to assign more work the fiction operator "according to Lewis': from his texts it is clear that he believed that there possible worlds with 17 dimensions (he also says nothing about possible worlds with 17 cows). But the operator then becomes mysterious e.g. "From Lewis' texts follows logically ..." Vs: why should Lewis decide about possible world and not another author?. Fiction/Schwarz: it is better to idealize. That is then an only fiction of many possible worlds.. Then we should have a "lagadonical" language again. Then we could distinguish worlds with strange things and properties: E.g. fiction can say that a strange property A in a possible world 1 plays exactly the same role as another, B, in a possible world 2. (Sider 2002)(2). Vs: Problem: the supposed modality remains ((s) And fictionalism and ersatzism were just going to replace it). Solution: the correct fiction would be one that accurately covers all possibilities. ((s) Vs: that would be meaningless, and would not make any distinctions, the distinctions have to be made within the fiction and would demand a meta-level). Vs Fictionalism: further problems: e.g. the use of possible worlds for analyzing information or meaning: Def information content of a proposition/SchwarzVsFictionalism: a class of possible worlds.. But not "in accordance with this and that fiction". Not even when the fiction in question contained a theory of information. We want our own theory, not the theory of a fiction!. VsFictionalism: should not leave too much to fiction. If all becomes fiction (e.g. all Abstracts) the concept loses contour. Possible world/Schwarz: you also have the obligation to possible worlds, when you talk in everyday language about possible options. But, as if you count your change, you do not need sophisticated metaphysics for this. (Jackson 1998a(6),11). Schwarz I 93 Vs fictionalism: Problem: when properties are classes of possibilia, statements about properties must also be analyzed away in a fictional way. 1. Gideon Rosen [1990]: “Modal Fictionalism”. Mind, 99: 327–354 2. Theodore Sider [2002]: “The Ersatz Pluriverse”. Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279–315 3. D. M. Armstrong [1989a]: A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 4. Kit Fine [1975]: “Review of Lewis, Counterfactuals”. Mind, 84: 451–458 5. Kit Fine [2003b]: “The Problem of Possibilia”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003], 161–179 6. F. Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Field, H. | Kripke Vs Field, H. | Nonfactualism/Field: Usually we say that there is no fact which causes isomorphism as the cross world identity. Crossworldidentity/KripkeVsField: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972): may raise doubts as to whether this qualitative aspect is our normal convention for cross world identity. Field: I think these examples show that cross world identity can only be determined at a point in time. Kripke: E.g. A possible world just like ours until the birth of Nixon, but deviating from it at that point. In this possible world person X, who is born to people who are qualitatively identical with Nixon’s parents, looks different and has a different career than Nixon in the actual world Somebody else, Y on the other hand develops like Nixon and looks like him. Individuation/Cross world identity/Kripke: We individuate things in worlds in such a way that. I 41 The isomorphisms of the worlds’ beginning segments (until the birth of Nixon) count as identity. This results in X being Nixon and not Y!. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Field, H. | Putnam Vs Field, H. | Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Quine Vs Field, H. | Field I 128 Quine-Putnam-Argument/VsField: we must assume the truth of mathematical statements in order to be able to do academic work. >indispensability argument). FieldVs: the only way around this: show that the nominalistic resources for good science are adequate. This is not a consequence of conservatism. Field II 202 Partial Signification/Field: is not so unusual: we often apply it implicitly in the case of vague expressions. Ex what is the extension of the term e.g. "big man" in German? There is no fact which decides whether 185 or 180 cm. Solution: "big man" partially signifies a set and partially other sets. Namely, the sets of shape {xI x is a person taller than h}. FieldVsQuine: that is quite unlike in Quine. QuineVsField: it is not necessary to abandon the normal semantic concepts of denotation and signification. Instead, we can make them relative. (1) for a foreign language: here we do not have to refrain from talking about the signification of a foreign word. But we must say that relative to the obvious translation manual ... FieldVsQuine: but apparently that makes no sense. (1) seems to suggest that we could explain relative signification as: (2) saying that a term T used in one language signifies the amount of rabbits, relative to a ÜH M, actually means that M translates T as "rabbit". FieldVs: that is not sufficient. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Tarski Vs Field, H. | Field II 142 T-Theory/TarskiVsField: its variant is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: approach with schematic letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1. we have the same advantage as Feferman for schematic disquotation and schematic meta language: extensions of the language are automatically considered. 2. the use of ""p" is true iff p" (now as schema formula as part of language instead of axiom) seems to better grasp the notion of truth. 3. (most importantly) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of the language. While this is important, it is not omitted by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to get for beliefs. Horwich I 484 TarskiVsField/Soames: Tarski's semantic properties are not dependent on facts about speakers, thereby nothing gets lost. One should approach semantics abstractly and leave the interpretation of speaker behavior to pragmatics. Advantage: you get a T-predicate for metatheoretical discussion, and you keep the opportunity to ask philosophical questions in other areas.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Verschiedene Vs Field, H. | Field I 51 Infinity/Physics/Essay 4: even without "part of" relation we do not really need the finity operator for physics. VsField: many have accused me of needing every extension of 1st level logic. But this is not the case. I 52 I rather assume that the nominalization program has not yet been advanced far enough to be able to say what the best logical basis is. Ultimately, we are going to choose only a few natural means that go beyond the 1st level logic, preferably those that the Platonist would also need. But we can only experience this by trial and error. I 73 Indispensability Argument/Logic/VsField: if mE may be dispensable in science, they are not in logic! And we need logic in science. Logical Sequence Relation/Consequence/Field: is normally defined in terms of model theory: (Models are mE, semantic: a model is true or not true.) Even if one formulates them in a proven theoretical way ("there is a derivation", syntactically, or provable in a system) one needs mE or abstract objects: arbitrary sign sequences of symbol tokens and their arbitrary sequences. I 77 VsField: some have objected that only if we accept a Tarski Theory of truth do we need mE in mathematics. FieldVsVs: this led to the misunderstanding that without Tarskian truth mathematics would have no epistemic problems. Mathematics/Field: indeed implies mE itself, (only, we do not always need mathematics) without the help of the concept of truth, e.g. that there are prime numbers > 1000. I 138 Logic of Part-of-Relation/Field: has no complete evidence procedure. VsField: how can subsequent relations be useful then? Field: sure, the means by which we can know that something follows from something else are codifiable in an evidentiary procedure, and that seems to imply that no appeal to anything stronger than a proof can be of practical use. FieldVsVs: but you do not need to take any epistemic approach to more than a countable part of it. I 182 Field Theory/FT/Relationalism/Substantivalism/Some AuthorsVsField: justify the relevance of field theories for the dispute between S/R just the other way round: for them, FT make it easy to justify a relationalist view: (Putnam, 1981, Malament 1982): they postulate as a field with a single huge (because of the infinity of physical forces) and a corresponding part of it for each region. Variant: the field does not exist in all places! But all points in the field are not zero. FieldVsPutnam: I do not think you can do without regions. Field II 351 Indeterminacy/Undecidability/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Thesis: not only in the set theory but also in the number theory many undecidable sets do not have a certain truth value. Many VsField: 1. truth and reference are basically disquotational. Disquotational View/Field: is sometimes seen as eliminating indeterminacy for our present language. FieldVsVs: that is not the case :>Chapter 10 showed that. VsField: Even if there is indeterminacy in our current language also for disquotationalism, the arguments for it are less convincing from this perspective. For example, the question of the power of the continuum ((s)) is undecidable for us, but the answer could (from an objectivist point of view (FieldVs)) have a certain truth value. Uncertainty/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Recently some well-known philosophers have produced arguments for the impossibility of any kind of uncertainty in set theory and number theory that have nothing to do with disquotationalism: two variants: 1. Assuming that set theory and number theory are in full logic of the 2nd level (i.e. 2nd level logic, which is understood model theoretically, with the requirement that any legitimate interpretation) Def "full" in the sense that the 2nd level quantifiers go over all subsets of the 1st level quantifier range. 2. Let us assume that number theory and the set theory are formulated in a variant of the full logic of the 2nd level, which we could call "full schematic logic of level 1". II 354 Full schematic logic 1st Level/LavineVsField: denies that it is a partial theory of (non-schematic!) logic of the 2nd level. Field: we now better forget the 2nd level logic in favour of full schematic theories. We stay in the number theory to avoid complications. We assume that the certainty of the number theory is not in question, except for the use of full schemata. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Stalnaker Vs Field, H. | Field II 28 Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning. FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider". Field II 94 StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language. A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant. StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states. Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this: FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that. Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations. 2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms. Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Leeds Vs Field, H. | Field II 304 Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership. LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory. Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility). Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed. The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.) Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context. Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth. II 305 Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class" and ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language. Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language. Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation. FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found. Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language. Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30). Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear. FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms! e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two". FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.) Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) : II 306 e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true. Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value). Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation. 1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory. 2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true. FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum. The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness. FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better. I 378 Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) . Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField). Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....) Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness! Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction! Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language. Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end. LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable? I 379 This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way. Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction. Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English. Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list. Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English. Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law. LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory). And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization. Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)). Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction. I 386 Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted. I 380 Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important. Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world. Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation! The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world". I 381 We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard. Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic. LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI: a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned). Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation! This is an elder form of the correspondence theory. I 491 He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt. Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world. If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it. LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order. Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability). |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Soames Vs Field, H. | I 467 Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth. Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things: (i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages. (ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically (iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes. Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example (1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true. b. Church's theorem is true c. Everything he said is true. I 468 SoamesVsPropositions. Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists. Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example). Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say: (6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all.... I 470 SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise: (7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S. I 472 Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar. 2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation. The result is a sentence of the metalanguage: (8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S). FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong! Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions I 474 of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation. Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct. FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient. "Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9): (9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only) c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent) Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now. Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage). Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different! N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts. Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept. Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses). I 475 Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages: 1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above) 2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory. Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent. Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts). 2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference. SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)! Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1). Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except: L1: here "R" applies to round things L2: here on red things. Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages: (11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red. Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list. FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers. SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski I 476 in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true, L2: ...if A and B are true. FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning). FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior). Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts: (13) the term of a name referring to an object The term of a predicate that applies to an object. The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms ... I 477 Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b: (14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s). b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is .... Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary. SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price. Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition). New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories. SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms. Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either a) define about truth, or b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms. SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now! a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular. b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s]. Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing. Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent. Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable. SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough. I 478 It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior). Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer). (15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals). (16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc. ((s) Both times reference) Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16) that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition. I 481 Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms. Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories. Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects. ((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence). Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language). I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions. I 483 SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities. I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example Negation/Field (21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence). SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts). Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have. Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar: Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage. Solution/Soames: (22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence). "Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Fodor, J. | Brandom Vs Fodor, J. | I 731 BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle. II 12 Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity. II 144 Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor. BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states. Esfeld I 71 FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below. NS I 161 Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses conventional semantics. Instead of assuming, as semantics does, that the correctness of the conclusion "If Princeton lies east of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh lies west of Princeton" is justified by the meaning of "east" and "west", NS I 162 he carries out a Copernican turn: Brandom: Thesis: "west" and "east" get their meaning precisely because they occur in such subsequent relationships. The whole network of sentence utterances in which the words occur and also the corresponding actions constitute the conceptual content of the words. Inferentialism/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: does not see truth and reference as fundamental units constituting meaning. Correctness/Chance: which conclusions from which utterances are correct is determined pragmatically by social practice guided by implicit rules. Meaning/Holism/Brandom: the meaning of terms and expressions arises from their inferential roles to other terms and expressions, therefore they are not atomistic but holistic. (BrandomVsFodor). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Fodor, J. | Churchland Vs Fodor, J. | Lanz I 303 Learning / Fodor: represent and examine hypotheses about which parts of the natural language correlate with which parts of the innate "language of thought" (Mentalese): acquisition of the native language. ChurchlandVsFodor: it would follow that one can not learn new concepts in a certain sense. If opinions are relations to sentences of the "language of thought", then a sentence must be stored for each opinion somewhere. Must then for every opinion also a tacit record be saved in the "language of thought"? That would exceed the capacity limits. But this storage would not be sufficient for the sentences to be accessible and available at the right time. In addition, the links must be transparent for the organism (though not the consciousness). (ChurchlandVsMentalese). |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Fodor, J. | Dennett Vs Fodor, J. | I 531 "Cognitive lock"/Independence/Chomsky/McGinn: Spiders can't think about fishing. That's how it is for us: the question of free will may not be solvable for us. McGinn/Fodor: human consciousness is such a mystery. I 533 Cognitive Barrier/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different than for us: he cannot even understand the question. He is not even taken aback! Neither Fodor nor Chomsky can cite cases of animals to which certain issues are a mystery. I 534 In reality, it is not as they represent it, a biological, but rather a pseudo-biological problem. It even ignores a biological fact: we can certainly find an intelligence scale among living beings. >Intelligence. Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from issues that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way we cannot even imagine today. I 570 Why do Chomsky and Fodor not want this conclusion? They consider the means to be unsatisfactory. If our minds are not based on sky hooks, but on cranes, they would like to keep that secret. Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. eye of the frog: reports about meaning too vague if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Dennett. I 571 Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply cannot distinguish what was the selectioning environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says. Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the uncertainty that Fodor criticizes is in reality the material with which evolution works, its condition. (the "borderline cases"). I 571 Meaning/Meaning/Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the view that there must be something in particular which the frog’s eye "means" is simple essentialism. I Lanz 299 DennettVsFodor: denies Fodor’s assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing personal states. Thus, Dennett denies their feature: Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis). Rorty I 279 DennettVsFodor/Rorty: two subjects can absolutely believe the same thing, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Accordingly, no conclusions are required from the propositions of the processors to the propositions which the subject believes. Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricists, the causal process does not need to comply with any conclusion chain, which justifies the opinions of the person. Explanations may have their private character, justification is public in as far as disagreements of different people on the functioning of their tricky minds neither refer nor should refer. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Goodman Vs Fodor, J. | IV 141 GoodmanVsFodor: Contemporary theorists assert that language proficiency is based on a dictionary and a grammar inside the consciousness. (Chomsky, GoodmanVs) The mental dictionary defines the meaning of the individual words. The mental grammar defines the manner in which the meanings of significant word sequences are derived from the meanings of their constituents. IV 143 As if the consciousness were a digital computer. The charm lies in the seductive analogy to everyday machines and even the computer. According to Jerry Fodor, the computer is the only model of consciousness at our disposal. But introspection does not bring us even remotely close to a verification: the proponents of the view to be tested admit that access to the internal code is a deeply unconscious process. The reason for the belief that it does occur is that it is embedded in a high-performing linguistic theory. We are to believe that speakers "have access" to an internal syntactic and semantic code, and that is due to an analogy to the mutual attraction of bodies. I can know that ’elm’ and ’beech’ are separate classes of deciduous trees without having an idea of how to tell them apart. Goodman: my language proficiency is not endangered by my ignorance. I can connect with other members of the linguistic community to fill my gaps. In addition, the knowledge in question is not primarily linguistic, here is rather botanical or biographical. Fodor gives in on this point, and draws the conclusion that the dictionary is referentially opaque. His entries define the concepts in which we think, but not what we think about. IV 144 The analogy to the computer model is ambiguous, because it has a referential and a computer-like interpretation. I 145 Of course, the computer knows nothing of the referential interpretation. - Accordingly, we would not know that a computer simulation represents a molecular interaction - But according to Fodor, this is exactly our situation in terms of sentences that we understand. - Questions about the truth value of sentences are inappropriate according to the computer-like reading. Fodor’s theory can neither explain how we know what new phrases rep nor what trusted ones rep. The role of the dictionary has emerged to serve other purposes. The linguists cannot explain understanding of metaphorical language. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Fodor, J. | Harman Vs Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 160 Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: the language of the thoughts is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56). |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Fodor, J. | McGinn Vs Fodor, J. | I 123 Semantics / reality / thought / language / McGinn: most of which we can form an image based on our capabilities, has no semantic properties. In addition, only a little straightforward semantics is needed to folk psychological confront us with other people. I 124 This makes it unlikely that we have facilities to detect the possibility of meaning. E.g. Even monkeys probably have a primitive semantics, but no philosophical semantics. N.B. If we were able to grasp our semantic skills, that would be a biological accident. And that we are capable to think of something does not have the sense that we also grasp its essence. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Fodor, J. | Putnam Vs Fodor, J. | Pauen I 228 Meaning/VsFodor: it is not sure if Fodor has made here a sufficient condition for the emergence of meaning. Example, one could consider, according to Fodor, artificial chicken eggs as asymmetrically dependent on the production of real chicken eggs. Yet, one will not regard such eggs as a representation of chickens, although the latter represent the asymmetrical effective "causes" for the emergence of chicken eggs. --- I 229 Meaning/PutnamVsFodor/Pauen: it is also unclear whether the asymmetric dependence of references of a mental representation is necessary. E.g. Super-Billionaire: here, the meaning does not depend on the meeting with real specimens. E.g. Unicorn: can be no "original cause" of our thoughts. The relation is much more complex than it is assumed in Fodor with a quasi one to one opposition. It's about the whole language practice of our ancestors. Another problem: it has to be excluded that the original causations are from e.g. Lions children's books or television tubes. --- Putnam III 56ff Dependency/reference/Possible World/PutnamVsFodor: does the relationship really exist and is it asymmetrical? In the terminology of semantics of possible worlds this thought says that the "closest possible worlds" in which the cats do not trigger such remarks, are possible worlds, in which the word "cat" refers to something completely different (possible worlds not real worlds, but hypothetical situations). --- III 57 This would show that the dependency relationship does exist, and the law according to which the expressions of images are triggered is dependent on the law that cats trigger the expressions. But it is not enough to show that they are asymmetrical. For this, the evidence would have to be provided: if not images, then also not cats as a trigger. Fodor thinks this is obvious, but is it really? VsFodor: Would it not be reasonable to assume that the closest possible worlds, in which it is not a "law" that images are triggers, are possible worlds in which most people have no idea how cats look like at all!? If these are the closest possible worlds in which images do not trigger any, then it would be the case when images would not trigger any remarks, cats would also not trigger any, and then the dependency relationship would be symmetrical. FodorVsVs: possible answer: simply "intuitive" understanding. It could be about worlds in which people are blind. --- III 58 VsFodor: but this does not seem reasonable. He could better say that the signs would sometimes be triggered. Then it could be objected that the thesis is too weak. One would probably say that the sentence could be true, but it is not "law-like". "Law-like"/Fodor: is an undefined basic concept in Fodors metaphysics. Not a property of sentences, but a relationship between universals. In this way, he fends off the objection by the use of this term, an already intentional concept is introduced. (Putnam: is probably intentional). --- III 59 Fodor: even if the ordinary people there would have no idea, how cats look like, there would certainly be biologists and other specialists who would still know how cats look like. PutnamVs: at least for natural kinds it does not necessarily follow that it is possible for the theory to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of reference. The theory even fails completely when it comes to extensions by an analytical definition of necessary and sufficient conditions. --- III 60 E.g. "Super-billionaire" persons whose property is at least 100 billion Mark. It could be that there is not a single example of the triggering of such statements. Fodor could say, the characters would be triggered when the people would know about all the relevant facts. But what actually a relevant fact is, depends on the meaning of each considered word. The word is already interpreted. Omniscience is not only a non-real fact, but an impossible. FodorVsVs: could say that his theory does not apply to words that have analytical definitions. --- III 61 But especially Fodor's theory is anti-hermeneutic, he disputes the view that the reference of a word cannot be determined in isolation. Hermeneutics/PutnamVsFodor: according to the hermeneutic view, there can be no such thing as necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x. The best we can hope for are the adequacy criteria of translation schemes. (FodorVs). FodorVsVs: in his view, this leads to the "meaning-holism" which, in turn, results in the "meaning-nihilism" and thus the denial of the possibility of a "special science" of linguistics. --- III 62 FodorVsVs: might reply, actually the theory should not apply to natural languages, but to his hypothetical innate thinking language "mentalese". PutnamVsFodor: definitely, Fodor's theory fails for other words: E.g. witch. Perhaps it is analytic that real witches possess magical powers and are women. But no necessary and sufficient conditions for witch. There are also good witches. --- III 63 A witch-law (see above) would be wrong. Indeed, there are no witches that can trigger remarks. --- III 67 ff Cause/causality/PutnamVsFodor: uses the concept of causation very informal. --- III 68 Putnam: the normal linguistic concept of cause is context-bound and interest-dependent. The concept of causality used by Fodor is not the relatively more context-independent concept of a contributing cause, but the context-sensitive and interest-relative concept of everyday language. According to Fodor the presence of a cat is then a contributing cause for remarks. --- III 69 PutnamVsFodor: now, then past behavior of past generations is (not to mention representatives of strong dialects) also a contributing factor. --- III 70 FodorVsPutnam: that is certainly not Fodor's causality. All his examples just want to take the colloquial term as an undefined basic concept as a basis. PutnamVsFodor: the strange thing is that this is interest-relative. How do we use it, depends on what alternatives we consider for all relevants. (Intentionality). --- III 71 Counterfactual conditionals/KoKo/Fodor: assumes, they had established truth values. PutnamVsFodor: counterfactual conditionals have no fixed truth values. --- III 73 Possible Worlds/Putnam: we can then call "closer" worlds the ones which we believe are more relevant when it comes to determining the truth value of the conditional clause. --- III 74 FodorVs: might reply that this physics would be given a special position compared to the specialized sciences. PutnamVsFodor: one might then reply, the laws of the special sciences are just as unproblematic as those of physics. FodorVsVs: but that does not really work: E.g. "coffee, sugar cubes": it could mean that this piece of sugar is somehow "not normal." --- III 78 Reductionism/PutnamVsFodor: Fodor fails in the scaling-down, because he fails to define the reference using these terms (law, counterfactual conditionals and causality). --- III 79/80 PutnamVsFodor: from the fact that a statement does not specifically deal with something mental, it does not follow that no requirement of this statement refers to our cognitive interests. Causality/Putnam: the concept of causality has a cognitive dimension, even if it is used on inanimate objects. --- Putnam I (k) 269 Meaning/PutnamVsFodor: actually makes the same mistake as Saussure and Derrida: that equality of meaning is, strictly speaking, only reasonable in the impossible case in which two languages or texts are isomorphic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Fodor, J. | Rorty Vs Fodor, J. | I 245 Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply. I 256 Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves! RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned! Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) I 277 Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>contingent a priori/Kripke). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Searle Vs Fodor, J. | FN I 283 SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)(1) III 139 Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor). To enable: should therefore be a causal concept. Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here. III 142 Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is. Cf. >Background/Searle. 1. J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Schiffer Vs Fodor, J. | I 80 SchifferVsFodor: his theory implies that everyone is omniscient and infallible under optimal conditions. omniscient: because if any situation exists (and yourself are working perfectly) you believe it and probably know it. infallible: because under ideal conditions nobody believes anything wrong. Optimality condition/Optimum/Schiffer: whatever Fodor's optimality condition is, it is clear 1. that they will never be fulfilled 2. that we have no idea what they should be 3. if they are to serve the strong thesis of the language of thought, it must be shown without reference to semantic or intentional vocabulary 4. it is compliable, even though it will never be fulfilled. Otherwise (a) would incoherent. (…+…) I 81 SchifferVsFodor: 1. his performance is not the best solution for finding naturalistic truth conditions for Mentalese. 2. Problem: reliability theory: each reliability theory for mental content must take into account that we ourselves are only reliable indicators in terms of some of our beliefs. E.g. Ralph sees a dog: Then the chances are good that he believes it is a dog. But: E.g. when Ralph Jesus sees how high are the chances that he thinks he's divine! E.g. I have exactly 11 dollars in my pocket: what are the chances that Ralph believes that?. Truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: So we must not individually proceed belief for belief!. I 82 Reliability/truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: the reliability considerations extend transversely through the systematic links that exist between the expressions in Mentalese. And again we should better look from the standpoint of thought language as a whole and not, as Fodor, for each mental representation individually. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Fodor, J. | Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. | I 208 Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L". PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there. E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell. I 209 But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time. In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from. Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing. Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs. Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions. But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands. Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions: 1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) states. 2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior. I 215 Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ. Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C. Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent. That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations! The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ". The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures. Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: "No representation, no computation". I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes. d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties. VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either: 1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or: 2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Fodor, J. | Cresswell Vs Fodor, J. | II 53 Meaning/CresswellVsFodor: Cannot be a representation of any kind. Although this is a strong tradition in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and AI (artificial intelligence research). propositional attitude/Fodor (Fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): These propositional attitudes must be understood as relations between organisms and internal representations. Cresswell: This can be construed in two ways. For this I use the attitude verb "to say". --- II 54 CresswellVsFodor: his focus on belief may have obscured his view to the fact that there are two different problems with propositional attitudes Object/Fodor/Cresswell: when Fodor speaks about objects of propositional attitudes he does not say that in the semantic sense (meaning as an object) but rather in the sense that the objects of indirect speech are the sentences that have been expressed if the whole sentence is true. CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong. Fodor/Cresswell: but he is right in that if (1) Is true, there is a relation that exists between an organism and a representation. But that’s then an external one, not an internal one. Fodor: for him it is about psychology, not to semantics. I.e. it is about what goes on in the activity of discourse (parallel to the speech act theory). In particular, he is concerned with beliefs and desires. --- II 55 Paul ChurchlandVsFodor: (1981) Fodor/Cresswell: so for him it is so about how the expression is related to the rest of the behavior. That’s a very different approach than that of semantics. Semantics/Meaning/that sentence/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: (semantic approach) to learn the meaning of an attribution of propositional attitudes it’s not about the behavior nor about what is going on in Ambrose’s head. If this were the question, it would have to be about the spirit of the speaker of the whole sentence (1). Vs: but even that is not plausible, because we want the meaning of (1), Regardless of who uses it! CresswellVsFodor: because it is so much about the subject for him, he obscures the distinction between the semantic question of the meaning and the psychological one of the organism that has an attitude. Contents/Object/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: the distinction between content and object of an attitude is important, because there may be many different objects (sentences) whose content is the same. ((s) a belief may be expressed differently than in indirect speech). Mentalese/propositional attitudes/Fodor: Thesis: a belief is a sentence in the thought language of the speaker. CresswellVsFodor: Problem: then the original speaker and the speaker of the the attribution would have to have the same sentence in Mentalese in their internal system; E.g. (2) Beatrice believed what Callum said Causal role/Fodor/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that faith and desires play in behavior. This understands in terms of the manipulation of formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) this does not account for semi-conscious and unconscious attitudes. --- II 56 Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: What entities would that be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Suppose meanings were internal representations. Problem: (3) Can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning! If we do not assume this, there is no problem at all with propositional attitudes/Cresswell: Problem: how the meaning of an attribution sentence of propositional attitudes is based on the embedded sentence. ((s) That means how the original meaning is preserved with non-verbal substitutions and different contexts). CresswellVsFodor: If meanings were really in your head (as representations), then e.g. the same representation that Fodor has when he says (4) Meanings are in the head and must also be in my head when I utter (3) ((s) the total set). Then Fodor’s object of belief is in my head! That would not have to be a problem, but: Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: Problem: How can the representation in my head play a causal role in Fodor’s head? VsVs: you could say that’s unfair. Because his object is still in his head. CresswellVsFodor: But that does not help, because if (3) Is really true, then the belief that I attribute to him must be exactly the same as the one he has. --- II 159 Content/Representation/CresswellVsFodor: I’m not at all convinced that representations are involved in content of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Fodor, J. | Vendler Vs Fodor, J. | I 240 A priori/Fodor/Katz: the methods of confirmation and refutation cannot distinguish the philosopher from the linguist, nor the philosopher himself. A priori/VendlerVsFodor: the latter is not aware of the difficulties arising from the assertion that philosophical statements are valid a priori. If Fodor and Katz were right, scientific linguistics would tend to replace linguistic philosophy. I 241 Linguistics/VendlerVsFodor: can never have the same methods as philosophy. It also has a different logical status. Philosophy of Language/Fodor/Katz: should only be conceived as a philosophy of linguistics. This is revoked by Katz later. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Fodor, J. | Pauen Vs Fodor, J. | Pauen I 223 VsFodor/Pauen: unjustified preferential treatment of the computer analogy over the neural networks. It is disputed whether mental representation must always have a language-like form. Stock: Kosslyn/PomerantzVsFodor: pictorial representation. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Fodor, J. | Newen Vs Fodor, J. | NS I131 Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis 2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. NS I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states. Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax). It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories. VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language. NS I 133 b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early." Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed. Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills. - - NS I 160 Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional. Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate. VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow." NS I 161 Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case. VsFodor: 1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried. FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept! Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Folk Psychology | Dennett Vs Folk Psychology | Lanz I 300 Dennett: functional explanations make an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to carry on their tasks). Similarly, intentional explanations: the agent is rational: he has goals that he should have due to its constitution and its place in the world. Likewise, the opinions that he should have. Thus, only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. So one asks, what are the causally relevant factors for the behavior that can be explained functionally or intentionally depending on the interest and complexity of behavior, then only the physical explanation of the information remains. It follows that it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of further mental states and causes of actions. Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsFolk Psychology). Pauen I 135 Psycho Functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in the determination of mental states. Because the binding to everyday language is not necessary it can be abandoned. On the other hand, the functional description can go arbitrarily far, practically down to the individual neuron. All properties can be considered, depending on the objective. V 137 Measuring instruments can be used as well. Problem: to recognize simulation: is in principle not impossible. Representatives: Dennett. (DennettVsEveryday Psychology: simulation impossible to include) V 138 Dennett: in cases of conflict neuroscientific data prevail over self-attribution of the first person! We do not have direct access to our mental states (unlike as semantic functionalism and eliminative materialism). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Formalism | Frege Vs Formalism | Brandom I 606 FregeVsFormalists: How can evidence be provided that something falls under a concept? Frege uses the concept of necessity to prove the existence of an object. Brandom I 609 Free Logic: "Pegasus is a winged horse" is regarded as true, although the object does not exist physically. It can serve as substituent. FregeVs. (>Read). Brandom I 620 Frege: Pegasus has "sense" but no "meaning". FregeVsFormalism: Important argument: it is not enough merely to refer to the Peano axioms, identities such as "1 = successor to the number 0" are trivial. They do not combine two different ways of picking out an object. Solution: Abstraction: it is necessary to connect the use of the expressions of the successor numbers with the already common expressions. Frege I 130 Equation/Frege: you must not put the definite article on one side of an equation and the indefinite article on the other. FregeVsFormalism: a purely formal theory is sufficient. It’s only an instruction for the definitions, not a definition as such. I 131 Number System/Expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning cannot be fixed arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already unchangeable before the definitions, but it is determined by these. ((s) Contradiction? Anyway, Frege is getting at meaning as use). Number i/Frege: it does not matter whether a second, a millimeter or something else is to play a role in this. I 132 It is only important that the additions and multiplication sentences apply. By the way, i falls out of the equation again. But, E.g. with "a ´bi" you have to explain what meaning "total" has in this case. It is not enough to call for a sense. That would be just ink on paper. (FregeVsHilbert). Bigelow I 182 Consistency/FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert/Bigelow/Pargetter: Existence precedes consistency. For consistency presupposes the existence of a consistently described object. If it exists, the corresponding description is consistent. If it does not exist, how can we guarantee consistency? Frege I 125 Concept/Frege: How can you prove that it does not contain a contradiction? Not by the determination of the definition. I 126 E.g. ledger lines in a triangle: it is not sufficient for proof of their existence that no contradiction is discovered in on their concept. Proof of the disambiguity of a concept can strictly only be carried out by something falling under it. The reverse would be a mistake. E.g. Hankel: equation x + b = c: if b is > c, there is no natural number x which solves the problem. I 127 Hankel: but nothing keeps us from considering the difference (c - b) as a sign that solves the problem! Sign/FregeVsHankel/FregeVsFormalism: there is something that hinders us: E.g. considering (2 - 3) readily as a sign that solves the problem: an empty sign does not solve the problem, but is only ink on paper. Its use as such would then be a logical error. Even in cases where the solution is possible, it is not the sign that is the solution, but the content. Wittgenstein I 27 Frege/Earlier Wittgenstein/Hintikka: ((FregeVsFormalism) in the philosophy of logic and mathematics). Frege dispensed with any attempt to attribute a semantic content to his logical axioms and rules of evidence. Likewise, Wittgenstein: "In logical syntax, the meaning of a sign must never play a role, it may only require the description of the expressions." Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that the Tractatus represents the view of the inexpressibility of language par excellence. The inexpressibility of semantics is merely limited to semantics, I 28 syntax can certainly be linguistically expressed! In a letter to Schlick, Wittgenstein makes the accusation that Carnap had taken his ideas, without pointing this out (08.08.32)! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Foster, J.A. | Davidson Vs Foster, J.A. | II 35 DavidsonVsFoster: my mistake was not assuming that any theory that gives the correct truth conditions could serve as an interpretation. My mistake was, however, (like Foster says) to overlook that someone could have a sufficiently clear theory without knowing that it is there! It was easy for me to overlook this, because I departed from the one who constructed the theory himself. FosterVsDavidson: Question: whether Davidson made clear enough what a competent translator must know. FosterVsDavidson: Davidson’s theory is in ruins because in order to secure the translation II 38 an intensional expression like "determines" (or "asserts") must be used. DavidsonVsFoster: But I’ve never tried that! My attempt at finding access to language and meaning, makes significant use of concepts such as belief and intention, but I do not think that these concepts can be reduced to something behavioristic or scientific. I avoid substantial use of unexplained linguistic concepts. Saying that an interpreter necessarily must know a so-called intensional concept does not ruin my theory. (Beliefs and intentions are also intensional). DavidsonVsFoster: has not exactly distinguished two problems: 1) whether the paratactical analysis can be applied here at all. (Marginal). 2) whether the radical interpretation is threatened if the relevant concept "determines" obscures an unanalysed linguistic concept. Davidson: I propose paratactic semantics for "determines", unless it can be shown that it is not working. Reference/DavidsonVsFoster: it cannot be sufficient to maintain the same reference, because then all true propositions would assert the same fact. II 40 DavidsonVsFoster: ...this is not a "notational variant", notation has nothing to do with it. Both accept the same notation, the possible-world semanticist and I. We differ in the semantic analysis. Reference/Translation/Token reflexive/Davidson: the fact that the reference is changed in translation often occurs in token-reflexive sentences (so-called by Reichenbach). (E.g. snow ... snow, this ... this). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Foster, J.A. | Hintikka Vs Foster, J.A. | EMD II 15 FostersVsDavidson: a truth theory is no longer truly interpreting for all languages if that what the elements designate exceeds that which is relevant to the truth. These languages include at least all extensional languages for which L is typical. VsFoster: there are at least 4 ways to attack this view: 1) HintikkaVsFoster: (correspondingly): Foster reads more meaning into an extensional language that its simple syntax allows. In such a language, the meaning of the elements does not exceed their truth-relevant designation function. The additional conditions cited by Foster ("the earth moves and...") are more of an extensional fragment of a richer, non-extensional language. 2) VsFoster: no natural language could ever be purely extensional, a language needs propositional attitudes, and these are attributed non-extensionally. 3) VsFoster: (weaker): even if there may be a purely extensional languages, all known natural languages are non-extensional. I.e. Foster’s conclusions have little relevance. 4) VsFoster: if the method of truth theory sufficed for a certain type of non-extensional language, we can easily adapt it to an extensional language by constructing the theory only for a hypothetical non-extensional language of which this language would be a fragment. Common denominator of this criticisms VsVsDavidson: that the peculiarity of the language with which Davidson’s theory is tested was not grasped. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Foucault, M. | Habermas Vs Foucault, M. | I 317 Will to Knowledge/Foucault: intervenes in the constitution of the scientific discourses. He determines the exception of the rules by which true is distinguished from false. (Power). HabermasVsFoucault: the so disguised origin of the concept of power from the metaphysics-critical concept of the will to truth and to knowledge also explains the systematically ambiguous use of the category "power". On the one hand, the innocence of a concept that can be used descriptively, on the other hand, a constitution-theoretical basic concept which only gives analysis its reason-critical meaning. I 318 HabermasVsFoucault: paradoxical combination of positivist attitude and critical aspirations. I 320 Foucault Thesis: Power and knowledge formations form an indissoluble unity. I 321 HabermasVsFoucault: this strong thesis can certainly not be justified with functionalist arguments alone. Form of Thought Proof: HabermasVsFoucault: he would have to prove that specific power strategies implement themselves in relevant scientific strategies of the reification of everyday language experiences, and thus preempt the sense of using theoretical statements about such constituted object areas. HabermasVsFoucault: he has not taken up this approach later, otherwise he would have noticed that objectivist approaches no longer dominated the field in the human sciences in the seventies. They compete rather with hermeneutical and critical approaches. I 322 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy appears in a confusing double role: on the one hand, the empirical role of an analysis of power technologies, on the one hand, a transcendental role of the same analysis of power technologies that are supposed to explain how scientific discourses are possible at all. The forced connection of the idealistic notion of transcendental synthesis with empiricist ontology is not a way out of the philosophy of the subject: the concept of power is taken from the philosophy of consciousness itself! I 323 HabermasVsFoucault: he turns the truth-dependence of power into the power-dependence of truth without further ado! Power becomes subjectless. HabermasVsFoucault: however, nobody escapes the conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject solely by performing inverse operations of the basic concepts. I 324 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy turns out to be exactly the presentistic, relativistic and normative cryptographic pseudo-science it does not want to be! It ends in hopeless subjectivism. I 325 HabermasVsFoucault: 1) involuntary presenteeism 2) unavoidable relativism of a present-oriented analysis which can only consider itself to be a context-dependent practical enterprise. 3) arbitrary partisanship of a criticism that cannot document its normative foundations. (Foucault is circumstantial enough to admit this. I 326 HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historicist can explain power technologies and domination practices only in comparison with each other and not every single one as a totality of itself. I 327 HabermasVsFoucault: caught up in exactly the self-reference he fought: the truth claims are not limited only to the discourses in which they occur. I 328 Even the basic assumption of his theory of power is self-referencing; it must also destroy the validity, the basis of of the research inspired by it. I 330 HabermasVsFoucault: Foucault’s concept of power does not allow such a privileged notion of counter-power (E.g. the workers). Every counter-power already awakens itself in the horizon of power. I 336 He fights against a naturalistic metaphysics, which reifies a counter-power. HabermasVsFoucault: but therefore he also has to refrain from answering the question of the normative foundations of his criticism. HabermasVsFoucault: undialectical! Leveling of ambiguous phenomena - (Foucault admits weaknesses in earlier works) |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Foucault, M. | Rorty Vs Foucault, M. | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies. III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications. V 8 Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing. RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions. V 20 Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it. V 21 RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Strawson Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 126 Reference/StrawsonVsFour-Dimensionalism: (1959): reference to everything is parasitic to the reference to perceptible continuants, e.g. body and people. If that is true, we cannot replace the ordinary language objects by four-dimensional ones. Simons: maybe you could quite consistently translate all of this in process-ontology, but that would be only one way for higher beings that might describe us with it. And this is not a priori to decide. Process-Ontology/Simons: all that does not show its impossibility, only its foreign nature. We must in fact not only adopt continuants, but also events that they involve, in particular changes of continuants. Terminology/(s): here: four dimensionalism = process-ontology. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense: Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts. Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism (because of his ontology of temporal objects). Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change (change): for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times as in everyday language, or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t"). 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. Process-Ontology/Four-Dimensionalism/SimonsVsProcess-Ontology: all representatives except Whitehead speak with a "split tongue" when it comes to concrete examples. Continuants/Quine: says he can "reconstruct them four-dimensionally". "Describe them as new". Reconstruction/Redescription/SimonsVsQuine: when something is rewritten, it gets a new description. Reconstruction is strictly speaking a discarding. So continuants must then disappear from our ontology and something else must take their place. Problem: thus, it is misleading to speak of river stages or cat stages. E.g. not one Philip stage is drunk, but the whole person is. For example, one does not bathe in one river stage, but in the whole river. Error: it cannot be right to change the subject and leave the predicate unchanged, and think you still have a true sentence! Similarly: Four-Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,p. 167) "four dimensional objects have different careers". SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants like generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career. Problem: if continuants are to disappear from ontology, then there is nothing that can be a career. That is talking with a "split tongue": you cannot enjoy the advantages of the old entities if you abolish them. Four-Dimensionalism needs a whole new way of speaking (unfamiliar, contrary to everyday language). Whitehead/Simons: is the only one who can do this and it is literally obscure. I 126 Process-Ontology/Simons: all this does not show their impossibility, only their alien nature. We must not only adopt continuants, but also events that involve them, especially changes of continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsVsFour-Dimensionalism: that the space-time requires the task of continuants is not so sure and rather depends on the circumstances. Certainly, Minkowski diagrams simply represent time as another (equal) dimension. I 127 Argument/Simons: it is not a conclusive argument to derive an ontology from a convenient representation. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Austin Vs Frege, G. | I 236 Negation/AustinVsFrege: affirmation and negation are on exactly the same level in the sense that there can be no language that does not contain conventions for both, and that both refer equally direct to the world and not to statements about the world. However, there can of course be a language that does not contain a means to fulfill the functions of ’true’ and ’false’. (Tugendhat I 66 Frege: propositional content). |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Frege, G. | Davidson Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 180/181 According to Davidson everything Frege referred to as "force", can be attributed to the non-language sector. It is sufficient to know the truth conditions of the utterance. Cf. >assertive force, >theory of force, >truth conditions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Frege, G. | Kripke Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell II 151 Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions). ((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.) Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter! Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects. Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect. Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres". Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre. Stalnaker I 172 Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent. a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language. I 174 Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues. a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names b) what circumstances lead to those semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language. Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time. a) why a name has these referents and b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content). Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways. a) as meaning b) as the way how the reference is determined. By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings. I 192 Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics") Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics? Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language. Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values. Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain. Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it. Similar to Kripke: Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies. KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things. Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words. I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to: Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language. E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker") Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents. Tugendhat I 440 KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Frege, G. | Quine Vs Frege, G. | Quine I 425 VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. I 209 Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object) "a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object. Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs). I 264 according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited. I 266 Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function. II 201 Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear. II 202 "So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write: "{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment). (i.e.the inversion of "so that"). Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes! We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality. The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular. II 203 It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory: (1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx}) This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! III 98 Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates. III 99 Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences. Applying: Terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs. III 100 Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person. Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension. QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes"). Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes. VII (f) 108 Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are. Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities. VII (f) 109 Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71). Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements. Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language: Names are one kind of expression and statements are another! QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements. Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme. "p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111) VII (f) 115 Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names. IX 216 Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT! Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again. NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands. Ad 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks). XI 55 QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")". QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy). 2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization (Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7)) comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Strawson Vs Frege, G. | Searle III 213 Fact/statement/Strawson: here there are not two independent entities, facts are what statements testify. They are not what statements are on statements. Facts: are not language-independent things in the world. They like "statement" and "true" contain even a certain type of discourse in itself. Frege: Facts are simply true statements.(!) (Strawson and AustinVs). E.g. there are not two separate types of events such as winning and victory. The victory consists precisely in winning. III 214 StrawsonVsFrege: but it would be wrong to draw here an exact analogy (but not from Austin's reasons). Fact and statement are not identical, because they play different roles in our language! Facts act causally in a way that true statements do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Wright Vs Frege, G. | II 223 Natural Language/Frege: inaccurate, this is a deficiency that must be remedied. Logic/Crispin WrightVsFrege: for vague predicates there seems to be a special logic. II 226 WrightVsFrege: it seems that all language use in order to be informative depends on the successful use of vague predicates. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Frege, G. | Schiffer Vs Frege, G. | I XV Belief/Schiffer: Is no relation to what is believed SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: Natural languages have no compositional meaning theories (m.th.). propositional attitude/Schiffer: late: thesis: cannot be reduced or explained! "No theory-theory"/Schiffer: all present philosophies of meaning and intentionality are based on false premises. Thesis: there cannot be any meaning theory. I 144 SchifferVsCompositionality: We can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. Otherwise the relation theory would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional meaning theory, because it would have to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! Schiffer: so far the arguments are not yet very stable. We still have work to do. I 182 Compositionality/SchifferVsFrege/Problem: Intentional expressions like E.g. "is a picture of" E.g. "true" - adjectives like eg "large" E.g. "toys" (soldier). - E.g. adverbs - evaluative terms such as "should", "good", - E.g. pronouns and demonstrative pronouns - e.g. ordinary language quantifiers such as "everybody", "all", "some". Also counterfactual conditionals and modal expressions contain difficult ontological problems for a compositional semantics. I 183 Solution/Schiffer: Maybe we should give up the idea that there is something to do to give the semantics of these expressions. 3. (most important point): Thesis: Natural languages need no compositional semantics at all. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Frege, G. | Waismann Vs Frege, G. | Waismann I 77 Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal. b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation. Under Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world. VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation. For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before. As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups. But what does "can" mean? I 78 That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly. Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example 1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer. 2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus. According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment! In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example 1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned. I 79 2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry. 4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability 5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation). WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use. I 80 This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons. For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible. There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning. For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many. This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists. You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor. Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate. For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words. I 80/81 VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett) Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said. Frege: second part of the definition of numbers: Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!). Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3. This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term. WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words? Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3. Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it. WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences. In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein). RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class. Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0. To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong. This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom. Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know. It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning. I 82 Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not: The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies. That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world (VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world). Waismann I 85 The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture, I 86 as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them. Waismann I 163 The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege) II 164 1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert) Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away? But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means. If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers. The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation! I 165 For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore? Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts. WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore? Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something. I 166 Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink. WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent. I 167 Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Frege, G. | Millikan Vs Frege, G. | I 102 Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world. Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond? Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying. wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies". Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world. I 103 Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks. Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.). ((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.) I 190 real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...". focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted. intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset. embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence. Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined. Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references. Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning. Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified. I 191 Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having". I 274 Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time. polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance. But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual. Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property. I 275 Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said: Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else. Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category. Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th. Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined. Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc. I 308 Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Wessel Vs Frege, G. | I 27 Syntactics/Syntax/Wessel: some claim that syntactics examines "meaningless" signs. (Klaus/Buhr, 1969) WesselVs: this is a distorted idea of language: one cannot separate syntax, semantics and pragmatics at all: there are no "meaningless signs", because a physical object that means nothing is not a sign. Semantics: the meaning of the term "table" cannot be addressed as a special object to look for somewhere. WesselVsFrege: one cannot say: "The meaning of the term "Müller" goes for a walk". I 157 Truth Value Gaps/Wessel: exist when the object to which properties are to be assigned or denied does not exist at all. WesselVsFrege: a sentence with an empty subject term is not meaningless, it can also not be true, but therefore it does not have to be without truth value. I 352 Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Differentiation Intension/Extension: does not help with the problems. Just the hint that these are intensional contexts is not enough. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Functionalism | Field Vs Functionalism | II 43 Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations. II 44 Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. Belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82). Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations. 1) We have not observed the entire behavior. 2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused. FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief. Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior. II 49 Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions. The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago. II 50 Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely. Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence. Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald". FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow? FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.) Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said: "A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism." II 51 Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it). And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property. Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general). Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3). N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Functionalism | Lewis Vs Functionalism | IV 120 VsFunctionalism/Lewis: a broader established functionalist theory of the mind is criticized by both sides: a) it seems wrong to assume that it is necessary or inalterable that mental states take exactly the causal role they have at this moment. e.g. can there be no exception like in the case of the calculator that does not work? b) on the other hand, Karl's mental states seem to be intrinsic in him. Why should the feelings he currently experiences - pain or stupidity- lead to other feelings in other humans? ((s) Meaning resulting from publicly shared language?) Lewis: I see no other way than to equally represent those two intuitions at the same time. Individualist functionalism: represents the second theory at the expense of the first one. Lewis: I have tried to use a compromise. As such, every theory is respected a bit. a) it is indeed possible that extraordinary states do not fully take up their definite causal role IV 121 b) mental states of somebody are the intrinsic states in which he/she is. Yet what makes them the states is not entirely intrinsic.To a certain extent it is related to the other representatives of his nature. But this extent is limited since most cases are not extraordinary. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Functionalism | Nagel Vs Functionalism | Frank I 64 Subject/Body/Nagel: if I am familiar with my mental states necessaryly directly, i.e. not through perception, but it is only possible to address perception findings as mine through the direct familiarity, then I have a reason not to seek the subject of the psyche in the body. In addition, I am also in an arbitrary mental state when I have no idea about its descriptive interpretation. ((s) VsNagel: (with Sellars): access only through language). NagelVsFunctionalism: if he was right, it would necessarily be true of mental states that they would be identical with functional states, but only by chance, that they are mental states, because the latter depends on their causal roles, and not on their inner epistemic nature. Nagel III 21 NagelVsFunctionalism/VsReductionism: the ordinary concept of the mental already contains the beginnings of a very different conception of objective reality. We cannot understand the idea of a different consciousness if we interpret it in a way that becomes incomprehensible when we try to apply the idea to ourselves. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Functionalism | Newen Vs Functionalism | I40 Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech. NS I 16 Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology. NS I 27 Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Gadamer, G. | Habermas Vs Gadamer, G. | Rorty II 127 Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to wipe out both the concept of "inner nature" and the concept of "identifying description" Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to replace metaphors of depth with metaphors of width, the more descriptions are available, the better. II 129 VsGadamer/Rorty: many times he was blamed of having invented a language-bound variety of idealism. V 24 HabermasVsGadamer/Rorty: relativism and potential repressiveness. VI 415/416 RortyVsKrüger/Rorty: his propagating of the "scientific and technological world" has lead authors such as C.P. Snow, Habermas and Popper to think that Heidegger and Gadamer were on the wrong political side, (representing the more "literary culture") and were enemies of human freedom. (HabermasVsGadamer, PopperVsHeidegger, SnowVsLiterature). |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Geach, P. | Evans Vs Geach, P. | Klaus von Heusinger, donkey sentences and their horse feet Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 Heusinger I 5 Range/Quantifier/Conjunction/Geach/VsGeach/Heusinger: (4b) E.g. [man(x) & comes(x) & whistles(x)] VsGeach: Problem: the existential quantifier has a longer range than the "and", i.e. it is regarded as a text operator. Then compositionality is violated, because the first sentence is not independent of the second one. This has caused much criticism. EvansVsGeach: the plural shows that (4b) is still too strong and does not express the everyday language meaning: (ii) is too strong: - (ii) Some sheep are such that John owns them and Harry vaccinates them in spring. I 17 Anaphora/Variable/Labeling/Existential Quantification/E Type/E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: Discourse anaphora not as bound variables, but as shortened (or disguised) descriptions. Representatives: Evans: semantic Cooper: pragmatic Neale: syntactic. Def E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: = specific descriptions: the pronoun denotes those objects that make the sentence true which contains the quantified antecedent ((s) antecedent of the anaphor). Anaphora/Pronoun/EvansVsGeach/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: anaphoric pronouns must be interpreted as decriptions. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Geach, P. | Quine Vs Geach, P. | V 18 Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions. V 18/19 Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning. V 89 Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning. Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?". E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time. Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech. Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30) V 129 Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses. Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him." Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it. Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term! This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence. Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten"). Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis). Or with "when he" or "since he". V 130 Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all. Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g. Everyone who owns a donkey beats it; Some donkey owners do not beat them. Problem: that would turn into nonsense: Every donkey owner beats it Some donkey owners do not beat it. Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he": Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it. Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences) A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him. Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference. Solution/Geach: A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her. Quine: pro Geach. ((s) sequence of main clauses.) V 131 Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido) (2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y). (3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y)) (4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y). QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky. QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example. The child is torn between analogies, V 132 which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause. Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Geach, P. | Verschiedene Vs Geach, P. | EMD II 347 Truth Conditions/Tr.c./Geach: Condition (6) (see above, EMD II 330): (6) (Sxi)phi is a true sentence, iff there is a term t, so phi' is true when phi' is obtained from phi by replacing all free occurrences of xi with t: Geach: this actually specifies the truth conditions for an interpretation of the existence quantifier. WallaceVsGeach: criticizes that there is a difference between this requirement and that of Convention T: according to Geach a sentence without semantic vocabulary can have its truth conditions indicated by a sentence which itself contains semantic vocabulary (i.e. meta-language with semantic vocabulary), according to Tarski allegedly not. (KripkeVs: this is nowhere in Tarski!). KripkeVsWallace: this is a mistake! He believes that if phi' is such that T(phi) ↔ phi' is provable, then it contains the T-prdicate itself! But it does not! It is not necessary to assume R(a) as a primitive basic term! Or that his explanation must contain "semantic vocabulary". |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Glanzberg, M. | Stalnaker Vs Glanzberg, M. | I 105 Infinite language/infinite/Stalnaker: we assumed here one with infinite quantification-prefixes and infinite Boolean combinations. Michael GlanzbergVsStalnaker: (2001) showed that only finite quantifications are sufficient. In such a language one can express that there are infinitely many different to each other objects by saying that there are at least n objects for each n. I 106 Stronger/weaker/language/Glanzberg: problem: such a language is too strong to deliver the kind of supervenience that we need for our philosophical discussion. A supervenience basis due to an infinite language will be too weak because then one can define arbitrary properties. Relevance/Glanzberg: to build an interesting concept of supervenience we need restrictions that exclude arbitrary properties. Only then we will get a strong thesis. (> stronger/weaker: >Strength of theories). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: I think our thesis is as strong as we need it. Namely because the strong supervenience from A to B’ is equivalent to the global one from A to B. This is the converse of the main thesis that was proved in the appendix. This follows from the following three facts that apply to any three sets of properties X, Y and Z where X' is the set of properties that can be defined in concepts of X properties in the infinite language. 1. If X strongly supervenes on Y, then X supervenes globally on Y ((s) strong supervenience implies a global one). 2. if X supervenes globally on Y and Y globally on Z then X supervenes globally on Z ((s) transitivity of global supervenience). 3. X’ supervenes globally on X. Global supervenience/Stalnaker: is clearly never trivial. It is obviously not true for arbitrary sets of properties A and B that A supervenes globally on B and is therefore also not generally true that A globally or strongly supervenes on the infinite closure (infinitary closure) B'. How expressive the infinite language may be it is not give us the strength to define properties that distinguish between B-undistinguishable possible worlds (poss.w.). StalnakerVsGlanzberg: with him it only seems so because his formal argument assumes that a full B-description of a poss.w. completely describes it but that is only true if all the properties globally supervene on the B-properties. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Goodman, N. | Chomsky Vs Goodman, N. | I 287 Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure). But we have no empirical evidence. --- I 288 ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language. Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language. GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages". --- I 289 ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. --- I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German". E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia. Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other. But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen). Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen". Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German. This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples. As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill. --- I 291 ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.) Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system. Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment! --- I 292 Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Goodman, N. | Putnam Vs Goodman, N. | III 145 Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte! III 146 Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is. III 147 If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other. The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major". III 148 That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one disappeared, we undoubtedly still spoke of Ursa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously. Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist. The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list! No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star. In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain! III 149 Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius. Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor! Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. III 154 Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one. Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. III 157 Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark. I (k) 257 Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit. Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"! PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun. It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars. Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation. We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same. Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation! Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists. I (k) 257/258 The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"! Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"! Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Goodman, N. | Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. | Introduction Putnam II IV Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language. Sainsbury V 129 Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 358 Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher. ((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.) I 359 Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger: 1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction 2. provisional nature 3. without claim to factuality 4. expediency. RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed. I 360 Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95). Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 406ff Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery. It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production. 407 Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura. (Bolz pro Aura). Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility. Putnam I 256 Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Goodman, N. | Simons Vs Goodman, N. | I 108 Sum/extensional mereology/CEM/Simons: CEM, or extensional mereology, is based on a general existence of sums. This has found the most critics, including Rescher and Chisholm. ChisholmVsSum: it seems that it does not belong to the concept of part intrinsically or analytically, that there must be a sum that should otherwise contain all of these individuals and nothing else. I 109 Part: but somebody who refuses the sum-axioms does not refuse Lesniewski’s and Goodmans’ and others concept of "part". Individual: instead of it there is disagreement about the concept "individual". Individual/Goodman: an individual has a very technical sense for him: they must not be connected or causally connected as everyday things. They do not have to be "medium size dry". Any accumulation of individuals may be (subject to paradoxes) combined into an abstract quantity. Individual/Goodman: an individual is analogous to such abstract quantities and each cluster (collection) of individuals can be grouped to a sum-individual (here, however, without the threat of paradoxes!). The resulting thing does not have to be anything that can be found in the everyday world. SimonsVsGoodman: but that is only so far a good analogy as the existence of any desired composition is acceptable. We must distinguish: a) the existence of specific (not abstract) pluralities can be claimed, but not: b) the one of abstract pluralities which is just a mere reflection of the existence of a plural term, therefore merely a facon de parler. Goodman's sum-individuals seem merely correspond to the need for a reference for some arbitrary expressions. I 110 Sum/Goodman/Simons: Goodman could indicate that arbitrary sum individuals obey the extensional theory. They exist in which the identity in the equality of parts exists. Identity/SimonsVsGoodman: this general condition of the equality of all parts is itself questionable (see below). Sum/mereology/Simons: so far no one has been able to show that the acceptance of sums leads to contradictions (as Russell has shown it for certain sets). ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): stronger theories tend to lead to contradictions.) Simons: but even the strongest extensional mereology does not lead to contradictions. Theory/solution/Simons: not the theory is suspicious but its non-critical application to the world. Part relation/Simons: part relations may be different in different areas (for example, mathematics). One must not force them to a common denominator. Sum/Simons: what damage should they cause that does not already exist in the ontological assumption of corresponding "pluralisms"? I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: suppose we looked at any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then it comes to the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. I 284 "Normal part"/mereology/Simons: philosophers often forget that there is a middle way between a simple part and an essential part: that something is a "normal part of a normal kind". There is no formal theory of "normal mereology". Here are some informal remarks: Normality/Simons: one could start from the idea of a well-shaped thing of a kind. Normality/Aristotle: Aristotle called an object mutilated when it is connected but a prominent part is missing. Shapeliness/music/Nicholas WolterstorffVsGoodman/Simons: (Wolterstorff 1980, 56): he applied the idea of a normal or shapely thing of a kind to music pieces: it is non-well-formed if one or more of the normal parts are missing or are in the wrong place. Thus, the term is a little wider than Aristotle defined it. It allows us to say that a performance with an incorrect note is still a performance of the same piece. GoodmanVsWolterstorff: (Goodman 1969, 186f): we must not allow this because of the transitivity of identity: if a performance with a wrong note is identical, then at the end all pieces identical. I 285 Metaphysics/Goodman/Simons: metaphysics represents here a hard metaphysical line and adheres to bivalence and strict identity conditions. SimonsVsGoodman: the price for it is a distance from the everyday language. Solution/Simons: musical performance has no strict identity conditions. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Grice, P.H. | Field Vs Grice, P.H. | II 223 Radical Deflationism/RD/Terminology/Field: within Deflationism it is disputed whether the W concept must always be disquotational. Narrow Deflationism/Radical Deflationism/Field: Deflationism is uninteresting if it is not considered narrowly (radically). Radical Deflationism only permits purely disquotational truth and Vsinter personal synonymy. Truth/Translation/Radical Deflationism/Field: yet "true" and "satisfied" can be applied to other languages as well. Non-Radical Deflationism/Field: can remain non-trivial if it explains inter-personal synonymy as equality of the computational role. FieldVsSpeaker Intention/Understanding/Truth/Deflationism/Field: the radical deflationism which I favor declares it to be meaningless to ask whether a proposition is true in the sense that the speaker understands it. It’s all about how the listener understands it. II 224 Ambiguity/Deflationism/Solution: according to this, a sentence is true in some uses, but not in others. Translation/RD/Field: the concept of a "good translation" makes sense, but strongly interest-relative and contextual. It should not be understood as a correct translation. Correctness/Translation/Deflationism: the question of the correctness of inter-personal translation is useless. Non-Radical Deflationism/Translation/Field: thinks here that there is an objective concept of synonymy for good translation. VsDeflationism/Utility Theory/Field: it could be argued that it is a contingent fact that we use "snow is white" in a way that the sentence is true if snow is white. So our use of "true" is not purely disquotational. (Because of (2)). VSVs: It’s true that we could have used the sentence differently! ((s) But we do not do it. And it’s about actual use in the actual world). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Tugendhat Vs Grice, P.H. | I 233 Grice/Tugendhat: Notification is a special case of meaning, but it is not always a notification when we intend to effect that the partner believes something. One can also bring him into a certain perceptual situation. We can ask him to sniff. Conditions so that one can speak of a message or a mine: 1. that the partner recognizes the intention and 2. that the recognition of the intention is for him the reason for the formation of the opinion. TugendhatVsGrice: For example, a student does not answer to inform the teacher. Grice later withdrew his theory. However, he maintained that the rule of use is that the sentence is to make a partner mean something. Precise: A intends that B means that A means that p. (This also applies to the lie.) Lie(s): the meaning does not lie in the function. I 234 TugendhatVsGrice: that is correct, but it does not follow that this is the primary intention. Above all, it does not follow that the meaning is contained in the function. If one now takes Wittgenstein's proposition as a basis, then one would have to say that one explains the meaning of a proposition "p" by means of a longer proposition "q", which contains the proposition "p" as part. Vs: 1. "q" is obviously not synonymous with "p". 2. One cannot understand such an explanation if one does not already understand the meaning of "that p". 3. One would have to assume a meta language (that the other already knows what it means to mean) (TugendhatVsMeta Language). I 235 Grice/Tugendhat: the essential thing is that he has specified the comprehensive concept of meaning (in the sense of vouloire dire), which goes beyond meaning in sentences: it also includes signals that are not to be understood causally. I 269 To mean/TugendhatVsGrice: two possibilities:a) Correlative to understanding: then it is wrong that what a speaker wants to say with "p" is that he wants to effect...etc. that would rather want to say when he said "I want to effect" etc. What he wants to say with "p" is to claim that p. b) If one gives Grice, so to speak, his terminology, then one must say that the function of an assertoric proposition or the intention with which it is used is not to mean something, but to claim something! I 270 TugendhatVsGrice: his model does not consider the possibility of self-talk at all. As a result, different truth conditions and different meanings must indeed apply to self-talk! That would be completely absurd. As if we spoke a different language internally than in conversation. Tugendhat Thesis: the function of communication does not belong to the meaning of the sentence (otherwise a self-talk would not be possible). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Grice, P.H. | Schiffer Vs Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 56 Deception/SchifferVsGrice: the recognition of the speaker's intention by the listener must at least partly be the reason for the reaction - Problem: distinguishing primary intention, "with" which something is expressed - secondary: "in" which something is expressed - primary intention to cause the reaction is important - secondary: E.g. "by expressing a, he means b" - primary/(s): "with a he means x". Avramides I 60 VsGrice: Counter-E.g.:examination, learning, memory, inference, reckless speech, indifference with respect to the listener reaction, accusation - solution / Grice: "active belief" or belief that the speaker believes .. "(= activated belief, not querying learning material) - SchifferVs: problem: speaker often intend no belief in the listener - problem: then the analysis is no longer enough - solution: for real communication is necessary that belief is not caused but justified. Schiffer I XIX Expression meaning/intention based semantics (IBS)/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsIntention based semantics/intention supported: not only requires compositionality and relation theory, but also implies that Understanding/IBS: Thesis: is an inferential process (conclusions) SchifferVs: that's dubious. This in turn requires propositional knowledge that one clearly does not have! ((s) in relation to or as a "belief objects"). SchifferVsGrice: so by that the whole project is brought into disrepute. I 248 Speaker Meaning/SchifferVsGrice: depends also from the fact that the speaker himself is willing to describe himself accordingly. And the complex conditions of (S) are just not realistic. They make each utterance to a falsehood when you replace "to mean" in each pattern by "to say". Paradox of the Analysis/Schiffer: revenges here: IBS can maybe say what meaning is but by that it does cover nobody's notion of meaning. The IBS-analysis cannot replaced its analysandum by a that-proposition on a propositional attitude. IBS/Schiffer: of course it is about an analysis of "S believes that p" and not of "x believes that S means that p". Nevertheless, this can be seen as an obstacle to a reductive analysis. E.g. "It is snowing": is irreducible semantically. Point: in the end we can omit all speaker intentions here! It is not of interest, if it does not help to deliver the base I 249 For the semantic features of the expressions of natural language. Expression Meaning/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsGrice: IBS has much to say about speaker-meaning, but too little (surprisingly little) about expression meaning. And for good reason, as we shall see. I 264 Schiffer: Thesis: ultimately it is the way in which we use signs and sounds - described non-semantic and non-psychological - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). SchifferVsGrice: Problem: the fact remains that we cannot formulate this semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice, P.H. | Loar Vs Grice, P.H. | I 1 Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief. Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist: 1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice). LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical: LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!) 2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on I 2 Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning. Belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics. Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication: Belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state. Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects. Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Grice, P.H. | Millikan Vs Grice, P.H. | I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed). Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin. Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use). I 4 Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use. Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity". Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects. I 5 Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use. belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language. I 51 quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped". I 52 Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. its literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function. literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below). Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding. I 61 Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions. I 62 Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs. I 63 2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth. Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it! Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things. Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. I 65 VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking. Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!" There is a similar Ex by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop. I 66 Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative. ((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones). generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes "Usually: if A then B" and also: "Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)" rational: then would follow that John had to believe. a) "usual: if A then C" and b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B. 2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C. I 67 Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C. Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C? Millikan: we assume that he has to. Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing: "Usually, if D, then C" etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying? |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Habermas, J. | Derrida Vs Habermas, J. | I 32 VsHabermas: he fails to recognize that Derrida no longer interprets the language in the light of the theory of signs. He does not understand writing as signs. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Habermas, J. | Luhmann Vs Habermas, J. | Reese-Schäfer II 109 Ethics/Habermas: Cognitive ethics, with the dimension right/wrong. LuhmannVs. Reese-Schäfer II 112 LuhmannVsHabermas: "political moralist" (in Luhmann's eyes sharp criticism.) Ethics should rather ask whether morality can be regarded as good without circumstance. It should not pursue morality itself, but perform translation in both directions. Reese-Schäfer II 140 LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marital conflicts show that these conflicts cannot be solved colloquially, because the colloquial language provides positive and negative expressions. There is no law that communication leads to consensus. One should therefore understand and analyse discussions themselves as systems. Discussions in particular offer little chance of bringing in one's own subjectivity. The language symbols like God, reform, justice, love, truth, democracy etc. are moralized in the discussions. This limits the possibility of connecting. This means that those who use counterarguments must defend themselves. Reese-Schäfer II 141 LuhmannVsHabermas: there is no logical hierarchy of reasons. Therefore there is no hope for an end to the discussion. At some point it just stops. There must be social, not logical or semantic rules for its termination. Cass 8 VsHabermas: Problem: the term should actually be the same on both sides, because why do we speak of rationality when both are rationality? What is the common component? HabermasVsLuhmann: in Luhmann only the system has rationality but the system is not everything! LuhmannVsHabermas: but that applies also to Habermas' "communication rationality", because if one communicated, there are also still things, over which one did not communicate yet and humans, with whom one did not communicate yet and the conditions change faster than the readiness to communicate again. So the realm of the afterlife plays a role in every model. But the system rationality is better equipped to deal with it. For Habermas, by the way, this afterlife is not the lifeworld. Cass 11 System/Society/Individual/Luhmann: the system is not an object, but a difference (S/U). For example, for the body the consciousness operations belong to the environment! ((s) No border crossing). Luhmann: that is not so frightening at all: for example, I myself feel more comfortable in the "environment" of my society than I would feel "in the society", where others think my thoughts or cause my chemical reactions. LuhmannVsHabermas: systems theory therefore allows us to think of a radical individualism that would not be possible if we were to adopt the humanist standpoint of the human as part of society. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not aspired to at all. Society/LuhmannVsHabermas: it would be a mistake to claim that society must run towards a "human goal"! LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already contained in communication - otherwise one needs the receiver, a disciplining instance. If one leaves understanding in communication, one gets a theory relieved of norms and rationality demands. Cass 13 Communication: Tradition like Habermas: Searching for consensus. Luhmann: what do you do when the consensus is reached, then there is no more communication? Habermas: there are enough conflicts. Luhmann: what is then the demand for consensus supposed to do? Then we turn an impossibility into a norm! The result of communication must already be open! Why do we have the "No" in the language? |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Habermas, J. | Rorty Vs Habermas, J. | Brendel I 133 Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals. Brendel I 134 Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either. Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality. Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths. Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness. Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community. Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto). Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community. Brendel I 135 RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests. Rorty II (b) 50 RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism". II (b) 29 French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers, Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity." II (b) 43 Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. II (d) 94 Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence. II (d) 94/95 Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves. II (d) 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship. III 113 Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas). III 119 RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower. III 120 RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of 'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language". III 231 Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste". III 232 Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?" V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Hare, R.M. | Newen Vs Hare, R.M. | NSI 155 "Good"/"Should"/Prescriptivism/Hare: Thesis: these words have even primarily prescriptive meaning. E.g. speaking about a good book, a good exhibition is to recommend these things. (s) VsHare: then it would be conceptually contradictory, e.g. to say of a finished exhibition that it was good. Or e.g. to praise for a sold-out book) Def Secondary Prescriptive/Hare: e.g. "proper", "hardworking". Universalizability/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: every should-statement contains a principle that this statement is applicable to all exactly similar cases. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant, you should carry the groceries into her apartment for her. And that is what every healthy person should do who has nothing better to do at the moment. This universalizability is reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative which is, however, not linguistically motivated. NS I 156 HareVsKant: it is the logic of language that imposes the categorical imperative on us. Moral/Logic/Hare: Thesis: someone who acts contrary to a moral statement does not understand the meaning. Hare: e.g. in a train compartment it says: "Please do not smoke, there are children on board." If the smoker then says, well, I'll smoke next door where there are also children, he did not understand the meaning. On the other hand: e.g. "No smoking!" Such signs were distributed at random in otherwise identical compartments. Point: there is no universalizable principle. Therefore, the sign expresses no moral should-sentence. Moral Principles/Principle/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: how to generate moral principles. Problem: how to recognize the essential in a situation. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant. Is it necessary for the principle that she could swap roles with her husband? Is imaginability sufficient? VsHare: some authors see a fundamental impossibility when comparing such situations. Universalizability: must also accommodate subjective desires and dislikes. This makes the objective description of situations very difficult. NS I 157 Utilitarianism/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Hare is close to utilitarianism in as far as a theory instructs to ensure the fulfillment of the preferences of the greatest number of parties. Universalizability/Generalizability/Moral/Descriptivism/Hare: moral judgments possess their descriptiveness because of their universalizability. Newen/Schrenk: the descriptive portion then consists of the should-portion along with the situation in which it is expressed. So moral statements can certainly be assessed as correct or incorrect. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Harrah, D. | Prior Vs Harrah, D. | I 72 Questions/Logic/Prior: we distinguish: a) questions b) the act of questioning c) interrogative sentences d) the things that they are about. Interrogabilia/Middle Ages/Prior: the "questionable thing", "questionable nature", "subject of the question", etc.? Any objectivity? (see below). "Objective questions? Would probably have to be based on a theory of propositions. Questions/Prior: it is quite reasonable to say that there are questions that were never asked. Study 1) interrogabilia and then 2) enuntiabilia (remarks): Adam of Balsham/Middle Ages/Questions/Interrogabilia/Logic/Prior. Aristotle: (de interpretatione): first affirmative and negative responses. Balsham: had proof that interrogabilia could be put in a one-to-one relationship with a part of themselves. Questions/Ontology/Prior: we need not be Platonists regarding interrogabilia and we can avoid considering what is asked as "part of the sentence"as if it were a name. Content/Command/Questions/Prior: as with the command, also with questions there are no special features or something "behind" the indicative sentences which constitutes a special content. Def Questions/Harrah, David: Thesis: a question is simply an indicative statement which consists in the disjunction or the set of possible answers. PriorVsHarrah: we need not go this far. (But pro: see below) Questions/Prior: We can rules for equivalents for statements of the form "He asked the question Q" and "He knows Q" for different types of Q (questions). E.g. "He knows whether 2 + 2 = 4" This is equivalent to "Either he knows that 2 + 2 = 4, or he knows that 2 + 2 unequal 4". E.g. "He knows what is 2 + 2 is." turns into: "For some x, he knows that 2 + 2 is x". (He knows only that they have a sum). Questions/Variables/Prior: unasked questions: Problem: "For some p, no one has ever asked if p" is not the same as "There are questions that were never asked." Because there are other kinds of questions than those of the "whether variety". It would be arbitrary to single out this translation and not I 74 E.g. "For some , it has never been asked for which x it is the case that x t" or: "For some x, it has never been asked for which it is the case that x t" Would we have to ask then if "questions of type A were ever asked? In ordinary language that's nonsense. The alternative seems to be to introduce variables for questions for questioning sub-sentences: E.g. "whether 2 + 2 = 4" or "what is 2 + 2", etc., and then to say: "For some p, it was never asked, p". ((s) here no longer "if p" or "what is p"). Question Variables/Prior: could then be put in front of any indicative sentence. E.g. "Is it the case that..." (variable), thus producing an understandable question. Command/Variable/Prior: in the case of commands only a not accurately defined subset seems to be accessible for this treatment. Mainly because of the cases that refer to the past or to logical truths. E.g. "Make (variable) that 2 + 2 = 4", e.g. "Make that yesterday the glass was on the table". Questions/Command/Variable/Prior: our language can also express that someone has asked a question or gave a command. It can be formalized like this: a) first convert the indicative sentence into a question or command, and then introduce an operator. b) couple an operator directly to the question or command. (Quote). In everyday language, it does not quite work like in formal logic. The sentence structure is changed. I 75 For commands we found b) good enough Questions: here we will need a). The "question sub-sentences" are of course not names of questions or interrogabilia. Questions/Prior: are not supposed to be a "relations" between a questioner and any interrogabilia. The argument is not a name but an interrogative sentence. Knowledge/Questions/Meaning/Prior: Problem: 1) It should seem that if "whether p" and "what t" are different components, if they follow "He asks __", just as they should be different if they follow "He knows __". Because they do not seem to have any other meaning, when they appear in this different context. Vs: but then "knows" would function for itself as a special ((s) operator?) that forms a sentence from a name and a question. Operator/Prior: (see above), we have seen above that we have to use parentheses: not "__ knows __", but "__ knows, that __". Knowledge/Questions/Prior: nevertheless "knows" seems to have no different meaning in a) "He knows that 2 + 2 = 4" and b) "He knows what 2 + 2 is". Knowing That/Knowing What/Prior: has the same meaning, but if it should be a different sentence-forming operator in each case (as we assume here for questions), then a different meaning would have to turn up! (PriorVs). I 76 Solution/Prior: in "He knows what t" and "He knows if p" is understood as something, but not explicitly: what is meant: "He knows the answer to the question..." In that, we assume a different form which consists of an indicative sentence and a sub-sentence of the question. Then there are two forms: a) "For some p, he knows that p" b) "...that p is the answer to the question q". A "logic of the question" will work out the following thesis, among others: "For some y, that y t is the answer to the question for which x applies that x t" or "Either, the answer to the question whether p is that p or it is that not p". From this we can then deduce the above forms. ("He knows what 2 + 2 is", etc.) Questions/Variables/Prior: that still does not seem to be easy and economical enough with repsect to to the internal question sentences and variables. Surely there is a now better understood relation between the forms: "He asked whether p" and "It is the case that p": the latter is part of the former. This can also be done with commands. But the relation that we want is not syntactic, but a semantic one and that can best be brought out in a meta-language: "For all x, if x expresses p?" then he will ask, under normal circumstances, if p", etc. What initially prevented us from using this, was the fact that "There are questions that have never been asked" cannot be formally presented as "For some p, no one asked whether p". Because that only covers the specific question type "whether" and not e.g. "which are?" or "Who stole my pencil?" I 77 Perhaps "Is it the case that p?" is reducible to "For which ?" Where "d" is somehow distributed on the operators "It is the case that" and "it is not the case that". But that is a bit odd. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Heidegger, M. | Derrida Vs Heidegger, M. | I 29 DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeidegger's Van Gogh interpretation. Heidegger: sees reliability in the strength and robustness of build shoes. Derrida wants to go further: he sees a cipher for the reliability of being. But he can only do this by thinking about the reliability of the farmer's wife at the same time. I 43 DerridaVsHeidegger: is not consistent on his way to leave metaphysics. He remains arrested because he demands of thinking to be cruel to the "voice of being". This seems to presuppose an instance that speaks. The Christian God is associated. On the other hand, for Heidegger the "voice of being" is naturally silent, silent and wordless. I 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: does not pay enough attention to the difference between man and animal. Heidegger emphasizes the hand as the organ of showing as the property of humans. Heidegger: "what is world ?": "1. the stone is worldless 2. the animal is world poor 3. the human is world forming". Rorty III 202 Language/Primordial Words/DerridaVsHeidegger: his litany is only his own, by no means that of Europe. There is also no "universal name". III 203 Vs Myth of a "hidden language". (Vs superpersonal power, the gives certain words power) III 207 DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: one can escape Heidegger's "we" and the trap into which he ran - when he wanted to lean on something greater than himself through affiliation - through avoiding by what Gasché (his biographer) calls "wild private thought games". III 208 Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: degrades language to a language game, degrades wave to sign, thinking to metaphysics. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: the problem is not to touch the essence of language without hurting it, but how to create one's own style that makes it impossible to compare oneself with one's predecessors. Language/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: has as little a "nature" as a "human" or "being". III 213 Primordial Language/DerridaVsHeidegger: the day on which a most elementary word would be found, through which there would be only one possible reading of the "Map of Oxford", would be a tragedy! The end of the story! Rorty IV 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: "There will be no unique name, even that of being". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a group of metaphors that he and Husserl have in common. These metaphors indicate that we all have the "truth of being" deep within us! Calling and listening do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. IV 137 Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: being has always had only "meaning"; it is always thought only as hidden in being. The "differance" is in a certain and extremely strange way "older" than the ontological difference or as the truth of being. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Heidegger, M. | Quine Vs Heidegger, M. | V 127 Identity/Everyday Language/Individuation/Reference/Quine: also identity is part of our referential apparatus, but it is obscure in everyday language, because we use it without clear individuation principle. E.g. Do two editions of a novel have the same hero? How unlike may the heroes be? Or e.g. how unlike may the editions be to still be considered as versions of the same novel? E.g. Was Baal the devil? E.g. Did the Indians rever God by worshiping the Great Spirit? Identity/Possible Worlds/PoWo/Quine: all these examples fall under the issue of cross-world identity. Identity in various possible worlds. Differently: Attributes/Identity/Quine: E.g. when attributes are coextensive, they are not necessarily the same attribute. But when are they anyway? Wrong solution: some say in case of "necessary co-extensivity" the two attributes are identical. QuineVs: that only shifts the problem. Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: we do not clarify ontological ambiguities by taking everyday language literally and sifting through it. (>Existence, >value of a bound variable). ((s) primacy of language not in ontology). V 128 Solution/Quine: it is the other way round: one comes up with something and gears language towards it! Existence/Ontology/Language Learning/Quine: the existing things are genetically nothing but an interplay of grammatical analogies that cover up the differences in the forms of learning. In the center is talk of objects. Ontology begins with the generalization of object study. (see above: e.g. color words, which, as you learn, do indeed not refer to individual things). Grammar is thus simplified, ontology is multiplied. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Heidegger, M. | Rorty Vs Heidegger, M. | III 195 Poetry/Philosophy/RortyVsHeidegger: could as philosopher not become a poet, because he himself could not bear to be provisional. He wanted to make a final point. III 197 Language/Heidegger: he believed he knew words that do or should ring a bell for all here in modern Europe. >Langauge/Heidegger. RortyVsHeidegger: it must be realized that those words do not exist and not at any time. They would be completely useless for people who do not share his associations or have different experiences. History/Continuity/Rorty: the notion of a crisis in history presupposes what it wants to destroy: the notion of continuity. (VsHeidegger). III 198 Poetry/Language/RortyVsHeidegger: he is right in saying that poetry shows what language can be if it is no longer a means to an end, but he was wrong when he thought that there could be a universal poem. Language/Sound/Speech Sound/RortyVsHeidegger: phonemes are important, but no a single phoneme is important for many people over a long time. III 199 Fate/Destiny/RortyVsHeidegger: neither Europe nor people in general have a fate. III 204 RortyVsHeidegger: Nietzsche fills wine in Kantian hoses in Being and Time. (Too discursive, contrary to his own intentions). He says things that come from Nietzsche in a university style. IV 79 HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: tries to understand him by reading him as the last of the metaphysicians. RortyVsHeidegger: one of those who Nietzsche referred to as "ascetic priests". IV 80 Heidegger tries to encapsulate the West, to turn to something completely different. Not unlike Plato, when he tries to create a spiritual world, from which he can look down on Athens. IV 142 RortyVsHeidegger: wrong longing for Greekness. Pointless desire for elementary Greek words. We must create our own words. VI 140 Knowledge/RortyVsHeidegger: contributes to that we hold on to the notion that our knowledge was somehow "based" on our non-linguistic causal interactions with the rest of the universe, rather than simply to say that these interactions are among the causes of our knowledge. Available/Present/RortyVsHeidegger: (with Brandom and Mark Okrent): what exists is merely a special case of the available, like words are a special case of tools. I 390 RortyVsHeidegger: its selection of the philosophers with whom he furnished the "history of Being" stems from the doctoral regulations of the time! It's a bit suspicious that Being should have geared itself so much towards the curriculum. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Heidegger, M. | Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M. | Habermas I 182 TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth. Tugendhat I 88 TugendhatVsHeidegger: Being: ambiguous in all languages. Heidegger was completely naive not to investigate this beforehand. Def veritative being: e.g. "It is the case that", "It is so, as you say, Socrates..." I 90 Disclosure: all disclosure that is articulated in statements is in this respect a disclosure of (veritative) being. I 91 Heidegger/Tugendhat: did not give an account of it. It seemed natural to him to say with the figurative tradition that all to be is a to be of being, although this does not fit at all to the veritative being ("If something is the case, it is also true"), let alone to the expanded concept. (TugendhatVsHeidegger). I 92 Disclosure/Heidegger: original development is not at all related to objects. By "objectivity" in being and time he meant "existence", not only that which singular terms stand for, but the entire ontological perspective that results from the orientation towards a statement. Pre-linguistically. I 104 TugendhatVsHeidegger: this contradicts the central importance that Heidegger attached to language ("Language is the house of being"). Heidegger fell back to the level of the most primitive theories of language by emphasizing the meaning of the word for the resoluteness of being. II 65 Being/Heidegger: the content of that universal proposition of existence as enabling all "is"-saying is quasi the epitome of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: this sense remains unclear. Ambiguity: "being and nothingness" in its formulations has finally changed into "being and non-being". Through this ambiguity he also failed to make clear the difference between his position and the traditional ontology. II 109 Quotation Marks/Heidegger: its use of quotation marks is not uniform. Being/Plato: "...what you mean when you use the expression "being"..." TugendhatVsHeidegger: he omits the quotation marks! Falsification! One can now argue about whether he means the meaning of the word or the meaning of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: typical: he makes inconspicuous shifts from harmless starting positions with considerable consequences. II 110 Sense of the Being/Heidegger/Tugendhat: no other way out than to speak of two different kinds of meaning: Sense1 and Sense2. When Heidegger now asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. He asks for the sense2 (which in any case is not the sense of a word) of something that we mean when we speak of the being of an existing being. And what this something is, is left open. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he was even content to leave the words unclear that should be the most important to him and to us. II 111 Def Sense/Heidegger: "The result of the design, from which something becomes understandable as something." Only existence has meaning if it is disclosed. Def World/Heidegger: The "Whereupon" of Understanding Def "Worumwillen" (what for) of the Being/Heidegger: its own being that is designed in one way or another. TugendhatVsHeidegger: Question: to what extent is anything we can refer to meaningless? Heidegger had used another meaning of "sense" here, something like the purpose of words. Thus one can speak of the meaning of the human, but not of the meaning of being. Sense of Sense/Heidegger: nothing behind being, but in existence. TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggests that the same being can once be opened up and once not. II 112 Tugendhat: isn't something that we can refer to always accessible? Sense of Sense/Heidegger: Time. Like what was understood by "being" since the Greeks: "attendence", "present", "presence". TugendhatVsHeidegger: Presence is not only made accessible by being seen in the horizon of time, it is from the beginning in this horizon. This could only be overlooked by someone who is completely immersed in "presence". And that is exactly what Heidegger accused ancient philosophy of of! II 113 But there are simple words (like "present", "time") that we understand only in connection with other words. II 115 Understanding/Heidegger: all human understanding is primarily an understanding of being. It goes beyond language. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he has not seen the following tension: on the one hand his being should be of being, on the other hand he is oriented towards the "is" and connects this with the thesis that all understanding is understanding of being. II 116 For example "It is so that it rains" here one can say that the "is" refers to the state of affairs, and that is also a being. But that is not possible with unicorns. Tugendhat: Why should one deform oneself so? Example (from Heidegger): "The sky is blue". Question: To which being does the "is" refer to the sky, or to what is meant by "blue", or to both? So it makes sense to omit the orientation towards the existing and to speak only of being. II 121 TugendhatVsHeidegger: his will to clearly think through what he had seen once was weak. Heidegger has seen quite a few new things, two themes seem worth preserving. II 123 Mood/Heidegger: the primary way in which we are related to the world "as a whole". Being has no intentional content (!), it is directionless. ("fear", "withdrawal") focus on the "being in the whole". TugenhatVsHeidegger: here a substantiated "nothing" appears again, so to speak: an (impossible) negative proposition of existence: "There is nothing I can hold on to". II 124 Being/later Heidegger: the "one who differs from all that exists", "absolutely other to all that exists". This could not have been formulated in such a way in "Being and Time" yet. "Being" is now the "world". It no longer stands for "is" but for "there is". TugendhatVsHeidegger: I see no clue for the vibrating thesis that all understanding can be understood from this being. Everything but clear. II 129 Greek concept of being/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger uses a sleight of hand: one must ask whether he was actually aware of the swindle. "Ousia" belongs to the tribe of "einai". Ousia = "being" pre-philosophically: "property", "house", "yard". Heidegger translates it as "estate" and projects back. In being and time he claims: "pareinai" = "being by" and could be translated as "estate", but the equation of ousia with parousia is simply wrong! II 130 Time/Heidegger: the temporality of existence is more original than Heidegger's so-called "vulgar" time. (With a ratio of "sooner" and "later"). Future/Heidegger: one must see the self-behaviour to one's own being as a reference to the future. II 131 Play on words: "Future" (German: "Zu-kunft") as that which is already fixed for being, in contrast to the indefinite future. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but this vulgar time must still be assumed. Of course, in every waking moment of my life I refer to the time ahead. II 131 Time as meaning of being/time/future/Heidegger: he tried to construct a peculiar "movement" of existence, unlike the rest of being. This had to fail. II 132 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the transfer of a structure, which is essentially conscious or present, to something else - even being - makes no sense! II 132 Turn/Heidegger: can be understood as an attempt to project the "movement", which lies in the temporality of existence, into being itself or to settle it now on both sides. Here the terms "world" and the supposedly original concept of truth of "unconcealment" or "discovery" play a role. II 133 Existence has its motion only from the motion of being, from the time thus understood as meaning of being. Oblivion of Being: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: which supposedly has forgotten the actual being and sees only the being of the existing. II 134 TugendhatVsHeidegger: the new "movement of being" (understood from the movement of existence) is the crux of the "turn". Tugendhat: this fails: the reference to existence is a phenomenon sui generis. It is an extension of Husserl's intentionality (from Heidegger's point of view) both in the direction of the world and in the direction of temporality. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but we have no possibility to consider a somewhat mirror image correspondence on the part of being. All words stand for the very process that takes place in the "vulgar" time! Heidegger: wants existence to be temporal and yet not processual. That is contradictory. An emergence that is not an emergence in the "vulgar" time does not exist. Heidegger's reaction to these contradictions was a quasi-religious attitude whose practical counterpart was "serenity". |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Heim, Irene | Verschiedene Vs Heim, Irene | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 20 Def Skolem Function/Heim/Heusinger: (Heim 1990, Chiercha 1992, 159) (spelling f(x)) is interpreted in the meta-language as the function that assigns to each man a donkey that belongs to him. (33) Every man who has a donkey beats it. (33a) (x)[man (x) & (Ey)[donkey (y) & has (x,y)] > beat(x,f(x))]. VsSkolem Function/VsHeim/Heusinger: this pragmatic approach is more flexible than Neale's syntactic approach, but it overgenerates: Example (34) *Every donkey1 –owner beats it1. Problem: for (34) there is no reading in which the anaphoric pronoun can refer to the NP donkey-owner. (?) ((s) wouldn't it also require that there be only one donkey1?). Solution/Chiercha/Heusinger. (Chiercha 1992, 159): Rule for limiting the value range of the skolem function with a syntactic rule: (35) In a configuration of the form NPi,...esi, if esi is interpreted as a function, the range of this function is the head (value) of NPi. Problem: Uniqueness condition: in the given interpretation one receives only the weak reading of donkey sentences, since the skolem function always assigns only one donkey to a farmer. I 21 Selection function/Solution/Chiercha: must map each man to one of the (s) maybe several) donkeys he has. So this will be a selection function and a unique one. In this type of context, however, it will be a whole family of functions that are a priori all good candidates. VsChiercha/VsHeim/VsSkolem Function/Heusinger: the problem of ambiguity between strong and weak reading remains or is simply put into context. |
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| Heim, Irene | Cresswell Vs Heim, Irene | I 163 Semantics/Hans Kamp/Irene Heim/Cresswell: (Kamp 1983 Home 1983, independent): 1) Thesis: facts about descriptions, in particular their anaphoric use, require a level of representation between surface form and logical form (surface/deep structure). 2. thesis: Sentence meaning/Kamp/Heim: is no longer given by the truth-conditions. Description/CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsKamp/CresswellVsHeim: although there is a new point of view in terms of descriptions, (including by Lewis 1975), we do not need a new kind of semantic theory. -categorical language/ Cresswell: in it, we can formulate the semantic insights of Kamp/Heim. So. I 82 s: syntactic category: either simple or complex. simple: syntactic category 0: Sentence syntactic category 1: Name complex syntactic category: form (t, s1, ... sn). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Hempel, C. | Schlick Vs Hempel, C. | I 91 Context: Schlick: The foundation of knowledge" (1934) HempelVsSchlick). HempelVsSchlick: he was a "metaphysician and poet". Proposition/reality/HempelVsSchlick: you cannot compare statements with facts! SchlickVsHempel: you can without being a metaphysician. I 92 E.g. I compare this sentence in my Baedeker "This cathedral has two towers" with reality: namely simply by looking at the cathedral. If someone has something against it, it may just be that he understands "Proposition" in another sense. Coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick/HempelVscorrespondence theorie: you can only compare propositions with each other. ((s) Not propositions with reality). Schlick: we can distinguish between cases where a written, printed or spoken proposition is compared with another written, printed or spoken proposition. Schlick: and I call that the comparison a proposition with a fact. HempelVsSchlick: statements can only be compared with other statements. ((s)> coherence, > coherence theory). SchlickVsHempel: Why? I take out the modest freedom to compare everything with everything. If propositions and facts are to be too far from each other? Too different? Should it be a mysterious property of propositions that they cannot be compared with anything? Fact/statement/Hempel: the gap between them is only a metaphysical. SchlickVsHempel: that may be so, but who believes because in such a gap? I 93 Def Proposition/Schlick: is a string along with the logical rules for their use. ((s) So almost a proposition, along with the importance of rules). Proposition meaning/Schlick: these rules culminate in "deictic" definitions that make up the meaning of the proposition. Verification/compliance/correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: to verify the proposition, I have to find out if the (meaning-) rules were followed. Why should it be impossible? E.g. I look at the cathedral and then at the proposition and realize that the symbol "two" is used in the proposition in connection with the symbol "towers" and so I will get to the same icon when applying the rules of counting the cathedral towers. Coherence theory/fact/proposition/Compare/Schlick: sometimes it is said that "in a logical sense" propositions can be compared only with other propositions. That may be so, but I do not know what is meant by a "comparison in a logical way". Comparison/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot say exactly what a comparison of statements and facts is, I 94 Because we cannot determine the structure of facts. Fact/structure/SchlickVsHempel: that we cannot determine the "structure of a fact" reminds me of the metaphysics of "things in themselves". If one does not deny the existence of facts, then why deny the possibility to determine their structure? Structure of a fact: E.g. if I count the towers of a cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a certain fact. If you wanted to say that it is meaningless to speak of "structures of facts" at all that would be merely a question of terminology. One proposition is also not per se meaningful, but only in conjunction with the rules for its use. Fact/propositions/Compare/Vscorrespondence theory/SchlickVsHempel: that is what the whole controversy is about, if it should be impossible to compare propositions and facts, Hempel uses the words simply in a different sense. The easiest way to deny that you can compare them would be to say that there are simply no facts! (In formal speech: the rule of the word "fact" is such that it should not be used). Or maybe the comparison is simply never applied in the sciences? I think this is true for purely logical sciences such as mathematics, but not in experimental sciences. I 95 SchlickVsHempel: here is the psychological motivation of his criticism: it is about a vision that completely settles within the sciences. Science as a system of propositions. This should be a substitute for reality. Then "protocol statements" are used as a material, without subjecting them to an empirical test. Science/Schlick: But science is not the world! The universe of discourse is not the universe. It's one thing to ask how their whole system is constructed and why it is generally regarded as true, and another, why I even look at them as true. This is a psychological question. But none of the "cultural subordination". My trust in science and colleagues is that I found them trustful, every time I checked their allegations. I 96 Def confirmation/Schlick: the final step in the comparison between a statement and a fact. But one should not attach too much importance to the concept. I 97 Fact/proposition/compare/match/correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: his example for comparison is not quite adequate. (E.g. "The cathedral has two towers"). Hempel: I agree that one can consider propositions as empirical objects that can be compared with any other empirical object. But if we take that literally it leads to something like: I 98 E.g. "The proposition contains more parts, "the words" referred to" than the cathedral has towers". Correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: There is a different kind of comparison between proposition and fact: Comparison of symbols "two" in the sentence and the counting by looking at the cathedral. HempelVsSchlick: so by that he compares a proposition in Baedeker with the result of an action by himself. Coherence theory/Pointe: this result of the action is determined in a second proposition. And these two are compared! That is what I meant with "logical point". Revision/verification/coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick: it's about whether the propositions contradict each other. This goes even without knowing the meanings of the propositions! (> Carnap: "The logical syntax of the language", "Philosophy and logical syntax"). Example, the above two propositions, both contain an icon that is shaped like "two". |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 |
| Heraclitus | Quine Vs Heraclitus | I 296 ff Everyday language has the annoying habit of grammatically highlighting time relations at the expense of relations relations of weight or color. In the canonical notation you usually drop the temporal distinctions. Even in mathematics: we feel the "is" differently after "seven" than after "Maria". Re-forming. E.g. "I called him, but he is asleep" becomes: "I call him then, but he sleeps at that time". E.g. "Earlier than now George marries Maria and now Maria is a widow, therefore Georg earlier marries someone who is now a widow." I 298 QuineVsHeraclitus: It's not a bigger problem to step twice into the same river than it is to do so twice at two different locations. (Goes back to the different weighting in our grammar). III 270 Identity/Time/Change/Transformation/Heraclitus/QuineVsHeraclitus: how can you say that a thing that changes its substance does not remain identical with itself? The key is not in the concept of identity, but in the concepts "object" and "time". Def Object/Object/Thing/Quine: in every moment the sum of the simultaneous current states of atoms distributed in the area or other small physical particles. And over time it is the sum of its successive current states. QuineVsHeraclitus: we can step into the same river twice. What we cannot do is step twice into the same temporal stage (time stage) of the river. (At least not if this part is shorter than the time we need to climb into it ((s)(twice)). III 271 ((s) Transformation/Change/Quine/(s): depends on the choice of the time periods under comparison.) Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is an ordinary relative term (rel term). The equal sign is necessary, because two variables may relate to the same or to different objects. From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not between singular terms. V 186 Ontology/QuineVsHeraclitus: we forced his talk of time and river into a clear structure of general term and singular term and the reference to objects. Thus we have a simpler ontology. VII (d) 65 Identity/Heraclitus/Quine: E.g. you cannot bathe in the same river twice. Solution: you can, but not twice in the same "river stages". A river is a process in time. Unlike its stages. Water: to be a multiplicity of water molecules. VII (d) 66 River Stage: is simultaneously a water stage. But two stages of the same river are not always stages of the same water. ((s) division into two types of stages to explain the change). Quine: in our fast-paced world you could bathe twice in the same water but in different rivers! A: current stage of the river Cayster in Lydia b: stage of the Cayster two days later c: Current (two days later) state of the water molecules from river stage a. Half of them is further downstream, the other half in the Aegean Sea. a and b: are in "river relation". a and c: are in "water relation". River: as an entity is thus introduced as a single thing, namely as a process or time-consuming object that you say identity instead of "river relation". Identity: but you cannot say that a and b are the identical, they are merely river-related. But if we point to a and after two days to b, then we should express that we do not point to stages, but to the same river, which contains both. The assumption of identity is essential. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hilbert | Verschiedene Vs Hilbert | Berka I 414 Problem: the number of conclusions is completely incalculable. Solution/Hilbert: the process of following (logical inference) has to be formalized itself. This, however, removes all content from the closing process. Problem: now one can no longer say that a theory is about natural numbers, for example. Formalism/Schröter: after that mathematics is no longer about objects, which refer to a real or an ideal world, but only about certain signs, resp. their transformations, which are done according to certain rules. WeylVsHilbert: this makes a reinterpretation of the whole mathematics necessary. Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 29 Donkey Sentences/Epsilon Analysis/Heusinger: Thesis: that certain and indefinite nominal phrases are context-dependent. I 30 The epsilon operator EO represents NP and anaphora as context-dependent selection functions - classic: by Hilbert. VsHilbert: too inflexible - modified: represents the progress of information - modified EO: selects a certain object in a certain situation. I 36 Modified Epsilon Operator/situation/Egli/Heusinger: (Egli 1991, Heusinger 1992,1993), Van der Does 1993) the epsilon operator receives a parameter for the situation. Selection function/VsHilbert/Heusinger: Problem: the selection principle does not say which element is selected. ((s) it means only afterwards: "the selected element"). Problem: with an ordered range like the numbers this can be the smallest. The linguistic range lacks such an order. Order/Language/Linguistic/Lewis: Solution: Def "Salience Hierarchy"/Lewis: (Lewis 1979) (s): contextual or situational outline of a given linguistic area. (salient. = outstanding). Selection function/Heusinger: so we have to assume a whole family of selection functions. I.e. not from a selection function defined by the model M. Salience Hierarchy/Epsilon operator/Egli/Heusinger: the salience hierarchy is represented by modified epsilon expressions. Index i/Spelling mode/Heusinger: represents the respective selection function here: For example, eix Fx refers to the most salient (outstanding) object in context i that has the property F. Unambiguity/Situation/Heusinger: the modified epsilon operator always specifies a certain object. Context/Sincerity/Heusinger: in changing contexts different objects can be selected. Solution/Heusinger: 1. the individual range of a model M must be extended by the range of indices I. The individual range of a model M must be extended by the range of indices I. 2. the function F is added to model M itself. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Hintikka, J. | Quine Vs Hintikka, J. | I 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory. I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed. Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations. Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification. I 139 Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes. I 140 Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby (2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby) Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E). Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from (3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby) i.e. (3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby. ... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise: (4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x) i.e. (5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is. Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke). Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is. HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it. I 141 Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway. I 145 HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time. I 146 Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them? Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited. Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds: Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator. ((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish). Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out. Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above) Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds). HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met. On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world. Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same. I 147 Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic. HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play. Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form (18) (Ex) K(b = x) and equally of (19) (Ex) K(b = x) become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences! Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description. I 148 World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form "knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19). HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. I 160 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same. The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question. I 161 Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hintikka, J. | Russell Vs Hintikka, J. | Hintikka I 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this lies merely in a further error by Russell: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced this to objects of acquaintance. But Russell believed that it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that apparently denote objects, which are not those of acquaintance. N.B.: with this, his quantifiers do not enter an ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do so. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: with Russell only notational patterns. Ontological commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment, which languages of 1st order bring with them. Being/ontology/Quine: "Being means, being a value of a bound variable." HintikkaVsRussell: that, he did not recognize. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Hintikka, J. | Foster Vs Hintikka, J. | I 16 FosterVsHintikka: if we accept that an extensional language by our means can provide all the provisions of a natural language, its objection loses plausibility. It is absurd to assume that the erroneous interpretations do not come to an end. For if extensionality as such does not limit descriptive resources, it does not limit the kind of empirical evidence that is relevant to interpretation. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Rorty Vs Hobbes, Th. | II (f) 125 Nominalism/Rorty: NominalismVsMetaphysics. > Quine still connects him with that. Language/World/Order/RortyVsHobbes/RortyVsQuine: that leads to contradiction if they think that by words for the smallest particles of matter nature will be dissected in a manner that is not possible with other words! A consistent nominalism must emphasize that the forecast success of such a vocabulary has no importance for the "ontological rank". |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hodgson, D.H. | Lewis Vs Hodgson, D.H. | V 340 Utilitarism/Veridicality/Decision Theory/d.th./D.H. Hodgson/Lewis: e.g. two highly rational utilitarian theorists are afflicted with a demon, "you" and "I". We are in separate rooms with both a red and a green button. The demon set this up that we cause something good to happen if we both push the red button or if we both push the green one. If we push different buttons are push red and green button at the same time or if we do not push any button, we cause something bad to happen. We both know all the facts, and we both know that we both know it, etc. You manage to pass a message to me: "I have pushed the red button." But strangely it is not helpful! The reason: You are a highly rational being. So you do what you think will have the best consequences without taking into account other deliberations. This is also true for the sending of messages. You send the message you believe will have the best consequences, i.e. veridicality is not taken into your deliberations. As such, I do not have any reason to believe the message, unless I have good reason to believe that you believe that veridicality have the best consequences. In this case, you need to know that veridicality will have the best consequences. V 341 only if I have reason to believe that you and I will act accordingly. If not, there is nothing to choose between the expected consequences of truth and non-truth. But I know that you will not think - since you are the rational being you are - that I do not have reason to believe you, unless I really have reason to do so. Do I? I cannot indicate that I have reason to believe you without firstly assuming what there would be to indicate (circular, petitio principii). Namely, that I have reason to believe you! By arguing like this, I randomly choose the green button. LewisVsHodgson: This is the non-operability of the "expected" utilitarism. The non-operability is not sufficiently compensated by the endeavors to maximize the utility and fulfill the expectation. Hodgson: Rationality has no reason to expect that the other is veridical, not even when the combination with the expectation of veridicality would bring along good consequences. Communication/LewisVsHodgson: as such, the complete communication is forfeited. Promises as well, e.g. message: "I will push the red button." >Utilitarianism. LewisVsHodson: But to tell myself that I would ignore your message "I pushed the red button" is absurd! Hodgson is generally wrong.[hat allgemein unrecht.] Where is the mistake in his argument? It went wrong when I tacitly assumed that I had no reason to believe you, unless I could show our situation, our utilitarism and our rationality. V 342 As well as our knowledge about it, and the knowledge about it of the other person, etc. in order to have a reason to believe. But the premise that you will be veridical is nevertheless accessible to me! At least provided that common sense prompts it. The only contrary argument is Hodgon's one. On the one hand, this is consistent with our rationality, our utilitarism and our knowledge of it. On the other hand, it is not implied by it because they were not systematically not veridical, and I expect this of you, and you expect from me that I expect this from you, etc. Then you have a good utilitarian reason to not be veridical. Language/Veridicality/Lewis: Naturally, I only speak about veridicality in English. I should mention that systematic non-veridicality in English is the same as systematic veridicality in anti-English if it is like English only with reversed truth conditions. This is why I should decide that I have reason to believe you message, based on the additional knowledge that goes beyond the situation and is completely consistent with the situation. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Holism | Dummett Vs Holism | Fodor/Lepore IV 8 Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. Fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interpersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing. Fodor/Lepore IV 9 And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction. Horwich I 459 Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about"). DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German." T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again. Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers". Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto). DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible. RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty I 289 Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Fodor Vs Holism | Esfeld I 60 Holism/Esfeld: although there are close relationships between all forms of belief holism, the meaning holism (MH) and justification holism (JH) do not imply the semantic holism (SH). One can accept the meaning holism or the justification holism and reject the semantic holism (conceptual content as constituent). (FodorVsSemantic Holism (Fodor/Lepore 1992, also Horwich 1998 p.150)). Semantic holism: does not imply meaning holism or justification holism in turn. One can represent logically correctly: while beliefs ontologically depend on other beliefs in terms of having conceptual content, the justification and the confirmation is not relative to the fact that there are other beliefs. ((s) DavidsonVs: only other beliefs can justify or confirm beliefs). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 5 VsMeaning Holism/VsMH/Fodor/Lepore: first objection: you may wonder whether semantic properties are anatomical, but that is not possible with at all semantic properties. E.g. if you wanted to say that the property to express the proposition that the cat is on the mat is anatomically L (relative to the language L), then that would mean to require that this language must have at least one other expression for the cat being on the mat. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Holism | Verschiedene Vs Holism | Davidson II 60 Glüer: if one restricts the meaning holism, one can develop a dynamic model of understanding. We assume that malapropisms, idiolects and T-theories develop. A significant portion remains invariant from theory to theory. A holistic T-theory for one speaker does not exist. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Language/language acquisition/communication/Fodor/Lepore: the standard view VsHolism is that linguistic and theoretical determinations of speaker and listener can overlap partially at will. You can understand a part of my language without having learned the rest. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: if we understand him correctly, then he says that this image of language only makes sense to the extent that partial conformity in use does not require perfect conformity in use. I.e. only to the extent that Semantic Holism is rejected. Quine VI 20/21 Necessity/Laws/Mathematics/Science/Quine: why is mathematics spared? Many scientists may answer that their laws are necessarily true. However, I take the opposite view: it is precisely an explanation of mathematical necessity itself: it is inherent in our unspoken practice to shield mathematics and make use of our freedom instead of abandoning other suitable beliefs. Holism/Quine: we do well not to make the boat swing too much. Simplicity of theory is an important criterion. Adolf GrünbaumVsHolismus/Quine: He had a stronger holism in mind than ours. Quine VI 22 Theory/GrünbaumVsHolism: one can always save a hypothesis by revising one's theoretical reserves of accepted sentences in such a way that these, together with the threatened hypothesis, imply the absence of the prognosis. Holism/QuineVsGrünbaum: Such an assumption does not occur to me in the first place. It is all about defusing the false implication Holism only combats the naive notion that each sentence has its own separate empirical content. Empirical Content/Quine: is rather something that is common to sentences, and in which even mathematical sentences indirectly participate. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Quine Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 115 Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume). Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure. I 178 The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. Quine V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. V 88 Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as V 89 e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times. QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist. But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images: a) Fantasies b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory. Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit" b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete. Quine VII (d) 65 Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it. Quine XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Husserl, E. | Dummett Vs Husserl, E. | Dummett I 36 Husserl generalizes the concept of sense and meaning until he arrives at his concept of the noema, thus making the turn to language impossible. A generalization of Frege’s concept of sense is excluded. DummettVsHusserl: Noema not linguistically deducible. Husserl: An utterance as such is certainly not a consciousness act, but the fact that it actually has this specific meaning, goes back to an accompanying consciousness act: the "meaning-giving act." I 55 DummettVsHusserl: it is difficult to spare him the accusation that he represents here a Humpty Dumpty-view. In no case the intention of the speaker that the word could be interpreted in a certain sense consists in the fact that he performs an internal act by which it is filled with meaning. Noema/DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that the slipping into idealism would be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not readily evident. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, for it is mediated by the noema. Namely, there is no concept of direct perception which we could oppose to this. I 104 DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to the "interpretation". I 106 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: are not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activities) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Idealism | Davidson Vs Idealism | Horwich I 449 Davidson/Rorty: can he be attributed (1) - (4)? He often asserted (3), but (4) does not seem to suit him, because he is a "realist". (2) also sounds alien to him. (see above): Theses of pragmatism/Rorty: 1) "truth" has no explanatory use 2) We understand everything about the relation belief world if we understand the causal relation with the world. Our knowledge about the use of "about" and "true of" is a spin-off of a naturalistic access to linguistic behavior. 3) There is no relation of "true-making" or "true-makers". 4) There is no dispute between realism and anti-realism, because this is based on the empty and misleading assumptios that beliefs are "made true". Rorty: although Davidson does not seem to be a pragmatist because of its proximity to Tarski, I think that one can attribute all four pragmatist theses to him. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: Thesis: the approach about the field linguists (radical interpretation) is everything that Davidson thinks is needed to understand correspondence. Language game/External/RI/Davidson: the position of the field linguist is the only one that makes it possible to position oneself outside of the language game. He tries to make sense of our linguistic behavior. In that, it is asked how the external observer uses the word "true". ((s) then you would have to ask whether the external language game really contains the situation as an internal language game.) DavidsonVsIdealism: metaphysical and seeks ontological uniformity, hopeless DavidsonVsPhysicalism: hopes to discover such a homogeneity in the future.) Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Idealism | Frege Vs Idealism | Frege V 105 FregeVsIdealism: Idealism is useless because it can not represent the effect of the language. Avramides I 140 FregeVsIdealism: Language/Ideas/DummettVsLocke: the entire analytical school is a rejection of the idealistic conception, first clear rejection by Frege with the distinction of sense/meaning. I 141 And this, in turn, explained as different from the associated idea. (Frege 1982, p.59)) |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Ideas | Quine Vs Ideas | III 254 Singular Term/Existence/Quine: can designate an object, or not, but in any case it has a meaning. E.g. "Cerberus" ((s) >Unicorn example). Derivation: our techniques of QL (precisely with free variables) are very favorable for conclusions in which singular terms occur. III 255 But only if we are sure that the objects really exist! Existence/Ontology/Quine: the question of existence therefore moves (for reasons of logical deduction) into the focus. a) narrow view: existence as concrete presence in space and time. I.e. "exists" is equated with "is". Advantage: then no difference needs to be placed in "being", when it is about e.g. the Parthenon or the number 7. This is at most a difference in the type of object (concrete/abstract), but certainly not in the sense of "to be". Unicorn/Quine: E.g. there is nothing the word "Cerberus" denotes, neither in the past nor in the present nor in the future. III 256 But this is not about a "shadowy existence" for fear the word might lose its meaning. Unicorn/Meaning/Quine: if the word were without meaning, not only the poets would suffer; it would also be impossible, e.g., to express the simple fact of the non-existence of Cerberus. ((s) difference reference/meaning - Terminology/Quine: speaks of designating instead of reference). Idea/QuineVsIdea: false solution: speaking of Cerberus as an "idea": that would be doubling the existence: one in Athens and one in imagination. Or one in mythology, and one in the world. QuineVs: there is only one world) Solution/Quine: Parthenon "refers to the Parthenon and only the Parthenon, while" Parthenon idea" refers to Parthenon idea and only Parthenon idea. "Cerberus idea" does not denote Cerberus! Idea/Psychology/Quine: from the standpoint of practical psychology an idea could perhaps be explained as a tendency to certain reaction schemes to words. We can be as generous as we want with that. But to equate "Parthenon" with "Parthenon idea" would simply mean confusing one thing with another. And wanting to secure the existence of a thing like Cerberus through identification with an idea would be the same confusion. IV 399 QuineVsIdeas: the idea of the idea is of evil, because its use (just like a virtus dormitiva in Moliere) creates the illusion to have explained something. IV 400 Explanation/Sense: ideas neurophysiology is in charge of the explanations. Our mentalistic concepts can likewise not gain importance by the fact that they "ultimately refer" to neural states. We learned this vocabulary on the basis of behavior, and to know something of neurological issues. You can master it completely and simultaneously have a wrong or no opinions about the brain! Brain Condition/Predicates: with our predicates (folk psychology) things can be classified together that, seen neuro-physiologically, may be worlds apart! IV 401 QuineVsIdeas: reliance on the "ideas" has other drawbacks: 1) It leads to a mistaken image of communication as a transport of ideas from one mind to another. IV 402 2) It leads to a false theory of language acquisition, according to which it would simply obtained to link words with previously existing ideas at some point. Questions of learning are degraded to idle questions about the causal connection of ideas. 3) The wrong tendency to handle the different parts of speech as semantically identical is reinforced. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Identity Theory | Ryle Vs Identity Theory | Pauen I 89 RyleVsIdentity theory: category error: refers to inner events to explain outward behavior. PauenVsRyle: harmless practice like "interface", "data highway". It is by no means always a mistake to use a term outside its normal context. Of course, Ryle also accepts metaphors, but he has no useful criterion for distinguishing permitted metaphors from impermissable ones. Even the everyday language transcends everything that Ryle considers to be permissible. Disposition/VsRyle: E.g. even with headaches, someone could refrain from taking a tablet. E.g. one could take an umbrella to give it back to someone without believing it rains. One could fast in spite of starvation, etc. I could enter a music store to buy notes for someone else, etc. I 90 When asked for reasons, it is impossible to arrive at a complete list. This would, however, be necessary if the meaning of a mentalistic expression is actually to be understood in the disposition analysis. Each of these sentences also contains a mentalistic expression. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Incommensurability | Feyerabend Vs Incommensurability | I 367 Explanation/VsIncommensurability/Feyerabend: They say that if you allowed incommensurability in science, you could no longer decide whether a new conception explained what it is supposed to explain or whether it wanders of to completely different fields. I 368 FeyerabendVsVs: such a knowledge is quite unnecessary. The question does not arise at all. One can no longer ask about the absolute velocity of an object. This is not a loss. I 369 The theory of relativity does not need to worry about the fate of classical physics. The concept of "explanation" is not so important. I 355 Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsCritics: Incommensurability does not apply to all competing theories and it applies only to theories if they are interpreted in a certain way, for example, without reference to an "independent observation language"! This restriction has been overlooked by most critics. I do not claim the incommensurability of all theories! Only general and non-instance-bound theories may be incommensurable and even those only if they are interpreted in a certain way. (The conditions of "non-instance-bound" theories excludes "theories" such as "All ravens are black"). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Individualism | Burge Vs Individualism | Stalnaker II 169 Externalism/Anti-Individualism/Burge/Stalnaker: (Burge 1979) further developed Putnam's approach: 1) not only meaning and other semantic properties, but also intentional psychological properties are dependent on external conditions. Wishes, fears, intentions, hopes, etc. 2) Social Conditions - facts about language use in a community - are external conditions that determine mental states. 3) The dependence on external conditions is a penetrating phenomenon, not limited to few terms and expressions, not only to de-re attitudes or names, natural kind concepts and index words, but also attitudes de dicto and all kinds of expressions. Def Individualism/Burge: Thesis: that intentional mental states are intrinsic properties of the individuals that have them. BurgeVsIndividualism. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Induction | Medawar Vs Induction | Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 245 Induction/MedawarVsInduction: (similar to Popper): 1. There is no objective starting point. 2. The process of discovering is confused with that of proving. 3. It is not possible with certainty to arrive at a generalisation containing more information than the sum of the specific sentences on which it is based. Medawar pro Popper: (Logic of Research): hypothetical-deductive method. Trial and Error. This should account for the process of discovery. Solution/Medawar: Style of the traditional literary narrative: notions, false starting points, rejected hypotheses, emotional aspects, coincidences. It is possible to use literary language in the sense of a "true narrative". I 246 DotzlerVsMedawar: that is naive! I 247 The social use of words and writing inevitably brings fiction into play as a communicative trick. |
Meda I P. B. Medawar The Uniqueness of the Individual |
| Inflationism | Field Vs Inflationism | II 220 Gavagai/Deflationism/Field: the question is whether the facts about our use of the equal sign determine that it stands for identity instead of partial identity. The normal axioms just make sure that it is an equivalence relation and also a congruence relation with respect to the other predicates of our language. FieldVsInflationism: amplifies the uncertainty. Even if partial identity was a "partial reference" of "=" in a primitive language that contains no predicate "is a unseparated part of", it is likely that the addition of this predicate would then exclude this. Thus, the vagueness of "rabbit" would also be reduced. II 221 These observations are based on an inflationist perspective. Deflationism/Field: reduces the indeterminacy. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intention Based Semantics | Schiffer Vs Intention Based Semantics | I 258 SchifferVsIntention-based semantics/SchifferVsIBS: much worse: from normal speakers too much knowledge is required. For example, that he knows the function that maps sentences to propositions. Solution/Lewis: (Lewis 1975): Actual speech ratio / population / Lewis (Lewis 1975): L is a language in G only if it's common knowledge in G that members of G "never attempt to express a proposition of L, which is not true in L "(p 167). Then Lewis would respond to the above objections: I 259 Lewis: the normal human being does not need a term of L to expect that his fellows are truthful. He just needs proper expectations about how they should behave. He expects them to act in accordance with a regularity of truthfulness. But we would - and not he - describe this as regularity. He might have an internally represented grammar, and being able to have the potentially infinite number of expectations, but this is not critical. (p. 180f). Schiffer: Problem: it is not entirely clear how this is to avert the above objection: to know that a fellow human being will never say a false sentence, a member of the population must know the function. And in addition he needs a manner of givenness (givenness, "concept"). And that is too much for the knowledge that can be attributed to normal people. Lewis: seems to want to attribute the following knowledge: For all s, p, if L(s) = p, then it is common knowledge, in G, that members of G would not express s, if p is not true. Schiffer: I do not know whether that's adequate for Lewis, it does not help the IBS: the idea is to redraft IBS definitions in a way so that all references to L are outside of that-propositions. ((s) so that the speaker does not affect the language itself.). Pointe: then the individual speakers must know only sentences and individual propositions. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Internal Realism | Horwich Vs Internal Realism | Horwich I 399 Internal Realism/Putnam: why is internal realism not refuted by all this? VsInternal Realism: e.g. he might ask, "How do you know that 'cow' refers to cows?" After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: e.g. suppose God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be an infinite number of possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the phrase "cow refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then that in this sense of "true" it is true that there is an unambiguous "intended" interpretation? How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a particular set of things as opposed to a particular set of things in any accessible interpretation? Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the opposite direction. Reference/Internal RealismVsVs: the fact that "cow" refers to cows follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism was wrong! Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. Unrevisability: it is not absolutely unrevisable, however, that "cow" refers to cows, but in order to revise it you would have to overthrow the entire theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: that does not answer the question: "'cow' refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Intersubjectivity | Brandom Vs Intersubjectivity | I 823 Vs I-we conceptions of social practices: they do not meet the adequacy condition. They found a distinction between what individuals consider as proper use and what is right on the comparison of the views of the individual and society. (VsInter-subjectivity) I 824 This is the usual way to treat objectivity as inter-subjectivity. The excessively high price is the loss of the ability of giving a sense to the distinction on the part of the entire community. This conception unduly assimilates the language communities to the individuals involved in it. It treats the community as something that brings forth and assesses performances. ((s) I.e. as a subject that it is not. Brandom: It is not the community that agrees on definitions, but individuals.) Objectivity: the fact that our concepts are about an objective world, is partially due to the fact that there is an objective sense of rightness to which their application is subjected. I 825 A propositional or other content can only be specified from one point of view, and that is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in a very practical sense. (score-keeping subject). I 832 VsInter-subjectivity (I-We style) it is flawed, since it cannot give room to the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective! LL. The community (as composed of individuals) thus has a privileged perspective. In the face of it, one cannot take a third-person point of view as an individual and therefore one cannot judge from the outside, what is actually true. This leads to a full frame. (BrandomVs). I-you conception of inter-subjectivity: no perspective is privileged. Perspective form instead of cross-perspective content. The common aspect of all perspectives is that there is a difference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Introspection | Chomsky Vs Introspection | Münch III 304 Museum myth/Chomsky: Vsintrospection: introspective evidence is not reliable, diffuse and sometimes influenced by prejudice to the meaning or structure of certain words and phrases. >Myth of the museum. Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126. – dt: Introspektion und Beschreibung des Sprachgebrauchs, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Introspection | James Vs Introspection | I 37 Behaviorism: James B. Watson was a student of James! Declined introspection. VsIntrospection: assumes prior knowledge. ((s) The meanings used in dealing with ourselves come from public language. >Private Language, >Intersubjectivity.) James per introspection: peculiarities of the inner world of experience require extension of the method. |
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| Introspection | Quine Vs Introspection | Münch III 290 Introspection/other minds/Quine: it would not do any good to look in the head of others. We will not deal with the nerves and even with the private history of habit formation. >Other minds. Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126. – dt: Introspektion und Beschreibung des Sprachgebrauchs, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Introspection | Ryle Vs Introspection | I 208f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects from it, since its object is a myth - consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same kind as what I can find out about others - The small differences do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Priviledged Access, >Public language. --- I 216 RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any phenomena in the inner - there are no such events. --- I 221 Introspection/Tradition/Ryle: an ideal of a true perception, attentive observation, only executed here and there. Whereas consciousness is an ongoing component of all mental processes. RyleVsIntrospection: assuming there are certain ghostly things that one could perceive, then this observer would always have to do two things at once: to stand up in time for the realization of the plan, he would also have to pay attention to the process of plan compliance. That would become fastly infinitely. (> Regress). --- I 222 But if one admits that the number of perceivable inner things is limited, it follows that there must be imperceptible inner things. Non-introspective act, namely, the act of introspection, which already contains the greatest possible number of simultaneous attentions acts. This knowledge could not be based on introspection. But then the question arises whether it was ever based on it. Then one would have to postulate another form of privileged access. Scylla and Charybdis. >Mentalism. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Intuitionism | Quine Vs Intuitionism | VII (a) 14 Set Theory/Fraenkel: classes are discovered. (VsIntuitionism). Quine: this is more than a play on words, it is an essential question. (>Beings). X 118 QuineVsIntuitionist Logic: it lacks manageability and familiarity. Its sentence links have no truth-functional, but an intuitive meaning which we explain using "refute" and "from ... follows". These explanations become unclear, however, if we want to maintain the difference between uttering a sentence and talking about the sentence (mention/use)! Quine: then you might as well move on to Heyting's axioms and not interpose translation, but X 119 Apply the direct method of language teacher. Intuitionism: gained more momentum through Godel's proof of incompleteness. Constructivism/Quine: there is not a correct definition for it. QuineVsIntuitionist Logic: changes the meanings of quantification and the constants. Solution: you can follow the constructivist procedure, and still use the orthodox logic: that is what Weyl's constructive set theory does. Quantifier/Differing Logic/Quine: there are also variations in quantifiers: intuitionistic logic requires knowledge of the proof path. X 120 Problem: The variables must all (be able to) have a name so that the existential quantification can correspond to the (finite) adjunction of the singular sentences that make them true (see above). Problem: with infinite existential quantification no infinite number of names can be given out. Variations in the quantification are of course important in terms of ontology. X 121 Ontology/QuineVsIntuitionism/VsIntuitionist Logic: we might not even see with what the intuitionist declares as existing,. Solution: We need to translate his language into ours first. And not necessarily into our logic, but into our overall language! Then we can say what he regards as existing (and in our sense of "existing"). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Intuitionism | Poincaré Vs Intuitionism | Wessel I 236 PoincaréVsIntuitionism/VsConstruktivism/Wessel: (Poincaré calls the intuitionists pragmatists): "The pragmatist should take the position of the extension, the Cantorian that of comprehension (compréhension). The objects, however, are there before the inscriptions, and the set itself would exist if there was no one who would undertake to organize it." I 237 Intuitionism/Logic/Wessel: the intuitionists reject not only the concept of the actual infinite, but they also believe that they have to limit logic: Brouwer: the law of excluded third only applies within a certain finite main system, since it is possible to come to an empirical confirmation here. BrouwerVsLogic: as foundation of mathematics. Instead: vice versa! I 238 (s) It is about the practice of the mathematician, therefore the limits of the constructive possibilities are not random or can be overcome easily by logical considerations.) Constructivism/Brouwer/Heyting: examines the construction as such, without inquiring after the nature of the objects, e.g. whether they exist! Law of Excluded Third/Intuitionism/Heyting/Wessel: (a) k is the biggest prime number such that k-1 is also one; if there is no such number, k = 1 (s) "the only prime that is adjacent to another". (b) l is the biggest prime such that l-2 is also one; if there is no such number, l = 1. Wessel: k can really be determined (k = 3), while we do not have any methods to determine l. This leads to the rejection of the law of excluded third: for if the sequence of prime twins was either finite or infinite, then (b) would define an integer. Intuitionism/Logic/Logical Operators/Wessel: because certain laws of logic do not apply here, the different logics are various complexes of operators. But the intuitionists have the same claim, to comprehend the meaning of "and", "not", "or" in the everyday language. Def Conjunction/Intuitionism/Wessel: p u q can be claimed exactly then when both p and q can be claimed. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Intuitionism | Wessel Vs Intuitionism | I 239 WesselVsIntuitionism: the limitation of negation to a specific field destroys logic as an independent science. But this can be solved in a universal system of rules. (see below). I 269 WesselVsIntuitionism: Main defect: that the universal character of logic is denied. Different logics for finite and infinite domains. Also the representatives of microphysics (quantum mechanics) propagate different domain logics. I 270 Wessel: this has to do with a wrong understanding of the object of logic: Logic/Wessel: a special science that investigates the properties of the rules of language. Science: Understands by the object of logic (erroneously) any extra-linguistic object (e.g. quantum, elementary particle, etc.). WesselVs: Dilemma: that this considered object is not directly given to the view, it must be constructed linguistically. But for this you need logic, circular. Negation/Intuitionism/Wessel: the intuitionists reject the negation of the classical calculus, but they should apply (our) non-traditional predication theory, which already takes into account the problem of undecidability. For example, the question whether a certain sequence of numbers occurs at some point in the development of the number π: here there are three possibilities: 1. it can occur (A) 2. it cannot occur (B) 3. it is impossible to determine (C) Suppose someone claims A, then two different negations are possible: 1. the assertion of B 2. the explanation that it is not right. Negation/WesselVsIntuitionism: confuses two different types of negation: the propositional (outer) and the negation in the operator of awarding predicates ( I 271 Intuitionists/Logic/Wessel: accepts, like most classic logicians, the bisubjunction ~(s< P) ↔ (s We now compare some formulas, using the character combinations that are actually meaningless: -i p, ?p etc. -i p: shall be ~(s <--) u ~( I 272 In the class logic the de Morgan laws apply, the IntuitionismVsDe Morgan: Vs 3. and 4. law . 3. ~(p u q) > ~p v ~q 4 ~(~p v ~q) > p u q. Intuitionism/Wessel: is a hidden epistemic logic: "It is provable that p is provable or that ~p is provable". WesselVs: but first you have to have logical basic systems that are not dependent on empiricism! Epistemic predicates ("provable") must not be confused with logical operators! The classic paradoxes occur for the most part also in intuitionistic logic. I 273 There is evidence to show that there must be a number, but not the number itself! Example + One need not be a follower of intuitionism to prefer evidence that constructively provide the number. I 274 MT5. There is a group of formulae provable in the IPC (intuitionist propositional calculus) for which the following applies: some of their P-R are provable in PT and others are not...e.g. p > ~p > ~p p > ~q > (q > _p) ++ I 275 MT6. There is a group of formulas that can be proven in the IPC (intuitionist propositional calculus) to which applies; all their P-R are not provable in PT. E.g. ~(p v q) > ~p u ~q, ~~(p u ~p) WesselVsIntuitionism: MT5 and MT6 show that the intuitionists are inconsistent: if they identify s |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Jackson, F. | Bigelow Vs Jackson, F. | I 117 Strong centering/Lewis: Axiom (strong Centring): (a and b)> (W a > W b) Translation into everyday language/(s): everything that is true is linked by Counterfactual Conditional. I 150 Strong centering/Solution/Jackson, Frank: accepts the strong centring at the price that he rejects the following assumption: "If a then probably b" entails that if a, then it could be that b and it could be that it is not b". BigelowVsJackson, Frank: We reject the strong centering (BigelowVsStrong centring). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Jackson, F. | Stalnaker Vs Jackson, F. | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: n.a.p. is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It arises from an optional descriptive semantics that characterizes the random natural languages: a mechanism for determining of references. Thesis: there could also be languages without determined reference that says even to some extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: but if the reference-determining mechanisms are part of a meta-semantically story they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our statements and internal states can ever have representational properties. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: can show that the possible and the true interact that means separate semantically from factual questions in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could give a neutral view of the possibility space. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kant | Black Vs Kant | III 132 Lie/Kant: we have the absolute obligation not to lie. E.g. Even if this means showing a killer the way to his victim. BlackVsKant. III 133 Kant: the greatest damage caused by a lie is for mankind as a whole. BlackVsKant: that can be said about all misdeeds. Language/Montaigne: as human beings we are held together by language. Lie/language learning/language acquisition/Montaigne: if we were brought up by liars, we could not learn the language. Or if our teachers were lying at random occasions. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kant | Brandom Vs Kant | I 852 Kant: dualistic character of his distinction of the conceptual and non-conceptual (BrandomVs). I 853 Kant: 1) Judgments are the basic form of consciousness. 2) Recognition and action are determined by normative assessments in conscious beings as opposed to non-conscious beings. 3) Dualism spontaneity and receptivity. I 855 Brandom: For Kant, concepts relate to views 1) like shape to matter - 2) like the general to the specific - 3) like the work of spontaneity or intellectual activity to that of receptivity Brandom: these are real differences, but they are independent and orthogonal to one another. None of the above differences is understood between the conceptual and something non-conceptual in the judgment. That which a judgment expresses, its content, is conceptual through and through. So Kant threw together the second and the third point, by systematically not distinguishing between representations of the individual and individual representations. (see BrandomVsKripke) II 13 Kant and Descartes: Mind primary, language secondary - BrandomVsKant and Descartes. II 123 Law/action/BrandomVsKant: Proposal to replace "image of a law" with "recognition of a determination". |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kant | Davidson Vs Kant | Rorty VI 217 DavidsonVsKant: language behavior that is not ultimately interpreted by reference to its causal interactions is not interpretable. VsKant: VsMetaphors of fullness and emptiness. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Wittgenstein Vs Kant | Brandom I 75 WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. --- Münch III 327 WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Kant I 12 I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. --- Kant I 13/14 The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. --- Kant I 14 WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." --- Putnam III 220 WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed. Wittgenstein II 35 There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. --- IV 109 Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kant | Stroud Vs Kant | I 145 Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)). I 146 StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise. I 159 Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism. I 160 Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition. StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle): to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental. I 161 2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions? a) empirically: For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens. b) transcendental: other language use: here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth. ((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant). StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language. KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible. I 162 StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism: Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level? Why does Kant reject empirical idealism? ((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.) Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first). StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us? Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental? Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true. 2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists: This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism. KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence. Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses. Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them! StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something? StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism? Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one. The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently. Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us". StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here again: I 164 shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken. StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects. Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge. StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained. Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known? Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge. Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.). Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of. StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible". I 165 Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences. StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic. Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all. I 166 Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description. Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me. I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity. Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism. I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level! I 167 Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes. StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity. I 168 Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below). KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Chisholm Vs Kant | II 57 Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: closer to Kant than most. Also synthetically a priori: Chisholm pro. II 58 But in terms of the form of the sentences in which s.A. may occur: VsKant: very different ontological framework. Content: I. distinction synth./anal. II. Property theory III. Involvement of properties (with anal. judgments) ChisholmVsLanguage-related view. IV. Property inclusion and property existence. Result: SauerVsChisholm: Thesis: neither a conception of sA nor one of the analyticity seem to be fundable with Chisholm’s property theory. II 60/61 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there exist non-analytical a-priori propositions of the form "All S is P". Synth a priori/VsKant: He gives the E.g.: "Space is three-dimensional", but this is contradicted by Riemann. Kant’s criterion of "strict generality" can therefore not imply the form "All S are P". II 62 Synth a priori/ChishomVsKant: Much more phenomenological than Kant, who overlooked in fatal restrictedness the material (synthetic) a priori. Husserl: "contingent a priori" (e.g. color sets). II 76 Analytic/Synthetic/Kant/Sauer: for Kant the distinction serves only to prepare the question: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" That is the question of the "third party" on which reason is based and to recognize the predicate as belonging that is not in the concept of the subject. ChisholmVsKant: asks on the other hand, how truths of reason a priori propositions are possible. I 77 SauerVsChisholm: it is difficult to see where the specific significance of a s.A. should lie, as he conceived it. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Kant | Vaihinger Vs Kant | Vaihinger I42 ff Def Practical Fiction/Freedom/Vaihinger: it does not correspond to anything in reality, but it is a necessary fiction. False concepts also have the value of an ideal. Ideal/Vaihinger: For example the unity of good and true is an ideal. Kant/Vaihinger: Freedom: "the idea", i.e. as fiction. VaihingerVsKant: the reactionary trait, which one also finds elsewhere with Kant, induced him to turn fiction into a hypothesis again, which was then transformed into a dogma by the epigones. I 77 Thing/Kant/Vaihinger: assumed that the real world consisted of things in themselves, which were understood in mutual influences. VaihingerVsKant: made a hypothesis out of the fiction of the thing itself. (Wrong). I 148 VaihingerVsKant: what Kant saw in others, he did not see clearly in himself that his thing itself was also a fiction. I 173 Categories/Tradition/Vaihinger: the original psyche had more categories than today. Their traces can be found in all languages, they are simply analogies. So the categories are by no means innate. They have been applied and selected over the course of time. They have very different analogies in different languages. (VsKant.) |
Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Kant | Vollmer Vs Kant | I 25 VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity! I 84 Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that: VsKant, VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language VsPositivism VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms. Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences. I 103 Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person. Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate. I 173 Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge. He cannot answer the following questions: How are our categories created? Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories? Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others? Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems: Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution? Why can we understand each other? How is intersubjective knowledge possible? Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!) Can they be scientifically justified? I 193 Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible. I 196 Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false). For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws. I 197 Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes. 2. Anticipations of Perception a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes 3. Analogies of Experience a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances. 4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions). I 199 VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs). Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause! Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs). Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation. Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience. I 202 Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine. Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic. Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them. VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact. Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE. EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs). I 208 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct. 2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success. Kant does not make this distinction. I 210 VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm. I 304 Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer). I 305 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena. I 306 Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world. I 307 VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized! II 48 Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Kaplan, D. | Stalnaker Vs Kaplan, D. | I 206 Def character/Kaplan: (= proposition meaning): a function of context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered poss.w.). Centered world/centered possible world/ poss.w./Stalnaker: shall represent the context here. I 207 Content: is here represented by propositions Proposition: function of poss.w. to truth values. Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: is then a two-dimensional intension. (Kaplan 1989b) StalnakerVsKaplan: this paradigm does not answer the questions of basic semantics to the facts that determine the semantic values. It belongs to the descriptive semantics. That means it is not a theory on the interpretation of thoughts. Thoughts/interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics that means of the facts. Character/content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts. Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intension. Content/Kaplan: that what is being said. The thought, the information that the speaker intends to transmit. I 208 Solution/StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan's approach must be expanded by a theory of thoughts and a language theory. This allows us to treat a wider domain of expressions as context-dependent than normally. II 5 Double indexing/double index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan Demonstratives, 1968): thesis: 1. a) the meaning of a proposition determines the content relative to the context but b) the content determines a truth value only relative to a poss.w. Stalnaker: so Kaplan's theory was two dimensional or double indicated. Context/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was represented by an index like the one of Montague and propositions were interpreted relative to this index Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the actual values of the interpretation function were then, however, the contents and not the truth values, while Def content/Kaplan: a function of poss.w. on truth values. 2. Kaplan second modification: Index/Kaplan/Stalnaker: was limited: Index/Montague/Stalnaker: only a list of time, speaker, place, maybe poss.w.) Index/Kaplan: only: the relations between these must also be considered. That means an index can represent the content only when the agent is actually at the location in the poss.w.. II 6 Context dependence/Stalnaker: is, however, pervasive: adjectives like e.g. "large" are interpreted relative to contextually specific comparison classes. Likewise e.g. "I", "here", "now" (index words). StalnakerVsKaplan: Kaplan (1968) says nothing about this. II 10 Character/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan was about proposition types. Propositional concept/p.c./StalnakerVsKaplan: are, however, associated with certain statement tokens. This p.c. is dependent on the semantic properties that these tokens have in the poss.w. in which they occur. This is no contradiction to Kaplan's and my theory. It is simply about different issues. II 162 de re/belief/ascription/Kaplan/Stalnaker: ("Quantifying in", 1969) Kaplan has an intermediate position (between Quine and Stalnaker): Ascription/Kaplan: (like Quine) is not ascribed to a certain conviction. de re/logical form/Quine/Kaplan: de re-ascription: existence quantification. Truth conditions/tr.c./de re/KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: here Kaplan follows the semantic approach: ascriptions de re are only then true if the believer has to be in a relation with the knowledge. Intensification: the name must denote the individual. E.g. "a is a spy": here a must not only denote Ortcutt, but there are additional conditions 1. for the content 2. for the causal relation between the name, the individual and the believer. Pointe/Stalnaker: it is still possible that all the conditions are fulfilled by two different names. Thus, the examples can be described without having to ascribe conflicting belief. KaplanVsQuine/Stalnaker: his approach also covers cases in which Quine's analysis was too liberal. StalnakerVsKaplan: his approach is an ad hoc compromise. Knowledge/ascription/Stalnaker: in the semantic analysis knowledge is self-evident without it you cannot believe anything. You cannot believe a proposition without having detected the expressions occurring in the concepts in which they are defined. StalnakerVsKaplan: 1. but the need for knowledge loses its motivation when it is grafted to Quine's approach. 2. Kaplan keeps the artificial assumption that de re-ascriptions ascribe no particular belief and he is bound to the sententialism (propositions as belief objects). II 163 At least it have to be proposition-like objects with name-like constituents. de re/ascriptoin/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we instead accept propositions as sets of poss.w.. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kaplan, D. | Newen Vs Kaplan, D. | NS I 117 Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA). NS I 118 E.g. (1) I am here today. Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary! E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum. It is true because of the expression conditions. NS I 118 Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan. VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy. E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity). Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that. NS I 119 Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification). Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones). Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be 1) the designated object 2) the description associated by means of language competence 3) cognitive way of givenness. Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence. Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role: E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships. "This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship". NS I 120 The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest). Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object. Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy. There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Katz, J. | Vendler Vs Katz, J. | I 260 Translation/Wittgenstein: was aware of these difficulties: he did not forbid the translation of his works, but insisted that they should only be printed together with the German original. Translation/Philosophy/Language/Vendler: in Hungarian the use of the copula is limited. Should one conclude from this that a Hungarian cannot understand Aristotle's being? Necessary Truth/Translation: For example, "You cannot know anything wrong" is true in all languages, provided it has been well translated! It is a necessary truth. (Vendler: Tautology). ((s) HegelVs: there can be false knowledge, e.g. incorrect gemoetrical figures (Preface of Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes). >Knowledge/Frith, >deception/Frith. One can find necessary truths embedded in individual languages. Thus one can come to necessary conclusions. But that does not give much. The regulative idea of language and thinking in itself gives nothing here. But this does not mean that we are trapped in the conceptual system of our mother tongue. We have already freed ourselves from terms like "magic power" etc. in the past. I 261 The philosopher, of course, makes suggestions for improving the imprecise natural language. But he does it in his natural language! I 262 Katz: Thesis: we may only consider those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: In view of the above, I see no need for this. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Kim, Jaegwon | Lewis Vs Kim, Jaegwon | V 249 Character/Naming/Event/Lewis: one could think that the following is sufficient: "the F en from A to T". f is the property expressed by the predicate f, a is the individual designated by A, t is the time denoted by T. The designations do not have to be rigid! >Rigidity. "Constitutive triple." (Kim, "Causation, Nomic Subsumption and the Conept of Event", 1973)(1) Furthermore, the occurrence of the event is somehow connected to the fact that the property f belongs to the individual a to t. Property/Question: how does a property belong to an individual to t? Perhaps because it really is a characteristic of time sections or a relation of individuals at times. LewisVs: then it would be all too easy to attribute a character simply by setting up a triple. I.e. "the F-en from A to T" denotes the event, so that it is necessary, if and only if f belongs to a to t. ((s) For example, it rains necessarily on Tuesday if it is necessary that it rains Tuesday). >Events/Lewis. LewisVsKim: this does not satisfy the needs of counterfactual analysis of causation. Sometimes an event can actually be caused by a constitutive property, V 250 an individual and a time can be substantially specified. But not in general for events that we call by naming. Problem: if the being is too rich, it is too fragile. It's hard to modify without destroying it. It cannot occur anywhere except in its constitutive time. Our everyday causes and effects are more robust. ((s) it would be incomprehensible to have an individual, which can only occur once in one place at a time, because one would have no language use for it, i.e. the meaning of something that only occurs once cannot be determined by predicates, which can also be assigned to other things, if these predicates are to come essentially only to this individual. Schwarz I 132 Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(2): a triple of a thing, a time and a property. LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile: Schwarz I 133 This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense. Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects: Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified? Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A. Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on. Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f). Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships! (see above 2.3). But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261). Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q". Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant. 1. Jaegwon Kim [1973]: “Causes and Counterfactuals”. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–572 2. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton (ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177 4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kleene, St. C. | Priest Vs Kleene, St. C. | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxes/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar and its negation are both assertible (and also their conjunction). The rules of logic are attenuated (>stronger/weaker; >strenght of theories), so that not every assertion is assertible. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent Logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry Paradox: is thus precluded, because the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material Conditional/Field: defined by ~ and v. In the logic of Kleene/Priest it does not entirely support the modus ponens. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviating" sentences): have truth value gaps. But there are no truth value clusters. Deviating Sentence: E.g. liar-sentence has no truth value clusters, but truth value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): conversely have truth value clusters and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here you cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and ""p"is true"! Because to assert a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)", but a sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth Value Gap/Logical Form/Field: asserting a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, then it is a correct assertion as by Priest. The assertion of the absence of a truth value cluster in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") and true ("~A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot assert this absence for deviating sentences, Priest can. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Brandom Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 805/806 The legitimacy of a chain of name tokenings depends on how the reference is passed on, just like in an anaphoric chain. Caution: According to Kripke, different beliefs of the users of proper names do not change the reference of those Tokenings as long as the user "specifies that it is used in the name of references common in the community." (> Kripke). I 965 BrandomVsKripke: That sounds as if one would need to have the concept of reference in order to use an expression in an anaphorically tranferring way. Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! The "Cicero" E.g. shows that not all need to belong to the same chain, but that there is also no need for quasi-names which would play a role that corresponds to quasi-indexical expressions in de-dicto attributions of strong de-re attributions. Any belief, be it strong or be it weak, can be attributed de-re or de-dicto. I 807 The fact that the anaphoric analysis does not come into play at Kripke is due to his "Millian" theory of the semantics of proper names. BrandomVsKripke: his front position between Millian and Fregean principle makes it unclear whether (Millian): direct attribution, direct reference, i.e. that it is not permitted to refer back to anything other than the reference. It also does not seem reasonable to treat other cases like this. "This" and other demonstratives are not really "directly referential" but require implicit sortals. I 855 BrandomVsKripke: difference descriptive/causally historical is alright, but it gets dark when he is alleged to have shown that these are two ways of looking at the relation of language and consciousness to the world. Because that is not applicable to predicates. Never was a descriptive theory of meaning drawn up by predicates. At least the basal predicates get their reference through connection with the properties. (see BrandomVsKant). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Davidson Vs Kripke, S. A. | Esfeld I 67 DavidsonVsKripke’s Wittgenstein: (1990) pro Kripke: 1991. pro wider interpretation of what a private language is. >Private language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Dummett Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 361 Rigid Designators/DummettVsKripke: (Frege): in modal contexts: Descriptions: to be construed as precluding the modal operator (MO), proper names: include MO E.g. Kripke: St. Anne did not have to be mother of Mary but still St. Anne, DummettVsKripke: "St. Anne" is not a predicate, not a candidate for being an accidental property of someone BurckhardtVsDummett: false justification: "St.Anne" simply as a rigid designator - by Dummett: in essential properties it is different. Stalnaker I 173 DummettVsKripke: (M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London 1973, 232) there can be no proper name, whose whole purpose is to have an object as a reference, without sense that defines the object somehow. Stalnaker: what kind of argument could indicate that we are not only speaking no such language, but that we are not even able to do it? |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Verschiedene Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 232 Identity/Schmidentity/VsKripke: some have claimed that identity cannot be the relation that exists between each thing and itself and only there, because that could not explain the nontriviality of identity statements. Kripke: "Test": if a hypothetical language contains this relation and the same problems are generated, this is not a refutation of the fact that "identical with" in English stands for the same relation. Stalnaker I 175 VsCausal Theory/Name/VsKripke/Stalnaker: was criticized for its vagueness. One would still have to specify the type of causal connection, Kripke: Thesis: he did not provide a reductionist analysis of the reference, but only an alternative picture. I 176 Kripke/Stalnaker: actually articulates only the naive answer, without the details. VsMill's Semantics/: I will examine an argument for the impossibility of a semantics that picks out the reference without intermediate meaning, that separates the two questions and examines where it has weaknesses. VsMill/VsKripke/Stalnaker: an argument VsMill claims that not every well-defined language can be the language of a community. E.g. like this: Language/VsMill/VsKripke: if the semantics are correct, the speakers need to know what they are saying. It may be that in individual cases they use words they do not understand themselves, but 1. a) if you do not know what you are saying, you cannot mean what you are saying, and b) if you present correctly what people say in a community, you have to say that people generally mean what they say. I 177 2. it could be that we can determine a semantic value without knowing what the value is, even that nobody knows what the value is. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Schiffer Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 175 Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/SchifferVsKripke: Paradox/Schiffer: Solution: Usually, by showing that one of the propositions must be rejected. Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: we represent so canonically: (P1) (1) Yesterday Clem meant addition instead of quaddition with "plus". (2) But there is nothing in Clem's past, which could find that he meant the one in place of the other, there is simply not a fact. (3). But (1) and (2) are incompatible: if there was not a fact that it stipulated, then it is not that he meant addition instead of quaddition in the past. (P2) The same for the present. I 176 Schiffer: if (P1) and (P2) are paradox, then also (P3): (1) Clem believes that there are lions in Africa (2)But there is nothing in Clem's past, which specifies that he believes that. There is no fact of belief about Clem, specifying this. (3) Because (1) and (2) are incompatible, it is not the case that he believes that there are lions in Africa. ((s) difference to Kripke's Wittgenstein: there it says in (3) that he believes either addition or Quaddition (wherein Quaddition can be any deviation). But in (P3) it is said that he cannot believe that there are lions in Africa, and even Clem itself would have to notice that.). So that it is not possible at all to have an attitude is something different than the inability to determine the exact content of the attitude). Schiffer: Here too it can be said that there is neither a "reducible" nor a "irreducible" fact. Pointe: Pointe: if there is a solution to (P3), it could also be used for Kripke's Wittgenstein. How would the solution look like? "Direct solution"/Kripke's Wittgenstein would ultimately be a physicalist reduction. That many want. But that is impossible. We cannot reduce "to mean". Fact/Schiffer: if we are talking about the fact, then from the non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact, that, however, does not exist for Kripke's Wittgenstein. Kripke’s Wittgenstein/solution/Schiffer: both (2) and (3) are ambiguous in terms of "fact", it can be read here pleonastic or non-pleonastic. pleonastic: here (3) is true and (2) false: Clem meant addition and believes that there are lions in Africa, so it is a fact that he does. ((s) in the "superfluous", non-ontological sense of "fact".) non-pleonastic: here (2) is true and (3) false: there is indeed no objective language-independent fact which stipulates that Clem thinks or believes this and that. Nonfactualism/solution: there is no property that is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. I 177 Belief-predicate/propositional attitude: E.g. "means by "plus" the addition" E.g. "believes that there are lions in Africa". SchifferVsKripke/Kripke's Wittgenstein: the fact that there are no non-pleonastic facts regarding belief and meaning, does not conclude that you cannot mean anything. Conclusion/Schiffer: (a) Clem means addition and believes that there are lions in Africa. (b) the propositions about Clem's meaning and belief are not reducible to propositions without semantic, Intentional or Mentalese vocabulary. (They are irreducible intentionalistic). (c) there is no non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact or property in respect of meaning or belief, that is in relation to the predicate "means addition" or "believes that lions ..." as the name "Greta Garbo" to Greta Garbo. Schiffer: which makes the way for the ontological physicalism. VsSchiffer: it could be argued: E.g. Clem died yesterday after he has used "plus" for 50 years. Now we have a complete sound film his life along with complete records of its neurophysiological life and his stream of consciousness. I 178 Then we can formulate two empirically adequate hypotheses which exclude each other: 1. Clem meant addition, 2. Clem meant Quaddition. That is a mystery, isn't it? SchifferVsVs: this is indeed a mystery. Here I have another one: there are two empirically adequate hypotheses about myself, one that my sensory experience originates from physical objects, 2. that they are caused by Descartes evil demon. ((s)> brains in a vat). Nevertheless, I believe in physical objects. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Donnellan Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 27 Names/DonnellanVsRussell: logical proper names ("this") are no meaningful construction: according to the natural conception, it is precisely proper names that stand for an object without describing it. DonnellanVsKripke: for him it looks as if the name would somehow stand directly for the language-independent given object, I 27 Donnellan: but the name is only a means, which could also be replaced by another one. (>Donnellan I 205) I 27 Causal Chain/Donnellan: must be historically correct. In the case of negative existential propositions it breaks off or is blocked. Names/BurgeVsKripke/BurgeVsDonnellan: not singular terms, but predicates (like Russell). E.g. "There is a time t for the speaker S a reference action x to an object y, so that: y is a Socrates and y is bald". The part sentence "y is a Socrates" thus has a truth condition itself. Reference is not eliminated. Dual reference: To the reference action and to naming. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Horwich Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stegmüller IV 154 Meaning/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/HorwichVsWittgenstein/HorwichVsKripke: the list (see above) has to be completed: d) Meaning addition with "plus" does not exclude that mistakes are made. That must not be violated by any concept of meaning. e) The meaning of "plus" is an intrinsic property! This stands in contradiction to d), though! Horwich: brain research could produce matches, by the way. Kripke and Wittgenstein have indeed shown that there must not necessarily be facts of meaning, but that there could be! IV 154/155 Stegmüller: Wittgenstein as well would certainly welcome a return to empiricism, but a theory could probably determine the match as a fact (like the theory of Chomsky), but still only in the context of assertability conditions (justification conditions), not in the sense of a truth-functional semantics. Turing Machine/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Stegmüller/Chomsky: e.g. (Kripke) a machine fallen from the sky can be analyzed with respect to all relevant things (program and memory). a) Stegmüller: Chomsky thus accepts a view that contains a linear solution of the paradox. Due to differences in the program, we recognize, whether "plus" or "quus" is represented. Because we have a theory that tells us something about differences. IV 156 b) Linear solution: linguistic competence: we distinguish well-formed and not well-formed vocalizations. IV 157 "Switch Model"/Internalized Language: in the structural original state there may be many switches that are set to "zero", waiting to be turned into active positions. Language is nothing more than a present stable switch setting (internalized language). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Burkhardt Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 340 Names/Burkhardt: Speaker Reference: is on the level of the parole. Semantic reference: is on the level of the langue. Langue: the actually conventional or regular of the language, here lies the meaning of the proper names. Only here can they designate rigidly. Here they are safe from possible errors of the parole. II 341 BurkhardtVsKripke: he is not aware of this difference. |
Burk I A. Burkhardt Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Stegmüller Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stegmüller IV 119/!20 Kripke: the skeptical solution is logically independent of the hyper-sceptical thesis (the impossibility of language in general). StegmüllerVsKripke: has fallen victim to the confusion of the private language argument with that of the impossibility of following private rules. The problem of rule following is only encountered if the sceptical solution is already assumed to be valid. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Field Vs Kuhn, Th. | II 183 Theory Change/Semantic Change/Reference/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1962.101): The references of Einsteinian concepts are never the identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. Newton’s mass is maintained, Einstein’s can be converted to energy. FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, because Einstein showed that there is no "Newtonian mass"! Semantic Change/Kuhn/Field: I do not deny that Newton’s "mass" meant something else, but I also do not deny Kuhn’s assertions about meaning, but about reference or denotation. Kuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts have a different meaning and therefore no reference at all. FieldVsKuhn/(s): Newton’s concepts do have different meanings, but they refer to a set of objects where the present terms only refer to a subset of these objects. (see below). II 184 FieldVsKuhn: I deny that there ever was such a thing as "Newtonian mass" or ever will be. And therefore Newton himself can never have referred to "Newtonian mass". Therefore, no further positive analytic hypotheses are possible other than merely (HP) and (HR). (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. Problem: now we have to consider the negative (HA): that Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing, just as "Nicholas" denotes nothing. (HA) Newton’s word "mass" denoted nothing at all. Problem: then we have to attribute false truth values to Newton’s (indisputable) sentences (sentence tokens). Nicholas/Unicorn/Solution/Frege: Some phrases have truth value gaps. Newton/Field: E.g. undeniably true statement by Newton with which every physicist agrees: (7) In order to accelerate a body uniformly between any pair of various speeds more force is required if the mass of the body is greater. That certainly seemed to be true in Newton’s time. And the RT agrees with him (both for net mass and relativistic mass). II 195 Theory Change/Denotation/FieldVsKuhn: one should not say that Newton’s "mass" did not denote anything. In that case, a sentence like E.g. "The mass of the Earth is less than that of the Sun" would not have been literally true if Newton had expressed it. Solution/Field: you should at least speak of a "conveyance of information". (Also FieldVsLanguage Rules). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Scheffler Vs Kuhn, Th. | Rorty I 352 Kuhn/Rorty: for Kuhn there can be no algorithm for the course of science, unless from a winning perspective in retrospect. VsKuhn: he has often been accused of idealism. He gave his critics a point of attack by saying that there could be no "neutral language of observation" because scientists "see different things" or "live in different worlds". I 353 Rorty: that is completely harmless. I 354 Kuhn/Rorty: the dispute between competing standards can only be decided within the framework of criteria that lie outside normal science. I 355 SchefflerVsKuhn: Kuhn speaks of a second discursive level. Second order standards. Accepting a paradigm means not only accepting theories and methods, but also guiding standards and criteria. I 356 Kuhn: Choice between theories not according to rules, but according to values. Theory/criteria: "Conformity with facts, consistency, scope, simplicity and fertility". |
Schef I I. Scheffler Science and Subjectivity Indianapolis 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Lakoff, G. | Searle Vs Lakoff, G. | IV 199 Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean) IV 201 Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself. IV 202 They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule. Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained. IV 203 Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features. IV 204 SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?"). Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language Rules | Quine Vs Language Rules | XI 75 Analyticity/QuineVsLanguage Rules/Lauener: Suppose we had different language rules which do not determine sentences as analytic, but as true. Then we can define analytic as a statement. If how is only true by this rule. ((s) no longer circular. "Only according to this rule": Not empirical). QuineVs: this is not progress, because the rules to which we refer, are distinguished from other rules only by the fact that they figure on a particular page in the section "language rules". No award of a subset of truths in L is in itself more a semantic rule than any other. If Def analytic: is to be: "true because of language rules": then no truth of L is analytic under exclusion of another. (Two Dogmas, p. 35). ((s) This does not distinguish a particular rule). XI 76 I.e. the rules are only useful for the determination of "analytic" if we already know what the term means! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Language Rules | Chisholm Vs Language Rules | II 69 Truth/Truth conditions/Tarski/ChisholmVsLanguage rules: the part right of "bic" formulates a necessary condition for the truth of the sentence to the left. But it does not refer to language rules, but to something non-linguistic. Therefore, we cannot say of any sentence that it is true only because of the way we use the words. The way the T-scheme stands, a T-sentence does not express a relation to something non-linguistic, so that one must first be able to replace it with it with one that does that. It is Tarski’s definition of "X is true" by "Every thing fulfills X". II 71 VsLanguage rules: common accusation: only conventional, arbitrary. ((s) only list). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Leeds, St. | Field Vs Leeds, St. | II 281 Indeterminacy/Own Language/Theory Change/Leeds/Field: (Leeds, Steven 1997), Section IV) LeedsVs indeterminacy within a theory (within one language): Field: Leeds view seems to be disquotational, i.e. the reference of our own expressions should be determined according to the following scheme: (R) if b exists, then "b" refers to b and nothing else. Foreign Language/Theory Change: In this case, it only makes sense relative to a correlation between the concept of the two theories. More Moderate View/Field: we might as well have an unrelativized concept of reference that extends beyond our own concepts, this will, however, be very vague. FieldVsLeeds: it seems very reasonable to assume that the concepts of our currently best theories are vague. Simply because many aspects still have room for improvement. E.g. Ricci tensor: will probably not just refer directly to something, but it will not be without any reference either. Falseness/Theory/False Theory/Field: E.g. "mass"/"weight" makes it clear that if a theory is false, it is often because of the vagueness of terms. Correctness/Translation/Theory/Field: the concept of a "correct translation" is nonsense: E.g. root -1, "i"/"-i" "/" / "" (see above). This is not about an epistemic limitation. There is no "subtle fact" that we cannot know, it is rather the case that there is no certain fact that makes a difference. The example is interesting in the context of Leeds: it seems as if also our own terms "i" and "-i" would be indeterminate, because: Chauvinism/Theory/Theory Change/Asymmetry/Field: it would be chauvinistic to assume that our own theory is determined if we attest indeterminacy to the other theory. FieldVsLeeds: he cannot avoid the accusation of chauvinism, because he denies our own theory indeterminacy. II 282 Solution: In the process of language acquisition (learning, use) we learn to accept (R) and that creates no connection between "refers" as applied to "/" and "i". Asymmetry/Chauvinism/Field: we get this asymmetry without chauvinism: our term "i" is as indeterminate as the foreign term "/", it is just that the indeterminacy is "hidden" in our normal semantic statements, because these semantic concepts contain a compensating indeterminacy! (f..o.th. compensation). Indeterminacy/FieldVsLeeds: this dissolves the doubts regarding the indeterminacy of our own language. The fact that "i" refers to i does not show that "i" is determined, it is therefore compatible with the fact that "i" and "refers disquotationally" are both indeterminate. Caution: This only shows how a prior indeterminacy of "i" would lead to an indeterminacy of "refers disquotationally". Indeterminacy/Own Language/FieldVsLeeds: the possibility of indeterminacy of our own language can also be shown regardless of the theory of reference, and thus also of disquotationality: surely, vagueness is a kind of indeterminacy, and that is everywhere. Vagueness: it can also be problematic itself: Vagueness/Williamson’s Riddle/Field: (Williamson 1994): there are people who consider the riddle to be so serious that it would be doubtful whether II 283 the phenomenon of vagueness (or, more generally, of indeterminacy) would be a real phenomenon. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Leeds, St. | Verschiedene Vs Leeds, St. | Horwich I 381 Standard Interpretation/Truth/SI/Leeds: if that is true, we do not need standard interpretation, but maybe sometimes we do? Perhaps some statements about truth that are denied by naturalistic instrumentalism (NI), for example the idea that a truth theory is necessary to explain why our theory works. Theory/Success/Function/Truth: For example, the idea that a truth theory is necessary to explain why our theories work. Explanation/Leeds: the Explanandum must be formulated in such a way that it is clear that it must be explained systematically. For example, it is not enough to simply read "our theory works" as "our theories contain truth-sentences". Solution: Observation/Truth/Theory/Leeds: the agreement with observation must come into play. For example, we can say in a clear sense that humans are superior to animals because their predictions are more precise and more often apply. Theory/Success/Leeds: Success consists in having expectations that are fulfilled. I 381 Next: we might find that many sentences of our language are associated with certain stimulus patterns, so whoever believes these sentences will expect a certain stimulus type. Success/Theory: then we can say that our theories work because they have correct O consequences (observation consequences). Then we want to explain why they have these consequences. Observation consequence(s): For example "if I have observed this, this and that will happen afterwards". VsLeeds: the sharp distinction between theory and observation that I have made here is, of course, controversial. ((s) > Theoryladenness of observation). Leeds: but our thesis does not depend on this distinction. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Saussure Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 21 SaussureVsLeibniz: the meaning of a language expression can be produced with the help of the elements of a grammar, but not by them alone and without the intervention of a speaker. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 221 Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle). Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties. In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates. In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language. Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects: Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life. In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it. I 228 Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply". Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate. x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa). WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true. Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce: x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged! Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. (x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e) and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle): (x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n) Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae P(x) ↔ P(y) and -i P(x) ↔ -i P(y) are not equivalent. Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988): the same predicates must also be denied! strict identity: x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded! I 229 In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Lesniewski, St. | Prior Vs Lesniewski, St. | I 43 Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of non-nominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects. Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first: Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them. Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences. Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question. E.g. if φx is read as "x is red", I 44 then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction) "Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx. To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object. Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φ-ness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate: (λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...") One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation. But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification. E.g. all-quantification of higher order: a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx, i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then something results in either ψ or X. That's alright. Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first: b) C∏φΘφΘ() Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X". AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences. We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows: (A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx this turns the whole thing into: c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx. And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a). This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem. I 45 PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized: For c) gives us e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz) which can be instatiated to: f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y. From this, λ-conversion takes us back to a). Point: λ-conversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λ-abstraction is not bound to an individual variable. So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated. I 161 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the all-class is not empty. Russell himself found this problematic. LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty. Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe. PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious: Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell). But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names! Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a well-formed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true. Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is well-formed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell. I 162 Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: so-called "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names. This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names. So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all. Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation. Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product! And we can construct a name that is logically empty. E.g. the composite name "a and not-a". Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless. Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals. Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higher-order functors, etc.) Basic sentences are something like "x ε a". I 163 Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Lewis, D. | Chomsky Vs Lewis, D. | Black I 200 Language/Semantics/Convention/Psychology/Lewis/Schwarz: the psychology behind the intentions and expectations does not interest Lewis. ChomskyVsLewis: denies the mechanism LewisVsVs: that is wrongly attributed to him. In the present state of neurophysiology, he considers it idle to speculate about it. It would also be possible that beings without internal grammar use the German language, or that different speakers of the German have different internal grammars. Therefore, we should not focus on cognitive implementation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Davidson Vs Lewis, D. | I (e) 114 Davidson: conventions and rules do not explain the language, the language explains them. >Conventions/Davidson. Fodor/Lepore IV 84 note T-sentence/Davidson: T-sentences have the form and function of laws of nature! 25th Language/DavidsonVsLewis: it is not useful to describe it as a system of conventions. >Language/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Verschiedene Vs Lewis, D. | Metz II 274 Nida-RümelinVsLewis: this objection is off the table here after we have shown that on the 1st level (Marianna finds a colorfully furnished room with partly wrongly colored prints) the alternatives come into view, which are then excluded on the 2nd level. Real phenomenal knowledge. Lewis I 9 ShafferVsIdentity Theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neural events are also abstract. Whatever results from considerations about experiences as an argument for nonspatiality should also apply to neural events. - VsLewis: it is nonsense to consider a mere sound chain or character string as a possible carrier of a meaning or a truth value. Meaning/Carrier: Carriers of meaning are only single speech acts! II 213 LewisVsVs: my assertion is not that sounds and characters are carriers of meaning, but that they carry meaning and truth relatively to a language or population. A single speech act can be the bearer of meaning because in most cases it unambiguously determines the language used in its particular enforcement situation. - VsLewis: A meaning theory recurred to a possible world is circular. - Def Possible World/VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can itself be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical propositions of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. -LewisVs: Possible world cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1. Such a substitution does not work properly: two worlds which are not different in the representing language get (wrongly) assigned to one and the same representation. II 214 ++ 2. Such a replacement would also be completely unnecessary: the concept of possible worlds is perfectly understandable in itself. II 216 Hypostatization of meaning - VsLewis: not just words, things exist! - VsVs: we can form a grammar II 221 VsLewis: maybe internal representation? VsVs: that does not help! II 222 Convention is more than agreement: the others must believe in it! II 223 VsLewis:Language conventions are no better than our infamous obscure old friends, the language rules. VsVs: A convention of truthfulness and trust could be called a rule. II 224 VsLewis: Language is not conventional. LewisVs: There may be less conventionality than we originally thought. However, there are conventions of language. II 225 VsLewis: Only those who are also set theorists can expect others to adhere to regularity. LewisVs: An ordinary person does not need to possess a concept of L in order to be able to expect that the others are truthful and trusting in L. He only needs to have expectations about action. II 226 VsLewis: Using language is almost never a rational matter. LewisVs: An action can be rational and explainable even if it is done out of habit and without thought. II 227 VsLewis: Language cannot possibly be traced back to conventions. It is impossible to agree on everything at any time. LewisVs: Admittedly, the first language cannot possibly go back to a convention. II 227 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose a lifelong isolated person could one day spontaneously start using a language due to his ingenious talent. LewisVs: Even people living in isolation always adhere to a certain regularity. II 228 VsLewis: It is circular to define the meaning in P of sentences using the assumptions made by the members of P. LewisVs: It may be so, but it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as accepting sentences. II 229 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose population of notorious liars. LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population! II 229 E.g. Ironist: these people are actually true in L! But they are not literally true in L! I.e. they are truly in another language, connected with L, which we can call "literal-L". II 232 VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. LewisVs: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust par excellence. It is in a certain language! Its alternatives are regularities in other languages! II 233 + VsLewis: Even truthfulness and trust in L cannot be a convention. Moral obligation/Lewis: a convention continues to exist because everyone has reason to abide by it, if others do, that is the obligation. VsLewis: Why communication when people can draw completely different conclusions from a statement? II 234 VsVs is quite compatible with my theory. But these are not independent conventions but by-products. II 235 VsLewis: not only one language, but an infinite number of fragments (e.g. interest in communication etc.) VsVs: this is indeed the case, the language is inhomogeneous e.g. educated/uneducated. II 237 VsLewis: silence is not untruthful. VsVs: Right expectation of truthfulness, but no trust! II 238/239 VsLewis: either analytical or not, no smooth transition! VsVs: fuzzy analyticity with the help of gradual conventionality: regarding the strength of assumptions or the frequency of exceptions, or uncertainty as to whether certain worlds are actually possible. II 240 VsLewis: thesis and anti-thesis refer to different objects: a) semantic (artificial) languages, b) language as part of natural history - VsVs: no, there is only one philosophy of language, language and languages are complementary! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Lewis, D. | Avramides Vs Lewis, D. | Avra I 28 Vs Lewis: It’s pointless to say that noises have truth conditions. LewisVsVs: I do not say that noise chains or signs themselves have truth conditions, I say, they have meaning or truth conditions relative to a language. (> Lewis 1983c, p. 173). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Lewis, D. | Peacocke Vs Lewis, D. | EMD II 169 Lewis: Chomsky: Thesis: it could be that we have far fewer conventions than is generally assumed. But as long as there are at least two possible human languages, there must be a convention according to which the choice is explained. PeacockeVsLewis: that is funny: in the borderline case where there is no other equally rich language, can this fact prevent a possible language from being the actual language? Then it might seem as if it were a matter of convention whether L1 is an actual language of P1, but not a matter of convention whether L2 is an actual language of P2. Ipso facto, the actual language relation (see above II165, application to the world ) is not analyzed in terms of the conventions. II 187 Truth/Actual Language/Peacocke: but we can explain the concept of truth "true in L" that only related to the language (unlike the general W concept) to someone by total recursion: we can teach its use (like winning). For this we do not need to presuppose the general concept of truth (in this case). (Conditions of use) Here, no specific starting point is required, it is only necessary that you start somewhere. PeacockeVsLewis: (conventions) he avoids this current point, but at the price that he has to introduce a quantification over possible worlds, or at least over conditions or propositions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Lewis, D. | Cresswell Vs Lewis, D. | I 23 Performance/Competence/Semantic/Cresswell: what relationships are there between the two of them? Lewis: Convention of truthfulness and trust: in L: thesis: most language use is based on it. --- I 24 We assume that the speakers are trying to express true sentences and we expect the same from others. Important argument/CresswellVsLewis: this may be the case, but to me it seems to be more a matter of empirical investigation than a definition that it should be so. And therefore: --- I 33 Language/Bigelow/Cresswell: John Bigelow tells me, thesis: that one of the earliest functions of language was storytelling. Then it is more about imagination than everyday communication! ((s)VsCresswell: 1) How does Bigelow know that? 2) Why should one draw such far-reaching conclusions from that). CresswellVsLewis: even if it should turn out that there was a logical link between the convention and the use of language, it seems better to me not to include this in a theory of semantics from the start. Anyway, we do not need a connection of competence and performance. --- II 142 Fiction/Belief de re/Lewis/Cresswell: (Lewis 1981, 288): E.g. In France, children believe that Papa Noel brings gifts to all children; in England, Father Christmas only brings them to the good children (and these get twice as many gifts, as Pierre calculates). De re/Fiction/Lewis: this cannot be an attitude de re, because there is no such res in both cases. Fiction/CresswellVsLewis: here you can also have a reference de re, even if the causal connection is not direct. Solution/Devitt: storytelling. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Loar, B. | Avramides Vs Loar, B. | Avramidis I 29 Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111 Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Loar, B. | Schiffer Vs Loar, B. | I 274 Belief/Loar:/Schiffer (1981): ingenious theory about the thesis: belief is a relation in the public language of the ascribing, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content, are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski-style. I 275 Tarski-style/T-Def/Schiffer: is not of any role of (translation: prescinds from any role) that can have the expression in the communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then contains [s is T] nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956). I 15 Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary that convictions based on interpersonal attributable functional states are individuated. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). SchifferVsLoar:: (see below): which is not likely to go. That leaves as the only way: (see above). a) (compatible with IBS (intention based semantics): the local (topical) thesis that belief is a relation to a mental representation (in Mentalese). That 1. the content of signs and sounds must be reduced to contents of mental states (i.e. their intentional properties that are attributed to that-propositions). 2. then the contents of mental states are reduced to semantic properties of non-public language of mental representations that realize these mental states. ((s) representations implement mental states). Non-public language/Problem: the semantic properties of the non-public language of formulas in the inner system are contingent (!) properties! That means they require a theory that tells us what the truth conditions intends for sentences in Mentalese. This is a difficult legacy. Belief/Schiffer: but must be able to be explained without psychological vocabulary. (see above). ((s) representations/Schiffer/(s): must be explained in a non-public language, or the declaration itself in a public language, but as a phenomenon must be recognized that their contents are determined in a non-public language. (Non-public: E.g. attribution of truth values, but also Mentalese, content of mental states, etc.). I 34 SchifferVsLoar/SchifferVsFolk psychology: there are not nearly enough M-restrictions in a possible folk psychology, that by definition must be accessible to everybody, E.g. the belief that New Zealand is not a dictatorship: with which "observation moderate belief" (or amounts of such) is this belief to be connected via M-restrictions?. SchifferVsFolk psychology: they can not afford the functionalist reduction. I 45 Belief/Proposition/Loar/Schiffer: (Loar, 1981) began with propositions of belief objects, but then showed how it manages without the benefit of linguistic entities. SchifferVsLoar: 1. gives no completely general proposal. Its only meta condition is supplied from a common sense theory which is applicable only to normal adults. I 46 Problem: it is a consequence of Loar's theory that E.g. the predicate "believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" in my idiolect is partially defined by a common sense theory, which is incorrect for the blind and therefore, as I use the predicate, the proposition "Ved Metha believes that the New Yorker publishes Ved Metha" cannot be correct, because Ved Metha is blind. 2. Loar's theory is not immune to twin-earth examples and Burges examples. (He is aware of that). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Loar, B. | Stalnaker Vs Loar, B. | II 195 Narrow Content/Loar/Stalnaker: (Loar 1987, 1988): Loar has an ingenious thesis and good examples that allow us to better understand the internalism. StalnakerVsLoar: his defense of internalism is, however, not entirely convincing. Stalnaker: I believe that something like Loar's narrow content will play a role in intentional explanation but that it will not be narrow content! II 203 Content/that-clause/Loar/Stalnaker: "loose connection": here there shall be a certain way how the world appears to the thinker and this be a purely internal characteristic of the thinker. Language/content/problem/Loar: our language is permeated by social and causal presuppositions so it can only inaccurately detect our internal content. Stalnaker: pro, but I do not think that the belief states are themselves infected one whit less causally and socially! II 204 "loose connection"/Loar: (e.g. Paul, arthrite) Problem: what things about the world of which Paul believes that he is in make Paul's convictions true? The ascription of "I have arthrite in the ankle" expresses something else than the ascription of "J’ai l’arthrite dans ma cheville". StalnakerVsLoar: I also think that this is a mystery, but about ascription. I do not think that supports an internalism. Truthmaker/conviction/possible World/poss.w./Stalnaker: are the facts about the world as it appears to Paul internal or facts on the language use in Paul's environment? Ascription/to make true/Stalnaker: to answer the question, we need a theory on what makes belief ascriptions (ascriptions of content) true or false. Solution/Stalnaker: we need a causal information-theoretical approach that uses counterfactual conditionals. And I do not see how this could go internalistic. Counterfactual conditional/co.co./Stalnaker: (externalistic) one might assume that Paul would be in another state when the world would be different. Or Paul is in his internal state iff the world is actual in this certain way. ((s) But that excludes illusions). externalistic: that would be non-internalistic because it is based on general causal regularities. Problem/Stalnaker: the same problems arise that already appeared in Loar's belief ascription. Content/Loar/Stalnaker: after Loar there are two dimensions, which are connected to a mental state: a) a purely internal content – the way how the world appears to the thinker – with it behavior is actually explained. II 205 b) a social content (to what the ascriptions refer). Stalnaker: it is not clear to me what role b) shall play. Content/StalnakerVsLoar: thesis: if we describe it properly psychological and social content fall together. Loar's examples do not show that psychological content is narrow. Loar: thesis: there are phenomenological reasons why the way the world appears to the thinker must be an internal property of the thinker. II 205 privileged access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with the anti-individualism. (Team: Loar per internalism, Loar per individualism). II 206 Loar: thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - assuming Freud exists timelessly. StalnakerVsLoar: this is true but why is this in conflict with the externalism? LoarVsExternalism/Stalnaker: Loar's arguments are based on observations of the externalist analysis of the reference relation. logical form: (of the argument);: I do not judge that I stand in relation R to x ("R") be an externalist conception of this relation of aboutness or reference). aboutness/"about"/Loar/Stalnaker: therefore "R" cannot be a correct analysis of the aboutness relation to which I have privileged access. aboutness/"about"/Loar: it is implausible that I, to know that my thoughts are about Freud, need an opinion on a causal-historical relation to him. Such a relation has no one properly characterized yet. StalnakerVsLoar: two things are wrong about this: 1. a philosophical analysis of a concept may be correct, even if a competent user of the concept does not know the analysis. 2. the externalism does not specify that the aboutness-relation is analyzable. Burge: proposes no analysis Kripke: (in his defense of the causal theory) does not assert that this is reductionist. Loar/StalnakerVsLoar: he is right that my "pre-critical" perspective, "that my thought that my thought about Freud is a thought about Freud" does apparently not need an externalist concept. ((s) "drastic content". see below). II 209 Context dependency/ascription/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar shows us, however, correctly that belief-ascriptions are context-dependent. And he is also right to accept realization conditions for it. Realization conditions/StalnakerVsLoar: but these give us no opportunity to come to purely internal properties of the believer Def content/Stalnaker: (whether psychological or social) is a way to put us in touch with others and to our environment. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Locke, J. | Berkeley Vs Locke, J. | Danto2 I 211 Berkeley assumes that the world is perceived by God. BerkeleyVsLocke: he casts an externalist view on a whole inevitably internist position. Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsIdealism/BerkeleyVsLocke/Avramides: (18th century): Locke: "The mind has the power to assemble (set, grasp, conceive, "to frame") abstract ideas. Language/Berkeley: Locke's mistake lies in believing that language has no other function than to communicate our ideas and that every descriptive name stands for an idea. (cf. Berkeley 1710, Absch.10ff) This leads to the assumption that linguistic generalization is an expression of generalization (generality) in thought. But one only has to deny it in order not to have to postulate such generalizing powers of the mind anymore. Berkeley denied it: BerkeleyVsLocke: it is not necessary for individual names to provoke in us the understanding of ideas for which they should stand. Communication/Berkeley: is also not the main purpose of language, there are other purposes of language like e.g. evoking passion, stimulating or stopping actions that put the mind into a certain disposition. Avramides: but it took more than a century for the idealistic grip to be loosened and idealistic theories to be revealed as completely misguided. Stegmüller IV 379/380 Reality/World/Berkeley: there is an agreement that ideas exist only in the mind. (i) Question: Can there be things outside the mind that are similar to ideas? No: only an idea can be similar to an idea. (ii) BerkeleyVsLocke: he recognizes that there are ideas of secondary qualities (odors, colors, sounds, etc.) that are not images of something that exists outside our mind. Berkeley: but he gives no reasons why it should be different for the primary qualities (shape, extension, movement)! Moreover, we cannot even form the idea of a body that has only primary but not secondary qualities. (iii) Relation/Berkeley/Stegmüller: certain values of primary qualities like distance and speed are always only relative values! This shows that they exist "only in our mind". (iv) Substance/Substrate/BerkeleyVsLocke: he admits that they are the "unknown something". But "to carry" the word is nothing more than a metaphorical term. (v) Skepticism/Berkeley: if we can imagine a material world, skepticism is still possible. We will never know. (vi) Ideas/Berkeley: even if we accept an external world, our ideas cannot be explained because it is inexplicable how material bodies can affect our mind. (vii) Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: ideas are passive and causally ineffective. If there were expansion and movement similar to our ideas, they would also be passive and could not be the cause of our ideas! |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Quine Vs Locke, J. | I 411 ff Properties/Quine: question: whether properties are analogous to the (already accepted) sensory qualities (accepted in the common sense like the elementary particles). We can invoke continuity here, analogous to the particles. This shows the widespread preference for properties. (QuineVsProperties) I 412 For lack of curiosity any non-sensuous properties are projected analogous to sensory qualities, consequently as recurring features of subjective scenes that take place in our mind. Another reason: Some are tempted by the object-oriented patterns of our thinking to see the main content of each sentence in the things about which the sentence is. So a predicative sentence is less understood as a sentence on the object than about the object and a property. Locke: took the view that general terms are names of general ideas QuineVsLocke/QuineVsIdeas: fallacy of subtraction: tendency to extract too much from "about" or "talks about". Such a person will be of the opinion that any general term for physical objects such as "round" and "dog" simultaneously symbolizes a property. But then (he will think) any argument for physical objects assuming utility has to speak even more for properties! Because these terms neatly symbolize a single property while they do not correspond so seamlessly with the indefinite number of objects to which they apply. V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be of this or that nature, but words are out there, where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve the transmission of ideas! (>NominalismVsLocke). Quine: it is probably true that in language learning we learn how words are to be connected to the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Locke, J. | Wittgenstein Vs Locke, J. | Avramides I 141 Language/ideas/WittgensteinVsLocke/Avramides: Wittgenstein goes further than Frege, who still allows private ideas or views): he doubts the coherence of an approach that leaves undetectable things outside from communication. He doubts a private realm of ideas. We have no coherent concept of such a realm. (> Dummett 1973 S.638f) |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Verschiedene Vs Locke, J. | VsLocke Locke I 26/27 Knowledge/VsLocke: Problem: the ideas have to be fixed in words, but that does not mean recognizing yet, because the words have to be processed into statements. Locke, however, develops his idea analysis first in isolation. (Thereby lengthy repetitions arise). Locke I 42 VsLocke/VsSensualism: the critique of Locke always misses a clarification of the necessary preconditions of human knowledge in the subject itself. This is caught by Locke's introduction of reason at the end of the essay. Locke I 66 Ethics/Locke: the suspension force is of utmost importance for Locke's ethics: the "Angel" around which the freedom of rational beings revolves. Thus the possibility of a free decision for the morally good is to be justified. (Despite hedonism). VsLocke: this is not contradictory, but not very plausible. It has been criticized time and again that the motive of moral decision is not the independent value of the morally good, but the benefit determined according to desire/displeasure. Locke never clarified this despite the pressure of his contemporaries. Locke I 169 Sensualism/VsLocke: an old tradition of Locke-Criticism considers sensualism naive. (LeibnizVsLocke, KantVsLocke). Locke: Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind that was not in the senses before". LeibnizVsLocke: "except the mind itself!". Curl I 170 KantVsLocke: there are a priori forms of perception that enable us to have experiences in the first place. Language/Knowledge/VsLocke: (today): Locke misjudges the irreducible linguistic foundations of empirical perception. But in his thinking the correction is already applied in order to also include abstract and general ideas under the empirically given, from which every reconstruction of knowledge must already start. (L. Krüger). Economy/EuchnerVsLocke: Contradiction: Locke's mercantilism and its simultaneous praise of world trade. Locke I 188 Knowledge/Reality/KreimendahlVsLocke: restricts possible statements of reality to the realm of ideas and the "nominal" entities formed by them. In doing so, he questions his own empirical program. On the one hand it is correct that there can be no knowledge without mediation of ideas, which in their complex form are human art products, while on the other hand he claims that the source of all ideas is experience (circular). Experience/Locke: the combination of sensory experience and reflection ("inner experience"). Gravity/Locke: "Hoop and Ribbon" (Euchner: that was more naive than it should have been at the time). Locke II 187 Complex ideas/Locke: e.g. friend: from simple ideas: human, love, willingness, action, happiness, which in turn can be traced back to even simpler ideas. LambertVsLocke: he did not recognize the necessary connections of the terms. ArndtVsLambert: Locke was not interested in an axiomatic system. He was interested in separating the realm of "real knowledge" (mathematics) from the empirical, in which the complex idea is based solely on the observable factual co-existence of qualities. In empiricism, no necessary connection can be observed! Locke I 62 Law of Nature/EuchnerVsDoctrine of the Law of Nature: Locke does not treat it systematically, otherwise he would have had to deal with the following problems: the world as an order of creation, to the legal order of political structures under the aspects of natural and human law, as well as the the legal position of the individual, to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason, and to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason. Reasons why the principles of natural law and morality are recognised as binding and followed. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Locke, J. | Avramides Vs Locke, J. | Avra I 2 Meaning/Locke: (Essay Concerning Human Understanding): words are signs for ideas. Communication/Locke: occurs when the words trigger the same ideas in the listener. I 3 Ideas/Locke: (empiricist): all result from experience. AvramidesVsLocke/GriceVsLocke: That raises the question of how we are to understand the significance (signification, meaning) which the ideas have themselves! Saying that they arise from experience is only brandishing in the direction in which we should look. Moreover: if ideas are to depend on the subject it is difficult to see how references to the ideas could be used to explain the universality (commonality) of language. Another problem: how the alleged significance of the ideas should be transferred from them to the statements. Saying that words are "external signs" suggests that words encode ideas. GriceVsLocke: that only describes the problem, instead of explaining it. (for example, Armstrong 1971) |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Luhmann, N. | Habermas Vs Luhmann, N. | I 426 Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies. I 430 HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment. I 431 Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life. Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true). I 434 HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself. I 435 Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that! I 437 HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution. I 438 HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events. I 441 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension. Luhmann II 136 Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness." II 141 HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice. II 165 System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action. AU Cass.12 HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Mach, E. | Putnam Vs Mach, E. | I (a) 42 PutnamVsMash: he does not provide evidence for his assertion that his construction of the world of "sensations" is compatible with amateurish and scientific language. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Markerese | Lewis Vs Markerese | IV 189/190 Semantic Markerese/Semantic Markers/LewisVsKatz: (after Jerrold Katz, Paul Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions (Cambridge, Mass. MIT, 1964). Semantic markers: are symbols, objects in an artificial language that we can call "semantic markerese". The semantic interpretation by this means merely leads to a translation algorithm from the object language into the Markerese help language! But then we can also know the markerese translation without knowing anything about the meaning of the original English sentence! Namely, without knowing the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics without truth conditions is not semantics! The translation into markerese depends either on our (future) competence as speakers of markerese or on our ability to apply semantics at least to markerese. But then translation into Latin would be just as sufficient if the semantics for markerese were perhaps also somewhat simpler. Markerese/Lewis: pro: is attractive because it only handles symbols. Finite combinations of familiar entities form a finite set of elements with finite applications of finite rules. No problem for ontological thriftiness. VsMarkerese: but it is precisely this pleasant finiteness that prevents the semantics of markerese from establishing relations between the symbols and the real world of non-symbols! So it's not real semantics. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Mates, B. | Cavell Vs Mates, B. | II 172 Cavell Thesis: Native speakers generally do not need any statements about what can be said in their language. They themselves are the source of such statements. MatesVs: intuition and memory regarding correct speaking. CavellVsMates: intuition is not even necessary. I do not need a memory of the lesson in which I learned something and no perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language, one speaks it. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Maxwell, G. | Quine Vs Maxwell, G. | II 212ff Maxwell thesis: that our knowledge of the outside world exists in a commonality of structure. Quine: important truth. Definition structure is what we retain when we encode information. --- II 213 The speech about material objects has no qualitative similarities between the objects and the inner state of the speaker, but only one type of coding and of course, causal relations. Maxwell has a theory of relative accessibility of the foreign-psychological with which I agree in a strange way. Quine: difference: I assume that between the knowledge of two individuals with regard to the same things exists a more substantial similarity, than between knowledge and things. But to that, to which our most secure knowledge relates to, is not the knowledge of other people, but publicly perceptible bodies. --- II 213 Knowledge/Quine: between knowledge of two people more substantive similarity than between person and thing (language, observation term has consensus inclination). --- II 213 Properties/Quine: can be emergent: (water) table smooth, brown, but not atoms, similar to "swarm" and "waging war": only for masses because of that not unreal or subjective. Observation Termini have consensus inclination, because they are learned through ostension. --- II 214 Therefore, I share not Maxwell's theoretical belief that "The outside world is not observable." Quine: On the contrary, as an observation scene, the outside world has had little competition. Maxwell denies the colors of the bodies, since they would be accumulations of submicroscopic particles. QuineVsMaxwell: water remains liter for liter of water, even if sub-microscopic particles are rather oxygen and hydrogen. And that has nothing paradoxical. As little paradoxical as that a table remains smooth and brown square inch for square inch, although its submicroscopic particles are discrete, swinging and colorless,. (> Emergence). Qualities: Quine: the qualities of wateriness, of the smoothness and the "being brown" are similar to the properties of swarming and of waging war. They correspond exclusively to masses as properties. Thus they are not getting unreal or subjective. It is not necessary that a predicate is true for each part of the things to which it applies. Finally, not even a figure predicate would stand the test. That specifically wateriness, smoothness and "being brown" are similar in this regard to "being square" (one corner alone is not square) and to the swarming. This is a modern knowledge, it is not a contradiction. QuineVsMaxwell: he reified without questioning the sense data, Humean sensations, floating spots of color. If one attaches the color to a subjective "curtain", there is nothing else than to leave the bodies colorless. Quine pro Maxwell: We agree that bodies and our knowledge of them are not linked by common properties with each other, but only structurally and causally. --- II 214 Knowledge: structurally and causally related to the object, not by similarity. The curtain comes from the time when the philosophy wanted to be closer to the objects than the natural science, and when it claimed, to just pull those curtains aside. --- II 215 Quine: this and not behaviorism is the exaggerated empiricism which must be expelled. Neurath: Philosophy and Science are in the same boat. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| McDowell, J. | Esfeld Vs McDowell, J. | I 185 Social Practice/Esfeld: so far it does not include any rational restriction by the world on our beliefs. (>McDowell). EsfeldVsMcDowell: to reject this, we must first show how the social practices that determine the conceptual content respond to the world. I 188 Rule Following/EsfeldVsMcDowell: even if the realm of the conceptual is unlimited, we are confronted with the problem of rule following. How can beliefs have content? I 189 We therefore need social practices in any case, even if the conceptual realm is unlimited. We should try to conceive rational limitation ((s) correction, control, "responsibility to the world") within social practices, instead of granting a conceptual status to the physical world itself. Social holism is sufficient for this. The world exerts a restriction on our practices which is not only causal but also rational. This is necessary to ensure that those whose content consists in inferential relationships are beliefs whose truth value depends on the world. This would then also prevent the objection that not only language but also the content of our belief is conventional. Esfeld: Thesis: the physical world is not part of the conceptual content of our states of belief. But it is part of the social practices in which this content is determined. Group: BrandomVsMcDowell: (1998a, also 1994 473 476,875 876, (with Sellars and Davidson) |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| McDowell, J. | Rorty Vs McDowell, J. | I 111 McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. >Space of reason, >space of nature. VI 201 McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly. RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory). VI 203 Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor. VI 204 "Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all. RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary. VI 208 RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts: 1. "Crass naturalism" 2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom" Vi 210 Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning." >Second nature. VI 211 RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"! Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of law each are sui generis. RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it. With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes. VI 212 Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms. Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech! McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of "memorizing facts". RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric. VI 214 RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us. VI 215 Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one. VI 217 "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature". VI 216 VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons." VI 219 Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this. >Scheme/Content. James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| McDowell, J. | Schiffer Vs McDowell, J. | I 204 SchifferVsDavidson/SchifferVsMcDowell/SchifferVsEvans: thesis: a translation theory is possible for the Radical Interpretation (RI). compositionality/Schiffer: problem: If Davidson is right, and we first need a theory of meaning for our own language for the RI, then our language must have a compositional semantics. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| McGee, V. | Field Vs McGee, V. | II 351 Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism. II 352 in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory. (ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it. Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number. Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated. McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity. Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification). Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation. Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?. "Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy. McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise. FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy. "Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!. Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!. All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate. Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything. II 353 McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: (*) We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of F. ((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown). Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification. FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept. FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range. Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself). FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh (*) is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here. FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!. II 355 Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts. McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it. FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end). Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics. McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly. Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models". McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number". Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models. FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language. Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong). FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number". Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help. Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension. II 356 Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic. FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here). Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition. FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy. FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meinong, A. | Meixner Vs Meinong, A. | I 62 Round Square/Description/Meinong/Meixner: the Meinongian does not say that the round square exists, he goes even further and says that it cannot exist at all, he insists only that it is an entity. I 63 MeinongVsRussell: if the description "the golden mountain" designates an incomplete individual, then probably also the following description is exactly the same: "the existing golden mountain". MeixnerVsMeinong: not very convincing. However: "Weak Sense"/Existence: like Holmes, you can say in the weak sense, "it has the property F to exist". But that is not the strong sense. Possibilia/Meixner: individual-like entities that are at least in principle able to exist. ((s) So not a round square). Question: Is there such a thing? That would be exactly the ee maximum consistent individuals. The impossible are not ee maximum consistent. Maximum consistent individuals: e.g. Meixner, Bush, (sets of properties). Pure Posssibilia: only possible individuals. Are there any? Language: interestingly, has no names for pure Possibilia! I 64 Nevertheless, there is some ontological evidence of the presence of pure possibilia: It is clear that some individuals are actual, but could not have been actual (e.g. humans). Meixner: Thesis: the reverse assumption, that some are not actual but could have been actual, naturally occurs next to this fact. Meixner: certain actual individuals refer to non-actual ones: egg and sperm cells from which a human never emerges. Should we now say here that it merely seems as if it refers to a possible human being, and that at the other end there is no reference relationship (reference). Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the merely possible human does not have certain qualities, e.g. an exact date of birth, (i.e. he does not have them in the real (actual) world, but nevertheless he has the negation of these qualities. Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the predisposition for blue eyes (the egg and sperm cells) leave nothing to be desired in positive determination! Def maximum consistent/Meixner: of every individual characteristic the individual contains either this or his negation. ((s) > continuous determination/Kant). Pure Possibilia/Meixner: this applies to merely possible. The individual is, so to speak, nothing other than this set of properties (see above). |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Mentalesese | Churchland Vs Mentalesese | I Lanz 303 ChurchlandVsMentalese: ad b): VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not good at languages. So because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors one must assume a large number of non-voice-analog cognitive processes even in people. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Mentalesese | Dennett Vs Mentalesese | II 177 Mentalese/Dennett: most of what has been written about the possibility of a "thought language" presupposes that we think in a written thought language (thought language, Mentalese). (DennettVsMentalese). Münch III 375 DennettVsAdaptionism: is, like mentalism, at risk of building the entire building from the ground up. Theory/Dennett: Adaptionismus and mentalism are no theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and to ask nature questions. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mentalesese | Peacocke Vs Mentalesese | I 212 PeacockeVsMentalese: E.g. Suppose a creature whose brain is composed of layers of spatially organized "maps": here you do not need Mentalese, either. Disjunction/Belief/Peacocke: could be realized as something that can be explained with the theory of circuits. Then there could be a third state, that would be equivalent to the acceptance of both alternatives. [Fa or Gb]. (>circuit algebra). There might be reasons to believe the whole disjunction without reasons for one side alone! Our model also allows to explain why a person does not always draw the disjunctive consequences of their beliefs! It is possible that a component of S Fa is not always present. "Not always present" means that the component can be implemented quite differently. It could be a concentration of substance in an set of neurons or a question of the distribution in them. Deduction/Mentalese/Peacocke: because of the single requirement that it must take care of analog syntactic structures of the lines, the thesis of Mentalese is obvious. I 213 Vs: but it is not true that it is indispensable. A physical unit could register that the state S Fa v Gb is a disjunction, because it is suitably connected to two belief states. One side could be negated. (e.g., S ~Gb), then the unit could cause the system to go into the state S Fa. In this case, no information about the contents of either of the two sides is required! There is only the modus tollendo ponens. PeacockeVsMentalese: therefore, we can ask in any situation where the language of the brain seems indispensable at first glance: can supposed syntactic operations be replaced by relational operations? If so, we do not need the thesis of Mentalese. Mentalese/Peacocke: as far as I know none of the proponents asserts that except for an assumed Mentalese sentence S that is supposed to be stored if a subject believes that p, also another Mentalese sentence S' is to stored, which means: "I believe that p." ((s) recourse). It is generally believed that it is sufficient for belief that a stored sentence is based on perception, other states and behavior appropriately. Peacocke: but that is exactly my replacement tactics. (Relations instead of syntax). I 213/214 Replacement Tactics/Peacocke: can also be used to show how actions can easily be explained by states with content. Mentalese would have to adopt an additional translation module. Peacocke: an intention that Gb may partly have its propositional content by the fact that the corresponding action is determined by the fact that the subject is in the unstructured state S Gb which has its contents by its relations to other states. This also applies to the practical inferring: ((s) "content from relations rather than language.") The relational model seems to conceive Mentalese as a special case among itself. I 215 Computation/PeacockeVsMentalese: if we can be in mental states with content (by relations), without having to store sentences, then there can also be computation without internal brain language. Because Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessarily apply: "No representation, no computation". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Mentalism | Quine Vs Mentalism | V 57 Definition mentalism/(s): Speech of internal entities that should correspond to words or ideas, or ideas as internal objects themselves. QuineVsMentalism. Quine: mentalism has strong echoes of introspection. Introspection/Quine: one must not confuse mentalist speech with clarity and be lured into a dream world of introspection. --- V 57/58 Imagination/tradition/Quine: Problem: E.g. whether one could imagine a number that would be at the same time even and odd. Imagination/Quine: Solution: If one conceives mental images as hypothetical nerve states there are no such problems. With respect to a nerve state one must not tie oneself down to e.g. the number of spots on a chicken. --- V 96 Timeless sentence/QuineVsMentalism: one has been deceived for a long time about the difficulties with its semantics ((s) Because one adopted internal objects as truth guarantors.) Solution/Quine: one has to retrace language learning. --- VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: their prerequisite is that people perceive that others perceive something. It is now, however, the temptation to overstretch the mentalist speech. Similar to the explanation of the meaning of life by final causes. Purpose is a psychological projection from the introspection, perhaps the modality of possibility is nothing more than a depersonalized projection of a subjective feeling. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Metalanguage | Prior Vs Metalanguage | I 100 Metalanguage/Prior: must contain: a) a systematic method for naming sentences b) a translation of every sentence of the given language. Easiest method for b): the object language should be part of the metalanguage (!), then its sentences are their own translation. Truth Definition/Tarski/Prior: general form: x is true iff. p "x": represents the name in the metalanguage. "p": represents the translation. Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski/PriorVsMetalanguage: in our own system, we do not need any metalanguage. That gives us certain ways of self-reference that are not provided in Tarski. In Tarski, no sentence can say anything about its own truth, nor about other sentences of the object language. Prior: with us it is possible under favorable circumstances that people think, speak or fear about the truth or falsity of their speech, thinking, fearing, etc. This then also counts among the things that he thinks, fears, etc. ((s) absurd: someone would have to fear something, but not that the corresponding sentence is true, because that is not part of the object language.) Prior: but that is a difference with Tarski, not a conflict with his theory. Because we do not use "true" and "false" in his sense. We have only roughly outlined such a language and said nothing about the means it may have to refer to its own sentences. I 144 Belief/Relation/Theory/Prior: the second theory we are considering says that a relation only comes about if the believer infallibly knows that the object exists: Russell: knowledge by acquaintance. Names/Russell: mainly resorts to Mill. Names/Mill: a) singular ones b) general ones each α. "connotative ones", β. not connotative ones. General names: nouns and adjectives all connotative. PriorVsMill: better "apply to" than "denote". Meaning/Names/Mill: the objects attribute nothing to meaning! We can understand a name in principle without knowing the object. (However, with reductions with e.g. "red"). But here the meaning is not changed either when the word is applied to different things. I 145 Thus a noun or adjective retains its meaning even when it is applied to non-existent things. Understanding/Mill: to understand a word we need to know which attributes a thing must have so that a word can be applied to it. Connotation/Mill: are the attributes that fix the meaning of the noun or adjective by determining whether the noun or adjective can be applied to a thing. Singular Term/Mill: may be connotative, but not necessarily. Proper Names/Mill: meaningless signs. We may have information previously, and the name may invoke it, but it does not carry it. Prior: his Platonist "attributes" are not essential to his theory. Information/Connotation/Mill: connotative expressions bring information with them. Noun/Predicate/Verb/Peirce: nouns and adjectives might be banned from the language. There is nothing that could not be accomplished better and less ambiguous by verbs. Denote/Peirce: nouns, verbs and adjectives have in common that they do not denote, but are merely applied to objects. The word "chair" is applied to x if x is a chair, and accordingly to white if x is white, or the verb "smokes" if x smokes. Noun and Adjective: are always implicit parts of verbs! E.g. "every man runs': I 146 here "man" is not explicitly part of "is a man", but the verb "to be a man", "is a man" is implicit. Reason: "Whatever is a man runs". E.g. adjective: "X is a bad person": "bad" is not explicitly part of the verb "is bad", but implicitly: "X is bad and is a person". Connotative Names: we might say they are not names at all, but "predicative". Connotation/Mill: E.g. "The Chimborazo is white": subject: not connotative, predicate: connotative. The individual thing denoted by the subject has the attributes connoted by the predicate. E.g. "All men are mortal": both connotative: whatever has the attributes connoted by the subject, also has those connoted by the predicate. Point: in both cases, the analysis shifts the connotative expression to the predicate position. (>Verbs). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Metalanguage | Tugendhat Vs Metalanguage | I 326 Metalanguage/Tugendhat: in the usual meta language semantics, the definition of truth for a predicative assertion is roughly the same: I 327 It is true if the singular term is an element of the class for which the predicate stands. The name of the object is then given in the meta language. (List with combinations). TugendhatVsMetalanguage: unsatisfactory. 1. Relapse into object-theoretical position. (That a sentence must correspond to a state of affairs). I 328 2. Also assumes that you already understand what a class is. 3. The metalanguage also presupposes that you already understand the corresponding expression of another language. 4. Predicate and singular term are not explained as complementary expressions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Metalanguage | Wittgenstein Vs Metalanguage | VI 78 Figure/sentence/Wittgenstein/Schulte: In the sentence must be distinguished just as much as to the situation that it represents. (4:04). (Mathematical, logic manifold). --- VI 79 This mathematical multiplicity cannot be reproduced again. One cannot escape it during reproduction. (4041). (WittgensteinVsRussell, WittgensteinVsType theory, WittgensteinVsMetalanguage). The logical element - which gives the image the multiplicity - cannot be the subject itself of an image. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Metaphysical Realism | Maturana Vs Metaphysical Realism | I 223 Objectivity without Brackets/Maturana: neglects the distinction between perception and illusion. Here the observer cannot explain language and perception, because according to this perspective he can refer to the independent. However, this contradicts the structural determinism of living systems. Cannot explain scientific explanations, because here the abilities of the observer are presupposed as general and given. ((s) MaturanaVsMetaphysical Realism). |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Metaphysical Realism | Putnam Vs Metaphysical Realism | VI 390 Truth/metaphysical realism/Putnam: thesis: truth is not radically epistemic. Because we could all be brains in a vat, even the most beautiful and most ideal, simplest and most conservative theory could be wrong. Verification/metaphysical realism: then "verified" implies not "true". Peircean Realism/Putnam: thesis: there is an ideal theory (weaker: than a regulative idea that is presupposed by the terms "true" and "objective"). PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: I criticize precisely the characteristic that distinguishes it from Peirce's realism. E.g. T1: is an ideal theory as we understand it. We imagine that it has any property except for objective truth; e.g. it is complete, consistent, predicts observations accurately (as we see and meets all "operational restrictions", it is "beautiful", "simple", etc. Putnam: thesis: T1 may still be wrong. E.g. WORLD/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Suppose, it can be divided into an infinite number of parts. And T1 says that there are infinitely many parts in it, so that it is "objectively correct" in this regard. T1: is consistent (by hypothesis) and has only finite models. Completeness Theorem: according to it, T1 has a model for every infinite cardinality. M: is a model with the same cardinality as the WORLD. (This is finite.) The particulars of M are mapped one to one to the parts of the WORLD. We use this mapping to define the relations of M directly in the WORLD. SAT: is then the result of it: a fulfillment relationship, a "correspondence" between the terms of L and sets of parts of the WORLD. ((s) sets because of the predicates). Truth: the theory results then in "true" when we interpret "true" as "TRUE(SAT)". (I 403 thereby SAT is of the same logical type as "satisfied" and TRUE(SAT) is defined in terms of SAT like "true" is defined in terms of "satisfied" with Tarski). VI 391 TRUE(SAT): is then the property of the truth, determined by the relation SAT. ideal theory: Question: what becomes of the claim that even the ideal theory could be wrong" in reality"? Solution: It may be that SAT is not the intended correspondence relation (unintended model). "Intended"/Putnam: what does it mean in this case? T1 meets all operational limitations. E.g. if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" belongs to T1, VI 392 then that will naturally appear true when there is a cow in front of me. But SAT is a true interpretation of T. Definition operational conditions/Putnam/(s): that a sentence can be falsified if the object does not have the properties that the sentence attributes to it. T1 is TRUE(SAT). Thus, the sentence is "true" in this sense, in the sense of TRUE(SAT). On the other hand: if "there is a cow in front of me at this and this point of time" is operationally "wrong" (falsified), then the sentence is FALSE(/ SAT). Reference: thus, it meets the "operational conditions". theoretical conditions: the interpretation of "reference" as SAT meets all theoretical conditions for reference. N.B.: so the "ideal" theory T1 becomes true. ((s) Problem: We wanted to ask how it can be wrong according to the metaphysical realism). unintended: question: what additional conditions are there for reference, that could SAT pick out as "unintended" and a different interpretation as intended? Putnam: thesis, the assumption that even an "ideal" theory could be wrong "in reality", should then be incomprehensible. Causal theory/reference/metaphysical realism/Putnam: a causal theory of reference would not help here, because how "cause" should clearly refer, is, according to the metaphysical realism, as much a mystery as "cow" can clearly refer. VI 393 Reference/anti-realism/verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/anti-realism/Dummett: thesis, the theory of understanding should be operated in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (for example, sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses truth-conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence is to know what would be its verification. Analogy: for the intuitionism: knowing the constructive proof, is to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility condition/assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam. N.B.: we say the sentence is verified when it is pronounced > Firth: Definition self-affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirmative. It is thus verified when it is pronounced. This does not mean that it is incorrigible. It also does not have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: thesis: in this sense (the "self-affirmation of observation sentences" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". VI 394 N.B.: thereby, the realistic terms of truth and falsity are not used. N.B.: the problem how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise. Because the term "reference" is not used. Reference: can we introduce it à la Tarski, but then ""cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and understanding this sentence needs no metaphysical realism. Facts/verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: one should not operate the verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither the one of sense data). Otherwise you could repeat all objections VsMetaphysical Realism on the level that the meta language gets incomprehensible (which would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein's private language argument). (?). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply the verificationism also in the meta language and the meta-meta language etc. Understanding/truth condition/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible vice-versa in what this knowledge should be. Meaning/meaning theory/PutnamVsDummett: but I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (with a theory of reference, not meaning theory). Realism/Putnam: then it is not wrong per se, but only the metaphysical, which was just a picture anyway. (So you could say at least). Solution: Internal realism is all we need. Problem: that is not the whole story: Peirce: the metaphysical realism collapses at a certain point, and this point tells us something, because it is precisely this point at which the metaphysical realism claims to be distinguishable from Peirce's realism . (That is, from the proposition that there is an ideal theory). PeirceVsMetaphysical realism/PutnamVsPeirce: is mistaken when he says that the metaphysical realism collapses at this exact spot. And I, myself, was already wrong in this point. > E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism/PutnamVsPeirce: the metaphysical realism is incoherent elsewhere: E.g. Suppose, the WORLD is merely a straight line. Then you can tell 2 stories about the WORLD: Story 1: there are points. That is, the line has segments which can be infinitely small. The same relation "part of" is valid between points and segments that contain it VI 396 and between segments and large segments. Story 2: there are no points. Line and all segments have expansion. Thus, it is not claimed that story 1 would be wrong, points are simple logical constructions of segments. Speech about points is derived from speech about segments. VI 397 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Problem: when you cannot say how the WORLD theory is independent, the speech of all these descriptions will be empty. Putnam: Quine says that in "Ontological Relativity". E.g. Theory: if we have a complete theory, we can define an equivalence relation (AER): "provable co-extensiveness", with the property that if two terms belong to different equivalence classes (Aeki), no model of the theory refers to the referent, while, if they belong to the same equivalence class, they have the same referent in each model. We take advantage of that. Now, if our view is correct, VI 399 then there is a unique reference maintaining "translation", which connects the two languages. Problem: it is known that there are often not equivalent interpretations of a theory within another theory. Story 1 can be interpreted in Story 2, namely in many different ways. E.g. "points" can be understood as sets of segments with negative power of two. Or sets of segments whose lengths are negative powers of 3. VsMetaphysical Realism/problem: if that was so, there ought to be a fact about which translation "really" contains the reference. Putnam: now we can make the picture again more complicated in order to also address the second objection: we allow that the language has more than one way, how it can be applied to the WORLD. (> way of use). Problem: we can no longer hold onto the image itself. If that, what is a unique set of things within a correct theory, could be "in reality" no definite set, then we have no picture anymore. Internal realism/Putnam: why is it not refuted by all of these? VsInternal Realism: E.g. he might ask, "how do you know that "cow" refers to cows"? After all, there are other interpretations of the language as a whole, which would make an ideal theory true (in your language). VsVs: E.g. Suppose, God gave us the set of all true propositions. That would be the "perfect" theory. Problem: there would still be infinitely many possible interpretations of this perfect theory, which would meet all operational and theoretical conditions. Even the sentence ""cow" refers to cows" would be true in all these interpretations. How do you know then, that it is true in this sense of "true" that there is a unique "intended" interpretation? "How do you know that "cow" refers to cows in the sense of reference to a certain set of things as opposed to a certain set of things in each accessible interpretation?" Putnam: that is precisely the objection of Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism, but now in the reverse direction. Reference/internal RealismVsVs: that "cow" refers to cows, follows directly from the definition of reference. It would even be true if the internal realism would be wrong. Relative to the theory, it is a logical truth. not revisable: but it is not absolutely unrevisable that "cow" refers to cows, but to revise it you would have to reject the whole theory. Metaphysical RealismVs: The question is therefore not answered: ""cow" refers to cows" is certainly analytically relative to the theory, but it is about how the theory is understood. That "cow" refers to cows is true in all accessible interpretations, but that was not the question. VI 401 Internal RealismVsMetaphysical Realism/Putnam: the metaphysical realism makes it a mystery how there can be truths a priori, even in the contextual sense, even as a limiting case. An a priori truth must be given by a mysterious intuition. Even E.g. "bachelors are unmarried" would only be a priori due to an intuition. But if it is a "verbal" truth ((s)> "analytical", true because of the meaning of the words) then this is an abbreviation for E.g. "All unmarried men are unmarried. And that is an instance of "all AB are A". And why is that true? VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism is doomed to a) consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believed, myself) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or b) he must see the logic as a priori in the sense, which cannot be explained by the term of convention. --- Field IV 414 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: (Reason, Truth and History pp 135f, 142f, 210f): Thesis metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. And this leads to relativism and the relativism refutes itself. --- VII 440 Theory Change/truth value/Putnam: not every sentence changes the truth value when it changes from an acceptable theory in another acceptable theory. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: but to set off an image, it suffices to show that his project of a complete description of the world without such sentences that change truth values, is impracticable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Dummett Vs Metaphysics | Horwich I 463 Metaphysics/Frege: the only solution for disagreement here is semantic ascent. Dummett: pro: Rorty: we can go further and prohibit language philosophy to re-establish the alleged contrast between "objective reality" and "useful fictions". DavidsonVsOntological Commitment/DavidsonVsMetaphysics/DavidsonVsQuine: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics. They belong to the duality scheme/content. (1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysics | Field Vs Metaphysics | II 216 Gavagai/FieldVsMetalanguage: Although it is psychologically easier to understand sentences like (10) as formulated in an unambiguous (determinate) ML, but they are just as understandable and have the same truth conditions if the metalanguage is indeterminate: (10) "rabbit" partially signifies the set of rabbits and partially the set of unseparated parts of rabbits. II 385 Metaphysics/FieldVsMetaphysics: I have nothing against "metaphysical restrictions", only that they should rather be called semantic restrictions. They are only demands relating to the meaning of "epistemic goal" or "belief". And here you can demand what you want. If someone has goals that my demand does not meet, why should he bother about whether I call his goals "epistemic" or his mental states "belief"? I doubt that the goals and beliefs of the people differ so radically, but otherwise they could also be called "shmepistemic" and "shmelief". But if these do not exist, it has nothing to do with "metaphysical limitations". Richard Jeffrey: "the fact that it is allowed to wear knight’s armor in buses does not mean that they are full of it." (1983, 145). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mill, J. St. | Searle Vs Mill, J. St. | V 144 SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names were "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Proper names. V 247 Names/SearleVsMill: (Mill: proper names have no sense). E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma can be used to make geographical, not only lexicographical assertions. Had proper names however no sense, no information could be transmitted by that! Then there were no more information than in the sentence Everest = Everest. (This is Frege's argument against Mill). Stalnaker I 181 SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969 (1)) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference" without intermediary sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his view of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and it's properties. >Reference. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt, real or alleged characteristics to transmit a language to the world. ((s)> also Kant like Searle). Searle: you cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him. Stalnaker: there can be no good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 163ff |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Mill, J. St. | Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St. | I 349 Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative". Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute. Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself." TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself. His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object. I 350 Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves. It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation. I 352 Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially. I 353 Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense. I 354 TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense. 2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart. I 355 However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Proxy/Tugendhat). I 356 3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty-Dumpty Theory). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Millikan, R. | Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 90 Sentence/Belief/Language/Thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop speaking or uttering sentences with meaning. But why is that clear? We need another explanation (see below). Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typical intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has to a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process. N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle). ((s) Intentionality/Millikan/(s): must then no longer refer to the mental.) VsMillikan: one could argue that intentionality must be connected with the mental, because the analysis of the intentionality of thoughts or inner representations must at least take place in accordance with principles according to which consciousness and the mental itself must be analyzed. Relation/VsMillikan: the relations offered by Millikan are merely external. At best, they correlate changes in consciousness with changes in the external world. They themselves lie outside the mind and outside consciousness. Consciousness/Tradition: but be a consciousness of the world, not merely consciousness of the changes of itself. I 91 Tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: what kind of experience of intentionality should this be? What kind of power should this argument have? The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We would then also have to have an immediate understanding. It would also have to assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot only consist of external relations to the outer world, and these are necessary for nature. MillikanVsVs: suppose we reject this epistemic rationalistic picture, i.e. we deny that there is "something epistemically given". Then we could admit that sometimes people are aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (consciousness, awareness) I 92 does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: even consciousness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent about consciousness. N.B./Millikan: this is disturbing because it follows (negative thesis) that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: ditto). I.e. nothing is guaranteed from the act of consciousness itself. Rationalism/rationalist/intentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to one dead end after the other. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Model Theory | Wittgenstein Vs Model Theory | Hintikka I 38/39 Model Theory/VsModelltheorie/QuineVsModelltheorie/WittgensteinVsModelltheorie/FregeVsModelltheorie/RussellVsModeltheory/Hintikka: from deep theoretical reasons: they represented the thesis of language as a universal medium (> inexpressibility of semantics) - that is, we cannot stand outside the language. Inconceivable that the semantic relations would be different than they are - hence the model theory is impossible - in particular, we cannot change the scope of quantifiers - opposite position: language as calculus - Terence Parsons - Hintikka. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Montague, R. | Dummett Vs Montague, R. | Dummett I 176 Schulte: Frege sometimes talks of an "ideal language". Frege: scientific language: without demonstratives and indicators. Do you think that what Geach once called the "Hollywood-semantics" (Montague) could come close to that? Dummett: No, that s probably not the same direction. The program is based on Frege s idea though, but differs but very much. (DummettVsMontague). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Montague, R. | Lewis Vs Montague, R. | I 10 Experience: not identical to the property that one assigns to someone by saying that they have this experience. >Experience/Lewis. Experience: the state that has a certain defining causal role. >Causal Role/Lewis, >Events/Lewis. Property: the property of being in this state. For example, pain is not the same as the property of having pain! "Pain" is a contingent name, which means it has different denotations in different possible worlds. (Non-rigid). >Rigidity. "The ability to have pain," on the other hand, is a non-contingent name. (Rigid, the same in every possible world).( I 11 + MontagueVsLewis,LewisVsMontague). V 37 Def Determinism/Possible Worlds/Lewis: if two possible worlds obey the laws perfectly, then they are either exactly equal throughout the whole time or in no two periods of time. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of nature are deterministic. My definition of determinism stems from Montague, but deviates from him in two points: LewisVsMontague: 1. I avoid his mathematical construction of ersatz worlds ((s) elsewhere: = sets of sentences). 2. I temporarily take equality of worlds as a simple relation. Instead, Montague takes the relation of having the same complete description in a particular language as a basic relation, which he leaves unspecific. My definition assumes that we can identify different periods of time from one world to another. V 246 Def Event/Richard/Montague/Lewis: (1969) certain properties of time. The event occurs at a certain time in a certain possible world if and only if the event belongs to the world and the time. This means that the event is identified by the property of being a time when the event occurs. LewisVsMontague: I think my approach has two minor advantages: 1. in the theory of relativity it is not always clear what time is, 2. Suppose a Montague event happens at a certain time in a certain possible world, then we have to find the place first. With my approach, the region is given immediately. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Montague, R. | Verschiedene Vs Montague, R. | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 33 Quantifier-free/logical form/everyday language/Hilbert/Epsilon operator/Epsilon analysis/Heusinger: Epsilon expressions: make quantifiers superfluous: instead (complex) epsilon terms. Raise/VsMontague/Heusinger: the general increase of all NP as with Montague can then be dispensed with! (Hintikka 1976). Functor/Argument/Operator/Heusinger: the functor-argument structure can also be found in the grammatical structure. Range/Heusinger: also the dependence on expressions does not have to be represented by interaction of the range. |
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| Montague, R. | Hintikka Vs Montague, R. | II 97 Quantifier/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of his treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are connected to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond on a one-to-one basis to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. I.e. the semantic rules work from inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: E.g. "a girl", E.g. "every man". II 98 Behave semantically like singular terms. I.e. E.g. "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is the basis of the possible worlds semantics. (It is a generalization of Carnap’s approach). ad (ii) is a form of Frege’s principle (compositionality). ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica(1). Individuals Domain/Possible World/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: this is precisely what leads to problems. In particular, in belief contexts. Individual/Montague: individuals are the range of functions that operate as a sense of a singular term. Belief Context/Opaque Context/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague dedicates no special treatment to contexts with propositional attitudes (attitude contexts). E.g. "knowing who", E.g. "remembering where," E.g. "seeing what". This is a deficiency, because Montague had admitted his interest in propositional attitudes. W-Questions/Who/What/Where/Hintikka: Thesis: are nothing more than quantified phrases. II 99 logical form: (1) John knows who the prime minister of Norway is analyzed as a that-construction: (2) (e.g.) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto) Problem: you have to specify the individuals domain over which the variable "x" goes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka). de re: (de re interpretation of (1)): (3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway & (Ey) John knows that (x = y)) De Re/De Dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2). ((s) Because otherwise omniscience would follow again). Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not need to analyze it here as the relation to the alternatives, which singles out one and the same individual in each possible world compatible with the knowledge. HintikkaVsMontague: problem: all this does not work in the context of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of Montague semantics, which we are considering here, the following sentences are all valid: (4) ((x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z))) II 100 Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows of every currently existing individual who that is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z))) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose identity is known to John who this individual is (again de re). Problem: both are blatantly false. Non-Existence/Hintikka: However, that is not a problem as long as we do not need to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds. Hintikka: Problem: but that does not change the problem. Possible Non-Existence/Hintikka: we do not allow it here, i.e. every individual is somehow linked to one or another individual in every possible world. Terminology/Kaplan/Hintikka: "TWA" "Transworld Heir Line" ((s) same pronunciation) world line that links an individual between possible worlds. Individual: it follows that every individual is well-defined in all possible worlds. This means that the sentences (4) and (5) are valid in our extension of Montague semantics. TWA/World Line//Hintikka: therefore, we must also allow the world lines to break off somewhere and not to be continued ad libitum. Non-Existence/Intensional Logic/Montague: according to Montague’s thesis we need not worry about possible non-existence. For one and the same individual occurs in every possible world as a possible denotation of the same name (name phrase). ((s) Because the individuals domain remains constant). HintikkaVsMontague: that is precisely why our criticism applies to Montague. Non-Existence/Montague Semantics/Hintikka: how can his semantics be modified to allow for possible non-existence in some possible worlds?. II 101 Important argument: Knowing-Who/Knowledge/Hintikka: for John to be able to know who Homer was, it is not necessary that his knowledge excludes all possible worlds in which Homer does not exist. Quantification/Opaque Context/Belief Context/Hintikka: therefor,e we need not assume with the quantification in intensional contexts that a world line exists that connects an existing individual in all knowledge worlds accessible to John. Solution: All we need is that we can say for each of these possible worlds whether the individual exists there or not. ((s) I.e. we do not allow any possible worlds in which the question of the existence or non-existence is meaningless.) E.g. I.e. in this example we only have to exclude those worlds for John, in which it is unclear whether Homer exists or not. World Line/Hintikka: this shows that world lines are independent of the question of the possible non-existence. Quantification/Intensional Contexts/Epistemic/Hintikka: i.e. an existence theorem with quantification in an epistemic (opaque) context E.g. (6) (e.g.) John knows that F(x) can be true, even if there is no world line that singles out an existing individual x in any knowledge world of John. Important argument: but it must always make sense to ask whether the individual exists in a possible world or not. Non-Existence/Hintikka: So there are two possible ways of failure of existence: a) non-existence b) Non-well-definedness (i.e. it does no longer make sense to ask whether an individual exists). World Line: breaks off in both cases, but there is a difference. TWA: can only be drawn if there is comparability between possible worlds, and that is no longer the case in b). II 102 Comparability/Hintikka: always needs regularity (continuity). E.g. spatiotemporal continuity. HintikkaVsMontague: with this distinction we move away from his oversimplified semantics with constant individuals domain. W-Questions/Non-Existence/Hintikka: Variant: Problem: (7) John knows that Homer did not exist. I.e. in every epistemically possible world of John Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask about the existence. Uniqueness/Existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between existence and uniqueness (determinacy) of an individual. Non-Existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the identity of the individual unknown. ((s) otherwise the question would not make sense). II 103 Non-Existence/Not Well Defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague semantics does not allow the question of the existence or non-existence to be pointless, because an individual in a possible world is not well defined. ((s) Because the individuals domain is assumed to be consistent in Montague). Individuals Domain/Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow the domain of individuals to be inconsistent. But problem: Quantification/Belief Context/Existence/Truth/Hintikka: In the following example, we must presuppose existence, so that the sentence can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is, too. ((s) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural interpretation of (11) it must be assumed that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a longer range than "is looking for". ((s) I.e. both are looking for the same unicorn. Problem: how can you know whether both subjects believe in the same individual or have it in their heads?) ((s) >Geach E.g. „Hob, Cob, Nob, Hob/Cob/Nob E.g. (Geach 1967, 628) Cresswell. II 142 (Needs quantifier that is simultaneoulsy inside and outside the range of the attitude verb). Hob/Conb/Nob-E.g./Geach/(s): ~Hob believes that a witch killed his sow and Nob believes that it is the same witch who bewitched Cob’s horse: problem: the sentence must be true in order to preserve the ordinary language meaning of "believe". On the other hand, it must be wrong, because there are no witches, exacerbation: "the same witch" poses an additional condition to the truth of the sentence. The demanded identity makes it harder to simply say that the three believe something wrong). II 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless, example (11) shows that the reading should not oblige us to assume the existence of unicorns. Non-Existence/Epistemic Context/Intensional/Belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can seek the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some possible worlds. For this purpose, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: in more complex sentence, all the problems resurface: II 104 E.g. John does not know if unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn, because Mary is looking for one. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a particular unicorn. (because otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true) although he is considering possible non-existence. World Line/Hintikka: to expand the Montague semantics we have to allow more or less unnatural world lines. HintikkaVsMontague: according to his semantics all sentences of the following form would be valid: (8) John knows that (Ex) (x = a) > (Ex) John knows that 0 (x = a) ((s) i.e. conclusion from de dicto to de re.) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows the reference of a name immediately if he knows that the name is not empty. That is, of course, often wrong. World Line/Hintikka: therefore, the world lines cannot be identical with lines that connect names with their references. ((s) Otherwise again a kind of omniscience would follow. Moreover, it implies that names are non-rigid.) Species/Common Noun/Hintikka: the same applies to common names (generic names): They cannot identify the same individuals in all possible worlds, otherwise sentences like the following could not be analyze in the possible worlds semantics: E.g. (9) John holds this bush for a bear. Perception Concepts/Perception/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsMontague: here there are further problems: E.g. all sentences of the following form become contradictory accoridng to Montague semantics: (10) (Ex)(Ey)(x = y & it appears to John visually that x is right of y). I 105 SIolution: It may well be that John sees an object as two. World Line: can split or merge. But according to Montague semantics they are not allowed to! World Line/Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there were two sets of world-lines for one set of possible worlds, these also connected every individual with an individual in another possible world, but the two sets differed in which individual is connected with which. Perception: we need such a possibility for perception verbs ((s) because it may be that you confuse one object with another. Elegance/Theory/Cantor/Hintikka: elegance is something for taylors, not for mathematicians. II 106 Quantification/Quantifiers/Ambiguity/Any/HintikkaVsMontague: All in all, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity is caused by the interaction of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: only explains why certain expressions may be ambiguous, but not which of them actually are. In general, he predicts too many ambiguities. Because he does not consider the grammatical principles that often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Range/Hintikka: determines the logical sequence. Quantifier/Quantification/Each/He/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he exerts himself, he will be happy (15) If everyone exerts themselves, they will be happy. Problem: in English "if" has precedence over "every" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: So we need additional rules for the order of the application of rules. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Montague, R. | Wiggins Vs Montague, R. | II 312 Modal Logic/Lemmon: System S0.5 (1959)(1): excludes: necessarily ((necessarily p) > p). Thus it does not have the self enclosing properties of stronger systems. Used by Montague. WigginsVsMontague: he also ignores the real possibility that modal logic might end up being forced to recognize a hierarchy of languages to avoid paradoxes. Meta Language/Wiggins: our intuitions about "necessary" are beyond the boundary of what marks Lemmon's system S0.5. And this is also the reason why I still have to be discouraged from reading "necessary" in a meta-linguistic way de dicto, namely as a predicate of sentences that has a broader meaning than provable. 1. J. Lemmon, "Is there only one correct system of modal logic"Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. xxxiii (1959), 31 |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Montague, R. | Stalnaker Vs Montague, R. | II 35f Pragmatics/Stalnaker: I proceed according to the following scheme: The syntactic and semantic rule for a language determine an interpreted proposition or subset. This, together with some features of the context of use of the proposition determines a proposition. This in turn, together with a possible world (poss.w.) determines the truth value. interpreted proposition: corresponds then with a function of contexts on propositions Proposition: is then a function of poss.w. on truth values. Truth value/Tr.v.: is then partially determined by both, the context and the poss.w.. This can also be summarized (merge). Then Proposition: is a function of context-possible worlds (poss.w. in a certain context) on truth value. Pragmatics-semantics/Stalnaker: should then as examination of the way how not depend propositions but truth value from the context. Poss. w.: would then be part of the context. Montague/Stalnaker: that is the way how - I think - Montague suggested the analysis of the pragmatics. StalnakerVsMontague: his analysis is simpler than the one I suggested. So I need a justification for my intermediate step - the propositions. They must be of interest themselves and there must be a functional difference between contexts and poss.w.. Proposition/Stalnaker: are interesting because they are objects of speech acts and propositional attitudes. That cannot be represented directly by assuming that propositions themselves determine the truth values. II 37 E.g. "Are you going to the party?" – "Yes, I am". The answer addresses the question, because the proposition is expressed in the question. StalnakerVsMontague: this cannot be expressed in his direct analysis. Montague/Stalnaker: for him propositions that are expressed from different points of view are different propositions. Content/Stalnaker: a shared truth value is not enough here to be the content. It would not be appropriate to answer "Yes, snow is white". II 41 StalnakerVsMontague: his simpler approach (that throws the poss.w. and context together) cannot distinguish between Donnellan's cases referential/attributive. If you go directly from propositions (together with the context) to the truth value (tr.v.) you missed the ambiguity. Because the truth conditions in a fixed context then coincide with both interpretations. II 42 Solution/Stalnaker: if you go from poss.w. to truth value the difference appears (in the intermediate step). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Montague, R. | Stechow Vs Montague, R. | I 44 Types/Stechow: Definition/Linguistics/Stechow: Example for definition of a definition using the semantic ranges defined by types: e.g. for an adjective and a prepositional phrase: "in". Logical Type/Linguistics/Stechow: is a semantic feature of a category symbol. Montague/Stechow: acts as if each syntactic category has exactly one logical type and therefore writes only the categories. He has made this popular. StechowVsMontague: but this is not possible, because a syntactic category does not only correspond to a logical type. Problem: for example, the nomina Fritz, student, father these probably have different meanings: Fritz: designates something of type e, student: type ep, father: Tap e(ep). Then there must also be three different noun categories for Montague. Since we only accept one noun category, we must already write the types in the lexicon. I 104 Intensional Functional Application/IFA/Intensor/Heim/KratzerVsMontague: the intensor can be replaced by the composition principle of the intesional functional application. (Intensional Functional Application): in the metalanguage it does what the interpretation of the intensor does. This makes the calculations simpler: for example Since Montague places a node before each argument, this saves a lot of money. 105 Extensional Functional Application/FA/Montague: with him you first have to dismantle the Intensor and then the FA Intensional Functional Application/Heim/Kratzer: merges both steps. 150 Lambda Abstraction/Stechow: can already be found in Frege (1884)! 151 Quantifying in/Montague/Stechow: Example Each rule consists of a syntactic and a semantic operation. Syntactic operation/Stechow: has always been very simple: just write side by side. Montagues syntactic operation f14,2 is much more complicated: take the first argument of the function (here "every linguist") and replace the first occurrence of the pronoun "him" in the second argument by this expression. The semantics of this rule is of course exactly the semantics of our quantifier relation. I.e. we apply the meaning of the quantifier to the meaning of the λ-abstract that we form from the second expression. VsMontague: Problem: there are infinitely many rules of quantifying in, one for each natural number. This is because we can choose any index for a pronoun. Lambda Calculus/Stechow: you can do almost anything with it. The original work does not contain semantics. (Lit: Lambek, 1958). 152 Type/Not/Stechow: cannot have the type (st)t, then it is a sentence adverb. Or (s(et)(et), then it is a VP modifier. ((s) > narrow range/>wide range). |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Moore, G.E. | Carnap Vs Moore, G.E. | Stroud I 186 Language/Existence Assertion/Carnap: for Carnap the choice of a language is a practical question of the convention. CarnapVsMoore: but the type of choice cannot be answered internally as Moore tried. Practical solution: can be influenced by theoretical considerations. It can be about fertility and simplicity. Thing Language/Carnap: is efficient, but it makes it attractive, but it does not show any evidence of the reality of the world. (ESO, 208). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore, G.E. | Searle Vs Moore, G.E. | III 191 SearleVsMoore: the existence of the outside world is a truth condition of the statement that I have two hands. Difference: between truth conditions and conditions of intelligibility .. There intelligibility conditions of discourse. They are essential to our way of thinking and our language. We cannot give them up, as the idea that the earth is flat. (> Conditions of understanding, understanding condition). III 193 Similarly, the external realism is not a hypothesis, but a condition of the intelligibility of other theories. It creates a space of possibilities. Background/SearleVsMoore: we keep it for granted that his hands are in a certain relation to the rest of his body. You are not in a safe deposit box. We simply take this for granted. >Certainty, >Moore's Hands, >skepticism. III 195 The joke is that we keep a lot in our normal understanding for granted, but many of the conditions of our normal understanding cannot be conceived without substantial distortion as truth conditions of the utterance. These are the kinds of conditions that will help us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. They themselves are not part of this truth conditions. V 264 naturalistic fallacy/SearleVsMoore: the being may well be derived from the ought: a statem 1. Jones expressed, "I hereby promise you, Smith, to pay $ 5." Jones is obliged - Jones has to...Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Moore, G.E. | Wittgenstein Vs Moore, G.E. | VI 212 "On Certainty"/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the book goes back to the confrontation with the remark Moore's "I know that I have two hands" or: "This is a material object" and others. E.g. Moore: "The earth has long existed before I was born". (> "Moore's hands") WittgensteinVsMoore: one can only say that this sentence has a clearer sense than "it exists in the last 5 minutes". Wittgenstein: E.g. But why should a king have not been brought up to believe that the world started with him? Knowledge/certainty/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: Moore justifies knowledge by specifying contingent empirical propositions. Wittgenstein (PU, BPP): we see in knowledge often the highest level of a hierarchy of attitudes to objects of knowledge. --- VI 213 From this ranking, we too easily conclude that sentences that are fixed indubitable, are sentences at the same time, whose contents one knows. E.g. 1 + 1 = 2 can one really say, you "knew" things like this? Thesis: if doubts are excluded, the use of the term "knowledge" is not appropriate. E.g. I am simply in pain, has nothing to do with "knowing that". --- VI 216 E.g. At maximum, after an accident I can reassure myself that I still have my hands. --- VI 222 WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: E.g. "I never went far from the surface of the earth": it is difficult to classify the sentence into a context. Therefore, it is also not clear what one might call error here. Moore's sentences can hardly be assigned to a language game, a spokesperson cannot be fixed. --- VI 233 Certainty/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: sentences that exclude doubts and mistakes, stand on a dead track. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Moore, G.E. | Malcolm Vs Moore, G.E. | Stroud I 87 Knowledge/Skepticism/Compatibility/Moore's Hands/Stroud: how can skepticism be misinterpreted when it comes to compatibility with our everyday minds? Two possibilities: Stroud I 88 Proof of Existence/External World/Moore's Hands/Norman MalcolmVsMoore: (Malcolm: Moore on Ordinary Language, (in Schilpp Phil.of Moore, New York 1952, p. 348ff "S"): the answer VsSkepticism remains open. Moore does not say what is wrong with the skeptic's doubts about the existence of his hands. It would be pointless for Moore to say, for example, "I know there's a tree because I have a clear view of it. But that is exactly what Moore seems to be doing. |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Moore, G.E. | Newen Vs Moore, G.E. | New I131 Metaethics/Newen: to clarify, what the status ethical statements is - not what kind of ethics is the right one. Moore: is utilitarian. Moore pro utilitarianism. Good/Moore/Newen: 1) Thesis: you never make a purely empirical assertion by saying that something is good. 2) good is not a natural property, i.e. it is a non-natural one. 3) For that, we need moral intuition. Def Right Action/Moore/Newen: I 132 The one that brings forth more good than any alternative action. "Right": can therefore be further analyzed. Naturalistic Fallacy/Moore/Newen: the wrong intention to define values properties empirically. This confuses two worlds. The natural and the non-natural. Good/Moore: since the substitution in "What we all want, we want all" by "What we all want is good" is not trivial, "good" cannot mean the same as "what we all want." I 133 NewenVsMoore: this does not mean that "good" is a non-analyzable and non-empirical property. Paradox of Analysis/Moore/Newen: (solution see above I 15) a concept relation necessarily applies and it is informative if it is not part of the normal language competence, but can only recognized through systematic study of conceptual relations. This option applies - as for all expressions - also for "good". I 133/134 Good/Moore/StevensonVsMoore/Newen: Suppose Moore had shown that "good" is not a natural property. It does not follow that it is a non-natural property. It would require that "good" is a describable property at all. Although Moore is right that such statements are not empirical ones, it does not follow that they are non-empirical. Value/Values/Stevenson: Thesis: Value statements are no assertions that are true or false, they do not express opinions and beliefs, but they serve to evoke attitudes. This thesis was called emotivism. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Mundy, B. | Field Vs Mundy, B. | I 199 Representation Theorem/VsRelationism: Relationism cannot take over the representation theorems from substantivalism either, because these depend on structural regularities (regularity of spacetime structure). And this regularity of spacetime is lost in relationalism. ((s) because there should be no empty sp.t., the sp.t. itself is bound to (empirically irregularly) occurring matter). Wrong Solution/Mundy: (1983): has proven a "representation theorem" which is not based on structural regularities. But that does not help heavy duty Platonism, because it generates numerical functors only from other numerical functors. That means he does not take predicates which put matter particles (point particles) in relation to each other, but a functor k: that refers particles to real numbers. E.g. For every three-point particle a real number that represents the inner product of two vectors which have one of these points as a common starting point, and the other two as endpoints. From this he extracts (several) coordinate systems, so that we have a representation theorem of species. FieldVsMundy: this does not serve the purposes for which representation theorems were originally developed, because it does not depart from a non-numeric base. Mundy: also sees that the R should not use any functions of point particles to real numbers as the basis for its formulation of physics. Therefore, he reformulates the equation: old: k(p,q,r) = a (where a is a real number) new: ka(p,q,r) so that we have an uncountable, infinite set of 3-digit space relations, one for every real number. (Mundy, 1983, p 212, 223.) FieldVsMundy: this does not solve any problem, because it’s only a notational trick. ((s) notation, orthography, paraphrasing, renaming >Rorty: "redescription" not a mere renaming, because description (language) necessitates stronger revision than replacing individual predicates with others. Potentially different number of digits). FieldVsMundy: if you really wanted to interpreted the ka’s as 3-digit spatial relations, the a’s would have to be considered as unquantifiable indices. Then we would have uncountably many primitive predicates, and thus no theory would be possible. Index/Quantification/(s): it is impossible to quantify on indices. Indices are not quantifiable. Mundy: of course, does not treat the indices as unquantifiable, but he re-writes them: k(p,q,r) = a if he wants to quantify on a. FieldVsMundy: but a quantifiable index is simply a variable that appears in a different place. And with the re-naming we do not change the fact that we have a 4-digit relation of which one term is a real number. Conclusion: With that you cannot take advantage of the difference between moderate Platonism and heavy duty Platonism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mysticism | Wittgenstein Vs Mysticism | III 226 WittgensteinVsEsotericism/Private Language/Flor: it makes no sense to speak of a knowledge of certain phenomena, regardless of the participation in a regulated public practice. WittgensteinVsMysticism. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Myth/Museum | Quine Vs Myth/Museum | XII 44 Definition Myth of the Museum/original point/Quine: Thesis: Exhibits: the meanings Labels: the words. QuineVsMyth of the Museum: 1. Then meanings should be mental entities. 2. (more important, it also exists when meanings should not be mental but platonic ideas or even concrete objects): the semantics is still considered somehow as set in the mind of humans. Thus, it becomes unclear. It should then be something that goes beyond behavior and dispositions. --- XII 46 Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/Quine: E.g. Suppose, in a foreign language there is a word for which there are two mutually incompatible German translations. But no ambiguity in the foreign language. Assuming the foreign expression can be translated in the same use into German in both ways. And both can be equally well reconciled by compensation with the foreign and the own speaker's behavior (assumed with all behavioral dispositions). Problem: then you could never know which translation is right or wrong. QuineVsMyth of the museum: would not be a solution, because we would have no access to the museum. ((s) to the mental entities). 1. decomposition of translation: E.g. "ne ... rien" in French: the "rien" could be translated into German as "something" or equally well, with "nothing". Compensation: you can make both in accordance with each other: by translating the "ne" with either "no" or translate it as empty. Solution: Here we have simply broken down the French into too small parts. The example is disappointing. --- XII 47 Problem: The decomposition is still a problem because it has to be admitted with this length of expressions, which correspond to predicates. Because then they must bear meanings. 2. E.g. (W + O, § 12): Gavagai: based on the fact that exactly a whole rabbit is present if a non- seperated part or a temporal stage is present. Ostension/Show: also repeated showing on several occasions does not help. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nagel, Th. | Sellars Vs Nagel, Th. | Rorty VI 147 To appear/to seem/language/explanation/SellarsVsNagel/Rorty: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by the scientific explanation, in turn, are linguistically relative. What seems to you dependends on how you are accustomed to speak. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nagel, Th. | Verschiedene Vs Nagel, Th. | Tetens IV 153 Nagel: Experience content can never be identical with anything physical. Tetens IV 59 Nagel seems to conclude: if x and y are identical, then the one who perceives x must also perceive y. I.e. if an observer perceives the physical world, he would also have to perceive the experience content of another person if these were identical. But he does not perceive it, so it cannot be identical. Identity/(s)VsNagel: for example, water and H20 are identical, but one actually only perceives water. The perceptions do not have to be identical. TetensVsNagel: there is also the knowledge: if someone knows that he perceives x, this does not mean that he knows that he perceives y! Experience/Perception/Nagel: "...and finally we feel the taste of chocolate..." IV 60 Experience/Perception/TetensVsNagel: why does he not simply say: "by all this taking place in the organism, especially in the brain, the person concerned eats and tastes chocolate"? Then he would not have succumbed so easily to the temptation to ask the following question: Nagel: "But what is the taste of chocolate?" Tetens: he would have done well to just say the following: "he puts it in his mouth and perceives it in a specific way, because you can identify chocolate by chewing it". Taste is not something additional to the process of tasting. (s) Activity instead of object - taste instead of taste ("reification"). Tetens: that would also save us from the even more fatal question: "Where is the taste? TetensVsNagel: he puzzles the question and e.g. acts like a blind man who wanted to question the colours: because he cannot touch or smell them, why do they then occur in the world? They are simply physical characteristics of physical things in the world. NagelVsTetens: we do not have two languages without a reason! Tetens IV 72, 73 + TetensVsNagel: correct, but the two do not differ in that the one - the "language of sensation" - is closer to "reality" than the other. Tetens IV 75 Tetens: Solution: is there still a mystery when the naturalist says: "when a certain wavelength is reflected, one experiences something to which one has learned to react in our culture with color words". |
Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Naturalism | Dummett Vs Naturalism | Putnam I 148 DummettVsRepresentation/DummettVsNaturalism/Putnam: What then is the understanding of the own mental representations? The "Knowing of the truth conditions" leads to recourse or to the recognition that some characters need to be understood without the correspondence theory. If there were "thought characters" without language that we could compare directly with the uncomprehended reality, then the understanding of the characters would have to be preceded by a "grasping of the truth conditions". Absurd! |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Neogrammarians | Saussure Vs Neogrammarians | I 17 SaussureVsNeogrammarians: better question: how to build a single language as a whole. I 27 VsNeogrammarians: their sound laws have no real explanatory value in themselves. Neogrammarians: Thesis: Nature sounds are in themselves predisposed for meaning entries. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Nietzsche, Fr. | Rorty Vs Nietzsche, Fr. | III 59 Truth/RortyVsNietzsche: with the traditional conception of truth he did not abolish the notion that we could discover the reasons for why we are. (>Metaphysics/Rorty, Metaphysics/Nietzsche). III 60 Language/Vocabulary/Rorty: as poets (and thus, according to Nietzsche, as humans) we fail if we accept the description given of our self by another. III 62 Nietzsche: "Turn all 'it was' into a 'so I wanted it to be'!" |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nominalism | Carnap Vs Nominalism | Quine XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about the choice of a language. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | James Vs Nominalism | I 30 James VsNominalism: inductive classification uncovers the "real identity of the phenomena". Cf. Order. >Empiricism: I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: supports a kind of "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language /James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. |
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| Nominalism | Saussure Vs Nominalism | I 58 SaussureVsNominalism: based on the false assumption that imaginations exist already before the language. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Nozick, R. | Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. | I 133 Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to. Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon. Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person a) a conditional that they know or is it b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge? The first case would be: a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true! E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom... ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs: I 135 1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator. Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I and he also knows: Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius. but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I. So he is not in the position to judge: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me. I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory. Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement? Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations: 1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle. 2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"? I 136 This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German! Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem: The time of the utterance of u "now" = now Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language. Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness. We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way. Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though. Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness? Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference). 1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead: Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed. But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role. I 137 Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Objectivity | Chisholm Vs Objectivity | II 105f Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. II 107 "Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality. II 120 Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense. II 120/121 Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute. II 123 Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game. II 124 Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference. II 125 VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy". II 126 Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X. II 128 BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Observation Language | Fraassen Vs Observation Language | I 56 Empirical Content/Theory/Fraassen: we have seen that we cannot isolate the empirical content of a theory in the interpretation by saying that language consists of two parts (observation language, theoretical terms). That should not surprise us. Phenomenon/Fraassen: the phenomena are preserved if they are proven to be fragments of a larger unit. FraassenVsObservation Language: it would be very strange if the theories described the phenomena, the observable, in other terms than the rest of the world they describe. A conceptual distinction between the observable and the unobservable is always too easy. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke Vs Observation Language | I 88 Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts/Peacocke: the distinction can be defended. The attacks against it fall into two groups: 1) VsObservational Concepts/some authors: Vs allegedly too casual, arbitrary (permissive) way to make the distinction. E.g. one and the same device can be seen as an x-ray tube or a Geiger counter. These concepts enter the representational content. I.e. experience itself represents something as X-ray tube. So there is no conscious inference taking place! Theory Ladenness/Hanson/Peacocke: most provocative formulation: that theoretical concepts determine the content of experience; milder formulation: theoretical assumptions can determine some reasons to express a sentence typically classified as observation sentence. Theoretical Concept/Tradition: X-ray tube is one typically considered a theoretical concept. If it now enters the representational content, it meets certain standard conditions for observability. Observability: again depends on the ability (sophistication) of the observer. 2) VsDistinction Observational Concepts/Theoretical Concepts: the classical approach to observability is empty: nothing really fulfills the conditions. In reality, theoretical considerations do indeed play a role. Both criticisms can be represented together, although that means claiming that the distinction simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Operationalism | Putnam Vs Operationalism | V 50 Operationalism: clumsy agreement: when the needle of the voltmeter is deflected, current flows. PutnamVsOperationalism: 1. The connections between theory and experience (read) are probabilistic and cannot be properly formalized as perfect correlations. (Background noise, etc.). 2. Even these probabilistic connections are not simple semantic correlations but depend on the empirical theory, which is exposed to the revision. According to the naive operationalism the terms undergo each time a change of meaning when a new test procedure is developed. There is an operational notion after which theories are tested sentence after sentence. --- V 51 Solution: one can formulate the class of permissible to be accepted interpretations so that the sentence S is mostly true. (Attenuation). The ideal set of operational preconditions is what we gradually approach in the course of empirical research, and not something that we just agree on. E.g. a "permissible interpretation" is such that different effects always have different causes. --- V 70 Re-interpretation/language/PutnamVsOperationalism: the whole problem only arises when the permissible interpretations are only picked out by operational or theoretical preconditions. The embarrassing thereto is that operational plus theoretical preconditions represent the natural process. What remains is the looseness of the relationship between truth conditions and reference. --- V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not useful. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be a relation in each permissable model and it will nothing contribute to reduce the number of permissable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: but this cannot necessarily be expressed in that you simply pronounce (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wants to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view, whereby is it then made true? How is a particular correspondence R discarded? It appears, the fact that R is really the reference, should be a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if reference to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke 'metaphysically necessary' truth). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Ordinary Language | Black Vs Ordinary Language | II 207 Everyday language/Austin: Passed the long test of survival of the fittest, finer distinction than theoretically designed artificial languages. II 208 VsOrdinary language, Phil.der/Black: it is intellectually conservative. II 161 VsLanguage/Black: There is a long tradition to rebel against alleged or actual deceptions by language: E.g. Logan Pearsall Smith: "I stood there for a while, thinking about language, about its perfidious meanness and its inappropriateness, about the shamefulness of our vocabulary and how the moralists have spoiled our words by infusing all their hatred of human happiness in the words like in little poison bottles." "Logophobia"/Abhorrence of language/BerkeleyVsLanguage: "most of the knowledge is confusedbvand darkened by the misuse of words; since the words so much oppose understanding, I am determined to make as little use as possible of them and to try to involve them bare and naked in my ideas." II 162 LockeVsLanguage: was so impressed by the errors, the darkness, the mistakes and the confusion which is caused by the bad use of words that he wondered if they contributed more to the improvement or prevention of knowledge. (Essay Book III, Chapter XI Section 4). WhiteheadVsLanguage: it is incomplete and fragmentary, it only represents a transitional stage beyond the monkey mentality. Main risk for philosophy: false confidence in the appropriateness of the language. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Brigham Young: I long for the time in which the pointing of a finger or a gesture can express every idea without expression. (1854) Swift: (trip to Balnibarbi): ... the project of the second professor was aimed at abolishing all words ... II 163 The smartest followed the new method to express themselves through the things they carry in a bundle on their backs ... III 166 SartreVsLanguage/Black: "disgust": Roquentin tried to retreat into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Ordinary Language | Fodor Vs Ordinary Language | II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: this forces the philosopher of everyday language to seek ever more refuge in intuition. II 124 In particular, he will claim to intuitively recognize anomalies and say that a philosophical problem is solved when anomalies are recognized. (Cavell claims that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he means that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words incorrectly and at the same time he means that with the help of intuitions he can decide when a word is used incorrectly. While it may be intuitively clear when a word is anomalous, for philosophical purposes it is not enough to know that it is anomalous, it can be anomalous for many reasons, some of which are not flawed! For example, if the metaphysician is accused of misusing language, he will rightly answer: "So what?". Moreover, we cannot expect a theory of meaning to evaluate every utterance that an untrained theoretical speaker calls anomalous in the same way by the theory. II 125 Rather, the theory should only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about anomalies cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory at all, only overstrained intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: this misses the point: specifying the relevant similarity just means determining exactly the generation rules. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ordinary Language | Positivism Vs Ordinary Language | Fodor II 118 PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties. II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions. II 124 In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused. Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty! E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?" Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory. II 125 The theory should rather only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules. III 222 Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements) Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations. Type III Statement: Generalizations. Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world). Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language). Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act. Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 223 Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 |
| Ordinary Language | Quine Vs Ordinary Language | QuineVsOrdinary language, Philosophy of I 22 VsPhilosophers who see everyday language as sacrosanct. Mistake, to ignore the fact that the language is always developing. Our ship remains afloat: at each change the largest part remains intact. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ordinary Language | Cresswell Vs Ordinary Language | I 45 Natural language/Logic/Cresswell: Thesis: The analysis only makes progress when it leaves the narrow confines of logic and considers the natural language in all its richness. Here, every word has "its own logic". --- I 46 CresswellVsOxford/CresswellVsOrdinary language philosophy/Cresswell: this may recall the heyday of Oxford. But the difference is that we do not claim the impossibility of formal semantics. Meanwhile, there have been fascinating, albeit frighteningly complex formal semantics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Parmenides | Plato Vs Parmenides | Bubner I 51 Being/Parmenides: had forbidden to concede being to the the nonexistence. Being/Appearing/PlatoVsParmenides: the solution of the problem of being must be newly approached, namely in memory of the linguistic nature of the concept. Only in language can the concept of being express what it means, and also the concept of being only occurs usefully in statements. I 52 Being/Not-Being/Paradox/PlatoVsParmenides: Solution: the other is the form in which that which is not directly about itself has a mediated being. So it is the being of that which is not. So every logos speaks of something that it is not. The wrong speech can only deceive because speech and thing are not one. Tugendhat II 43 Being/PlatoVsParmenides: (Theaithet): apart from the possibility of not thinking something, there is the possibility to think that something is not. "Not believing" does not mean "not saying" but "saying that not", "denying". |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Parsons, Ch. | Putnam Vs Parsons, Ch. | I (i) 233 Language/Paradox/antinomies/Tarski/Putnam: that brings us to the philosophically important opportunity to deny that our informal discourse is a "language". (That says Russell!). Charles Parsons: (1987) the statement about the truth value in each higher-levelled language is a "speech act sui generis". PutnamVsParsons, Charles: that such "systematically ambiguous statements" as (V) Each language S has a meta-language MS look quite the same way as ordinary inferences, but are none. (This works by inserting to infinity: language Sn has the metalanguage MSn). For Parsons this is supposed to be a very different kind of discourse that cannot be understood in the normal kind of language use. I (i) 234 Putnam: that is simply incomprehensible for me: E.g. as if language, which is written in red ink, would be a "language sui generis". Since generalizations, written in red ink, about "all languages", would not include the red ink language in which they are written (the Red ink language is sui generis), we could not get any paradoxes. But this is only a formalistic trick: The problem is only shifted: in what language do we express the fact that "generalizations about the Non-Red ink languages do not go beyond the red ink language"?. Putnam: Solution: Perhaps the idea is, in fact, that some forms of discourse can be understood without presupposing the concept of truth at all. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Parsons, Ta. | Luhmann Vs Parsons, Ta. | Au Kass 11 Interpenetration/Parsons: different subsystems are coupled: E.g. Culture penetrates the social system (interpenetrates with it). E.g. A social system affects the individuals through socialization. E.g. Individuals domesticate their own organisms through learning processes. Parsons thus marks overlaps. But after the whole theoretical construction this did not happen on an operative level! Rather, Parsons thinks that the various subsystems contribute to the emergence of action. They are not themselves already operative! If they are differentiated out as action systems, then again only on the level of action. These systems must then in turn fulfil all the requirements of systems. ((s) So the levels remain separate). LuhmannVsParsons: but the term that would have to say what actually affects the other system or how culture is actually a part of the social system could never be explained by the division into four of Parson's box (see above). I.e. several system relations would have to be internalised and identified as internal subsystems and then the whole system would be defined by the interpenetrative relations. This was not possible and therefore remained unclear. AU Kass 1 LuhmannVsParsons: terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed to be given. No criteria for the inventory of the item. Instead, the theory must be able to include all deviance and dysfunction. (Not possible with Parsons). Question: in which period of time and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (Example Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory Criteria Biology: definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. AU Kass 2 LuhmannVsParsons: assignments are not always mandatory. LuhmannVsParsons: certain hermeticism of the conceptual scheme, the compulsion to always fill out the 4 boxes, leads the theoretical decisions. Is thereby more and more occupied by self-posed problems. One cannot recognize any direct mistakes, but nevertheless a dead end. LuhmannVsParsons: he has already integrated a lot: Cybernetics, Input/Output Language, Linguistics. But self-reference (important in modern systems theory) is not possible within the framework of Parson's model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Parsons, Ter. | Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter. | I 37 Non-existent Objects/unrealized possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the real world. (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject it have thought too strongly in syntactic paths. Hintikka. Thesis: one must answer the question rather semantically (model theoretically). Fiction/Ryle: Test: is the paraphrase valid? Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test is missing in cases like "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction". HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all. I 38 Ontology/Language/linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: Model theory. E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here the question is whether the soldiers have bullets in their gun barrels. ((s) sic, by Puccini, not by Verdi). N.B.: even if they did, they would only be fictitious! ((s) within history). ((s) I.e. so that the story can be told at all, one must assume that the corresponding sentence can be decided with "true" or "false", depending on whether there are bullets in the gun barrels. Otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.) Model Theory/Hintikka: provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model" means, in history it is true that bullets are in the gun barrels). HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not only ask which conclusions may be drawn and which may not. Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask about the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic. Singular Term/Ontological Obligation/Existence/Parsons: Parsons says that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And thus to a speaker. I.e. it is an obligation to an inference. HintikkaVsParsons. I 41 Non-existent Objects/possible object/unrealized possibilities/Hintikka: but are some of these non-existent objects not in our own actual world (real world)? Hintikka: Thesis: yes, some of these merely possible objects are in the real world. Bona fide object/Hintikka: can exist in one possible world and be missing in another. World line/Hintikka: when it comes to which ones can be drawn, existence is not the most important problem. Rather well-defined. HintikkaVsLeibniz: we also allow an object to exist in several possible worlds. Question: if inhabitants of two different possible worlds can be identical, when are they identical? I 42 Existential Generalisation/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: this shows that his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Example: (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll one cannot infer from this, even though Caroll existed, and the Queen knew this, that (2) (Ex)Queen Victoria knew that Lewis was Carroll x. And therefore (3) Someone is such that Queen Victoria knew he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) say the same thing as (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll was. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2)-(3) with (4) is completely independent of whether the quantifiers only go over existing or also over non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of unambiguousness. However, unambiguousness fails, because in different situations it is compatible with the Queen's knowledge, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different persons. Therefore, not only a single, particular object can function as a value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply and (1) and yet it can be understood as committing the external to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parson's criterion fails. |
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| Peacocke, Chr. | McDowell Vs Peacocke, Chr. | I 192 Concept/experience/Peacocke: prerequisite for the subject to have a concept of a square is the non-conceptual content (the experience). I 193 This property (the concept) has also a condition of accuracy, which relates to the world. McDowellVsPeacocke: that's no proof that the non-conceptual content is eligible as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. Perhaps the subject does not even have reasons! Ex an experienced cyclists makes the right movements without the need for reasons. A description also does not require reasons. McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: that qualifies neither to assume that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor, that beliefs are founded on experiences "as reasons." I 194 McDowellVsPeacocke: flatulently abstruse conceptual apparatus: "protopropositional content", "experiential content", etc. McDowellVsPeacocke: he has to dissolve the alliance between reason and language, which has existed since Plato. (One word for both: "Logos") He has to dissolve the tie between the reasons for a subject to think how it thinks and the reasons it can give (articulable reasons). (Absurd). I 195 Experience/world/McDowellVsPeacocke: Ex Square: reason: "because of what it looks like." This is quite ok and just one reason for a conviction and not merely a "part of a reason ..." Ostension/concept/McDowell: Ex "It looks like ..." - need not be any less conceptual than that for which there is a reason. We can only get the rational relationship under control if we understand it conceptually, even if according to our theory (Evans) the content would be non-conceptual. Circle/Peacocke/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe, that in experience there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is outside? He thinks he has to avoid a circle. To explain the prperty of an obersvational concept we can not perceive the contents as conceptual fromthe very beginning (according to Peacocke). Ex colors: then, not only the term "red" is presupposed but, even worse, the "concept of the property of "Red."" Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: that only shifts the problem. Why should we assume that we would always be able to explain what it means to have a concept? Ex neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks if they think that something is red. (This is exactly what Peacocke wants). Circle/McDowell: the explanation of observational concepts must always be located outside the space of concepts. (also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective." |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Peirce, Ch.S. | Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | I 54 Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience. Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories. --- I 55 Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth. Likewise, any so-called pragmatic truth-definition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail. --- I 444 Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relations-in-extension" here. They stand in a relationship to relations-in-intension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The father-relation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members - for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.) QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grown-up general terms. Mathematical --- I 445 Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w. If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two. --- X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings). Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism). --- XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession. 2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization. N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality. Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism: --- XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Phenomenalism | Dummett Vs Phenomenalism | Brandom I 429 Dummett: problem of "recognition transcendence": distinguishing three things: 1. What should be considered phenomenalistically (objects, mental activity, semantic properties, the past, etc.) 2. To which considering-to-be or attribution the talk about such things should supervene, 3. how this supervenience relation is to be fully understood. For each phenomenalistic assertion there is now a class of assertions that are realistic, in the sense that they deny the phenomenalistic "there is nothing but« analysis. (DummettVsPhenomenalism). Horwich I 393 Reference/Anti-Realism/Verificationism/Dummett/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Understanding/Anti-Realism/Dummett: Thesis: the Theory of Understanding should be pursued in terms of verification and falsification. DummettVsPhenomenalism/Putnam: new: is that there is no "base" of "hard facts" (E.g. sense-data) with respect to which one ultimately uses the truth conditional semantics, logic and realistic terms of truth and falsehood. Understanding/Dummett: understanding a sentence means knowing what its verification would be. Analogy: for intuitionism: knowing the constructive evidence means to understand a mathematical proposition. Assertibility Condition/Assertibility/Dummett: then E.g. "I see a cow" is only assertible if it is verified. Verification/Dummett/Putnam: Important Argument: we say the that sentence is verified by being pronounced! > Firth: Def Self-Affirmation/Roderick Firth/Putnam: E.g. "I see a cow" is self-affirming. It is verified by being pronounced. ((s) In such and such circumstances). That does not mean that it is incorrigible! Neither does it have to be completely determined (bivalent). Facts/Dummett/Putnam: Thesis: in this sense (of the "self-affirmation of observation statements" (Firth)) all facts are "soft". I 394 Important Argument: The realistic terms of truth and falsity are not needed for this! Important Argument: the problem of how the "only correct" reference ratio is identified, does not arise! Because the term "reference" is not needed. Reference: we can introduce it à la Tarski, but then "cow" refers to cows" becomes a tautology and the understanding of this sentence does not need a metaphysical realism. Facts/Verificationism/Dummett/Putnam: you should not use verificationist semantics in terms of "hard facts". (Neither of sense data). Otherwise all objections VsMetaphysicAL Realism could be repeated at the level that the MS becomes incomprehensible (this would be an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s private language argument). Solution/Dummett: we need to apply verificationism also in the metalanguage and the meta-metalanguage, etc. (1) 1. Hilary Putnam, “Realism and Reason”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1976, pp. 483-98, in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Phenomenalism | Ryle Vs Phenomenalism | I 322 Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of the theory, but he does not recognize the disease. (Ryle). RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less praiseworthy motive: He assumed that having a sensation is to be a determination of something, or that something is "revealed" in sensation. (> Sense data theory). It seemed to follow that we cannot really observe things and therefore cannot find out through observation things that we already know about gate posts. --- I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: the truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is meaningless. Such facts: that gate posts persist for a long time, especially when they are painted with protective paint, that they are hard and solid other than smoke clouds, that they can be found by anyone at day or night other than shadows, that they carry the weight of gates and doors, but possibly burn down, are found by observation and experimentation. In the same way, it is also found that gateposts can sometimes look very similar to trees and people, and that it is, under certain circumstances, very easy to be mistaken about their size and distance. Certainly such facts are not directly given to the senses, or are revealed in sensation. RyleVsPhenomenalism: this also shows why the language does not make it possible to formulate the statements to which, according to phenomenalism, all statements about gate posts should be translatable: the reason is not that the vocabulary is inadequate but that there are no such objects, for which such additional expressions would be desired. "Sense objects" are absurd. Rather, we cannot describe our sensations without referring to ordinary objects. Observation: some say we should reserve the honour-title "observation" for those operations which are absolutely safe. Ryle: But why? If it makes sense to call a person a careful observer and another person a negligent observer, why should we deprive ourselves of this possibility? --- I 325 Because it was assumed that from the fact that every observation could be erroneous, there would have to be a special kind of fail-safe observation so that "empirical" can be defined with their help. For this purpose the sensory perception was invented to play this role. Erroneous immunity/immunity/Ryle: but the reason why a sensation cannot be faulty is not that it is a failing-safe observation, but that it is not an observation at all. (In addition, the above postulate is strongly circular). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Phenomenology | Wittgenstein Vs Phenomenology | I 213 ff Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: even February 1929: "There seems to be a lot that suggests that the image of the face area by the physics is really the easiest. That is, that physics would be the true phenomenology." But he takes this back quickly. --- I 214 Physics: truth phenomenology: sense. Physics: correct predictions, that does not aspire the phenomenology. --- I 215 WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: the description of the phenomena by means of the hypothesis of the objects of the world is much easier than the phenomenological! When I see several scattered pieces of a circle, so their precise direct description may be impossible, but the indication that there are pieces of a circle is easy. --- I 219 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: the big question: "Is it possible to translate the 'vagueness' of the phenomenon in an inaccuracy of the drawing?" Shortly thereafter, he finds the solution and calls the phenomenological language from there "absurd." --- I 222 WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hitnikka: Wittgenstein's doubts about the phenomenological objects have more sources: The more closely one examines them, the less they seem to have the kind of logical behavior, that should correspond to the real objects. Phenomenological objects not even seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Physicalism | Schiffer Vs Physicalism | I XVIII VsPhysicalism: (8th hypothesis) cannot be correct: E.g. if it is a fact that I believe that worms do not have noses, then that is not represented in non-Mentalese and non-intentionalistic vocabulary. Problem: what can you do? we accept Eliminativism: Thesis: We have no belief with meaning or words with meaning. Or Mentalism: Thesis: belief objects as internal entities (QuineVsMentalismus: Z "Sargasso Sea above which somebody slides obliviously). (> Dualism) . Nominalism/solution/Schiffer: we need to accept none of them: but we deny that the existence of language-independent, objective characteristics of belief. That means Belief/nominalism/Schiffer: denies that the characteristics of belief are to believe "this and that" or to be a belief that this and that is the case, and he also denies the facts. Nominalism/Schiffer: allows then to include both: ontological physicalism: there are no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities and the Def Sentential Dualism: that there are true but irreducible belief-ascribing propositions. Schiffer: pro. Here the token token physicalism (6th hypothesis) is tentatively accepted. >Kripke: Paradox of rule following, >Kripkes Wittgenstein, (1982). I 144 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because thesis: if there is true attributions of belief, they cannot be shown without Mentalese or intentional vocabulary. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Piaget, J. | Pinker Vs Piaget, J. | I 375 Piaget: compared children with young scientists - Pinker pro: we all think scientifically from childhood on - but for primitive humans it was more difficult to survive than for the people of today I 391 PinkerVsPiaget: considering knowledge strategies as innate is something else than presuming science I 392 Piaget: children are sensorimotoric beings and unaware that objects are related and persist, and that the world obeys external laws and not the actions of a child. I 414 Logic/Human/Child/Development/Evolution/Pinker: children use "and", "or", "if" properly before they turn three. I 418 Maths/Child: three-week-old babies notice when they first see a scene with three and then one with two objects, and vice versa. Ten months: they remember how many (up to four objects) are presented to them, and it does not matter whether the objects are homogeneous, grouped or spread, also sounds. Arithmetic: Five months: surprised when suddenly on object is missing. I 419 18 months: Babies know that there are different numbers and that they belong in a particular order. Question: can these children and animals count without having words? Pinker: counting does not depend on language. Adults: use several representations for quantities. Preschoolers: even before they fully see through counting and measuring, they understand a lot of the logic and try to split a sausage fairly by cutting it. I 421 E.g. even a blind toddler knows that the straight line from A to B is the shortest and a turn to C is longer. I 422 School/TIMMSS: American students' performance is extremely poor. PinkerVsPiaget: mathematical education follows constructivism: a mixture of constructing while the social institutions are at odds about these concepts. "Holistic" method. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Piaget, J. | Schurz Vs Piaget, J. | I 194 VsPiaget/Schurz: it was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: For example, children who were presented with a simpler form than a mountain landscape (a box with four differently coloured sides) could solve the problem at the age of 4 (instead of 6-7). Schurz: this did not mean, however, that the core of the theory was revealed. (according to the Lakatos motto). I 195 1. VsPiaget: it was concluded that its test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, 1978). 2. VsPiaget: e.g. number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New. E.g.: the children should select pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this payment test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Core/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: e.g. statement logic. According to Piaget, children of 13-14 years of age should be able to make propositional logic correct statements. Problem: modus ponens is actually controlled at the age of 3, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: this cannot be solved by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: e.g. preservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive Principle: (here): objects that are hidden therefore do not cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the senso-motoric stage at the age of 2. Variant. For example, dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at the age of 6: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/Development/Alternative TheoryVsPiaget: the development of intelligence is not based on the formation of general abstract structures, but on the development of content-specific and content-related abilities. (Ausubel, 1978, Novak 1980, Schurz 1985). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Platonism | Searle Vs Platonism | V 170 SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered): (Ep)(p = q . p is true) According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition. 2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects. SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute. 2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here. 3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical. V 170/171 SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality. V 245/246 SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato: 1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting). 2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject. SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties. IV 80 Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction. IV 81 There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie. >Fiction/Searle, >Platonism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Platonism | Schiffer Vs Platonism | I 107 SchifferVsPhysicalism: this can only be true if the Platonic realism (Platonism) is correct with respect to intentional properties and intentional facts. And there is no reason to assume that Platonism is correct. SchifferVsPlatonismus. I 152 Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (the mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way. SchifferVs: 1. that's the way to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (contradiction). 2. Do you believe that if they can: problem: the superfluity is even more serious: SchifferVsPlatonism: in Plato's heaven, there are many things that unnecessarily do something that other things already do for them. But these latter now do not do anything anymore! The 2nd stage property to be causally necessary that the neural Z-Token has its effect, is completely empty because B is not part of a broader property that would be necessary and sufficient for the effect. ((s) because B is to stand on its own). I 234 Anti-Realism/Schiffer: the anti-realism I represent is not plausible when natural languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. SchifferVsPlatonism: for my attitude in this case, the same applies. (With regard to objects of propositional attitudes or belief properties. Problem: a question is still: how is the rejection of the relation theory compatible with the validity of such forms as E.g. "So and so believes that this and that", so "there is something that he believes". Platonic realism: E.g. (a) Mother Teresa is modest after realism we need to actually distinguish four entities here: 1. Mother Teresa as a language-independent object 2. linguistically: the singular term "Mother Teresa" with the reference ratio referenced ("Mother Teresa", Mother Teresa) Pointe: this requires that the speaker understands the term and knows the relation. 3. and 4 .: the entity of modesty (the property of being modest) and the adjective "modest". I 235 Universal/Schiffer: first is modesty, as Mother Teresa a language-independent object! But it has no place and no time. Familiarity/Universal/Schiffer: you may be familiar with modesty, without knowing the term. Predicate: expresses the property, that means we have again a relation Expresses ("modest", the property to be modest). Schiffer: this canonical representation shows that the fact that is notified, contains two separate things that are connected by a relation. And it is precisely this fact, in which the meaning of "modest" is. ((s) then the meaning of each predicate would be the expressed (not identical with the predicate) property.) Schiffer: the knowledge that the term expresses the properties, belongs to the understanding of the term. Without that one could not understand propositions that include "modest". Realism/Schiffer: (that here always requires the (rejected) realism (or the relation theory). Realism then equals the two relations.: 1. Between names and object. 2. Between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiated the second. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Platts, M. | Avramides Vs Platts, M. | Avramides I 91 DavidsoniansVsGrice/Avramidis: E.g. Mark Platts: thinks that he can discredit the entire program of Grice with Davidson’s doubt: Platts: Consider the following two statements: (1) The term of sentence meaning can be defined in terms of the speaker’s intentions (2) The meaning of each sentence in a language can be determined by reference to the intentions with which it was expressed. (Platts 1979 p.92)(1). AvramidesVsPlatts: he relies the mistakes of superficial epistemic asymmetry (that psychological concepts are more fundamental than semantic ones) in order to discredit (2). Then he connects the weakened assertion (2) with (1). Platts: if (1) is to have any meaning at all, it must have implications for the determination of the meaning of individual sentences. But what else could these implications be than what we have already seen to be inadequate? ((s) the fact that the RI cannot explain language by intentions). Platts: therefore (1) is either uninteresting or wrong. (1979, p.92.)(1) AvramidesVsPlatts: he does not distinguish between reductive and non-reductive interpretations of Grice’ analysis. He simply decides that the entire analysis by Grice was wrong or uninteresting, namely on the basis of superficial epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVsPlatts: he overreacted. 1) It is not clear why a non-reductive Gricean should be committed to (2). 2) Platts assumes that (2) is important without explaining why. Reductionism/Avramides: no reductive Gricean known to me really relies on the superficial epistemic asymmetry. 1. M. Platts, Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language, 1979, p. 92 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Popper, K. | Putnam Vs Popper, K. | V 146 Popper/Putnam: predictions are confronted with "basis sentences" that are publicly accepted. VsPopper: one has criticized, he used a "conventionalist" language, as if the acceptance of a basic sentence would be a convention. >Protocol sentence. Putnam: in reality it is simply recognizing the fact of institutionalization. V 257/258 Method/Popper has suggested that one should accept the most falsifiable hypotheses of the alternative ones. PutnamVsPopper: but it turns out that the falsification varies, depending on which undefined predicates the language choses as a basis. Method/Science: it follows that there is still a necessity, (or the acceptance of a Bayesian "prior"), for a non-formal element that equals a Goodman-decision on the projectability. Here one may ask, how should we explain the success of science, if there is no method? It cannot be denied that science has been remarkably successful. Answer: there is probably a scientific method, but it assumes that you already have a concept of rationality. --- V 258/259 Rationality/Science/Putnam: It cannot be that a newly created method serves only to define what rationality actually is. --- V 260 Popper/Putnam: Claims, that there are rationality terms that are broader than the scientific rationality, and also valid for ethical decisions. PutnamVsPopper: it is not possible to test all theories with high falsifiability. --- V 261 Even his method involves such a thing as a previous selection. Also his calculations of falsfiability levels is not independet from what predicates that are chosen as a basis. >Method/Putnam. Popper/Putnam: could it not be that the Popperian method (as vague and non-formal as it may be) covers not only the concept of scientific rationality exhaustively but the entire concept of knowledge-based rationality? PutnamVsPopper: such a rationality view is even too narrow for science. E.g. it would exclude a theory that belongs to the most successful: the evolution. (Popper would accept this). Evolution: is not high-falsifiable, and it does not imply any predictions. --- V 263 PutnamVsPopper: he even exaggerates the degree of falsifiability of theories of classical physics. >Falsification. Method/Science/Putnam: danger, to dilute the method more and more: if it says in the end: "perform experiments as carefully as possible, then conclude the best explanation, eliminate theories that can be falsified by experimenta crucis" then it can no longer be seen, what cannot be verified through such a vaguely described method. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Positivism | Austin Vs Positivism | Husted III 247 Logical positivism/Language: Language has only two functions 1) means to describe reality, 2) means to express feelings, preferences, evaluation etc. (emotive, descriptive). AustinVsPositivism: speech acts are useful, but cannot be attributed to either of the two categories. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Positivism | Feyerabend Vs Positivism | I 364 Vienna Circle: one finds the empirical content of a theory by looking into how much of it can be translated into an ideal language whose empirical properties are easily recognizable. FeyerabendVsIdeal Language: An ideal language is not achieved easily. Even the first steps lead to problems which are unknown in physics. I 366 Experiment: why should there be a terminology in which one can say that the same experiment confirms one theory and refutes the other? II 80 Vienna Circle/"Formal Speech"/Translation: E.g. question Is the world finite or infinite? In the "translation" we no longer speak of a property of the world, but of a property of sequences of explanations. So either one fundamental explanation or a never-ending sequence of explanations. FeyerabendVs: If one forgets the cosmological background (and that happens easily with philosophers) - then the matter is already decided: there are no "fundamental or ultimate" explanations. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Positivism | Fodor Vs Positivism | II 107 Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages can be constructed so that they have any desired property. II 108 When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem. II 109 Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica(1). This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic. II 110 FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply. II 112 Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally. II 113 Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously. II 117 Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before. Fodor/Lepore IV 49 Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Positivism | Loar Vs Positivism | Avramides I 137 Attribution/Propositional Attitude/Theory/Loar: Thesis: the epistemology of attribution of belief and desire must be separated from its explanation. LoarVsPositivism: without the separation one succumbs to the errors of positivism, phenomenalism, behaviorism and semantic instrumentalism in relation to science. (Loar 1981 p.128). LoarVsPositivism/Avramides: his mistake: to try to formulate truth conditions in terms of document conditions. AvramidesVsLoar: Thesis: now "a priori constitutive connections between attribution of attitudes (propositional attitudes) and language behavior" are exactly what I propose. (Loar 1981 p.128). In addition, I have proposed not to separate precisely between the epistemology of the attribution of desires and beliefs from their explanation. ((s) Well, so not after all!). Do I now fall into the "positivist trap" of Loar? I do not think so. AvramidesVsLoar: his mistake is to think that only positivism can combine an approach to psychology with semantics. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Positivism | Apel Vs Positivism | Danto II 315 K. O. Apel/Lübke: language-pragmatic criticism of positivism. ApelVsPositivism. |
Ape I K. O. Apel Transformation der Philosophie: Band I. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik Frankfurt/M. 1994 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Possible World Sem. | Hintikka Vs Possible World Sem. | II 74 Cross World Identity/Cross World Identification/Identity/Identification/Individuation/Hintikka: is the main problem of the possible worlds semantics/semantics of possible worlds. This is also about the relation between individuation and identification. VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: problem: it seems to absolutize possible worlds and complete sets of possibilia II 75 Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: on it you can build a theory of questions and answers. I 76 This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this, we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/Possible Worlds Semantics: here it is not enough to assume only those references that have our expressions in the actual world. Extensional Language/Hintikka: assumes much less than possible worlds semantics. Namely, only the references from the real world. World Line/Hintikka: is used here for identification (or re-identification) between possible worlds. I 77 VsPossible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: some authors: the drawing of the world lines is too dependent on the context of use and other pragmatic factors, much more so than in other semantics of natural language. II 205 Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: does not need any conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", more like event histories or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the term is misleading if you conceive it as complete worlds. Cross World Identification/Cross Identification/Perception/Hintikka: here we must assume situations when it comes to perceptual identification. Because there must be a perceiver in them, and the different situations (possible worlds) must share the perception space of the subject. Possible Worlds Semantics/Perception/HintikkaVsPossible Worlds Semantics: has overlooked this point. Situation/Possible World Semantics/Hintikka. In addition, the possible worlds semantics should study the relations between smaller and larger situations. I 206 Descriptive Cross World Identification/By Way of Description/Hintikka: descriptive identification should take place between parts of the world which are larger than the current perceptual cross identification. I.e. a comparison between "major" and "minor" situations. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Hintikka: their situations semantics is a welcome addition to the possible worlds semantics. Situation/Hintikka: an interesting question is how small egocentric situations can be put together to give a larger comprehensive "worldview". Relations: there should be at least three types of relations between situations: 1) spatial 2) temporal 3) the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained situations. It is best to study them insulated from each other. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Pragmatism | Williams, B. Vs Pragmatism | Rorty IV 38 Bernard WilliamsVsPragmatism/Rorty: Difference between practical considerations and the search for truth. IV 40 Cultural Relativism/Williams/Rorty: in extreme cases of ethical disagreement "questions of evaluation" do not arise at all! IV 44 Pragmatism/Rorty: continues Hegel's work and is not interested in finding mentality-historical explanations for the occurrence of dead ends. Language/Rorty: people simply give up a problematic vocabulary. RealismVsPragmatism: Williams: that is a deceitful trick! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Presentism | Lewis Vs Presentism | Schwarz I 19 Past/Future/LewisVsPresentism: it is common sense that the last moon landing was in 1972 and that certain species are long extinct. Presentism: but also refers to common sense and claims that these things are no longer real. To be past means to no longer exist. There will also be future species only when they are there. There is only what exists now (give/exist/"there is"). LewisVsPresentism: "there is": Lewis does not claim that "dinosaurs exist now". But they do exist (although not today). They only exist in the past. But the presentist also accepts this. Then what is the point of contention? Schwarz I 20 Solution: has to do with the area of quantification. Quantification/Area/Schwarz: unlimited quantifiers are rare and are part of metaphysics. Example "there is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example: "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: so there are different "ways of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/Existence: statements about what exist ignore from his point of view past and future. When we say that there are no dinosaurs ((s) then we (wrongly) extend the present into the past.) Schwarz: through the present tense we indicate that we are not talking about absolutely everything, but only about the present. Quantification/Schwarz: can also be neutral in the present. But it doesn't depend on grammar. Schwarz I 21 Solution: make true: what makes the sentences true, e.g. that Socrates drank the cup of hemlock? Four-dimensionalism truthmakers: the events in the past part of reality. Presentism: does not believe in past parts of reality. But then the truthmaker must be a characteristic of the present! VsPresentism: Problem: the present is logically not dependent on the past. It is possible that the world was only created five minutes ago. Reality/Presentism: (some representatives) one does not grasp reality by just determining what things are present. That Socrates existed is not true because there are certain things now, but because they existed then. Statements about what has existed and will exist express basic facts that cannot be reduced to statements about what is. Then the sentence operators "it was a case that," and "it will be the case" are primitive and unanalytic. (Prior, 1969(1)). Properties/LewisVsPrior/LewisVsPresentism: Vs these primitive operators: All truths must be based on what kind of things with what qualities there are. The two operators above would not be sufficient. Example "Socrates is still admired today" ((s) This does not distinguish the present from the past as desired here. Example "There were several English kings named Charles": Problem: there was no time when there were several. Then, among other things, plural past quantifiers must also be accepted. Four dimensionalism/Lewis: Solution: Temporal operators simply move the range of quantifieres. Example "...1642" is like "...in Australia". Then: with "there were several English kings named Charles" we quantify about a larger part of the past, perhaps about all past things together. Presentism: (some representatives) try to acquire it without sharing the metaphysics: Reference to "Socrates" or "1642" is then somehow abstract and of a completely different kind than that to concrete things (Bigelow 1996). Perhaps past times are linguistic fictions, sentences and their inhabitants contained in them (descriptions). Then, for example, "cup of hemlock" would not require that there is someone of flesh and blood who does anything. (!) It is enough if a fiction tells about it ((s) >Fiction/Field). Schwarz I 22 Other solution/presentism: such sentences about past things as set-theoretical constructions of present things: the Socrates of the year 399 is then a set of now existing qualities, among them also the characteristic to drink the hemlock cup. VsPresentism: not all things that ever existed can be described in our language or constructed from current events. Besides, there are many fictions that have nothing to do with them. What distinguishes the "real" from the "false"? Four dimensionalism: "Surrogate V" ("Replacement V"): interprets other times and their inhabitants as metaphysically fundamental entities. Example "Socrates" refers to an irreducible entity ("being") that is somehow linked to the qualities we assume from Socrates. (LewisVs) Problem: the link must not be that the entity has these properties! Because that would be the true four dimensionalism. LewisVs "ersatz world": no theory of substitute Socrats can be developed where these are really "abstract". PresentismVsFour-dimensionalism: sweeps essential aspects of reality under the carpet: what will become of the flow of time, the change of things and the peculiarity of the present? The four-dimensional block universe never changes. His time dimension "does not flow". E.g. then I can't be happy that the visit to the dentist is over, because it is still just as real. Four-dimensionalismVsPresentism: e.g. visit to the dentist: I am glad that it is no longer there, not that it has been erased from reality. Just as I'm glad the attack didn't happen here, but elsewhere. 1. Arthur N. Prior [1969]: Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Principia Mathematica | Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica | II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity. II 352 Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned. II 353 The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down. II 402 Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. II 415 Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing. The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate. Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads. WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class? II 416 It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica(1), there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations") 2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs. WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one. --- IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. IV 73 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica(1) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic. 5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here. 5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity. People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and IV 74 lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth). Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations. IV 84 Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form "a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing. WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p" and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences. That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical. 5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there IV 85 would be things but these were not identical with themselves? IV 85/86 Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). IV 87 Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number. IV 98 Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. IV 99 Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Prior, A. | Belnap Vs Prior, A. | Brandom I 198 BelnapVsPrior: if you introduce logical vocabulary, you must restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences containing only old vocabulary. This means that the new rules must extend the repertoire conservatively. > Example "boche". Brandom: if these rules are not inferentially conservative, they allow new material inferences and thus change the contents associated with the old vocabulary. The expressive concept of logic requires that no new inferences containing only old vocabulary be made appropriate. Conservativity/Conservative Extension/Dummett: if a logical constant is introduced by introduction and elimination rules, we can call this a conservative extension of language. Brandom II 93 For example, this could apply to Belnap's "tonk": introduction rule of the disjunction and elimination rule of the conjunction: Def "tonk"/Belnap: 1. Rule: licenses the transition from p to p tonk q for any q. 2. Rule: licenses the transition from p tonk q to q. With this we have a "network card for inferences": any inference is allowed! Brandom II 94 PriorVsBelnap/PriorVsGentzen: this is the bankruptcy of definitions in Gentzen's style. BelnapVsPrior: if you introduce logical vocabulary, you can restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences with only old vocabulary that were not allowed before the introduction of the logical vocabulary. Such a restriction is necessary and sufficient. Brandom: the expressive analysis of the logical vocabulary now gives us a deep reason for this condition: only in this way can the logical vocabulary perform its expressive function. The introduction of new vocabulary would allow new material inferences without the restrictive condition (conservatism) and would thus change the contents correlated with the old vocabulary. ((s) retroactive change, also of the truth values of established sentences). Read: meaning: the meaning, even the logical connections, must be independent of and prior to the determination of the validity of the consequent structures. Logic III 269 Belnap: came to the aid of the view of "analytical validity". What it lacks, he said, is any proof that there is such a connection as "tonk" at all. This is a problem for definitions in general. One cannot define into existence. First of all you have to show that there is such a thing (and only 1). Example "Pro-Sum" of two fractions. (a/b)!(c/d) is defined as (a+c)/ (b+d). If you use numbers, you will quickly come to results that produce completely wrong results. Although it is easy to find originally matching numbers, they cannot be shortened.(> Dubislav). Logic III 270 Belnap: we have not shown, and cannot show, that there is such a connection. The same applies to "tonk". Read: one problem remains: why is there any analogy at all between definitions and links? One problem remains: why is there an analogy between definitions and links at all. It cannot always be wrong to extend a language with new links. One could imagine calculation rules for "conservative" extensions of languages. The old rules must continue to exist. |
Beln I N. Belnap Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World Oxford 2001 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Private Language | Dewey Vs Private Language | Quine XII 42 Private Language/DeweyVsPrivate Language: Dewey thought about this problem already in the 20s. (Before Wittgenstein): Self-talks are secondary, after communication. ((s) Because the meanings are learned in communication.) At that time Wittgenstein was still advocating his more traditional depiction theory of language. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Private Language | Stegmüller Vs Private Language | Stegmüller IV 120 VsPrivate Language/rule following/Wittgenstein: assertibility conditions for private rule following are impossible because there is no community. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Properties | Quine Vs Properties | I 215 We have seen that the appearance of abstract singular terms cannot be separated from that of abstract general terms ("virtue is rare"). Already a mass term has something of the hybrid appearance of the abstract singular term. E.g. "water" rather designates 1) a common characteristic of different puddles and glass filling levels than 2) a scattered part of the world that consists of those puddles. I 216 Mass terms are archaic remnants from the first phase of language acquisition, preforms of abstract singular terms. The difference between the "red" that is said about apples and the "red" that is said of their outside has no meaning. "Red" becomes the name of a property that is not only lumps and drops of a homogeneous substance, but also in common with apples. This abstract object can no longer be put aside as easily as the water property was put aside by giving 2) (common property) preference over 1) (dispersal). I 217 Because even if we have learned to construe water as a distributed concrete object, we tend to additionally permitting an abstract object like "redness". This analogy then spreads beyond the the mass terms up to terms with strictly divided reference. Therefore, roundness and sphericity. Every general term leads to an abstract singular term. The usefulness of abstract terms is mostly in the abbreviation of cross-references: E.g. "The same is true for Churchill", "Both plants have the following property in common". Only that in such cases the cross-reference merely refers to word structures. But we stubbornly tend to objectifying what has been said again by establishing a property instead of talking only of words. QuineVsProperties: Many thoughtless people insist on the reality of properties for no other reason than that both plants (or Eisenhower and Churchill) "must admittedly have something in common"! I 218 Properties: In as far as talk of properties has its origin in such abbreviated cross-references, the putative properties probably do not correspond to simple abstract terms, but to longer expressions. E.g. "being equipped with spikes in clusters of five." Properties: Cassirer: "Properties are remnants of the secondary deities of a disused faith". X 94 Properties/Predicates/Propositions/Individuation/QuineVsFrege: also the conception of the first logician is untenable: properties behave just like propositions. X 95 Properties/Quine: behave to predicates or open sentences like propositions to sentences. One cannot, just like with propositions, distinguish individual properties. Sets: can be distinguished due to the principle of extensionality. Principle of Extensionality: two sets are identical if they have the same elements. Open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine two different sets, but they can be based on two different properties. Properties/Identity: for two properties to be identical, the corresponding open sentences must be synonymous. And that is not possible because of confusion. Solution/Some Authors: Sets as values of "F". Quine: nevertheless, predicate schematic letters should not be regarded as quantifiable variables. Predicate/Quine: predicates have properties as their "intentions" or meanings (or would have them if properties existed), and they have sets as their extensions. But they are neither the name of one nor of the other. Intention: of a predicate: property Extension: of a predicate: set. Name: a predicate is never a name, neither of its intention (property) nor of its extension (set). Variable/Quine: quantifiable variables, therefore, cannot take the place of predicates, but of names. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Propositions | Davidson Vs Propositions | Field II 167 Meanings as intentional entities/DavidsonVsPropositions/Field: (Davidson 1967): Thesis: It is impossible to come up with a non-trivial theory of these intentional entities. E.g. meanings as intentional entities. E.g. How are meanings to be combined in form combinations? Meaning Combinations/MC/Davidson: ((s) instead of syntactic combinations): the most obvious is still to assume that meaning equality requires equal MC to be constructed of synonyms parts in the same way. Then we need a link operation for meanings. Like otherwise only for expressions ((s) syntactically). Of course, we could set up something like this: E.g. for all expressions E1 and E2: if E1 means m1 and E2 means m2, thenE1^E2 means m1^m2. How exciting! We can expand this "theory" by combining meaning equality with equality of meaning characterization. Problem: this does not yet create a connection between these meanings on the one hand and truth conditions (TC) and reference conditions on the other hand. That must yet be added. E.g. nothing tells us that the meaning associated with "Plato" picks out Plato. We have to add that through another theory of reference. (Which could be disquotational). Wrong solution: it would not help to introduce the concept "Plato" in a way that no intentional entity can be "Platon" if it does not single out Plato. Vs: If we did that, it would no longer be trivial that the meaning associated with "Plato" is iPlatoni. We would need an additional explanation as to why this is so, and it is not clear why this should be self-evident. "Theory of Reference"/Field: we would have to add that for other expressions, such as predicates and logical symbols. E.g. a theory that explains how the corresponding truth functions for "or" is singled out. T theory/Field: we would then have to add a T theory that explains how the meanings of composite expressions contribute to the TC. Conclusion: Hasn’t all the interesting work been done by the theories of reference and truth, plus access to equivalence relations on the set of meaning characterizations after this is subjected to translation? Horwich I 461 "Propositional assumption"/Propositional assumption/Terminology/Dummett/Devitt/Rorty: this is how Devitt called Dummett’s assumption that language understanding consists in the knowledge that the proposition is true in L in such and such circumstances. Understanding/Truth conditions/Tr.cond/Circumstances/Situation/DavidsonVsDummett: it is hopeless to try and isolate such circumstances because of the holism. Dummett: gives a non-holistic representation of "Davidsonean truth conditions" Dummett/Devitt: tries to infer: E.g. from "X knows the meaning of S" and "The meaning of S = the TC of X" to "S knows that the TC of X are TC". Rorty: this is only possible if we construct "S knows the meaning of S" as "There is an entity that is the meaning of S, and thus X is known." This is the propositional assumption. DavidsonVsPropositions//Rorty: Davidson would not accept them. And therefore he is not a TC theorist in Dummett’s sense. Devitt: assumes that Davidson accepts the propositional assumption. Rorty: this goes back to the fact that Davidson identified the meaning of theory with a theory of language understanding in his early articles. But they are incompatible with holism, and as misleading as E.g. the metaphor that billiard balls have "internalized" the laws of mechanics. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Propositions | Quine Vs Propositions | V 61 QuineVsPropositions: to maintain the old "ideas": the idea that a sentence expresses. Superfluous. VI 99 QuineVsPropositional Stances de re: peculiar intention relation between thoughts and intended things. There are no reliable policies for that. Not scientific. Better: Opinions de dicto. VI 142 Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This is shown by the indeterminacy of translation. X 19 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as meaning of sentences, as an abstract entity in its own right. Some authors: consider it as what t/f is, and between which there are implications. Oxford/Terminology: many authors use "proposition" for statements. Quine: in my earlier works I used it for assertions. I gave up on it, because of the following trend: Proposition/Oxford: actions that we perform when we express assertions. X 20 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: their representative believes to save a step and thus to achieve immediacy: Truth/Tarski/Quine: the Englishman speaks the truth, 1) Because "Snow is white" means that snow is white and 2) Snow is white. Quine: the propositionalist saves step (1). The proposition that snow is white is simply true, because snow is white. ((s) >Horwich: "because snow..."). He bypasses differences between languages and differences between formulations within a language. Quine: my disapproval does not arise from dislike of abstract things. Rather: QuineVsPropositions: if they existed, they would bring about a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between propositions themselves: False Equivalence/Quine: such sentences would be equivalent that express the same proposition. QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/VsSentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences. X 32 Letter/Quine: p can be schematic letter (only for sentences) or variable (then only for objects). Here problem: that does not work simultaneously! Solution: semantic ascent: we only talk about sentences. Sentence/Name/Quine: the other formulation could be given sense by stipulating that sentences are names, for example, of propositions. Some Authors: have done that. Before that, however, the letter "p" is no variable about anything except schematic letters, placeholder for sentences in a logical formula or grammatical structure. QuineVsPropositions: Problem: once sentences are conceived as names of propositions, the letter "p" is also a variable about objects, namely propositions. Then, however, we can correctly say: "p or not p' for all propositions p" ((s) Because the letter p is no longer at the same time a variable about objects and a schematic letter for sentences, but only a variable about objects.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Propositions | Schiffer Vs Propositions | I XVII SchifferVsPropositions: (For reasons that have nothing to do with the mind-body-problem): Belief/Schiffer: (late): cannot be a relation to propositions: E.g. Tanya's belief that Gustav is a dog: Proposition: if the propositional theory is correct, the proposition has to, in order to present the full content, so to speak contain doghood or a manner of the representation of doghood. I 43 SchifferVsPropositions: if a functional theory can also be set up with sentences or even uninterpreted formulas, propositions are surely completely superfluous. I 44 Why should an arbitrary formulation that uses propositions to index functional roles, be considered as determination of the extension of the colloquial "believes"?. I 51 Proposition/Schiffer: There are several things that can be taken as propositions: rough-grained: propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values. These have no structure as functions. fine-grained: Complex that contain individuals (as components) and properties as structure. (E.g. situation semantics, Barweise/Perry 1983, Bealer 1982, Adams 1974, Lewis 1970a, Loar 1981, Plantinga 1974). SchifferVsPropositions: no matter whether to accept propositions as fine-grained or rough-grained, there are problems: E.g. Suppose (a) Ralph believes that snow is white and all theoreticians agree that one can analyze it like this: (b) B (Ralph, the proposition that snow is white). FN I 277 But they are all not obliged to (b). I 51 But they will agree that the expression "that snow is white" in A functions as a complex singular term that refers to this proposition and that the reference of this singular term is defined by the references of its components. ((s)> compositionality of reference). I 52 Then the proposition is necessarily true if snow is white. Schiffer: the two theorists may differ in whether the propositions contain their speakers as components. Function/Structure/Schiffer: if propositions are functions of possible worlds in truth value, they contain their references not as components. They do not include the entities they determine. I 70 SchifferVsPropositions/As belief content/SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsPropositional Theory/Conclusion: if the theory were true, the proposition would contain as belief content either doghood itself or a BT of it But if there were a truly language-independent property of doghood, they would belong to the biologically determined natural type and E.g. show "shmog" I 71 That doghood itself cannot be the component of propositions that we seek. That the content of natural-type-concepts should include BT, is only credible if there was a specific approach for what those BT should be at all. And we have not found such an approach. So the propositional theory (propositionalism) is wrong. Another reason against propositions as belief content: Property/Doghood/Schiffer: if there should be a non-pleonastic, voice-independent 1. property of being a dog that it would have to be the only one. But there is not. If it existed, it might not be irreducible. 2. if there were a reducible such property, there would be a property that is specifiable in phenotypic and/or genetic etc. terms that would be this property of being a dog, 3. but there is not such a property: none of Gustav's properties, however complex. But that is not so important. It only later plays a role for the existence of language-independent belief properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Prosentential Theory | Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory | Horwich I 344 Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example (28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then… Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then Or If snow is white, then… CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____"). (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB). Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here. I 346 VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs Mary: that's surprising, but true. (31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being Mary: that is profound and it is true. Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization! VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way? CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true". CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition). What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs. Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act. I 347 The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.) CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true! Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts. Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto). Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic. Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example (32) John: Some dogs eat grass. Mary: You believe that, but it's not true. Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs). I 348 However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference. N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property. VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin. Example: a child says I've got 15 logs That is right. I 349 Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use. I 349 Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property). CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic". Moreover: Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn). Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing. Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts. Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, I 456 and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions. Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements. Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds. Instead: Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Psychologism | Dummett Vs Psychologism | I 115 Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different of inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you - like Evans and others - to reverse the priority of language against the idea. (Danger of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Putnam, H. | Davidson Vs Putnam, H. | I (b) 29 Twin Earth/: The question is whether it follows that the person concerned does not know what they think? DavidsonVsPutnam: Answer: this does not follow: it would only follow if the object that is used to identify my thoughts were something which I would have to be able to distinguish in order to know what I think. However, we had abandoned this assumption. What I see in front of me I believe to be water, I do not run the risk of thinking it was twin earth water, because I do not know what twin earth water is. I (b) 30 Even more: I also believe that I think I see water, and I am right with that, although it is probably not to water but twin earth water. I (c) 59 Putnam and Dummett show that the concept of truth itself can be given a knowledge-based twist. Yet all three have given the evidence precedence over the truth (as the primary status for the determination of meaning). DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsPutnam: I think this is a mistake: This leads to the difficulties of the proximal theories: to a concept of truth relativized to individuals and to skepticism. The proximal theories are always kind of Cartesian. I (d) 73 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: Vsproximal theory: skepticism, relativism to individual evidence: The only insightful concept of evidence is that of a relation between sentences. Or between beliefs! Davidson: My externalism is excited not by "linguistic division of labor" but by the "Twin Earth". Therefore, I do not believe that Putnam’s externalism threatens the authority of the first person. But I do not quite agree for other reasons. DavidsonVsPutnam: his externalism applies primarily to words for natural species such as "water" and "leopard". The idea is that I identify these objects henceforth through the microstructure. ((s) why?) DavidsonVsPutnam: but I do not see why the equality of the microstructure necessarily should be the decisive similarity, through which the reference of a word such as water should be determined. I (e) 116 There is no reason to limit externalism to a single, or small number of categories. For language and thought it is generally characteristic that their link with the world emerge from the kind of causal connections I discussed. Putnam: microstructure provides similarity for determining the reference (DavidsonVs) Davidson: causal connections generally relevant for language and reference DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he emphasizes the everyday situation so strongly with the triangulation sets him apart from Putnam’s and Burge’s externalism. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Putnam, H. | Field Vs Putnam, H. | III 113 Pure Mathematics/Putnam: should be interpreted in a way that it asserts the possible existence of physical structures that satisfy the mathematical axioms. FieldVsPutnam: pure mathematics should not be interpreted at all. I 211 Properties/Relations/Putnam: (1970): are predicative, according to them we have a few basic physical prop and rel from which all others are derived: 1st order: Allows no reference to a totality of physical objects when a new property is constructed. 2nd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st order. 3rd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st and 2nd order. - Every physical property appears on any level of the hierarchy -> functionalism. Functional properties are 2nd or higher order properties - the prop that the role has may differ from person to person. I 214 FieldVsPutnam: instead of properties provide instantiations of properties with steps. I 268 Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: ("Mathematics without foundations", 1976b, 1975 "What is mathematical truth?"): Field: Putnam Thesis: the mathematical realist does not have to accept the "mathematical object picture". He can formulate his views in purely modal terms. And that not as an alternative, but only as another formulation of the same view. I 269 Indispensability Argument/Putnam: appear in the subsequent text. Field: If "Mathematics as a modal" logic was really an equivalent description of mathematics in terms of mathematical objects (MO), then it should also be possible to reformulate the Indispensability Argument so that there is a prima facie argument for one or the other kind of modalized mathematics and mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: but Section 6 and 7 show that we cannot formulate the indispensability argument like that: it requires MO and modalized mathematics does not bring them forth. VSVs: but beware: I have not studied all the possibilities. I 269 FieldVsPutnam: his mathematical realism seems puzzling: Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: Thesis: there is a modal translation of pure mathematics: he presents a translation procedure that turns mathematical statements into modal statements, one that transforms acceptable mathematical statements (E.g. axioms of set theory) into true modal assertions that include no quantification, unless it is modalized away. (I.e. no mathematical entities (ME) in the modal statements). I 270 FieldVsPutnam: two general questions: 1) what kind modality is involved here? 2) what benefit is the translation to have? ad 1): Putnam thinks that the "object-image" (the starting position) and its modal translation are equivalent at a deeper level. FieldVs: that’s really not interesting: "mathematically possible" should coincide with "logically possible" in any reasonable view (this is stated by conservatism). ((s) contrary to the above). Important argument: if A is not mathematically possible, then "~A" is a consequence of mathematics - i.e. if A (and then also its negation) are purely non-mathematically, then "~A" is logically true. If Putnam now says that his modal translation involves a "strong and clear mathematical sense of possibility", then a mathematical possibility operator must be applied to sentences that contain ME. However, such a sentence A could also be a mixed sentence (see above, with purely mathematical and purely physical components). I 271 FieldVsPutnam: for purely mathematical sentences mathematical possibility and truth coincide! But then the "modal translations" are just as ontologically committed as the mathematical assertions. FieldVs"Mathematical Possibility"/FieldVsPutnam: we had better ignore it. Maybe it was about 2nd order logical possibility as opposed to 1st order for Putnam? I 271 FieldVsPutnam: what benefits does his modal translation have? Does it provide a truth transfer (as opposed to the transmission of mere acceptability)? And what value has it to say that the mathematical statements are both true and acceptable? Etc. Mathematics/Realism/Putnam/Field: Putnam describes himself as "mathematical realist": Difference to Field’s definition of realism: he does not consider ME as mind-independent and language-independent, but (1975): Putnam: you can be a realist without being obliged to mathematical objects. I 272 The question is the one that Kreisel formulated long ago: the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question the existence of mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: this is puzzling. I 277 Model Theory/Intended Model/Putnam/Field: this morality can be strengthened: there is no reason to consider "∈" as fixed! Putnam says that in "Models and Reality": the only thing that could fix the "intended interpretation" would be the acceptance of sentences that contain "∈" through the person or the community. Putnam then extends this to non-mathematical predicates. ((s)> Löwenheim-Skolem). FieldVsPutnam: this is misleading: it is based on the confusion of the view that the reference is determined, E.g. by causal reasoning with the view that it is defined by a description theory (description theory, (labeling theory?), in which descriptions (labels?) that contain the word "cause" should play a prominent role. (> Glymour, 1982, Devitt, 1983, Lewis 1984). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Putnam, H. | Fraassen Vs Putnam, H. | Hacking I 80 Theory of meaning / FraassenVsPutnam: may be interesting, but it does not contribute to the understanding of science. (Hacking ditto). Empiricism is true, but not in the language-related figure given to it by the logical positivists! Def Constructive empiricism / Frassen per: Science aims to provide theories that are empirically adequate. Acceptance here means only that a theory is adequate. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Putnam, H. | Hacking Vs Putnam, H. | I40 Truth/Reason/Putnam: are very closely connected. HackingVsPutnam. I 148 Meaning/Science/HackingVsPutnam: we should talk about types of objects, not about types of meaning. Meaning is not a very good concept for philosophy of science. I 156 HackingVsPutnam: Reference is ultimately not decisive! (E.g. muon). For physicists, "Meson" was initially synonymous with "whatever corresponds to the presumption of Yukawa". That’s something like Fregean sense. When it became clear that this sense did not correspond to the object, the baptism was annulled and a new name was given. I 163 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Vs idea of "fixed whole of mind-independent objects". HackingVsPutnam: nobody has never represented this!. I 164 HackingVsPutnam: links his different theses, as if they were logically connected. They are not!. HackingVsPutnam: he used to represent a scientific realism. He has not changed party, he has changed war. I 179 HackingVsPutnam: however, actually he has shown nothing but the failure of the reference by naming a number of true statements, which are brought into being in the first-order logic (>Löwenheim, >AustinVsMoore). I 181 Löwenheim-Skolem/Premises/Hacking: 1) the sentence is only about the first-order logic sentences. So far, no one has proved that the language of the physicists could be pressed in this context. Spoken languages contain indicators: "this" and "that". Montague thesis: colloquial language primarily uses second-order quantifiers. Wittgenstein’s arguments against showing, according to which it was not possible to fully specify meaning using rules, do not imply that there was something in our linguistic practice, which is essential undetermined. Löwenheim and Skolem spoke about large numbers and we can only talk about them. About cats or cherries we can do more than merely talk. Putnam asserts that it is possible to reinterpret words such as "designate" and "refer" in turn. HackingVsPutnam: I do not need theory of reference to refer. And it’s a - possibly with reference to Wittgenstein - at least defensible conception that there cannot be a general theory of reference. I 182 scientific articles on muons are full of photographs! - E.g. muons: it has been found that the mass of the muon is 206,786 times the mass of the electron. How have we found out this figure at the time?. I 183 From a whole bunch of complicated calculations with a bunch of variables and a number of relations between nature constants. These consist not only of sentences, but are linked to experimental findings. They also have been found by independent scientists and laboratories. I 184 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is not constructive. I.e. in principle there is no method for producing a non-intended interpretation available to man. - E.g. we also speak of "Persian" and "Heart Cherry". These species names do not act like ordinary adjectives of the type "sweet", because sweet heart cherries are sweet fruits and not "heart fruit". - Solution: This is not possible or would be noticed, because the number of subspecies is not the same: the number of cherry species is different from the number of cat species. So no correspondence relation will preserve the structure of the species names. Moreover, you would not bake a cake with cats! How should cherry facts come to light in the cat world?. I 185 Putnam perhaps commits the gravest error possible in philosophy: he takes a sentence as an example that was perhaps never uttered and would be pointless outside logic. The next step is then to assert that just as it is possible to reinterpret "cherries" it is possible to reinterpret "designating". Reference: its warranty does not depend primarily on the expression of true propositions, but on our interactions with the world. Even at the level of the language there is far more structure given than Putnam involves. I 220 HackingVsPutnam: transcendental Nominalist (anti-realist). It is not possible to step out of the system of thought and retain a base of reference that does not belong to one’s own system of reference. HackingVsPutnam: misguided dichotomy of thought and action (like Dewey). Hacking Thesis: man is a representing being. (A tribe without images is not a human tribe for me). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Putnam, H. | Nagel Vs Putnam, H. | I 25 NagelVsPutnam: has always been flirting with subjectivism. I 132 Internal realism fails because of its own test of rational acceptability. What we actually accept is a worldview that confirms or refutes our perceptions. Even our interpretation of the quantum theory and the related observations would be a view on the suchness of the world, even if a physicist says it could not be interpreted realistically. It would not be a view that would rightly be restricted by means of an "internalist" interpretation. Our point of view is a set of beliefs that affect the real suchness, while it is being admitted that we do not know many things. The only method of determining the rational acceptability is thinking about whether it is true. With all the evidence and arguments, and considering all the things that are cited by others as relevant. Nagel: we must not equate acceptability with truth, otherwise we would rob both terms of any content. Internal Realism/Putnam: internal realism should not contain any reduction of truth to epistemic terms, truth and acceptability are interdependent. NagelVsPutnam: that is not clear. Putnam seems to be making concessions lately, however, see his explanation for why Wittgenstein was not a relativist: a position outside the language game is something else than participating in the language game itself. Putnam: but why should metalanguage be so sure of itself?" I 133 Brand: the belief that the world is organized is quite confirmed in a number of areas, namely: if they predict observations that, in turn, cannot be explained by our belief in these hypotheses. The "theory ladenness" of the observation in my opinion is of little importance. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Putnam, H. | Poundstone Vs Putnam, H. | I 95 Quark/Poundstone: are quarks counterfactual? It is impossible to observe an isolated quark. They are what would make a proton split if it could be split, but it cannot be split. I 96 Reason: the color intensity grows with increasing distance instead of diminishing. Endless energy demand. Even if it was possible to provide this energy, new particles would be produced instead of a quark. PoundstoneVsPutnam: the answer to whether these assumptions are merely complications lies not in the skies, but in our minds. I 319 Universe/Turtle/Poundstone: E.g. "The universe rests on the back of a turtle": is to say that the known universe rests on the back of an unknown turtle. We automatically determine the semantic content of "universe" such that it fits into the context of the sentence. Brains in the Vat/PoundstoneVsPutnam: we would do the same with a statement, "We are brains in a vat"! They could say: "I am that which "retort brain" means in the laboratory language". Within the retort language "laboratory language" would be a metaphysical expression without physical equivalent. I 323 Thought Experiment/PoundstoneVsPutnam: possible or impossible physical realization is of importance in thought experiments! E.g. Twin Earth: a long chemical formula would correspond to a thick, sticky mass! Therefore no confusability with our water, other mental state! The only other combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O2 hydrogen peroxide) is extremely unstable. Planets with ammonia atmosphere would have to be much colder. When ammonia is liquid, mercury is solid. That would be a very different world. ((s) PoundstoneVsPutnam/(s): brings a holistic argument then). I 324 PoundstoneVsPutnam: our brain is largely composed of water, i.e. we also have the meaning of water in our heads. The inhabitants of the Twin Earth would then have XYZ in their heads! I 326 Twin Earth/Putnam: every experience is ambiguous. The counterparts have made identical experiences, their neuron currents or brain states may be identical, but there is more than one reality to match. I 336 Model Theory/PoundstoneVsPutnam: a key which provides some kind of meaningful text at all will be the right one! Reason: the infinite number of theoretically possible keys. I 339 Meaning/Translation/Coding/Cryptography/Poundstone: where is it? In the message, in the key? In the consciousness of those who understand the message? PoundstoneVsPutnam: only few would argue that the meaning is in the consciousness, after all, i.e. in the mind. Extreme case: if the system puts out "iiii...", then the entire meaning lies in the key. Mostly, the meaning is divided between the text and the key. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Pythagoras | Quine Vs Pythagoras | XII 75 Löwenheim/Skolem/Strong Form/Axiom of Choice/Ontology/Reduction/Ontological Relativity/Quine: (early form): Thesis: if a theory is true and has a hyper-countable object range, then everything except for a countable section is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of the variables, without any sentence becoming false. I.e. all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And these, in turn, to a specific ontology of natural numbers. For that you take the list, as far as it is explicitly known, as SF. And even if the list is not known, it exists. Accordingly, we can interpret all our objects as natural numbers, even though the list number ((s) the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not establish a Pythagorean multi-purpose ontology once and for all? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either only of numbers or only of bodies, or of sets, etc. Problem: Suppose we had such an ontology and somebody offered us something that would have appeared as an ontological reduction prior to our decision for the Pythagorean ontology, namely a method by which all things of a certain type A are superfluous in future theories, while the remaining portion would still be infinite. XII 76 In the new Pythagorean framework his discovery would still retain its essential content, even though it could no longer be called a reduction; it would be only a maneuver in which some numbers - we do not even know which - would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: it shows that an all-engulfing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and more obscure versions of old methods and problems. Solution: Ontological relativity, relativistic theory. It's simply pointless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms. ((s) i.e. in this case to assert that everything is a number.) (>inside/outside). The relevant predicates, e.g. "number", "set", "body" or whatever, would be distinguishable in the frame theory, however, by the roles they play in the laws of this theory. Quine: an ontological reduction is only interesting if we can specify an SF. If we have the axiom of choice and even a sign for a general selection operator, can we then specify an SF that concretizes the Löwenheim theorem? 1) We divide the object range into a countable number of equivalence classes, each with indistinguishable objects. (Indistinguishability Classes). We can dispense with all members of every equivalence class, except one. 2) Then we'll make use of the axiom of choice to pick out a survivor from each equivalence class. XII 77 Quine: if this were possible, we could write down a representative function with Hilbert's selection operator. Löwenheim/Quine: but the proof of the theorem has a different structure: it does not seem to justify the assumption that a representative function could be formulated in any theory that maps a hyper-countable range in a countable one. At first glance, such an SF is of course impossible: it would have to be reversibly unique to provide different real numbers with different function values. And this contradicts the mapping of a hyper-countable into a countable range, because it cannot be reversibly unambiguous. ((s) Because it has to assign the same value to two arguments somehow.) Framework Theory/Stronger/Weaker/Theory/Ontology/Quine: there are three strength levels of requirements regarding what is said about the ontology of the object theory within the framework theory. 1) weakest requirement to the framework theory: is sufficient if we do not want any reduction, but only explain about what things the theory is. I.e. we translate the object theory into the framework theory. I.e. we make translation proposals, with which, however, the inscrutability of reference still is to be taken into account. The two theories may even be identical, e.g. if some terms are explained by definitions by other terms of the same language. XII 78 2) stronger: in case of reduction by an SF, here the frame theory must assume the non-reduced range. (see above, analogy to raa, reductio ad absurdum). 3) strongest requirements: in case of reductions according to Löwenheim: i.e. from a hyper-countable to a countable range: here, the SF must be from a truly stronger frame theory. I.e. we can no longer accept it in the spirit of the raa. Conclusion: this thwarts an argument from the Löwenheim theorem in favor of Pythagoreanism. Ontological Relativity/Finite Range/Quine: in a finite range, ontological relativity is trivial. Since instead of quantification you can assume finite conjunctions or disjunctions, the variables and thus also the question of their value range also disappear. Even the distinction between names and other signs is eliminated. Therefore, an ontology for a finite theory about named objects is pointless. That we have just talked about it is because we were moving in a broader context. Names/Quine: are distinguished by the fact that they may be used for variables. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 577 E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units. I 578 BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur. I 579 Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of "the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme). The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups. I 580 VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough. BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli. I 601 Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing. I 666 BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective. II 217/218 The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism). II 224 BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings. BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Carnap Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 173 Analytic/Synthetic: CarnapVsQuine: trying to overcome the difficulties in order to maintain the distinction. Restriction: the distinction should apply only to the so-called constructed languages. Here there are clear rules as to when a composition is allowed.(1) 1. J. R: Flor, "Ernst Mach: Der Vater des Wiener Kreises" in: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 VII 147 Pragmatics/Carnap: additional problem: whether the objects exist. Quine: doubts that in the case of absence an explication of the words is possible, since he requires clear behavioral criteria. So these words become meaningless. CarnapVsQuine: it is theoretically possible to show the fruitfulness of semantic concepts through the evolution of language systems without pragmatic basis (language use, behaviourist). (operational procedures). VII 151 Intensionalist thesis of pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the language habits. Extensionalist thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste; the linguist is free, because it cannot be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise, either. Quine: the completed lexicon is e.g. pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the foot. But we can draw an advantage from that. On the other hand, if we postpone a definition of synonymy in the case of the lexicon, no problem appears as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. VII 152 Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist must provide not only the real cases, but also the possible ones. VII 153 CarnapVsQuine: The extensionalist thesis is inappropriate: E.g. entry in the lexicon: (3) Einhorn, unicorn Kobold, goblin On the other hand the wrong registration: (4) Einhorn, goblin Kobold, unicorn Carnap: The two German words here have the same extension, namely the zero class (Carnap pro). If the extensionalist thesis is correct, then there is no essential, empirically verifiable difference between (3) and (4). VII 154 QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man in the street was unwilling to say anything about nonexistent objects. VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man in the street is very well able to understand issues related to assumed counterfactual situations. Quine XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things is only to choose a certain language. It does not mean to believe in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be a value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning as it only expresses a choice of language. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be so separated. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. Stroud I 221 Dream/Quine/Stroud: Quine does not exclude the possibility that we dream all the time. (>Descartes). Skepticism/Empiricism/Carnap: cannot be answered empirically. Knowledge/Carnap: however, there may be empirical studies that show how we arrive at knowledge. Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: is supposed to do that. CarnapVsQuine: N.B.: precisely because it is an empirical investigation, it cannot answer the traditional question of the philosopher. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 319 Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion. ((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity. Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages. II 320 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case. II 321 Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined. II 324 Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty: II 325 Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). II 326 Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, II 327 so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations. Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13) ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning. Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined. II 328 ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. II 329 Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation. II 330 ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". II 333 VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. II 343 Language may not be taught at all. II 335 Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances. ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance. It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless. II 337 Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others. II 337 Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. --- Quine V 32 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.) Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances. Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence. QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions. --- V 33 We find this through the procedure of question and consent. --- Quine XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. --- XI 116 Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations. Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language. ((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I (c) 41 Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations. I (c) 55 So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) - I (c) 64 DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides. I (d) 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person. I (e) 93 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language? McDowell I 165 McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason. Fodor/Lepore IV 225 Note 13.> IV 72 Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Dummett Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Dummett I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer considers the language of a particular individual as a starting unit, but the disposition to language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevalent DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding of the private and non-communicable knowledge depend on a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is rather tempting to consider an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a move means is not derived not from the players’ knowledge of the rules, but from the rules themselves. Fodor/Lepore IV 34 Language Philosophy/Fodor/Lepore: current status (1992): 1. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because the distinction analytic/synthetic must be maintained nevertheless. (VsQuine). Representatives: DummettVsQuine: the smallest language in which the proposition that P can be expressed is the one that can express those propositions with which P is analytically connected. 2. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because even though the distinction analytic/synthetic cannot be maintained because there is a different way of distinction for those propositions, which are constitutive of content, and those that are not. 3. It may turn out that holism follows the assumption that semantic properties are anatomical, but that semantic properties are not anatomical at all! This would mean that the semantic atomism was true. If 3 should be true, someone needs to invent a new story about the relation symbol/world that is not based on similarity or behaviorist stimulus-response scheme,. Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: what we doubt is that the previous arguments show that atomism could not be true. But we want to be moderate. ("Modesty is our middle name"). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 62 FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both. Fodor II 114 Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar. Fodor/Lepore IV 54 Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely: IV 52 Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.). IV 76/77 Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note IV 237 13> IV 157 o Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!. IV 218 Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Kripke Vs Quine, W.V.O. | III 368 Ramified ed Type Theory/vTT/QuineVsRussell/Kripke: Is intended for propositions. QuineVsRussell: Does not give significant ontological improvement vis-à-vis normal set theory. KripkeVsQuine: Our ability to apply the substitutional quantification at higher levels (in strong resemblance to vTT) shows that it is not irrelevant to semantic paradoxes. The failure of not branching brought in problems for the pseudo substitutional language. III 411 KripkeVsQuine: Uses criteria to reduce and others to revalue his favored things, and does not discuss why he uses these criteria. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Lewis Vs Quine, W.V.O. | IV IX LewisVsQuine: Realism in relation to unrealized possibilities. IV 27 Possibility/Quine: Vs unrealized possibilities: the identity criteria are not clear. LewisVsQuine: But identity is not a particular problem for us. Individuation/possible worlds: in every world, things in every category are as individual as in the actual world. Identity/Possible World: Things in different worlds are never identical. (Because of P2) The counterpart relation is the correspondence of identity across worlds (cross world identity). Lewis: while some authors say they can do different things in different worlds and have different properties, I prefer to say that they are only in the actual world and in no other worlds but that they have counterparts in other worlds. IV 32 Essentialism/LewisVsQuine: we actually have the ability to say which properties are essential regardless of description. And also regardless of whether the attribute follows analytically from any other descriptions of the thing. For example, the single-digit sentence φ and an object that is designated by the singular term ζ To say that this attribute is essential means to claim the translation of N φ ζ (N = necessary). IV 147 Centered possible worlds/de re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, "Propositional Objects"): For example, a cat that is chased by a dog wants to go to the roof to be safe. de dicto: the cat wants a state of affairs, which is the class of all possible worlds in which it is on the roof. It fears the class of all possible worlds where the dog catches her. Problem: Crossworld Identity. Question: which of the many similar cats in the many possible worlds (with many dogs and roofs) is it? Some cats are on roofs, some in the dog's claws. Does the cat belong to both the desired and the feared conditions? Solution: centered possible world: pairs consisting of a world and a designated time in space, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds. In fact, the gravitational center is the cat's pineal gland. No centered world belongs to two classes (desired and feared). It would be problematic if the wish were fulfilled under one centering and not fulfilled under another. Quine: does not accept this solution in the end. He prefers the shared theory that the objects of "simple settings" are classes of stimulus patterns, while the more complex settings are linguistic. LewisVsQuine: the benefits of unified objects (properties only) should not be given away. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more precisely a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. Let X be a class of centered worlds, Y be a property. Then the class corresponds exactly to the centered worlds that are centered on a cat with the property Y. It cannot be centered on two different cats. To rule that out, we can redefine centered worlds as pairs of a world and a designated inhabitant in it. Quine/Lewis: he has actually replaced propositions by properties through centering. IV 148 I'm not sure what his reasons are. They are not the same in relation to Catilina and the Great Pyramid (> ontological relativity) (here he wants to avoid the counterpart relation) but certainly in the cat example. Possible World/LewisVsQuine: big difference: by possible world I simply mean big individual things, of which our actual world is one. Possible Worlds/Quine: means certain abstract entities, certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers. ((s) space-time points). Quine/Lewis: I suspect that he at least distinguishes our concrete world from the abstract "replacement world" that it represents! Let's call it "updated ersatz world" to distinguish it from the world itself. Lewis: Variety of concrete worlds. Quine: Variety of abstract ersatz worlds, one of which represents our special one. Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to everyday language than "how it could have been". Lewis: the actual ersatz world is special only because it represents our concrete real world. And it is special not only from its own point of view, but from every world. One could assume the following now: therefore it is not contingent special, because contingency is variation from one possible world to another. LewisVs: in this way it looks like it is a non-contingent fact, which is updated by the many possible worlds. And that is wrong! ((s) Then every fact in the actual world would be necessary, every movement. >Determinism.) Schwarz I 46 Possibility/LewisVsQuine: there must be a theory of what would be true under these or other conditions. But not only because they are needed for the analysis of dispositions and causality. Schwarz I 132 Def Event/Quine/Schwarz: (1960b(1),171): Suggestion: to identify them with the space-time region in which they occur. Vs: this is too coarse-grained for effects and causes. For example, if a ball flies through the air and rotates, then flight and rotation occupy the same region, but only flight causes the window to break. Counterfactual analysis/counterfactual conditional/CoCo/Possible World/Similarity/Lewis: the next possible world in which rotation does not take place are not the next possible worlds in which flight does not take place. The two events correspond to the same space-time region in the real world, but not in all possible worlds. ((s) "Next" is not decisive here). Event/Identity/LewisVsQuine: Modification: Events are identical if they occupy the same space-time region in all possible worlds. Def Event/Lewis: is then the class of all regions (in all possible worlds) in which it happens. (1986d(2)). Schwarz I 220 Def Analytical Truth/LewisVsQuine/Schwarz: a sentence is analytical when its primary truth conditions cover all situations. Schwarz: More interesting is his thesis that practically every sentence can empirically prove to be wrong. Our theories cannot be divided into a revisable empirical and an unrevisable analytical component. 1. Willard Van Orman Quine [1960b]: Word and Object. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press 2. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 162 McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions. On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview. I 184 McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. I 185 McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine. I 186 Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema. I 188 DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory. I 189 Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma. Esfeld I 63 Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system. VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system? 2. Confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"? Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system! Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs. Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors! Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs). Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason? I 64 (S.McDowell I 157ff). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Prior Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 37 Higher-Order Quantification/Prior: It's true, we still have to admit that "for some p, p" is no idiomatic (real) Indo-European. But it is still not difficult to find ordinary language equivalents! We have common quantifiers, nominal and not nominal ones, as "whoever" from "who" or "wherever" from "there", or "somewhat", etc. Grammatically, this corresponds to the adverbs: "I met him somewhere," e.g: in Paris. that's alright. Quine: could say: then we would be "ontologically committed" to the existence of "places" as of ordinary objects. PriorVsQuine: but we do not need to respond to that! I 48 Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being the value of a bound variable" is just a unproven dogma. Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions such as "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the single ones. In particular, it is meant that "X believes __" should not fall into the same category as "It's not the case, that __". I.e. they are both supposedly not single-digit constructions. Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then each composite sentence, which differs only in that it has S1 as sub-sentence where the other has S2 as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value. This is the "law of extensionality". |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 191 Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist: I 192 "Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated. I 222 Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology. I 223 Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in? I 225 RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences: 1) There is such a thing as an ontology. 2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status. 3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning. 4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point. 5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference. RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism. I 226 Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles. I 231 RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of the idea" than necessary. I 250 Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants. IV 24 RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network. VI 212 RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Searle Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 20 SearleVsQuine: Occasionally mistakes in philosophy entail mistakes in the linguistic philosophy. Beliefs that - when it comes to what linguistic signs mean - there are no facts that go beyond speech pattern behavior. (Quine 1960(1)): it is no question of fact, if anyone, you or I, say the "Rabbit" meaning a rabbit by it or a separate part or a portion of the rabbit story. (> Gavagai). II 269 Generality/de re/de dicto/representation/SearleVsQuine: he confuses the distinction between particular and general propositional attitudes of re and such de dicto with a distinction between attitudes. No one may have wish for something indefinite, without somehow representing the object itself. (E.g. "General sailboat" as the object of my desire.). II 270/271 SearleVsQuine: (SearleVs attitudes that are supposedly irreducible de re). Belief in such attitudes is due to a Wittgensteinian diagnostic. Our language provides two ways to report about propositional attitude: with de re-reports or de dicto-reports. E.g. Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. (de dicto) Or: of the man with the brown hat Ralph believes that he is a spy. (De re). As these two reports can even have different truth values, we believe that there must be also a difference in the phenomena (falsely). The following dialogue is completely absurd: Quine: as far as the man with the brown hat is concerned, Ralph, do you believe that he is a spy? Ralph: no, Quine. You asked me if I have one of the re-conviction, but it is not the case that I believe of the man with the brown hat that he was a spy. Rather, I have the de dicto-belief: I believe that the man with the brown hat is a spy. SearleVsQuine: the opinion that intentional states are somehow intensional themselves is based on the confusion of logical properties of reports of intentional states with logical properties of the states themselves. Searle: there is a de re/de dicto distinction, but that is a distinction between different types of report. V 14 Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: some analytical authors: there is no adequate analysis of the concept of analyticity. Therefore, the concept supposedly does not exist: if there is no analysis and no criteria, we cannot understand him. It is illicit. (SearleVs). The definitions of analyticity and synonymy supposedly require the concept of meaning. As criterion then observable behavior is required. V 15 SearleVsQuine: it is not enough to simply say that we lack the criteria. V 16 SearleVsQuine: false requirements regarding the relation between our understanding of a concept and our ability to establish criteria for its application. V 17 Criteria/Searle: how do we know that one criterion is inadequate? Criteria need projective force. They must lead to specific results. V 18 Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: reversed: instead of proving that we do not understand the concept of analyticity, is our inability to find criteria, rather just requires that we understand what is analyticity. Analyticity/Quine/Searle: Quine chose the example wisely! "I do not know if the statement "All Green is extended" is analytic or not". One can namely deny the extent of sensory data! V 19 E.g. someone might be unsure whether a glass of chartreuse green. All this is a sign that we understand the concept of analyticity very well. V 163 Ontology: the main question: are there criteria for ontological conditions? V 164 Existence/Quine: "to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable." Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and inane. Alternative criterion: a theory requires those and only those entities of which it says that they exist. (Does not have to be done intentionally.) V 165 Ontology/Searle: a notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not necessarily be taken from it. It is also possible that no translation method exists, by which it could be determined which statement is the easier or better. SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion two statements that in reality include the same conditions would include different conditions! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine). V 166 Fictional dialogue Quine/Alston: criteria/existence/AlstonVsQuine: (according to Searle) Q: Instead of saying, "There are four miles from Nauplion to Tolon" one should say: "distance in miles between ... = four." A VsQuine: the first formulation does not include a condition that would not be included in the second! How could it be? The second is only a paraphrase of the first. Existence assumptions depend on statements, not propositions! Q: The objection misses the key point: by the translation we show that the condition is made only apparantly and not necessary. The criterion itself is ontologically neutral! Furthermore, no claim to synonymy is connected to the paraphrase. V 167 A VsQuine: that is confused: according to Quine's criterion, it seems as if every statement could be reproduced in equivalent but in the notation different statements that lead to different results according to Quine's criterion, even though the conditions are the same. Q: The condition of abstract entities in a sentence like (2) "For the property of being a chair there is at least one example" is completely unnecessary, since such a proposition can always be represented by a different proposition. Paraphrase: (1)(E.g.)(x is a chair). This paraphrase shows that we got rid of the unwelcome conditions of being a chair. V 171 Existence/ontology/AlstonVsQuine: ~ what somebody says is important for his assumptions, not how he says it. (Searle pro). Ontology/ontological condition/SearleVsQuine: so the question arises whether the concept of ontological conditions itself is so clear. Perhaps there is no class of irreducible ontological conditions. There is no abstract problem of ontological conditions. But the problem, how we know those facts which we require in our statements. V 172 SearleVsQuine: his stilted way of expressing: "to tolerate", "to shun": it is something completely different if I tolerate or shun tobacco than if I endure or shun universals. Universals/Searle: misunderstanding that we imply anything at all: E.g. "None of us has holiness" is just another way of saying that none of us is sacred. This is quite harmless. 1. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge 1960 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | NS I 149 Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking. Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language. Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form. --- NS I 150 Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility. Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental. --- Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable. StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant. Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object). In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects. Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal). The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view. The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things." StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people. --- Strawson I 252 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright. --- I 253 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences. Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions. StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable. --- Strawson IV 69 StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? --- IV 70 Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. --- IV 71 Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson I 55 CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) Kanitscheider II 23 Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme. Quine VI 36 VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place. VI 51 Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism. VI 52 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is! Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations Quine XI 146 Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction). Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. Quine X 83 Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth. Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability). Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then: Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps. Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences. Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions, X 84 namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs. 1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth! 2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place. Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important. But even mere terms can be better or worse. Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems. 3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped. QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristoteles: cannot be considered independently of the way objects are specified. Wiggins: Quine mocks essentialism. WigginsVsQuine: is his critique on the level of an unreflected acceptance of Aristotle's three-dimensional fiction of our world? Or does he claim that, even if we remain in this provincial ontology, we have the choice to choose whether we want to discriminate or not to discriminate in favor of some of the concepts under which the things we perceive fall? II 286 Concept/Language/WigginsVsQuine: Quine's attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of concepts of substance and against chance formations could explain the certainty with which our culture deals with questions of identity in time or permanence. II 303 WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: there is the question if we can evaluate sentences with names for all possible worlds ("necessary existence") Problem: Cross-world identity |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 183 Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions. Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology. I 184 The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense. I 223 Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience. Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli). StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory! Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two? Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope. Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information. Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain, I 224 how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically. Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal. StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that. "Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem. Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness. Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection. QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science. I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies. Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms. Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge. I 230 Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense. Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously. Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that. StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here. I 231 Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow. I 233 Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630! I 234 Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input. I 240 Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief. I 245 Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chisholm Vs Quine, W.V.O. | III 86 Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: many authors maintain that the distinction is untenable. III 87 1. for that one would have to speak of necessity 2. from the behavior of people it is not evident that their language is such that it is necessarily true: if a certain expression applies to something, then it applies also another way of saying the same thing. 3. The behavior does also not show the need that two expressions must apply to the same thing. ChisholmVsQuine/Chisholm: That together, if it were true, would be insufficient to show that the distinction is untenable. An additional premise would have to contain a philosophical generalization on the conditions for such a distinction. Generalization/Chisholm: how would it be defended: we see that in connection with the question of the criterion (see below) and skepticism (see below) - ChisholmVsQuine: none of the possible generalizations was ever defended. Therefore, it is not true that the distinction analytic/synthetic was proved untenable. Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change: for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times like in everyday language or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t".) 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Simons Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 60 Ontology/variables/quantification/Lesniewski/Simons: because of his understanding of quantification Lesniewski can quantify over variables (otherwise 2nd order logic). I 61 But by this he does not enter into any commitment. Quantification/Lesniewski: quantification was described by Quine as substitutional quantification but... SimonsVsQuine: ...Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions and he also does not assume an infinite number of expressions. That would be implausible for him as a nominalist. Küng/Canty/solution: Lesniewski does not quantify over expressions but on their extensions. Thus, abstract entities are still allowed through the back door. Simons: you could say that Lesniewski developed a combinatorial semantics, that is based on a simple idea of an "extensional" meaning so that an expression of the form "Π ... [__]" is true iff. the matrix is true regardless of the meaning of the variables. "∏"/Lesniewski/ordinary language translation/Simons: "∏" simply means "for all". I 123 Four-Dimensionalism/Quine: (1960, W. + O.): physical objects in four-dimensional space-time are not distinguishable from events (more concrete: from processes). I 124 Substance/Quine: a substance differs from other physical objects in that there are relatively few atoms that (temporary) lie partly in it partly outside of it. Substance/SimonsVsQuine: this is simply wrong: material substances are not simply those who win or lose a few atoms. I 128 Extension/Quine: Quine called their occupants: "content of a portion of space-time". SimonsVs: instead, we assume superposition (different individuals with identical parts in the same place at the same time). Continuants/SimonsVsQuine: if such occupants exist at all, they have to be continuants. Events/Simons: events seem at least to have a chance to meet the extensionalist principle no matter whether arbitrary sums are approved. Here, we need definitions of the concepts of temporal and spatial part. Masses: here, we need different meanings of "part" to capture the relations between individuals, between classes or between masses. But this is different than the criticism in the last chapter because here it is about that there may be various analog applications. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Leeds Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 376 LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/Theory/Leeds: Theories which assume that there must be a SI for our language, are based on a wrong premise, namely that the question on whether our theories "depict" the world is dependent on whether "electrons really exist". Reference/Gavagai/Theory/Relation/World/LeedsVsQuine: (Quine seemed to defend this view as well once): that "rabbit" does not really have the relation R to rabbits. (Or only in a "relative sense"). (I have criticized this elsewhere). Indeterminacy of the translation/Quine: 1. the results of word and object do not determine an unambiguous translation 2. there is no standard reference scheme for every language, e.g. we cannot add "obtain reference" or "obtain truth" as a condition for a translation. 3. demands as "conserve the psychological isomorphism" or "conserve the linguistic role" cannot be made precise I 377 Naturalism/Quine/Leeds: Quine's naturalism is revealed early and at the end of his work, e.g. in "Ontological Relativity". Idealism/VsQuine/Leeds: Many authors have thought him to be an idealist in disguise because it is so difficult to see that Naturalistic Instrumentalism (NI) is not inconsistent. These authors have thought that someone who is so obviously an instrumentalist cannot simultaneously believe that electrons exist in an unambiguous manner like the naturalist believes. NI/Leeds: Is coherent at any rate. The great question is whether it is true! |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Kanitscheider Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 23 Ontology/Language/Human/Kanitscheider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology rather as a research programme. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Newen Vs Quine, W.V.O. | New I 129 Concept/Holism/Quine/NewenVsQuine/Newen: not all concepts are linked to all others. E.g. color concepts are independent of the concept of the electron. NS I 68 Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: Quine is a meaning skeptic. His raw material for a reconstruction of a theory of meaning are the empirical sciences. Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: is Quine's largest "Wrecking Ball". NS I 69 Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Dogma: distinction analytic/synthetic 2. Dogma: reductionism: any meaningful synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms all refer to the sensory experience. Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine: the concept of meaning is not well defined. Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 1) Experimental Definition: "... true because of the meanings of the words in it, regardless of empirical facts. Vs: Problem: the transition from e.g. "every unmarried man is unmarried" to "every bachelor is unmarried". Analytical: its definition thus depends on the concept of meaning. Meaning/Quine: Problem: reference objects cannot always serve: e.g. creatures with heart/kidneys. Same Extension. But only because of the (random) evolution), not because of the meaning of words. It cannot always be true solely on the basis of the meaning of words, because the words are different ((s) and "heart" and "kidneys" just are not synonymous.) NS I 70 Today: VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: recent developments have advanced: although meaning is not the same as the reference object, the reference object may be part of the meaning. (see below >natural kinds). Synonymy/Quine: is closely linked to the concept of meaning. If you wished that the meaning was an abstract object, then the class of all synonymous terms/sentences can serve as this abstraction. It follows a new definition: Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2) Experimental Definition: a statement is analytically true if it is true because of synonymy relations and regardless of facts. Point: "meaning" does not occur here anymore. New: the class of the synonymous sentences of w.g. "every bachelor is unmarried" contains the sentence "all unmarried men..." NS I 71 Dictionary/Two Dogmas/Lexicon/Quine: the dictionary already presumes the concept of synonymy. Dictionaries are empirical hypotheses about the use. Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: example Bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability salva veritate is not given, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: e.g. heart/kidneys Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks... Solution: for example heart/kidneys, because it was not necessary but contingent that living creatures with hearts have only evolved if they also had kidneys. NS I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle. Essentialism/VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: in modern metaphysics and philosophy of science essentialism is experiencing a comeback. (Lit 4-4). NS I 74 Analyticity/Synonymy/Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: these expressions are not well defined. Solution/Quine: stimulus meaning: consists of positive and negative stimulus meaning: also contains irrelevant stimuli, i.e. the total package of stimuli on one occasion that lead a particular speaker to accept or decline. It is only a pale imitation of the original concept of meaning. This is part of Quine's meaning nihilism. NS I 75 Stimulus Synonymy: only for defined speaker. The same stimulus meaning. Stimulus Analyticity: only for defined speaker. Agreement with each stimulus. Differs from the original analyticity concept. NS I 76 Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1) inscrutability of reference: E.g. unseparated rabbit parts comply with the same observation situations 2) indeterminacy of translation: E.g. unseparated rabbit part: can a) "be the same" b) "belong to the same thing" (both in the foreign language! This goes beyond the inscrutability of reference 3) underdetermination (of a theory) by the data: (corresponds to translation indeterminacy): there may be rival theories that match the same number of observations. VsQuine: some argue that it never comes to radical translations, because many aspects of language are evolutionarily enscribed in the brain and cannot vary so widely (literature: 4-2). I.e. only the third uncertainty remains. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Radical Interpretation | Newen Vs Radical Interpretation | NI 63 Radical Interpretation/RI/Newen/Schrenk: Basic requirement: that the community has a coherent, rational system of beliefs that is respectful of our logic. Davidson: If this is violated, the foreign language cannot be a language and the strangers can be no thinking beings. VsDavidson: Many argue that this is too strong. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 54 FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT. I 55 PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses. I 56 Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Grover Vs Ramsey, F. P. | Horwich I 319 VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: the first two objections assume that the data base is too narrow, i.e. that there are cases that are not covered by the theory. (See Redundancy Theory). I 320 1) Index words: (Here: repetition of indices): (14) John: I’m greedy - Mary: That is true Problem: here no mere repetition, or else she would say "I am,..." Problem: there is no general scheme for such cases. 2) Modification: Here, a translation is absolutely impossible: (here with indirect reference and quantification): (15) Every thing that Mark said could be true Problem: there is no verb for "could". Similar: (16) Something that Charlie said is either true or not true. (17) Everything that Judith said was true then, but none of it is still true today. Of course you can try: (15’)(p) Mark said that p > It could be the case that p) or (15’)(p) (Mark said that p > that might p exist) Vs: "being the case" and "existing" are variations of "being true". This would make the redundancy theory a triviality. In this case, Ramsey’s "direct" theory would be wrong. CGBVsRamsey: we improve the redundancy theory by we let by not only allowing propositional quantification for the target language, but also an indeterminate field of links, such as M (for "might"), "P" (for past tense), "~" for negation, etc. I 321 The reader has likely already assumed that we have introduced the negation long ago. But that’s not true. Then: (16’)(p) (Mark said that p > Mp) (17’)(Ep) (Charlie said that p & (p v ~p)) (17’)(p) (Judith said that p > (Pp & ~p)) Redundancy Theory/Ramsey/CGB: it is this variant of the theory of Ramsey, enriched by the above links and propositional quantification, which we call redundancy theory (terminology) from now on. The thesis is that "true" thus becomes superfluous. Thesis this allows translations in Ramseyan sense to be found always. VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey: 3) "About"/Aboutness/Accuracy of the Translation/CGB: some authors: argue that "snow is white" is about snow, and "That snow is white, is true" is about the proposition. And that therefore the translation must fail. CGB: this involves the paradox of analysis. We do not directly touch upon it. ((s) Paradox of analysis, here: you’d have to act more stupid than you are in order not to realize that both sentences are about snow; to be able to name the problem at all (as the opponents do) you need to have it solved already.) 4) PragmatismVsRedundancy Theory: even if the translation preserves the alleged content, it neglects other features which should be preserved. Case of recurrence: E.g. (3) Mary: Snow is white. John: That is true. (3’) Mary: Snow is white. John: Snow is white. Is that supposed to be a good translation?. I 322 Strawson: "true" and "not true" have their own jobs to do!. Pro-Sentence/Pronoun/Anaphora/"True"/CGB: "that is true" presupposes that there is an antecedent. But that is not yet taken into account in Ramsey’s translation (3’). So Ramsey’s translation fails in pragmatic terms. VsPropositional Quantification/PQ/VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/CGB: 4) redundancy: at what price? Propositional quantification is mysterious: it is not consistent with everyday language. It is not shown that "is true" is superfluous in German, but only in a curious ad hoc extension. 5) Grammar: (already anticipated by Ramsey): variables need predicates that are connected with them, even if these variables take sentence position. CGBVsRamsey: unfortunately, Ramsey’s response is not convincing. Ramsey: (see above) "p" already contains a (variable) verb. We can assume the general sentence form as aRb here, then. I 232 (a)(R)(b): If he says aRb, then aRb). Here,"is true" would be a superfluous addition. CGBVsRamsey: We must assume an infinite number of different sentence forms ((s)> language infinite). Redundancy Theory/CGB: But that does not need to worry us. 1) Propositional quantification can be set up formally and informally proper. 2) Variables which take sentences as substituents do not need a verb that is connected to them. That this was the case, is a natural mistake which goes something like this: E.g.(4’) (p)(John says p > p). If we use pronouns that simplify the connected variable: For each sentence, if John said it, it then it. Heidelberger: (1968): such sentences have no essential predicate!. Solution/Ramsey: (4’) For each sentence, if John said that it is true, then it is true. T-Predicate/CGB: "T": reads "is true". (4’) (p) (John said that Tp > Tp) Problem: because "T" is a predicate, and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, i.e. it must take a nominal position. I.e. the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables about sentences. I 335 Disappearance Cases/Pro-Sentence: some of them can be regarded as a translation in Ramsey language. Def Ramsey Language/CGB/(s): Language in which "true" is entirely superfluous. English*/CGBVsRamsey: for the purpose of better explanation. E.g. (26) It is true that snow is white, but in Pittsburgh it rarely looks white. (27) It is true that there was unwarranted violence by the IRA, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. T-Predicate/CGB: used in (25) and (26) to concede a point in order to determine afterwards by "but" that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. English*. I 336: E.g. (26’) There was unwarranted violence by the IRA, that’s true, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. These are all disappearance cases. I 342 VsProsentential Theory/Spurious Objections/CGB: I 343 Index Words: Laziness pro-sentences refer to their antecedent. Therefore, the theory must be refined further when it comes to indexical expressions. Otherwise E.g. John: "I’m lazy." Mary: "That’s true." Is not to say that Mary means "I (Mary) am lazy". CGB: but that’s a common problem which occurs not only when speaking about truth: E.g. John: My son has a wart on his nose. Bill: He is the spitting image of his father. E.g. Lucille: You dance well. Fred: That’s new to me. Pragmatics/CGBVsRamsey: our approach represents it correctly, in particular, because we exclude "plagiarism". Ramsey’s theory does not. I 344 Quote/VsPro-Sentence Theory/VsCGB: The pro-sentence theory is blamed to ignore cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences, is expressed. E.g. (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: We could say with Ramsey, that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: that obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become more apparent when we use a foreign language translation. E.g. (28) If "snow is white" is true, then... Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then or If snow is white, then... CGB: There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that we want to make clear that the original sentence was said in German. Or it is possible that there is no elegant translation, or we are not sufficiently familiar with German grammar. Or E.g. "snow is white" must be true, because Fritz said it, and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose, English* had a possibility to present a sentence formally: E.g. "consider __". (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work just like "Snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: it could be argued that this requires a reference on sentences or expressions, because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation Marks/CGB: we depart from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. I 353 Propositional Variable/Ramsey: Occupies sentence position. (Quantification over propositions). CGBVsRamsey: Such variables are of pro-sentential nature. Therefore, they should not be connected to a T-predicate. ((s) otherwise, "true" appears twice). T-Predicate/Ramsey/Redundancy Theory/CGB: this answers the old question of whether a Ramsey language has to contain a T-predicate: see below. Our strategy is to show how formulas can be read in English*, where there is no separable T-predicate. E.g. (4’) For each proposition, if John says it is true, then it is true. CGB: in this case,propositional variables and quantificational pro-sentences do the same job. Both take sentence position and have the cross-reference that is required of them. Important argument: (4’) is just the candidate for a normal English translation of (4’). Problem: this could lead to believing that a Ramsey language needs a T-predicate, as in (4’) (p)(John said that Tp > Tp). ((s) then, "true" implicitly appears twice). I 354 But since (4’) is perfect English, there is no reason to assume that the T-predicate is re-introduced by that. Or that it contains a separately bound "it" (them). |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Realism | Putnam Vs Realism | I (c) 96/97 Realism/Putnam: argues ultimately that science should be taken "at face value", given the failure of all serious programs by philosophical reinterpretation of sciences without philosophical reinterpretation and that science, "taken at face value" implies realism. Realism is sort of "scientific theory of science". VsRealism: could be cited (in the absence of convergence) at the most that the realism would be refuted diachronically. --- I (i) 243 PutnamVsRelativism/PutnamVsRealism: both claim at the same time to be able to exist inside and outside the language. The Realism thus does not refute itself because it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But Relativism refutes itself with that. I (i) 249 PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism: both see the world as a product Realism: the world is a product ex nihilo. Relativism: product of our culture. Putnam: but the world is not a "product", it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Realism | Millikan Vs Realism | I 245 Classical Realism/thinking/Millikan: for classical realism thinking about a thing was to bring this thing or its nature before the conscious mind. Plato/Aristotle/Husserl: the nature of the thing alone occurs in the mind. formerly Russell/Moore/phenomenalism: the thing alone comes before the mind, (without "nature"). Locke/Hume: Thesis: instead of the thing we are dealing with a representation that embodies its nature by copying it. Descartes/Whitehead: a way or an aspect of the thing embodies its nature. Knowledge/thinking/realism/Millikan: So we know ipso facto what we think. The following four things are not distinguished by classical realism: 1. that it seems that one thinks something of something 2. really thinking 3. that it seems that one knows what one is thinking 4. really knowing what one thinks. Identification/classical realism/Millikan: to identify the real value of one'S thoughts is then not the identification with something, or recognition, because one only has a single encounter with the thing. Clear and precise/Realism: if a thought is clear, it is necessarily real and known about the nature of this thing, real or possible. I 246 Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object happens in the moment and never has a reference to past or future acts of consciousness. Problem: how then a thing should be identified as the same as earlier. Classical realism makes a mystery of that. Item/object/thing/classical realism: an object may then have no permanent existence. Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: nothing can be identified by perception alone, recognition: is an act of pure thought in the re-encounter in the volatile flux of things that are given to the senses. Sense/Platon/Descartes/Locke: to somehow direct the mind on eternal objects. thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: Then one could only ever have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects. Solution: taking properties and kinds as the eternal objects one could think of directly. I 247 Problem: how should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could being involved in the world be essential to them? Then it had to be assumed that there are features and kinds that are not exemplified. Thing/nature/essence/classical realism/Millikan: because durable items could not appear before the (only momentarily conscious) mind, the thing and its nature had to be separated. (Nature is eternal and necessary, the thing transitory and accidental). nature/classical realism was sometimes simplistically interpreted as a set of properties. Problem: how can the nature of a transitory thing, its very own identity, be a set eternal characteristics? Identity/MillikanVsRealism: how can the identity of a thing be something other than this thing again? But this has not troubled philosophers at that time. Empiricism/EmpirismVsRealism/Hume/Millikan: revolutionary with Hume was that nothing should be in the mind which had not previously been in the senses. This means that the previous distinction between perception and thought coincided. Problem: now is no longer how to construct the temporal from the eternal, I 248 but how we should construct permanent objects from current objects. ((S) Hume/(S): Thesis: an object only exists in one moment and later again).This led to forms of nominalism and phenomenalism. Realism/thinking/judgment/nature/thing/existence/Millikan: a solution: if there is rather the nature than the object that comes before the mind, then the accidental object is not necessary for nature, it does not necessarily have to exist. Then the realization that there is really the object corresponds to a judgment rather than contemplation about its nature. Existence: that the thing existed became something additional that was added. Ontology/Millikan: Problem: that something should exist "in addition to its previously existing nature". Thinking/Classic Realism/Millikan: applying a term was then equated to judging that a thing exists. So thinking-of = Identifying. I 249 Identification/realism/Millikan: takes place only in a moment and involves only a single encounter with the object. Then this is a kind of aesthetic experience in which consciousness bathes in a becoming aware of the thing. What good would that do? Identification/Millikan: which purpose does it serve normally? Thesis: a) it supposed to help apply prior knowledge to a current case. b) it should match up experiences that were mediated by a medium with experiences from another medium Ex seeing and language. Identity/Relation/Millikan: then identification needs to be described as essentially relational! But classical realism is not able to. Identification/classical realism/Millikan: assumes that the identification of the object is involved in thoinking of it. And since thinking of an object is a momentary act that has nothing to do with other acts, it is impossible to match the capturing of one aspect of an object and capturing a different aspect of that object! Ex knowing that Kant lived in Konigsberg has nothing to do with knowing that he was a philosopher. I 250 Recognition/classical realism/Millikan: recognizing the object as the same is another achievement, it has nothing to do with the repeated thinking of the object. Intentionality/MillikanVsRealism/Millikan: Solution: there may be simple thoughts of complex objects. Also, my theory allows that one knows what one thinks while discovering the complexity of one's thoughts. Intension/Millikan: my theory does not confuse intentionality with having differing intensions. That is, a term can transform with time, without losing track of the thing at issue. (Conceptual change, >meaning change). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reductionism | Dummett Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 146 DummettVsLocke/VsIdealism/DummettVsReductionism/Avramides: Dummett says above that the idealistic MT is not irreparable, but it is then obliged by an objective (objectivistic) image of the mind. Avramides: because of the reduction the Gricean must assume that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to propositional attitudes. He must therefore separate the theory of propositional attitudes from the behavior. Avramides: any theory that denies that the mind manifests itself in linguistic behavior, refers to an objective image of the mind. Functionalism/propositional attitude/GriceansVsAvramides: It might be objected that I have overlooked one theory all the time, in spite of everything: functionalism! It allows us to refer to behavior with propositional attitude, but not language behavior. This makes it attractive for the Gricean. I 147 Avramides pro functionalism: it gives a subjective (subjectivist) image of the mind. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Field Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 113 FieldVsReductionism/VsReductive Griceans: the reductive Gricean approach says that one can explain what it means to believe that Caesar was selfish, without somehow referring to the semantic properties of the sentence "Caesar was selfish". Because explaining the semantic properties of the sentence with belief would be circular. The question is whether the Gricean presupposition is true that you can explain belief without reference to the sentence. (84). ((s) This is not the argument of Pieter Seuren that one could not explain linguistic meaning linguistically. ((s)> Evans/McDowellVsSeuren)). Field: I believe that the presupposition is correct. In a typical case, that which in my system makes a symbol a symbol that stands for Caesar that this symbol has acquired its role in my representation system as a result of my learning a name. I 114 Which stands for Caesar in the public language. (85). Meaning/Language/Field: if that’s right, then ... Avramides: then there can be no inner language without public language, according to Field. SchifferVsField: there is no incompatibility. Intention-based Semantics (IBS, Grice) does not need to assume that you have propositional attitude before you have acquired public language. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Avramides Vs Reductionism | Avra I 112 Avramides Reductionism: Reductionism/Avramides: can deny to be committed to attributing thinking without language to a being. Antireductionism/Avramides: might be uncomfortable with the implausible thesis (attribtuted to him) of having to deny thinking without language. Solution/Avramides: ontological asymmetry Vs ontological symmetry: Ontological asymmetry/Avramides: one could argue that my deep epistemic asymmetry (EA) contained ontological implications. If there is to be a deep EA, there would have to be an ontological one. This conditional could be interpreted as follows: Antireductionism: discards the antecedent and thus must reject the consequent. Therefore it is set to ontological symmetry. Reductionism: can assume ontological asymmetry. And with that he seems to be committed to epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVs: that only seems like that! Because the controversy between ReductionismVsAntireductionism runs above that of ontological SymmetryVsAsymmetry. Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. AvramidesVs: but the flaws in these arguments are obvious. Antireductionism/Avramides: (formal errors aside) how can he accept thinking without language? What exactly is the relationship between epistemic and ontological asymmetry? We will now examine that. I 112 Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny it. I 168 Reductionism/Grice/Epistemic/Ontological/Avramides: the controversy over reductionism or antireductionism is not about ontological but epistemological questions. The reductive follwer of Grice accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, Antireductionist: denies it. AvramidesVsReductionism: so he has nothing to do with interpretation and understanding anymore. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Peacocke Vs Reductionism | Avramidis I 92 Reductionism/Peacocke/Grice/Avramides: Peacocke seems to have equated the failure of superficial epistemic asymmetry (eA) with the failure of the reductive interpretation of Grice's analysis: But he is more cautious than Platts. PeacockeVsReductionism: Grice is more interesting without. "Actual Language Relation"/Peacocke: it is a misleading idea that there is simply a kind of reductionism that can bring the motivation for a search for the "actual language relation", the uses no semantic vocabulary. This is wrong. Suppose we could very precisely attribute certain beliefs and desires before we could translate the language of an individual: even then, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes and locutions would be necessary. And to achieve this, it is not necessary that exactly certain propositional attitudes are ascribable before understanding the language. (Peacocke 1976, p. 167). Avramides: Peacocke seems to connect reductive interpretation and oeA here. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Reductionism | Cartwright Vs Reductionism | I 100 Book of Nature/Science/BoN/17th Century/Boyle/Hooke/History/Cartwright: God wrote down the fundamental laws in the BoN. Then the phenomenological ones are a consequence of it. I 101 A lot of these cann still be found even in today’s philosophy of science, especially in the reductionism and the deductive-nomological model (although not by its authors Hempel, Grünbaum and Nagel). Cartwright: I myself have formerly used such stories in the classroom with the students: namely two creation stories: a) Reductionism: E.g. God writes the book of nature, Peter was his assistant. God writes down the fundamental laws and then leaves the hard-working Peter with a bit of a poor imagination to establish the phenomenological laws. b) God takes special care of the regularities in the world, there are no distinctions between different kinds of laws, God himself dictates every single one of them. Now Peter’s task is much more demanding: he must find the possible initial conditions! According to this view, all the laws are true together. I 102 Cartwright: I have searched long for a non-metaphorical analysis of these metaphors. Today I believe that it cannot be found. Laws/Derivative/Important argument/CartwrightVsReductionism: without the story of God and the Book of Nature, there is no sense in assuming that in nature something is derived from something else. I.e. that the fundamental laws are more "fundamental" and that the others apply "by virtue of them". Deductive-nomological model/Cartwright: here is only an apparent help: because here we can look for quasi-causal relation between LoN. If we do not find any, we focus on language. Then we have formal placeholders for relations between laws. CartwrightVsRealism: but the deductive-nomological model itself is not an argument for realism. Truth/Cartwright: without all the metaphysics, the success in the organization of our knowledge is no argument for the truth of the theory. We still need a story about how the connection between fundamental equations and complex laws should be. > Grünbaum (see above I 94). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Redundancy Theory | Black Vs Redundancy Theory | IV 155 Truth/Tarski/Philosophy/Everyday language/Black: then one could say that "true" is an "incomplete symbol", a part of the assertion stroke "I-". Redundancy theory/BlackVsRedundancy theory: with that truth will lose its dignity. One might tend to call "true" "redundant". IV 156 Redundancy/Definition/Black: in this sense, every defined character is redundant (eliminable). Truth/Everyday language/Black: We do not need to fear that the paradoxes occur again, because we can always stratify (distinguish semantic types). Truth/Everyday language/Philosophy/Tarski/Black: Thesis: a "philosophical t-theory will bring little more than platitudes and tautologies". |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Redundancy Theory | Searle Vs Redundancy Theory | III 216 Def Redundancy Theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). III 217 These two theories are believed to be usually incompatible with the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory. III 219 Disquotation/Searle: disquotation tells us only for each individual case, what it is what makes statements true. >Disquotation. III 223 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: the illusion of redundancy arises from the fact that at disquotation the left side looks like the right. III 227 SearleVsRedundancy Theory: "true" is not redundant, we need a metalinguistic predicate to evaluate the success. >Metalanguage. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Redundancy Theory | Ramsey Vs Redundancy Theory | Horwich I 213 Redundancy Theory/RamseyVsRedundancy Theory/Ramsey: (Foundations of Mathematics, p. 142f)(1): there are statements from which we cannot eliminate "true" and "false" in everyday language. (143).(2) 1. F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 2. L. Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Strawson's Analysis of Truth", in Analysis 10, (1950), pp. 136-40, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Regularism | Sellars Vs Regularism | SellarsVsRegulism To mean: mistake: to apply language here as descriptive category. Brandom I 64 to learn a language, to learn the rules: "Correct" should not be understood as correct in accordance with a rule! (regress). Regress: the learning of a language (S) is the learning of the obeying the rule of S. But a rule works that prescribes the execution of an action (H) is a proposition in a language that contains an expression for H. .. So the learning of the rules for S requires the ability to use the meta-language which in turn requires a Meta-meta-language... Rule: if one tries to understand it from the outside, it is like trying to eat the cake and keep it. I 66 Def Regularism : Standards as regularities. I 66/67 Maybe rules are only descriptions of regularities. Sellars: (not pro): you replace the learning to obeying the rules by the learning of complying with the rules. Then there is nothing that practice participants must already understand. Because it is not about rules but about regularity. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Relation Theory | Schiffer Vs Relation Theory | I 221 Relation Theory/meaning theory/m.th./Schiffer: when I argued VsRelationtheory I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong if languages do not have a compositional truth-theoretical semantics. Otherwise, it were true! Verificationist meaning theory/verif.m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: at a verificationist m.th. could the relation theory might also be true? |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Relativism | Field Vs Relativism | II 204 FieldVsQuine: However, (4) For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation hypothesis M: T signs {x I Fx} relative to M gdw. M T maps to a term that signs y. (or {x I Fx}). only defines Quine’s relativized concept of signification in terms of an unrelativized concept of signification, applied to our own language (into which we translate). So we need to understand the unrelativized concept before we can understand the relativized one. >Reference systems. Underdetermination/Reference/Quine/Field: this was responsible for the fact that the unrelativized concepts of denotation and signification are not physicalistically acceptable. FieldVsRelativized Denotation: now we see that the relativized concepts do not help either. FieldVsQuine: with the relativized signification and denotation Quine himself has become a victim of his >museum myth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Davidson Vs Representation | I (e) 93ff Scheme/Content: came into play as a pair (C.I.Lewis) Now we can let them get out as a pair as well. Then no objects are left behind in terms of which the question of representation could be raised! Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing! With that we are also getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth. It is faith in it which gives rise to relativistic thoughts. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something may be a map of Mexico, but only with respect to the Mercator projection or a different projection. Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental sign system whose object reference is yet under discussion,... language has inherently no other function than making the world accessible". Glüer II 126 Davidson: There are no facts! (as Frege: all true sentences have the same meaning: compliance with all the facts of the world). ("Big Fact"). Davidson: There are no representations that could be t/f - beliefs are true if they are caused correctly. II 127 A true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world. Horwich I 454 Dualism/Scheme/Content/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the main criticism is the dualism of scheme and content. Dualism: that of scheme and content has the following possible forms, with the sides not being causally linked: "Tertia": like E.g. "conceptual framework" E.g. "intended interpretation": they are not causally connected with the things they organize or intend. They vary independently from the rest of the universe, just like the relations of the skepticist, the "correspondence" or "representation". Horwich I 454/455 Representation/DavidsonVsRepresentation/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: if we do not have "Tertia" such as "intended interpretation" or "conceptual framework", we have no concepts that could serve as representations and then we also do not need to ask whether they represent the world properly. Important argument: we still have beliefs, but they are now viewed from outside, just as by field linguists. Without the "Tertia" we have no "third way" anymore to see things differently. Language/Davidson/Rorty: then we see language just as we see beliefs: not as a "conceptual frame", but rather as causal interaction with the surroundings described by the field linguists. Then you can no longer ask if the language "does or does not fit" the world. At the same time you cannot formulate skepticism any longer. Scepticism cannot express itself. ((s)> Nagel: ditto, but other reasons). Tertium/Tertia/Davidson/Rorty: therefore will not be relevant for truth claims. And the fact that there is none will not be a result of an empirical study nor an "analysis of meaning". Correspondence/Rorty: the fact that it is delivered by coherence, according to Davidson, then comes down to the fact that from the perspective of the field linguists nothing is needed but word meaning and the world. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 194 DavidsonVsRepresentation/Rorty: encourages us to cultivate our "realistic intuitions" (Crispin Wright). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Resnik, M. | Lewis Vs Resnik, M. | Schwarz I 82 Plural quantifier/Quantification/Lewis/Schwarz: is common in everyday language. Predicate logic: here it has to be replaced by singular constructions: Example "the numbers" may then stand for the class of all numbers, example "are few" expresses a property(!) of this class. Plural/Michael Resnik: (1988)(1) is the correct interpretation of everyday language plurals. LewisVsResnik: (Inwagen dito): on the one hand "the classes" is unproblematic, but on the other hand there is not the class of all classes, so you can't translate it that way. Question: in the above one-to-one correspondence, isn't it hidden and quantified via classes? 1. Michael D. Resnik [1988]: “Second-Order Logic Still Wild”. Journal of Philosophy, 85: 75–87 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Rorty, R. | Davidson Vs Rorty, R. | II 131 The truth of a statement depends only on two things: on what the words mean the way they were used, and on the world. II 132 VsTranscendentalism: But you cannot separate linguistic competence and world influence. "Negative Transcendentalism". DavidsonVsRorty: this does not have the consequences Rorty wants. He wants to understand Davidson’s rejection of the third dogma as an argument against the possibility of epistemology. But Davidson only narrows the critical path, he does not leave it. Frank I 26 Def Myth of the Subjective/Davidson/Frank: the superstition that thoughts required "mental objects". Even in the supposed intimacy of the "first person authority" whose principal corrigibility is thus conceded, the social character of language and the external determinants of individuation are not canceled. We can make mistakes about what we believe! DavidsonVsRorty: authority of the 1st person not inherently contingent, it cannot disappear "like a face in the sand" (Foucault, Rorty pro Foucault). Davidson, late, pro externalism (pro Burge). Frank I 624 Mental/Davidson: Thesis: Primary to explain human actions. But only if attribution inter-subjectively verifiable. DavidsonVsRorty: not a purely private realm of mental phenomena, this would rule out any theory of human action a priori. The criteria for the attribution of mental states must be analyzed within our empirical psychological theory. I 641/642 Authority/Self-attribution/Rorty: Thesis: Self-attribution was originally carried out on the basis of the same kind of observation or behavior as external attribution! Later it was discovered that self-attribution could be performed without observation. It turned out to be the better behavior out explanations at the end. Davidson: Of course, this is not meant to be a serious anthropological information. DavidsonVsRorty: Question: what reason has Rorty presented for self-attribution which is not based on evidence (Wittgenstein) to concern the same conditions and events as the one based on observation? I 645 DavidsonVsRorty: the fact that the attribution of mental states is a convention, is uninformative and unsubstantiated. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 654 Incorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty: Does not exist! We can make mistakes in terms of our own internal states and prop. att.s. But such cases are rare and cannot be the norm! Question: Can we think straight out that we have a belief which we do not have in reality? Many authors from of recent times: this could even happen quite easily. > Russell: Proposition. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Rorty, R. | McDowell Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 179 Deletion of quotation/Rorty: in apparent connection with the success or failure of utterances. This question is however regarded as descriptive and not as normative. Norms/McDowellVsRorty: it is veiled that it is precisely the norms that are at stake. They are normative exactly because deletion of quotation is the norm of their results. (McDowell: normative, not descriptive). Norms/world/thinking/Rorty: "It seems that there is no obvious reason why the further transition of the language game should have anything to do with the nature of the world. World/thinking/McDowellVsRorty:. The idea of norms is precisely that our chances to think correctly about the world increase, if we follow them. If they do not increase, we'll have to modify the norms. I 180 Radical Interpretation/Davidson/McDowell: ultimately, the field linguist appropriates norms from the internal perspective (language, coherence, not relation stimulus/world). I 181 McDowellVsRorty: if he forbids the normative view of the field linguist (and therefore virtually suggests an outside perspective purely causal in nature), then he denies the importance of the transition from an unfortunate starting position to the interpretation reached. McDowellVsRorty: ultimately, dualism of nature and reason. Therefore, he can only be partially successful as a pragmatist. He himself, doesn't perceive that as a dualism, of course. He speaks of (Rorty): "to explain patiently that norms are different from descriptions." |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Rorty, R. | Nagel Vs Rorty, R. | I 47 Reality/World/Rorty: we believe it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos are real entities or merely useful heuristic fictions. This is what we mean when we say that it is pointless to ask whether the reality is independent from our statements. There certainly were mountains before we started to talk about mountains. The usefulness of these language games is however unrelated to the question of whether the self-existent reality, regardless of the functional way of describing this reality to people, contains mountains. (>Reality/Rorty) I 47/48 NagelVsRorty: he won't get away so easily: his thesis contradicts the categorical statements about which it claims to be: e.g. there are infinitely many primes, racial discrimination is unjust, water is a mixture, Napoleon was less than two meters tall. Although the subjectivist may insist that he does not dispute those platitudes, he is not able to explain them: 1) There are many truths about the world that we will never know ((s) Why then "about"?) 2) Some of our beliefs are wrong, which will never be discovered. 3) If a belief was true, would it even be true if no one believed it. If Rorty (~) says: "Injustice is nothing more than a violation of the laws of my community.", then he has to add: "Of course, the laws of my community state that not all injustice is a violation of the law." |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Rorty, R. | Putnam Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 178 Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards. Putnam I (a) 21 Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate. PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God. Putnam I (h) 204/205 PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever. Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is! Putnam I (i) 239 Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists. I (i) 240. Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant. I (i) 242 justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy. By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case! RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"". PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind? I (i) 242/243 A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language! Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself. Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors. Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement". I (i) 243/244 As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.) PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent! Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not. Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse. normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture. hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements. I (i) 244/245 PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936). If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image? PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it! Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God. Rorty VI 79 Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rorty, R. | Searle Vs Rorty, R. | Rorty VI 92 SearleVsRorty/Rorty: Searle considers relativism, which he attributes to Rorty, as a threat to the freedom and sovereignty of the American universities. Rorty VI 105 World/knowledge/language/human being/reality/SearleVsRorty: Rorty seems to deny that there were mountains before there were people or before the word "mountain" appeared in the language. RortyVsVs: that is not disputed by anyone. No one believes that there is a causal chain that ensures that mountains become an effect of thoughts or words. In fact, we believe (Kuhn, Derrida, Rorty): that it is pointless to ask whether there really are mountains, or whether it is only appropriate to talk about mountains. Rorty VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to convince all concerned parties that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding for those that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). Rorty VI 117 SearleVsRorty: There is a "general atmosphere of vague literary frivolity of which the Nietzschian Left is penetrated." Searle I 168 Incorrigibility: it is often said, we could not be mistaken about the contents of our mind. This is the authority of the 1st person. It has even been argued this incorrigibility was a sure sign that we are dealing with something mental (Rorty). SearleVsRorty: e.g. Sally might discover later that she was simply mistaken when she thought she loved Jimmy. I 169 By this it only follows that the standard model of error, models whose basis are the distinction between appearance and reality, do not work with the existence or characterization of mental states. We all know from personal experience, how often it occurs that we can judge somebody else better than the person can judge him- or herself, if we are for example really jealous or angry, or whether we just seem very generous. Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU 1953): the bold attempt to tackle the idea of my statement, drafted in the 1st person, on intellectuals were after all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and that the question after any authority was not asked at all. When I cry out in pain, then it raises no question of my authority. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rorty, R. | Millikan Vs Rorty, R. | I 88 Sentence/world/meaning/MillikanVsRorty/Millikan: 1. Let's assume that a sentence belongs to the world (at least, if it is true). Mathematical equation: here, it is perhaps different. Truth/Millikan: let's assume it has to do with some projective relation or projective rule. Pointe: this can not be a natural state (status within the natural world). Ex false sentence: projects nothing, but still has a meaning. But if it has a meaning, it must mean something. But not something actual. So, not something in the natural world. Pointe: then even what a true sentence means cannot be anything that is in the actual world. Solution: the relation of a true sentence to something undoubtedly actual in the world is mediated by a relation which is itself not in the world... This relation is the meaning. Meaning/Millikan: is not itself in the world, but the relation between a true statement and what is in the world. Therefore, this relationship is not causal. Truthmaker/Millikan: not to be found in the sentences. And we don't understand false sentences by simply saying that ithey are not true. Meaning/Millikan: must be something that true and false sentences have in common. Projection/meaning/Millikan: meaning seems to be irrelevant for the actual projective relation. Solution/Millikan: our concepts of "intrinsic ..." and "Normal". True and false sentences "should" ("are supposed to") to correspond to the facts in the world in accordance with specific projective rules. This can be explained with the concepts of normality and the eigenfunction. I 89 Falsehood/false sentence/Millikan: is then just as unproblematic as Ex a chameleon, which does not adopt the color of its surroundings. ((S) defect, error, mistake). Meaning/Millikan: 2. sounds turn into sentences with meaning if they are interpreted. Intentionality/language/tradition/Millikan: is therefore dependent intentionality (on interpretation). ((s) > derived intentionality). Sentence/object/world/Millikan: without intentionality a sentence would be an ordinary object. Thought/thinking/intentionality/Millikan: Pointe: then the intentionality of thoughts can not be interpreted as the one of sentences. Otherwise we would have a regress. Representation/Millikan: those who view sentences as internal representations forget that sentences and images are derived intentionally. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Russell, B. | Rorty Vs Russell, B. | I 187 RortyVsRussell: confuses the specific semantic doctrines of Frege and Wittgenstein, which had indeed emerged from the new logic, with epistemological teachings. >Language/Frege, >Language/Quine. Rorty I 189 Russell/Rorty: distinguishes "truth by virtue of meaning" and "truth by virtue of experience". >Acquaintance. QuineVsRussell/Rorty: (Quine in >Two Dogmas): VsTradition: Vs the conventional belief that philosophy relates to the empirical sciences like the study of structures to the study of contents. I 190 Quine: (like Wittgenstein): we can hardly distinguish when we respond to the pressure of experience and when to the pressure of language. Quine/Rorty: Thesis: "every statement can be revised". >Theories/Quine. Sellars/Rorty: "It may turn out that there are no colored objects." |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Russell, B. | Strawson Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 17 StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things. --- Newen/Schrenk I 92 Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses (i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion) (ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition (iii) truth value gaps are allowed (iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. (v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties). Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use. Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference: Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand: Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value. Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied. E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis. Newen/Schrenk I 94 He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him. Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier. Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential. Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer). Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...". In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential. --- Quine I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. --- Schulte III 433 StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. "The common language has no exact logic" Schulte III 434 King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences: 1. There is a king of France. 2. There are no more than a king of France. 3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. 2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence. 3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning. --- Schulte III 435 Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game. --- VII 95 Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person. There can also be more than one description in one sentence. VII 98 StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing. This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. VII 99 King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. VII 100 Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology: "Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description). Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: (A1) sentence (A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence accordingly: (B1) expression (B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same. VII 101 Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson: Assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times. Statement (proposition): ditto Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition). VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. VII 104 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent. VII 105 Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. VII 106 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. VII 106/107 King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense. 2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one, StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim. 2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists. Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson). Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object. VII 110 Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica(1): (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists". StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table VII 111 This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing. Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. VII 112 StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names). He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. VII 113 Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use). They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".) VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive. VII 123 Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..." StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..." Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table". VII 124 Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). VII 126 Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Donnellan Vs Russell, B. | I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did..."). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Ryle, G. | Fodor Vs Ryle, G. | II 118 Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking. Language/FodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.# --- Rorty I 256 Compliance/seeing/correspondence/behavior/Ryle: here you have to do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other! RyleVsVs/Rorty: Ryle might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it is just the notion of the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this. Infinite: e.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned! Either: 1) There is infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an unlearned ability. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ryle, G. | Rorty Vs Ryle, G. | Frank I 597 Sensation/Thought/RortyVsRyle: his approach encounters the difficulty that our everyday language seems to support the Cartesian notion of two series of events persistently. >Cartesianism, >Dualism. Fra I 598 That is not the problem with opinions, feelings, etc. Here we are not tempted to consider them as episodes instead of dispositions. Mental/Rorty: only the first class a) (thoughts, feelings) generates the contrast to the physical, which is more than a mere linguistic contrast. (see below) They are paradigmatic for a separate area. b) (moods, feelings, etc.) these are such that in no way would bring forth the idea of a separate area if we had not heard of thoughts and feelings. If we had no mental concepts, but only concepts of opinions and desires, then we would have no >mind body problem. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Ryle, G. | Sellars Vs Ryle, G. | I XXXIII Propositions/thoughts/RyleVs "category mistake": as beliefs, desires or motives thoughts are no space temporally localized events or states. Therefore, they cannot occur as antecedents or causes of actions. SellarsVsRyle: he suggested to understand mental predicates like "to be convinced", "to believe" etc. as expressions of dispositions but without acknowledging that again there is an explanation like in the way of the Freudian ego or super-ego . Belief/Ryle: to be convinced means to behave in a certain way. I XXXIII Disposition/explanation/to appear/Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how once can also explain the behavioral dispositions themselves. His tie seller John developed a kind of theory, which specifically refers to the language behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. I 77 Inner episode/category mistake/SellarsVsRyle: inner episodes are by no means a category mistake, they can even be very well "speak" with the means of intersubjective discourse. And in fact through a critical examination of inner episodes of a different kind, namely with thoughts. I 79 Episode/tradition: modern empiricism: a) thoughts are verbal or linguistic episodes. SellarsVs: there is not enough language behavior to explain all thoughts. b) To think/tradition: be any form of "intelligent behavior" both linguistically not linguistically. RyleVs: actually no episodes but hypothetical or mixed-hypothetical-categorical facts about this or other behavior. ((s) This seems to be by Ryle, but Ryle is not explicitly mentioned here by Sellars). SellarsVs: Problem: whenever we refer to a component of non-habitual behavior as intelligent, we seem then to think it necessary to thereby refer to a thinking. (hidden circle. VsRyle). I 88 Category Mistake/Sellars: e.g. to assume that the combustibility of wood is so to say latent burning. SellarsVsRyle: nevertheless, not every non-observable episode is the consequence of category mistakes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ryle, G. | Verschiedene Vs Ryle, G. | Lanz in Metz I 279 VsRyle: his analysis is not convincing for elements of conscious experience as feelings or perceptions or mental images or thoughts that are currently occurring. E.g. pain: here something is present to the the consciousness when it is neither recognized thorugh behavior nor verbal utterances. Hare II 142 Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: we may know something without being able to say what we know. For example, how a certain word is used, or a certain dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but you should not extend that to speech situations. II 143 It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used here, even if one cannot say how it is used. Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: but in language it may be clearer than anywhere else. For example, when we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is used. For example, a child may have learned to use the word "father" and use it correctly, but may not be able to say how it is used because it has not yet learned to use "to mean"! Henle confuses the ability "To decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true or not with the ability to use the expression "the statement is logically true". Confusion Mention/Use. (doing without knowledge). Hare: who does not know how to use the expression "logically true" could do the former, but not the latter. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ryle, G. | Cavell Vs Ryle, G. | II 170 Everyday Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say..." Type II statement: the addition of explanations to Type I statements. Type III statements: generalizations. II 171 AustinVsRyle: for example a gift can be given voluntarily (without being guilty) but that is not something you should normally not do. II 173 CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (Type II statement): he is generally entitled to do so, but especially with regard to his example "voluntarily" the generalization goes wrong: II 174 (E.g. Austin: voluntary gift). Austin Thesis: we cannot always say of actions that they are voluntary, even if they were obviously not involuntary either. CavellVsRyle: he has not completely neglected it, his mistake is that he characterizes these actions incompletely and those where the question cannot arise wrongly. He does not see that the condition for the use of the term "voluntarily" applies in general. II 175 He falsely assumes that "not voluntary" means "involuntary". Cavell: this is also overlooked by utilitarianism. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Saussure, F. de | Luhmann Vs Saussure, F. de | AU Cass 12 Language/Luhmann: Language is structural coupling. That is their task, their function. This means: language is not a system! Language Theory/Tradition/Luhmann: traditional theories: Saussure: language is a system! Luhmann: but his concept of system is not related to operation! Rather on structures, differences etc. LuhmannVsSaussure: in his distinction between spoken word and language it remains empirically unclear what the basal operation actually is. Unless one refers to communication. But that would force us to distinguish more strongly between mental and social systems than is usual in linguistics. Language/Luhmann: 1. It is not a system. 2. Language does not have its own mode of operation. So no linguistic operation that is not communication or non-linguistic thinking. ((s) A genuinely linguistic operation would therefore have to be non-linguistic itself.) Luhmann: this has to do with the deep storage of the concept of the operation and with the precision with which one empirically asks what is to be excluded. Saussure/Luhmann: the sign means the meaning of the object. Saussure/Luhmann: or the sign means what the speaker thought. LuhmannVsSaussure: and thus his theory loses its uniqueness! Then the sign no longer denotes the object, but the inner state of the speaker. Double reference to subject and object of the sign. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Saussure, F. de | Putnam Vs Saussure, F. de | Putnam III 162 Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences should be transferred as a whole by the individual elements to the language . (to semantics). But in fact it is so that different languages do not have the same semantic opposites available. A language might only have four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out leads quite quickly to the conclusion that meanings are reserved to specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for different "texts". According to this thesis two languages never express the same meanings. So even the concept of the meaning that can release itself from the sign, collapses. DerridaVsSaussure: is that good, he criticized Saussure only that he did not go further, and that he dropped the concept of the sign completely. --- I (k) 276 Definition signifié/Putnam: this signified is in the French semiology the meaning of the signified, the intension, not the extension. --- I (k) 266/269 PutnamVsSaussure: the alternative to his view is to maintain the concept of "meaning equality", while one recognizes that it must not be interpreted as the self-identity of objects, which are called "meaning" or "signified". There is no question of a mathematically clean equivalence or non-equivalence of contrast systems, when two uses of a word can be seen as "same" or "not the same". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Saussure, F. de | Verschiedene Vs Saussure, F. de | Saussure I 66 VsSaussure: he has often been misinterpreted by his critics: functionalism without the participation of subjects. But this is not true, for Saussure it is always about the communication structure of at least two individuals. The step to structuring results from the needs of a language community. |
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| Schlick, M. | Verschiedene Vs Schlick, M. | Hempel I 102 Basic Sentences/Schlick: Vs complete renunciation of a system of unchangeable basic sentences: leads to relativism. VsSchlick: nowhere in science can one find an absolutely indisputable criterion. I 103 Confirmation/Schlick: in contrast to ordinary empirical statements, they are understood and verified in one act, namely by comparison with the facts. Thus he returns to the material way of speaking. Unlike statements, they cannot be recorded and are only valid in one moment. Thiel I 41 ThielVsSchlick: can the problem really be solved that way? Schlick's language is not the everyday language, it is already strictly regulated. Our interpretations always give the signs additional meaning. Why are some sign systems transferable to reality and others are not? I 42 Russell (1903) when "empirical constants" are used for variables, it must be examined each time whether the formulas are fulfilled. Math would then only be transferable if it is "isomorphic" (structurally equal) to the world of experience. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Searle, J.R. | Danto Vs Searle, J.R. | Searle: denies that in terms of linguistic competence no distinction is possible. Chinese room: the person in the room does not speak the language, but proceeds according to established rules. The output is indistinguishable from language skills. I 273 DantoVsSearle: but maybe the brain makes not more than to respond to electrical pulse with electrical reactions. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Derrida Vs Searle, J.R. | I 95 Derrida: makes no distinction between everyday language and special languages. (DerridaVsSearle). Dispute DerridaVsSearle: Habermas I 229 ++ Austin: speech acts by actors: are "hollow and void in a peculiar way". Searle: such cases are parasitical for everyday use. DerridaVsSearle: how the impossibility of such a distinction between fictitious, and everyday, ordinary and parasitic ways of speaking show. HabermasVsDerrida: (DerridaVsSearle): a) little plausible connection between quotability and repeatability on the one hand, fictionality on the other: a quote is always only something secondary. Supposedly, every utterance is essentially quoted because it presupposes conventionality, i.e. repeatability according to a rule. I 230 ++ Derrida thus presupposes what he wants to prove: that every convention has not only a symbolic but also a fictitious character. Austin: everyday language is subject to other restrictions than stage action. DerridaVs. Habermas |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Luhmann Vs Searle, J.R. | AU Cass. 12 Language/Luhmann: language is not eo ipso communication. This has to do with the fact that it takes two parties and understanding. The concept of communication just tries to bring together the parts. LuhmannVsSearle: parlance is no action, no plot! Because it always requires indeed an understanding, so that it can go on! (See also VsSpeech act theory). |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Searle, J.R. | Tugendhat Vs Searle, J.R. | I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or sentence are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a sentence are in turn indicated by a sentence. This of course presupposes that for the explanation of a sentence there is always already another sentence available. Meta-Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used like the second, it must be shown under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every adoption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric sentence, which is a pseudo-explanation. I 258 TugendhatVsSearle: at this point it becomes clear that his rule system ends where it should begin. Understanding/Tugendhat: whoever understands an assertion does not know if it is true, but knows how to determine it. Claim/Mean: the listener can record the speech as follows: "he claims 'that p, but he does not mean that p'". On the other hand, the speaker cannot say of himself: "p; but I don't mean that p". Searle: sincerity rule. TugendhatVsSearle: the connection with this rule and the essential rule (in its place we have here put the thesis (7) (opening move)) does not become clear with Searle. I 504 Modal Adverbs: Example "Peter runs fast". Analog problem: cars are faster in any case. So how is this "fast" explained? It depends on 1. that the object for which the singular term stands is in a certain state and 2. that this state can be classified in a certain way. Tugendhat: 1976: research has only just begun here. I 507 TugendhatVsSearle: he has stopped where the problem only begins. I 512 TugendhatVsSearle: false: to treat promise (central for Searle) sentences as on a level like statement sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Searle, J.R. | Wittgenstein Vs Searle, J.R. | Esfeld I 76 Use theory/Esfeld: does not imply that beliefs to statements can be reduced in a public speech or can be replaced by statements. Otherwise one would have to develop a theory of meaningful statements that is not referring to believe states of people. SearleVsWittgenstein: Thesis: believe states have priority of linguistic expressions. WittgensteinVsSearle: instead: thesis: to have beliefs and to master a public language is equally original. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Searle, J.R. | Stalnaker Vs Searle, J.R. | I 178 Identification/reference/Searle: (1969,87): ultimately by description. (description). Stalnaker: and this must then be explained by the ability of the speaker to a certain behavior. Otherwise you need a magic intentionality. StalnakerVsSearle: even if he was right, it would not provide additional premise that he needs to show the impossibility of Mill's semantics. For he does not say that we cannot have intentions on certain individuals. He only says that we need a necessary condition for it. Solution: he needs a restriction on the content of the attitudes that we can have StalnakerVsSearle: he offers instead only a restriction of the conditions under which we may have attitudes with a specific content. Mill/Stalnaker: as long as it is possible to have such intentions ((s) "direct reference") it is possible to speak and understand a corresponding language. I 181 SearleVsMill/Stalnaker: (1969, 163ff) Mill's theory ((s) "direct reference", without interposed sense) leads us into a "metaphysical trap": his understanding of proper names requires a metaphysical distinction between object and its properties. Metaphysics/Searle: their original sin: the attempt to transmit real or alleged characteristics of a language to the world. ((s) > also Kant like Searle). Searle: one cannot derive any ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. StalnakerVsSearle: but Searle does that now himself by using Mill's allegedly implicit requirement against him. Stalnaker: it cannot be a good argument against a semantic access that someone drew illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from it. ((s) No argument against a theory that someone abused it). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Self-Reference | Tarski Vs Self-Reference | Skirbekk I 141f Linguistic Expressions/TarskiVsSelf-Reference/Tarski: physical objects. Proposition: ideal object. Truth: always only in relation to a certain language. #Truth semantic: fundamentally different from fulfillment, designation, definition. Mathematics: provability and truth often fall apart. Meta Language: we need it because object language must not contain the T-predicate (VsSelf-Reference).(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Sellars, W. | Brandom Vs Sellars, W. | I 322 BrandomVsSellars: Two problems: 1) Sellars assumes that the reporter has to justify his assertions. This implies that general facts of the form to "X is a reliable symptom of Y" are known. I 323 But invoking something contains an implicit assertion of reliability (to avoid regress?) 2) Error: construe the authority of non-inferential reports as the act of invoking a piece of evidence. (Regress: On what is the authority of the evidence based, etc.). The authority of inferential reports is rather sui generis. "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 242 BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of so understood semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as the alternative language game theory does. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Sellars, W. | Field Vs Sellars, W. | II 157 Scheme Letters/Field: "p" and "e" are used here with respect to an individual thinker. ((s) Not for the role in the linguistic community). Idiolect: a single speaker then has an idiolect. This will typically not coincide with the limits of the use of any language, or with the union of all languages. As insertions for the scheme letters we use expressions here in the idiolect of the person (at a time). Ambiguities are not considered. II 158 Then we have "p" (as I understand it now) means that p (s) while the that-sentence is not necessarily a literal rendering.) and means "e" (as I understand it now). ((s) not necessarily a literal rendering). Quotation Marks/Meaning Attribution/Field: instead of assuming "ways of understanding", we can also assume that the expressions in quotes do not refer to an orthographic type, but on a computational one: Computational Type/Field: (here): refers to a class of expression tokens in the actual idiolect of the interpreter who are regarded as computationally equivalent. This corresponds roughly to: Def Point-Quotation Marks/Spelling/Sellars: (Sellars 1962): They should, however, refer to inter-personnally attributable conceptual roles. QuineVsSellars: then you do not know what beliefs only pretend a conceptual role. Equality of Computational Role/Field: only within one idiolect. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Sellars, W. | Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. | Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other. I 207 Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism. I 208 SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the: Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities. Sellars I 34 Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content. 2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism. I 34/25 3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time. Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content? Sellars: admitted. I 35 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content! I 36 Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sense Data | Verschiedene Vs Sense Data | Tetens IV 156 Observation Language/Tetens: it has been understood that so-called observation languages can never really be sharply separated from theoretical-explanatory languages. Terms, which originally designated theoretical entities, are finally used as observation terms. Tetens IV 71/72 So there is no "pure sense data" and so on. Tetens: the boundaries between observation language and theoretical terms are pragmatic at best. |
Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Sententialism | Schiffer Vs Sententialism | I 120 Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes. I 120 And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98). 2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring". Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!. E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!. I 123 DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f). 2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts. I 137 Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist. Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory. I 157 Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221). Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs: If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And: Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited. Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true. Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad. I 158 We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory. (2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine). (3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible. SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Shapiro, St. | Field Vs Shapiro, St. | II 357 Intermediate Claim/IC/Parsons/Shapiro/Field: both acknowledge that. They formulate an intermediate position between the strong and the weak assertion saying that according to that skepticism about the determinacy becomes uninteresting. (IC) any two persons who accept the schematic arithmetic must consider the theory of another equivalent to their own. II 358 FieldVsShapiro/FieldVsParsons: 1) I doubt that you have to accept the intermediate claim (VsIC). 2) Even if we accept it, skepticism about determinacy is not uninteresting. FieldVsIC: E.g. X (male) considers his own schematic arithmetic as indeterminate, but acknowledges the weak conclusion that each "copy" of it in his own language is equivalent to his own arithmetic. Question: Does X have to regard a Y (female), who accepts schematic arithmetic, as someone who accepts something equivalent to that which X accepts?. Assuming both X and Y use the same vocabulary: "number", "successor", etc. Question: Does X have to a) translate Y’s number theoretical vocabulary homophonically, or rather. b) assume that if he introduces a new special term as a translation of Y’s term "number" (E.g. "number*"), etc., he then has an argument for an equivalence between his own vocabulary and the translation of Y’s vocabulary. ((s) equivalence rather than homophony). Question: can we not simply apply the conclusion from the monolingual case for it? No, because even if X assumes that Y accepts the full scheme (correctly), it only means that he X is tied to the acceptance of any new instances in Y’s own language! (And that X should be committed to their translations). If X cannot argue that Y can enhance her language for every predicate P in hir own language (i.e. "number", etc.), so that it contains an expression that X can translate as P, then there is no reason to assume that X should consider Y’s schemes complete in relation to X’s language. Problem: there is no way to argue for it without leaving the question open. E.g. X cannot argue that, because Y accepts full arithmetic, she must accept induction over a predicate, which means "the same" as X’s predicate "natural number". (s) he does not know whether the predicate means the same thing >Translation indeterminacy). Field: this is just a variant of McGee’s cheating that Y must accept induction on a predicate whose extension are the natural numbers. ((s) he does not know whether this is the extension >indeterminacy of the reference). II 360 FieldVsShapiro/VsIntermediate Claim/Vs(IC): the reason why we cannot accept the (two-language) intermediate claim is that we are forced (in the single-language case) to consider two copies (of theories) in our own language as equivalent. FieldVs(IC): even if the intermediate claim applied, it would be indeterminate! It would guarantee that in every acceptable semantic interpretation of X’s language the extension of "natural number" would be identical with the extension of the term "the extension of Y’s term "natural number"". But even that would not show that there are no non-standard elements in every acceptable interpretation of this joint extension! (Superior view of asymmetry). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Dawkins Vs Shoemaker, S. | Frank I 644 DavidsonVsIncorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty/DavidsonVsShoemaker: I will ignore the incorrigibility and put something less powerful in its place: something that comes to terms with the authority of the first person. Important Point: Shoemaker does not combine incorrigibility with a kind of knowledge, but with a class of expressions (instead of propositions as meanings). Explanation/Davidson: this could lead to an explanation of the authority, if the class of the corresponding expressions could be specified purely syntactically ((s) otherwise circle). DavidsonVsShoemaker: unfortunately it does not work! The speaker must know that he uses the privileged kind of sentence! If he does not, he does not use the language correctly. Fra I 645 What would be considered as such an abuse of language? Precisely asserting a proposition for which no such authority exists. Perhaps this is true, but this only repeats the uninformative and unfounded assertion that attribution of mental predicates is a language convention. DavidsonVsShoemaker: from the point of view of the interpreter this means that the interpreter should interpret self-attributions in a way that they come out as true. According to Shoemaker, the point of view of the interpreter is the only one that we can take, and that robs the principle of independent application: our only reason to say that the speaker occasionally enjoys special authority is that we are ready to treat his expressions as a self-attribution! But this was the initial problem. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | Austin Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about the strong thesis of Descartes that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without them, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin major thesis Method/everyday language/AustinVsDescartes: Can it be shown ((s) > manifestation) that Descartes violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge with his strong thesis? Stroud: we have already seen it that it seems like this. (In terms of our everyday life and science). --- I 49 For example, no one asks whether the other is not dreaming when he points to a goldfinch, or e.g. in court, if the witness does not dream. But even in very important cases the dream possibility is not allowed in the discussion as a relevant alternative. --- I 50 Knowledge/Austin: is only questioned in special cases. --- I 51 Only then certain alternatives are relevant. Austin: typical e.g. external psychological. And again, there are (more or less) established procedures. Error/Deception/Austin: Thesis: "You cannot always deceive all people". Austin/Stroud: his demand for specific reasons for doubt related to e.g. suspected deception are not the same as the above requirement that there must always be a "special basis" for the question, e.g. "is it really a goldfinch?". E.g. Goldfinch: this is all about the question of whether there are certain reasons to assume something else. This can also be the case, for example, when we quote authorities. Reliability/everyday language/Austin: it is fundamental for our speech that we are entitled to trust others, unless there is a concrete reason against it. Knowledge/Stroud: excludes error or mistake. Austin: dito: "If you know something, you cannot be wrong": this is perfectly fine. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Carnap Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Thesis: the significance of our expressions is limited to their empirical use. This means that the use of the expressions themselves is limited by whether there is a possible sensation which is relevant for determining the truth or falsity of the sentence in which these expressions occur. Def Principle of Verification/Understanding/Meaning/Carnap/Stroud: Thesis: then we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if appropriate sensations are possible for us. Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: sentence: "Nobody will ever know if__." Here, the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because it is unverifiable. Def Meaningless: neither true nor false. I 174 CarnapVsSkepticism: the question "Are there external things?" would thus be pointless. It would not be a question that you could not answer (sic), because there is no meaningful question and no meaningful response here. Important argument: but that does not mean that there are no entirely meaningful questions about the existence of external things: these are the internal questions ((s) within an area of knowledge). I 176 Truth/Sense/Meaningless/Carnap/Stroud: something that is true, cannot contradict something that is meaningless. Moore/Carnap/Stroud: verificationism shows that everything Moore says can be true, without however refuting skepticism. But there is nothing meaningful that he does not consider. VerificationismVsSkepticism/CarnapVsStroud: the skepticism is not, as Kant says, to be understood transcendentally, but it is meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Def External/External Questions/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: are "philosophical" questions that relate to the whole (the outer frame, i.e. that is initially not possible). Def Internal/Internal Questions/Science/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: these are questions about the existence of things that are asked within a science. E.g. the question of the existence of numbers is useful in mathematics, but not outside of it. I 177 External/Existence/Verificationism/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: if skepticism allows the things outside of us to be useful at all ((s) The sentences about the things that cannot be things may be useful or useless), then he cannot describe them as unknowable. I 178 Objectivity/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: this principle prevents any concept of objectivity that does not contain the possibility of empirical verification. VsSkepticism: every concept of objectivity which includes the possibility of knowledge then makes skepticism impossible. Practical/Theoretical/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: the distinction theoretical/practical goes far beyond the verification principle. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSekpticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic framework (reference system). This does not follow from the verification principle alone. It is part of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) according to which the insignificance of the skeptical question is indicated by a non-skeptical answer to the question how it is possible that we know something. Knowledge/Carnap/Stroud: two essential components: 1. Experience, 2. linguistic frame (reference system) within which we understand the experience. Language/Carnap/Stroud: is a rule system for the formation of sentences and for their verification or rejection (ESO 208). Thus we are equipped to determine that some statements coincide with our experience and others do not. Without those statements, which are made possible for us by the acceptance of the language, we would have nothing either to confirm or to refute the experience. Skepticism: would agree so far. It also needs expressions of language for the things of the outside world. CarnapVsSkepticism: he misunderstands the relation between the linguistic context and the truths that can be expressed within it. He thinks the frame was only needed I 188 To express something that was "objectively" true or false. ((s)> Quine:> Immanence theory of truth, immanent truth > Ontological relativity: truth only within a theory/system). Objectivity/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: every speech on objective facts or external things is within a reference system (frame) and cannot justify our possession of this frame. ((s) which is a practical choice (convention). Theoretical Question/Philosophy/Carnap: the only theoretical question that can we ask here is that about the rules of language. I 192 CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic context of the expression about external objects and the truths that are expressed within this reference system. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-skeptical approach to this relation?. 1) to what system belongs Carnap's thesis that existence claims are neither true nor false in the thing language?. 2) what does the thesis then express at all?. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Davidson Vs Skepticism | I (e) 93 VsSkepticism: a general skepticism cannot even be formulated with regard to the information of our senses, because the senses and their information do not even play a role in explaining the belief, meaning and knowledge, provided the content depends on the causal relations between the attitudes and the world. Of course, the senses play an important causal role in understanding and in language acquisition. II 124 DavidsonVsSkepticism: This can be pathologized and ignored (like FregeVsSkeptizism: the skepticist cannot be cured, because he cannot assume even with his next statement that his words still have the same meaning as before). II 128 DavidsonVs: Although it is possible to be wrong, but only in exceptional cases. Particularly a meaning-theoretical externalism allows to explain the asymmetry that exists between the knowledge of the externally and interanlly psychological. Davidson externally mental/internally mental: asymmetry II 129 We only have to interpret others. But we have to assume that the speaker himself knows in general what his words mean. It is also true from the perspective of the actor himself that he is not in a position to wonder whether he generally uses his words for the right objects and events, because whatever he regularly applies them to gives his words the meaning they have. Horwich I 450 DavidsonVsSkepticism: in the methodically simplest cases we just have to assume that the belief objects are also the cause of the belief. Communication/Davidson: starts where causes converge. That means if belief in the truth in foreign assertions is systematically caused by the same events and objects ((s) as that of attributing person). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 166 DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: the "problem of the outside world" and the "externally mental" is based on a false distinction between the "phenomenological content of experience" (tradition) and the intentional states, which are attributed to a person based on their causal interactions with the environment. Rorty VI 231 DavidsonVsSkepticism: Davidson does not worry (according to Rorty) about answering directly, rather he wants to undermine the notion of the skepticist that we could know what our beliefs are without already believing many true things with regard to the causal link between those beliefs and the world. Skepticism does not realize that self-attributions of experiences presuppose the attribution of intentional states, which in turn is only possible for someone who believes a lot of truth with regard to the world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Frege Vs Skepticism | Davidson II 124 FregeVsSkepticism: the skeptic has no cure, because he cannot even assume for his next statement that his words still have the same meanings as before. Dummett I 58 Skepticism: never sure whether sense corresponds to a relation -Frege: just a severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated. IV 45 FregeVsSkepticism: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! - If everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imagination! - Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. IV 50 Imagination/Psychology/Skepticism/Frege: not everything is imagination, otherwise psychology would contain all the sciences. (s) VsFrege: That does not make it impossible for everything to be imagination at the end of the day. (reductio ad absurdum is not enough.)) - IV 51 Perception/Frege: sensory perception necessarily requires sensation, and this is part of the inner world. Frege IV 46 FregeVsSkepticism: interestingly, in his consideration the opposites turn into each other. (>"Dialectic"). E.g. a sensory physiologist as a naturalist is initially far from considering the things he is convinced to see and touch as his imagination. IV 46 Stimulus/Frege: skepticism can easily refer to him: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! We are experiencing only one end of the process that protrudes into our consciousness! Perhaps other causes are at work? So everything dissolves into imagination, also the light beams. The empirical sensory physiologist thus undermines his own conditions. Everything requires a carrier, I have considered myself as the carrier of my imagination, but am I not myself an imagination?. IV 47 Where is then the carrier of these imaginations? If everything is imagination: there is no carrier. Also, no imaginations are somehow distinguished. Now I experience the change into the opposite: FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imaginations! ((s) that introduces a new concept, which does not exist in Berkeley: that of the carrier). But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a carrier of my consciousness is only one part of this consciousness, while another part is perhaps a "moon image"? I.e. something else is taking place when I judge that I am looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I, etc. so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So that what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued E.g. that if I think that I don’t feel any pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be. IV 48 I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its carrier as I am the carrier of other images. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path towards recognizing other people as an independent carriers of imagination is clear. Images may also be the common object of thought by people who do not have this image. Imagination may become object. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Smart, J. C. | Quine Vs Smart, J. C. | II 118 ff The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics). There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism. Smart's materialism is more robust than that. II 119 Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance. SmartVsEmergence. They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.) Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth. II 120 Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins. On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory. II 121 Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent. Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work. Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances. Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of ignorance, disregard details. There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute. Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle. They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al. As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added. II 122 Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Soames, S. | Schiffer Vs Soames, S. | I 217 Compositional Semantics/Comp.sem./Understanding/Explanation/Scott Soames/Schiffer: (Soames 1987) Thesis: comp.sem. is not needed for explaining the language understanding, nevertheless natural languages have a comp.sem .: Language understanding/Soames: you should not look at the semantics to explain semantic competence. Instead one needs comp.sem you. for the explanation of the representational character of the language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is needed to represent the world. Propositions encode systematic information that characterize the world so and so. We need comp.sem. for the analysis of the principles of this encoding. SchifferVsSoames: Instead, I have introduced the expression potential. One might assume that a finally formulated theory should be able to formulate theorems for the attribution of expression potential to each proposition of the language. But would that then not be a compositional theory?. I 218 E.g. Harvey: here we did not need comp.sem. to assume that for each proposition of M (internal language) there is a realization of belief, that means (µ)(∑P)(If μ is a proposition of M and in the box, then Harvey believes that P). (s) Although here no connection between μ and P is specified). Schiffer: Now we could find a picture of formulas of M into German, which is a translation. But that provides no finite theory which would provide a theorem for every formula μ of M as If μ is in the box, then Harvey thinks that snow is sometimes purple. Propositional attitude/Meaning theory/Schiffer: Problem: it is not possible to find a finite theory which ascribes verbs for belief characteristics of this type. Pointe: yet the terms in M have meaning! E.g. "Nemrac seveileb taht emos wons si elprup" would realize the corresponding belief in Harvey and thus also mean trivially. SchifferVsCompositionality: when the word-meaning contributs to the proposition-meaning, then it is this. Then expressions in M have meaning. But these are not characteristics that can be attributed to a finite theory. We could find only the property to attribute to each proposition of M a particular belief, but that cannot happen in a finite theory. mental representation/Mentalese/Schiffer: the formulas in M are mental representations. They represent external conditions. Propositions of E, Harvey's spoken speech, received their representational character via the connection with mental representations. Therefore Mentalese needs no comp.sem. SchifferVsSoames: So he is wrong and we need the comp.sem. not even for an illustration of how our propositions represent the world. I 219 We had already achieved this result via the expresion potentials. Because: representational character: is indistinguishable from the expression potential. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Speech Act Theory | Hintikka Vs Speech Act Theory | II 281 HintikkaVsSpeech Act Theory: this view is misguided, because there is only hope maintaining the notion of language games if you make a basic distinction between the different games that are played by the utterance of a given word in a variety of situations, on the one hand, and the games that give the word this meaning, on the other hand. II 282 However, in interesting exceptional cases they may coincide, Austin calls them the performative uses of language. (but for Wittgenstein they are exceptions). E.g. "If I say Hans has promised to marry Gretel, I’m not involved in the language game of the promise, although it is true that this "game" gives the verb "promise" its meaning. E.g. Hintikka: if I say: "for every blooming plant there is an insect that pollinates it" I’m not playing a game of flower picking and insect catching, although I have to be familiar with such games in principle in order to be able to understand this sentence. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Field Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 35 Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed. Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say. FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT). Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions. By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth. Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following: (i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth. Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following: (ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth. wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language. Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself! And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world). FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing. Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences. E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms. The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons. II 45 Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that. Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations. This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations. Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations. II 46 It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages: 1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents). 2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states. II 82 Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions. II 83 FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent. II 84 2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way. 3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR. Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear. Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either. Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content. Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following: 1) the belief objects are coarse. Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent. 2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought. Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image. FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading. Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions. II 85 StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Stegmüller, W. | Hintikka Vs Stegmüller, W. | Wittgenstein I 273 Language/World/Language Game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to the popular view (among others, Stegmüller 1975, 584) Wittgenstein abstains from showing in his late philosophy in how far language is directly linked to the reality. Stegmüller: thesis: we should not pay attention to the meaning of our expressions, but to the manner in which they are used. Hintikka: according to this (supposedly Wittgensteinian) view the "vertical" connections do not matter through which our words are linked with objects and our sentences to facts, but it is "horizontal" connections between different moves in the course of our language games that matter. That means suggesting that Wittgenstein says understanding of language is nothing more than understanding the role that different types of statements play in different circumstances in our lives (Vs: Understanding Language = Understanding the Role it Plays). HintikkaVsStegmüller: this interpretation would result in that according to Wittgenstein not even the ordinary descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. According to that, assertibility and justifiability conditions were a possible Wittgensteinian counterpart to the truth conditions. Then a statement would not be justified if it corresponds to a fact, but if its assertion is justified through its role in our language-related activities - ultimately through its role in our lives. Wittgenstein I 274 HintikkaVsStegmüller: the late Wittgenstein is far from abolishing the vertical relations between language and reality. He rather emphasizes them! The main function of language games (though not the only one) is to accomplish this task. Wittgenstein I 279 ff Use Theory/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller: in the (here criticized) "naturalized" view "X" (Stegmüller among others) Wittgenstein is said to eventually have given up asking questions about meaning, and instead examined the use. Variant: according to a subordinate interpretation Xa, use is to be understood as the language game which is the "logical home" this expression. However, this is not the interpretation that is assumed by the "naturalized" the interpretation of "X". Several facets: in X Wittgenstein understands the use of an expression as something that is not very different from the usual traditional language use. Wittgenstein I 280 Use Theory/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: does this correspond to Wittgenstein, though? In the famous equation of use and meaning Wittgenstein uses a word that essentially has two meanings: for use a) can serve to emphasize the usual, the traditional, or it can. b) indicate that it is about the practical application of a thing (such as "Instructions for Use"). That is consistent with Wittgenstein’s comparison of words with tools and speaks to a high degree in favor of the new interpretation. Wittgenstein speaks of "use" and "application". "Application I understand to be that which makes a language out of the sound combinations or lines. "You can shorten the description of use by saying this word designates the object." Hintikka: if use did not serve as a link between language and the world, it could not be abbreviated in this way. HintikkaVsStegmüller: the mistake is to regard language games as a predominantly intra-linguistic (verbal) games, i.e. games whose moves typically consist in speech acts. Move/Language Game/Hintikka: in contrast, the moves of the interpretation advocated here consist in transitions, where utterances can indeed play a role, but usually not the only role. On the contrary, many moves do not need to contain any linguistic utterances. X/Terminology/Hintikka: we shall call X the "mistake of verbal language games". Wittgenstein already warned against this error in his explanation of the expression "language game": "The word is to emphasize here that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a way of life". Wittgenstein I 281 Hintikka: according to X, speaking the language would not be a part of the language game, but it would be the whole language game as such. Evidence: in "Über Gewissheit" language games are apparently contrasted to speaking: "Our speech obtains its meaning by the rest of our actions". Wittgenstein I 314/315 E.g. beetle in the box. PU § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. Through the thing in the box abbreviations can be made. It lifts off itself, whatever it is". Stegmüller: (according to Hintikka): asserts that Wittgenstein denies the existence of private experiences in general. Hintikka: if we are right, the naturalized conception is not only wrong, but diametrically wrong: Private Language/HintikkaVsStegmüller: the changeover from the phenomenological to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of the phenomenological objects, including private experiences!. The world in which we live remains for us a world of phenomenological objects, but we need to talk about it in the same language in which we talk about physical objects. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Stich, St. | Stalnaker Vs Stich, St. | II 189 Def principle of autonomy/principle of autonomy/Stich/Stalnaker: thesis: psychological states should be those that supervene on current internal (intrinsic) physical states of the organism. StalnakerVsStich: that is a strong thesis (see above). But even with Stich a causal language creeps in: historical or environmentally relevant facts are irrelevant unless they affect the current physical states. Replacement argument/replacement argument/Stich: e.g. suppose someone had made an exact copy of me. Psychology/Stich: should explain the behavior that I do not have in common with my copy. Identical behavior must be irrelevant to psychology. nonautonomous description/principle of autonomy/Stich: e.g. nonautonomous: a robot is described as just successfully completing its millionth workpiece. Problem: a copy of this robot could break beforehand. Therefore, the description is "conceptually hybrid" (mixed of autonomous and historical). autonomous: would the description "successfully produce a workpiece" and purely historical II 190 to have "previously already produced 999,999 other workpieces". Problem/Stich: if we are looking for a generalization for the declaration of robot behavior it would be perverse to describe it (simultaneously autonomous and historical) with hybrid concepts. StalnakerVsStich: plus we have to assume in addition that the historical properties are causally irrelevant. Fatigue would not be a perverse explanation that the robot gives up the ghost. Substitution argument/Stich/Stalnaker: his argument requires the replacement with exact replicas, not identical robots. Generalization/StalnakerVsStich: a generalization is not immediately refuted by exceptions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Frege Vs Strawson, P. F. | SMD II 269 Descriptions/Fregean Language/FregeVsStrawson: Def Fregean decriptions: descriptions that apply to more than one object (according to a certain interpretation), then they should apply only to one element. ((s) i.e. no truth value gap as in Strawson). Using them exerts least force on classical logic. The simplest of such a convention could be that an element of interpretation should be an element that is designated by all basal descriptions, which makes it idle. Identity ("creates" (s) "Identity operator")). Alternatively: complicated convention, then an idle description should be considered as indicative of a set that fulfills the embedded formula. Formulas that contain idle descriptions either turn out as true or false. Classical logic is preserved. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Quine Vs Strawson, P. F. | I 299 Strawson/Quine: he introduces a category of "process-things" which can be identified neither with the processes nor with the things. QuineVsStrawson: unnecessary as a category. Strawson takes proper examples from the usage of language, unnecessary for canonical notation. (>Strawson I 72). Tugendhat II 76 QuineVsStrawson: he made a fundamental mistake to assume that the elimination of singular terms by the Theory of Descriptions leads to the elimination of demonstratives. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Searle Vs Strawson, P. F. | Searle V 160 Referential/attributive/Donnellan: E.g. we come across the mangled corpse of Smith without knowing who committed the murder. We might then say: "The murderer of Smith is crazy" without meaning someone specific. V 161 E.g.' The man who is (falsely) accused, rioted in the courtroom. In this case, we do not mean: "The killer, whoever he was" but a certain man. referential: should it turn out that Smith committed suicide, our statement about the man in the courtroom would at least in a certain sense still be true. attributiv: in the attributive meaning it cannot be true if the description doe not apply to anything. (DonnellanVsRussell, DonnellanVsStrawson: both do not account for the distinction). referential: S has talked about e, regardless of whether e is actually φ. He said something true or false about it independent of whether e is actually φ. But he implied it. >Attributive/referential. One can report correctly about his speech act that he talked about e, because one can report also with other expressions than with "the φ". If the identification was used attributively, there were no such entity e. (And the speaker would not even have had in mind that it exists). V 176 Term theory/object/universals/SearleVsStrawson: in what sense is the is by "is red identified term a non-linguistic form? Is the universal in a similar sense a non-linguistic form like the material object? >Term theory. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? >Universals. V 177 Universals/Searle: they do not persist in the world, but in the language of our representation of the world. They are however not linguistic in the way as words are (as phonemes), but linguistic in the way in which the meanings of words are linguistic! SearleVsStrawson: considering the usual criteria for distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic entities his finding that universals are not linguistic is therefore wrong. V 178/179 Universals/Searle: so are not identified with the help of facts, but with the help of meanings! Universals/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: shows that "to identify" has both times completely different meanings in the model of the term theory. V 179/180 According to Strawson we would be forced to assume that also subject expressions identify universals. E.g. "The rose is red". If "is red" identified redness, then "rose" would identify the property of being a rose, something like "roseness". Or e.g. The thing that is a rose is red. By this proposition no more and no less universals are identified than by: The thing that is red is a rose. I cannot imagine any argument with which it could be shown that hereby "is red" a universal is identified without necessarily showing at the same time, that "is a rose" identifies a universal. The term theory is not consistent enough. If predicate expressions identify universals (what the theory claims) then subject expressions necessary do this as well! V 181 Universals/SearleVsStrawson: no non-linguistic entities! |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. | Wolf II 20 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language. Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 433 Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell). I 384 StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true. I 385 Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year. StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood. RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language. I 386 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.) Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term. "To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify"). I 397/398 TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more. I 399 Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world). I 400 TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.) I 415 TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications. I 419 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Cohen Vs Strawson, P. F. | Horwich I 214 Paradoxes/true/Strawson/Cohen: occur under the assumption that the words "true" and "false" can be used to make claims of 1st level. Solution: (formal). The paradoxes are formally solved by declaring that "true" and "false" may only be used in level 2 claims. Paradoxes/Strawson: disappear under the much more radical thesis that "true" and "false" are not used at all to make claims. True/Redundancy Theory/CohenVsStrawson: that is unsatisfactory. It is also not only a "descriptive use" done by "true" and "false". ((s) Redundancy theory is not really the issue here). For example, a judge might interpret a lawyer's remark "What the policeman said is true" as an assertion about the character of the policeman. And then there could be empirical evidence about the character. CohenVsStrawson: but this claims much more than the presupposition that the policeman made a statement at all. The judge would set up a formula ((s) scheme) to indirectly verify a number of further statements. But the verification would not consist of confirming the presupposition "The policeman made a statement". Cohen: You do not have to assume that "true" here works as a logical predicate to describe the policeman's statements. CohenVsStrawson: but the sentence cannot be paraphrased by "The policeman made a statement, I confirm it," as Strawson assumes. I 215 Because this is not a statement about the character of the policeman. VsCohen: one could argue that it is only a summary of some statements like e.g. "the defendant was riding 50 on the wrong side", "the plaintiff was riding his bike on the right side", etc. Then one could say that it is these statements that are indirectly verified by empirical evidence on the character of the policeman Strawson/Cohen: could then say that the lawyer said: e.g. "I confirm what the policeman said, the defendant was riding...". CohenVsStrawson: this does not work, 1. if the content is unknown 2. if the number of statements made is indefinite ((s) or infinite). ((s) >"Everything he said".) For then "what he said is true" cannot be replaced by a set of auxiliary statements confirmed by the reporter. He seems to make a single complete assertion: For example, "Smith's observation reports are always true" and he can do that without having read all his reports. Cohen: I had suggested that this be verifiable by evidence of the character of the person concerned. Then you could also say that conclusions can be drawn from it. And this leads to paradoxes. This often occurs in journalism, in historical and scientific research and in jurisprudence. I 216 Redundancy Theory/paradoxies/everything he said/Ramsey/Cohen: Ramsey's solution of eliminating "true" and "false" from such contexts has the price of introducing logical jargon. RamseyVsStrawson/Cohen: but he still assumes that the sentence is used as a statement (assertion). Example "For all p, if the policeman claims that p, then p". Problem/Cohen: here again we can get paradoxes, analog to the truth paradox. For example "Every statement I claim is false". Logical Form: (p): (x).phi(p . x) >. ~p. Logical Form/everyday translation: phi(p, x): "The statement that ... is made by ..." ((s) in brackets one point, one comma). "Is true"/Truth/Logical Form/Question/(s): not "wx" or "wp" (for P is true") but better "x is a statement and x" or p is a statement and p": (Ex)(Ae . x) or (Ep) (Ap . p). But that means "there is a true statement" and not: "the statement p is true"?). Paradox/Logical Form/Cohen: can occur when in (p): (x). phi (p . x) >. ~p. this expression as a whole can occur as value of p. Solution/Cohen: you can even take "all my statements are wrong" as a statement about the character. Then you do not get a paradox. CohenVsStrawson: but if that amounts to "the policeman is a reliable witness" then that is more a recommendation than a description! Solution: I should specify the type of statement I classify as unreliable. I 217 Strawson/Cohen: may still be right that "true" is not used as a logical predicate: Logical Predicate/Cohen: Example Analysis as description: here it is "true statements maker". Analysis as recommendation: here "true" is not a logical predicate. Analysis as verification: "true" can be eliminated here. (But not in everyday language). |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Structuralism | Chomsky Vs Structuralism | Searle VIII 409 ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. Old: object of investigation: an arbitrary set of sentences. Classifications, corresponding discovery procedures. New: object of investigation: the basic language knowledge of the speaker. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Structuralism | Field Vs Structuralism | II 328 Numbers/Structuralism/Field: it is sometimes expressed in a way that 2 is simply a point in a structure. (Resnik 1981, Shapiro 1989). Vagueness/Field: This view corresponds to the view that vagueness is in the world instead of in our language! ((s)> epistemic view). FieldVs: it seems to work well not only for numbers like "2", but also for the expressions that we use to describe structures in which there are no symmetries. Symmetry/Field: brings a problem into play here. E.g. Brandom: √-1/Root -1/Complex Numbers/Field: Problem: every complex number other than 0 (Ex -1) has two roots. (actually BrandomVsFrege, BrandomVsLogicism). "Number i": this term has introduced as a standard for one of the two, (-i is then of course the other one). Problem: even if we assume that we have somehow defined which objects are the complex numbers, which subset of them are the real numbers, and which functions of them are addition and multiplication, then our use of these expressions still leaves undetermined to which of the two roots of -1 our expression "i" refers. ((s) Because of the symmetry, it is impossible to make out a difference). Complex Numbers/Interior/Exterior/Theory/Field: within the theory of complex numbers there is no way to distinguish i and -i. There is no predicate A(x) that does not itself contain "i" and that is true of one but not of the other. Complex Numbers/Field: Of course, the practical applications are no help in distinguishing them either!. Problem: even if you say that "i" is simply a point in the system of complex numbers, the indeterminacy continues, because the complex number plane contains two structurally identical positions for the roots of -1, without distinguishing properties. 4) Incompleteness"/Mathematics/Numbers/Field: numbers are more or less incomplete objects: E.g. 2 has properties such as being the predecessor of 3 and being a prime, but no property that determines whether it is a quantity!. FieldVsStructuralism: This fourth way of seeing it is certainly not the best way to capture the "structuralist insight". II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical domains must not be indistinguishable. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| substit. Quantific. | Quine Vs substit. Quantific. | V 158 VsSubstitutional Quantification/SQ/Quine: the SQ has been deemed unusable for the classic ML for a false reason: because of uncountability. The SQ does not accept nameless classes as values of variables. ((s) E.g. irrational numbers, real numbers, etc. do not have names, i.e. they cannot be Gödel numbered). I.e. SQ allows only a countable number of classes. Problem: Even the class of natural numbers has uncountably many sub-classes. And at some point we need numbers! KripkeVs: in reality there is no clear contradiction between SQ and hyper-countability! No function f lists all classes of natural numbers. Cantor shows this based on the class {n:~ (n e f(n))} which is not covered by the enumeration f. refQ: demands it in contrast to a function f enumerating all classes of natural numbers? It seems so at first glance: it seems you could indicate f by numbering all abstract terms for classes lexicographically. Vs: but the function that numbers the expressions is not quite the desired f. It is another function g. Its values are abstract terms, while the f, which would contradict the Cantor theorem, would have classes as values... V 159 Insertion character: does ultimately not mean that the classes are abstract terms! ((s) I.e. does not make the assumption of classes necessary). The cases of insertion are not names of abstract terms, but the abstract terms themselves! I.e. the alleged or simulated class names. Function f: that would contradict Cantor's theorem is rather the function with the property that f(n) is the class which is denoted by the n-th abstract term g(n). Problem: we cannot specify this function in the notation of the system. Otherwise we end up with Grelling's antinomy or that of Richard. That's just the feared conflict with Cantor's theorem. This can be refute more easily: by the finding that there is a class that is not denoted by any abstract term: namely the class (1) {x.x is an abstract term and is not a member of the class it denotes}. That leaves numbers and uncountability aside and relates directly to expressions and classes of expressions. (1) is obviously an abstract expression itself. The antinomy is trivial, because it clearly relies on the name relation. ((s) x is "a member of the class of abstract expressions and not a member of this class"). V 191 Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Nominalism/Quine: the nominalist might reply: alright, let us admit that the SQ does not clean the air ontologically, but still we win something with it: E.g. SQ about numbers is explained based on expressions and their insertion instead of abstract objects and reference. QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be inserted are just as abstract entities as the numbers themselves. V 192 NominalismVsVs: the ontology of real numbers or set theory could be reduced to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for the sQ based on Gödel numbers. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. This is not about the extrapolation of the concrete and abhorrence of the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the refutal of the most transcendent nnumbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are the work of man." QuineVs: but even that does not work, we have seen above that the SQ about classes is, as a matter of principle, incompatible with the object quantification over objects. V 193 VsVs: the quantification over objects could be seen like that as well. QuineVs: that was not possible because there are not enough names. Zar could be taught RZ coordination, but that does not explain language learning. Ontology: but now that we are doing ontology, could the coordinates help us? QuineVs: the motivation is, however, to re-interpret the SQ about objects to eliminate the obstacle of SQ about classes. And why do we want to have classes? The reason was quasi nominalistic, in the sense of relative empiricism. Problem: if the relative empiricism SQ talks about classes, it also speaks for refQ about objects. This is because both views are closest to the genetic origins. Coordinates: this trick will be a poor basis for SQ about objects, just like (see above) SQ about numbers. Substitutional/Referential Quantification/Charles Parsons/Quine: Parsons has proposed a compromise between the two: according to this, for the truth of an existential quantification it is no longer necessary to have a true insertion, there only needs to be an insertion that contains free object variables and is fulfilled by any values of the same. Universal quantification: Does accordingly no longer require only the truth of all insertions that do not contain free variables. V 194 It further requires that all insertions that contain free object variables are fulfilled by all values. This restores the law of the single sub-classes and the interchangeability of quantifiers. Problem: this still suffers from impredicative abstract terms. Pro: But it has the nominalistic aura that the refQ completely lacks, and will satisfy the needs of set theory. XI 48 SQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: the SQ does not make any ontological commitment in so far as the inserted names do not need to designate anything. I.e. we are not forced to assume values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: we precisely obscure the ontology by that fact that we cannot get out of the linguistic. XI 51 SQ/Abstract Entities/Quine/Lauener: precisely because the exchange of quantifiers is prohibited if one of the quantifiers referential, but the other one is substitutional, we end up with refQ and just with that we have to admit the assumption of abstract entities. XI 130 Existence/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: with the saying "to be means to be the value of a bound variable" no language dependency of existence is presumed. The criterion of canonical notation does not suppose an arbitrary restriction, because differing languages - e.g. Schönfinkel's combinator logic containing no variables - are translatable into them. Ontological Relativity/Lauener: then has to do with the indeterminacy of translation. VsSubstitutional Quantification/Quine/Lauener: with it we remain on a purely linguistic level, and thus repeal the ontological dimension. But for the variables not singular terms are used, but the object designated by the singular term. ((s) referential quantification). Singular Term/Quine/Lauener: even after eliminating the singular terms the objects remain as the values of variables. XI 140 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: is ontologically disingenuous. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Supervaluation | Quine Vs Supervaluation | Field II IX Supervaluation/Semantics/Lewis/Fine/Field: (Lewis 1970a), (Kit Fine 1975): both propagate supervaluationist semantics for vague languages. Field: both are right: indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. Indeterminacy: seems to be a bigger problem for deflationism at first. Because it does not seem clear how indeterminacy can be solved within their own language. Quine/Field: had a big problem with that (see section 7). SomeVsQuine: Indeterminacy within their own language would simply be incoherent. II 24 Propositional Conditions/Truth/T-Theory/Quine: (1953b, p 138) Propositional conditions are all it takes to make the term "true" clear. (Field ditto). Reference/Field: then we may wonder why we ever need causal theories of reference? "Denoted" and "true" become sufficiently clear through scheme (T). If we want more to pin language to reality, we overlook that we are on Neurath's ship! Quine/Field: has hinted at something like that in § 6 of W + O (Quine 1960). FieldVsQuine: but that is not due to the inscrutability of reference, to the under-determinacy of theories or to the ontological relativity. In a T theory or a theory of primitive reference we try to explain a connection between language and the world. We do not try to put ourselves outside of theories. Reference/Field: here, psychological and neurophysiological models will be important. Conceptual Scheme/Field: but we do not need to stick our conceptual scheme to the outside of reality, but without access via psychological models our conceptual scheme collapses from the inside. According to our theory, it would be extremely unlikely in any case that there should be non-physical connections between the word and the world. II 63 Synonymy/Quine/Field: intralinguistic synonymy is much easier than inter-linguistic. Quine e.g. Everest/Gaurisankar/Field: (1960, W + O, § 9, 11): (designed as a one-word sentences): here, the fact that the stimulus is different was to make the speaker prefer one over the other. The different meaning is revealed by the fact that the sentences are not intra-subjectively synonymous for most members of the language community. FieldVsQuine: "consent initiative" is too behavioristic. That causes Quine to unnecessary concern about the second intention. Second Intention/Quine/Field: verbal stimulation as e.g. "Agree to one-word sentences beginning with "E" or I'll beat the brains out of you." (W + O § 48-9). Field: nevertheless Quine's argumentation seems to be generally correct: we can explain intra-linguistic differences by evidence considerations. Advantage: that explains meaning differences where they are suspected, but without referring to possible worlds. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 |
| Synonymy | Davidson Vs Synonymy | Cresswell II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: Problem: it involves a relativation on languages. That’s the reason for DavidsonVsSynonymy: (Davidson 1969, 161-167). QuineVsSynonymy: (1960): it is impossible to establish identity criteria for languages. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Tarski, A. | Davidson Vs Tarski, A. | Glüer II 28 Tarski tests his definitions through that they only imply -equivalences where the sentence on the right side translates the one quoted on the left. The T-predicate used may remain uninterpreted. Because: Def T-predicate: every predicate that provides correct translations is a T-predicate. Tarski assumes meaning in order to explicate the truth. Davidson: vice versa! It is not required of T-equivalences that the right side translates to the leftd. Glüer II 29 Def T-equivalence: true iff. the linked sentences have the same truth value in all circumstances. Those who want to apply Davidson’s "Convention T" need to know when T-equivalences are true. With Tarski, one must know the meaning of both object-language and meta-language sentences. Davidson’s T-predicate, however, must be interpreted. Glüer II 29 Vs: Why should T-equivalences indicate truth conditions if there needs to be no substantive connection between the linked sentences? Translation: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff. grass is green. How could T-equivalences be prevented from implying such equivalences?. Answer: Such a theory would not be too interpretive. Right has nothing to do with the truth conditions of left. DavidsonVsTarski: empirical rather than formal - empiricism excludes false law amendments (> Goodman).- Convention T insufficiently empirical. Glüer II 50 ff Tarski-like T-theories include no reference to meanings in the sense defined clearly assignable entities. Davidson: two radical consequences: 1) Understanding: for understanding it’s basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks (DavidsonVsTarski). Glüer II 51 Every language is accessible via the causal relationships. 2) It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a matter of social practice. DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language has to be abandoned in the radical interpretation. Glüer II 122 DavidsonVsTarski: The radical interpreter can only develop a T-theory for his L if he uses an interpreted T-predicate for the construction of his T-equivalences, i.e. his own, intuitive concept of truth. While Tarski’s T-predicates provide a structural description of a language whose translation is known, and precisely do not make a contribution to a truth theory, because for that it would be interesting to see what T-predicates in different languages have in common. Dummett I 25 DavidsonVsTarki: presumes, however, that the concept of truth must already be understood! If we knew nothing about it, except that it applies to sentences of the language concerned, according to the definition of truth, we cannot learn anything about the meaning of a sentence by stating the truth conditions. Therefore, you need a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! because this knowledge will be determined by the truth theory. Frank I 633 Truth/Meaning/Interpretation/DavidsonVsTarski: without interpretation the assertion that a particular physical entity has truth conditions or meaning remains an empty presumption. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Field Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 68 T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics"). Bre I 69 FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc. Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is. Bre I 70 Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is. Field I 33 Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences. a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities. That does not look as contradictory as Fie I 34 John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms. VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation". FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction. Field II 141 T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more. Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands. Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory. Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks. Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences. Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above). II 142 TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered. 2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better. 3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences. Putnam I 91 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form "Electron" refers to electrons "DNS" refers to DNS "Gene" refers to genes. etc. this is similar to (w) "Snow is white" is true iff.... (s)> meaning postulates) Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because: Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it). Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ... Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment): Def Criterion F/Putnam: (F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn). Then we reformulate: "Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron. PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F. This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically. Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tarski, A. | Kripke Vs Tarski, A. | III 337 Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage. III 367 Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence". III 410 Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way. Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski. Field I 245 Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (∏/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) for all sentences, not objects") definiert werden. S is true iff ∏p(if S = "p", p). where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?. Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>Semantic Paradoxes, (s) >Everything he said is true). Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates. Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ. KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need. Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für Field I 246 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?. → sQ: Could then be used as a basic term. → Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini. → b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b). → If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well. → Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Prior Vs Tarski, A. | I 98 Truth/Falsity/PriorVsTarski: the concepts of truth and falsity discussed in the last chapter are not the concepts of Tarski. Prior: ours could be described as properties not of sentences, but of propositions. I.e. quasi-properties of quasi-objects! Not adjectives "true", "false", but rather adverbs "correctly" (accurate, truthful, rightly) and "falsely". I 99 PriorVsTarski: (A) If someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully iff. snow is white. Tarski: (B) The sentence "snow is white" is true iff. snow is white. The truth of all true sentences of a language can be derived from Tarski's definition with normal logic. And that is for him the criterion of satisfiability of the truth definition. Quotation Marks/Truth/Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski: for me there are no quotation marks. But in Tarski, these belong more to informal preparation than to strict theory. Use/Mention/Tarski/Prior: left: the sentence is mentioned (by the name of the sentence) right: used. Prior: in my version () there is no mention, only use. (A) is not about sentences from start to finish, but about snow. (B) is about the sentence "snow is white". Self-Reference/Foreword Paradox/Tarski/Paradox/Prior: it remains the case that it looks as if self-reference were involved when we speak about people and what they say, think, fear, etc., which seems to exclude Tarski's semantics. But we must take a closer look: In Tarski, the predicates "true" and "false" do not belong to the same language as the sentences by which they are stated. I 103 PriorVsTarski: we say instead "x says something true if..." Or: "x says during the interval t t'that __" If we abbreviate this last phrase as "Sx!, "Sxp", then we could insert it in theorems like: CSx∑pKSxpNp∑pKSxpNp. Problem: (see above) If I says that he says something wrong between t and t', then it cannot be the only thing he says. This is a problem for very short intervals. How about if poor old x had to express theorems, and only had such a short time available for it? To the above theorem he would also have to express the consequent ∑pKSxpNp, and for that he might not have time! Above all, it may be that I will not do it ex hypothesi! Metalanguage/Point: this means that the language in which these theorems are expressed cannot be the same language that is used for that at some other occasions! |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Tarski, A. | Putnam Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 70 Truth Def/theory of truth/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is counterintuitive from the outset: this also applies to the model theoretical variants. They do not do our intuitive concept of "true" justice. Brendel I 71 His concept of truth is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" itself is quite unclear. Brendel I 72 "True-in-L"/PutnamVsTarski: doesn't consider the speaker nor their use of expressions. It depends only on syntactic features. Problem: Then "snow is white" is also true in such possible worlds in which the words have an entirely different meaning! Then they correspond to another issue. Then what is semantic about it? And what does it mean that in a counterfactual situation a sentence is true-in-L, but not "true"? It must then be said, in what language the phrase is "not true". Brendel I 73 It should also be explained why such a "counterfactual situation" shows that "truth" was not analyzed conceptually. E.g. I1: "Snow is white" here means that snow is white (L1). I2: here that water is liquid. I2: in a trivial sense "snow is white" is also L1-true! This is the case even if in a world "snow" and "white" are interpreted in a way that they express a false sentence in this possible world. Ex ""The earth is at rest" is true in a geocentric worldview" is true also in the heliocentric worldview. Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: here, the expressions are supposed to have a different meaning, and the issue to continue to hold that snow is white. Brendel I 73 Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: expressions have a different meaning, but the SBV are equal. I (a) 16 PutnamVsTarski: it must be added a certain substantial understanding of reference and truth, in which both are not made conditional on the possibility of human knowledge. (That would be the case of instrumentalism which thinks a sentence must be true if certain criteria are met, such as "sensations xyz are present."). Truth has to go beyond basic recognizability according to realism. I (b) 66 PutnamVsTarski: many think that he has completely and precisely defined reference, I do not. Truth/reference/Field: (1972) has shown that the "definitions of truth" and "definitions of reference" of logic did not do their job at all. PutnamVsTarski: his "Convention T" does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the terms of the designation of a sentence and "following from something". These concepts are closely related to truth and reference, but need to be clarified. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Tarski, A. | Tugendhat Vs Tarski, A. | III 191 TugendhatVsTarski: his scheme is too narrow. Also VsMeta Language. Somehow reality and subjectivity (intersubjectivity) have to be taken into account in the truth view. Question: whether criteria must not be incorporated into truth theory, since judgments refer beyond themselves to reality. III 197 TugendhatVsTarski: his implicit use of equivalence conceals the reference to the truth of judgment. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tarski, A. | Wittgenstein Vs Tarski, A. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would reject the logical semantics as a whole, because according to the view of language as a universal medium it cannot be articulated. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Tarski, A. | Verschiedene Vs Tarski, A. | Eigen VII 303 v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: for the description of the meta language one needed again a meta language. Recourse. Sainsbury V 180 Tarski: the ordinary everyday concept of truth is incoherent: it must be replaced by a hierarchical series of predicates of truth. The object language must not contain a predicate that applies exactly to its true sentences. SainsburyVsTarski: some authors think that our everyday language is not really deficient, but already contains the required hierarchy. e.g. with turns like "What you just said isn't true." It seems too radical to reject our ordinary concept of truth. On the other hand, it is probably not correct to assume that our everyday concept already contains the whole separation. Reinforced LiarVsTarski : (L2: "L2 is not true"). Despite Tarski we could formulate: LN: LN is not trueN Version 1: If that is flawed because it does not respect the separation of levels, then it is not trueN. But that is what it says, it has to be trueN! Version 2: A sentence that breaks through the levels is semantically flawed and therefore not true. So you can always construct an amplified liar sentence to disprove an approach about levels! Horwich I 122 Truth Definition/T-Def/VsTarski: Objections about alleged lack of correctness are directed against the semantic T-concept in general. VsTarski: the T-Def is circular, because in the form "p iff q" truth occurs implicitly: namely, because the equivalence applies when either both sides are true or both sides are false. TarskiVsVs: if this objection would be valid, there would be no formally correct T-Def at all, because we cannot form a composite sentence without the help of connections and other logical terms defined with their help. I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (truth value tables). I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (Truth-value-tables). Horwich I 127 VsTarski: because of his scheme, which obliges him to facts, he is committed to realism. (GonsethVsTarski). TarskiVsVs: that the expression ... Snow is "actually" white...was wrongly inserted by my critics. Truth conditions/T-Def/Tarski: the reference to facts is deliberately missing in the T-scheme! It is not about truth conditions. T-Schema/Tarski: only implies that if we use the sentence (1) Snow is white we claim or negate that we then also have the correlated sentence (2) The sentence "snow is white" is true we have to claim or negate it. I 128 N.B: with it we can keep our respective epistemological attitude: we can remain realists, idealists, etc., if we have been before. Realism/Tarski: the semantic T-concept does not commit us to naïve realism. ((s) If truth is disquotation, then the "disciplines" must be distinguishable by sentences that are disquotationally true instead of "immanently true"). TarskiVsVs: reductio ad absurdum: if there were another T-concept (according to the will of these critics, then it would have to be somehow different and then it would ultimately come out that "snow is white" is true, iff snow is not white! Otherwise it would not be another T-concept but the same T-concept! Nevertheless, such a "new" T-concept would not necessarily be absurd. In any case, any T-concept that is incompatible with the semantic T-Def would have such consequences. Tarski I 160 VsTarski: Question: Is the semantic conception of truth the only "right" one? TarskiVsVs: I must confess that I do not understand this question because the problem is so vague that no clear solution is possible. I 162 VsTarski: in the formulation of the definition, we necessarily use statement links like "if..., then...", "or" etc.. These occur in definitions. However, it is well known that the meaning of propositional connections in logic is explained by the words "true" and "false". (Circle). TarskiVsVs: it is undoubtedly the case that a strictly deductive development of logic is often preceded by certain statements that explain the conditions under which statements of the form "if, then..." are true or false. However, these findings are outside the system of logic and should not be regarded as a definition of the terms in question! I 163 These findings influence in no way the deductive development of logic. Because here we do not discuss the question whether a statement is true, but whether it is provable! (Truth/Proofability). I 163 Logical Connection/Statement/Tarski: the moment we are in the deductive system of logic (or semantics based on logic), we treat the propositional connections either as undefined terms, or we define them with the help of other propositional connections. However, we do not define the connections using terms such as "true" or "false". (p or q) exactly when (if not p, then q). This definition obviously does not contain semantic terms. Error: the schema (T) X is true exactly when p. for a definition of truth! VsTarski: a critic, who commits this mistake, considered this alleged definition to be "inadmissibly short", i.e.: "incomplete". I 164 It is not necessary to decide whether 'equivalence' means a logical formal relationship or a non-logical relationship. He suggests to add: (T') X is true exactly when p is true. ((s) Vs: here "true" occurs twice). (T'') X is true exactly when p is the case. TarskiVsVs: this is a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the statement connections. (Confusion of name and subject matter/confusion of statements and their names, mention/use). ((s) p (right) is the statement itself, not the assertion of its truth. This has nothing to do with the correctness of redundancy theory). I 168 VsTarski: but the formal definition of truth has nothing to do with the "philosophical problem of truth". It gives necessary and sufficient conditions, but not the "essence" of this concept. TarskiVs: I am not able to understand what the "essence" of a term should be. ((s) FregeVsTarski: Terms have necessary characteristics.) I 172 Criterion/criterion of truth/VsTarski: some argue that definitions do not provide us with general criteria for deciding whether an object falls under the defined terms. And the term "true" is of this kind, since no universal criterion of truth emerges directly from the definition. (> criterion of truth). ((s) RescherVsTarski). Tarski: this is completely correct, but it does not distinguish the term from many terms of science such as theoretical physics. (> term). I 174 Semantics/Tarski: Semantic terms are actually contained in many areas of the sciences and especially empirical sciences. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Tarski, A. | Loar Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 149 LoarVsTarski: there is an intensionalist counterpart to his theory: semantic concepts are completely definable in terms of abstract correlations between expressions and certain intensional entities. Assuming that we should understand language as a function of sentences on sentence-like intentions (which in turn we can identify with functions of possible worlds on truth values). Would we define a semantic concept in this way? Is it the case that everything that gives meaning to a sentence can be mapped to an intension by an abstractly defined function? |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Tarski, A. | Peacocke Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 162 T-Sentence/PeacockeVsTarski: logical form for a language with index words: ApAt (true (s,p,t) ↔ A(p.t)). s: "structurally descriptive name" of a sentence A(p,t) is a formula that does not contain "true" and "fulfilled". p, t: people, time points. (s) this takes circumstances into account, unlike Tarski, thus making it empirical. Truth/PeacockeVsTarski/PeacockeVsDavidson: Point: i.e. we must assume a certain access to the concept of truth already! When we omit this empirical tendency, the question is what makes one language the language of a community instead of another language. (>Meaning theory/Loar). EMD II 163 Then we do not know what "true in L" means for a particular population P. Demanding an answer here does not mean to criticize Davidson's program. We merely sought to fill a gap. Vs: it could be argued that this gap is already closed by the requirement that every truth definition must satisfy convention T. (Convention T: right side must be a translation of the left, material equivalence, extension is not enough). Davidson: himself speaks of the assimilation of a translation manual. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Tarski, A. | Brendel Vs Tarski, A. | I 49 Truth-Def/Tarski/Brendel: contains no object constants and only one relation expression for class inclusion. Testimony/Property/Name/Model Theory/Brendel: compared to Tarski we need some changes: 1. Statements no longer result from the fact that free variable n AF are bound by universal quantification, but e.g. that object constants are assigned property or relation expressions. Example "Hans loves Paula". 2. Property/Model Theory: here you also have to specify for each property what it means that I 50 a sequence of objects satisfies this property or relation. 3. Naming/Model Theory: a semantic relation of the naming of objects by object constants must be formulated. Interpretation/Model Theory/Brendel: (instead of fulfillment) new: now the constants as well as the variables and the property and relation expressions can be used as descriptive signs. This is done by a function of assignment. (Assignment function). Variables/Model Theory: new: now also variables are interpreted semantically. Therefore also formulas with free variables are truthful statements. Truth-Def/Modell Theory/BrendelVsTarski: new: now also a recursive truth definition about the structure of statements is possible. Example for the language L with countable infinite property and relation expressions ...+.... I 51 Model Theory/T-Def/BrendelVsTarski: this model theoretical truth definition is more general than Tarski's definition, since it cannot only make statements about set-theoretical entities. Semantic: but it is also because "truth" is defined by "interpretation in an area of objects", i.e. a function is described that connects linguistic entities with non-linguistic ones. I 58 Semantic Truth/T-Concept/Brendel: should be ontologically neutral in relation to truth value-bearers. VsRealism: should the T-concept force a realistic position, it could not function as minimal consensus of all knowledge conceptions. VsTarski: he is often accused of his T-concept being based on an uncritical realism. (Because of the existence of state of affairs as truth makers.) TarskiVsVs: no realism is implied, but only that if a statement is rejected, then also the assertion of the truth of this statement. (Tarski 1944, 169). I 59 JenningsVsTarski: his T-term is ambivalent: a) semantic, as relation between statements and the state of affairs b) that only an equivalence of two statements (e.g. "snow is white" and, "sn..."is true") (Jennings 1987). I.e. the assertiveness conditions are the same. But then the semantic dimension is abandoned! Brendel: Thesis: we should keep the semantic T-concept, which however is not ontologically neutral. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Taylor, Ch. | Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch. | VI 126 World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things": 1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions. 2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless). VI 127 Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed. VI130 Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious. RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars per representation (!)). RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity. VI 131 Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object. VI 133 Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self. But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre! (Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice"). TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material. Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence. Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions). World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences! Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)! Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized. VI 134 Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us. VI 137 Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism. VI 139 Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general. VI 140 Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated. Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Theism | Mackie Vs Theism | Stegmüller IV 466 Theodicy/popular version: (i) logical necessity: God cannot create e.g. quadrangular circles. Since evil is logically a part of the good, one cannot exist without the others. Vs: firstly: this is not a conclusion from the premise! further: a) The principle is not compellent. 1. if there were a common property that each and every thing possessed automatically, there would be no need for a predicate for it in any language. 2. It could be that this property would not be noticed by anyone! However, one could not assert: if everything possessed this property, this property didn't exist at all. b) The argument would explain at most the occurrence of very few evils. (As a side effect, not as e.g. planned genocide). IV 467 Theodicy/popular version: (ii) frequently, the argument of "necessary means" is brought forward: The evil as a means for the good. Ex. children must learn from mistakes. StegmüllerVs: However, many children do not learn from the mistakes of the world, but perish from them! Ex. pain as a warning function. Stegmüller: all these truisms are irrelevant to the problem. They are relevant only for limited beings, but God is attributed omnipotence. IV 468 (iii) principle of the organic whole: like an aesthetic principle: evil is part of the "organic whole". Such a world were even better than a purely good world. It were not static, but dynamic. Gradual overcoming of evil by the good. Def. evil of 1st order: suffering, pain, illness Def. values of 1st order: joy, happiness Def. values of 2nd order: moral values, responses to evil of 1st order: compassion, assistance, kindness, heroism. Theism must then support the thesis that evils of 1st order are satisfactorily explained and justified by values of 2nd order. Stegmüller IV 469 Theism/Mackie: Question: can the theist rightly claim that there is only absorbed evil in this world? Only then can he defend his position, otherwise there is unnecessary evils that God in his omnipotence could have avoided. VsTheism: 1. there is much more unabsorbed evils of 1st order (suffering, pain, etc.) as can fit in a valuable whole. 2. the game would be repeated at the next level! The values of 2nd order are accompanied by evils of 2nd order: Ex. wickedness, callousness, gloating, cruelty, cowardice etc. IV 470 Oly possibility: Values of 3rd order: only candidate: free will. It need not be such a value itself, but is logically necessary for realization. IV 471 Theism/Theodicy/R. Gruner: the theist should not only concede the evils, but empasize them as particularly important. The most faithful people have always been those who were most convinced of the reality of evil. Paradox: that faith depends precisely on that fact of which one claims it refuted it. This position is taken in the dialogues of Hume of the Demea. IV 479 Theodicy/free will: in defense of theism the concept of free will could be modified: freedom as a high value, such that God did not know at creation, how people would make use of it. Therefore God is not omniscient. Vs: 1. If God is not omniscient, he is no longer omnipotent, because a limitation of information is a limitation of power. Vs: 2. God would have to be thought of in a timely manner. This renounces an essential element of monotheistic religion. Vs 3. If God did not know what people would do, he still had to know what they could do! IV 481 MackieVsTheism: canot be explained without contradiction, without changing major points. Hume: would say: our boundless ignorance prevents us from claiming to have conclusively refuted theism. IV 516 MackieVsTheism: the competing naturalism always has the better arguments and lower improbability on its side. IV 517 Religion/Theism/R. Robinson: Thesis: the main contradiction between religion and reason is that religion prefers the consolation of truth. God/Spinoza/Stegmüller: (relatively strong modification of the traditional concept of God): no creator God, but infinite. Metaphysical necessity is part of him and thus the universe itself. Theodicy/Spinoza: Thesis: God knows no mercy! It is not a person, even not an infinite one, but a being who does not care about human concerns. IV 518 Religion/theology/Mackie: the monotheistic religions rely on a for them indispensable assumption of existence that is probably wrong. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Smart Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 210 Aquinas: fourth way (Fraassen: undoubtedly the most difficult, the most subtle but also the most confused): Aquinas: (based on the gradation in the things found): in the things there are better, worse and truer and less truer things, etc. But gradations are ascribed to things according to agreement with something else (namely a maximum) (>similarity, >comparisons). So there must be something that is best, truest, noblest, etc. (namely God). Most Real Thing/Aquinas: refers to Aristotle: what is greatest in truth has most reality. (FN 11) Fraassen: there is a subtle analogy here: Smart: I want to defend the image of the physicist not just as ontologically respectable, but as a more true image than the image of our everyday language. Susan StebbingVsEddington: ~ the table is who it is for us (in our everyday world). Eddington: Thesis: the truer view is that, as an aggregate of molecules, it consists largely of empty space. (FN 13). Explanation/Smart: what we need is not for micro-theory to explain a macro-theory of macro-laws to which it is linked by correspondence rules, but (with Sellars and Feyerabend) to explain why observable things obey these macro-laws. |
Smart I J. J. C. Smart Philosophy and Scientific Realism London 2013 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Wessel Vs Thomas Aquinas | I 221 Identity/Thomas Aquinas: "merely ideal relation, since there is only one thing, caused by our language. Wessel: pro: Identity is indeed a linguistic phenomenon, WesselVsThomas Aquinas: but it is not a "mere ideal relation" but an ontological assertion. The relation exists when there is the object and the two modes of designation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Tractatus | Wittgenstein Vs Tractatus | Tugendhat I 163 Tractatus/Tugendhat: naive object-theoretical position. Wittgenstein: "what the case, the fact is, is the existence of atomic facts", "the fact is a combination of objects". "In the facts objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain". (2.03). (Later discarded by Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein/late/self-criticism/VsTractatus: Philosophical remarks: "complex is not the same as fact I say of a complex, it is moving from one place to another, but not from a fact." "To say that a red circle consists of redness and circularity, or a complex of these constituents, is an abuse of such words and misleading." --- I 235 ff WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/WittgensteinVsTractatus/Hintikka. WWK, 209 f. "unclear to me in the Tractatus was the logical analysis and ostensive definition" ... "thought at this time that it is a connection between language and reality"... --- I 236 Sign/Meaning/Definition/showing/Waismann ("theses"): "We can give meaning to characters in two ways:. 1. by designation 2. by definition". --- I 237 Hintikka: deeper reasons: in the Tractatus the thesis of inexpressibility of semantics does not stop Wittgenstein from highlighting the role of the ostensive definition under the guise of showing. Through his move from phenomenology to the physical language it is impossible for him to indicatively define all his not further-back-tracable objects. One and the same gesture may be in the game when one indicatively defines a person's name, a color word, a substance name (mass terminus) a numeral, the name of a compass direction. The differences apparantly do not seem to belong to the area of the phenomenological, but to the ontology of everyday objects. Philosophical Investigations, PI § 28 For these reasons, Wittgenstein rejects for some time the idea that the ostensive explaining could establish a connection between language and reality. --- I 297 ff Image/agreement/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: is the vividness an agreement? --- I 298 Image/sentence/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/self-criticism: in the Tractatus I said something like: it was an agreement of the form, however, this is a mistake. Hintikka: this could give the wrong impression, that Wittgenstein abandoned the image thoughts. But that is a mistake. Image/Wittgenstein: the image can represent a possible state of affairs. It does not need to be an image of a de facto state in the world. A command is usually an image of the action that should be performed, but not necessarily an image of the actual completed act. (Also work drawing). What is the method of projection? --- I 299 "So I imagine the difference between sentence and reality is offset by the projection beams belonging to the image, the idea and which leave no more room for a method of application. There is only agreement and disagreement." "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality in grammar can be found in the language." --- II 138 Atomism/VsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there were elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives of infinity as a number, and assumes that there is an infinite number of sentences. 2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) they must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent). --- III 151 Tractatus/later self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein: he was dealing with two weak points: 1. that the descriptive language is so openly regarded as a model of the actual language. There are many unrecognized forms of speech. It may be questioned whether the meaning of an utterance can be understood regardless of the context. In addition, doubt, as to whether any meaningful sentence has one and only one logical form. 2. Problem of intersubjectivity disregarded. --- III 214 WittgensteinVsTractatus (self-criticism): discussions with Ramsey and the Italian economy scientist Piero Sraffa. SraffaVsTractatus: VsImage theory: Vs, that a meaningful sentence must be a projection of a state of affairs. Also denied that any meaningful sentence could be resolved into elementary propositions. From this critique emerged in 1929 30 Philosophical remarks (PB) 1932 34 Philosophical Grammar (PG) 1933 34 The Blue Book + The Brown Book Main work of the "Second Period": Philosophical Investigations (Philosophical Investigations). --- III 217 WittgensteinVsTractatus/Wittgenstein/late/Flor: that can be useful and clear in a specific situation, to give a vague question or a vague description or a vague instruction. --- VI 95/96 Logical constants/elementary proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: self-criticism: does now no longer assume that one would be able later to specify elementary propositions. In truth, we already have everything, namely at present. New: Priority of sentence system over the individual sentence. Previously: I believed that we have to do without the logical constants, because "and", "or", "not" do not connect the objects. (I abide by this). But I falsely believed that the elementary propositions would be independent from each other because I falsely believed the linking rules of logical constants could have something to do with the internal structure of sentences. In reality, the logical constants form rather just a part of a comprehensive syntax of which I did not know anything then." --- VII 148 Language/Tractatus/Tetens: language only serves one purpose here: to map facts. WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/VsTractatus/later Wittgenstein/Tetens: instead there is a variety of language games. To speak sensibly, we must take part in a complicated social life form with its diverse language games. --- VII 149 The philosopher must describe how we use the expressions in everyday language. --- VII 150 "... a picture holds us captive. And we could not get out because it was in our language, and it seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." (Philosophical Investigations, PI 82) Descriptive/normative/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein's ignores in the Tractatus the distinction between descriptive and normative sentences. He later calls this the "one-sided diet" ((s) only descriptive sentences). (Philosophical Investigations, PI p. 251, § 593) --- VII 152 Skepticism/philosophy/Wittgenstein/late: also the philosophers learned the words "error", "doubt", etc., from the everyday language, they have not been invented for the purpose of philosophizing. --- VII 153 Deception/Wittgenstein/late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything, then he uses the words in a way that he would never use them in everyday life. --- VII 154 Wittgenstein: E.g. one cannot say that one his mistaken about something in his joy. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tradition | Chomsky Vs Tradition | Lyons I 136 Grammar/Modern/Lyons: is often referred to as "formal" today in contrast to the traditional "content-related" grammar. ((s) stock: Lyons pro formal grammar, partial VsChomsky). --- I 137 Interposition: some grammarians assume that there are extralinguistic categories independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: there are universal grammatical categories (tradition). For example, "parts of speech", "tense", "mode", etc.). (see below, the question is whether there is any at all). Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that there are no such universal grammatical categories. The structure of each language should be described individually. --- Quine X 38 ChomskyVsTradition/Quine: Trees of educational rules are not enough, you also need grammatical transformation. Some compositions can best be understood by looking back and forth between different trees of the educational rules. Transformations allow this lateral movement. Quine: this is superfluous for the artificial expressions of logic. --- Searle VIII 407 ChomskyVsTradition: most famous example "John is easy to leave" - "John is eager to leave". The (structuralist) tradition treats both sentences as grammatically equal. However, the VP(Verb Phrase) and NP(Noun Phrase) are grouped differently. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Tradition | Searle Vs Tradition | II 28 Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. II 49 SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience! SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength. II 190 Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski. II 191 This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained. II 192 They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently! The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. II 228 Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. " II 231 According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.) II 232 SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). II 246 de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states. III 165 Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true! Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects). V 176 Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology. IV 155 Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous. ((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation). IV 156 SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence. IV 157 There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 |
| Tradition | Sellars Vs Tradition | I 57 Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association). I 62 Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report, a) without that this is a public language implementation, and b) without speaker/listener! Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought. I 65 Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits. Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions. I 84 Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas. I 88 SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical. I 86 Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists. I 87 Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing. SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Tradition | Schiffer Vs Tradition | I 265 Meaning/Schiffer. Thesis: There is no meaning theory. (All have failed). Language Philosophy/SchifferVsLanguage Philosophy: proceeds from false premises. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Tradition | Castaneda Vs Tradition | Frank I 342 Proposition/Tradition/Castaneda: its strength: that all of these entities which this theory equates must somehow converge. If language is to be an efficient means of thinking, then meaning and thought content must coincide. I 343 Belief/Intention/Tradition: their contents should coincide. Frege: what can be believed can also be demanded, commanded, required, requested, etc. CastanedaVs: that seems to be synchronically successful, but it lacks dynamism. The discrepancies between the different entities involved in proposition ((i) - (vii) emerge when we consider the diachronic river, where one undergoes changing experiences about a constantly changing world. In particular, we must have direct contact with the world in order to locate ourselves in it. This is precisely the role of the indexical reference. Propositions/CastanedaVsTradition: classical propositionality theory fails with indexical reference when it encounters experiences with "here", "now", "I", "he", etc. I 345 Thinking/Language/Proposition/CastanedaVsTradition: we seem to have assumed that thinking is embodied by symbolic activity. While thinking one somehow produces an illustrative token; since it happens both when thinking aloud and in silence, there has to be some brain pattern. I 346 The distinction between episodes of production of sentences and episodes of thinking is already made in the theory itself: therefore it postulates the convergence of sentence meaning and thought content. The propositionality theory does not have to identify a thinking episode ,that p, with an event in the brain or in the entire body. It is not about the body-soul problem. Vs: the required application of this distinction breaks the elegant arrangement of the coincident units: the distinction between a symbolic system and its application! This is Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole. This accomodates the dynamics of language and is itself not dangerous for the propositionality theory. But: Problem: the distinction between knowing the meaning and correct use exists! This is not a problem in most cases, but: I 347 E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen compounds in my liver": we may understand the sentence, but we do not know whether someone expresses a truth or falsity with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Tradition | Lyons, J. Vs Tradition | Lyons I 137 Grammar/Jespersen/Tradition/Lyons: there are universal grammatical categories ("parts of speech"), tense, mode, etc... Formal GrammarVsTradition: each language should be described individually. I 150 Def Grammatical Classes: Example verb, noun, etc. - Example word classes: man, dog, banana, runs, eats, sees - problem: the differentiation is too rough - solution/tradition: subclasses (e.g. a {man, linguist, scientist,...}, b {monkey, horse, dog...}) to avoid "the monkey sees the meaning". I 167 VsTradition/ChomskyVsTradition: not the grammar, but the lexicon excludes that! - Chomsky: nevertheless grammar is not indefinite. I 140 Universals/Chomsky: 1. Substantive Universals/Chomsky/Lyons: (not "substantial"): if one introduces a set of distinctive features, a subset of which is combined differently in the phonological systems of each language, then the distinctive features are the substantive universals. 2. Formal Universals/Chomsky/Lyons: any condition for the functioning of the phonological rules or the combinations of the phonological units according to the rules. For example, the postulate of one-dimensionality. VsTradition: the universal categories there can neither be described as formal nor as substantive, since the rules of traditional grammar have not been explicitly formalized. I 140 Tradition/Chomsky: was defined first and foremost by "nouns". I 150 Def Grammatical classes/Tradition/Lyons/VsTradition: Grammatical Classes: Nouns, verb, adjective, etc. Problem: the tradition mixed two points of view: 1. here it is asked about the conditions that should be decisive for the assignment of a word to a certain grammatical class. For example, "Does the word "men" belong to X or Y? This is practically always determined by the distribution of the word. (Tradition ditto). 2. has to do with the naming of classes (if their "class content" has already been determined on a formal basis): e.g. "Is X rightly called the class of the nominal? Formal grammar: here every description is equally good, you do not have to call something "adjective"! "Universal": here word classes such as "verb", "noun" etc. are taken as content-related. (tradition). Formal: (modern grammar): here we assume that the classes were created based on the distribution, and could have been named differently. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Tradition | Millikan Vs Tradition | I 13 classical realism: thought and knowledge are separated and intentionality is transparent. Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: intentionality is not transparent: many processes which are "about" something, are not done consciously. Ex von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, but bees do not know. Bees merely react adequately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the reference is identified. Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are. That's why they are representations. Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in what general structure the world has to have so that subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. can be projected onto it. Realism/Millikan: properly understood realism does not require that the world must be "allocated correctly" for that. I 17 Eigenfunction/Millikan: Ex heart has something to do with the fact that it pumps blood. But what kind of connection to the blood pump must be given? Some hearts are malformed and can not pump, others, Ex water pumps could perfectly pump blood, but they are not hearts. Ex artificial hearts: do not belong to the biological category. So it's not the actual constitution, the actual forces, dispositions etc that make something an element of a biological category. Eigenfunction/Millikan: causes to submit something into a biological category. It has nothing to do with forces and dispositions, but with history. Having an intrinsic function means to be "slated for something", "to want" something ("supposed to", designed to "). We must now examine in a naturalistic, non-normative way. Language/propositional attitude/Millikan: So we have to ask, "what are they good for." Sentence/Millikan: Just as a heart sometimes may be deformed, a sentence can also not be well-formed. Other sentences are simply wrong. Tradition/falsehood/Millikan: the tradition was obliged to accept that false beliefs are beliefs. Then we also have to have the forces to influence our dispositions. MillikanVsTradition: but a broken kidney does not have the power to fulfill its function. I 18 And wrong and confused thoughts also do not have such forces. Tradition: here has more to do with input-output relations. Millikan: thesis: we are dealing with the biological functions, the functions that "something thought for". Millikan: thesis: by focusing on the intrinsic function (biological function), we are free to find the defining characteristics between true convictions and the world outside. Eigenfunction/Millikan: 1. direct eigenfunction: the first part of the theory relates only to the functions of things that are members of families that are similar to each other Ex hearts, or are similar to an archetype Ex sentences, words, Ex shaking hands. 2. derived eigenfunction: here we have to show that new things can have eigenfunction: Ex new behavior, new bee dances, new convictions. I 133 Intension/tradition/Millikan: always has to do with the application criteria. 1. set of properties or characters that are associated in the mind. 2. this criterion defines what the term is applied to - the extension! Extension/intension/tradition: the two are connected in spirit. Intension/MillikanVsTradition/Millikan: instead, it is the evolution that defines the connection between intention and extension. Sense/Millikan: results from the combination of term and reference, how the term "is intended to project". We still need the concept of testing. I 157 Rationalism/rationalist/tradition/Millikan: (similar argument): what a term means in one idiolect must be known to the speaker of this idioleckt a priori. But all that can be known a priori is whether two expressions in the idiolect have the same intension. If a term now has more than one intension, one can not know a priori whether the intensions will converge in the application. Therefore, each unambiguous term must have only one intension. meaning/sense/MillikanVsTradition: importance of Frege'ian sense, not intension. Then emptiness is the primary type of insignificance and neither ambiguity nor synonymy are determined by reasoning that is purely a priori. Intension/Millikan: is only the secondary meaning. I 158 They can be meaningful only insofar as these intentions are explicit and have meaning themselves. I 171 Error/delusion/to show/indexical word/Millikan: Ex there are two items on the table, an ashtray, which I do not consider an ashtray and a thing that is not an ashtray but I think it is and say "This is a nice Ashtray". Question: have I thereby said that the ashtray is nice, although I meant the other object? Ex I hold up a book and say, "This belonged to my grandfather." However, I am mistaken and am holding up the wrong book. I 172 What I have said, of course, is wrong. What is not so clear is whether what I meant is something other than what I said. Millikan: thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" have meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous with respect to Frege's sense. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have so often ignored that. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead us to temporary concepts. temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: intensions are then linked to our ability to pursue things and to re-identify them. preliminary concept: Ex this coffee mug for me is totally indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it's my cup. I 173 Question: whether that even counts as a concept. Ability to track the object leads to an interior concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: if thinking is not mediated by perception the objects one thinks of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are provided with an index. I 174 Error/delusion/indexical word/perception/misidentification/Millikan: Ex Suppose I'm wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived meaning from the ability to track the object. 2. inner concept I already had previously. "This" is therefore ambiguous. I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. in order to give them a content a "standard observer" must mean more than "observers to whom red things appear red under standard conditions". And accordingly for "standard conditions". Solution: standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no one has any idea how that could work. Problem: if you have every reason to believe that to be a standard observer, there are circumstances in which an object seems to have a different color than it has. But one would not conclude that the thing would not be red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must be able to identify these opposite characteristics, also. And it may be that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify to the oppositeness of red and green? Many authors: think that one could never argue that red and green could even be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: but that is not true, in fact there are many ways, Ex strabismus. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certitude/Millikan: our trust in the fact that red and green are opposites (perhaps incorporated into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is exactly the objective validity of these concepts, of the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Trope Ontology | Meixner Vs Trope Ontology | I 43 Def Trope/Ontology/Meixner: (Main representatives of trope ontology: Donald C. Williams, Keith Campbell, forerunner: Hume). Greek: tropé: twist/turn. Tropes: Thesis: Property individuals (individual properties) as basic building blocks of reality. N.B.: then they are not accidentals but substances. Hume/Meixner: its tropes are the "perceptions". They are "impressions" or "ideas", which are linked by relations like either contiguity (spatial, temporal touch), similarity or causality. Be it to a body, be it to an ego. I 44 The tropes are not themselves dependent on properties as universals, they are not derived from general properties. MeixnerVsTrope Ontology: the fact that individuals are regularly named with reference to a bearer speaks against this independence of property individuals. Trope ontology: must make language (naming) irrelevant. Peter Simons: has a lot of sympathy for trope ontology. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Tugendhat, E. | Davidson Vs Tugendhat, E. | Frank I 668 Twin Earth/Davidson: does not depend on the idea that social language use dictates what speakers mean and of course not, what their narrow psychological states are. Meaning/DavidsonVsTugendhat: is partially determined by the circumstances. TugendhatVsDavidson. Twin Earth/Stereotype: "Water" is not only applied to substances with the same molecular structure, but also to substances that are sufficiently similar. (Stereotype), E.g. odorless, colorless, etc. Rigid Designator/Davidson: this remark shows that it is possible that I do not recognize a rigid designator when I see one!. Facts/Twin Earth/Davidson: the special fact does not depend on such cases, and also not on how we analyze or should analyze them. It depends instead simply on how the basic connection between words and things is made. Frank I 669 Otherwise we would have no way of knowing what others mean. Meaning/Davidson: we can easily learn the meaning of "Moon" without ever having seen the moon! Davidson thesis: all thinking and every language has a foundation in such direct historical connections (> Putnam, Kripke, baptism/not only for the name, but for all the words). Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Unger, P. | Lewis Vs Unger, P. | IV 244 Sorites/Truth Value/Vagueness/Lewis: For example Fred is a borderline case of baldness, then the sentence "Fred is bald" is perhaps without truth values. Nothing in our language makes such descriptions (delineations) right and others wrong. We can't find a limit once and for all. If a sentence is true over the entire range, it is simply true. But we treat a sentence as more or less "simply true" even if it goes beyond an area of its vagueness that is large enough. So if it is "true enough". We can usually cope with this, but not always, as the paradoxes testify: Problem: truth-preserving arguments do not always have the quality of being "true enough"! "true enough": when is one sentence true enough? It's a matter of vagueness in itself. IV 245 More importantly, it depends on the context. In other circumstances, something may not be true enough. Austin: "France is hexagonal". Standards can be loosened or tightened. Interestingly, tightening is easier than loosening: For example, if the standards were high and something is said that is true enough only under relaxed standards, and nobody contradicts, then the standards are lowered. But what is said under lowered standards may still seem imperfectly acceptable. For example, tightening standards: always manages to appear recommendable, even if it disturbs the purposes of conversation. Absolute/relative: e.g. (Peter Unger): one could say that there is actually nothing that is really level! The sidewalk is level, but the desk is more level! And so there is surely also something that is more level than the desk. One can always think of something that is even more level, etc. Problem: "level" should actually be taken as an absolute term. Then how could one deny that the table is level VsUnger: one could deny that "level" is absolute. But Unger is right about that. What he calls inconsistent really sounds that way. So I assume that in no description of the relative vagueness of "level" and "more level" it is true that something is more level than something that is level. LewisVsUnger: the correct answer is that he is changing her account. (He is changing the score on you). He's transferring the account to you. What he says is only acceptable under tightened standards of precision. IV 246 Because what he says is only acceptable under tighter standards, it is no longer true that the sidewalk is level. But that does not change the fact that it was true in the original context. Unger has not shown that the new context is somehow more legitimate than the old one. "Safe"/Unger: in an analogous way, Unger (correctly) observed that "safe" is an absolute term. Therefore, nobody is actually safe in any matter! In fact, the approximation rule allows Unger to create a context in which everything he says is true, but that doesn't show that anything we do in more everyday contexts is wrong. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Universalism | Schiffer Vs Universalism | I 41 Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) but it must be translatable into everyday language. > Universalism of everyday language: it must be possible to translate any formalism or formula into normal language. > Formalism). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of normal language: the colloquial concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "there is just nothing that corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: this misses the decisive factor in our everyday language psychological concepts. (see below 6.4). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Urmson, J.O. | Searle Vs Urmson, J.O. | V 201 Validity/logic/Urmson: E.g. "valid" is of course a value expression. Calling a conclusion "valid" means accepting it and to declare it as good. V 202 1. It is impossible, "to define valid with the means of purely descriptive terms as "valid" is a value expression. 2. from the description of a deductive inference can never be derived a statement that it is a valid deductive conclusion. SearleVsUrmson: that is wrong. One can define: X is a valid deductive conclusion = df. X is a deductive conclusion and from the premises of X follows the conclusion of X. It should also be given the description of a conclusion, from which it follows that it is a valid deductive conclusion: X is a deductive conclusion in which from the premises the conclusion is followed. Further description: "It is a contradiction to affirm the premises and to deny the conclusion", etc. V 203 We have hereby refuted the view that it is impossible to derive a value expression from descriptive statements. SearleVsUrmson: This fallacy is based on the assumption of the language theory according to which a logical gap exists between the meaning of a value expression and the criteria of its application. This distinction, however, does not apply to the present example, because by saying that a conclusion is deductive, the criteria for its validity are already set. Summary: it is refuted that from a description no value could be derived: by describing a logical validity and concluding its evaluation from it. V 205 Criterion/meaning/use/Urmson: E.g. the British Ministry of Agriculture stipulated: "extra-fine variety" (evaluating) and beyond it the classes A, B, and C. (descriptive). Urmson: therebetween no derivation relation can exist! (s) otherwise circle). SearleVsUrmson: the Ministry has given a definition. "Every apple that is A, B, or C, is an extra-fine variety." This is as analytical as any other analytical statement. Of course, the characteristic illocutionary statement "this apple is extra fine" is quite different from V 206 "This apple has the properties A, B and C". But this difference is not enough to assert that the expressed proposition in the second statement cannot be derived from the first. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Use Theory | McGinn Vs Use Theory | I 106 To mean sth./meaning/language/object/usage/McGinn: whoever masters the meaning of a word has never seen the vast majority of the corresponding objects. In addition, the potential use of words is greater than could be explored in the life of a speaker. But in every single situation of the application of the word its intended meaning includes all these objects. That is, there is a property exemplified by the speaker, by virtue of which s_he captures this spacious yet exclusive meaning. The semantic ability thus contains a kind of universality that construes a relationship between the speaker and things that is far beyond the range of personal experience. I 120 Wittgenstein: If meaning is simply the usage, there is no sense to speak of fitting. Detecting the meaning happens all at once and certainly something other than the time-extended use." To mean sth./Theory of Utility/McGinn:. Kripke elaborates how problematic this is for meaning sth. McGinn. there must, for example, be a constitutive connection between intentioned meaning and usage, but a simple equation leads to fundamental problems (Kripke) ((S) Ex all the time you can have meant something else by addition than I have, and have the same numbers.) "relation of order." if two creatures match in all non-semantic descriptions (behavior, interior, relation to other things), they must think and mean the same. Nevertheless, the basis of this relation of order contains nothing that could be handled by the nature of being of semantic features in the handle detected by FIN-features (FIN - fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity). I 125 theory of usage/Kripke/McGinn: The reference to the usage of language in the sense of units of characters over time and changing situations gives us no CALM theory, because exactly in this sense, the theory of character can be problematic! (CALM: combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can not somehow represented the meaning meant as the sum of uses, otherwise the FIN-characteristics were lost. ((S), if characters could mean something else from time to time (and the "sum" form a kind of average should) there could be e.g. no normativity since also the average would change constantly with the sum.) theory of usage/McGinn: meaning is nothing like the link between situations of usage. Precisely for this reason it is so difficult to articulate the relationships, because the FIN-features are not results of CALM. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Use Theory | Searle Vs Use Theory | III 64 Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies. Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case! III 64/65 Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it. III 79 Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times. To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use) There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words. Status: here no physical features are available. V 221 Searle: the concept of use is too vague. SearleVsUse theory: 1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case! V 221/222 E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False: 1. What does W mean? 2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!). 4. how are such propositions used? V 223 5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions? The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.) Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy: V 224 SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression. V 229 SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?" V 234 SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Brandom Vs Various Authors | I 205 The approach advocated here is critical of three views: Vs 1) that the content is construed exclusively in accordance with the model of the representation of facts. 2) that the quality of the inference solely according to the model of formal validity, 3) that rationality is construed only according to the model of reasoning based on means or purposes. I 338 Brandom: VsReductionism, Brandom pro Relativism I 340 Beliefs: make a difference for what we say and do. They can only be understood in a context of social linguistic practice. First-person reflection is the internalization of third-person reflections. (Vs "privileged access"). I 542 BrandomVsFormalism: of course it is not the case, that something would be propositional in content only by virtue of its relation to accuracies in the inferential practice. Formalistic error: equals all accuracies of inference with logical correctness. I 822 VsTradition: so far, a clear distinction could be made between semantics and pragmatics only by largely overlookeding anaphoric phenomena. I 826 BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of score keeping practices. II 13 VsBrandom: characterized as super-rationalist by others. The meaning of it all stems from the role in language use. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Various Authors | Chomsky Vs Various Authors | Lyons I 157 Rules/grammar/transformational grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion, ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: the grammatical structure of language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is mastered by the speaker of the mother tongue "intuitively" (unconsciously). (ChomskyVsRules: because of the consistency of the "indeterminacy of grammar"/ChomskyVsIndeterminacy of grammar). Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not the whole grammar is indeterminate. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Various Authors | Dennett Vs Various Authors | I 87 DennettVsDavies, Paul: ("God’s plan"): the human mind cannot be an unimportant byproduct. Dennett: why should it be unimportant or trivial merely because it is a byproduct? Fallacy, error. Why can the most important thing of all not be something that has emerged from something unimportant?. I 192 DennettVsSnow: was wrong when he compared scientific discoveries with Shakespeare: Shakespeare belongs only to himself, scientific achievement belongs to all. E.g. Why is there no copyright on the successful multiplication of two numbers?. I 244 DennettVsSmolin/Parallel Universes: Problem: there are too few limitations on what should be described as obvious variations and why. I 333 GhiselinVsPangloss Principle: is bad because it asks the wrong question: the question of what is good. Instead, we should ask "What happened?". I 692 DennettVsGhiselin: he deceived himself: there is never a clear answer to this question that does not greatly depends on what we like!. General/Particular/AI/Dennett: Donald Symons: there is no "general problem solver", because there are no general problems, only particular problems. DennettVsSymons: What was that? Neither is there a general wound, but only particular wounds. Nevertheless, there is a general healing process. II 23/24 Consciousness/Language/Dennett: There is a view that certain beings could possess a consciousness, but due to their lack of language they cannot inform us about it. DennettVs: why do I think that is a problem? E.g. The computer can also be function if no printer is connected. Our royal road to getting to know the minds of others is language. It does not reach all the way to them, but that’s just a limitation of our knowledge, but not a limitation of their minds. Sai V 77 Identity/Sainbury: no vague relation. DennettVsSainsbury: identity is no relation!. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Duhem Vs Various Authors | I XXIII DuhemVsLord Kelvin: (in which mechanical models play a fundamental role). Kelvin: If I have a model, I understand, if I have none, I do not understand. - Today more set-theoretic models that Duhem certainly would not have challenged. I 254 DuhemVsMaxwell: Helmholtz established an electrodynamic theory which arises completely logically from the best-supported principles of the theory of electricity, in which no fallacies occur in the formulation of the equations, which are so common in the works of Maxwell. I 115 Newton Thesis: in healthy physics, every theorem is deduced from the phenomena and generalized by induction (DuhemVs). I 255 DuhemVsNewton: on closer inspection, the method is not as strict and simple as Newton claimed. I 257 Question: is this principle of universal gravitation then rather a simple generalization of two expressions provided by Kepler and extrapolated by Newton on the satellites? Can induction derive it from these principles? DuhemVsNewton: not at all! In fact, it is not only more general than the two expressions, it is not only different, it contradicts them. If the theory of Newton is correct, Kepler’s laws are necessarily false. I 261 DuhemVsAmpère: The mathematical theory of electrodynamics is not derived solely from experience: the raw facts of the experiment as they are by nature would not be accessible to the mathematical treatment. They must be reformed and brought into symbolic form. (Ampere did this in reality) I 263 DuhemVsInduction: The need for the physicist to express the experimental data symbolically before introducing them into his thoughts, makes the purely inductive path unusable! I 357 DuhemVsEuler: Euler follows a circular argument: Definition: A force is the force which brings a body from rest to movement. (everyday language use). I 355 We would say instead: A body which is not subjected to any force remains motionless. A body that is subjected to a constant force moves at constant speed. If the force with which a body is moved is increased, the speed of that body is increased as well. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Various Authors | Evans Vs Various Authors | EMD II VIII Meta Language/Theory Language/Evans/McDowell: often mentioned conditions: 1) if S is meaningful and unambiguous, there is exactly one sentence of L which is registered for S. 2) if S is n times ambiguous, there are n different sentences of L which are registered for S. 3) if S has no meaning, there is no sentence of L which is registered for S. 4) If S entails another sentence S’, there is an effectively decidable relation which is valid between the sentence of L that is registered for S or for S’. Problem/Seuren: the 4th condition leads to a conceptual collapse!. EMD II VIII/IX E.g. "John is a bachelor" entails "John is unmarried". According to the semantic representation, the simple "bachelor" cannot be the same as the complex "unmarried man". Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: this whole thing can be challenged, not because it revives the controversial distinction analytic/synthetic or because the "conceptual collapse" would go on without end, but because we, if we got ourselves into it, would put ourselves into a position where we would be unable to do what we are doing. And that would be that we set up something that, if someone knew about it, would put him into a position to speak and understand a language. It would be unfair to imply that the theorists are unaware of the speaker listener competence. Evans/McDowellVsSeuren: he suggests to people that if they "broke through circle", it would lead to the impossibility of determining the meaning of sentences "outside the language", i.e. "without using language". Vs: there is a fallacy in that: surely we cannot determine meanings without using words. But it does not follow that if we specify the sentence meaning of S using the sentence S’. EMD II X we thus determine a relation between S and S’!. Solution: S is mentioned, and S’ is used. (Use/Mention, T sentence). E.g. (5) "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white does not constitute relation which has the sentence has to itself, but rather constitutes under these circumstances a semantic property of the sentence by using it. This is an exemplification, with which we may well express our belief that snow is white. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Various Authors | Feyerabend Vs Various Authors | I 355 Incommensurability: FeyerabendVsCritics: Incommensurability does not apply to all competing theories and it applies to theories only if they are interpreted in a certain way, for example, without reference to an "independent observation language"! This restriction has been overlooked by most critics. I do not claim the incommensurability of all theories! II ~ 10 FeyerabendVsEthics: it assumes that man is entirely a worldly being (materialism). II 31 "Objectivity"/FeyerabendVs: supposed to conceal a position or tradition. Position a participant who abstains from his skepticism. II 74 FeyerabendVsLogic: the objection assumes that the class of the consequences of a scientific sentence is fixed irrespective of the treatment of the sentence and according to the rules of propositional logic. This assumption has never been substantiated. The propositional logic is only one among many logical systems, there are also intuitionistic logics within them without Foreclosed Third. II 162 VsAstrology: it is criticized that stars lead to tendencies but not to constraints. Astrology/Feyerabend: connects their success with making money! |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Various Authors | Foucault Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 311 Sciences/Foucault: empirical natural sciences have a certain special status, he criticizes the human sciences (humanities) as non-autonomous. They work with borrowed models and foreign ideals of objectivity. FoucaultVsHumanities: they remain pseudosciences because they do not see through the compulsion to aporetically duplicate the self-referential subject (subject/object). I 334 Def Biopower/Foucault: disciplinary power functions without the detour of a necessarily false consciousness. The discourses merge with the practices of their application. It is the form of society that eliminates all naturalness and transforms the whole of creaturely life into a substrate of bequest. Habermas I 335 > Sloterdijk: .... until there, resistance can draw its motif solely from the signals of body language, from that non-verbalizable language of the tormented body, which refuses to be suspended into discourse. (Critique of Cynical Reason). FoucaultVsSloterdijk: this interpretation (by Sloterdijk) that he admittedly does not make himself his own: otherwise he would have to grant the other of reason, as materially, the status that he denies him with good reasons. He defends himself against a naturalistic metaphysics that reifies a counter-power. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Various Authors | Hacking Vs Various Authors | I 98 Argument of Cosmic Coincidence: a good theory explains phenomena as contiguous which have not previously been thought of as related. Conversely, we arrive at the same raw entities with very different thought processes. I 227 Reichenbach: "Argument of the same cause" - also Salmon: E.g. Brownian movement, Avogadro number: you always come to the same number in different ways. HackingVs: petitio principii. Language/Bennett: developed, E.g. because one native wanted to warn another that a coconut was about to fall from a tree. HackingVsBennett: racist! In general, conjectures about the origin of language have a tendency to be unimaginative and patronizing. I 249 Bacon: "An experiment which is not preceded by theory is related to the natural sciences like the sound of a child’s rattle to music". HackingVsBacon: an experiment can be made out of mere curiosity and be equally fruitful!. I 299 Theory/Observation/Hanson: Noticing and observing are skills and abilities. E.g. positron. HackingVsHanson: you cannot train an assistant to make accurate observations without teaching him big theory. (still practiced in England today). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Various Authors | Heidegger Vs Various Authors | I 186 HeideggerVsCatholicism: (against the re-admission of a Catholic student fraternity): "one still does not know the Catholic tactic. And one day this will severely take revenge". Habermas Seyn: spelling in late work, Vs traditional ontology. I 123 HeideggerVsHerder: there is no general language. >Language/Foucault, Language/Davidson. HeideggerVsPhilosophy: Vs Division into individual areas and thus scientification. I 171 Subject/Object: HeideggerVs this traditional, space-creating differentiation. Instead: "Walten sui generis". VsDichotomies: Truth/Untruth, - Theory/Practice - Freedom/Necessity - Belief/Wisdom - Divine/Human - Vs Categories constituting totality: Being as substance, happening as consciousness, God as prima causa, will as thing in itself (VsSchopenhauer). II 36 HeideggerVsLogic: "dissolves in the vortex of an original questioning..." II 56 Signs/Heidegger: Vs The becoming predominant of the sign character of the word. This must be destroyed. (>Rorty: Sounds become more important, search for original words: Language/Rorty) . II 66 "Indian thinking": does not need the human. (Heidegger Vs). II 131 HeideggerVs "culture enterprise". But he respectfully speaks of "culture", no contemporary thinker is "big enough" to bring thinking directly and in a shaped form before his cause and thus on his way. (Spiegel Interview with M. Heidegger: R. Augstein,Der Spiegel Nr. 23, 31. 05. 1976). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Various Authors | Hofstadter Vs Various Authors | II 108 Arthur Koestler: VsKoestler: "Koestler's Fallacy": general inability to see that unusual events is likely in the long run. Reason: 1. Because we do not notice non-events, we misjudge the basis. 2. We are weak in the assessment of event combinations. 3. We overlook the principle of equivalence of curious coincidences: for one theory of the supernatural, one chance is as good as another. II 482 Sapir-Whorf-Thesis: Language controls thinking. A programmer in the language X can only think in terms offered by the language. (HofstadterVsWhorf) VsWhorf: the power of a great literary work does not come from the language into which the author was accidentally born, otherwise all Russians would have to be great writers. It also stems from the history of his experiences and his ability to make experiences. II 486 Language/Hofstadter: Question: Why is there not a single word for the phrase "Come and have a look" after so many thousand years, e.g. "Kamhuseda"? Also novels have not become shorter in the last 200 years! Reason: The ideas have another dimension. II 688 Artificial Intelligence: Avon Barr: "information-processing cognition model". "Everything interesting about cognition happens above the 100 millisecond level, the time it takes to recognize your mother. VsBarr: just as well you can say:" everything above this level..., the time you need to recognize your mother." II 701 VsBarr: confusion of levels: "cognition as arithmetic process": even if the neurons cope with sums in an analogous way, this does not mean that the epiphenomena themselves also do arithmetic. Example: if taxis stop at red, this does not mean that traffic jams stop at red. II 701 Simon: (Artificial Intelligence pioneer): Common ground between the brain and information-processing processes is obvious. VsSimon: How can he believe that? Computers still do not have subcognitive actions in the most elementary sense. There is no common sense program. ((s) See Hofstadter II 696) Def Intelligence/Simon/Newell: mind, bound in any matter that can be arranged into patterns. II 703 Symbol/HofstadterVsSimon/Nevell: for me has more to do with representative expressiveness (representation). To represent something else, something must be immensely rich. HofstadterVsSymbol Manipulation, "symbol processing": the manipulation of meaningless signs is not enough to generate understanding, although it is enough to enrich them with meaning in a limited sense of the word. (Gödel, Escher, Bach, Chapters II to VI). II 704 Computer/Artificial Intelligence/AI/Consciousness/HofstadterVsSimon/Newell: Problem: they see the computer as lifeless, passive objects and also the symbols as passive. Denotation /Hofstadter: does not happen at all on the level of symbols! Also the single ant is not "symbolic". II 720 Thinking/Boole: believed he could grasp the "laws of thinking" through rules for manipulating claims. II 723 Cognition/VsSimon/Newell: Thesis: In every truly cognitive system there must be several levels that allow a rigid syntax at the lowest level to develop into a fluid semantics at the highest level. Symbolic events are reversed into non-symbolic events. II 724 Symbol/Newell: a physical symbol is actually identical to a Lisp Atom with an attached list. ("property list"). HofstadterVs. Symbol/Bits/Hofstadter: Bits are not symbols. Meaning/Lisp/Hofstadter: The logic of Lisp does not rise from a lower level. It is fully present in the written program, even when there is no computer. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
| Various Authors | Locke Vs Various Authors | Danto I 112 LockeVsInnate Ideas: God created us so that we can acquire the basic ideas with our senses, therefore it would be superfluous to provide us with innate ideas. Locke I 78 Second Treatise Law/LockeVsFilmer: Adam did not obtain an absolute right of dominion over his children or the world either by paternity law or by God's positive gift. Had he possessed this, his heirs would not have possesed this. If these had attained it, there would be neither a determination of the natural nor the positive right from which it could be seen who was entitled to the right of inheritance. I 79 Legitimacy/Locke: claims to derive political violence from the "true origin": the state of nature without power. Locke I 159 Law of Nature/LockeVsGrotius: unthinkable without God's existence (Grotius: but thinkable, even if the assumption would be a great crime!). Locke II 195/196 Language/LockeVsArtificial Language: (fashion of the time, according to Leibniz, according to the algebra model): instead, analysis of the use of language, critical discussion of its function. An individual cannot reform his or her mother tongue. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Various Authors | Quine Vs Various Authors | II 111ff QuineVsSemantic Theory: there is a lack of a general definition of meaning QuineVsUse Theory of Meaning: definition of meaning through use too vague! (Demarcation of what is detectable under the "circumstances") (QuineVsWittgenstein). III 272 Singular Term/QuineVsSingular Terms: the whole category of singular terms is logically superfluous and should be abolished! ((s) Instead: variable). V 58 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. the child learns that "red" is applied to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, etc. The idea associated with that may be whatever it likes! Language bypasses the idea and focuses on the object. ((s) reference/(s): goes to the object, not an idea, which is in this case unnecessary.) Stimulus/Quine: has nothing mysterious in language learning. V 60 Problem: in progressive learning sentences are formed which have less to do with stimuli. E.g. about past and future. Quine: philosophers have great difficulty to specify accurately and in detail which connections it is about. QuineVsSupranaturalism. V 61 We only need orientation by external circumstances. Internal mechanisms are only insofar positive as we can hope that they will be clarified by neurophysiology. IX 199 Individuals/QuineVsFraenkel: we cannot follow him to simply waive individuals, because under TT this would exclude infinite classes and also the classical number theory. (Chapter 39). Solution: (from Chapter 4): the identification of individuals with their One classes. IX 199/200 But then we would have to make an exception in the interpretation: if x is an individual, then "x ε x" should count as true. (Above, "x ε y" became false if neither were objects of sequential type). Now (1) and (2) reduce to: (4) Ey∀x(x ε y (Tnx u Fx)), (5) (∀w(w ε x w ε y) u x ε z) > y ε z. Moreover, the definition of "Tnx" needs to be revised to make it match the new idea of the individual: " x VT y" by way of merging we can define (6) "T0x" stands for "∀y (y ε x y = x)" ((S) "all parts of individuals are identical with this one".) "T n + 1 x" stands for "∀y(y ε x > Tny)" ((s) "The set x is always one type higher than its elements y".) IX 237 Set Theory/QuineVsAckermann: (like ML and NB) but unlike ZF: does not fully guarantee the existence of finite classes. Additional concept "M". II 129 QuineVsZettsky: Zettsky: properties are identical if the classes to which they belong are the identical... but when are such classes identical? II 130 We cannot rely on the identity of the elements here (as with physical objects), as we simply have no antecedent principle of individuation for the properties (as elements of classes) here. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Various Authors | Wright Vs Various Authors | I 256 Expression Theory/Wright: wants to persuade us to reclassify certain propositions in a theoretical framework of solid concepts of "real" assertions, "real" truth, etc., in order to convince us that mathematical propositions actually function as imperatives. Wittgenstein/WrightVsExpression Theory: but one can show that precisely this distinction between "genuine" truthful contents and "merely grammatical" assertions does not exist! Rather, the merely grammatical ideas are the only general ideas, the truth and the assertoric content that we have! Of course, a philosophical discourse can be motivated by making differences disappear. I 257 But differences that merely call a philosophical picture into question must not have a significant influence on the integrity of the language game in question. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Various Authors | Mackie Vs Various Authors | Stegmüller IV 399 "Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds! MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy. IV 400 Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason? 2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable! God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems: 1. Has God simply emerged with the time? 2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced! 3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again. Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume: a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable. IV 401 Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not. a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses. b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself! Stegmüller IV 447 Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole. MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act. IV 472 Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive. Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent. MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all. IV 271 Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic. Stegmüller IV 502 Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition! When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe. Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life. IV 503 Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct. Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld. The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing. IV 504 According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume. Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions. Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense. IV 504/505 Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes! PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood! IV 506 MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism. Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference! |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Various Authors | Hintikka Vs Various Authors | Hintikka II 136 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka Thesis: Wittgenstein’s image concept is little more than a particularly vivid formulation of the same idea that underlies the usual truth-condition for atomic sentences. Hintikka: structural equality is a truth condition for elementary propositions. II 137 False: in the most comments it is assumed that the image theory is a complete theory of language understanding. The difference lies in the completeness thesis that is attributed to Wittgenstein. What needs to be presumed so that the isomorphic relation appears as a complete explanation of language understanding? 1) No separate explanation required 2) The domain of all permissible compounds of names must match the entire domain of possible configurations of their objects. Otherwise one has to decide first whether the connection really exists. Wittgenstein makes both conditions in the Tractatus. HintikkaVsOther Authors: it is unfortunate if all three ideas are mixed up with each other. If the three were made to resemble each other, as many commentators do, the question of whether Wittgenstein abandons the picture theory later would lose its charm. Wittgenstein II 131 Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: Whenever a hypothesis is "always true", so that there is no falsification or verification, this hypothesis is meaningless: Eddington said: every time a light beam falls upon an electron, it disappears. Then you could also say, there is a white rabbit sitting on the couch sits, and every time I look it’s gone. WittgensteinVsEddington. Hintikka II 59 HintikkaVsCopi: Wittgenstein’s remarks on Def Reducibility Axiom (Russell)/Hintikka: the axiom states: that for any given property or relation of a certain type (higher lever) there is an equivalent predicative property or relation. It is not about the absolute existence or non-existence, but by the configurations. Therefore, the reducibility axiom cannot belong to the logic! II 60ff Character/Relation/Denote/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: Not the complex sign "aRb" says that a is in a certain relationship to b, but the fact that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says that aRb. (3.1432) quotation marks sic!) But Wittgenstein is getting at something else: The number of names that occur in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to the Tractatus, as that of the objects in the situation represented by the sentence. What situation that is, however, is not determined solely by the names a and b. Copi: thinks (falsely) that Wittgenstein basically abstracts from the relation sign by using the phrase "in certain respects" and undertakes an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Various Authors | Cresswell Vs Various Authors | II 58 Computation/Cresswell: (representative: e.g. Moore/Hendrix, 1981) make it appear as if they have solved a problem which logicians have tried in vain to solve for years. CresswellVs: these are two completely different issues: ((s) The logicians are more concerned with the semantic one, the computation people with psychological issues). Content/Cresswell: (of a complement sentence) can be considered to be an equivalence class of all objects that are considered representations of this sentence. Belief objects/Moore/Hendrix (Hendrix 1981) some of these objects (the objects of mental states such as beliefs) are sentences in an internal language of the mind, others are in public language. There may be some that are in no language at all. (E.g. logical formulas). --- II 59 Content/Meaning/Cresswell: two sentences have the same meaning when they have the same content, providing they contain no index words. (5) The map indicates that the distance to Lower Moutere is 12 km. ... This requires each sentence to already have a meaning, so that the attitude is simply an attitude with regard to the meaning. CresswellVsMoore/CresswellVsHendrix: i.e. we can only solve the problem of Moore and Hendrix if we already have a semantics. Synonymy/Cresswell: if the synonymy relation ~~ (notation: in the book two swung dashes on top of each other) is defined like that, it can be set up compositionally for the whole language. I have no idea how this is supposed to work, but Hendrix and Moore refrain from it anyway. CresswellVsHendrix: they do not show how the synonymy classes are obtained. --- Hughes I 260 Non-standard systems/Hughes/Cresswell: have other basic operators as L and M. E.g. Halldén (1949b): limitation to a single three-digit operator which defines all other modal and truth-functional operators: [p, q, r] with the meaning that "either p is false or q is false or r is impossible" , i.e. (~p v ~q v ~Mr). Then: negation, conjunction, possibility: ~a = def [a,a,a] (a . b) = def [a,b[a, ~a,a]] Ma = def ~[[a, ~a,a],[a ~a,a],a] Hughes I 261 Hughes/CresswellVsHalldén: that makes an unnatural impression. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
| Various Authors | Lycan Vs Various Authors | Cresswell I 104 Def Inscriptionalism/Terminology/Cresswell: Thesis: that sentences about propositional attitudes can be analyzed as a relation between persons and linguistic units ((s) sentences or propositions > Relation Theory/SchifferVs)). 1. BoerVs Inscriptionalism/LycanVs Inscriptionalism: (Boer and Lycan, 1986, Lycan 1986, Appendix): Indirect Speech/Cresswell: the theory I want to discuss is this: "saying" means a relation between a person and a class of sentences. They do not have to belong to the same language. I 113 Relation Theory/Belief/Cresswell: if so, my argument is of course not applicable, because I have nothing against the thesis that the meaning of "believes" relates a person to a meaning. CresswellVsInscriptionalism: only Vs propositional attitude as relation to linguistic things, thus things that have meaning. (CresswellVsRelation Theory). |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Various Authors | Lyons, J. Vs Various Authors | Lyons I 169 / I 134 Grammar/Semantics/Congruence/Lyons: we called the expressions used for the characteristics e.g. "proper name" or "appellative" grammatically. I 170 We have not yet abandoned the principle that such expressions, when they stand for word classes, are terms for distributional categories. N.B.: that leads us to semantics! Classification: due to characteristics such as "animated" etc. this often contradicts the meaning of the words (see Chapter 7 below). VsContent-Related Grammar/Lyons: this is the reason why most authors have withdrawn from "content-related grammar". In a language description, the lexicon must contain both grammatical and semantic information for each word. Lyon's thesis: there is often congruence between semantic and grammatical classification. There one can infer the grammatical information partly from the word meaning. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Various Authors | Mates Vs Various Authors | I 281 Renaissance/Humanism/Logic/Modern Times/Mates: HumanistsVsLogicians: barbaric style, boring, men with scientific inclinations found Aristotle's syllogistics worse than useless. Mates: the next 4 centuries were meaningless in terms of logical literature. Peter Ramus: (1515 72) (was murdered in the night of Bartholomew and martyr of Protestants): Mates: Ramus gave the logic the service to ask everyone seriously whether Aristotle should not have allowed such syllogisms: For example, "Octavius is Caesar's heir; I am Octavius; therefore I am Caesar's heir. VsRamus/Mates: Aristotle's defenders found themselves in the desperate position of having to argue, this syllogism has to be reformulated: "Whatever Octavius is, is Caesar's heir; whatever I am, is Octavius; so whatever I am, is Caesar's heir". I 83 Artificial Language L/Interpretation/Mates: Vs complete interpretation: but we do not want to be limited by allowing only those areas for which there are enough individual constants (names) in L, so we stick to the old definition. We want to make examples about the real numbers. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Various Authors | Saussure Vs Various Authors | I 40 Grammar of Port Royal: explicit system of rules and laws. SaussureVsPort Royal: rules of the language, if there are any, can be considered historical, random, non-normative. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Various Authors | Vollmer Vs Various Authors | II 169 Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then? II 170 Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method. II 97 DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually! Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage. Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn). II 98 VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated. 2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated". Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence. I 40 VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it. I 293 VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject. VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong. VollmerVsProjection Theory II 90 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory. VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties). II 92 Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing. II 93 VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory: System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure. Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon). II 94 None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Vendler, Z. | Rorty Vs Vendler, Z. | I 276 Idea/Mentalese/Zeno Vendler (provocative VendlerVsWittgenstein): how to move from the language of thought to a rationalist epistemology: I 277 "Such a system of innate "ideas" makes for a frame. They are "a priori", "self-contained" by development.: no experience will be able to change their content. No experience is relevant to my idea of what it means to say something or demand, to believe or to decide, or what persons, objects, processes, states, changes, purposes, causation, time, expansion and numbers are." >Mentalese, >Vocabulary/Rorty. RortyVsVendler: this inference from a built-in vocabulary on a system of opinions that can only be "clarified" and not modified, adds to Quine's criticism of the distinction between the empirical and the conceptual, science and philosophy, meaning explanation and change of mind! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Verificationism | Dummett Vs Verificationism | I 188 DummettVsVerificationism (Vienna Circle): criterion: If theory is presented as a mere criterion of meaning, it is without any foundation. A criterion of meaning has no basis if it has no theory of meaning as a support. I 189 A strict interpretation of verificationism (which was certainly not intended) yielded grotesque results: it consists in a process for deciding on t/f. But if one knows no effective method, the statement is of no importance. Dummett: far too restrictive. Further: Parallel to intuitionist mathematics: to capture the meaning one must recognize a given verification as such. The proposition of the excluded third party can only apply in cases where you know how to verify or falsify them. The verificationism is no coherent theory. I 190 DummettVsVerificationism: 2) Verificationism pretends that each sentence has a meaning regardess of the language. If we know the method of verification, we attribute a meaning to the sentence. Said verificationism is something language independent. Vienna Circle: verification is given entirely by the sensual. Radical distinction from mathematical propositions. Then very different kinds of meaning. The Vienna Circle ignores compounds like the dependence of the understanding of one matter on the understanding of another. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Verificationism | Goodman Vs Verificationism | I 49 Verification/Goodman: The history of the verification theory of sense is tragic. A.J.Ayer, Language Truth and Logic: Philosophical nonsense was to be eliminated without simultaneously discarding many useful theories. Goodman: The failure led to an overestimation of the problem: If there is no general theory of the good, vice does not become virtue. The heroic attempt to distinguish sense and nonsense failed, similar to the attempt to define the difference between right and wrong, which caused libertinistic circles to think that everything is permitted. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Verificationism | McDowell Vs Verificationism | II 63 Def weak verificationism/McDowell: language proficiency can not be represented regardless of susceptibility to evidence. Def strong verificationism/McDowell: language proficiency can only be represented as consisting in susceptibility to evidence. II 64 McDowell: perhaps we have seen how the approach of the conditions of truth for the explanation of meaning can fulfill the weak V., but certainly not the strong V. VsStrong V: a concept of truth, which is independent of evidence, can not even be learned. Strong here: should only accept significance as stimulus (McDowellVsVerifikationismus). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Verificationism | Stroud Vs Verificationism | I 201 Verificationism/Knowledge/Stroud: this draws attention to a little-noticed problem of the relation between the verification principle and traditional skepticism: one usually only sees a one-sided competition between them: the principle implies that the skeptical conclusion is meaningless. Asymmetry: so the whole problem is meaningless. Verification Principle/VP/Skepticism/Stroud: but in reality have the same task to solve: to explain how our belief is empirically confirmed. SkepticismVsVerificationism: its standards of confirmation are not fulfilled at all. Stroud: this is a dispute about what our standards are and if anything fulfils them. No side is in a better position, they share the problem. I 202 Skepticism/Stroud: is not refuted by the verification principle: if we do not know whether we are dreaming, we also do not know whether the confirmation by evidence does not only take place in the dream. ((s) The argument of empirical verification is something quite different from the argument about the use of language.) Confirmation/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: there is already a conflict about how the verification principle (VP) should be formulated at all, or about what can be considered a confirmation. If the verification principle is to be adequate, it must imply that there can be no meaningful difficulty of the kind that the traditional skeptic puts forward. Problem: when formulating the principle, the principle itself cannot yet be applied to the decisive concept of confirmation. ((s) Otherwise circular). Empirical confirmation/confirmability/Stroud: their definition would need an explanation of how and why the traditional concept of our everyday practice should be wrong. I 203 Skepticism/Stroud: cannot simply be rejected without showing the relationship between "internal" and "external" (distanced) access as incoherent. StroudVsVerificationism: in everyday life, the conditions of the verification principle are never completely fulfilled. A successful theory of empirical confirmation must therefore show what is wrong with the concept of confirmation. It could nevertheless be that verificationism is on the right track. I 204 Confirmation/Tradition/Stroud: it is generally true that the problem of the outside world (skepticism) is empirically undecidable, no matter what concept of empirical confirmability one chooses. This is the common problem that scepticism and verificationism must share. So it seems reasonable that the verification principle must first be formulated precisely before it can be used. SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism: as long as lack of verifiability is connected with futility, our speech about the world around us will be condemned to futility if skepticism is right. StroudVsRational Reconstruction/StroudVsCarnap: we can leave the rational reconstruction aside and simply ask how plausible it is to make sense of verifiability. And apparently we cannot do that without trying to assess the plausibility of skepticism ((s) and not dismissing it as meaningless ourselves). I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why Question). Verification Principle/Stroud: to accept it, we need an understandable diagnosis of why and how skepticism is wrong. ((s) quasi circular, one presupposes the other). StroudVsVerificationism/DescartesVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: Descartes' example "I don't know if I'm really sitting by the fireplace with a piece of paper in my hand" is a perfectly sensible sentence! We understand it well enough to know what would be the case if it were true. And it can be true or false. It would be nonsense to claim that sentences like "Here is a human hand" or "There are mountains in Africa" would be meaningless. Verificationism/Stroud: but only claims that they are meaningless in connection with the traditional conclusion that their truth can never be known (skeptical conclusion). I 206 Verification Principle/Stroud: we would have to show that there is nothing to fear from scepticism. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Volitions | Ryle Vs Volitions | 79 Volition/Act of will/Tradition/Ryle: long-term undisputed axiom: that the human mind is three-parted: thought, feeling, will. Tradition/Ryle: also modes: of knowing, of affection, of striving. We refute this, but do not deny that there are will-strong and weak people, voluntary and involuntary acts. Tradition/Ryle: only when my body movement arises from an act of will, I deserve praise or blame. --- I 80 RyleVsVolitions/Ryle: inevitable expansion of the myth of the ghost in the machine. He assumes that there are states of mind and processes, and there are different states of the body and processes for this. An event on the one stage is never identical to an event on the other stage. A causal proposition is necessary, which says that the physical action of pulling the trigger of the pistol is an effect of the mental act of will to pull the trigger. A mental impulse has caused the contraction of the muscles. This is the language of the paramechanic theory of mind. When a theorist believes in acts of will, he believes in the mind as a secondary field of special causes. He will then speak of physical actions as "utterances" of mental processes. RyleVsVolitions: 1 .: nobody ever says (even not the advocates of the theory) that he was busy at ten o'clock in the morning, to want this or that. Or he carried out five fast and light and two slow and heavy acts of will between the breakfast and lunch. If there were acts of will, with what predicates would they be described? Could they be sudden or gradual, strong or weak, pleasant or unpleasant? Can I do two or seven of them at the same time? Can I execute one in a dream, or while I think of something else? Can I mistakenly believe that I had executed one? At what moment did the jumper perform his act of will as he put his foot on the ladder when he took a deep breath when he counted one, two, three but did not jump? What would he answer to these questions himself? Acts of will/Tradition/Ryle: Advocates of the theory say, of course, that the execution of acts of will would be tacitly asserted whenever an action is described as voluntary, deliberate, etc. They also say that one cannot only, but one must know that one carries out an act of will. RyleVsVolitions: but you cannot ask an advocate when he has done his last act of will, or whether he performs one when he recites "Oh, you dear Augustin" backwards. He will admit that he had difficulties in answering these questions, although he should not have any according to his own theory. RyleVsVolitions: 2. It is admitted that one can never observe an act of will. One can only conclude from effects. It follows from this that no judge, father, or teacher ever knows whether the deeds which he judges deserve praise or rebuke. The making of confessions is also just another muscle movement. (The only thing you can observe according to this theory). Nor can it be maintained that the agent himself can know whether any action is the effect of an act of will. Suppose, for example, that he could localize his act of will shortly before pulling the trigger of the pistol due to introspection. Then it would still not prove that the pulling of the trigger was the effect of the act of will. It could still be caused by another event. (Regress) RyleVsVolitions: 3. The connection between the act of will and the movement is admittedly puzzling. It is not, however, an unsolved mystery of a solvable kind, as the problem of recognizing the causes of disease, but of a quite different kind. Tradition/Ryle: The episodes in the life of the mind have supposedly a completely different existence than the episodes in the career of a body. A middle position is not allowed. But interrelationships between the body and the mind need the middle members, where there can be no members. VsVolitions: 4. It is the main function of acts of will to induce body movements, but from the argument to the proof of their existence, as weak as it is, it follows that some mental events must also be caused by acts of will. (Regress). Acts of will/Tradition/Ryle: were postulated to make actions voluntarily, resolutely, laudably or wanton. But predicates of this kind are not only attributed to body movements, but also to those activities that are not physical, but mental, according to the theory. Acts of will/volitions: Ryle: what is the status of the will acts themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary? ((s)> Schopenhauer: We are free to do what we want, but not free to want what we want). VsVolitions/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress). It has been proposed for avoidance that the acts of will can neither be described as voluntary nor involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous," "vicious," "good," or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. --- I 85 In short, the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Whorf, B. | Black Vs Whorf, B. | II 103 Whorf hypothesis/Black: there is a certain romantic enchamntment in the idea of the freedom to refer to reality in different, perhaps equally valid ways, while thoughts and feelings are reflected. Language, according to Whorf, should be adapted to the needs of a nation like fish, collecting berries, etc. II 104 Every language contains words that are particularly difficult to translate. Whorf: it was found that the linguistic system (grammar) of each language is not only a reproductive instrument for the expression of thoughts, but rather forms those thoughts, it is a pattern and guidance for the mental activity and for the synthesis of its ideas. The formulation of thoughts is not an independent process. It is more or less different for different grammars. We structure nature along lines that are given to us by our mother tongue. (Putnam pro). II 105 We cannot speak at all without subjecting ourselves to the order. BlackVsWhorf: that alone would not be of particular interest if Whorf had not attempted to apply this to some Native American languages. E.g. Hopi/Whorf: the Hopi do not emphasize temporal relations, nor even the distinction between time and space, instead they have two major categories, which Whorf calls "manifest": "Subjective"/"Objective": they are to correspond to realized or not yet realized things or to "budding" or "fermenting" things. Reality/Hopi/Whorf: is presented as composed mainly of events. Subject and predicate are avoided. II 106 Black: Whorf’s successors tend to quote selected suitable examples. BlackVsWhorf: for English the pendant would be that we have a strong heritage of Aristotle. With "essence", "substance", "specific", "entity", etc. But how many English speakers reflect that at all?. >Use. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Whorf, B. | Dennett Vs Whorf, B. | Newen/Schrenk I 147 World/Language/Reality/Structure/Newen/Schrenk: if we hold on to realism, we must say that some languages represent reality better than others which have a completely different structure. Newen/Schrenk I 148 Sapir-Whorf Thesis/Newen/Schrenk: can already be found in Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literature: 11-3a, Vol IV, p 27). Thesis: Speakers with different vocabulary and above all different grammar must think very differently about the world than others. E.g. Hopi language: only has words for "son" and "daughter". Problem: "uncle" and "grandfather" can only be characterized indirectly. It looks as if both are not distinguished with respect to their relationship. Newen/Schrenk I 149 DennettVsWhorf/Evolution TheoryVsWhorf/ChomskyVsWhorf/PinkerVsWhorf: the ability of language use is realized through specific areas of the brain that have been formed by evolution and are therefore genetically encoded and thus common to all humans. FodorVsWhorf: Language is already anchored in the brain. Newen/Schrenk: Problem: It may still be that we read structure into the world (idealism) instead of discovering it. But then it is unlikely that people of different cultures do it in very different ways, since the relevant biological equipment is common to all if them. Language/Reality/World/Newen/Schrenk: if the language capacity in the brain has evolved through adaptation to an environment, it is also possible that the structure of the world has left its footprints in the language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Whorf, B. | Feyerabend Vs Whorf, B. | I 311 Style/Feyerabend: one must not overlook the fact that a style provides an accurate representation of the world as the artist and his contemporaries see it. Perhaps people really felt like puppets at that time. That would indeed be a realistic interpretation. It would correspond to the Whorfian thesis that languages are not only a means of describing events, but also shape the events. VsWhorf: however it seems as though technical resources were quite present in order to create "more realistic" art. They seemed to have deliberately refrained from it! If so, then influence of style (or language) on cosmology and types of perception require additional arguments. It is not self-evident. These additional arguments (which can never be mandatory) point to similar circumstances elsewhere. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Whorf, B. | Saussure Vs Whorf, B. | I 10 Saussure: different language worlds do not necessarily mean different thing worlds. ((s) SaussureVsWhorf). |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Wiggins, D. | Simons Vs Wiggins, D. | I 130 Event/mereology/relation/Simons: how do the mereological relations between events look like? Here, we do not need to modify the predicates timely like continuants. This makes the event interesting for philosophers who want to preserve the extensionality. Relation currently: is for events direct and narrow. Relation to the space: is for events indirect on the continuants involved in them. Duality/Wiggins: (1980,25-6,n12): events are "dual" to continuants in this regard. SimonsVsWiggins: this is not perfect because continuants occupy space and continue as well. Event/splitting/scattered/Simons: because continuants are involved in them they can be split (to be divided, dispersed, scattered). And therefore they can have both spatial and temporal parts. But not as events involved continuants, e.g. the increase in the intensity of a magnetic field. Field: whether itself is a continuant is controversial. Event/localization: localization is only possible by the continuants involved in them. Entering/time/happening/Simons: the time of the happening (whether continuants are involved or not) can only be calculated by measuring time intervals. We must rely on local cyclic processes. I 221 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: what the superposition of things of the same kind is about is that we have no way to track things ((s) in its coming together and breaking up). I 222 Namely, they are temporarily indistinguishable (this is an epistemic problem). Epistemic/(s): why are epistemic problems at all important or interesting? Because we have to revise our language use in epistemic impossibility: for basically indistinguishable we should not use different words (no distinction without difference). Simons: e.g. two bee swarms unite and separate again. We generally do not know if the two are afterwards the same two as before. This could be, however, clarified by tracking each individual bee. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem. Superposition/Simons: there are apparently cases where things can superimpose in the same way and we can still track them: E.g. moving points of light or shadow, which overlap for a moment. E.g. mutually parallel wavefronts, here we assume this in addition to uniform wave velocity. E.g. (shorter): clouds of water vapor that can be manipulated by a "cloud projector", here we have a means of identification: causal paths. I 223 Wiggin's Principle/WP/Wiggins: pro: space can be displayed only by reference to its occupiers (availability), and spatial facts are conceptually independent of the existence of facts about individual things (particulars) and the identities of these particulars. Now, if space is mapped by reference to permanent particulars the non-identity of the particulars A and B, that are both of the type f, has to be sufficient to determine that the place of A to t is different from the place of B to t. Simons is pro illustration by reference to particulars. SimonsVsWiggins: nevertheless, objects of the same type may coincide: because the requirement of illustration only requires that some specific continuants can impossibly coincide with others of their kind. There are exceptions, though they are a minority: e.g. see above clouds, points of light, shadow, waves, etc. VsSimons: it could be argued that these objects are not material or substances. Simons: they actually are not substances. Just like accidents or disruptions. SimonsVsVs: still the answer is not yet there if two things of a kind can superimpose whether they can be substances. The examples suggest that we can appease Wiggins' fear that we cannot retrace the traces if we find the appropriate means, e.g. separate causes or uniform speed. Wiggins/Simons: Wiggins is only right if everything with which we can trace a continuant is, so to speak, in its own container. If this is the case, his principle (WP) is correct. These cases seem to make out the majority, so we have no problem to map the space (illustrating, mapping). Sortal Concept/Simons: (for a continuant): the sortal concept tells us, inter alia, under which conditions the object continues to exist and under which it ceases. These were the "existence-conditions" ((s) meaning linguistically!). Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of matter can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) meaning intensional). I 260 Neccessary/Nec/Wiggins: "Nec" is a predicate modifier working on λ-abstraction, rather than using the proposition operator "N". QuineVsWiggins: (1977, 236): misleading: "Nec[(λx)(λy)(x = y)]" for "the relation like any r and s have if they are necessary identical" correct: "(λx)(λy)(N(x = y)" (p. 293). SimonsVsWiggins : "Nec" seems to be superfluous and Wiggins suggests this himself. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Williams, B. | Putnam Vs Williams, B. | III 107 Ethics/relativism/Williams, Bernard: if an approximation of positions is really taking place in ethics, it is not because of a steering by the way things really are, whereas in the sciences this could actually be explained in this way. III 108 Reality/Williams/Putnam: We can select some of convictions of which one could say that they are maximally independent from our perspective. "The world as it appears to us" is interpreted as "the world as it appears to us in particular". For such a description only primary qualities should be chosen. III 263 footnote: Ex further terms can be derived therefrom: Ex "impulse" is defined by "mass" and "speed" whereas "speed" is defined by "time" and "location". III 109 How would we describe the world and imagine how it would be if there were no observers. In colloquial descriptions we could, of course, also include secondary qualities and speak of green grass and warm weather. According to Williams, we can readily be brought to the conclusion that we only describe how the grass had appeared to observers. Williams: thesis: our world (with observers) emerged from a world without observers. The laws are exactly the same. III 110 Therefore a description with primary qualities only should be possible. PutnamVsWilliams: enchanting, but it is true? Through evolution, no new laws of physics have emerged. But our predictions refer to phenomena that are described in the language of physics, not in the language of biology, psychology or economics. Once living beings and societies appear on the scene, actually new laws come to light, but they do not contradict the laws of physics. "Offer" and "demand" can not be described in terms of physics. III 128 Values/Williams/Putnam: even if it turns out that the color of a surface is an objective property of reflectivity, that does not impair the contrast between color characteristics and values, which Williams wanted to highlight. Putnam: but to demonstrate that the evaluation does not emerge from one eye from the nature of the eye, the complicated metaphysical explanations of Williams are unnecessary. Def values/Dewey: Evaluation results from the critique of various problem-solving processes. Absoluteness/Williams: contains ideally a "theory of knowledge and error"; contains both the possibility of the local views, as well as its own possibility. Is being eliminated virtually immediately by Williams: "this view of the world must enable to explain the possibility of their own existence". Later: withdrawal: "... which may be subject to the radical indeterminacy of interpretation ..." III 129 Austin: "this is the point at which the philosopher says it, and then comes the point at which s_he withdraws." III 130 PutnamVsWilliams: Problem: for the absolute conception, there is only one way to explain the possibility of local views and their own possibility: an prediction of future occurrences of characters and sounds. III 135 ff RelativismPutnamVsWilliams: the outright "truth of relativism" by Williams is not more coherent than the "absolute conception of the world". Williams/truth: rather carefree use of the term. Sometimes something that is "detected by the procedural manners of a linguistic community" (same perspective as Rorty, who Williams considers an opponent). II 136/137 Truth: According to Williams in the purely academic conflict "not really a problem." He believes that the members of other communities have ethical knowledge, and their beliefs are true, if they use their concepts carefully. PutnamVsWilliams: striking contradiction: Ex "right, her sitting together with her boss alone in the office is unchaste, but we do not consider chastity a virtue". In contradiction to Williams assertion that "true" and "false" could only be used in case of a real conflict. III 140 PutnamVsWilliams: Opposition: Williams would like to acknowledge the involvement of facts and values, and at the same time hold on to the "absoluteness" of scientific knowledge. Putnam: but that's impossible. It's not possible that science is absolute, but nothing else. I (k) 253 Norms/values/Bernard Williams: presumes the perspective of "some social world". On the other hand (according to Putnam) physics proposes an absolute metaphysical truth. PutnamVsWilliams: the talk of the "content" of a conviction that would be "perspective", is lacking any clear sense. That was grist to the mill of deconstructionism. Rorty VI 64 PutnamVsWilliams/Rorty: "approach to the big picture": purely dogmatic. The notion of absoluteness is incoherent. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Brandom Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 92 Wittgenstein: the fact that there is a conception of a rule is not the interpretation, it manifests itself from time to time what we call "following the rules" and what we call "acting against it". That means there must be something like practice-implicit standards. I 94 BrandomVsWittgenstein: worrying that the normative attribution here requires a range of regularities of behavior and dispositions. Moreover, that the existence of these regularities is not part of what is asserted by such attributions. An analogy to length measurement assumes the rigidity of the world. But we learn practically immediately to apply new concepts. I 820 BrandomVsWittgenstein: W. had insisted that explicit standards are intelligible only before a background of practice-implicit standards. (see above regress - prevention). II 26/27 Brandom: He was wrong to say that this principle is incompatible with understanding the discursive practice in a way that it involves interpretation at every level (in his sense), including the most basic one. Double score keeping: an assertion is seen in the face of further determinations assigned by the score keeper as well as the stipulations entered into by himself. BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification asserts that the language has a center. Assertions are not just things that can be done with language. Rather, they are that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Carnap Vs Wittgenstein | II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory). Hempel I 99/100 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora). CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose. CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences. Carnap II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora) |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Wittgenstein | Dennett Vs Wittgenstein | II 103 WittgensteinVsVollmer: you cannot say that my knowledge of the evolution is a result of evolution II 30 (DennettVsWittgenstein: gradually emerged (> robots, molecules). DennettVsWittgenstein: if a lion could talk, we would understand it quite well - with the usual trouble that a decent translation between different languages requires. But in conversations with it we would learn virtually nothing about the mind of normal lions, because its mind equipped language would be completely different. Pro Wittgenstein: in any case, we should not assume that the mind of the speechless animals is like ours. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Dummett Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 490 Wittgenstein (according to Dummett): There is no single means of derivation of all other properties from one. (Use only) DummettVsWittgenstein: If there is no key concept anymore, then we do not know what the meaning of a word is as opposed to the meaning of a sentence. Dummett I 31 DummettVsUse Theory: The downside is that this is essentially unsystematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, this is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness is not everything, though, the use theory is likely to assume that a significant portion of language is already understood. Only a systematic theory might explain in how far linguistic meaning can be explained without a previously given stock of semantic concepts. Ideally, no semantic concepts are needed in advance. From the elusiveness of truth (Frege) does not follow the inexplicability. Dummett I 83 Understanding/Wittgenstein:> understanding is not a mental process, but an ability (dispositional).LL. FregeVs: the grasping of a thought is an act of consciousness. And one that is directed towards something outside of the consciousness: (episodic). DummettVsWittgenstein: hard to see why no episodic sense of understanding should be possible if E.g. you can be stunned at first hearing of a sentence!. I 145 Private Language: WittgensteinVs - Dummett artificial private language possible and learnable. I 156 DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsUse Theory: Failure to assume a complete representation of language understanding is given as soon as its statements that express themselves in the use are described. For this reduces command of a language to having a practical ability. I 161 Animal: question: whether we can attribute thoughts to animals. Wittgenstein: "The dog is afraid that the master will strike it, but it is not afraid that the master will strike it tomorrow". DummettVsWittgenstein: this depends to a much lower degree than Wittgenstein would like on memories, but rather on a theoretical apparatus. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wittgenstein | Goodman Vs Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein I 295 Image/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: second meaning of image: "not similar, but that it is an image of something consists in the intention". (Lecture 26). I 296 Large typescript: here, the comparison with genre paintings is used to understand the nature of sentences to which the verification concept cannot be applied: (E.g. novels). Such sentences correspond to historic paintings or portraits: isomorphic structure like the possible fact that would make it true. (GoodmanVsWittgenstein, E.g. Constable) ((s)> Cresswell). I 297 The image conception does not only apply after the reference objects are allocated, but also regardless of the manner in which the objects are determined for a sentence, even if these simple components do not stand for specific entities. Early: the relationships between name and object do not require any action on the side of the speakers and can therefore be understood once and for all without further ado. late: this Wittgenstein overthrows this early conception once he introduces language games. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Habermas Vs Wittgenstein | I 233 HabermasVsWittgenstein: against Derrida, I would not like to cite Wittgenstein’s language game positivism: not the common linguistic practice in each case decides which meaning a text or an expression has in a particular moment. More likely, language games only work, because they presuppose cross-language game idealizations which - as a necessary condition of possible communication - give rise to the prospect of an agreement that is criticizable against validity claims. (Endurance test). Using this colloquial probation constraint, Austin and Searle allow to distinguish the "ordinary" from the "parasitic" language use. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Wittgenstein | Quine Vs Wittgenstein | I 209 Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but yet different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3, 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes. (QuineVs/FregeVs) I 210 Identity/QuineVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's mistake is easier to recognize: Wittgenstein: "To say of two things that they are identical is nonsense and saying of one thing that it is identical with itself says nothing." Quine: Indeed identity statements that are true and not idle consist of unequal singular terms that refer to the same thing, of course. XII 96 Facts/QuineVsState of Affairs/QuineVsWittgenstein: the concept has no meaning, because most sentences are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But that is no problem for the verification theory of meaning. XII 44 Representation Theory/Language/QuineVsWittgenstein: traditional, close to the myth of the museum. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Wittgenstein | Sellars Vs Wittgenstein | II 318 Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. II 319 Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves. Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy). Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways: a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement. K depicts y. Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of: that p depicts y: II 321 Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards. Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to. Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model fact depicts fact. There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions. Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention. II 322 Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations. E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York. Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed. Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects? II 323 Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). II 324 One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Wittgenstein | Tugendhat Vs Wittgenstein | Pauen I 254 I/TugendhatVsHeidelberger School/Pauen: (1979): has created its own problems with false basic assumptions. Instead: semantic approach: use of the expression "I" in everyday language. What do we mean by the self-attribution of mental states? Tugendhat: "The ego" is a false substantiation of a personal pronoun. An art expression. Tugendhat like Wittgenstein: in reality they are expressive sentences. Wittgenstein: "I feel pain" only replaces "Ouch"! I 255 TugendhatVsWittgenstein: difference between the two: the former expresses knowledge. It can also be denied. The sentence cannot be mistakenly misused. In the case of self-attribution, the possibility of false knowledge is omitted. ((s) Cf. >privileged access, >incorrigibility). I 256 Tugendhat: "Epistemic asymmetry" between self and external attributions. Self-attributions are true exactly when they are also attributed to others. But not vice versa. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Verschiedene Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 97 NeurathVsTractatus: (Carnap was the first to discover the implications of Neurath's ideas.) Neurath: Science is a system of statements consisting of statements of only one kind. Each statement can be combined or compared with any other. But statements are never compared with a "reality", with "facts". I 98 A separation of statements and facts is the result of a doubling metaphysics. Neurath VsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still eliminated: it is easily imaginable that the protocol of a certain observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one drops one of the two sentences. I 100 Protocol sentences can therefore no longer be regarded as an unchangeable basis. I 101 Neurath: we are not against a judge, but the judge is deductible. Stegmüller IV 76 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke: some defend Wittgenstein against Kripke: Kripke did not represent conceptual nihilism or meaning nihilism. IV 77 Stegmüller: But that is not what it is about: it is about the possibility of capturing meanings. But the concept of "meaning" becomes meaningless if people do not have the opportunity to grasp it! Not the grasping of objects is the problem, but the grasping of the intensional structures, the intention, the Fregesian sense, which precede the denotates. Stegmüller IV 152 GoldfarbVsKripke: the relation token/type is a special case of the "continuation of a series" and the "rule sequence". Goldfarb: this is not correct: 1. In order to determine whether two tokens belong to the same type, one simply has to be able to detect the perceptible similarity. 2. "Type" is not a sequence to be generated according to a rule, but an unordered set! Also not for the Platonist. GoldfarbVsKripke: the conditions of justification (conditions of assertiveness) do not replace the conditions of truth at all, but are only a trivial reformulation. Wittgenstein VI 167 Original Meter/Sense/Wittgenstein/Schulte: also here misunderstanding: one has said: VI 167/168 VsWittgenstein: even if the sentence "The original meter is not 1m long" is always wrong, it still makes sense! Schulte: but this does not agree with Wittgenstein's conception of "sense". ((s) To have meaning means to be able to be negated.). Schulte: the train must have a joke in the language game! Example: "The original meter is not 1m long" is not a valid move and it is also not a joke. VI 175 VsWittgenstein/Schulte: it confuses the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. Never taken seriously by Wittgenstein. Wants to overcome borders anyway, although such theories do not belong to his philosophy at all. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Hintikka Vs Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein I 32 Calculus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: but Wittgenstein’s calculus is not an intra-linguistic act. Understanding a sign is a step of calculus, (quasi to a calculation). "What a sentence is, is in a sense determined by the rules of sentence structure, in another sense through the use of the sign in the language game." PU § 136. HintikkaVsWittgenstein: Problem: that we actually need to do something in the application of the calculus. This approach has failed, and therefore Wittgenstein almost entirely dispensed with the calculus analogy in the PU. But it is not true that he no longer considers the entire theory valid, he has only come to realize that the concept of calculus cannot fulfill both purposes at the same time. Wittgenstein I 238 Showing/Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s, the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond symbolism... we cannot do anything more than to replace one symbolism it with another." HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong, because pointing gestures can easily lead us out of the realm of the merely linguistic. WittgensteinVsVs: denies this. He explains that what we achieve with an ostensive definition is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between written and spoken language on the one hand and sign language on the other hand. Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus. Wittgenstein I 242 Rule/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: for the first time, the rule is introduced as a mediator. But that does not remove the questions: What is the conceptual status of such a rule? How does it fulfill its mediation mission? Here is the seed to later philosophy: main question: the issue of the rule obedience. HintikkaVsWittgenstein: of course it bothers Wittgenstein to postulate mysterious "mediator beings". But in the middle phase the rules threaten to become such beings. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein | I 55 CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. --- Hintikka I 133 ... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege. Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski) CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that). --- I 134 But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Horwich Vs Wittgenstein | Stegmüller IV 154 Meaning/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/HorwichVsWittgenstein/HorwichVsKripke: the list (see above) has to be completed: d) Meaning addition with "plus" does not exclude that mistakes are made. That must not be violated by any concept of meaning. e) The meaning of "plus" is an intrinsic property! This stands in contradiction to d), though! Horwich: brain research could produce matches, by the way. Kripke and Wittgenstein have indeed shown that there must not necessarily be facts of meaning, but that there could be! IV 154/155 Stegmüller: Wittgenstein as well would certainly welcome a return to empiricism, but a theory could probably determine the match as a fact (like the theory of Chomsky), but still only in the context of assertability conditions (justification conditions), not in the sense of a truth-functional semantics. Turing Machine/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Stegmüller/Chomsky: e.g. (Kripke) a machine fallen from the sky can be analyzed with respect to all relevant things (program and memory). a) Stegmüller: Chomsky thus accepts a view that contains a linear solution of the paradox. Due to differences in the program, we recognize, whether "plus" or "quus" is represented. Because we have a theory that tells us something about differences. IV 156 b) Linear solution: linguistic competence: we distinguish well-formed and not well-formed vocalizations. IV 157 "Switch Model"/Internalized Language: in the structural original state there may be many switches that are set to "zero", waiting to be turned into active positions. Language is nothing more than a present stable switch setting (internalized language). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Meixner Vs Wittgenstein | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: Example "that Regensburg is situated at the Danube" is a name for a factual entity. Example "to be square": Name, but not for an individual or a factual entity, but a name for a property. (Property name). I 32 The names tell us which entities the ontology calculates with. But they are only certain indicators for entities. We do not know if they refer successfully. (> Reference). However, if names were mistrusted in principle, language would lose a large part of its ontological relevance. I 33 Meixner: "ontological basic trust": where there is a name, there is also the corresponding entity". Therefore we can assume that the names tell us something about ontology on the whole. MeixnerVsWittgenstein: had no deeper justification for his skeptical intention of fundamental linguistic criticism. I 125 World/real world/actual world/sum/subject/state of affairs/Meixner: for "the sum of all existing state of affairs par excellence" one can also say: "the real (actual) world", or briefly "the world". (>Wittgenstein: speaks of facts, not of things that form the world). MeixnerVsWittgenstein: but one can also call the world a single large actual individual (namely the sum of all actual individuals). Vs: but the world as state of affairs has the advantage that non-actual, thus possible worlds (poss.w.) must also be state of affairs, and thus belong to the same category. Because it is not possible, since they belong to different ontological categories. Possible Worlds/poss.w./Meixner: what kind of state of affairs do they form? The paradigmatic possible worlds and the non-actual possible worlds must have something designating in common. I 126 Actual World/Real World: maximum consistency state of affairs. And also the possible world. That is what they have in common. ((s) They cannot be contradictory in themselves. That is why we need separate possible worlds.) Maximal Consistent/Meixner: incomparably richer in content than just consistent state of affairs. Possible Worlds: are so rich in content that they are temporally determined and for each state of affairs x, which is temporally determined or time-differentiated, have either this itself or its negation as partial-state of affairs. Part: the partial relationship between state of affairs is the specification of the relational transcendental "part of" for state of affairs. For example that Fritz is taller than Anna is part-state-of-affairs of the state of affairs that Anna is shorter than Fritz. General: If sentence B follows logically from sentence A, then the state of affairs is that B is part of the state of affairs that A. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Wittgenstein | Millikan Vs Wittgenstein | I 221 not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining". Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs. b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence. Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist. Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities. negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value. Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation. negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way. Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations. projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts). Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"? MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can. When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations. Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference .Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"? Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator! Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p". 1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd. 2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements! 3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference. Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact. negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles. non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation. negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact. Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist". negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts). It is well known how such a thing is done: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does. I 223 This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known: 1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist." Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions. Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem: Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense! Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real. Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function. 2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value. real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function. Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves. I 229 "not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense. Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense. sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense. I 303 Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Newen Vs Wittgenstein | New I 94 Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles 2) Hintikka: points in the visual field 3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties 4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects. Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned I 95 to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed. (ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors. (iii) elementary propositions are logically independent. Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time. Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent. Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form. I 98 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties). I 99 Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red." Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names. Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised. 100 Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here. NS I 35 Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them. This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign. ((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.) NS I 36 VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change. NS I 37 Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293). Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community. One person alone cannot give meaning expressions. NS I 38 Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow. VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grice | Pro | Avramides I 35 Def strong Griceanism / Loar: Thesis: Analysis is sufficient to explain all the semantic properties of natural language, whether used in communication or not - Def moderate Griceanism: only for communication (sentence meaning, illocutionary force - so that independent access to the language of the Spirit - Moderate: Schiffer and Loar. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Thinking w/o Language | Pro | Avramides I 9 ~ Thinking / Grice: without language possible (Arvramides ditto) - reductive Griceans Vs. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Positivism | Pro | Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?) HabermasVsWittgenstein: Wttg. positivist. WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty. WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy) |
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| Behaviorism | Versus | Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?) WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language" , progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy). |
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| Skepticism | Versus | Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?) WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty. WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy) |
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| Physicalism | Pro | Block I 167 Def functionalism * /a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, per: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. > Psycho functionalism. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Functionalism | Block I 167 Def functionalism* / a priori functionalism / Block: heritage of behaviorism, functional analysis as an analysis of the meanings of mental terms. Linguistically, everyday language, behaviourist. Representative: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker. (Vs: I 185, pro: I 186). Specifications of the inputs are restricted to everyday knowledge. Classifications must be externally observable. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
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| Brentano: Irreducib. | Pro | Chisholm II 216 Psychology / Brentano / Marek: his theory can be regarded as analytic philosophy of psychology. (Conceptual analysis). The fact that he is committed to the Aristotelian metaphysics, may separate him from Ryle and Wittgenstein. II 217 Scholastic-sounding term system. Mentalistic vocabulary to investigate the psychic self and not the language about mental. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Propositions | Versus | EMD II 149 Proposition / LoarVs: no language-independent meanings. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Correspondence Theory | Pro | EMD II 401 Correspondence theory / Davidson: Tarski seems to suggest a corr. th., because of the role played by the concept of accomplishment there. - ~ "For this is explained by a relation of language to something else." |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
| Inflationism | Versus | Field II 126 Inflationism / Field: starts (other than the deflationism) from facts - especially facts about the use of a language - FieldVs: what facts should that be? - Deflationism: Homophony - condition is sufficient to exclude the possibility that we do not use language with a different reference - further facts do not exist. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mentalese | Versus | Field II 84 Language of thought (not Mentalese): StalnakerVs. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Holism | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 10 revisionist holism / Fodor / Lepore: if the holism thesis makes language learning and communication impossible, so much the worse for language learning and communication - per r. h: Quine, Dennett, Stich, p. and P.Churchland. |
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| Thinking w/o Language | Versus | Fodor / Lepore IV 126 Thinking / language / Sellars: mental content is parasitic on linguistic content. |
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| Atomism, Semantical | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 32 Semantic atomism: thesis: the meaning of an expression can not be determined through its role in the language, but by direct relation symbol - world. Per: Locke / Hume / Hobbes / Berkeley / behaviorism / Dewey a) Locke / Hume / Berkeley: Ideas, ideas are associated b) behaviorism: Meaning behavior includes gestures (noise). |
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| Atomism, Semantical | Fodor / Lepore IV 32 Semantic Atomism: thesis: meaning of an expression can not be determined byits role in the language, but by direct relation between symbol and world. |
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| Innate | Pro | Fodor / Lepore IV 76/77 Innate: per: Skinner: generalization: that it does not happen in the one but in the other direction - Hume: association mechanisms of human nature intrinsically - Quine: generalization principles are not themselves learned - Quine: Similarity space - Vs: Fodor / Lepore: unclear to what extent an innate is ability has an effect - Churchland: relatedness to a particular language unlikely. |
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| Positivism | Versus | Fodor II 103 FodorVsPositivism: (formal language basic) ingored linguistics - FodorVsOxford: ingored linguistics |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language infinite | Pro | Fodor II 120 Language infinite: Fodor per - in any case artificial production is possible. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 |
| Anti-Realism | Pro | Fraassen I 10 Anti-realism: splits the two schools: 1 Science aims to be true but not literally, only if it is designed appropriately (> well linterpretated). 2 the language of the theory should be literally constructed, but a good theory does not have be true to be good. (Fraassen per anti-realism, 2nd type). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Theory/Observ. Language | Versus | Fraassen I 56 FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Extensional Language | Pro | Fraassen I 67 Theory / Fraassen: two camps: 1 Tarski Suppes: set theory, extensionalist (FraassenVs) - 2 Weyl Evert Beth: state space, modal approach (Fraassen per) - both initially conceived language-specific, later Vs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Nominalism | Pro | Frank I 12 analytic philosophy / Frank: three phases: 1 Frege, Carnap "Philosophy of Thought" 2nd lingustic turn: Quine, Wittgenstein Fra I 13 2 b. nominalist phase: Davidson (externalism) 3rd departure from nominalism: on the one hand "Re-Transzendentalisation" ("inner experience," the task of the primacy of language, Evans, DummettVs) on the other hand "renaturalisation of epistemology". |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Transcend. Objects | Versus | Frank I 462 Castaneda with Kant, Frege Vs. Vstranscendental objects with infinitely many properties / respect to all objects only from within the experience and language - Davidson per Frege: an infinite number of properties. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege Sense/Meaning | Pro | Frank I 484 Evans: "Oxford Neo-Fregeans" (together mt McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Theory/Observ. Language | Versus | Hacking I 193 Lakatos: 1965: not a principled distinction between theoretical statements and observation statements (Hacking: that was fashionable) |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Theory/Observ. Language | Pro | Hacking I 283 per distinction Theory / Observation: Carnap. Comte, Mach, van Fraassen - Vs: Grover Maxwell: distinction too vague - depending on the technology used - the distinction can not determine existence. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Holism | Versus | Horwich I 465 building block theory VsHolism: Russell / Husserl / Kripke / Searle;: per block-building - DavidsonVs: per holism: not the intentionality (the directedness of thought to objects) is responsible for the relation of language to reality - Block theory: piece-by-piece relation of words to parts of reality (Kripke: reference has to do with causation). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Ramsey-Sentence | Versus | I 56 FraassenVsRamsey Sentence / FraassenVsCarnap / FraassenVsCraig - Vs separation observation language / theory of language - irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntactic representation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
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| Language essent. Comm. | Versus | Rorty VI 147 Language / thinking / Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein / Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language essent. Comm. | Versus | Searle: III 436 Language / Chomsky: closed formal system which is incidentally also used for communication. - Vs: another camp: Language essentially aligned on communication. |
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| Theory/Observ. Language | Separation of theory language and observation language, theoretical terms, etc. > Ramsey sentence, Carmap sentence> Language dependence |
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| Sense = Mediation | Versus | Stalnaker I 172f Name / Kripke: reference is the designated object, without the mediation of sense - Frege / Dummett / Searle: sense is a mediator between the name and the signified object - otherwise identification (picking) inexplicable - language learning can not be explained. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Oxford School | Thesis: everyday language and its use in critical in questions of meaning, etc. |
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| Language infinite | Thesis: there are infinitely many sentences in a natural language. ((s) FregeVs: not infinite, but interminable!) |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 193 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Universals | Armstrong, D.M. | Meixner I 96 Universals / Armstrong / Meixner: Thesis: most predicates of everyday language do not refer to universals, for Armstrong there are only scientific universals. VsOntological Standard Analysis: the connection in between predicates and universals is not as tight as It seems. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Description | Austin, J.L. | Danto I 98f Use /language/ description / Austin: thesis: besides description there are many ways of using language. Trying to force the language in a purely descriptive role, and regarding sentences that do not comply with it as pointless, he calls: Def descriptive fallacy / Austin / Danto: attempt to force the language in a descriptive role. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Modification | Austin, J.L. | III 48 Austin/Thesis: "No modification without deviation": i.e. no modification of the language without deviation in behavior (to normality). One is of the opinion that there must always be at least one modifying expression. Austin: this is completely unjustified for most uses of most verbs! E.g. "eat", "push", "play football" here no modifying expression is necessary or even permissible. Probably also not with "murder". A modifying expression is only permissible in the case of a deviating design. Searle VII 86 Austin: Thesis: The terms used by us to modify descriptions of actions, such as "intentionally", "voluntarily", etc., are only used to modify an action if the action is somehow deviant or cross. "No modification without deviation". VII 93 .... Austin's thesis is not about words but about sentences. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Vs Skepticism | Austin, J.L. | Stroud I 42 AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) one arrives at the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies. I 44 Knowledge/Philosophy/Everyday/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers 1961,45) These typical philosophical investigations are carried out from our normal (everyday) practice. I 45 Austin Thesis: "enough is enough": i.e. not everything has to be said. It is not always necessary to prove that this goldfinch is not a stuffed bird. (OM 52). I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about Descartes' strong thesis that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without it, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin's nuclear thesis Method/Everyday Language/AustinVsDescartes: can it be shown ((s) >Manifestation) that Descartes with his strong thesis violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge? I 51 Misconception/Deception/Austin: thesis "you cannot always deceive all people". I 64 StroudVsAustin: the accusation of AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "Knowledge" has been distorted in everyday use can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain usage of language, a certain concept and the relation between them has been misinterpreted. Stroud: that is what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important. I 76 Stroud: this leads us to the depth and importance of skepticism. It is about much more than deciding if you know something about the world around you, it is about our practice (actions) and reflection of our knowledge (self-knowledge). Can we take a distant position here? I 82 Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Thinking/Language | Avramides, A. | I 117 Avramides: thesis: I will show that a certain type of analysis of propositional attitude is an evidence that the ontological asymmetry does not include the conceptual asymmetry. |
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| Griceanism | Avramides, A. | I 35f Group: Def Strong Griceanism/Loar: Thesis: Analysis is sufficient to explain all semantic properties of natural language, whether used in communication or not. Def moderate Griceanism: concerns only communication (sentence meaning, illocutionary force). Thus independent access for the language of mind. Moderates: Schiffer and Loar. I 127 Reductive Griceaner: Thesis: Semantic and (certain) psychological terms are logically equivalent. |
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| Vs Reductionism | Avramides, A. | I 104 AvramidesVsReductionism: Thesis: the semantic is important when it comes to understand the psychological. Therefore, a reduction is not possible. As paradoxical as it seems, I want to show this by allowing the attribution of thoughts to beings without language. |
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| Radical Interpretation | Avramides, A. | I 85 Def superficial epistemic asymmetry/radical interpretation/Avramides: Thesis: that we can solve the problem of radical interpretation by understanding the foreign language by first experiencing the belief attitudes ("belief") and intentions ((s) without language, because psychological concepts are more fundamental) - DavidsonVs: this will not work. I 85 Propositional Attitudes/Intention/Belief/Significance/Radical Interpretation/Davidson: Thesis: One cannot gain a particular meaning from someone's intentions and beliefs, regardless of the meaning of his utterances. (Da. 1984d, p. 144) |
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| Ontology | Bach, E. | Cresswell II 164 Natural Language / everyday language / Bach / Cresswell: (Emmon Bach, 1983): thesis: it is helpful if one examines a natural language, to ask what kinds of entities he presupposes. Ontological questions can be treated separately. Â BigelowVsBach / Cresswell (Bigelow 1981, 403) seems to represent the opposite. thesis: semantics should be as economically as possible. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Quotation | Bigelow, J. | Cresswell I 166 Quote/Quotation/Quotation Theory/Bigelow: Thesis: things themselves can be temporarily added to the language as names in it. For example, (deictic) use becomes necessary when a particular person is added to the language. Anaphora/Bigelow: Thesis: whenever the context can ensure something, it can also be the anaphora. ((s) If the clarification by context has already been done). Example "I, Claudius". |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 |
| Thinking | Black, Max | II 94 Black thesis: Thinking is possible without language - e.g. to imagine chess positions. |
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| Understanding | Black, Max | I 77 Black thesis: in complex situations, the background equally can not be seen when the core is not understood. (Eg Bazaar, eg foreign languages, eg gestures, eg Aboriginal). |
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| Whorf | Black, Max | II 103 Whorf-thesis :/ Black: there is a certain romantic charm in the idea of ​​freedom to relate to reality in different, perhaps equally validate ways reflecting feelings and thoughts.  Language according to Whorf is adapted to the needs of people such as fish, fruits etc. |
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| Tarski | Black, Max | Horwich I 156 Truth / everyday language / philosophy / Tarski / Black: thesis: a philosophical probability theory will lead to little more than tautologies and platitudes. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Conceptual Role | Block, Ned | Fod/Lep IV 163 Meaning/conceptual role/conceptual role semantics/CRT/Block: Thesis: The meaning of an expression is its role in a language - Fodor/Lepore: this invites to the conclusion that expressions belonging to different languages have different meanings - this leads to "translation holism" rather than to content holism. Block's argument is not transcendental but the proposal of a theory. ((s) Conceptual role is here equated with semantic or inferential role.) Fodor/Lepore: this does not lead to semantic holism, at most in connection with the analytical/synthetic distinction. Thesis: Belief must be explained causally. IV 168 Coextension/Inference/Block: Thesis: the inferential role of coextensive expressions may differ. Thus the CRT can distinguish between morning star/evening star or between "Cicero" and "Tullius". |
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| Assertibility | Brandom, R. | II 243 Brandom's own approach: Thesis: rule-guided language game that allows to combine declarative sentences with propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach themselves from the attitudes of the speakers - this divides the assertiveness into two parts: Definition and justification (two normative statuses) - goes beyond the meaning theory because it enables the distinction between right and wrong use. (>Dummett, >Chess, Joke, Win) |
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| Index | Brandom, R. | I 749 Brandom s thesis ... difficulties with the context-dependence on the content of indexical expressions. Our approach focuses on tokenings. Connection with indexicality by anaphora, at the same time the language is at the center. On the other hand, the semantics is rooted directly in the pragmatics. |
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| Paradox | Burge, T. | Grover II 201 Paradoxes/Antinomies/Amplified Liar/Burge/Grover: (Burge 1979, p. 178): II 202 In all variants we started with a) an incident with a liar-like sentence. b) then we argued that the proposition is pathological and concluded that it is not true in the wording of the pathological proposition. ((s) Here we are talking about "not true" and "not false"). Then we realized that this seems to be fixed at the following: c) that in the end the sentence is true! Burge: Thesis: there seems to be no change in the grammar or linguistic meaning of the expressions involved. Paradoxes/Parsons/Grover: similar: Thesis: the use of "true" and other semantic expressions in connection with paradoxes brings about a change of area (discourse area). KripkeVsBurge/Grover: (Kripke 1975): the change to b) takes place at a later stage in the development of natural language. II 203 Paradoxes/Liar/GroverVsBurge: Thesis: we can conclude that sentences by liars are pathological, but that does not force us to assume that they are not true. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Object Langauge | Carnap, R. | Stroud I 185 Thing Language/Carnap: in it the question of the existence of things (world of things) can be formulated. But this does not mean that the sentence "there are external things" is meaningless. Alternative to the thing language: phenomenal language. I 191 That we exist and have experiences cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. I 192 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis even express then? I 193 Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already accept as knowledge about ourselves and external things. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empiricially" and not the thing language "internally". Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of the "Copernican Turn" by Kant. And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation as to how it is possible that we know anything at all. I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no sentences about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Extensionality | Carnap, R. | VI XXI Extensionality-thesis / Carnap (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism VsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: every non-extensional statement is translated into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. |
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| grue | Carnap, R. | Schurz I 219 Grue/CarnapVsGoodman: Example Carnap: Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "positional" predicate: its definition refers to the time t0 - GoodmanVsCarnap: one can introduce an equally expressive language with gred/reen as basic predicates - SchurzVsCarnap: positional/qualitative can be distinguished by difference in ostensive learnability - Induction/Goodman: Solution: in an induction we must know what remained constant - these are the qualitative characteristics. - "Gred" remains constant during the change! - But we used it for anti-induction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Language Rules | Carnap, R. | Field II 177 Language Rules/Reference/Carnap/Frege/Tarski/Tradition/Referential Semantics/Field: Language rules determine the truth value for a sentence. Many authors: only because the language rules determine the truth value of sentences from the denotations of their components, the terms truth and falsity can be applied at all. II 178 Field: this is what I call the thesis of "Referential semantics". It has become increasingly widespread in recent years. FieldVsReferential Semantics: Uncertainty is a serious problem for them. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Skeptizimus | Carnap, R. | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/sense/meaningful/language/empiricism/verification/verificationism/Stroud: Thesis: The significance of our expressions is limited to their empirical application (use). Def Verification Principle/Understanding/Meaning/Carnap/Stroud: Thesis: then we can only understand something at all or mean something with our utterances if corresponding sensory experiences are possible for us. ... I 188 Stroud: ... But our language does not reflect any thesis about the existence of the world. We have simply adopted a language. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kripke | Chalmers, D. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Intentionality | Chisholm, R. | I 15 Chisholm thesis: priority of intentionality before language. |
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| Constituents | Chomsky, N. | Lyons I 259 Chomsky: (Syntactic Structures): Thesis: the idea of the constituent structure (formation structure) corresponds to a limited section of the language and the rest of the language can be derived by repeatedly applying a rather simple class of transformations to the chains given by the constituent structure grammar. If we were to extend the constituent structure grammar to describe the whole language directly, we would give up simplicity. Syntax/Chomsky: should be divided into two parts: 1. Basic component: constituent structure component (phrase-structur component, base component, phrase structure component, phrase structure rules (PS rules) ((s) constituents). 2. Transformation component (tranfsormational component) with additional rules. Transformation Rules/Chomsky: all transformation rules should be understood as additional rules. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Convention | Chomsky, N. | EMD II 169 Lewis: Chomsky: thesis: it could be that we have far less conventions than most people think. But as long as there are at least two possible human languages, there must be a convention according to which the selection shall be explaned. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Rules | Chomsky, N. | I 272 Chomsky thesis: then one could suggest that a language contains rules that relate depth structures to representations from universal semantics. (Analogous to phonology). Lyons I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical Rules: thesis: the grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is dominated "intuitively" (unconsciously) by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "Indetermination of Grammar"/ChomskyVsIndetermination of Grammar). Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not all grammar is indefinite. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Language | Chomsky, N. | Searle VIII 421 Language / Chomsky / Searle: Thesis: syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. The "language of the bees" is no language because it does not have the correct structure. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Theory | Chomsky, N. | I 303 Theory / Chomsky. the universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition" but one element of such a theory. My thesis is an "all-at-once-proposal" and does not attempt to capture the interplay between tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new interpreted data. |
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| Transform.Gramm. | Chomsky, N. | I 271 Chomsky: in any human language surface structures are generated by certain formal operations of a very special kind, called "grammatical transformation" from a more abstract type structures, which I call "deep structures". |
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| Indetermination | Chomsky, N. | I 325 Indetermination of Translation/Quine/Chomsky: according to this thesis "all proposals for translation should be compatible with the totality of the speech disposition, but incompatible with each other". (Q+O, 27). Chomsky: this is not possible because of the problems related to probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside a language. Quine: bypasses the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning". I 337 Indetermination of Translation/ChomskyVsQuine: the thesis, in a psychological context, amounts to an implausible and rather meaningless empirical assertion, namely which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemological context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the known sceptical arguments that can be applied just as well to physics or otherwise. It is quite certain that serious hypotheses "go beyond the data". If this was not the case, they would be uninteresting as hypotheses! |
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| Introspection | Churchland, P. | Metzinger II 411 Consciousness/Pat Churchland: introspective consciousness is a subspecies of perception. Thesis: in the language of a mature neuroscience there could be a more differentiated representation of "human subjective consciousness". |
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| Essentialism | Cresswell, M.J. | I 59 Essentialism / Cresswell: thesis: e. comes about from the way we talk about the world. It comes in through the language. We build on the language of physical theory. |
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| Identity | Cresswell, M.J. | I 117 Identity / Intensional Language / Cresswell: here there are two strategies: 1st is based on Russell’s Theory of Descriptions: Thesis: descriptions are never names. 2nd descriptions are names, but not from normal objects but of intensional objects (different objects in different worlds). Cresswell: Thesis: per Neo-Russell, CresswellVsIntensional Objects. |
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| Natural Language | Cresswell, M.J. | I 36 Cresswell: Thesis: the logic of natural language must be formulated in natural language. (> Entailment instead of logical consequence). In natural language we must adopt another concept of validity. I 44 Logic/some: Thesis: logic is above all about what is true in all interpretations, not just in one - CresswellVs: even if that is true, it cannot apply in an analysis of natural language. It is also simply not true that logic is concerned with all interpretations. I 141 Everyday language/logic of higher levels/Cresswell: Thesis: natural language needs much more "higher levels" than the standard logic allows. |
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| Semantics | Cresswell, M.J. | II 72 Semantics / Cresswell: the semantics for the entire language (except propositional attitudes) is to be obtained in a manner of function and argument (from the intensions of the simple parts) ((s)> compositionality). |
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| Situation Sem. | Cresswell, M.J. | I 65 CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Thesis: The so-called "situations" should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution/Cresswell: Possible world semantics/semantics of possible worlds: here the different roles are played by entities of very different kinds. Context: that the meaning of a sentence in meta language is the set of worlds in which the sentence is true, must be related to a context. I.e. they need information about place, time, speaker, etc. I 77 CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry/Possible World Semantics: Conclusion: Situational semantics: knows only entities of a single species (situations). Possible world semantics: assumes three types of entities: 1. possible worlds, which are single and complete and are assessed against the truth. 2. propositions - classes of possible worlds - are in logical relations and are the meanings of sentences in a context. 3. individuals (single things) among them events. Situations/Cresswell: can be considered as one of any of these entities! Problem: only occurs if you assume only one type of entity that should play all these roles. |
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| Truth-Cond. Sem. | Cresswell, M.J. | I 16 Truth Conditional Semantics/Cresswell: there is also a version without explicit reference to possible worlds. I 17 This says that the knowledge of the truth value of (3) is indeed not sufficient, but also not necessary for the knowledge of meaning. But not because there is more to know about it than possible worlds, but because we should know the truth values of other propositions, e.g. (4) (3) is true iff a cat... on 25 Nov... That's Davidson's approach (1969). Also John Wallace (1972a). They try an axiomatic meaning theory where propositions like (4) come out as theorems. Cresswell: For (4) to tell us something, we must understand its meaning. Davidson: ditto, but without having to say too much about how we achieve the meaning of (4). II 145 Meaning/Truth Conditions/Knowledge/Truth Conditional Semantics/tr.cond./Cresswell: Truth Conditional Semantics: Thesis: the knowledge of truth conditions is the knowledge of the meaning of the proposition or to know what a proposition means, means to know what the case should be if it is true. Propositional Attitudes/Cresswell: they show that we often do not know the truth conditions at all ((s) and still know the meaning). For example, it may be because we do not know that "7 + 5 = 11" has the same truth conditions as "56 is a prime". Solution/Partee: (1982, 97): it is more about determining the consequences of what we know. We should make a distinction between "what the speaker knows" and "what characteristics of the language are determined by what the speaker knows". |
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| Concept/Scheme | Davidson, D. | Rorty I 330 Concept Schema/Davidson/Rorty: the speech of the schema or concept system tries to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and must therefore go wrong. He defends the thesis that the thought of an "alternative conceptual scheme" implies the thought of a "true but untranslatable language". I 334 Verificationism/Rorty: such a thesis would be: German and the language that represents the world as it really is are not translatable into each other. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning Theory | Davidson, D. | Avramides I 8 Meaning/Davidson/Avramides: Thesis: In order to know what meaning is, we must see what form a meaning theory must have. Davidson: Thesis: to have a semantic concept of truth for a language means to know what it means for a sentence to be true, and that means in a reasonable sense to understand the language. (Davidson 1984b,p.24). Dummett III 83 VsDummett: One could argue that I simply denied Davidson's thesis that when constructing a meaning theory we can only proceed from sentences that are believed to be true and from the conditions under which judgments are made. Horwich I 455 Language Philosophy/Davidson: Thesis: we need nothing but the view of the field linguist. DummettVsDavidson: we need more. Skipper I 3 Meaning Theory/Davidson: Thesis: should have the form of an extensional, finally axiomatized truth theory for language in Tarski style. And somehow relativized to utterances. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Mistake | Davidson, D. | Perler / Wild I 130 Deception / mistake / language / Davidson: what would show the difference between what is believed and what is the case: Obviously linguistic communication is enough. I must be able to think of the same things, someone else is thinking of. I have to share his world. I do have not have to agree with him in all respects. Then the concept of intersubjective truth is sufficient as a basis for beliefs and therefore for thought. |
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| Radical Interpretation | Davidson, D. | Avra I 83 Radical Interpretation/Davidson: Thesis: cannot assume sentence meaning as evidence of complex intentions typically associated with the sentence. Glüer II 81 Propositional Attitude/Understanding/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson: Thesis: Knowing the propositional attitude of a person means understanding the person to the extent that the propositional attitudes are of an explanatory nature. II 151 Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: summary: Starting from the thesis that meanings and propositional attitudes are publicly accessible, Davidson argues that we can only interpret the words of a speaker if we understand interpretation as a "holistic" undertaking, if we also regard non-verbal actions as meaningful in a broad sense. The radical interpreter sees only the most necessary at his disposal. Monism: attempts to obtain a uniform ontology with the help of an event ontology underpinned by arguments of interpretation theory. Fod/Lep IV 73 Language/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Quine: Thesis: Nothing can be a language that is not accessible to radical interpretation! Newen/Schrenk I 62 Radical Translation/Quine/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Newen/Schrenk: Aim: to show that word and sentence meanings can ultimately be obtained purely empirically. Empirical Adequacy: to be guaranteed by empirical research. For this we exclude common roots of the foreign language with ours. |
D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Language | Davidson, D. | II 54 Language/Davidson: Thesis: The concept of language is superfluous! "There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists think."(1986, 446) Fra I 625 Language/Mind/mental/thinking/Davidson: Thesis: The mental area is not superior to the linguistic, the connection between subjective mind and interpretable language is theoretically unsolvable. Seel III 28 Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium. But mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. Language does not stand between us and the world. Seeing: we do not see through our eyes but with them. VsMentalese: There is no language like mentalese. Language is part of us. It is an organ of us. It is the way we have the world. Medium/Davidson/Seel: used very closely here. Medium/Gadamer: not instrument, but indispensable element of thinking. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Animal | Davidson, D. | Davidson: an infant has as much rationality as a snail, but he will earn it. Thesis: the difference consists in having propositional attitudes. And that is however confused, absurd, contradictory they may be! Thinking/Language/Davidson: Thesis: I do not believe that thinking can be reduced to linguistic activity. It is not plausible that thoughts can be identified nomologically with neurological or physical phenomena. There's no reason to believe that what we cannot say we cannot think. I 130 Animal/thinking/beliefs/Davidson: not without language ((s) contradiction to above I 117?) , because the same thing must be thought of and error must be detectable, "belief about belief" - different living beings must share the same concept of truth - (baseline of triangulation) |
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| Communikation | Davidson, D. | II 58 Language / Communication / Meaning / Davidson / Glüer: there are two possible interpretations of the thesis of the "communication without regularity". Strong, and weak. 1 Strong demand: Use the word e.g. "capacity" always in the way in which you want to be understood. 2 weak: as long as the radical interpretation is to ensure the accessibility of the foreign idiolect, it must have a certain weak internal regularity. |
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| Truth Theory | Davidson, D. | II 18 Truth theory / Davidson: an empirically interpreted tr. th. in the style of Tarski s theory of truth can be used as an interpretive theory for a natural language L. Semantic twist. Three thoughts of Frege. |
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| Compositionalit. | Davidson, D. | Schiffer I 4 Compositionality / language learning / Davidson: any natural language has a kcompositional semantics because we could not learn otherwise. (1973a, 71) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Convention | Davidson, D. | II 50 The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned! II 51 The thesis of the conventional character of language must be given up in the radical interpretation. |
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| Consciousness | Dennett, D. | Metzinger II 424 Def Model of Multiple Drafts/Dennett: Thesis: The criterion for consciousness is a "transcript" in memory - Thesis: The nature of our conscious experiences is not fixed from one moment to the next - therefore not independent of the content carrier. Metzinger II 425 Dennet/Thesis: the nature of our conscious experiences is not fixed from one moment to the next. Metzinger II 475 Consciousness/Dennett: is a virtual machine. Thesis: people become conscious to the extent that they acquire language and learn to talk about themselves. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Antirealism | Dummett, M. | II 455 Dummett Thesis: the two different aspects of linguistic expressions (realism and antirealism) can be linked by a third concept: understanding. Horwich I 393 Understanding/Antirealism/Dummett: Thesis: the theory of understanding should be practiced in terms of verification and falsification. Horwich I 460 Language/Quine/Dummett: Thesis: stands like a veil between us and reality! The more complex the stories become, the more doubt there is whether we still have contact with the world. I 461 Antirealism/Dummett: this is how we come to Antirealism: in more complex stories we lose direct empirical contact with the world ((s) More Conditionals). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Dummett, M. | EMD II 67 Meaning/Meaning Theory/Dummett: most authors (also Dummett) believe thesis that sentence meaning exists in the truth conditions. This comes from Frege and Wittgenstein and there has hardly been an attempt to construct anything else. EMD II 68 It would be possible to compile the details of an alternative theory, but hardly to get the machine running! (One needed a formalization for the natural language that would be available in quantum logic). II 97 Meaning/Dummett: Thesis: I do not believe that in the end meaning can be justified as a truth condition. Summary: All we can be sure about is that we have two basic models for what it means to know the truth conditions of a proposition. Dum I 29 Meaning/truth/Dummett Thesis: these two terms must be explained together. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Meaning Theory | Dummett, M. | EMD II 110 Dummett: Thesis: the intuitionist explanation of logical constants provides a prototype for a meaning theory in which truth and falsehood are not the central concepts. The basic idea is that to grasp the meaning of a mathematical proposition is not to know what must be the case (fact) but to recognize the construction and determine whether it is evidence or not. The assertion of a mathematical proposition is then not the claim to be true, but that a proof for it exists. Therefore the comprehension of the meaning of a mathematical proposition is shown by the mastery of the mathematical language in use and not every proposition must be decidable! It is sufficient if we recognize the proof. Negation: we understand the mathematical proposition when we recognize what proof is for it. Dum I 150 ff Dummett: in earlier writings. Thesis: the theory of meaning was a theory of understanding. Today: Relationship is more subtle. Neither can be explained by the other. Shi I 3 Dummett: Thesis: meaning theory and theory of understanding are identical. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
| Names | Dummett, M. | StalnI 172 Names/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: thesis: names have their reference directly, without mediating an intermediate sense Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its speaker one must assume the meaning of the name a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language. |
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| Realism | Dummett, M. | Fraassen I 38 Realism / Dummett: what is really going on in these discussions, are questions of language. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| pro Frege | Evans, G. | Fra I 484 Evans: "Oxford neo-Fregean" (along with McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Expansion | Field, Hartry | II 148 Expansion / "incorporation" / translation / Untranslatability / Field: thesis: there is a model of "inclusion," - "incorporation" (incorporation, integration) of untranslatable phrases of a foreign language into their own. This is extended by it. -> Anaphora. > Prosentential theory "his statement is true." |
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| Fictionalism | Field, Hartry | I 3 Field: the meaning in which "2+2=4" is true, is rather the meaning in which "Oliver Twist lived in London" is true: namely according to a well-known story, respectively in relation to standard mathematics. I.e. he does not literally believe that "2+2=4"! Field pro fictionalism: this view is the correct one. I 5 Def strong fictionalism: weak fictionalism plus the doctrine that weak fictionalism and platonism must be distinguished. Field pro strong fictionalism: Thesis: weak fictionalism and platonism do not coincide. I 22 Solution/Wagner: (1982): we have a good story about natural numbers and a good story about amounts etc. Within these stories it is completely unimportant whether you identify numbers with quantities or with something else. II 323 Fictionalism/Mathematics/Objectivity/Field: Thesis: there are no mathematical objects at all. a) This leads to the same limitation of mathematical objectivity: "anything goes", as long as it satisfies consistency in the above (broad) sense. II 324 b) Modal Interpretation/Fictionalism/Field: could say a non-direct view of mathematical language according to the example "There are primes greater than a billion" does not claim the existence of anything, but only makes a modal assertion. III 2 Instead: Thesis: Understanding mathematics as fiction. |
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| Gavagai | Field, Hartry | II 201 Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: Thesis: I think there are physical facts in this case, but I will not say anything about it in this text. Instead, I assume that Quine is right and I consider the consequences for a correspondence theory. II 211 Gavagai/Field: Thesis: "rabbit", ((s) not "Gavagai") "Dinosaur" etc. are dependent predicates whose extension is a function of the extension of another predicate, namely "identical". (This is the "basis"... Horwich I 409 Unseparated Part/Field: Thesis: is also not language-dependent. They are just as language independent as dinosaurs. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Object | Field, Hartry | Horwich I 409 Object / thing / object / language / World / Putnam: Thesis: objects themselves are made as well as discovered. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Referential Semantics | Field, Hartry | II 177 Language Rules/Reference/Carnap/Frege/Tarski/Tradition/Referential semantics/Field: language rules determine the truth values for a sentence. Many authors: only because the language rules determine the truth value of sentences from the denotations of its components, you can see the terms truth and falsehood apply at all. II 178 Field: I call the thesis of the "referential semantics". It has become increasingly common in recent years. FieldVsReferential Semantics: Uncertainty is for them a serious problem. |
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| Language | Field, Hartry | Avramides I 114 Field: no inner language without public language. SchifferVsField: since there is no incompatibility. Intention-based semantics (Grice) does not need to assume that one has propositional attitudes before one has acquired public language. Thesis: the two go hand in hand. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Vagueness | Field, Hartry | II 233 Vagueness / Field: is a lack of language, not of the world. |
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| Behavior | Field, Hartry | II 89 Behavior / Field: serious behavior attribution works without language. |
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| Atomism | Fodor, J. | IV 7 Atomism/Fodor/Lepore: British Empiricists - Russell's Analysis of Mind - Viennese Circle - Peirce, James, today: Behaviorism, Information Semantics, Model Theory: The thesis that the semantic properties of a symbol are only determined by a non-linguistic world - Opposite: Vs: Frege, structuralist linguistics: Representatives: Quine, Davidson, Dennett, Lewis, Block, Devitt, Putnam, Rorty, Sellars, almost the entire artificial intelligence and Cognitive Psychology. IV 32 Semantic Atomism: thesis: meaning of an expression is not determinable from its role in language, but by direct relation symbol/world: pro: Locke/Hume/Hobbes/Berkeley/ IV 34 Fodor/Lepore: thesis: What we doubt is that the arguments so far show that atomism could not be true. |
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| Thinking | Fodor, J. | Newen / Schrenk I 131 Language / thinking / Newen / Schrenk. two main streams: First thesis of the primacy of language: only linguistically gifted beings can think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis Second thesis of the primacy of thought before language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. |
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| Mentalese | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 55 Mentalese/Propositional Attitude/Fodor: Thesis: A belief sentence is a sentence in the speaker's thought language. CresswellVsFodor: Problem; then the original speaker and the attribution speaker must have the same sentence in mentalese in their inner system; Newen/Schrenk I 131 Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with the assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: thesis that thinking is lived in such a way that it already has all the core characteristics of natural language (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. For example, fuel gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized by brain states. I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p.199) Thesis: One cannot give a construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (embodiment) of another formal system: "Properly" requires: a) There must be a general procedure for assigning formulae to states of the organism. b) For each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism, so that c1) the state can be interpreted as a relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingent identical) to have propositional attitudes for it. d) Mentalese representations have their causal role by virtue of their formal characteristics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Vs Positivism | Fodor, J. | II 103 Thesis: positivism and ordinary language philosophy (Oxford) have failed because they have not made the methods of linguistics a basis. |
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| Translation-Holism. | Fodor, J. | IV 6 Translation holism: Thesis: translation preserves the meaning when the inferential relations between many sentences of the source language are only preserved in the target language. (> Block). |
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| Meaning | Foster, J.A. | EMD II 1 Meaning / Foster: thesis: meaning is interpreted due to the physical composition (makeup, presentation). (According to character notation). EMD II 1 Meaning / Foster: Thesis: is located in the facts about the language that implicitly recognizes the mastery. Mastery / (s)> totality, whole, instead of a list. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Meaning Theory | Foster, J.A. | EMD II 18 Meaning Theory / Davidson / new: Thesis: a truth theory that meets formal and empirical conditions, can serve as a m.th. , when you know that the conditions are met. II 20 Foster / new: Thesis: for a language X, the m.th. is that which is obtained from the equation: "A truth theory for y states that p." |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
| Interpretation | Fraassen, B. van | I 13 Science is interpreted in that its terms are based on an observation language (i.e. natural language without theoretical terms). |
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| Language | Fraassen, B. van | I 196 Language / Science / Fraassen: Thesis: Language problems have nothing to do with the content of Sciences and the structure of the world! I 202 Everyday language / Fraassen: its structure is determined by the main theories that we accept. This means that we need to talk as if we believed that the theory is true. |
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| Theoretical Terms | Fraassen, B. van | I 81 Everyday language / theoretical terms / Fraassen:theoretical terms are an essential part of our mother tongue. They can not be re-translated into the language of our grandparents. E.g. microwave or VHF receiver. (Fraassen per). |
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| Thought | Frege, G. | Dum I 89 Frege: Thesis: of the primacy of thought over language. Dum I 92 DummettVsFrege: Conversely, his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that the human can only grasp those thoughts which he/she understands as the meaning of sentences. From this one can take two readings. Strongest reading: we can only think in language, weakest: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 73 Question/Command/Wish/Frege: Thesis: a wish phrase, a question or a command contains no thoughts at all! |
SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Names | Frege, G. | Wolf I 13 Names/FregeVsRussell: singular term. Newen/Schrenk I 101 Meaning/Name/Frege: Thesis: The meaning of a name is expressed by its identification. This is the so-called designation theory, a simple variant of the description theory. Staln I 172 Name/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names have their reference directly, without mediation of an intermediate meaning. Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its reference one must assume the sense of the name a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Vagueness | Frege, G. | EMD II 223 Vagueness / natural language / Frege: imprecise, which is a deficiency that needs to be turned off. WrightVsFrege / (s): thesis some predicates have to be vague, to ever serve their purpose and thus ultimately to allow the natural language to fulfill its purpose. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Perception | Frege, G. | Dum I 89 Frege's Thesis: Sense perception includes grasping a thought or a sense. Dummett: this contradicts his thesis that thought takes precedence over language. |
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| Names | Geach, P. | I 163 Subject / object / name / grammar / logic / meaning / Geach: there is a contemporary theory that names and quasi names could be no grammatical subjects. (GeachVs). Supposedly they possessed no inherent meaning and are no words of a language! GeachVs: if, for example, the name "Arthur" has no meaning, then it can be neither clear nor ambiguously used! |
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| Infinite | Geach, P. | I 166 infinity / GeachVsFrege: Thesis: Mathematical infinity is not as Frege thought an infinity of "objective things", but consists in the infinite possibilities of human language. |
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| Assertion Cond. | Grice, P.H. | Graeser I 118 Grice thesis statement meanings as a whole, as well as situation-independent meanings of sentences and situation-independent word meanings are to reduce to the language-independent speaker meaning. ((s) Proposition). |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Intention | Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 4 Intention / belief / Grice: intentions must be explained in terms of the content, not vice versa. Avramides: that still leaves open the question of how intentions and beliefs get their content. Gtrice I 105 Intentionality / Grice: therefore it already seems to be included in the essential foundations of a theory of language |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Everyday Language | Grover, D. | II 165 Everyday language / truth / true / Grover: Thesis: all use modes of the T-predicate are either prosentential or derived from that. Even if "true" occurs within links. |
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| propos Quantific. | Grover, D. | II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "Facts and propositions".) Ramsey: Example "He's always right." Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). ((s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: It is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier. II 146 Propositional Quantification/pQ/Grover: Thesis: They exist in everyday language (English). Prior: (1967) ditto. StrawsonVsPrior/StrawsonVsGrover: They do not exist in everyday language. |
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| Prosentential Theory | Grover, D. | II 46 GroverVsQuine: with respect to propositional quantifiers. Thesis: propositional variables are not pronominal.Thesis: They have prosentential character. II 130 Quantifying Proset/content/Grover: (> "Everything he said"): Thesis: The content of a quantifying proset comes from the possible contents of the substituents (sentences that provide substitution instances). II 138 ZimmermanVsProsentential Theory/ZimmermanVsCGB/Grover: (Zimmerman 1978): "thatt" (((s) Abbreviation for "This is true", atomic proset) would not be understandable if there were no reading in everyday language for it. If one now interprets "thatt" as "that is true" then it is circular. |
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| Variables | Grover, D. | II 57 Grover: Thesis: the grammar of the variables in the "philosophical English" is determined by that of the variables in the formal language. II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences, or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "facts and propositions") Ramsey: Example He's always right: Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). (s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: it is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier. |
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| T-Predicate | Grover, D. | II 47 T-Predicate/Everyday Language/Grover: p: takes sentences as substituents. Question: how is "Epp" or "(p)(If Jon knows that p then p)" translated? Grover: Thesis: We need a harmless extension of English for this. II 48 Thesis: Sentences as substituents of propositional variables make sense. However, in § 3 we will discuss other theories which require that these must be names of sentences or that-sentences. A summary is given in § 4. II 151 Truth/True/T-Predicate/Proset Theory/Grover: Thesis: Consent is expressed by saying "the same thing". The theory that truth is a property of sentences changes the subject in this case. II 157 T-predicate/"true"/Grover: Thesis: The occasions in which the predicate is used (property-writing, for sentences) are probably those (if any) if there is a reason to speak about sentences (meta-language). II 158 Example Quine; if he needs the T-predicate for generalization, he uses it as a property-attributable. (Truth as property of sentences). |
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| Language | Hacking, I. | I 228 Language / Hacking: Thesis: (goes back to the Leakey family (?)) Has been invented out of boredom, to tell each other jokes around the campfire. Thesis: the first word that was needed was something to express: "true", "No, not here, but this here is real" the rest of it was shown. Even before names (for absent objects) there was a need for logical constants. Instead of "Me Tarzan, you Jane", "This really is!" As soon as a way of presenting is found (e.g. ostension) a second-order term foloows. |
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| Mentalese | Harman, G. | Cresswell II 160 Thought Language/Mentalese/HarmanVsFodor/Cresswell: (Harman 1982) Thesis: The language of thought is simply the public language. FodorVsHarman: (1975, 56). Skipper I 74 Mentalese/Harman: (1978, 58) Thesis: But it is not implausible to assume that our inner states of representation have elements and structure, in a way analogous to the way in which sentences have elements and structure. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Grice | Hungerland, P. | Grice I 266 ff Hungerland thesis Vs "inductive conception" of the paradigm of context-implication: p claim to imply believing that p. Hungerland: instead: Thesis: Explanation-Model, if an assertion is normal, everything is implied that can be inferred from it. Depends on three different things: 1. context of the assertion 2. assumptions about what is considered normal 3. rules for the correct use of expressions I 402 Thesis: everyday language meaning richer than truth functional. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Kripke | Jackson, F. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: theses of Kripke can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| necessary .a post | Jackson, F. | Staln I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism of determining referents - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of metasemantics, the reference-determining mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the representation of why internal states can be representative at all - thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference that even says to some extent how things are, and without necessary truths a posteriori. |
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| Prosentential Th. | Kamp/Grov/Beln | Field II 149 Prosentential Theory/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Field: (CGB 1975): in such cases, (with demonstratives, indices or unspeakable sentences) I can say instead: For example, "His utterance is true" to incorporate it into my language (indirectly). ((s) Different from "Everything he said"?). CGB: Thesis: This is the most important function of the truth predicate. ((s) The truth-predicate serves the generalization). FieldVsCGB: the most important is the disquotational function. Horwich I 315 Prosentential Theory/CGBVsTradition: is an alternative to the conventional analysis of "x is true" as a grammatical subject-predicate form. Subject: "X" , predicate "is true". CGB: this grammatical analysis is sometimes misleading, sometimes it limits our philosophical intuitions. Our approach eliminates some, if not all, problems. I 324 Pro sentence/CGB: Thesis: normal English (everyday language) has pro sentences! But not atomic ones. We start with atomic pro sentences here (i.e. "true" cannot be extracted from "is true", and there is no modification of the times). Example "It is true", example "This is true". I 324 Prosentential Theory/CGB: Thesis: We want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all talk about truth can be understood to involve only the prosentential use of "This is true". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Charact/Content | Kaplan, D. | Staln I 192 Kaplan Thesis: character and content must be separated - character/meaning: is a rule that says how the speaker is determined by facts about the context - Content/Kaplan: = secondary intention - content: possibly unknown in spite of language competence. Staln I 206 Content/Kaplan: is not yet defined by the sentence meaning. Context/Kaplan: only the context - together with the meaning of the sentence - determines the content. Example: "You will feel better in the morning". Def character/Kaplan: (= meaning of sentence): a function from context to content. Character/Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts. |
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| Two-Dimens. Sem. | Kaplan, D. | Staln I 206 Two-Dimensional Semantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Kaplan's thesis ("paradigm") Separation of character and content. We start with the obvious fact that natural language is strongly context-dependent. Sentence Meaning/Kaplan: does not determine the content itself. Content/Kaplan: is not yet defined by sentence meaning. Context/Kaplan: only the context - together with the sentence meaning - defines the content. Example: "You will feel better in the morning". Def character/Kaplan: (= sentence meaning): a function from context to content. Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world (centered possible world). I 207 Thought/Interpretation/Stalnaker: is a question of basic semantics, i.e. the facts. Character/Content/Kaplan/Stalnaker: the original motivation for the separation was that sentence meanings do not represent the expressed thoughts. Content/Stalnaker: = secondary intention. |
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| Language Theory | Katz, J. | Austin III 5 Katz: alternative thesis: Language philosophy as reconstruction of the "structure of conceptual knowledge on the basis of insight into the structure of the languages in which such knowledge is expressed and communicated". This is only possible with a language theory that represents the facts common to all natural languages regarding structure. III 6 Katz/Fodor: the intuitive finding of abnormal ways of speaking is philosophically irrelevant. We need a theory that tells us what unusualness is. ((s) One level lower). |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Language | Katz, J. | Vendler I 262 Katz: we may keep only those aspects of a language as philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: I see no need for this in the light of my above statements. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Idealism | Kuhn, Th. | Horwich I 492 Positivism / theory: the observation language must be theory-neutral. Likewise, the methodological principles. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory-neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community fixes the "facts". |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Incommensurability | Kuhn, Th. | Schurz I 216 Incommensurability / Kuhn: theoretical terms of different theories are semantically incomparable, even if they are word for word identical. - Solution: Ramsey sentence and Carnap-sentence - the r.s. of the other language can be translated and understood. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Instrumentalismus | Leeds, St. | Horwich I 374 Def Naturalistic Instrumentalism/NI/Terminology/Leeds: thesis that the reference relation R (which corresponds to the ref-sentences of Tarski (primitive reference/Field)) and T (the truth-schema determined by R) have no importance at all for our theory of the relationship between language and world. For example, denies that our theories work because they are true. Is a form of naturalism. (see below Quine is often naturalistic instrumentalism). Naturalistic Instrumentalism/Leeds: pro. A "Naturalustic Instrumentalism" believes thesis that the world consists of atoms, fields, sets, etc., (the entities of common science). But one may be skeptical about its existence. But this skepticism has normal scientific reasons, perhaps someone believes that only "observables" really exist. ((s) So there are no reasons of reference, no linguistic reasons). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Standardinterpr. | Leeds, St. | Horwich I 378 Field: (1972): Thesis: we need an standard interpretation theory of truth and reference (that a standard interpretation is always available), and this theory is also available. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/LeedsVsField). Truth/Field: Thesis (analogous to valence): despite everything we know about the extension of the term, there is still a need for physically acceptable reduction! Leeds: what Field would call a physically acceptable reduction would be what we call the standard interpretation theory of truth: that there is always a standard interpretation for "true" for a language. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Analyticity | Lewis, D. | II 239 blurred analyticity / Lewis: our language is selected from a bundle of similar languages, which contain randomly more or less the same sentences. - They have more or less the samt truth values similar worlds. - Then we have a space of languages. - Analyticity is then sharp in each language. - If different languages with respect to analyticity do not match, the record is just not analytical. |
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| Content | Lewis, D. | Schw I 161 Mental Content/Lewis: Thesis: is determined by the causal role, by the typical causes and effects. Content/DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of the public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. Schw I 171 Naturalization of Content/Representation/Schwarz: Thesis that mental representations are sentence-like to such an extent that their content can be explained compositionally. (cf. Fodor 1990). |
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| Convention | Lewis, D. | Cresswell I 23 Lewis: Convention of truthfulness and trust in language L: this is the basis of most language use. I 24 We assume that the speakers try to express true sentences and expect the same from the others. Lew II 206 Lewis's thesis: such conventions (of truthfulness and trust) provide us with the desired connection of languages on the one hand and language-using populations on the other. V 345 "Conventions" (1969) Social Conventions/Lewis: Regularities to solve ongoing coordination problems. Situations of mutually dependent decisions in which common interests prevail. Conventions/Lewis: are compared with other types of regularities: on communication: can be described as a convention to be true in relation to certain attribution of truth conditions to sentences. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Satz-Bedeutung | Lewis, D. | Grover II 158 Meaning / Lewis / Grover: (Lewis 1972): truth conditions that are mapped by the pictures of circumstances (possible worlds) and contexts to truthe values, grasp the sentence meaning. Schw I 161 mental content / Lewis: is determined by the causal role, through the typical causes and effects. Content / DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language that we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning / LewisVsDavidson: what sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, desires and beliefs. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Lewis, D. | Schw I 126 Language: .... LewisVsVs: doubts that we have a direct and exhaustive access to what our words refer to. With our words only strings are attached,that must be met by a potential speaker. Therefore, it may be that something meets tehm, which we did not think beforehand that it does. |
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| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Meaning | Loar, B. | EMD II 150 Meaning / language / Loar: should always be relativized to a language community. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
| Belief | Loar, B. | Schiffer I 15 Belief/Loar: (1981): ingenious theory according to the thesis belief is a relation to a sentence in the public language of the attributor, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski style. I 275 Tarski-Style/Truth-Def/Schiffer: does not prescind from any role that the expression can have in communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then [s is T] contains nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956). I 15 Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary to individuate beliefs on the basis of interpersonal attributable functional states. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). I 19 Functionalism/Schiffer: Thesis: what makes a physical state token a belief that makes it so and so is that it is a token of a physical state type, with a certain functional role. ((s): Believe: Token - Role: belongs to Type. Belief/Loar: as a function (in the set-theoretical sense) that maps propositions to internal physical states. These inner physical states have functional roles indicated by these propositions, in a way indicated by a psychological theory in which belief, desires etc. are theoretical constructs. (Loar 1981). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Behavior | Locke, J. | Avramides I 139 Behavior / thinking / language / Locke: behavior is linked only contingently with thoughts - AvramidesVs: Problem: what should then behavior have to do with spirit - (Vs "objective mind") - when words stand for ideas, the behavior is irrelevant. - physicalism: takes behavior to be as unimportant as idealism. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Evolution | Luhmann, N. | AU Kass 14 Evolutionary Theory: Parallel: thesis: somehow leads to a split between variation and selection and thus structural changes are stimulated. Evolution stimulates itself to build order. And this cannot be explained from the primordial soup or from "original conditions" (also from language or social order). (Not "initial conditions"). Double contingency is thus the invention of a reference problem for rational analysis. One might ask, for example, what are the reasons for China's different development in relation to Europe or vice versa, but this is a question that always presupposes a prehistory. |
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| Deep Structure | Luhmann, N. | AU Cass 5 LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered. Instead: modern communication research: in the communication itself the habit is developed to assign sounds and thus the language is learned. This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization. |
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| Competence | McDowell, J. | EMD II 63 Language mastery / McDowell: must be expressed in terms of the components (constituents) and only secondarily on whole sentences. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Language finite | McDowell, J. | EMD II 158 Language / infinity / Loar: the number of sentences which we understand is large, but still finite. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
| Genes | McGinn, C. | I 229 McGinn: Thesis: It could be that the genes have already solved our philosophical problem, at least in part. Because 1. they must already have solved the purely physical problems of construction: i.e. they represent plans for the physique, and 2. what is true for the body is also true for the mind. To the extent that a mental characteristic is biologically based, genes must contain instructions for the composition of organisms with that characteristic. (Building of consciousness, also I, free will, intentionality, all possible kinds of knowledge. I 234 Truth/Representation/Language/Genes/McGinn: Thesis: States of consciousness are not necessarily the optimal carriers of all varieties of truth. For example, genes represent the blueprint of the organs that produce them. Then the realm of meaning is not limited to consciousness. Genes have representation without semantics. II 249 Thesis: I believe that the genes contain an information system in this sense, and that this system contains the solution to the body and soul problem. |
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| Mentalese | McGinn, C. | Schiffer I 73 McGinn (1982a, 70): the inner sentences are the basic objects of interpretation. Their content gives the idea of its content and thoughts transfer their contents to public language. Fodor: ((1987), "Guru of Mentalese"): (unpublished): the strategy is to take the property of the intentional mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of mental representations that are implied in their Tokening. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Pragmatik | Montague, R. | Cresswell II 148 Def pragmatics / Montague: examines the role of contexts such as times and speakers. Fraassen: Reference to language (called by him idiolect) can be specified by the context. Cresswell: he does not show how that works in case of arithmetic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| 2nd Order Quantifiers | Montague, R. | Hacking I 180 Montague: everyday language uses primarily second order quantifiers. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Knowledge | Partee, B. | Cresswell II 145 Solution / Partee: (1982, 97): it is rather a matter of determining the consequences of what we know. We should make a distinction between "what the speaker knows" and "what characteristics of the language are determined by what the speaker knows." |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Normal Language | Pauen, M. | Pauen I / V 202 Everyday language / Pauen: already contains certain assumptions about functional relationships. Three steps: 1 the functional implications notice. 2 concretize these assumptions with the help of scientific psychology. 3 determined on the basis of these descriptions, the neural states, which occupy these functional roles. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Mentalese | Peacocke, Chr. | I 202 Peacocke: Thesis: Middle position between folk psychology and mentalese (internal language of the brain). I 206 Mentalese/Peacocke: "Language of thought", of the brain: thesis: that for each given setting there is a language in which the belief that p is stored in a set of that language, with the content that p. I 208 This does not lead to physicalism on its own. I 210/211 Peacocke: Thesis: it is consistent with this description (...) that these states are syntactically unstructured, in the sense that e.g. in S Fa, S ~Fc and S Fb there is nothing common which corresponds to a common property F as a common component of all its contents. |
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| Self | Peirce, Ch.S. | Rorty VI 421 I / Peirce: "I am the sum total of my language" (Sellars, Davidson per). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning/Content | Perry, J. | Newen/Schrenk I 110 Singular Term/Meaning Theory/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: different adequacy conditions are taken into account for different expressions. Perry: Separation of meaning and content Meaning/Perry: (a linguistic expression): the description associated with language competence. For example, the rule that Aristotle is called "Aristotle". (Language rule). Content/Singular Term/Perry: different ways to characterize a thought. Name/Content/Perry: Thesis: always the designated object (for any type of content). Thus he takes into account Kripke's theory that names are referential terms. Problem: e.g. Bieri is identical with Pascal Mercier: here the informativity of the identity is not reflected in the content, because the content is therefore the self-identity. Identity/Informative identity phrases/Perry: does not have to be completely dealt with within semantics. Cognitive Adequacy/Perry: cannot be completely fulfilled within semantics. (>Pragmatics). Similar to Kripke. Description/Indicators/Perry: have other contents than names. Description/Perry: has an identifying condition as referential content, which can be specified by the description. Designatory content: (of the description) is then the object. Semantics/Pragmatics/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: pragmatic aspects (reading, use) are already taken into account within semantics. Perry: thesis there are multiple statements for description and indicators. |
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| Church-Thesis | Pinker, St. | I 9 Church-These/Pinker: each algorithm can be run on a Turing machine - ie reality can be simulated as far as it obeys mathematical equations - ditto for language, as far as they can be grasped in grammatical rules. |
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| Music | Pinker, St. | I 656 Music/Pinker: E.g. Even such a simple story such as "boy meets girl" can not be traced back to a sound sequence. Therefore music is quite different from language, it is not an adaptation but a technique. Nevertheless, there are certain parallels. Bernstein s "music - the open question": an attempt to apply Chomsky on the music. |
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| Language | Pinker, St. | Perler/Wild I 325 1. Language/Evolution/Pinker: This language is more recent, highlighting the difference between humans and animals. 2. Language/Evolution/VsPinker: Thesis: Language is rather something built on a large foundation of more general cognitive abilities. Animal communication can then be used to learn something about human communication. P.Greenfield: Thesis: Language and tool use have a basic common basis. The ability to complete hierarchically structured tasks of object manipulation. E.g. the completion of subgroups for a combination to larger objects. This corresponds to Chomsky's idea of the structure of the language. (Nominal, verbal phrases as subgroups). I 327 Thesis: assets have a neuronal base that developed long before the divergence of hominids and pongids. |
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| Metalanguage | Prior, A. | I 105 "x means that __" is exactly the same as "x says that __" and the same for "thinks", "fears", etc. (>meta language!). Prior thesis: this is a meta-part of language, we don't need a separate metalanguage. Then we get: (1) If x means that something that means x is wrong, then something that means x is wrong. (2) If x means that something that means x is false, then something that means x is true. (3) If x means that something that means x is false, then there are at least two things that mean x. (4) If x means nothing except that something that means x is wrong, then x does not even mean that. |
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| Reference | Putnam, H. | Horwich I 394 Reference/Putnam: The thesis is determined by social practices and actual physical paradigms. III 208 Reference/Field: Thesis: If we could establish a "basic reference", then we would have a Tarskian theory of reference - average of the extensions of the connected expressions - PutnamVs: the reference does not establish the connection! - We need a theory of reference by description. V 55 Putnam Thesis/Reference: the reference of individual expressions remains indefinite even if we have preconditions of any kind that determine the truth value of every sentence of a language in every possible world! The whole language can be interpreted in a variety of ways. V 75~ Reference/Putnam: Thesis: Input is formed by concepts - there are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Analytical Hypothesis | Quine, W.V.O. | Chomsky I 326 Analytical Hypothesis/Quine: is fundamental to all knowledge. They go beyond the data material. Thesis: the accuracy of analytical hypotheses in the case of normal language and common-sense knowledge is not an objective matter about which one can be "right or wrong". They go beyond everything that is included in the disposition. Qui I 60 Thesis: Manuals of translation from one language into another can be so differently arranged that they are in harmony with the totality of the disposition of speech and yet are incompatible with each other. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Deconstrucivism | Quine, W.V.O. | II 267 Def deconstructivism / Putnam: no meaning can ever be expressed in more than one language, and no two languages can express the same meaning. |
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| Intension | Quine, W.V.O. | I 381 Brentano s thesis of the irreducibility of intensional expressions is fully in line with the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. - But you can understand Brentano s thesis shows the emptyness of a science of the intensions: Taking the intensional language at face value, ie, to postulate translation relations as objectively valid, although they are in principle indeterminate. But that will not do. |
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| Categorical Sentence | Quine, W.V.O. | V 114 universal categorical sentence / language learning / Quine: each of us first start on a few universal categorical sentences but several people start with different sets of such. |
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| Saussure | Quine, W.V.O. | III 162 Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences from the individual elements should be transferred to language as a whole. (On semantics). But in fact, different languages do not have the same semantic opposites. One language may have only four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out quickly leads to the conclusion that meanings are reserved for specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for individual "texts". According to this thesis, two languages never express the same meanings. Thus even the concept of the sign's meaning, which can be detached from the sign itself, becomes obsolete. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Semantic Ascent | Quine, W.V.O. | XI 142 Ontology / Carnap / Lauener: (temporarily replaced): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. semantic ascent / QuineVsCarnap: this should not be misused for ontological evasive maneuvers. |
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| Language Learning | Quine, W.V.O. | V 146 Mengenlehre/Sprachlernen/Quine: These beginnt 1. mit Relativsätzen 2. substitutionaler Quantifikation (Einsetzungsquantifikation). Variable: die Namenlosigkeit von Äpfeln zeigt, dass unsere Variablen Gegenstands-Variablen geworden sind. Dennoch könnte man Einsetzungs-Variablen weiter gebrauchen. allg Term/Variablen: These gerade die Verwendung von Einsetzungs-Variablen für allg Term ist ein Ursprung einer Ontologie der Attribute oder Klassen. Quantifikation/Gegenstand/Sprachlernen/Quine: (s.o.) These die Quantifikation über Körper entsteht aus dem Lernen der kategorischen Konstruktion [Jedes a ist ein b]. (Wegen des Gegenstandscharakters der Quantifikation. Dagegen: Einsetzungs-Variable: lässt sich eine Variable darauf festlegen, so kann man leicht lernen über sie zu quantifizieren, ohne an die kategorische Konstruktion zu denken. Dann ist der Allquantifikation zuzustimmen, wenn jeden Einzelfall zuzustimmen ist. Oder abzulehnen, wenn mindestens ein Einzelfall abzulehnen ist. substitutionale Quantifikation/Sprachlernen: wird damit schon fast beherrscht. Problem: Blinder Fleck: (substitutionale Allquantifikation) Bsp keiner der Einsetzungsfälle ist abzulehnen, aber einige verlangen Enthaltung. V 147 Dann weiß er nicht, ob die Quantifikation abzulehnen ist, oder ob man sich enthalten soll. (s.o. entspricht der Konjunktion § 20). substitutionale Existenzquantifikation: Blinder Fleck: liegt da, wo keinem der Fälle zuzustimmen ist, in einigen aber Enthaltung angebracht ist. Dann könnte man entweder zustimmen oder sich enthalten müssen. (Entspricht der Alternation). V 158 abstrakt/Sprachlernen/Quine: These die abstrakten Gegenstände verdanken ihre Anerkennung der sQ, formuliert in der Alltagssprache. |
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| Language | Quine, W.V.O. | Horwich I 460 Language / Quine / Dummett: is like a veil between us and reality! The more complex the stories are, the more doubt there is whether we still have contact with the world. I 461 Anti-realism / Dummett: so we come to the anti-realism: in more complex stories we lose the direct contact with the empirical world ((s) More conditionals). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Theory | Quine, W.V.O. | VII 40 ~ Empiricism / Quine: too rich ontology - Science has double function of language and experience, but this duality can not be traced back to into individual statements. VII 42 Even if we make statements as a whole, our network is too fine mesh: The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. |
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| Truth Predicate | Quine, W.V.O. | X 127f Logic / language / Quine: for linguistic theory seems to spesak in favor of the semantic ascent. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T-predicate) is already available and just helps to separate the logic from the language by showing it to the world. Logic: indeed speaks a lot of languages, but is oriented to the world and not on the language. This is caused by the T-predicate. |
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| Twin Earth | Quine, W.V.O. | V 42ff Twin Earth / mental state / Putnam: different reference but not essentially different mind states - reference is not determined by individual mind states - but by the mental overall state of all members of the language community. |
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| Picture Theory | Rorty, R. | VI 139 Language/representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". |
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| Consciousness | Rorty, R. | Fra I 584 Consciousness/Rorty: are there in the sense of an independent area of mental in reality even non-mental events are conventions, a contingent language game - thesis: this can be abolished without loss. Rorty III 41 Consciousness/Language/Rorty Thesis: to regard the history of language and thus of the arts, sciences and morals as the history of the metaphor (Rorty pro!) means to adopt the image in which consciousness or language are more and more suitable for purposes imposed by God or nature. Consciousness has simply emerged in evolution, it is not something the whole process was aimed at. (RortyVsAnthropic Principle). |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mentalese | Rorty, R. | I 277 Mentalese/ a priori / Fodor / RortyVsFodor: Fodor s thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we may at any time be wrong about it, so that we may be wrong about something priori for us. (> Kripke). |
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| Positivism | Rorty, R. | II 130f Positivists / Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities become more closely related to reality than secondary (VsLocke) - but that this theory was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn). |
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| Psych. Nominalism | Rorty, R. | I 203 Def "Psychological Nominalism"/Sellars/Rorty: Thesis: any consciousness of varieties, similarities, facts, thus abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. Language acquisition does not even presuppose the awareness of varieties, similarities and facts related to so-called immediate experience. I 204 The existence of "raw sensations" in babies seems to make an obvious objection to this thesis. |
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| Mirror | Rorty, R. | I 234 Mirror / Rorty: Thesis: just as thinking is a private mirror of nature, so language is the "public" mirror. |
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| Language/World | Russell, B. | Rorty I 285 Truth / World / Russell / Rorty: Thesis: every true statement contains both our own contribution and a contribution of the world. This has spawned two attacks 1 DavidsonVsRussell: VsDrittes dogma: separation of scheme and content. There is no content that is waiting to be organized. 2 PutnamVsRussell. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Philosophy | Ryle, G. | Tetens Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy / nonsense / logical grammar / Tetens: the thesis that philosophy comes from a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of the language, is to be found neither Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but at Ryle in his criticism Vs dualism, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969) . |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Meaning Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 261 Meaning / BT / language / Schiffer: all theories of language and thought go from false assumptions - Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. I 264 Solution / Schiffer: we ourselves are still cognitive mechanisms, noise-generating physical information-processing systems. I B264 Schiffer: ultimately it is the way in which we use characters and sounds - described non-semantically and non-psychologically - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). |
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| Meaning | Schiffer, St. | Field II 65 Def Meaning/Sentence Meaning/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer early, 1972): the meaning of sentences in spoken and written language can be explained by concepts of belief (and desire), namely those that are conventionally correlated with these sentences. II 66 Representation Meaning/FieldVsSchiffer: Thesis: part of what it is that a symbol in my representation system stands for Caesar is that it has acquired its role there as a result of my appropriation of a name that stands for Caesar in public language. II 66 Meaning/Representation/VsSchiffer/Field: a reverse approach to Schiffer's thesis would reduce the semantics of the representation system to the semantics of the public language. Graeser I 116 Meaning/Stephen Schiffer: ("The Remnants of Meanig, 1987): provocative book: Thesis 1. There is no correct theory of meaning Thesis 2. The questions that determine the current philosophy of language are based on false assumptions. Schi passim Meaning/Schiffer/Bio: I was a student at Oxford in the 60s. SchifferVsGrice: Representation of the speaker meaning is inadequate (incomplete), but pro Thesis: Reduction of semantics to psychology (like Grice) + reduction to physicalism. > 1972 "Meaning". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Conceptual Role | Schiffer, St. | I 93 Thesis: There is a single (clearly fixable) package of conceptual role and causal relations for reference that determines the truth condition function for each system of mental representations. I 167 Conceptual Role/Schiffer: Thesis: Simple conceptual role instead of platonistic irreducible property e.g. "being a dog": hairy nice barking four-legged friends - accordingly one does not need primitive propositional attitudes and no belief properties. I 187 Theory of Use/Reference/Meaning/Compositionality/Schiffer: Recent Tendency: (Putnam 1978): Thesis: We can have theories of use for language understanding (not meaning) that do not presuppose truth-theoretical semantics - the theories of understanding and reference do not have as much to do with truth as most believe. - Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use), nothing at all is assumed of a "correspondence" of words and things. |
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| That-Clause | Schiffer, St. | Field II 165 That-Clause/Schiffer: can seem like a singular term: for example the inference of "Susan believes that E = mc2" and "Einstein's theory is that E = mc2" to "Susan believes Einstein's theory". But you can also validate this inference by saying that the first premise was only an abbreviation for "Susan believes the theory that E = mc2". This preserves the thesis that that-clauses are non-denotative, but requires that we can accept beliefs as singular terms as well as that-clauses as supplements, and so we still have to decide whether these singular terms II 166 denote linguistic expressions or intentional entities. I.e. the problem is only shifted. I 211 That-Clause/Schiffer: Thesis: A that-clause does not refer! It is not a referential expression. - Problem: how to explain: Example Paul and Elmar believe that... so there is an attribute that they have in common. - For nominalism, which denies any classes of properties, language must not have compositional semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Properties | Schiffer, St. | I 145 physical properties and facts / Schiffer: these are language-dependent - but nominalism (Schiffer per): pr. are not the semantic values of predicates. I 235 Property / Schiffer: Properties do not exist, they are not among the things that really exist. |
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| Mentalese | Schiffer, St. | I 73 Mentalese/Harman: Thesis: internal representations have sentence-like structure - Lewis: Language of the brain from synaptic connections and neuronal firing - >SLT "Strong thesis of language of thoughts" = mental representation does not determine the intentionality. Belief refers to a neuronal sentence. Semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of the mental states. Other theory: semantical properties inherited from intentional properties. (VsStrong thesis of language of thoughts) - SLTVs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionaliy - this is explainable without public contents - SchifferVs: this is not fulfillable at all. I 189 SLT/Strong Thesis of Language of Thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: Thesis: 1. The brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree that this is a true and interesting thesis. 2. There is a computational relation R for every belief you can have so that you have that belief iff you have R for that formula. Schiffer: I can also accept that. ... I 190 I.e. we discover an illustration relation. This is a weak mentalese thesis. It is certainly empirical. > Then we can say carefully: Meaning/Mentalese/Schiffer: the neuronal sentence µ "means" that snow is white. But that doesn't mean that we have a "semantics" there that should be explained in terms of the meaning of inner formulas. In particular, it does not imply that this semantics is compositional. |
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| Sprache | Schiffer, St. | I 273 Schiffer: Language processing is done by a series of subdoxastic internal states. |
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| Fact | Schiffer, St. | I 145 physical properties and facts / Schiffer: are language-dependent, but nominalism: (Schiffer per): prop. are not the semantic values of predicates. |
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| Understanding | Schiffer, St. | I 224 Understanding/Language Understanding/Schiffer: Thesis: I believe there is no correct and non-trivial representation at all of understanding a sentence. Yet I am a realist and think it may well be that e.g. Thales did not start running before the 13th month. |
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| Causality | Searle, J.R. | II 286 Searle s thesis: for our language causality is only relevant, by its influence on the brain. And those agents are required to cause the intentionality, including network and background. |
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| Names | Searle, J.R. | Staln I 172 Names/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: thesis: names have their referents directly, without mediating an intermediate sense. Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its referent one must assume the meaning of the name a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language. |
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| Language/Thinking | Searle, J.R. | V 32 Meaning/to mean / Searle: everything you can mean you can also say. |
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| Speech Act | Searle, J.R. | IV 251 Searle: speech acts are governed by constitutive rules that define the social institutions. V 29 Searle: speech is rule-governed behavior. VI 205 Speech act / Searle: The purpose of language is communication - its unity is the illocutionary speech act - VsChomsky: it s not about rules - S.Th. includes everything that used to be called semantics and pragmatics. |
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| Thinking | Sellars, W. | I 83 Thinking / semantics / language / thoughts / Sellars: mentalistic discourse (thoughts) is attributable to semantic speech. (Sellars per modified Rylean thesis that thoughts are a shorthand for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about linguistic or non-linguistic behavior). I 84 Thinking / language / tradition: Thoughts without word-presentations are possible - I 88 SellarsVstradition: categories of intentionality are semantically. |
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| Intersubjectivity | Sellars, W. | I 81 Intersubjectivity / SellarsVs: in an intersubjective language, there must be a Rylean language: which springs to a simple picture of the relationship of intersubjective speech and public objects. I 82 Carnap: the resources can be obtained from the vocabulary of formal logic and are therefore already included in our Rylean language. (SellarsVs). |
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| psycholog. Nominalsm. | Sellars, W. | Rorty VI 183 psychological nominalism / Sellars: his thesis paves the way: if anyone can make use of semantic concepts, he already has everything necessary to intentional speech. > Intentionality. I 56 psychological nominalism / Sellars: Thesis: there is no consciousness of a logical space that precedes the acquisition of language and would be independent of it. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rylean ancestors | Sellars, W. | Pauen I 91 Sellars / Pauen: Thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. Question: how could such a deep theory emerge, if we do not know the mental states from our own experience (aw postulated by folk psychology)? Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: language and ideas relate solely to behavioral dispositions and verbal utterances. Step 2: attribution of inner states, i.e. "thoughts". |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Sprache | Sellars, W. | Rorty VI 184 Language / World / Sellars / Rorty: everything is linguistically - VsSellars: the most common objection: small children and dogs also have pain without being able to talk about it. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Science | Sellars, W. | I 70 Science / everyday language / Sellars: the scientific discourse is only a continuation of the everyday language. |
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| Theory | Sneed, J. | Schurz I 18 Theory / "non statement view" / Sneed 1971/Suppes 1957/Schurz: Thesis: scientific theories should be constructed for systems as statements of a formal language better than set-theoretic model systems. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Compositionality | Soames, Sc. | Schiffer I 217 Compositional Semantics/understanding/explanation/Scott Soames/Schiffer: (Soames 1987) Thesis: compositional semantics is not used to explain speech understanding, yet natural languages have a compositional semantics: Language Mastery/Soames: one should not look at semantics to explain semantic competence. Instead, compositional semantics is needed to explain the representational character of the language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is used to represent the world. Sentences systematically encode information that characterizes the world so and so. We need compositional semantics for the analysis of the principles of this coding. SchifferVsSoames: instead I introduced the expression potential. One could assume that a finitely formable theory should be able to formulate theorems for the attribution of AP to each sentence of the language. But wouldn't that be a compositional theory? |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Causal Theory | Stalnaker, R. | I 208 Causal theory / belief / Stalnaker: Assumed we have a causal theory of belief: Thesis: the idea that I express by the name "Cicero," is about Cicero by facts about the role of Cicero. In the causal explanation of the fact that I have the thought. So we apply the theory so directly on the thoughts and indirectly to the language. |
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| necessary a post | Stalnaker, R. | I 18 necessary a posteriori / Jackson is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it arises from a semantics randomly describing natural languages: a mechanism for determining of reference - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of the metasemantics, the reference-fixing mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the presentation, why internal states can be representational at all - there could be languages that have no specific reference that says to a certain extent, the way things are, without a posteriori necessary truths. |
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| Reductionism | Stalnaker, R. | I 88 Reductionism / reduction / tradition / Stalnaker: semantically: reduction is a relation between theories or languages I 89 One theory is reducible to another if all of its expressions are defined by expressions of the other. Furthermore - given the definitions - the reduced theory is derivable from the reducing theory. |
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| Two Dimensional Sem. | Stalnaker, R. | I 201/202 Two-Dimensional Semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: Thesis: I think this shows something about the nature of mental representation and not just about the contingent functioning of languages. I 204 Two-dimensional Frame/Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret it. a) semantic, b) metasemantic. Thesis: with this distinction I would like to reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. Thus the problem of intentionality can be solved. |
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| Ontology | Strawson, P.F. | Newen / Schrenk I 149 Ontology / language / Strawson: Per thing - property - ontology is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form. I 150 Space / time / Strawson: are tools for distinguishing different cases. |
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| Person | Strawson, P.F. | Graeser I 224 Person / Strawson (individuals): particulars are fundamental in our system of concepts. Special particulars: people. Person: not "ensouled body" nor "embodied soul". Strawson / Graeser: does not ask for the ultimate constituents of the universe and does not search for new truths concerning the reality. He elicited the conditions of our speech about the world. ((s) > language / thinking). Individual things have priority of processes or events that we could not identify without them. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Redundancy | Strawson, P.F. | Horwich I 213 True/Everyday Language/Redundancy/Strawson: (Analysis Vol 9, No. 6) thesis "true" and "false": all their non-technical functions can be performed without the use of "true" and "false" themselves. You can make a statement without using "true". CohenVsStrawson: there is at least one important non-technical function where this is not possible. I 213 True/Everyday Language/Redundancy Theory/Strawson: Thesis: For example "It is true that the sun shines": here we can replace "It is true" by performative expressions like "I confirm", "I admit", "I guarantee", etc. without a special change of meaning. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Theory | Suppes, P. | I 18 Theory / "non statement view" / Sneed 1971/Suppes 1957/Schurz: Thesis: scientific theories are better constructed as set-theoretic models than systems of a formal language. |
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| Representation | Taylor, Ch. | Rorty VI 139 Language / representation / Rorty: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "coping". (Taylor: "Dealing"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | Taylor, Ch. | Rorty VI ~126 Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "internal framework": a concept of truth that is given by our non-representational approach to the available. Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational dealing" with something suspect. RortyVsSellars: besides, language represents nothing at all! (Sellars pro representation (!!)). VI 140 Taylor: Heidegger ("Zuhanden") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: these two authors hold on to images and representations, no matter how they are conveyed. |
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| Behaviorism | Tugendhat, E. | I 216 Behaviorism: thesis that our language is a signal language and only understood according to the the pattern of conditioned reactions. Their rules are conditional rules. |
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| Vs Katz | Vendler, Z. | I 262 Katz: we take only those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: I see no need for this in the light of my above statements. |
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| Concepts | Wiggins, D. | EMD II 286 Term / language / WigginsVsQuine: Quine s attitude is not entirely clear here. Thesis: Only a conscious system of distinctions in favor of substance terms and against random formations could explain the certainty of our culture treated with issues of identity in time or durability. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: Thesis: the world has the same form as language has. Without the world itself being somehow linguistic in its structure, i.e. more reflection. Sellars II 318 Def Picture/Tractatus: Relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. Hintikka I 131 Hintikka Thesis: the "picture theory" is in reality an anticipation of the first condition of Tarski's truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 136 Picture Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka Thesis: Wittgenstein's picture conception is little more than a particularly vivid formulation of the same idea, which also underlies the usual truth condition for atomic propositions. VII 72 Model/Tractatus/Tetens: For example, the relationship between record and score is a model for the picture relationship between language and reality. This is the thesis of the picture theory by Tractatus. ((s) So not the score as a model of the symphony, but a model of a relation or an isomorphism). |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Wittgenstein | I 273 ff Stegmüller: Thesis: we should not pay attention to the meaning of our expressions, but to the way in which they are used. Hintikka: according to this (allegedly Wittgenstein's) view, it is not the "vertical" connections through which our words are linked to objects and our sentences to facts that matter, but "horizontal" connections between different traits within the framework of our language games. Wittgenstein is thus assumed that understanding language is nothing other than understanding the role. |
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| Wittgenstein | I 19 Limit/Language/Wittgenstein: is shown in the impossibility of describing a fact without repeating the corresponding sentence. - Hintikka: Thesis: the relativity of language (that reality cannot be expressed independently of language). I 22 The relationship between name and object cannot be expressed linguistically - not even the concept of existence - that can only be shown by using the name. I 19 Hintikka: mutual implication between the thesis of the unrecognizability of the objects regarded as things per se and the thesis of the unrecognizability of these aspirations and the framework concerned. I 88 Limit/Language/World/Wittgenstein: ...but that would anticipate what the language (which I understand alone) would be like if it were different. And that would violate the thesis of the inexpressibility of semantics. Now we can understand why Wittgenstein puts the world and life into one: "The world and life are one". (5.621). |
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| Wittgenstein | I 55 Thesis of the indestructibility of the objects: "Something red can be destroyed, but red can not be destroyed." § 57 I 72 The thesis of inexpressibility means that any authorized individual constant introcuces existence assumptions into the logical language. |
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| Wittgenstein | Dum III 139 Language holism / holism of language / Wittenstein / Dummett: e.g. "Moses": Wittgenstein s thesis: each single attribute may be omitted if not all disappear. |
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| Wittgenstein | I 340 Intersubjectivity / Wittgenstein: Hintikka thesis: Wittgenstein does not want to use the intersubjective communicability of language as a premise of his refutation of the phenomenological (solipsistic) language. |
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| Wittgenstein | Sellars II 317 Correspondence/Tractatus/Sellars: this is the 2nd type of "correspondence" one is looking for: Thesis: that elementary statements are configurations of proper names that represent configurations of objects. This means that statements are not lists of words. ... ultimately boils down to the thesis that any statement that contains at least one reference expression and one descriptive expression can be translated into an (invented) understandable language that contains equivalents for reference expressions, but not for descriptive expressions, but a special spelling of the reference expressions into which the descriptive expressions can be translated. Once again, the essence of "illustration" has proven to be a translation! |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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| Wittgenstein | I 183 later than in 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules. |
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| Wittgenstein | I 15 Inexpressibility of semantics. (IS) thesis: If the conception of language as a universal medium is true, any logical semantics (model theory) is impossible. |
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| Wittgenstein | I 15 1. Language as a universal medium: (SUM) Thesis: it is not possible to view language from outside. Meaning relations must be assumed. 2. Inexpressibility of semantics. (UDS) Thesis: if the view of language as a universal medium is correct, any logical semantics (model theory) is impossible. I 17 Language as universal medium/SUM/Hintikka: questions any model theory - representative: Frege, Quine, Wittgenstein: Thesis: semantics cannot be systematic - against: "language as calculus": metasemantic questions - semantics applied systematically. III 135 Language/Tractatus/Flor: Thesis: all languages that can be spoken and understood (German, Chinese, etc.) have the same logical structure and this structure can be found in the Principia Mathematica(1). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
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| Wittgenstein | I 301 ff Widerspiegelungs idea / reflection / Wittgenstein / Hintikka: in a sense, a modal notion. The synthesis of all the allowable combinations of symbols ("names") in a logically correct language is consistent with all the possible structures of entities (objects) in the world. |
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| Meaning Theory | Wright, Cr. | EMD II 247 Zus: Meaning Theory/Wright: we probably cannot associate the concept of what a meaning theory should do with the concept that the investigation is something that someone who speaks the language can do better (from within) than someone who observes us. There are no relevant preliminary considerations that we could rely on to properly explain a term. What do we have ahead of those who observe us? (s) Why should one be able to distinguish colours better in English than in German? Wright: Thesis: the methodical approach must be completely behavioristic and antireflexive! |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 theses of an allied field of specialization.
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Entry |
Reference |
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| Reference | Allen, C. | Perler / Wild I 334 Reference / Language / Allen: Reference is a fundamental functional property of language WittgensteinVsAugustinus / PU: but not the only one! (Eg Block World). Reference is older than other peculiarities of the language. I 345 Reference / Allen: reference to behaviors is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more fundamental than reference to objects. |
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| Language/Thinking | Brentano, F. | Chisholm II 217 Language/Thinking/Brentano: the study of language is subordinated to the study of the mind. It is the language that will be judged by our insights about thinking. II 253 Science/Language/Brentano/Hedwig: thesis: we may think with Copernicus, however, speak with Ptolemy. E.g. rising of the sun. II 263 Language/Thinking/Brentano: question whether words can be explained by words (> hermeneutic circle). Thesis: neither the clarification of equivocations nor the goal of linguistic precision can be reached by the language itself. "But in explanations of objects themselves, the basis for understanding all speeches is won. The objects offer a comparison and can help detect a common general term. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Everyday Language | Derrida, J. | Habermas I 239 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are equally poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference to literary texts, therefore the same analysability. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Truth | Friedman, M. | Horwich I 498 Truth / FriedmanVsDeflationsm: can not be shelved so: the disquotation scheme alone does not show the use of language. Compositionality / T-theory / Friedman: Thesis: truth theory requires a compositional meaning theory. Truth / Deflationism / M. Williams: That is not to say that a richer (substantial) T-phrase is required. This shows the case of Davidson. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Understanding | Gadamer, G. | Graeser I 166 Gadamer: Thesis: "Being that can be understood is language". DavidsonVsGadamer / Graeser: utterances are understood and these phrases have become objects. In Gadamer historical reconstructions and intellectual links stand in the place of systematics. Truth and Method: "How is understanding possible?". Rorty II 125 Gadamer’s thesis: only linguistic can be understood. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Colours | Harrison, B. | Peacocke I 44 Colors / Bernard Harrison: Thesis: colors have no "natural names" (not naturally nameables "). Colors are defined as certain objects which are not subject to our language conventions. Peacocke: the perception theorists in contrast treated colors as "naturally nameable". Colors / Harrison: thesis: we put some shades firmly as basic colors and obtain all the other colors on it as more or less similar. That is to defend his view that colors are not to be named by "natural names". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Grammar | Jespersen, O. | Lyons II 137 Jespersen: thesis: there are universal grammatical categories (tradition). Example - "parts of speech", "Tempus" - "Mode", etc.) (see below, it is the question of whether they exist at all). Formal Grammar / Lyons: does not rule out that these universal grammatical categories do not exist. The structure of each language will be described individually. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Necessity | Leibniz, G.W. | Staln I 169 Def necessity / Leibniz: truth in all possible worlds. Stalnaker: even that is no ontological thesis, but the attempt to create a theoretical language for modal discourse. |
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| Appearance | Lewis, C.I. | I XV Sellars Appearance / C.I.. Lewis: thesis: postulates the existence of an expressive language that expresses the way how something appears, and maintains no objective reality of what appears, or raises doubts. |
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| Metalanguage | Parsons, Ch. | Putnam II 232 Charles Parsons: These: Aussage über WW in der jeweils höherer Sprache sei ein Sprechakt "sui generis" - II 234 PutnamVs: genausowenig sui generis wie Satz in roter Tinte |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Language | Whorf, B. | Feyerabend I 295 Whorf/Feyerabend: (von Bacon vorweggenommen): These: Sprachen und die mit ihnen verbundenen Verhaltensmuster sind nicht bloß Mittel zur Beschreibung von Ereignissen (Tatsachen), sondern konstituieren auch Ereignisse (Tatsachen). Whorf/Feyerabend: These das »linguistische Hintergrundsystem« (Grammatik) in jeder Sprache ist nicht bloß ein produktives System zur Formulierung von Gedanken, sondern formt selbst die Gedanken. Newen/Schrenk I 148 Sapir-Whorf-These/Newen/Schrenk: findet sich schon bei Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literatur: 11-3a, Bd IV, S. 27). These: Sprecher mit verschiedenen Wortschatz und vor allem unterschiedlicher Grammatik müssen ganz anders über die Welt denken als andere. Bsp Hopi-Sprache: hat nur Wörter für "Sohn" und "Tochter". Problem: "Onkel" und "Großvater" sind nur indirekt charakterisierbar. Es sieht so aus, als würden beide nicht hinsichtlich ihrer Verwandtschaft unterschieden. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
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