Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Content | Sellars | I XXXVII Content/Sellars: There is a difference of descriptive and propositional content of experience. >Propositional content. Def Descriptive content/Sellars: what is responsible for ensuring that anyone who sees something red, or something that just seems red, will respond with the same words. Common content/Sellars: The common descriptive content of experiences could be determined, by saying that both were experiences of seeing a red object when their common propositional content were true. >Language community. I 20 Data: data are empirical. Content/Sellars: consists in the theoretical entities. ((s) "Theoretical entities" here are not as in most other contexts unobservables like elementary particles. For Sellars' Psychological Nominalism objects are not perceivable as objects unless our concepts are formed.) >Consciousness/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, cf. >Theoretical entities. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Cultural Differences | Lexical Studies | Corr I 388 Personality traits/lexical studies/cultural differences/Saucier: studies of most languages of European origin (plus those in Turkish, Korean and Chinese) have produced factors corresponding to Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Although this structure was not observed in Filipino, French, Greek or Maasai studies, it appears readily in a sub-set of languages that is larger than the sub-set that yields the >Big Five. Among English adjectives, this structure was as robust across variable selections as were one- and two-factor structures (Saucier 1997)(1). But studies of English type-nouns (Saucier 2003b(2)) and of other inclusive selections of variables (Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005;(3) Saucier, Ole-Kotikash and Payne 2006)(4) failed to find it. Lexical studies in Slavic and Germanic languages (including English) have been quite supportive of the Big Five, and so has a study in Turkish. But other studies (e.g., Di Blas and Forzi 1998(5); Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005(3); Szirmák and De Raad 1994)(6) have found no clear counterpart to the Intellect factor in five-factor solutions. None of these analyses has found the Big Five in a five-factor solution. The appearance of the Big Five is clearly contingent upon the variable-selection procedure, and thus on the operational definition of personality. Corr I 389 Six factors: Ashton, Lee, Perugini et al. (2004)(7) have presented evidence that many of the lexical studies conducted to date yield a consistent pattern in six factor solutions: six factors that can be labelled as Extraversion, Emotionality, Agreeableness, Honesty/Humility, Conscientiousness and Openness. Although the structural pattern was first detected in studies of Korean (Hahn, Lee and Ashton 1999)(8) and French (Boies, Lee, Ashton et al. 2001)(9), it has appeared to a recognizable degree also in Dutch, German, Hungarian, Italian and Polish. Seven factors: seven-factor solution (Goldberg and Somer 2000(10); Saucier 1997(1); Tellegen and Waller 1987)(11). Of the two additional factors in these studies, one was found in all three: ‘Negative Valence’ (NV) is a factor emphasizing attributes with extremely low desirability and endorsement rates and with descriptive content involving morality/depravity, dangerousness, worthlessness, peculiarity and stupidity (cf., Benet-Martínez and Waller 2002)(12). A core content theme seems to be Noxious Violativeness – attributes reflecting a tendency to harmfully violate the rights of others, corresponding in many ways to contemporary definitions of antisocial personality disorder (Saucier 2007). Corr I 390 A lexical study of the language with the largest number of native speakers (Chinese) generated seven emic factors with some resemblance to this structure (Zhou, Saucier, Gao and Liu in press). The seven factors include Negative Valence (or Noxious Violativeness), Conscientiousness, Intellect, Gregariousness, Self-Assurance, Even Temper and Concern for Others (versus Egotism). A comparison of seven-factor solutions from numerous studies indicates that the first six of these are particularly recurrent across studies. 1. Saucier, G. 1997. Effects of variable selection on the factor structure of person descriptors, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73: 1296–1312 2. Saucier, G. 2003b. Factor structure of English-language personality type-nouns, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85: 695–708 3. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 856–75 4. Saucier, G., Ole-Kotikash, L. and Payne, D. L. 2006. The structure of personality and character attributes in the language of the Maasai. Unpublished report. University of Oregon 5, Di Blas, L. and Forzi, M. 1998. An alternative taxonomic study of personality descriptors in the Italian language, European Journal of Personality 12: 75–101 6. Szirmák, Z. and De Raad, B. 1994. Taxonomy and structure of Hungarian personality traits, European Journal of Personality 8: 95–118 7. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P. De Vries, R. E., Di Blas, L., Boies, K. and De Raad, B. 2004. A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives: solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 356–66 8. Hahn, D. W., Lee, K. and Ashton, M. C. 1999. A factor analysis of the most frequently used Korean personality trait adjectives, European Journal of Personality 13: 261–82 9. Boies, K., Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Pascal, S. and Nicol, A. A. M. 2001. The structure of the French personality lexicon, European Journal of Personality 15: 277–95 10. Goldberg, L. R. and Somer, O. 2000. The hierarchical structure of common Turkish person-descriptive adjectives, European Journal of Personality 14: 497–531 11. Tellegen, A. and Waller, N. G. 1987. Re-examining basic dimensions of natural language trait descriptors. Paper presented at the 95th annual convention of the American Psychological Association, August 1987 Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Experience | Sellars | McDowell I 163 Experience/Sellars/McDowell: experience is not possible without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system. >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars. Experience/experience history/Sellars: experience history not the result of impressions, but of phenomena. Phenomena/Sellars: phenomena are conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Beliefs/Sellars. --- I XXXVIII Sellars: Three possible experiences: 1. This is a red object, 2. The object appears to be red (maybe it is white in red light). 3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination is possible). >Appearance/Sellars. One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic: Armstrong, Dennett). Ambiguity: process or result of process: experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object. I 44 Fact/Sellars: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) >Appearance. But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names? I 44 Experience/Sellars: ambiguity: experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing. -However: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience. I 45 Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object. - Possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? >Sensations. - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas. - SellarsVs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Perception | Armstrong | Sellars I XXXVIII Def perception/Armstrong: "Nothing more than the acquisition of knowledge of individual facts about the world with the help of the senses" (1961)(1). Here is just as little talk about a descriptive content as with Dennett. SellarsVsArmstrong: this solution is unacceptable. It is not the same, whether one thinks merely something or if you see something and at the same time think! 1. D. M. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, London 1961, p. 112 |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Personality Traits | Lexical Studies | Corr I 388 Personality traits/lexical studies/cultural differences/Saucier: studies of most languages of European origin (plus those in Turkish, Korean and Chinese) have produced factors corresponding to Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Although this structure was not observed in Filipino, French, Greek or Maasai studies, it appears readily in a sub-set of languages that is larger than the sub-set that yields the >Big Five, >Personality/Traits, >Personality, >Agreeableness, >Openness, >Neuroticism, >Extraversion, >Conscientiousness. Among English adjectives, this structure was as robust across variable selections as were one- and two-factor structures (Saucier 1997)(1). But studies of English type-nouns (Saucier 2003b(2)) and of other inclusive selections of variables (Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005;(3) Saucier, Ole-Kotikash and Payne 2006)(4) failed to find it. Lexical studies in Slavic and Germanic languages (including English) have been quite supportive of the Big Five, and so has a study in Turkish. But other studies (e.g., Di Blas and Forzi 1998(5); Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005(3); Szirmák and De Raad 1994)(6) have found no clear counterpart to the Intellect factor in five-factor solutions. None of these analyses has found the Big Five in a five-factor solution. The appearance of the Big Five is clearly contingent upon the variable-selection procedure, and thus on the operational definition of personality. Corr I 389 Six factors: Ashton, Lee, Perugini et al. (2004)(7) have presented evidence that many of the lexical studies conducted to date yield a consistent pattern in six factor solutions: six factors that can be labelled as Extraversion, Emotionality, Agreeableness, Honesty/Humility, Conscientiousness and Openness. Although the structural pattern was first detected in studies of Korean (Hahn, Lee and Ashton 1999)(8) and French (Boies, Lee, Ashton et al. 2001)(9), it has appeared to a recognizable degree also in Dutch, German, Hungarian, Italian and Polish. Seven factors: seven-factor solution (Goldberg and Somer 2000(10); Saucier 1997(1); Tellegen and Waller 1987)(11). Of the two additional factors in these studies, one was found in all three: ‘Negative Valence’ (NV) is a factor emphasizing attributes with extremely low desirability and endorsement rates and with descriptive content involving morality/depravity, dangerousness, worthlessness, peculiarity and stupidity (cf., Benet-Martínez and Waller 2002)(12). A core content theme seems to be Noxious Violativeness – attributes reflecting a tendency to harmfully violate the rights of others, corresponding in many ways to contemporary definitions of antisocial personality disorder (Saucier 2007). Cor I 390 A lexical study of the language with the largest number of native speakers (Chinese) generated seven emic factors with some resemblance to this structure (Zhou, Saucier, Gao and Liu in press). The seven factors include Negative Valence (or Noxious Violativeness), Conscientiousness, Intellect, Gregariousness, Self-Assurance, Even Temper and Concern for Others (versus Egotism). A comparison of seven-factor solutions from numerous studies indicates that the first six of these are particularly recurrent across studies. 1. Saucier, G. 1997. Effects of variable selection on the factor structure of person descriptors, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73: 1296–1312 2. Saucier, G. 2003b. Factor structure of English-language personality type-nouns, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85: 695–708 3. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 856–75 4. Saucier, G., Ole-Kotikash, L. and Payne, D. L. 2006. The structure of personality and character attributes in the language of the Maasai. Unpublished report. University of Oregon 5, Di Blas, L. and Forzi, M. 1998. An alternative taxonomic study of personality descriptors in the Italian language, European Journal of Personality 12: 75–101 6. Szirmák, Z. and De Raad, B. 1994. Taxonomy and structure of Hungarian personality traits, European Journal of Personality 8: 95–118 7. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P. De Vries, R. E., Di Blas, L., Boies, K. and De Raad, B. 2004. A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives: solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 356–66 8. Hahn, D. W., Lee, K. and Ashton, M. C. 1999. A factor analysis of the most frequently used Korean personality trait adjectives, European Journal of Personality 13: 261–82 9. Boies, K., Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Pascal, S. and Nicol, A. A. M. 2001. The structure of the French personality lexicon, European Journal of Personality 15: 277–95 10. Goldberg, L. R. and Somer, O. 2000. The hierarchical structure of common Turkish person-descriptive adjectives, European Journal of Personality 14: 497–531 11. Tellegen, A. and Waller, N. G. 1987. Re-examining basic dimensions of natural language trait descriptors. Paper presented at the 95th annual convention of the American Psychological Association, August 1987 Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Proper Names | Jackson | Stalnaker I 211 Name/Reference/Jackson: For example, let us assume a language that excludes the reference determination of names. It would still have the power of expressing "to say to some extent how things are" Stalnaker: if there was such a thing, it would make sense to say that the reference determination is part of the descriptive content of names. >Descriptive content, >Reference. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Propositional Content | Sellars | I XXXVII Definition descriptive content/propositional content/Sellars: that which is responsible for ensuring that anyone who sees something red, reacts with "red". - Even if the object only appears red. The common descriptive content is what you say if the common propositional content was true. >Counterfactual conditional. ((s) Propositional content: truth value - Descriptive content: connected to behavior.) I 40 Propositional content/Sellars: E.g. that the object is red - common propositional content of a) seeing that the x is red b) that it seems like this would be red c) that it seems as if there is a red object. Sellars: on the other hand: descriptive content: affects the different extent of affirmation. >Content/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Reference | Searle | II 289 Reference/Searle: linguistic reference always comes from intellectual terms. >Intentionality. II 313f Names/meaning/reference/Searle: e.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter whatever his name is". Here, we are talking about the person who has been recognized by their contemporaries, e.g. exchanged spots: identification: "the spot which causes the experience". Variant forgetting: "the one I was previously able to identify as A". II 316 Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on >descriptive content, our names still refer to our domestic objects, when the perceptual situation is unchanged. SearleVsPutnam: causal self-referentiality is sufficient. >Twin earth. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Twin Earth | Searle | II 89 Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? Answer: qualitatively identical visual experiences. How to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on earth before, may fulfill the conditions. SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person. >First Person. ad II 255 Twin Earth/Putnam: the twin earth is ((s) not a different type of water (tradition)) but a different type of liquid. II 283 Self-reference/Searle: self-reference is shown, but not seen. Twin Earth: "this man" has a different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical. >Selfreference. Perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged. Self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired). >Sense/Frege, >Fregean Sense. II 316 Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects. SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough. >Reference. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armstrong, D. | Sellars Vs Armstrong, D. | I XXXVIII Def Perception/Armstrong. "Nothing more than the acquisition of knowledge of individual facts about the world by means of the senses" (1961). It is here not about a descriptive content just like with Dennett. I XXXIX Perception/thinking/SellarsVsArmstrong/SellarsVsDennett/Sellars: it is not the same, whether you merely think something or if you see something and at the same time think! Even if one accepts that the thoughts that come into play in the perception possess a particular content (Sellars pro) so it is hardly understandable how the addition of another conceptual article can compensate for the difference between seeing and mere thinking. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Causal Theory | Searle Vs Causal Theory | II 303 SearleVsCausal Theory: the causal chain is simply a characterization of parasitic cases from the outside standpoint. II 304 The descriptivist Theory allows a baptism at the beginning. Kripke's theory is merely a variant of descriptivist. The causal chain does not matter at all! The only chain that matters, is the passing of the intentional content! E.g. chain having ten members. No additional intentions, omniscient observer. But what he observed, are not the features that secure the reference! II 305 Reference is for Kripke only and solely secured by descriptive content! E.g. Miss 7 decides a change, consequently 8 9 and 10 do not speak about a mountain, but about a poodle. II 308 Causal theory: intentionality transmission in the chain is the very essential. Descriptivism: merely casual act. II 309 E.g. Suppose I only knew roughly about what "Structuralism" is, yet I could ask: "Are there any structuralists in France?", "Is Pierre structuralist?" Descriptivism: finds it implausible that only thing that will be passed in the communication chain, was the intention to speak on the same subject. In real life much more is passed on, among other things the type of a particular thing. II 310 Whether something is a mountain or a man, is even in the parasitic cases connected to the name. SearleVsKripke: E.g. I talk about Socrates' philosophy of mathematics, but bring everything up and think Socrates is the name of a number. "I believe that Socrates is not a prime number, but can be divided by 17". That meets Kripke causal theory, but I do not succeed to talk about Socrates. SearleVsKripke: its view has the absurd consequence that it does not contain any restrictions on what may turn out to be the name reference. E.g. Aristotle could be a bar stool in Joe's Pizza Place, 11957 in Hoboken. Even if it is a metaphysical de re necessity that Aristotle had these parents, this tells us nothing about how the name refers to these people and not to a bar stool. II 311 Descriptivism: adheres to the intentional content first stage, and considers the parasitic cases as less important. Causal theory: emphasizes the parasitic cases, especially if we are not directly aware of the objects. Cf. >causal theory of names, >causal theory of reference, >causal theory of knowledge. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Description Theory | Verschiedene Vs Description Theory | Stalnaker I 211 Def Causal Descriptivism/Terminology/Stalnaker: a description theory of names that incorporates the causal chain into the description that is the content of the name. Thus it also incorporates a stiffening operator that ensures that the identifiers for which the names are an abbreviation (>Russell) have wide range. Counter Position/VsDescriptivism/VsDescription Theory: causal theory of the reference. VsCausal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: moves the meta semantic Black Peter from the names to the common terms. We need to know how their reference is established. Jackson: For example, suppose we have a language in which the reference definition of names is excluded. It would still have the expressiveness "to a certain extent to say how things are". Stalnaker: if there was such a thing, it would make sense to say that the reference definition is part of the descriptive content of names. Possible Languages/Stalnaker: we can make up any semantics we want. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Frege, G. | Kripke Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell II 151 Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions). ((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.) Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter! Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects. Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect. Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres". Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre. Stalnaker I 172 Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent. a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language. I 174 Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues. a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names b) what circumstances lead to those semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language. Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time. a) why a name has these referents and b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content). Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways. a) as meaning b) as the way how the reference is determined. By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings. I 192 Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics") Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics? Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language. Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values. Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain. Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it. Similar to Kripke: Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies. KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things. Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words. I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to: Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language. E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker") Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents. Tugendhat I 440 KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Pragmatism | Geach Vs Pragmatism | I 431 Geach: the performative analyses of the use of "good" have run aground: because, for example, questions and commands cannot be embedded as premisses in well-formed conditionals. Brandom I 432 VsPragmatism: if the essential part of calling something good consisted in an action, and not saying something, it could not reasonably be said, for example, "If this is good, then you should do it." That it is possible shows that "good" has a descriptive content which survives the elimination of the force when embedded. VsPragmatism: it cannot distinguish the two meanings of truth assertions: freestanding and embedded. Otherwise he would have to conclude: someone who is set to "if it is true that p, then it is true that p", is then also set to "if I assert that p, then it is true that p". A variant of the naturalistic fallacy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Russell, B. | Searle Vs Russell, B. | V 122 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell went as far as to negate that a specific description could ever be used as reference! ((s) This is about fictions.) Description/fiction/SearleVsRussell: of course you can refer to literary figures. Condition: they must exist (in the literature). You cannot refer to the wife of Sherlock Holmes, because he was not married. V 129 Theory of descriptions/Russell/problem: e.g. "The man insulted me" means that one might assume that only one man exists in the universe. SearleVsRussell: Russell actually asserted something like this in the theory of descriptions. V 245 Names/descriptions/SearleVsRussell: from the supposed distinction between proper names and certain descriptions the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties is derived. V 131 Definite article/reference/SearleVsRussell: there is absolutely no use of the definite article, which implies in itself that only one object can be meant. V 132/133 Definite article: its function is rather to indicate that the speaker intends a singular reference. V 144 Proposition/Searle: only the expression in a particular context (circumstances) ensures the transmission of a proposition! SearleVsRussell: no class of logically proper names can exist at all (this, now, there). If their expressions gave no descriptive content (Russell). There is no way to establish a relation between the expression and the object. How could one explain that this term refers to that object? V 238 Searle: a propositional act can never be identical to the illocutionary act of the assertion, since a propositional act can never occur independently but only as part of an illocutionary act. SearleVsRussell: the attempt to equate the specific reference (propositional act) with the setting up of assertions (illocutionary act) was bound to fail. V 239 Because Russell used the formal notation, complete statements must be prepared for him, even if there is no object. V 240 But from the fact that a certain type of act can be carried out only under certain conditions, does not simply follow that implementation of such an act in itself already represents the assertion that these conditions were met. Searle: the command "Bring this to the King of France" is neither a statement nor does it contain one. (> E.g. "The present King of France is bald.") IV 113 Sense/Russell: e.g. pointless: "Four-pageness drinking postponement": SearleVsRussell: this is read by many authors as a metaphorical statement about the Quadripartite Agreement after WW2. But none of the words occurs here literally! |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Russell, B. | Donnellan Vs Russell, B. | I 18/19 DonnellanVsRussell: has not grasped the referential use, but placed it in a strange construct of "logically proper names". DonnellanVsStrawson: does not see the difference ref/att correctly and mixes the two. Referential/Attributive/Donnellan: varies even when it comes to the importance of the distinction: 1) Text: only pragmatic distinction, 2) later: "semantic significance". KripkeVsDonnellan: denies semantic ambiguity of the use of descriptions. Both can be grasped with the Russell’s analysis: sentences of the form "The F which is G is H" have the same truth conditions, they are true, if the only F that fulfils G is actually H. I 193 DonnellanVsRussell: his strict implication works at most with attributive use. (But he does note make the distinction). I 194 Def Description/Russell: affects an entity which only it fulfills. Donnellan: that is certainly applicable to both uses(!). Ref/Att/Donnellan: if both are not distinguished, the danger is that it must be assumed that the speaker would have to refer to something without knowing it. E.g. "Presidential candidate": we had no idea that it would be Goldwater. Nevertheless, "presidential candidate" would absurdly refer to Goldwater. Solution: DonnellanVsRussell: attributive use. I 205 Logical Proper Names/"This"/Russell: refer to something without attributing properties! (Donnellan pro) Donnellan: It could eb said that they refer to the thing itself, not to the thing under the condition that it has any special properties. DonnellanVsRussell: he believed that this is something that a description cannot do. But it does work with referential use. I 275 Theory of Descriptions/Reference/Existence/Russell/Donnellan: Attributed to himself as a merit to explain the reference to non-existent things without the need to bring the idea of non-existent references of singular terms into play. His fully developed theory of singular terms extended this to the of proper names. Philosophy of logical atomism: names as covert descriptions. I 275/276 Here, the theory "proper names in the strict logical sense" was introduced, which is rarely found in everyday speech. ((s) logical proper names: "this", etc.) DonnellanVsRussell: we want to try to make Russell’s attempt at a solution (which has not failed) redundant with the "historic explanation". (> like ZinK). I 281 Logical Proper Names/DonellanVsRussell: have no place in a correct theory of reference. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: Russell’s view is incorrect in terms of common singular terms: it is not true that common proper names always have a descriptive content. Question: does this mean that ordinary singular terms might be able to fulfill the function which according to Russell only logical proper names can have?. I 283 Descriptions/DonellanVsRussell: it seems absurd to deny that in E.g. Waverley that what is described by the description, i.e. Scott, is not "part" of the expressed proposition. Russell: was of the opinion that such statements are not really statements about the described or the reference of the name, that they do not really name the described thing! Only logical proper names could accomplish the feat of actually mentioning a certain particular. "About"/Reference/DonnellanVsRussell: Putting great emphasis on concepts such as "about" would lead us into marshy terrain. We should require no definition of "about"!. It would be a delicate task to show that such a statement is either not a statement in any sense of "about" about the described thing or that there is a clear sense of "about" by it being not. I 285/286 DonnellanVsRussell: For his theory he paid the price of giving up the natural use of singular terms. RussellVsVs: but with the "natural conception" we end up at the Meinong population explosion. Proper Names/Historical Explanation/DonnellanVsRussell: according to my theory names are no hidden descriptions. E.g. "Homer" is not an abbreviation for "The author of the Homeric poems". I 209 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Question: Does he refute Russell? No, in itself not! For methodological considerations, Russell’s theory is better than many thought. Nevertheless, it will probably fail in the end. I 222 Statement/Donnellan/VsRussell/Kripke: It’s not so clear that Donnellan refutes Russell. E.g. "Her husband is kind to her": had Donnellan flatly asserted that this is true iff. the lover is nice, without regard to the niceness of the husband (is perhaps also nice), he would have started a dispute with Russell. But he does not assert this! If we now asked "Is the statement is true?", Donnellan would elude us. Because if description is used referentially, it is unclear what is meant by "statement". If the statement is to be that the husband is nice, the problem is: to decide whether ref. or att. Referential: in this case, we would repeat the speech act wrongly, Attributive: we ourselves would be referring to someone, and we can only do that if we ourselves believe that it is the husband. I 232 DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Are the two really conflicting? I propose a test: Test: if you consider whether a particular linguistic phenomenon in English is a counterexample to an analysis, you should consider a hypothetical language that is similar to English, except that here the analysis is assumed to be correct. If the phenomenon in question also appears in the corresponding (hypothetical) community, the fact that it occurs in English cannot refute the hypothesis that the analysis for English is correct!. DonnellanVsRussell/Kripke: Test: would the phenomenon ref/att occur in different languages?. I 234 E.g. Sparkling Wine: speakers of the weaker and middle languages think (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are fulfilled. Weak: here, the apparatus seems to be entirely adequate. The semantic reference is the only object. Our intuitions are fully explained. Strong: Here, the phenomenon may occur as well. Even ironic use may be clear if the affected person drinks soda. I 235 These uses would become more common in the strong language (which is not English, of course), because the definite article is prohibited. This leads to an expansion of the speaker reference: If the speaker thinks an item to be fulfilling (Ex)(φ x u ψx), it is the speaker reference, then it may indeed be fulfilling or not. Middle: if speaker reference is applicable in the strong one, it is just as easily transferred to the middle one, because the speaker reference of "ψ(ixφ(x)" is then the thing that the speaker has in mind, which is the only one to fulfill φ(x) and about which he wants to announce that it ψ-s. Conclusion: because the phenomenon occurs in all languages, the fact that it occurs in English can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. Newen/Schrenk I 95 Def Attributive/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the view of the body of Schmidt ((s) In the absence of the person in question, no matter whether it is them or not, "Whoever ...".). Def referential/Donnellan/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "The murderer of Schmidt is insane" in the face of a wild rampaging man at court - while Schmidt comes through the door - ((s) in view of the man in question, no matter whether it’s him or not. "This one, whatever he did..."). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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