Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Animals Davidson V 130
Animal/Thinking/Beliefs/Davidson: is not without language, because it must be possible to think of the same thing and to discover error, belief about belief - different living beings need to share the same concept of truth. - (Baseline of triangulation). >Triangulation.
V 136
Thinking/Language/Animal/Davidson: the lack of language makes thought impossible in animals - SearleVsDavidson: we know that human children have consciousness long before they have language. >Animal language, >thinking without language.
V 139
Animal/Propositional Attitude/Thinking/Davidson: E.g. the dog believes his master is at home, but not that the bank manager is at home, even though they are the same person - Searle: according to this argument, there is no intentional state without a certain fact that coresponded to its propositional content - SearleVsDavidson: we do not need language to recognize an incorrect belief. >Gavagai.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Beliefs Avramides I 122
Concept/Instantiation/Davidson: a concept can be instantiated. (Realize, E.g. swimming) without having the concept. - Davidson: but not with convictions.
I 122f
Conviction/Belief/Davidson: Condition. Awareness of the distinction subjective/objective (because of the necessary ability to be surprised).
I 123
Bennett/AvramidesVsDavidson: in animals also learning ability (= distinction subjective/objective) instead of language ability. - DavidsonVsVs: this is about properties of concepts, not beings. - Davidson: pro conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. - Therefore, no thinking without language.
I125
Reductionism/Antireductionism/Avramides: both are not separated by the dispute over ontological asymmetry, both could accept ontological symmetry like asymmetry - it is really about deep epistemic asymmetry.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Concepts Dennett II 13
Criteria/Recognition/Dennett: e.g. an animal is confused. Question: "what is the conceptual content of it being confused?"
II 57
Concepts/thinking//animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: a thought must consist of certain terms.
II 58
Question of the description, resp. the formulation: Example A bowl with meat, a bucket with food, "the tasty stuff that tastes like this and like that"... Translation/Ascription: could we e.g. in English, express exactly the thought that the dog thinks?
II 59
If not, then dogs can either not think at all, or their thoughts cannot be expressed at all, and so they lie outside our horizon. >Thinking without language.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Consciousness Dennett Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today.
Dennett II 23ff
Language/Animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought works without language but consciousness does work without thinking. >Thinking without language.
Rosenthal I 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what conscious is and what it is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
Metzinger I 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world. It relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.
Metzinger I 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of p-consciousness and a-consciousness. (phenonmenal consciousness and access-consciousness). >Consciousness/Block.
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,
I 114
control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: my criticism VsDennett from above applies to all.
Chalmers I 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in the brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Rosenthal I
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Grice Avramides I 26
Grice/Avramidis: should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism ->philosophy of the mind - reconciliation with Frege and Davidson.
I 42f
Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements - Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. - Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation before timeless! (of the standard meaning) - only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x" - 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... - 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker.
I 44
3rd Version: ... in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener - Vs: there are still many counterexamples.
I 45
GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person - Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. - Then no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning - the difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response.
I 46
E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing.
I 67
Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning - only for speaker-meaning - Meaning/Grice: to be found both outside language and within.
I 68
Timeless Meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x - also effect etc. but not practice (is not sufficient (may have second meaning), not necessary: (may have alternatives) - but " procedure in repertoire".
I 111
Reductionist Gricean/Loar: risks thinking without language.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Language Dennett I 269
Evolution/molecules/origin of life/Monod/Dennett: "language" of DNA and its "readers" have gone through a common evolution. Neither works alone.
I 474
Culture/Language/Dennett: for culture we need language, but language must first develop for its own reasons (because of the impossibility of foreseeing evolution).
I 516
Animal/Language: is it true, do dolphins and chimpanzees have some kind of language? So you can also call music and politics a kind of language.
I 517
Language/Intelligence/Dennett: to what extent does language contribute to intelligence? Which forms of thinking require language?
I 528
Language/Darwin: "Prerequisite for long trains of thought": Decisive for planning and persevering with long projects.
II 23/24
Consciousness/Language/Dennett: there is a view that certain beings may have consciousness, but for lack of language cannot communicate it to us. DennettVs: why do I think this is problematic? For example, the computer can calculate even if no printer is connected.
Our ideal way to get to know the spirit of others is language. It does not reach as far as you, but that is only a limitation of our knowledge, not a limitation of your mind.
II 185
Think/Human/Dennett: also we humans do not think many things, brush our teeth, tie our shoes, etc. We even answer questions without thinking. We call fleeting processes that last longer and gain more and more influence thoughts.
Some of the (previously existing) mental content gains more influence through language.
II 190
Language/thinking/Dennett: Thesis: there is no thinking without language.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Meaning Change Gärdenfors I 72
Meaning change/language/language development/historical/Gärdenfors: historical language development is difficult to explain: changes of meaning often occur fast and cannot be predicted. Still, we are trying to establish laws for meaning change, according to which some changes are more probable than others. If my thesis is true that pragmatics is to be put evolutionary before the semantics, certain cognitive functions have been defined before the formation of the language and are a condition for this. Language is then used to represent foreign beliefs and future goals. (See Gärdenfors 2003, 2004c; Gärdenfors et al. 2012). (1) (2) (3)

Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991). (4)
Terms/Dennett: Thesis: many terms can only be formed when language is already present to some extent, such as B inflation, month, heritage.
Terms/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our terms have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression.

(1) Gärdenfors, P. (2003). How Homo became Sapiens: On the evolution of thinking. Oxford.

(2) Gärdenfors, P. (2004c). Cooperation and the evolution of symbolic communication. In K. Oller & U. Griebel (Eds.) The evolution of communication systems (pp. 237-256).

(3) Gärdenfors et al. (2012). Gärdenfors, P. Brinck, L. & Osvath, M. (2012) Coevolution of cooperation, cognition and communication. In F. Stjernfelt, T. Deacon & T. Schilhab (Eds.) New perspectives of the symbolic species (pp. 193-222) Berlin.

(4) Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Reductionism Avramides I 96
Reductionism/Grice/Avramides: the real bone of contention between reductive and anti-reductive Griceans is the profound epistemic asymmetry - (that thoughts could be known without language) - both: Vs superficial eA: (Def Superficial Epistemic Asymmetry/Radical Interpetation/RI/Avramides: Thesis: that we can solve the problem of RI by understanding the foreign language through firstly learning the beliefs and intentions ((s) without language, because the psychological concepts are more fundamental).
I 96
DavidsonVsReductionism: of the semantic on the mental - without knowledge of the language beliefs cannot be verified. - The method of radical interpetation (RI) fails: you cannot first establish foreign beliefs and intentions.
I 112
Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny just that.
I 127f
Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: Thesis: the image of the reductionism of the objective mind is wrong - it goes back to its distinction between superficial and deep epistemic asymmetry. - I 130 Thesis: deep epistemic symmetry does not include ontological symmetry (despite Davidson) - the right (subjective) image of the mind requires the semantic and the psychological to be understood on the same level. -
I 128
Summary/Antireductionism/Avramides: is the right about how we can understand propositional attitudes - Reductionism: is right about what propositional attitudes are.
I 166
AvramidesVsReductionism: overlooks the fact that we have to characterize behavior semantically at some point. - Normal evidence are the only means to maintain the thesis that semantic and psychological concepts are on the same level. - I 168 The dispute over reductionism is about epistemic, not ontological questions.
I 166
Grice: Thesis: the psychological is an essential part of the semantic. - Reductionism/Avramides: denies that! - Thinking without language: if we attribute it, the semantic and the psychological may not be very interdependent. - Solution/AvramidesVsReductionism: behavior even with speechless creatures - this forms part of our concept of the psychological.
I 167
Manifestation/Avramides: it would be wrong to say that it must be more complex if the attributed thoughts are! - More complex is rather a linguistic behavior (>compositionality) - the reductive Gricean accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, the antireductionist: denies it. - VsReductionism: with that he has nothing more to do with interpretation and understanding.
Grasses I 128
AvramidesVsReductionism/Graeser: disregards the intimate connection between the psychological and the semantic and ultimately does nothing to contribute to the clarification of the mind and the thoughts. - ((s) Reductionism/(s): must even deny a connection, because it is suspended after the reduction.)

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Thinking Avramides I 104
Thinking/Language/Avramides: thesis: beings without language can have thoughts.
I 113
Thinking without Language/Avramides: then language mere vehicle for communication - Schiffer: the Gricean concepts allow for that, but contingently there are no such beings.
I 115
Thinking without Language/Reductionism/Avramides: there is only a problem for reductionism if the assertion is conceptually related to the semantic and psychological concepts - (and is not simply empirical) - Davidson: psychological concepts cannot be instantiated without semantic ones - SchifferVsDavidson: ditto, but they can be grasped without them! - Avramides: then the mere intuition that there can be no thinking without language is not sufficient for an antireductionism - Antireductionism: must assert that the assertion of the reductionist a deep epistemic dependence is unfounded.
I 142f
DummettVsIdealism/DummettVsLocke: wrong code concept of language for ideas - significance is not explained by thoughts - where the thoughts, in turn, are without reference to language - does not explain how thoughts themselves come to significance - then mother tongue like foreign language - Solution/Dummett: grasp = use: E.g. "square": sort out square things -then no representations to connect sentences with thoughts - understanding instead of association - AvramidesVsDummett: but allows no thinking without language.
I 15
Thinking/Dummett: can only be investigated through language (not through behavior) - AvramidesVsDummett: also through behavior.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Thinking Black II 94
Thinking/Black: not to be covered with "various linguistic clothes" - if a thought is supposed to be "too profound for words", we have to ignore it - Vs"Clothing Model": would lead to regarding all speaking as the encoding process and hearing as decoding.
II 97
Wrong: "Think before you speak" - Vs Cl.I.Lewis: meaning very well comes into existence through communication (otherwise Clothing Model) - however Black Thesis: thinking without language is possible - E.g. imagining chess positions.
II 98
Speech current does not need to be accompanied by a parallel stream of mental events - the spoken language needs no mental correlate to be meaningful.
II 100
Hardly possible to distinguish between thoughts and linguistic representation.
II 119
But: Language/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4.002 language disguises the thought - in a way that one cannot infer the shape of the clad thought from the outer shape of the dress.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Thinking Dennett II 58
Thinking/Animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts. Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ...
Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in English? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon.
II 157
Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment.
II 202
DennettVsRyle: notorious are his assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place.
II 190
Speech/Thinking/Dennett: no thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness. E.g. A dog has no concept of cat as an animal). >Thinking without language.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Thinking Lewis II 228
It may well be that our thinking has recourse to language, and that he who makes an assumption, accepted a corresponding sentence in the language. But it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as the acceptance of sentences. It is at least possible that man - like certain animals - believes some things without reason to accept certain propositions.
Circular: there is no one here, if it is at least possible to determine assumptions without recourse to certain phrases. >Animal language, >thinking without language.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Thinking Searle IV 251f
Language/Searle: thoughts, desires, feelings are not communicable without language.(1). >Thinking without language.
1. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Ed.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 251f

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Thinking Tomasello Gärdenfors I 72
Thinking without language/Tomasello/Gärdenfors: thesis: Thinking is more original than language: For example, to assume that language is a cause of human thinking is like the thesis that money is the cause of economics. (Tomasello 1999, p. 94). Gärdenfors: But even before the money came up, people were trading.
---
I 73
The language was also later added to communication and made it more efficient, just as money made trade more efficient.

Tomasello I
Michael Tomasello
Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation Frankfurt/M. 2011


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014
Thinking Gärdenfors I 72
Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991). Concepts/Dennett: Thesis: many concepts can only be formed when language is already present, such as B inflation, month, heritage.
Concepts/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our concepts have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression. GärdenforsVsDennett.
---
I 259
Deduction/Shirky/Gärdenfors: (Shirky, 2003): deductive reason is over-estimated by people who work on artificial intelligence and especially on the Semantic Web. GärdenforsVsDescartes: this over-estimation comes from Arthur Conan Doyle whose Sherlock Holmes stories have done more harm to the idea of how the human mind works than anything since Descartes.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Avramides, A. Grice Vs Avramides, A. Avramides I 164
GriceeansVsAvramides:
The analysis in question was that propositional attitudes are relations to sentences in the theory language. This allows seeing semantics and psychology as interdependent and simultaneously attribute thoughts to speechless beings. GriceansVsAvramides: would look at the matter the other way around: the apparent entailment of ontological asymmetry to conceptual asymmetry should be taken as evidence that this type of analysis of propositional attitudes is fundamentally wrong. Because if you can attribute thinking without language (Thw/oL) in a sensible way, then it would seem as if our psychological concepts are independent of semantic ones.
Avramides: No side has more than prima facie evidence.
Anti-reductionism: can claim conceptual symmetry without being limited to ontological symmetry. And it can accept thinking without language.

Grice I
H. Paul Grice
"Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice II
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle

Grice III
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice IV
H. Paul Grice
"Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Davidson, D. Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. Avramides I 115
Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently!
Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism.

Schiffer I 125
paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna.
Ambiguity:
E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna.
Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here).
Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!.
false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement.
I 126
A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief.
(3) Galileo believed that the earth moves
First, there are similarities:
1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same.
Galileo believed this. The earth moves.
2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative
3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation.
Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation.
B(x,u)
With an actual statement. E.g.
Galileo said something
If this is true, then
(Eu) S(Galileo,u)
I 127
But this does not work with Galileo believed something
(Eu) B(Galileo, u)
LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation.

Schiffer I 131
3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types.
possible solution:
The earth moves
Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement.
SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties.
Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept!
Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this".
Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here.
B. Second problem
paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle:
I 132
Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“.
singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar:
(P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x.
E.g. assumed I say:
Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things.
Alternative:
Ralph said that she was driving George's car.
Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George!
SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson:
(5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves.
From Davidson's theory follows that the second occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence
SchifferVsDavidson:
1. principle (P)
2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves."
I 133
3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct.
C. Third problem
paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of
(a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude)
as
(b) Sam PA that. flounders snore
cannot be correct because
(1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam
(2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude.
Schiffer: (1) seems correct.
Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it.
I 134
Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche
Donald: Tarski said this.
Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…).

Schiffer I 135
SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows!
I 136
(9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore.
Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements.
But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people!
Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge.
I 137
If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Dummett, M. Avramides Vs Dummett, M. Avra I 8
AvramidesVsDummett/AvramidesVsDavidson: the approach of the "theory makers" is too pessimistic, their pessimism is premature and unwarranted.
I 10
AvramidesVsDummett: his reasons are not convincing, the fact remains that he merely expresses a preference. The "knowing of a language" is therefore more complex than just knowing of meanings. Meaning/Dummett: What are the linguistic or non-linguistic means which we can use to determine the meaning of an expression without determining it explicitly? Or perhaps one should not ask at all how we express something in a situation, but rather how we should analyze sentences that include the concept of meaning.
AvramidesVsDummett: this might apply to other terms as well.
Analysis/Avramides: is a harmless means, if we meet Wisdoms demand. (And clearly capture the subject matter).
I 12
AvramidesVsDummett: he does not say why we should proceed like this in the case of the concept of knowledge (providing a theory that explains all knowledge of the actors (the users of the term)).
Avra I 143
Dummett/Avramides: shows three things: 1) Locke’s idealistic theory is not irreparable. It can be completed.
I 144
2) Dummett moves from the question "What associates a concept or idea with a word or phrase?" to the question: "What does it mean to understand a concept or idea?" AvramidesVsDummett: he could just as easily have started with both questions at the same time; if both are not answered, the ideational theory of meaning only wastes time.
3. AvramidesVsDummett: he has not developed his view of how we grasp a concept or an idea in a way that it also permits the attribution of thoughts to speechless beings. (Thw/oL).
I would therefore like to propose an extension.
Thinking without Language/Thw/oL/AvramidesVsDummett: if we allow Thw/oL (> See Dummett: W.James Lectures No. 8, pp. 48), how do we understand this kind of (speechless) thoughts? We could say, we attribute them through the behavior.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Grice, P.H. Loar Vs Grice, P.H. I 1
Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief.
Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist:
1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice).
LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical:
LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!)
2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on
I 2
Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning.
Belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics.
Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication:
Belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state.
Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects.
Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Loar, B. Avramides Vs Loar, B. Avramidis I 29
Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages ​​within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is ​​parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111
Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Reductionism Avramides Vs Reductionism Avra I 112
Avramides Reductionism: Reductionism/Avramides: can deny to be committed to attributing thinking without language to a being. Antireductionism/Avramides: might be uncomfortable with the implausible thesis (attribtuted to him) of having to deny thinking without language. Solution/Avramides: ontological asymmetry Vs ontological symmetry: Ontological asymmetry/Avramides: one could argue that my deep epistemic asymmetry (EA) contained ontological implications. If there is to be a deep EA, there would have to be an ontological one. This conditional could be interpreted as follows: Antireductionism: discards the antecedent and thus must reject the consequent. Therefore it is set to ontological symmetry. Reductionism: can assume ontological asymmetry. And with that he seems to be committed to epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVs: that only seems like that! Because the controversy between ReductionismVsAntireductionism runs above that of ontological SymmetryVsAsymmetry. Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. AvramidesVs: but the flaws in these arguments are obvious. Antireductionism/Avramides: (formal errors aside) how can he accept thinking without language? What exactly is the relationship between epistemic and ontological asymmetry? We will now examine that.
I 112
Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny it.
I 168
Reductionism/Grice/Epistemic/Ontological/Avramides: the controversy over reductionism or antireductionism is not about ontological but epistemological questions. The reductive follwer of Grice accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, Antireductionist: denies it. AvramidesVsReductionism: so he has nothing to do with interpretation and understanding anymore.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989