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The author or concept searched is found in the following 79 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Parsons | Habermas IV 301 Action Theory/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: Parson's initial question is how society is possible as an ordered relationship of actions. IV 302 Action Theory: starts with the orientations of those acting. The theory assumes a coordination of the actors System theory: examines the integration that goes through action orientations. The theory here assumes a functional networking of action sequences that remain latent, i.e. can extend beyond the orientation horizon of the participants. An orientation towards values and norms that is relevant in action theory is not constitutive for system integration. Habermas IV 303 Problems: 1) the theoretical framework for action is too narrow to develop a concept of society. 2) In system theory, the theory of action cannot be reinterpreted and assimilated without reservation. 3) HabermasVsParsons, Talcott: Parson's theory of modernity is too harmonizing because it does not have the means for a plausible explanation of pathological development patterns. >Modernism. Habermas IV 304 HabermasVsParsons: his theory of action is not complex enough to win a concept of society. >Action Theory/Habermas, >Society/Habermas. Solution/Parsons: at the transition from the level of the action to the level of the context of action, he must change the perspective and the terms. Problem: then it looks as if this transition on its own accord refers to the concept of society as a self-directed system. Solution/Habermas: with the term "lifeworld" as a complement to the term "communicative action", the reproduction of the lifeworld can already be analysed under various functional aspects. This makes a change of perspective superfluous. >Lifeworld, >Communicative Action. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Camps | Agamben | Brocker I 822 Camp/Agamben: the form (Agamben: "topology") that the political takes on through the introduction of the concept of "naked life" is that of the "camp": the camp "as a biopolitical paradigm of modernity" ("nomos of modernity" (1)) See State/Agamben, Life/Agamben. Brocker I 828 The camp appears as a hidden paradigm of the political space of modernism. This becomes understandable when one interprets politics as biopolitics, which is about "naked" life - in contrast to a policy that regards the citizen as a subject. The camp refers to political structures of the state of emergency (see Exception/Terminology/Agamben). As examples of "camps" Agamben cites reception camps for refugees or, for example, Guantanamo in Cuba: ultimately rooms without law. VsAgamben: In this context Agamben was accused of historical inadequacy: his thesis establishes a comparability between events that are not historically and ethically comparable. AgambenVsVs/Muhle: his thesis must be taken seriously as a structural thesis insofar as it refers to the fact that states of emergency and thus lawless spaces can also be produced within the borders of Western democracies that are consolidated under the rule of law, and thus here too naked life emerges as the original political subject. Brocker I 829 Camp/Agamben: it is about understanding the camp not as an "anomaly" of the past, but rather "as a hidden matrix, as nómos of the political space in which we still live today". (2) It should be emphasized here that the camps do not emerge from ordinary law, nor that they are a form of prison law, but that they are "derived from the state of emergency and martial law". The camp offers a "permanent spatial institution" (3) for the otherwise temporary state of emergency. 1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, s. 175. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. p. 178 Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Capitalism | Lash | Gaus I 272 Capitalism/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: (...) postmodernity is characterized in terms of social and economic developments that are already familiar from theorists of modernity. Characteristic in this respect is Lash and Urry's (1987)(1) theory of 'disorganized capitalism'. Their notion of disorganized capitalism refers to a series of social and - the replacement of economic developments 'Fordism' by 'post-Fordism', the internationalization of production and finance, the relative decline of manufacturing and rise of the service sector, and the related decline of the traditional working class and the rise of 'new middle classes'. Like other theorists of NSMs [New Social Movements], Lash and Urry associate these developments with the shift from the organized class politics of industrialized societies to the new politics of NSMs (1987(1): 311). Culture: An important further consequence of these economic, social and political developments is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: What differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). >Culture/Lash/Urry. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Communitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842(1): 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)(2) (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(3), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932(4): 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(5) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)(6). Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)(7), Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)(8), Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)(9), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)(10) - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)(12), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)(13), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)(14) also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983(9): xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(15) Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)(16). In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993(17): Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989(18) : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986(19); 1992(20)), Gewirth (1996)(21), and Mason (2000)(22) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992(23): 133; Friedman, 1992(24)). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Concepts | Lyotard | Sokal I 157 Concepts/Lyotard/BricmontVsLyotard/SokalVsLyotard/Sokal: Lyotard(1) often uses terms from physics in a wrong context. Lyotard, like other authors who do not come from the natural sciences, often uses terms from the macroscopic realm and mixes them with findings of quantum mechanics which they have heard of but which refer to the microscopic realm where other laws apply. For example "density of gases" (Lyotard 1993, p. 165), "fractal geometry", Sokal I 158 "Non-rerectifiable" (Lyotard 1993, S 172f): Lyotard uses the term in the sense of "non-rectifyable". SokalVsLyotard: in fact it is a property of certain non-differentiable curves. Sokal I 159 Chaos/Chaos Theory/SokalVsLyotard: the terms "linear" and "nonlinear" are used metaphorically by Lyotard and are applied and transferred prematurely. Sokal I 165 Linearity/Nonlinearity/Postmodernity/Sokal: Authors of so-called "postmodern science" have added other meanings to the terms "linear" and "nonlinear". Sokal I 166 It is not true that Newton had only linear equations. Sokal I 167 In contrast, the Schrödinger equation of quantum mechanics is absolutely linear. There are very difficult linear and very simple nonlinear problems. Contrary to popular belief, a non-linear system is not necessarily chaotic. >Chaos, >Quantum mechanics. For the correct use of the concepts of physics and mathematics see >Sokal/Bricmont, >Feynman, or >Thorne. 1. J. F. Lyotard, Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien, 1993. |
Lyo I J. F. Lyotard Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud Lyotard II J.F. Lyotard Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien 1993 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Conservative Revolution | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 397 Conservative Revolution/Political Philosophy/Bellamy/Jennings/Lassman: A notable feature of German political thought in the first half of the twentieth century is the way in which it questions the relationship between democracy and liberalism. The most extreme expression of this view is found in the writings of the legal scholar Carl Schmitt. >C. Schmitt. Schmitt's rejection of liberalism and democracy, along with the idea that the relationship between them is no more than historically contingent, belongs to a general pattern of anti-democratic thought that was vociferous in its opposition to the Weimar Republic (Schmitt, 1996(1); 1985(2); 1963(3)). >Liberalism, >Democracy >Parliamentarism. The thinkers of the 'Conservative Revolution', among whom Schmitt can be numbered as a prominent representative, were as one in their cultural pessimism, nationalist resentment following defeat in the war of 1914-18, opposition to democracy, liberalism, constitutionalism, and what they considered to be the soulless character of modernity. The opposition between 'the ideas of 1914' and the alien 'ideas of 1789' is a common theme. >Constitutionalism. Schmitt: Carl Schmitt expressed in an acute form the opposition to the liberal constitution of the Weimar Republic. His open and public support for the Nazi regime after it came to power in 1933 was the outcome of an attempt to resolve what was perceived to be a crisis in the tradition of Staatslehre. This problem coexisted with a mood of cultural despair common among the proponents of the Conservative Revolution. Rule of law: The significance of the crisis that Schmitt identified in legal theory was that it threatened to destroy the underpinnings of the liberal idea of the rule of law. As early as 1912, Schmitt had argued that the application of the law to particular cases is always, under current conditions, permeated by ambiguity. The implication, for Schmitt, is that the liberal view, maintained since the Enlightenment, that political power could be restrained by the rule of law was a fiction. The answer that Schmitt arrived at was that the only way in which this crisis of legal indeterminacy could be overcome was by rejecting the universalistic premises upon which the idea of the rule of law is based. Nation: Schmitt's response was to replace liberalism and the ideals of the Enlightenment with an image of a homogeneous nation (Volk) united by a common purpose. This account of the legal crisis is at one with Schmitt's (1985)(2) understanding of the decay of parliamentary democracy and the tension that exists between it and liberalism. >Nation, >People. Politics/state/Schmitt: (...) in his The Concept of the Political first published in 1927 Schmitt's starting point is a rejection of the unsatisfactory circularity of the conventional depiction of the conceptual relationship between the state and politics (Schmitt, 1985(2); 1996(1)). For Schmitt, before we can talk about politics we require an understanding of the defining characteristic of 'the political'. This is to be found in the antithesis between friend and enemy. Any genuine politics presupposes an understanding of 'the political' in this sense. 'The political' refers to the most extreme and intense antagonism in human relations. Who counts as 'the enemy' at any particular moment is based upon a decision made by a political state. Clearly, Gaus I 398 for Schmitt and other like-minded thinkers of the Conservative Revolution, this vision of 'the political' must be intensely hostile to liberalism in all of its forms. Liberalism is taken to be a clear example of the 'neutralizing' and 'depoliticizing' tendencies of the modern age. Furthermore, Schmitt (1996)(1) argues that the political state, as 'friend', must express the political unity of a people. Conservative Revolution: Political thinkers and philosophers such as Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Hans Freyer and Martin Heidegger combined their opposition to the politics of the Weimar Republic with a general distaste for the culture of the 'age of technology'. Schmitt and Heidegger, in particular, were supporters of the National Socialist dictatorship, although the precise nature and manner of that support have been the subject of seemingly endless debate. >M. Heidegger, >O. Spengler. 1. Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Schmitt, C. (1985) The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Schmitt, C. (1963) Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. Bellamy, Richard, Jennings, Jeremy and Lassman, Peter 2004. „Political Thought in Continental Europe during the Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Counter-Enlightenment | Habermas | IV 222 Counter-Enlightenment/Habermas: the counter-enlightenment that began with the French Revolution gave rise to a critique of modernity that has since branched out widely. (1) Their common denominator is the belief that the loss of meaning, anomie and alienation, that the pathologies of bourgeois, post-traditional society in general, can be traced back to the rationalisation of the lifeworld itself. This backward-looking critique is at first a critique of bourgeois culture. MarxismVsEnlightenment: the Marxist criticism of bourgeois society, on the other hand, starts with the circumstances of production because it accepts the rationalization of the lifeworld, but wants to explain the deformations of the rationalized lifeworld from conditions of material reproduction. This approach requires a theory that operates on a broader basic conceptual basis than that of the "lifeworld". >Enlightenment, >Lifeworld, >Bourgeoisie, >Society, >Culture. 1. While this tradition was represented by authors such as A. Gehlen, M. Heidegger, K. Lorenz, C. Schmitt between the wars, today it continues at a comparable level only in French poststructuralism. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Relativism | Winch | Habermas III 102 Cultural relativism/Relativism/Cultures/Rationality/Winch/Habermas: Winch Thesis (according to Habermas): every linguistically articulated world view and every cultural form of life is inhabitated by an incomparable concept of rationality. >Worldviews, >Rationality, >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Concepts, >Culture, >Cultural tradition. HabermasVsWinch: his arguments are not strong enough to consolidate this thesis, but they are strong enough to stand out against an uncritical self-interpretation of modernity, which is fixated on recognition and availability of outer nature, in contrast to the claim of universality justified in principle for that rationality which is expressed in modern understanding of the world. >Modernism, >Universalism. |
Winch I Peter Winch The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy 2012 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Tradition | Schütz | Habermas IV 202 Cultural tradition/tradition/protection/Habermas: Every step beyond the horizon of any situation makes an already known context accessible. What was "self-evident" until then is transformed into cultural knowledge that can be used to define situations and can be exposed to a text in communicative action.(1) Modernity/Habermas: only the modern understanding of the world is characterised by the fact that cultural tradition can be exposed to this test in its entire breadth and in a methodical way.(2) >Culture, >Cultural values, >Modernism, >Situations, >Method, >Theories. 1.A Schütz, Th. Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, Frankfurt 1979, S.29. 2.Ebenda S. 33 |
Schütz I Alfred Schütz Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt Wien 1932 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Culture | Lash | Gaus I 272 Culture/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: an important (...) consequence of [the] economic, social and political developments (>Capitalism/Lash/Urry) is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: what differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). Accordingly, philosophical postmodernism can be regarded as a symptom of broader cultural developments, which can, in their turn, be characterized in terms of postmodern philosophy. Postmodern culture is 'transgressive' both of intellectual boundaries between 'rational' and 'non-rational' and of aesthetic boundaries between 'high' and 'low' culture. It is suspicious of the distinction (so important for Habermas) between ethical, scientific and aesthetic discourse. Art/aura: Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Lash and Urry describe postmodern culture as 'post-auratic' (1987(1): 286): the work of art is no longer an eternal object of contemplative, almost religious reverence, just another constituent of an 'economy of pleasure', a means of distraction like any other. By implication, postmodern culture is particularly resistant to the discursive forms characteristic of modernity. Communication now occurs more through images, sounds and impulses than through the spoken or written word. Politics: Culture, finally, is an increasingly important medium of political struggle. It is the potential site for the imposition of an 'authoritarian populism' closely identified with the politics of the new right and Thatcherism. On the other hand, developments like the counterculture, popular music and film testify to the alternative possibility of an 'anti-authoritarian radical democracy'. Less clear from Lash and Urry's analysis are the details of this progressive alternative: they offer little guidance beyond the need for a 'genuine dialogue' between 'new social movements' and the old left (1987(1): 312). >Democracy/Laclau/Mouffe. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Culture | Urry | Gaus I 272 Culture/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: an important (...) consequence of [the] economic, social and political developments (>Capitalism/Lash/Urry) is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: what differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). Accordingly, philosophical postmodernism can be regarded as a symptom of broader cultural developments, which can, in their turn, be characterized in terms of postmodern philosophy. Postmodern culture is 'transgressive' both of intellectual boundaries between 'rational' and 'non-rational' and of aesthetic boundaries between 'high' and 'low' culture. It is suspicious of the distinction (so important for Habermas) between ethical, scientific and aesthetic discourse. Art/aura: Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Lash and Urry describe postmodern culture as 'post-auratic' (1987(1): 286): the work of art is no longer an eternal object of contemplative, almost religious reverence, just another constituent of an 'economy of pleasure', a means of distraction like any other. By implication, postmodern culture is particularly resistant to the discursive forms characteristic of modernity. Communication now occurs more through images, sounds and impulses than through the spoken or written word. Politics: Culture, finally, is an increasingly important medium of political struggle. It is the potential site for the imposition of an 'authoritarian populism' closely identified with the politics of the new right and Thatcherism. On the other hand, developments like the counterculture, popular music and film testify to the alternative possibility of an 'anti-authoritarian radical democracy'. Less clear from Lash and Urry's analysis are the details of this progressive alternative: they offer little guidance beyond the need for a 'genuine dialogue' between 'new social movements' and the old left (1987(1): 312). >Democracy/Laclau/Mouffe. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Discourse | Bohman | Gaus I 155 Discourse/Bohman: Discourse in political practices and in the public sphere seems to be directed to an implied audience or 'unseen gallery' and thus goes beyond 'sociable' interaction among friends (Gamson, 1992(1): 20). 1) Thus, discourse is communication directed to an indefinite audience, and an extension of face-to-face interaction that is made possible by technologies of writing, mass media or computer assisted communication and by formal political institutions (Thompson, 1995)(2). Second order coummuncation/reflexion: (...) discourse that has the property of being public is also reflexive or second-order communication; it must at least Gaus I 156 include the possibility of communication about the mode and assumptions of communication itself, for example, whether it is really public or not (Habermas, 1984)(3). This reflexivity is apparent especially when communication fails, when the assumptions that we make for practical purposes 'until further notice' in Garfinkel's (1969(4): 33) phrase are no longer successful in producing mutual understanding or co-ordination of action. In this case, speakers must make explicit the basis of communication itself by providing reasons and arguments that others might be able to accept. Just how far the demand for justification can be pursued by speakers and institutionalized in practices is subject to dispute among the proponents of various theories of discourse. Linguistics: For some, the linguistic medium makes reflexivity possible, while for others it imposes insuperable limits on reflection (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994)(5). >Discourse/Political Theory, >Discourse/Social sciences. 1. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Thompson, John (1995) The Media and Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Habermas, Jürgen (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I. Boston: Beacon. 4. Garfinkel, Harold (1969) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 5. Hoy, David and Thomas, McCarthy (1994) Critical Theory. London: Blackwell. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Disenchantment | Weber | Habermas III 293 Disenchantment/Worldviews/Religion/Modernity/Weber/Habermas: Weber observes enchantment primarily in the interaction between believers and God. The stronger this is designed as communication, Habermas III 294 the more strictly the individual can systematize his/her inner-worldly relations under the abstract aspects of morality. >Communication/Habermas. This means a) the preparation of an abstract concept of the world b) the differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c) the formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. >Norms, >Validity claims, >Ethics, >Abstraction, >World. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles. >Principles, >Tradition, >Cultural transmission. Habermas III 295 Cognitive dimension: here, the disenchanting of things and events is accompanied by a demythologization of the knowledge of the existing. All the more reason for individuals to systematize their relationships with the world, this time under the abstract aspects of a cosmological-metaphysical order whose laws govern all phenomena without exception. This means a) the preparation of a formal world concept for the existing as a whole with universals for the legal, space-time context of entities in general, (1) b) the differentiation of a purely theoretical attitude (out of touch with practice), c) the formation of an epistemic ego in general, which, free of affects, worldly interests, prejudices, etc., can surrender itself to the view of the existing.(2) >I, Ego, Self, >Rationality, >Rationalization. Habermas III 296 HabermasVsWeber: Weber has never analyzed in more detail the cognitive structures that emerge on the obstinate rationalization paths of religious and metaphysical worldviews. It is therefore not sufficiently clear that there is still another step between the results of world view rationalization and that world understanding that is "modern" in a specific sense. >Modernity, >Modernization, >Worldviews. Habermas III 297 Modernity/Habermas: Modernity has no reserves in ethics or science that would be exempt from the critical force of hypothetical thought. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. >Generalization, >Criticism. 1. A Koyré, Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum, Frankfurt 1969. 2. H. Blumenberg, Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung, Frankfurt 1974. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Education | Horkheimer | Habermas III 465 Education/Horkheimer/Habermas: in modernity, educational knowledge is separated from modern philosophy, which at the same time identifies itself ambiguously as an opponent and heir of religion with science and temporarily saves it into the scientific system. This educational knowledge is primarily justified by the fact that it continues traditions. >Cultural tradition, >Culture, >Society, cf. >Cultural relativism. Problem: the difficulty of traditionalism in education is that it has to conceal its own basis. For only those traditions must be conjured at all that are not certified by good reasons.(1) >Cultural values, >Values, cf. >Historiography. 1.M. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, Frankfurt 1967, S.32. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Environment | Morozov | I 260 Environment/Measuring/Morozov: It is a misunderstanding to take the decision to measure the consumption of resources such as water and electricity as a real reform of how WATER AND electricity enters our homes. The measurement itself should ideally only be a small step towards better behaviour. I 261 Problem: it is not possible to tell a good story about improvements that insist only on such measurements, without a picture of how water, gas and electricity come into our homes. Measuring does not deliver this story. >Technology, >Technocracy, >Progress. Environment/Resources/Anonymity/Maria Kaika/Morozov: anthropologist Maria Kaika writes: the supply of water, electricity and gas seems to come from nowhere (...) similarly our garbage disappears in some hole in the wall... (1) I 262 Resource Consumption/Veronica Strang: Thesis: measuring focuses us on private property ((s) of energy companies) and not on the population as a whole when it comes to the use of resources.(2) This also reinforces the isolation in which individuals have the feeling that the consumption of resources takes place in their own fortress.(3) Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City (Oxford: Psychology Press, 2005), 46. 2. Veronica Strang, The Meaning of Water (London: Berg, 2004), 228. 3. ibid. 230. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Ethics | Foucault | I 389ff Ethics/Foucault: outside of religious morality, the West has undoubtedly known only two forms of ethics: Early: Stoicism, epicureism, divided into the order of the world, and by discovering the principles, derived from it a law of wisdom. (Even still in the 18th century). >Ethics, >Ethics/Epicurus, >Stoicism, >Enleightenment. Modernity: does not formulate morality, inasmuch as every imperative rests within thought and its movement to grasp the unthought. (Sic). (Kant is the crucial point in the development). >Ethics/Kant. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ethics of Conviction | Weber | Habermas III 232 Ethic of conviction/Weber/Habermas: The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Ethics, >Morality, >Law, >Society, >Modernity, >Modernization. The ethics of conviction is universalistic and guided by principles. It removes the distinction between internal and external morals. This corresponds to a radical break with the traditionalism of legal tradition.(2) >Principles, >Tradition. Norms that refer to magic etc. are devalued. Norms are now regarded as mere conventions that are accessible to a hypothetical view and can be set positively. III 233 Norms, procedures and matters become the subject of rational discussion and profane decision making. This leads to the most important characteristics of rules of law: - Any right can become a statute - The law as a whole consists of a system of abstract rules, the administration of justice consists in the application of these rules to individual cases. - Civil servants are not personal rulers. The administration is also bound by rules of law and is conducted in accordance with principles that can be specified and are not disapproved of. - The people who obey the rule constituted by law are citizens and not subjects. They obey the law, not the officials. - Any measure of interference with freedom or property must be justified. (3) >Norms. Habermas III 314 Problem: the moral-practical rationality of ethics of conviction cannot itself be institutionalized in the society whose start it makes possible. Rather, it is replaced by a utilitarianism that owes its existence to an empirical reinterpretation of moral, namely the pseudomoral appreciation of procedural rationality, and no longer has an internal relationship to the moral sphere of value. >Purpose rationality. Solution/Weber: Competition with scientifically rationalized patterns of interpretation and life orders determines the fate of religion Habermas III 315 and ultimately shifts it into the irrational.(4) >Religion. Habermas III 318 Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands." (5) Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, p. 541. 2. Ibid. p. 543. 3. R. Bendix, Max Weber. Das Werk, München 1964, p. 320. 4. M. Weber (1963) p. 253 5. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, p.552. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Freedom | Hegel | Höffe I 332 Freedom/Hegel/Höffe: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. >State/Hegel, >Free Will. Free will: Hegel wants to show how the free will, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, gradually attains its full, alienation-absorbing reality. HegelVsKant: Hegel deviates significantly from (...) Kant, both in his understanding of freedom and law and in the way he argues. However, he shares the fundamental appreciation of the law and the state. Kant calls the law in eternal peace the "eyeball of God"(1) according to Hegel's basic lines it is "something sacred in the first place" (§ 30)(2). Freedom, with which the differences begin, he understands, however, not negatively as "being allowed to do" and "let do", but positively as "being with oneself in the other". Consequently, he is not satisfied with a generally acceptable freedom, but Höffe I 333 aims at the "existence of free will," where "existence" means as much as "full reality". Cf. >Dasein, >Law/Hegel, >Law/Kant. 1. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795, (Fn. zum Ersten Definitivartikel), 2. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Freedom | Rousseau | Höffe I 274 Freedom/Rousseau/Höffe: 1) The human "is" born free, freedom is therefore neither a mere idea nor an illusion, but a reality. Because this applies to "the" human being, it distinguishes the human being as a human being. Freedom is not just an epochal concept, characteristic of modernity. Rather, it belongs to the nature of humans, and thus has a greater anthropological rank. 2) Nevertheless, one (...) perceives the opposite everywhere. Although humans are free by birth, i.e. by "nature", one notices a fundamentally different reality: everywhere the human is in chains. 3) Here irritatingly [the thesis of an] equality of “un-freedom” [appears:] Höffe I 275 If humans are nevertheless to remain free, reality has only the status of potentiality (...). 4) [This status must be] actualized (...). There are two areas of responsibility for this, which Rousseau deals with in two different works, but which he rightly publishes systematically in the same year: education (Émile)(2) is responsible for the actual freedom of the individual alone and the community is responsible for the actual freedom of the individual in the political sphere (from the social contract)(1). État civil: With the conclusion of the social contract, people leave the state of nature and enter into the (civic) civil state (état civil). On the debit side [thereby] is the loss of natural freedom with its Höffe I 276 unlimited right to everything to which the request is directed. In return, for the loss of independence, everyone receives the freedom of a citizen with the property of everything he owns. The state of uncertainty is exchanged for a state of security. In place of the power to harm others, but also of the danger of being harmed by them, comes the law, which, thanks to the social contract, is characterized by an insurmountable power. >State, >Social contract, >Government, >Society, >Liberty. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 2. Rousseau, Emile, or On Education (Émile ou De l’éducation), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Grammar | Lyons | I 136 Grammar/Antiquity/Lyons: Greek: "Art of writing". Later: entire linguistics. Today: narrower: summarizes what was traditionally called "flexion" and "syntax". Flexion/Lyons: deals with the inner word structure Syntax/Lyons: deals with the way words combine into sentences. Grammar/Lyons: contains rules for linking words to sentences. Grammar/Modernity/Lyons: in contrast to traditional "content-related" grammar, is now often referred to as "formal". ((s) Group: Lyons pro formal grammar, partly VsChomsky). >Syntax. I 137 Intermediate position: some grammarians assume that there are non-linguistic categories that are independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: There are universal grammatical categories (tradition). Example "Speech parts" (parts of the speech), "tense", "mode" etc.). (It is a question of whether they even exist). Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that these universal grammatical categories do not exist. The structure of each language should be described individually. >Language, >Languages, >Everyday language. I 172 Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: Basic units: Word and phrase. Today: constituent grammar: subdivides finer. >Words, >Sentences, >Morphemes, >Phonemes. I 182 Formal grammar/Lyons: pro: one must not assume in advance that all languages have fixed forms for question, command, exclamation or assertion. Cf. >Speech acts, >Question, >Command, >Answer. "Universal Grammar"/Tradition/Lyons: was in fact based on the peculiarities of Latin and Greek. >Universal grammar, cf. >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| History | Benjamin | Bolz II 15 History/Benjamin: History is interwoven with aesthetics in Benjamin. >Aesthetics. History: There is no salvation in history, but salvation from history! Bolz II 34 History/Benjamin: history is antithetical to the "messianic intensity of the heart", but in such a way that "a force on its way is able to convey another force in the opposite direction." Conception of a secular "restitutio in integrum" which impresses on all natural aspects the features of eternal destruction. To this "total confinement" of Benjamin's work of nature on "world politics, whose method is called nihilism."(1) Bolz II 38 History/Benjamin: The past is unfinished in the eyes of the political theological view. As if the contemplative itself is the subject of the past. Awakening from the capitalist dream. The political and theological categories have left the flow of history frozen. In its interior, a crystalline constellation is formed. Ever-present in history is the scandal. There is no liberation for the humiliated and the insulted, but only salvation. Bolz II 76 History/Benjamin: "The dream we call the past things".(2) We must awaken from it. Modernity: modernity is nothing more than the history-blind form of dream of the time. >Modernism. Bolz II 77 BenjaminVsHistoricism: historicism has no concept of actuality. It tells the past and, at the same time, blocks the possibility of visualizing it as a past thing. No critical relationship to the present. Siegfried Giedion: "historicizing mask": characterization of interiors, exhibitions and museums of the 19th century. >Historicism, >Historiography, >Present, >Past. Question: "What is related to us"? Thus Benjamin seeks to establish a tactile relationship with the nineteenth century. Answer: "materialistic reflection on the next". Bolz II 79 History/Alois Riegl/Bolz: What could be called "borderline case history" should become the notion of necessity not in the course of history, but at the extreme. 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 204 2. Ebenda, Bd V, S. 491ff |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| History | Weber | Habermas III 228 History/Weber/Habermas: Weber separates the history of science from the history of modern living in its practical meaning. (1) He was only interested in the latter in his material works. He treats the history of science and technology as boundary conditions. >History, >Historiography, >Science, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Society, >Community, >Culture, >Cultural transmission. 1.M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, Bd. 2. S. 324. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Humans | Rousseau | Höffe I 274 Human/Rousseau/Höffe: Rousseau takes the people he says at the beginning(1), "how they are, and how the laws can be. As is reasonable for a theory of legitimation alone, he does not presuppose a new, better human - he designs him in the Emile. To him it depends solely on the legitimacy of the social order, in his opinion a "sacred right" (un droit sacré), which serves as the basis for all others. He does not give a clear answer to the obvious question of whether every social order can be considered legitimate or whether a criterion for better political conditions is needed. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau is read in both directions, as a conservative and as a revolutionary thinker. Community/State/Rousseau: The justification of a state is based on the irritating observation that the human is born free, but is everywhere in chains. On closer examination, this pathetic and incisive introductory thesis(1) contains four state theory assertions. >State, >Government, >Society. Freedom: 1) The human "is" born free; freedom, therefore, is neither a mere conception nor an illusion, but a reality. Because this applies to "the" human, it distinguishes the human as a human. Freedom is not merely an epochal concept, a characteristic of modernity. Rather, it belongs to the nature of humans, and thus has a greater, anthropological rank. 2) Nevertheless one (...) perceives the opposite everywhere. Although man is free by birth, therefore by "nature," one discovers a fundamentally different reality: everywhere he lies in chains. 3) [Here appears] irritatingly [the thesis of an] equality of “un-freedom”. Höffe I 275 If the human shall remain free nevertheless, reality has only the status of potentiality (...). 4) [This status must be] actualized (...). There are two areas of responsibility for this, which Rousseau deals with in two different works, but which he rightly publishes in the same year in a systematic way: education is responsible for the actual freedom of the individual alone (Émile)(2), the community is responsible for the actual freedom of the individual in the political sphere (From the Social Contract)(1). >Social contract. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 2. Rousseau, Emile, or on Education (Émile ou De l’éducation), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Imitation | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 78 Imitation/Policy of Russia/Krastev: The politics of imitation in post-communist Russia has unfolded in three distinct phases. >Imitation/Krastev. 1) Already in the 1990s, the electoral accountability of politicians to citizens was stage-managed and illusory. If the Yeltsin regime had been accountable, it would not have shelled the Supreme Soviet in 1993, stolen the 1996 election, carefully avoided putting the Gaidar economic reform programme to a popular vote, or allowed Russia's national wealth to be 'looted by a narrow group of future oligarchs with the complete consent of Boris Yeltsin and his team of "reformers.(1) Nevertheless, simulating democracy proved useful as a way for the Kremlin to reduce pressure from Western governments and NGOs (...). Vladislav Surkov: The multilayered political institutions which Russia had adopted from the West are sometimes seen as partly ritualistic and established for the sake of looking 'like everyone else,' so that the peculiarities of our political culture wouldn't draw too much attention from our neighbors, didn't irritate or frighten them. They are like a Sunday suit, put on when visiting others, while at home we dress as we do at home.(2) Krastev I 79 2) The second phase, which segued smoothly from the first, began around the turn of the millennium, when Putin acceded to the presidency. He continued to organize elections, but did so primarily to persuade Russian citizens that there were no viable alternatives to the current wielders of state power. 3) The third phase, which represents a more radical break, can be traced to 2011—12. At around that time, for reasons to be discussed, the Kremlin shifted to a strategy of selective mirroring or violent parody of Western foreign policy behaviour meant to expose the West's relative weakness in the face of Kremlin aggression and to erode the normative foundations of the American-led liberal world order. We are still in the third phase today. Krastev I 88 (...) while overly optimistic Westerners were right that Russia, after 1991, was predestined to imitate the West, they were wrong to assume that the mimic's desire to become like the model is the sole reason for imitation. Russia was undoubtedly weak, but its elites, except for a handful of socially isolated and unrepresentative liberals, were not prepared to accept the kind of moral subordination required from willing imitators of an acknowledged superior.(3) Many members of Russia's political elite, in fact, were dreaming secretly of revenge without regard to strategic gains. As German cultural historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch wrote in his elegant and insightful book The Culture of Defeat: 'Losers imitate winners almost by reflex.' But such imitation is not necessarily deferential: 'The borrower is not interested in the soul, the spirit, or the cultural identity of the creditor nation,' he argued.(4) Krastev I 89 Krastev: On the contrary, imitative politics can be essentially competitive and conflictual. Krastev I 124 Imitation/Policy of Russia/Krastev: Because hypocrisy helps us avoid conflict by hiding beliefs that are insulting and hurtful, attacks on hypocrisy often signal a desire to fight. This is what makes Russia's switch from simulation to mockery - from counterfeiting democratic accountability domestically to holding up a mirror to US misbehaviour internationally - so dangerous. The change was possible, presumably, only because the aspiration to become like the West was never genuinely internalized by powerful forces inside Russia. A good example of aggressive imitation is Putin's March 2014 speech announcing Russia's annexation of Crimea. This offcial address lifted whole passages from speeches by Western leaders justifying the dismantling of Serbian territory in Kosovo and applied them to the Crimean case.(5) Thus, what most Western observers took to be the first step in Putin's attempt to restore Moscow's empire was explicitly justified by the rhetoric of US President Woodrow Wilson extolling the fundamental right of popular self-determination. Krastev: By clothing its own violent actions in an idealistic rhetoric borrowed verbatim from the US, Moscow aims to unmask the Age of Imitation as an Age of Western Hypocrisy. Vaunted Western values, such as the self-determination of peoples, are simply Western interests in disguise. The implication is that the entire post-Second World War international system will collapse if other nations start imitating the real West. 1. Alexey Pushkov, ‘Russian Roulette’, National Interest (3 March 2008). 2. Vladislav Surkov, 'Putin's Lasting State', Russia Insider (13 February 2019); https://russia-insider.com/en/vladislav-surkovs-hugely-important-new- article-about-what-putinism-full-translation/ri26259 (13.08.2020) 3. According to the Russian-born historian of nationalism Leah Greenfeld every society importing foreign ideas and institutions has 'inevitably focused on the source of importation - an object of imitation by definition -and reacted to it. Because the model was superior to the imitator in the latter's own perception (its being a model implied that), and the contact more often than not served to emphasize the latter's inferiority, the reaction commonly assumed the form of ressentiment.' Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 15. 4. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (Metropolitan Books, 2013), pp. 33—4. 5. Bojana Barlovac, 'Putin Says Kosovo Precedent Justifies Crimea Secession', Balkan Insight (18 March 2014). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Individuals | Arendt | Brocker I 363 Individual/Arendt: The modern individual is incapable of referring to its fellow human beings. On the one hand, it is active for itself, but on the other hand, it works for the "progress" of mankind. It is driving a "development" that makes the question of the welfare of the community seem obsolete. >Progress, >Community, >Society, >Benefit, >Modernity. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Infrastructure | Sociology of Technology | Edwards I 42 Infrastructure/Sociology of technology/Edwards: In the 1980s and the 1990s, historians and sociologists of technology began studying the infrastructure phenomenon intensively. These researchers developed a “large technical systems” (LTS) approach to telephone, railroads, air traffic control, electric power, and many other major infrastructures.1 Around the same time, some scholars began to identify infrastructure as a key analytic category.2 The LTS school of thought generated new insights into questions of organizational, social, and historical change. Recently, investigators have applied this and related infrastructure-oriented approaches to urban development, European history, globalization, scientific “cyberinfrastructure,” and Internet studies.3 I 44 Systems/Edwards: No system or network can ever fulfill all the requirements users may have. Systems work well because of their limited scope, their relative coherence, and their centralized control. System builders try to expand by simply increasing their systems’ scale to reach more potential users, thereby excluding competitors. System builders seek to find or create well-defined niches that can be served by centrally designed and controlled systems, but users’ goals typically I 45 include functions that may be best served (for them) by linking separate systems. The fundamental dynamic of infrastructure development can thus be described as a perpetual oscillation between the desire for smooth, system-like behavior and the need to combine capabilities no single system can yet provide. For these reasons, in general infrastructures are not systems but networks or webs.4 1. 12. W. Bijker et al., The Social Construction of Technological Systems (MIT Press, 1987); W. E. Bijker and J. Law, eds., Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (MIT Press, 1992); P. Blomkvisk and A. Kaijser, eds., Den Konstruerade Världen: Tekniska System i Historiskt Perspektiv (Brutus Östlings, 1998); I. Braun and B. Joerges, Technik ohne Grenzen (Suhrkamp, 1994); O. Coutard, The Governance of Large Technical Systems (Routledge, 1999); O. Coutard et al., Sustaining Urban Networks: The Social Diffusion of Large Technical Systems (Routledge, 2004); A. Gras, Les Macro-Systèmes Techniques (Brutus Östlings, 1997); T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); T. P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (Pantheon Books, 1998); T. P. Hughes, Human-Built World: How to Think About Technology and Culture (University of Chicago Press, 2004); A. Kaijser, I Fädrens Spår: Den Svenske Infrastrukturens Historiska Utveckling och Framtida Utmaningar (Carlssons, 1994); T. R. La Porte, ed., Social Responses to Large Technical Systems: Control or Adaptation (Kluwer, 1991); R. Mayntz and T. P. Hughes, The Development of Large Technical Systems (Westview, 1988); J. Summerton, ed., Changing Large Technical Systems (Westview, 1994). 2. Star and Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure”; P. N. Edwards, “Y2K: Millennial Reflections on Computers as Infrastructure,” History and Technology 15 (1998): 7–; G. C. Bowker and S. L. Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences (MIT Press, 1999); Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity”; E. van der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal Change: A View From the Large Technical Systems Field,” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 16, no. 3 (2004): 395–. 3. Held et al., Global Transformations; S. Graham and S. Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition (Routledge, 2001); G. C. Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences (MIT Press, 2005); J. Schot et al., “Tensions of Europe: The Role of Technology in the Making of Europe,” special issue, History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005); P. N. Edwards et al., Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tensions, and Design (Deep Blue, 2007); E. van der Vleuten and A. Kaijser, eds., Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850–2000 (Science History Publications/USA, 2007). 4. Jackson, S. J., Edwards, P. N., Bowker, G. C., & Knobel, C. P. (2007). Understanding infrastructure: History, heuristics and cyberinfrastructure policy. First Monday, 12(6). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v12i6.1904 |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Innovation | Holmes | Krastev I 8 Innovation/post-communist countries/Krastev/Holmes: the prevailing cult Krastev I 9 of innovation, creativity and originality at the core of liberal modernity means that, even for the inhabitants of economically successful countries such as Poland, the project of adopting a Western model under Western supervision feels like a confession of having failed to escape Central Europe’s historical vassalage to foreign instructors and inquisitors. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Innovation | Krastev | Krastev I 8 Innovation/post-communist countries/Krastev: the prevailing cult Krastev I 9 of innovation, creativity and originality at the core of liberal modernity means that, even for the inhabitants of economically successful countries such as Poland, the project of adopting a Western model under Western supervision feels like a confession of having failed to escape Central Europe’s historical vassalage to foreign instructors and inquisitors. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Interpretation | Postmodernism | Gaus I 25 Interpretation/Postmodernism/Ball: The postmodern sensibility is not a single, stable thing. There are, to simplify somewhat, two main versions of postmodernist interpretation. One derives largely from Nietzsche and Foucault; the other, from Derrida. >Deconstruction/Derrida, >F. Nietzsche. A Foucauldian approach to interpretation seeks to expose and criticize the myriad ways in which human beings are ‘normalized’ or made into ‘subjects’, i.e. willing participants in their own subjugation (Foucault, 1980)(1). >M. Foucault. Thus a postmodernist perspective on the interpretation of texts typically focuses on the ways in which earlier thinkers (...) contributed ideas to the mentalité that paved the way for the creation and legitimation of the modern surveillance society. And conversely postmodernist interpreters look for earlier thinkers who challenged or questioned or undermined these ideas. This Foucauldian approach is well represented by William Connolly’s Political Theory and Modernity (1988)(2). Interpretation: A postmodernist rereading relocates and realigns earlier thinkers along altogether different axes. A postmodernist reading of the history of political thought not only exposes heretofore unsuspected villains, it also reveals heroes who have dared to resist the pressures and processes of ‘normalization’. Amongst the former are Hobbes and Rousseau. >Th. Hobbes, >J.-J. Rousseau. That the historical Rousseau was exceedingly critical of the historical Hobbes does not matter for a postmodernist reading. For we can now see them as birds of a feather, each having extended ‘the gaze’ ever more deeply into the inner recesses of the human psyche, thereby aiding and abetting the subjugation of modern men and women. BallVs: Whether this design was consciously formulated and put into play by the aristocratic French pornographer is, at best, doubtful; but like other postmodernist interpreters Connolly eschews any concern with such historical niceties as authorial intention. >W. Connolly. Gaus I 26 Truth/Postmodernism/Ball: Various criticisms can be levelled against a postmodernist perspective on interpretation. One is that we do sometimes wish, and legitimately so, to know whether something Marx or Mill said was true. We will not be helped by being told that true/false is a specious ‘binary’. >Truth values, >Bivalence, >Logic, >J. St. Mill, >K. Marx. More perniciously, with its emphasis on diverse, divergent and conflicting ‘readings’ or interpretations - there are allegedly no facts, only interpretation ‘all the way down’ - postmodernism is constitutionally unable to distinguish truth from falsehood and propaganda from fact. Cf. >False information, >Facts, >Truth, >Correctness. 1. Foucault, Michel 1980. Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon. 2. Conolly, W.E. 1988. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justification | Rousseau | Höffe I 274 Justification/Rousseau/Höffe: The justification of a state is based on the irritating observation that the human is born free, but is everywhere in chains. On closer examination, this pathetic and incisive introductory thesis(1) contains four state theory assertions. Freedom: 1) The human "is" born free; freedom, therefore, is neither a mere conception nor an illusion, but a reality. Because this applies to "the" human, it distinguishes humans as humans. Freedom is not merely an epochal concept, characteristic of modernity. Rather, it belongs to the nature of humans, and thus has a greater, anthropological rank. 2) Nevertheless one (...) perceives the opposite everywhere. Although humans are free by birth, therefore by "nature," one discovers a fundamentally different reality: everywhere he lies in chains. 3) [Here appears] irritatingly [the thesis of an] equality of “un-freedom”. Höffe I 275 If the human shall remain free nevertheless, reality has only the status of potentiality (...). 4) [This status must be] actualized (...). There are two areas of responsibility for this, which Rousseau deals with in two different works, but which he rightly publishes in the same year in a systematic way: education is responsible for the actual freedom of the individual alone (Émile)(2), the community is responsible for the actual freedom of the individual in the political sphere (From the Social Contract)(1). >Social contract, >Freedom. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 2. Rousseau, Emile, or on Education (Émile ou De l’éducation), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Law | Honneth | Brocker I 798 Law/Honneth: Following on from Hegel (see Law/Hegel), Honneth works out the sequence of stages of a productive continuation of the struggle for recognition in modernity within the legal sphere: the material content and the social scope of status as a legal person are expanded. Liberal freedom rights, in turn, result in successive political rights of participation and finally social welfare rights. (1) Thus, a social dynamic is inherent in the sphere of law, in which each stage of recognition that has been achieved generates new struggles for the fulfilment of as yet unfulfilled claims to equality and against forms of disregard, in particular structural forms of "deprivation of rights" (2), thus contributing to moral progress in social development. Problem: the moral potential of the sphere of law is also limited. Honneth follows Hegel by concluding from the self-contradictions a transition to a new level of recognition problems. (3) Problem: since in law "every person, as the bearer of the same claims, is equally respected, it ((s) the law) cannot serve precisely as a medium for respecting the particular life history of every individual". (4) 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 185-195 2. Ibid. p. 216 3. Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, Berlin 2010, p. 44 4. Honneth 2014, p. 95. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Machiavelli | Höffe | Höffe I 186 Machiavelli/Höffe: Although Machiavelli releases the politician from morality, he does not suspend him from it in principle, but only under certain conditions. Instead of disregarding him in principle, he merely represents a provisional amorality. Among the reasons are the political requirements of the time. Machiavelli lives in an epoch of political turmoil and, from the point of view of the history of ideas, in a time of change, in which the echoes of ancient and medieval thought mix with the echoes of modernity. Höffe I 190 The theme dominating the Prince [Machiavelli's major work] is political power. But it's not about its legitimation or even self-legitimation, but about its acquisition and preservation. >Power. Höffe I 196 One likes to interpret Machiavelli's political innovation in terms of emancipation, of liberation from a shackle foreign to politics. Such emancipation is true, but only with three limitations: 1. Emancipation is more likely to occur in relation to the theory of the political than in relation to politics itself. 2. The Reigning Prince does not represent that great emancipation which frees politics from all the fetters of morality. 3. [Machiavelli] (...) does not even consider this emancipation to be fundamental, but only permissible in case of emergency, for example if one has to expect the opponent to break his word. Höffe I 200 A leading authority of the Counter-Reformation, the Jesuit Giovanni Botero: (c. 1 544-1617), tries to integrate Machiavelli's relative innovation, the rules of prudence for the benefit of state power, into the tradition of Christian natural law. Francis Bacon: praises political realism, which "openly and frankly" sets out "what people do Höffe I 201 and not what they would be obliged to do”(1). >F. Bacon. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: in his main work of state philosophy, the Social Contract (1762), Machiavelli declares that he was a sophisticated enlightener who, under the pretext ("en feignant") of teaching kings, in reality taught the peoples (...). >J.-J. Rousseau. Johann Gottfried Herder: in the Letters for the Promotion of Humanity(2), he combines Machiavelli's esteem with a historicisation that continues in the case of Fichte, Hegel and Ranke and reaches as far as Italy's national unity movement, the Risorgimento ("Resurrection"). >J.G. Herder, >J.G. Fichte, >L.v. Ranke. Hegel: (...) as similarly later the historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) praised the Florentine as a statesman who, in view of the misery of Italy, "with cold deliberation grasped the necessary idea of saving Italy by uniting it in one state". >G.W.F. Hegel. Nietzsche: (...) [increases] the "Machiavellianism of power" to the "type of perfection in politics" (...). >F. Nietzsche. Lenin: emphazises the "prince" as a poison against stupidity. >W. I. Lenin. Mussolini: seeks ((s) in Machiavelli) a philosophical justification for his politics. Gramsci: (...) lists the "early" in the sense of "early Jacobinism". >A. Gramsci. Carl Schmitt: identifies with Machiavelli in a playful way, since he calls his house in Plettenberg "San Casciano". It is named after the country house near San Casciano, where Machiavelli wrote his two main works. Leo Strauss: (...) admires both works as visionary, revolutionary books, but renews the spirit of evil accusations. >C. Schmitt. 1. F. Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, 1623, VII, 2 2. J.G. Herder, Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität, Nr. 58 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Machiavelli | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 355 Machiavelli/Political theories/Whelan: The most prominent interpretation of Machiavelli ' s political theory in recent decades, that associated especially with the work of Skinner and Pocock (1975)(1), has situated it in the civic humanist tradition of Florence and Renaissance Italy more generally and has focused on its republican themes. >Qu. Skinner, >J.G.A. Pocock. Machiavelli's Discourses, his debt to classical theory, his commitments as a citizen, and his experience of the crises that overtook republican regimes in Italy (except in Venice) have been emphasized to the near exclusion of Machiavelli's traditional reputation (Bock, Skinner and Viroli, 1990)(2). However, a recent study largely in this vein also recognizes Machiavelli's practice of the anti-classical and more cynical 'art of the state', a precursor of reason of state teaching (Viroli, 1998)(3). Historical context: The study of Machiavelli in his historical context requires access to texts of his contemporaries for comparison. A noteworthy contribution here is a new English edition of a work by Guicciardini that contains the first mention of 'reason of state' (Brown, 1994)(4). Political realism: The more venerable view of Machiavelli as a political realist and an advocate of amoral power politics was reasserted several decades ago by Leo Strauss, who regarded Machiavelli as a key founder of modernity and its problems (...). As such, Machiavelli was shown to have repudiated key elements of the classical and Biblical traditions (including natural law), distorting classic texts for his purposes, sometimes by esoteric methods, in the process. Mansfield: This reading has been continued, most notably by Harvey C. Mansfield, who has examined Machiavelli's contributions to the modern political science of executive power (Mansfield, 1993)(5) and what is presented as his deliberate and pervasive, if disguised, assault on Christianity and its political teachings (Mansfield, 1996)(6). Today’s discussion: Two recent studies that fall in neither of these opposing camps are Fischer (1997)(7), who offers a valuable analysis of Machiavelli's psychology, and Coby (1999)(8), who examines Machiavelli's treatment of ancient Rome. >N. Machiavelli. 1. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975) The Machiavellian Moment: Floæntine Political Thought and the Atlantic Political Tradition. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. 2. Bock, Gisela, Quentin Skinner and Maurino Viroli, eds (1990) Machiavelli and Republicanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Viroli, Maurizio (1998) Machiavelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Brown, Alison, ed. (1994) Francesco Guicciardini, Dialogue on the Government of Florence. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 5. Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr (1993) Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 6. Mansfield, Harvey C. (1996) Machiavelli's Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7. Fischer, Markus (1997) 'Machiavelli's political psychology'. Review ofP01itics, 59 (4): 789-829. 8. Coby, Patrick (1999) Machiavelli Romans: Liberty and Gæatness in the Discourses on Livy. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Whelan, Frederick G. 2004. „Political Theory of the Renaissance and Enlightenment“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Measurements | Morozov | I 260 Environment/trade fairs/Morozov: it is a misunderstanding to take the decision to measure the consumption of resources such as water and electricity as a real reform of how Water anf electricity enter our homes. The measurement itself should ideally only be a small step towards better behaviour. I 261 Problem: it is not possible to tell a good story about improvements that only consists of such measurements, without a picture of how water, gas and electricity come into our homes. Measuring does not deliver this story. Environment/Resources/Anonymity/Maria Kaika/Morozov: anthropologist Maria Kaika writes: the supply of water, electricity and gas seems to come from nowhere (...) and our garbage disappears in some hole in the wall... (1) I 262 Resource Consumption/Veronica Strang: Thesis: measuring focuses us on private property ((s) of energy companies) and not on the population as a whole when it comes to the use of resources. (2) This also reinforces the isolation in which individuals have the feeling that the consumption of resources takes place in their own home. (3) 1. Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City (Oxford: Psychology Press, 2005), 46. 2. Veronica Strang, The Meaning of Water (London: Berg, 2004), 228. 3. ibid. 230. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Modernism | Habermas | III 297 Modernism/Habermas: Modernism has no reserves in ethics or science that would be exempt from the critical force of hypothetical thought. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. >Worldviews, >Worldviews/Weber, >Method, >Discourses, >Rationale, >Ultimate Rationale. Based on Weber's analysis, two problems are encountered on the threshold of modernity: 1. Religious asceticism must first penetrate the non-religious areas of life in order to subject profane actions to the maxims of ethics of conviction. >Religion, >Society, >Morality. Weber identifies this process with the emergence of Protestant professional ethics. >Ethics/Weber. 2. In the emergence of modern science, the decoupling of the theory from practical experience must be overcome. This happened in the form of experimental natural sciences.(1) >Practise. III 299 Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the demystification process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society.(2) >Protestant ethics. IV 433 Modernism/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Parsons describes the same phenomena that Weber can interpret as signs of social pathologies as further evidence of the formation of a form of solidarity appropriate to the complexity of modern societies. >T. Parsons. Parsons/Habermas: through his division of the basic concepts, he creates a synchronization of the rationalization of the lifeworld with increases in the complexity of the social system. In this way, he prevents exactly the distinctions that we have to make if we want to grasp the pathologies occurring in modernism. >Bureaucracy/Parsons. 1.W. Krohn, Die neue Wissenschaft der Renaissance, in: G. Böhme, W. v.d. Daele, W. Krohn, Experimentelle Philosophie, Frankfurt, 1977, S. 13ff. 2.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th.Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981 |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Luhmann | Habermas IV 420 Modernism/LuhmannVsParsons/Luhmann/Habermas: Luhmann only emphasizes the traits of complexity in modern societies. These owe their high complexity to the strong differentiation of subsystems, which are relatively independent of each other and at the same time form environments for each other and interact with each other via media in such a regulated exchange that zones of mutual penetration (interpenetration) arise. Neo-Kantianism/Luhmann/Habermas: Luhmann clears up with Neo-Kantianism, i.e. he abandons the idea of realizing values Habermas IV 421 and sweeps the skies clean of cultural values. He gives the theory of modernity greater flexibility back by undoing the corset of the scheme of four functions (see AGIL scheme). LuhmannVsParsons: Luhmann wants to explain historically what Parsons still predicts theoretically, e.g. that the development of modern societies is characterized by exactly three revolutions. ParsonsVsLuhmann/Habermas: in contrast to Luhmann, Parsons can translate the increase in system complexity recorded from outside, from the observation into the self-image of the system members bound to the inner perspective of the lifeworld.(1) 1.T.Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs 1971, S. 114ff. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Parsons | Habermas IV 303 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parson's theory of modernism is too harmonistic because it does not have the means for a plausible explanation of pathological development patterns. Habermas IV 420 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons' theory of modernity has a Janus face: A) it differs from a system functionalism that exclusively emphasizes the traits of complexity in modern societies. That's Luhmann's line. >Modernism/Luhmann. Habermas IV 421 Method/ParsonsVsLuhmann/Habermas: Parsons understands social modernization not only as systemic rationalization, but as action-related rationalization. Habermas IV 422 HabermasVsParsons: Problem: Parsons lacks a social concept designed from an action perspective. Therefore, he cannot describe the rationalization of the lifeworld and the increase in the complexity of action systems as separate, interacting, but often also contradictory processes. Therefore, he cannot grasp the corresponding dialectic and must reduce these phenomena to the degree of crisis symptoms that can be explained according to the pattern of inflation and deflation. >Revolutions/Parsons. Habermas IV 432 Modernism/Parsons/ParsonsVsWeber/Habermas: Parsons does not arrive at a different view than Weber through a divergent description of global trends, about which one could argue; rather, this view is deductively derived from his analysis of the modernization process: "When developed modern societies are characterized by a high degree of inherent complexity, and when they have this complexity only in all four dimensions of adaptation capacity. If we can simultaneously increase the differentiation of media-controlled subsystems, inclusion and value generation, then there is an analytical relationship between a) the high complexity of the system and b) universalistic forms of social integration and informal institutionalized individualism. Habermas: Parsons therefore draws a harmonized picture of modernity. >Bureaucracy/Parsons. Habermas IV 433 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons must reduce sociopathological phenomena to systemic imbalances; then the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, Habermas IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Touraine | Gaus I 271 Modernism/Touraine/West: Touraine, like Habermas, emphasizes the reflexive, self-critical potential of modernity. Although human beings have always made history, they have previously done so only unconsciously. This is because in premodern societies, society's 'self-production' was restricted and obscured by 'meta-social guarantees' - metaphysical and religious systems that represented certain values as absolute limits on social action and development. Society: Modernity has eroded these limits and so enhanced society's 'historicity', which refers to society's 'capacity to produce its own social and cultural field, its own historical environment' (Touraine, 1977(1): 16). For Touraine the ultimate bearer of this potential is social movements: 'Men make their own history: social life is produced by cultural achievement and social conflicts, and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements' (1981(2): l). Technology/Technocracy: But modernity's promise of autonomy and social creativity is, once again, threatened by the increasing pervasiveness of technical knowledge and bureaucratic structures of management within what Touraine calls 'postindustrial' or 'programmed' societies. >Postindustrial Society/Touraine. 1. Touraine, Alain (1977) The Self-Production of Society, trans. D. Coltman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Touraine, Alain (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Modernism | Weber | Habermas III 226 Modernity/Modernization/Society/Weber/Habermas: Like Marx, Weber understands the modernization of society as a differentiation of the capitalist economy and the modern state. Both stabilize each other. The organizational core of the capitalist economy is the capitalist enterprise, which - is separate from the budget, and - with the help of accounting - investment decisions are oriented towards the opportunities of the goods, capital and labour markets, - using a formally free labour force efficiently - makes technical use of scientific findings. The organizational core of the state is formed by the rational state institution, which - on the basis of a centralised and stable tax system III 227 - has a centrally controlled, standing military power, - monopolizes legislation and the legitimate use of force, and - organizes the administration bureaucratically, i.e. in the form of a rule of specialist officials. >Economy, >State, >Society, >Community, >Taxes, >Law, >Violence, >Rule, >Progress, >Science, >Capitalism, >Modernity, >Modernization. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Wellmer | Brocker I 366 Modernism/Polis/WellmerVsArendt/Wellmer: In the reception of Arendt's Vita Activa it has repeatedly been critically noted that it neglects social problems and their significance for the political space, places the polis as a model of political communities, so to speak as an archetype, and ignores the fact that modernism has produced an irreversible intertwining of the social and the political. (1) >Modernity/Arendt, >Work/Arendt, >H. Arendt. 1. Albrecht Wellmer, »Hannah Arendt über die Revolution«, in: ders., Revolution und Interpretation. Demokratie ohne Letztbegründung, Amsterdam 1998, 45-75. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Music | Weber | Habermas III 230 Music/Weber/Habermas: in the posthumously published book on the "Rational and Sociological Foundations of Music" Weber examines the development of chord harmonics, the emergence of modern musical notation and the development of instrument making. >Rationality, >Rationalization, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Sociology. 1. M. Weber (1921). Die Rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik. Neuausgabe: e-artnow 2018. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Nationalism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 259 Nationalism/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: Margaret Moore: Nationalism, according to Margaret Moore, is 'a normative argument that confers moral value on national membership, and on the past and future existence of the nation, and identifies the nation with a particular homeland or part of the globe' (2002(1): 5). >Nationalism/Moore. MooreVsKymlicka/MooreVsMargalit/MooreVsRaz: In this regard, Moore's account is at odds with the arguments of liberal nationalists such as Kymlicka, Margalit, Raz, and Yael Tamir who see nationality as grounded in culture (Kymlicka, 1995a(2); Raz, 1994;(3) Margalit and Raz, 1990(4); Tamir 1993(5)). Goodin: It has perhaps more in common with Goodin's (1997)(6) suggestion that group attachment is best explained in Bayesian terms, as conventions arising out of an unwillingness of people to expend scarce resources to question the prejudices and presuppositions they grow up with inside their own groups (for a similar analysis see Kukathas, 2002)(7). Definition/roots:The definition, and also the sources, of nationalism are much disputed, some seeing it as the prod- uct of modernity and others as its cause. (See the differing historical accounts of Gellner, 1983(8); Greenfeld, 1992(9); and Anderson, 1993(10).) >Individualism, >Community, >Society. Justification/justifiability: Similarly, the question of the justifiability of nationalism has been much argued about among political theorists. Liberalism: Among liberal theorists in particular, nationalism is viewed with suspicion, since its emphasis on community and belonging puts it at odds with liberal commitments to individual rights and to freedom and equality as universal values. >Liberalism. Often, they are inclined to give it only a qualified endorsement (see McMahan, 1997(11); Hurka, 1997(12); Lichtenberg, 1997(13)). Increasingly, however, liberal theorists (though not only liberal theorists) have begun to look more sympathetically at nationalist aspirations (Tamir 1993(5); Kymlicka, 1995a(2); Kymlicka, 2001(14): 203-89). Kukathas: This has led to a reconsideration of the claims of nationality in two respects. 1) (...) there is the claim for national self-determination, often associated with demands for independence or secession. 2) (...) there is the claim for the importance of the principle of nationality for the coherence of the state and the pursuit of liberal values in particular. >Citizenship. Both kinds of arguments in defence of nationality reveal important conflicts of value with which political theory - and liberal theory in particular - continues to grapple. >Self-determination/Political Philosophy. 1. Moore, Margaret (2002) The Ethics of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Raz, Joseph (1994) 'Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective'. In his Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford: Clarendon, 155—76. 4. Margalit, Avishai and Joseph Raz (1990) 'National self- determination'. Journal of Philosophy, 87:439—61. 5. Tamir, Yael (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 6. Goodin, Robert E. (1997) 'Conventions and conversions, or why is nationalism sometimes so nasty?' In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88—106. 7. Kukathas, Chandran (2002) 'Equality and diversity'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 1 (2): 185-212. 8. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 9. Greenfeld, Liah (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 10. Anderson, Benedict (1993) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. 11. McMahan, Jeff (1997) 'The limits of national partiality'. In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107-38. 12. Hurka, Thomas (1997) 'The justification of national partiality'. In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 139-57. 13. Lichtenberg, Judith (1997) 'Nationalism, for and (mainly) against'. In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds, The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158-75. 14. Kymlicka, Will (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Natural Laws | Wittgenstein | Hempel I 98ff Law of Nature/Wittgenstein: because they cannot be verified completely, they are not statements but only instructions for the formation of statements. >Statements, >Law statements. --- II 99 Laws of Nature/causal necessity/Wittgenstein: the laws of nature are not outside the phenomena - they belong to the language and to our description of things - when ones discusses them, one cannot ignore how they manifest themselves physically. II 131 Justification/laws of nature/Wittgenstein: laws of nature can be justified, rules of grammar not. >Rules, >Grammar, >Justification. II 163 Law of Nature/law/Wittgenstein: 2. Law of Thermodynamics/Wittgenstein: it is not clear a priori that the world continues to lose its order over time. It is a matter of experience. II 164 However, it is not a matter of experience, that it must come to an equal distribution of nuts and raisins, if one whirls them. That something happens with necessity, there is no experience. That one presupposes another force to explain the separation. (For example, specific weight). Laws of nature/Hertz/Wittgenstein: Hertz has said where something does not comply with his laws, there must be invisible masses, to explain it. WittgensteinVsHertz: this statement is neither right nor wrong, but it can be practical or not. Hypotheses like talking of "invisible masses" and "unconscious mental events" are standards of the expression. >Hypotheses. Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: we believe it has to do with a law of nature a priori while it is a standard of expression: E.g. So like saying "Actually, everyone is going to Paris, II 165 Although some do not arrive, but all their displacements are preparations for the trip to Paris." --- IV 109 Law of Nature/explanation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6,371 laws of nature are not explanations of natural phenomena - Tractatus 6,372 So they stay with the laws of nature, like the older with God. IV 105 Law of Causality/Law of Nature/Tractatus: 632 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. >Causal laws. IV 108 Causality/form/show/say/Tractatus: 636 if there were a law of causality, it might be: "There are laws of nature". But one cannot say that, it turns out. >Causality, >Causal explanation. --- Tetens VII 122 Civilization/WittgensteinVsCivilization/WittgensteinVsModernity/Tetens: believes he can explain everything and thinks all important is explained once the facts are scientifically explained in principle. It is an illusion that the world is explained when we know the laws of nature. >Explanation. VII 123 Definition laws of nature/Tractatus/Tetens: are the truth functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. Neither through logic nor through the laws of nature. The laws of nature also not explain natural phenomena. (> Tractatus 6.317). VII 124 The laws of nature are also not the last. That is the logical space, the space of all possible distributions of truth values to the elementary propositions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Negation | Geach | I 16ff Negation/Geach: the problem with compound expressions is always the negation (with "all", "some"). >All/Geach, >Each/every/Geach, >Sentences, >Quantification, cf. >Someone/Geach. I, 45ff Negation/Geach: in the subject-predicate-sentence: negation is only possible from the predicate, not from the subject. Modernity: quantification: also the negation of "there is" is possible. New: also subject negation is possible: E.g. "not everyone is ..." I 75 Negation/Russell: cannot be applied as a primitive term to propositions, therefore: All x are F: Negation: some x are not F ". Negation: not via a sentence: "Do not open the door" is on the same level as "Open the door". Negation is not "logical secondary". >Negation/Frege, >Thought/Frege. Asymmetry: only with identifying predicates: e.g. the same man/not the same man - subject negation: "not everyone is ..." - predicate negation: Socrates is not ... ". Negation is not parasitic to affirmation. - There is no added meaning. - Otherwise there would be a summation with double negation. >Double negation. I 260 Negation/assertion/Geach: propositions can be put forward without asserting them. For example, "p > q" therefore we need a negation which is not polar to the assertion. >Proposition, >Assertion. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Objectivity | MacIntyre | Brocker I 656 Objectivity/Moral/Modernity/Enlightenment/Aristotele/Thomas Aquinas/MacIntyre: Following Aristotle and his renewal by Thomas Aquinas, MacIntyre attempts to reconstruct an objective ethic and to bring it into position against what he sees as the failed efforts of the Enlightenment.(1) - MacIntyreVsEnlightenment. Morals/MacIntyre, Ancient Philosophy/MacIntyre, >Enlightenment/MacIntyre. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987) p. 40. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Plato | Popper | Höffe I 45 Plato/Popper/Höffe: After [Popper's] work The Open Society and its Enemies (1957)(1) Plato appears in the Politeia as an opponent of an open society and advocate of collectivist utilitarianism. >Utilitarianism. Höffe: It is true that Plato's main work contains many highly objectionable elements. For example, he subjects the guardian state to strict rules of reproduction; he allows censorship, even a political lie, i.e. a deception, provided it serves the common good. Euthanasia/Platon: Furthermore he advocates a rigorous euthanasia - not uncommon in antiquity, of course - he allows infanticide and refuses medical help for people who are malignant and incurable according to their soul. Equality/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: But it is also true that Plato opposes the inequality of men and women that prevailed at that time and considers institutional precautions against corruption. HöffeVsPopper: One can hardly blame the philosopher for not being aware of the openness and dynamics of modern societies, even to a limited extent, for not correctly assessing the measure that was already possible back then. More importantly, Plato is concerned with an element that also deprives modernity of openness and dynamism, the basic and framework conditions of the community. Idiopragy/Plato: With Plato, the idiopragy formula is considered unchangeable; in modernity it is democracy in conjunction with fundamental rights and separation of powers. On the other hand, the idiopragy formula allows for openness and dynamism, and accordingly gifted people are open to advancement(2). 2. popperVsPlaton: Popper's second accusation, that Plato subjects the individual to the collective good, can refer to the beginning of Book IV, according to which it does not matter that any group (ethnos: tribe) is particularly happy, but the whole polis (3). Polis/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: A Platonic polis does not sacrifice the welfare of individuals or groups for the common good. Rather, it is set up in such a way that everyone, groups as well as individuals, can become happy. The above-mentioned passage only formulates, in provocative exaggeration of Plato's basic intention, that no one may pursue his interests in an exclusiveness that robs others of the same right to pursue their interests. >K. Popper, >VsPopper. 1. K.Popper 1945. Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. London: Routledge 2. Politeia III 415 b–c 3. 420b |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Policy of Hungary | Holmes | Krastev I 74 Policy of Hungary/Krastev/Holmes: Illiberalism in a philosophical sense is a cover-story meant to lend a patina of intellectual respectability to a widely shared visceral desire to shake off the ‘colonial’ dependency; an inferiority implicit in the very project of Westernization. The same can be said of Viktor Orbán’s expressions of anti-immigrant nostalgia: ‘we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed … We want to be how we became eleven hundred years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.’(1) Interpretation of the past: This is a good example of how populists select one of their country’s many pasts and claim that it is the authentic past of the nation which must be rescued from contamination by Western modernity. (It is, of course, remarkable that the Hungarian prime minister remembers so vividly what it was like to be Hungarian eleven centuries ago.) Imitation: And while he is informing Westerners that ‘we’ are not trying to copy ‘you’, and that it therefore makes no sense for foreigners to consider Hungarians low-quality or half-baked copies of themselves, he is also pretending that the imitation of one’s remote ancestors, of whom few traces remain, requires no more effort than being oneself. >Imitation/Krastev. 1. Viktor Orbán, ‘Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cities with County Rights’ (8 February 2018) |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Policy of Hungary | Krastev | Krastev I 74 Policy of Hungary/Krastev: Illiberalism in a philosophical sense is a cover-story meant to lend a patina of intellectual respectability to a widely shared visceral desire to shake off the ‘colonial’ dependency; an inferiority implicit in the very project of Westernization. The same can be said of Viktor Orbán’s expressions of anti-immigrant nostalgia: ‘we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed … We want to be how we became eleven hundred years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.’(1) Interpretation of the past: This is a good example of how populists select one of their country’s many pasts and claim that it is the authentic past of the nation which must be rescued from contamination by Western modernity. (It is, of course, remarkable that the Hungarian prime minister remembers so vividly what it was like to be Hungarian eleven centuries ago.) Imitation: And while he is informing Westerners that ‘we’ are not trying to copy ‘you’, and that it therefore makes no sense for foreigners to consider Hungarians low-quality or half-baked copies of themselves, he is also pretending that the imitation of one’s remote ancestors, of whom few traces remain, requires no more effort than being oneself. >Imitation/Krastev. 1. Viktor Orbán, ‘Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cities with County Rights’ (8 February 2018). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Political Theory | Postmodernism | Gaus I 47 Political Theory/Postmodernism/Bennett: Postmodern theory often takes the form of genealogical studies which reveal how discursive practices and conceptual schemata are embedded with power relations, and how these cultural forms constitute what is experienced as natural or real (Butler, 1993(1) ; Brown, 1995(2); Ferguson, 1991(3)). >J. Butler. One of the political insights of postmodern theory is that ‘the stakes of a democratic politics … are as much about the modern crisis of representation as they are about the distribution of other goods’ (Dumm, 1999(4): 60). Much genealogical work, however, also insists upon the material recalcitrance of cultural products. Gender, sexuality, race, and personal identity are viewed as congealed responses to contingent sets of historical circumstances, and yet the mere fact that they are human artifacts does not mean that they yield readily to human understanding or control (Gatens, 1996)(5). >Identity/Postmodernism, >Gender, >Sex Differences, >Identity Politics. 1. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. New York: Routledge. 2. Brown, Wendy (1995) States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Ferguson, Kathy E. (1991) The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 4. Dumm, Thomas (1999) ‘The problem of the We’. boundary 2, 26 (3): 55–61. 5. Gatens, Moira (1996) Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. New York: Routledge. Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Post-communist Countries | Holmes | Krastev I 6 Post-communist countries/Krastev/Holmes: After the communist collapse, according to Central Europe’s populists, liberal democracy became a new, inescapable orthodoxy. Their constant lament is that imitating the values, attitudes, institutions and practices of the West became imperative and obligatory. Krastev I 8 The prevailing cult Krastev I 9 of innovation, creativity and originality at the core of liberal modernity means that, even for the inhabitants of economically successful countries such as Poland, the project of adopting a Western model under Western supervision feels like a confession of having failed to escape Central Europe’s historical vassalage to foreign instructors and inquisitors. This self-contradictory request to be both an original and a copy was bound to be psychologically stressful. Krastev: Poles and Hungarians were told what laws and policies to enact, and simultaneously instructed to pretend that they were governing themselves. |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Post-communist Countries | Krastev | Krastev I 6 Post-communist countries/Krastev: After the communist collapse, according to Central Europe’s populists, liberal democracy became a new, inescapable orthodoxy. Their constant lament is that imitating the values, attitudes, institutions and practices of the West became imperative and obligatory. Krastev I 8 The prevailing cult Krastev I 9 of innovation, creativity and originality at the core of liberal modernity means that, even for the inhabitants of economically successful countries such as Poland, the project of adopting a Western model under Western supervision feels like a confession of having failed to escape Central Europe’s historical vassalage to foreign instructors and inquisitors. This self-contradictory request to be both an original and a copy was bound to be psychologically stressful. Krastev: Poles and Hungarians were told what laws and policies to enact, and simultaneously instructed to pretend that they were governing themselves. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Postindustrial Society | Touraine | Gaus I 271 Postindustrial Society/Touraine/West: (...) 'technocracy' extends beyond economy and state to institutions concerned with communication (media), production and transmission of knowledge (education) and creation of symbolic and cultural contents (media, entertainment industry, marketing, design, etc.). >Modernism/Touraine. By implication, the fundamental contradiction of industrial society, that between capital and labour, is being superseded by new conflicts. The fundamental opposition of programmed society is between 'those who manage the apparatus of knowledge and economic transformation, and those who are caught up in change and are trying to regain control over it' (1977(1): 156). The student activism of May 1968 in Paris was an early symptom of new patterns of conflict (1971(2): 347); anti-nuclear and environmental protesters represent subsequent waves of resistance to the new form of domination. Marxism: Evidently, although Touraine updates the Marxist theory of class conflict, he retains its binary structure. Despite the apparent plurality and diversity of new social movements, ultimately ‚[A] society is formed by two opposing movements: one which changes historicity into organization, to the point of transforming it into Older and power, and another which breaks down this order so as to rediscover the orientations and conflicts through cultural innovation and through social movements. (1981(3): 31) West: Less radical forms of political activism are relegated to lesser categories of collective action in accordance with Touraine's aim 'to extract the social movement from the admixture in which it is compounded with other types of collective behaviour' (1981(3): 24; 1985(4)). * Social movements: The genuine social movement is identified by its relation to the progressive option of resistance to technocratic domination in the crisis of programmed society. Like Habermas’s Gaus I 272 analysis in its focus on reflexive modernity and on the role of technocratic or instrumental reason, and, above all, in its commitment to the schemata of Marxian critical theory, ... TouraineVsHabermas: ...Touraine's approach dif-fers mainly in what he regards as the alternative to an increasingly technocratic society. Technocracy/Touraine: As Touraine puts it: ‚Some, like myself, think it necessary to re-introduce the concept of the subject, not in a Cartesian or religious sense, but as the effort of the individual to act as a person, to select, organize and control his individual life against all kinds of pressures. Others, like Habermas, oppose to the instrumentalist view of modernity the idea of intersubjectivity, communicative action and, in more practical terms, democracy.‘ (1991(5): 390—1) * Melucci (1985(6); 1989(7)) follows Touraine's approach but, in a spirit closer to postmodernism (...) attempts to avoid such 'totalizing' tendencies. 1. Touraine, Alain (1977) The Self-Production of Society, trans. D. Coltman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Touraine, Alain (1971) The May Movement: Revolt and Reform. New York: Random House. 3. Touraine, Alain (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Touraine, Alain (1985) 'An introduction to the study of social movements'. Social Research, 52 (4): 749-87. 5. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. Il, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity 6. Melucci, A. (1985) 'The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements'. Social Research, 52 (4): 789—815. 7. Melucci, A. (1989) Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, eds J. Keane and P. Mier. London: Hutchinson Radius. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Postmodernism | Bennett | Gaus I 46 Postmodernism/Bennett: The term postmodernism has currency in political theory, but also in literary studies, philosophy, anthropology, the arts, and popular discourse, in each case functioning somewhat differently. Its usages can be summarized under three headings: (1) as a sociological designation for an epochal shift in the way collective life is organized (from centralized and hierarchical control towards a network structure); (2) as an aesthetic genre (literature that experiments with non-linear narration, a playful architecture of mixed styles, an appreciation of popular culture that complicates the distinction between high and low); (3) as a set of philosophical critiques of teleological and/or rationalist conceptions of nature, history, power, freedom, and subjectivity. Postmodernism in political theory participates in all three, but perhaps most intensively in the third (...). >Postmodernism/Butler. Postmodernism/political theory/Bennett: Within political theory, critics from both the right and the left have tended to see postmodernism as a rejection of the quest for an objective truth behind subjective experiences (Cheney, 1996(1); Dumm and Norton, 1998(2)). Because this quest is thought to set the condition of possibility for any affirmative claim, postmodern political theory is charged with being anti-political and unable to take an ethical stand, except that of resistance, disobedience, refusal, or deconstruction for deconstruction’s sake. WhiteVsPostmodernism: Stephen White offers a subtle version of this criticism: while ‘poststructuralist and postmodern thought … carries a persistent utopian hope of a “not yet”’, it too often ‘remains blithely unspecific about normative orientation in the here and now’ (White 2000(3): 90). PostmodernismVsVs: In response, some postmodernists contend that a positive ethic need not require a universal Gaus I 47 God, Reason or some such surrogate, but can be grounded on the cultivation of existential attachment to life rather than on an internal or external authority (Bennett, 2001(4); Coles, 1997(5); Foucault, 1988(6); Kateb, 2000(7)). The complex of epistemological and ontological claims that constitute the distinctive style of thinking called postmodern cannot with justice be reduced to negativism. Postmodernism/Bennett: Postmodernism in political theory emerged, and continues to develop, in close relation to other theoretical approaches, including feminism, liberalism, psychoanalytic theory, critical theory, and utopianism. Postmodern theory often takes the form of genealogical studies which reveal how discursive practices and conceptual schemata are embedded with power relations, and how these cultural forms constitute what is experienced as natural or real (Butler, 1993(8); Brown, 1995(9); Ferguson, 1991(10)). One of the political insights of postmodern theory is that ‘the stakes of a democratic politics … are as much about the modern crisis of representation as they are about the distribution of other goods’ (Dumm, 1999(11): 60). Deconstructions of madness and criminality, feminist and queer studies of gender and sexuality, postcolonial studies of race and nation – these all seek to uncover the human-madeness of entities formerly considered either natural, universal, or innevitable. >Political Theory/Postmodernism, >Identity/Postmodernism. 1. Cheney, Lynne (1996) Telling the Truth: Why Our Culture and Our Country Have Stopped Making Sense and What We Can Do About It. New York: Touchstone. 2. Dumm, Thomas and Anne Norton, eds (1998) ‘On left conservatism I’ and ‘On left conservatism II’. Theory & Event, 2 (2) and 2 (3). 3. White, Stephen K. (2000) Affirmation in Political Theory: The Strengths of Weak Ontology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4. Bennett, Jane (2001) The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 5. Coles, Romand (1997) Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics of Caritas. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 6. Foucault, Michel (1988) Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume III. New York: Random House. 7. Kateb, George (2000) ‘Aestheticism and morality: their cooperation and hostility’. Political Theory, 28 (1): 5–37. 8. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. New York: Routledge. 9. Brown, Wendy (1995) States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 10. Ferguson, Kathy E. (1991) The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 11. Dumm, Thomas (1999) ‘The problem of the We’. boundary 2, 26 (3): 55–61. Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Postmodernism | Lyotard | Blask I 117 Postmodernism/Lyotard: postmodernism is radicalized continuation of modernity. It is not a breach with that, but the actual fulfillment of all its implications. >Modernism. |
Lyo I J. F. Lyotard Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud Lyotard II J.F. Lyotard Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht. Wien 1993 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Protestant Ethics | Weber | Habermas III 299 Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the disenchantment process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society.(1) >Rationality, >Rationalization, >Tradition, >Cultural Tradition, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Society. Habermas III 307 Profession/Protestantism/Weber: modern professional culture is precisely that implementation of ethics of conviction that ensures motivationally the procedural rationality of entrepreneurial action in a way that has consequences for the capitalist enterprise. >Ethics of conviction. Habermas III 308 Weber does not want to explain why the Catholic inhibitions against commercial profit-seeking have fallen, but what made the conversion possible. He discovered the corresponding teachings in Calvinism and around the Protestant sects. In religious community life he finds the institutions that ensured the socializing effectiveness of the teachings in the supporting layers of early capitalism.(2) >Institutions, >Religion. Habermas III 310 Profession/Weber/Habermas: professional work as a whole is ethically charged and dramatised. The sphere of the profession is released from traditional morality and becomes the sphere of procedural professional probation. This is connected with an ethics of conviction limited to individual graces, which eliminates the Catholic coexistence of monk, priest and lay ethics in favour of an elitist separation between virtuoso and mass religiosity. >Purpose rationality, >Value spheres. Consequences are the inner loneliness of the individual and the understanding of one's neighbor as another neutralized in strategic contexts of action. (3) Habermas III 311 Protestant ethics/Schluchter: the ethics of ascetic Protestantism puts the relationship of the individual to God above his relationships to people and gives these relationships a new meaning: they are no longer interpreted in piety terms.(4) Habermas: even the objectification of these relationships destroys the basis of legitimacy of piety. It degrades all traditional norms to mere conventions. However, this does not require the special objectification required for capitalist economic transactions and which allows segmentation of a legally organized area of strategic action. HabermasVsWeber: Weber denies such a possibility of development. Habermas III 312 This is because of the structural incompatibility of any consistently ethicized religion of redemption with the impersonal orders of a rationalized economy and objective politics. >Economy, >Politics. 1.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th. Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981 2. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Bd 2, Hamburg 1972, p. 232. 3. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus, Tübingen 1979, p. 250f. 4. Schluchter ibid p. 251. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationality | Scanlon | Gaus I 111 Rationality/Reason/Scanlon/Gaus: For Scanlon, ‘[t]he distinction between what it would be reasonable to do and what it would be rational to do is not a technical one, but a familiar one in ordinary language’ (1998(1): 192). A reasonable person does not make claims that others cannot be expected to live with, or are grossly unfair. Rawls: Rawls has a similar idea: parties to his original position are ‘rational and reasonable’, not simply rational: ‘Persons are reasonable … when they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (1996(2): 48). In contrast to Hobbesian contractors, Rawlsian contractors seek to respect each other’s status as free and equal moral beings (Larmore, 1996(3): ch. 6). >Contractualism/Scanlon, cf. >Person/Benn, >Person/Gewirth, >Kant/Sandel. Kant: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998(1): ch. 5). 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Larmore, Charles (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Reason | Scanlon | Gaus I 111 Rationality/Reason/Scanlon/Gaus: For Scanlon, ‘[t]he distinction between what it would be reasonable to do and what it would be rational to do is not a technical one, but a familiar one in ordinary language’ (1998(1): 192). A reasonable person does not make claims that others cannot be expected to live with, or are grossly unfair. Rawls: Rawls has a similar idea: parties to his original position are ‘rational and reasonable’, not simply rational: ‘Persons are reasonable … when they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (1996(2): 48). In contrast to Hobbesian contractors, Rawlsian contractors seek to respect each other’s status as free and equal moral beings (Larmore, 1996(3): ch. 6). >Contractualism/Scanlon, cf. >Person/Benn, >Person/Gewirth, >Kant/Sandel. Kant: Kantian contractualism must build into the account some constraint that limits consideration to only justifications that all reasonable people would accept, or that none would reject. Rawls: One way to do this is, à la Rawls, to constrain the choice situation in such a way that the rational parties are forced to advance only reasonable considerations. The nature of Rawls’s argument behind the veil of ignorance (which excludes specific knowledge about a contractor’s post-contract life and personality) is such that given the constraints on choice, the most rational choice for a contractor will model a reasonable choice for you and me. ScanlonVsRawls: Instead, though, of building into the framework of the choice situation our understanding of the demands of reasonableness, we might, as Scanlon suggests, appeal directly to our intuitions about reasonableness in the contractarian analysis (1998(1): ch. 5). 1. Scanlon, Thomas (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, paperback edn. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Larmore, Charles (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Reification | Lukács | Habermas III 474 Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Lukács thesis: "in the structure of the relationship of goods (can) the archetype of all forms of representationalism and all corresponding forms of subjectivity be found in bourgeois society". (1) Habermas: Lukács uses the new Kantian expression "representational form" in a sense shaped by Dilthey as a historically created "form of existence or thought" that distinguishes the "totality of the stage of development of society as a whole". >Neo-Kantianism, >W. Dilthey, >About Dilthey. He understands the development of society as "the history of the uninterrupted transformation of the representational forms that shape people's existence". LukácsVsHistorism/Habermas: Lukács does not, however, share the historicist view that the particularity of each unique culture is expressed in a representational form. The forms of representationalism convey "the confrontation of the human Habermas III 475 with his/her environment, which determines the representationalism of his/her inner and outer life".(2) >Historism. Def Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Reification is the peculiar assimilation of social relationships and experiences to things, i.e. to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds (subjective, objective and social ((s) shared) world) are so miscoordinated in the social a priori of the living world that category errors are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we understand them in the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although in reality they are components of our common social world or of our own subjective world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Life world. Habermas: because understanding and comprehending are constitutive for the communicative handling itself, such a systematic misunderstanding affects the practice, not only the way of thinking but also the "way of being" of the subjects. It is the lifeworld itself that is "reified". Habermas: Lukács sees the cause of this deformation in a Habermas III 476 method of production that is based on wage labour and requires "becoming goods of a function of humans"(3). Habermas III 489 AdornoVsLukács/HorkheimerVsLukács/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno shift the beginnings of reification in the dialectic of the Enlightenment back behind the capitalist beginning of modernity to the beginnings of the incarnation. >Dialectic of Enlightenment, >M. Horkheimer, >Th.W. Adorno. The reason for this is that Lukác's theory of the unforeseen integration achievements of advanced capitalist societies has been denied. >Society, >Capitalism. 1. G. Lukács, „Die Verdinglichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats“ in: G. Lukács, Werke, Bd. 2. Neuwied 1968, S. 257-397. 2.G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke, Bd. 2, 1968, S. 336 3. Ebenda S. 267. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Religion | Huntington | Brocker I 839 Religion/Huntington: According to Huntington, the assumption of Western elites that the social and technological progressiveness of modernity will gradually supplant religiousness as a cultural characteristic proves to be misjudged in view of the "renaissance of religion". (1) Rather, numerous non-Western cultures reject secular and laical ideas of order to give more room to religious sources of identity. Instead of bringing about the downfall of religions, modernist ideas of rationality and reason had contributed to an emptying of meaning, which had been refilled by religion. Indigenization and religious renaissance strengthened the self-confidence of non-Western cultures. This is expressed in the challenging ambitions of Asian and Islamic cultures.(2) >Culture/Huntington, History/Huntington. 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996. Dt.: Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, München/Wien 1998 (zuerst 1996).S. 144 2. Ebenda S. 155 Philipp Klüfers/Carlo Masala, „Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHunt I Samuel P. Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order New York 1996 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Religion | Weber | Habermas III 235 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber examines the religious foundations of rational living in everyday consciousness, e.g. of Calvinists, Methodists, Pietists, Anabaptist sects. Main features are - Radical condemnation of magical means - loneliness of the individual believer - Secular fulfilment of professional duties as an obedient instrument of God - Transformation of Judeo-Christian world rejection into an inner-worldly asceticism. - Principle-led autonomous lifestyle. >Calvinism, >Judaism, >Christianity, >Religious belief. Habermas III 273 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber thesis: there is a commutated rationalization of all world religions. According to F. H. Tenbruck, Weber was thus in the group of evolutionism at that time.(1) >Rationalization. Tenbruck: "The rational constraints that religions are to follow arise from the need to receive a rational answer to the theodicy problem, and the stages of religious development are the ever more explicit versions of this... Habermas III 274 ...problem and their solutions. (2) >Theodicy. Monotheism/Weber/Tenbruck: for Weber, monotheism was an idea that first had to be born, but then had far-reaching consequences. Punitive God: the idea of a rewarding and punitive deity was also new, as was the sense of mission, according to which the human had to understand himself/herself as an instrument of God. Protestantism/Weber/Tenbruck: added to this the predestination. (3) >Protestantism. Habermas III 274/275 R. DöbertVsWeber: Weber does not distinguish enough between the problematic content and the structures of consciousness that emerge from the ethicization of world views. (4) Contents: reflect the various solutions to the theodicy problem. Structures: can be seen in the statements on the world, which are determined by formal world concepts. >Worldviews. Habermas III 281 Weber: The world religions try to satisfy "the rational interest in material and immaterial balance" by explanations that increasingly meet systematic demands. (5) Habermas III 293 Disenchantment/World Images/Religion/Modernity/Weber/Habermas: Weber observes de-enchantment above all in the interaction between believers and God. The stronger this is designed as communication, Habermas III 294 the more strictly the individual can systematize his/her inner-worldly relations under the abstract aspects of morality. >Disenchantment. This means a) The preparation of an abstract concept of the world b) The differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c) The formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles. Habermas IV 281 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber has shown that the world religions are dominated by a fundamental theme, namely the question of the legitimacy of the unequal distribution of happiness among people. Theodicy/Weber/Habermas: the theocentric world views designed theodicies to reinterpret and satisfy the need for a religious explanation of the suffering perceived as unjust into an individual need for salvation. Cosmocentric worldviews: offer equivalent solutions to the same problem. Common to religious and metaphysical worldviews is a more or less pronounced dichotomous structure that makes it possible to relate the socio-cultural world of life to a background world. The world behind the visible world of this world and phenomena represents a fundamental order; such worldviews can assume ideological functions if the orders of the stratified class society can be represented as homologies of this world order. >Metaphysics. 1.F.H. Tenbruck, Das Werk Max Webers, KZSS, 27, 1975, p. 677 2. Ibid p. 683 3. Ibid p. 685 4. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt 1973. 5. M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I Tübingen, 1963, p. 253. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Renaissance | Parsons | Habermas IV 424 Reformation/Parsons/Habermas: "Forerunner revolutions" are for Parson's Reformation and Renaissance, which make the transition to modernity possible by releasing the cognitive potentials contained in the tradition of Christianity and Roman-Greek antiquity, until then only worked on by cultural elites, monastic orders and universities, and Habermas IV 425 to let these potentials have an effect at the institutional level. >Revolutions/Parsons. Parsons builds on Weber's theory of social rationalization: just as the Reformation removes the barriers between the clergy, orders and laity and releases the drives of religious ethics for the shaping of profane areas of action, so the humanism of the Renaissance also makes the Roman-Greek heritage of science, jurisprudence and art that are emancipating from the church, accessible; above all, it paves the way for a modern legal system. >Rationalization/Weber, >Procedural rationality, >Ethics of conviction, >Ethics, >Renaissance. Parsons regards cultural traditions as the code that needs to be implemented in order to appear phenotypically at the level of social institutions. The Reformation and the Renaissance are regarded as these processes of social implementation. >Cultural Tradition/Parsons. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Revolution | Holmes | Krastev I 23 Velvet Revolution/Krastev/Holmes: The left praised these velvet revolutions as expressions of popular power. The right extolled them as both a triumph of the free market over the command economy and the well-deserved victory of free government over totalitarian dictatorship. What ensured that these revolutions would remain ‘velvet’ was their background hostility to utopias and political experiments. By 1989, moreover, regime insiders themselves had fully switched from utopian faith to mechanical rituals and from ideological commitment to corruption. They were thus fortuitously in sync with the dissidents who had no interest in remaking their societies to conform to some historically unprecedented ideal. Far from searching for an untested wonderland or craving anything ingeniously new, the leading figures in these revolutions aimed at overturning one system only in order to copy another. >Imitation/Krastev. François Furet, pungently observed: ‘Not a single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989.’(1) Jürgen Habermas, a life-long advocate of a cultural orientation towards the West and of remaking his country along Western lines, concurred. He warmly welcomed ‘the lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future’ after 1989, since for him the Central and Eastern European revolutions were ‘rectifying revolutions’(2) or ‘catch-up revolutions’.(3) Krastev I 24 Krastev: Their goal was to return Central and Eastern European societies to the mainstream of Western modernity, allowing the Central and East Europeans to gain what the West Europeans already possessed. 1. Cited in Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution, p. 27. 2. Jürgen Habermas, ‘What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left’, New Left Review 183 (September–October 1990), pp. 5, 7. 3. Jürgen Habermas, Die Nachholende Revolution (Suhrkamp, 1990). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Revolution | Krastev | Krastev I 23 Velvet Revolution/Krastev: The left praised these velvet revolutions as expressions of popular power. The right extolled them as both a triumph of the free market over the command economy and the well-deserved victory of free government over totalitarian dictatorship. What ensured that these revolutions would remain ‘velvet’ was their background hostility to utopias and political experiments. By 1989, moreover, regime insiders themselves had fully switched from utopian faith to mechanical rituals and from ideological commitment to corruption. They were thus fortuitously in sync with the dissidents who had no interest in remaking their societies to conform to some historically unprecedented ideal. Far from searching for an untested wonderland or craving anything ingeniously new, the leading figures in these revolutions aimed at overturning one system only in order to copy another. >Imitation/Krastev. François Furet, pungently observed: ‘Not a single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989.’(1) Jürgen Habermas, a life-long advocate of a cultural orientation towards the West and of remaking his country along Western lines, concurred. He warmly welcomed ‘the lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future’ after 1989, since for him the Central and Eastern European revolutions were ‘rectifying revolutions’(2) or ‘catch-up revolutions’.(3) Krastev I 24 Krastev: Their goal was to return Central and Eastern European societies to the mainstream of Western modernity, allowing the Central and East Europeans to gain what the West Europeans already possessed. 1. Cited in Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution, p. 27. 2. Jürgen Habermas, ‘What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left’, New Left Review 183 (September–October 1990), pp. 5, 7. 3. Jürgen Habermas, Die Nachholende Revolution (Suhrkamp, 1990). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Revolution | Parsons | Habermas IV 423 Revolutions/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons understands these three revolutions as structural differentiations of the community system from the economic, political and cultural subsystems: The industrial revolution that began in England in the late 18th century The French Revolution of 1789 The revolution in education, i.e. the expansion of formal education, which already began in the 18th century but was not radically implemented until the middle of the 20th century. (1) Habermas IV 424 These separated early from developed modernity and fulfil the starting conditions for an international system of highly complex societies, to which Parson's standard description of social systems with four subsystems each applies. >Subsystems/Parsons. "Precursor revolutions" are for Parson's Reformation and Renaissance, which make the transition to modernity possible by releasing the cognitive potentials contained in the tradition of Christianity and Roman-Greek antiquity, until then only worked on by cultural elites, monastic orders and universities, and Habermas IV 425 to let these potentials have an effect at the institutional level. The institutions of legal rule based on religious tolerance and agricultural production based on wage labour are the basis for the three "revolutions" with which the husks of a stratified, professionally still fixed class society are blown up. >Class society, >Religion, >Tolerance. 1. T.Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs 1971, p. 101. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rousseau | Höffe | Höffe I 269 Rousseau/Höffe: To the prize question of the Academy of Dijon, "whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to the purification of customs", Rousseau answers with a sharp "no". The award-winning treatise, the rhetorically brilliant First Treatise on the Sciences and Arts (1) hits Paris with force. The unknown vagabond from abroad, Geneva, becomes the centre of the social, literary and philosophical salons. HöffeVsRousseau: If one pays attention to the only basic idea that Rousseau unfolds in many attempts and without outstanding ingenuity, success must be surprising. Even the message is not so unusual, on the contrary, Höffe I 270 most of the submitted texts answer the prize question with a no. What is unusual, however, is the style, the mercilessly fierce polemic against the sciences and arts that have been praised so far. Höffe I 283 Aftermath: [Rousseau], the most widely read French author of the Age of Enlightenment, [is] considered the father of modernity and anti-modernity at the same time - for he became a source of inspiration both for the French Revolution and the subsequent restoration. Höffe I 284 Revolution: The leading revolutionary Maximilien de Robespierre always has a copy of the social contract on his table, and following Rousseau's civil religion (>Religion/Rousseau) he has the existence of the "Supreme Being" and the immortality of the soul raised from convention to law. Restoration: Rousseau can also refer to the Restoration, as he encourages it in that he hardly develops the forward-looking ideas of Spinoza, Pufendorf, Locke and Montesquieu: Höffe: Rousseau is neither a father of basic and human rights nor of the separation of powers. And despite the criticism of Revelation and Christian churches he at least accommodates the Restoration with his verdict against atheism. Nevertheless he will influence the philosophy of the state at least until Marx. Rousseau's influence in Germany is promoted by the early translation of the two treatises and their review by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. However, the most lasting effect he gets from and through Immanuel Kant. Fichte: Johann Gottlieb Fichte takes over Rousseau's pathos of freedom. In surpassing a Rousseau theorem, he explains: "Anyone who considers himself a master of others is himself a slave". Hegel: In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel calls Hume and Rousseau the two thinkers from whom German philosophy emanates. (...) in the basic lines of the philosophy of law (§ 258), [Hegel] will give credit to Rousseau for "having established the will as a principle of the state". HegelVsRousseau: But afterwards he criticizes the empirical side of Rousseau's social contract, which exposes the state to the arbitrariness of the citizens. HegelVsContract Theory/Höffe: Because Hegel, but also British and French thinkers, criticise contract thinking in general, it loses importance for many generations. 1. Rousseau, Premier Discours sur les sciences et les arts, 1750 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Movements | Postmodernism | Gaus I 272 Social movements/Postmodernism/West: What has been described as the 'mood of postmodernity', (...), involves scepticism about precisely (...) universal values and 'grand metanarratives' and an enthusiastic celebration of diversity and 'difference'. >Cf. >Social movements/Habermas, >Modernism/Touraine. Touraine and Habermas, with their commitment to classically modern values like autonomy and rationality and variations on the Marxian schema of critical theory, are both evidently theorists of modernity. Postmodernism/West: What has been described as the 'mood‘ In this spirit, post-modernist theorists frequently refer to NSMs [New Social Movemets] as proof of the irreducible plurality of 'subject positions' and 'voices' characteristic of postmodern Western societies in the aftermath of the unifying (universalizing and 'essentializing') project of Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985(1); Lyotard, 1984)(2). Diversity: However, although postmodernists are sceptical of any attempt to impose unifying or 'totalizing' theoretical constructions on the irreducible diversity of social life, a number of theorists nevertheless seek a more general understanding of NSMs as responses to the arrival of postmodernity. * Capitalism/Postmodernism/Lash/Urry: (...) postmodernity is characterized in terms of social and economic developments that are already familiar from theorists of modernity. Characteristic in this respect is Lash and Urry's (1987)(3) theory of 'disorganized capitalism'. Their notion of disorganized capitalism refers to a series of social and — the replacement of economic developments 'Fordism' by 'post-Fordism', the internationalization of production and finance, the relative decline of manufacturing and rise of the service sector, and the related decline of the traditional working class and the rise of 'new middle classes'. Like other theorists of NSMs, Lash and Urry associate these developments with the shift from the organized class politics of industrialized societies to the new politics ofNSMs (1987(3): 311). Culture: An important further consequence of these economic, social and political developments is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(3): 14) >Culture/Lash/Urry. *Some like Lyotard (1984), who understands the 'mood' of postmodernity as a feature of 'postindustrial' societies, effectively attempt to do both. 1. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategv: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 2. Lyotard, J. F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 3. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Society | Beck | I 15 Society/Beck: In its implementation, the industrial society says goodbye to the stage of world history. This is done via the back stairs of the side effect(s). I 17 Def risk society/Beck: While in the industrial society the "logic" of wealth production dominates the "logic" of risk production, this relationship is changing in the risk society. >Risks. I 19 The industrial society is, according to its layout, a semi-modern society whose built-in countermodernity is nothing old, traditional, but industrial-social construction and product. The structural image of the industrial society is based on a contradiction between the universal content of modernity and the functional structure of its institutions, in which this... I 20 ...can only be implemented in a particularly selective manner. I 59 We must distinguish between cultural and political awareness and the actual spread of risks. >Knowledge. I 60 The evidence of need suppresses the perception of risks. I 67 Risk society/Beck: Thesis: this is also a form of impoverishment. |
Beck I U. Beck Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi 1992 German Edition: Risikogesellschaft Frankfurt/M. 2015 |
| State (Polity) | Hegel | Mause I 47 State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state"(2). I 48 Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding"(3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea"(4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality.(5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx. Brocker I 794 State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them Brocker I 795 "empirically controllable". (7) 1. G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292. 2. Ibid. p. 307. 3. Ibid. p. 340 4. Ibid. p. 389 5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98 7. Ibid. p. 150 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 331 State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought Höffe I 332 conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2). State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable. Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel. Höffe I 336 The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...). Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel. Höffe I 337 From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 2. Ibid. § 1 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Taxation | Mbembe | Brocker I 920 Fiscal policy/taxation/statehood/citizen/Mbembe/Herb: In African states, according to Mbembe, the fiscal relationship between the individual and the state is initially a purely violent one; it is not mediated by a public discourse on the common good. In contrast, the political significance of the tax at the beginning of modernity, for example in France, was to create a loyal relationship between the state and the citizen and to provide the state as guardian of order with military force (Mbembe 2016(1),165): "Monopoly of force and monopoly of taxation thus justified and reinforced each other"(166). In the African case, however, this relationship is realised in a different way for Mbembe: It leads to a "new organizational form of power" (167) and a "new political economy", which, however, do not strengthen the connection between state and civil society, authority and loyalty, but rather lead to the "invention of new systems of coercion and strategies of exploitation" (168). >Postcolonialism/Mbembe, >Society/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Theology | Benjamin | Bolz II 14 Theology/Politics/Benjamin: Theology and political thought form a totality that must be thought of as a juxtaposition of extremes. Bolz II 17 Benjamin is often called a witness of historical materialism, negative theology, and even of literary-scientific deconstructivism. >Historical materialism, >Deconstructivism. Bolz II 21 Secularization of theology (1st history-philosophical thesis: theology must seek protection in historical materialism). Bolz II 31 Theology/Benjamin: Exodus from the philosophy in the commentary. >Critique/Benjamin. Benjamin himself hides his metaphysical and theological motifs in his work. Typical formulas: "brush against the stroke" "cover and veiled". Secularization of theology for its salvation. Turn to a "pragmatic" communism. Salvation: salvation is not the goal of history, but its end. >Redemption, cf. >End of History. Bolz II 34 Theology/Benjamin: Because theocracy has no political meaning, the world politics of the political theologian must be nihilistic in order to promote its mental meaning.(1) >Nihilism. This is the scheme according to which Benjamin's studies on Baroque, Baudelaire and Surrealism also articulate a Gnostic protest. It is directed against the return of antiquity on the apex of modernity as it is predicted by Nietzsche in Max Weber's doctrine of Occidental Realism. >Procedural rationality/Weber, >Western Rationalism. Bolz II 35 Eye to eye with fascism, theology is forced into inversion If a free mankind is to seek happiness in the field of history, the dependent mankind must now take a foot in hopelessness. Foot ... not hope. Bolz II 36 Teaching is abolished critique, critique is inverse theology and religion is the "concrete totality of experience".(2) 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 204 2. Ebenda. S. 170 |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Thinking | Foucault | I 389ff Thinking/Modernity/Foucault: no possible morality, thinking is already a "step out", no more theory. Thinking is a dangerous act, even before it sounds the alarm. (De Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud, Bataille). >Sade, >Nietzsche, >World/thinking, cf. >Laws of thinking. I 396ff Thinking/Modernity/Foucault: in modern thinking an origin can no longer be determined, work, life and language have assumed their own historicity. Man discovers himself only as connected with an already created historicity. He is never a contemporary of the origin that conceals himself. Thinking/Modernity: It closes the great square, by rediscovering the finiteness in the question of the origin: the connection of the positivities with the finiteness, the doubling of the empirical in the transcendental, the constant relation of the cogito to the unthought, the retreat and the return of the origin. I 404ff Thinking/Modernity: It no longer runs alongside the never-ending formation of the difference, but rather to the unveiling of the same which is always to be accomplished. Thought image: in modern thought, the reasons of the history of things and of man's own historicality is the distance that is kept which undermines the same, the deviation that streams it, and collects at the ends of itself. Deep spatiality. This space always allows thinking to think of time and to recognize it as a sequence. >Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Understanding | McDowell | I 98f Understanding/McDowell: the distinction between two types of intelligibility distinguishes two kinds of terms, but not of objects. I 123 Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/Hume: Nature cannot be understood in terms of meaning, nor in terms of a law. >Nature/Hume. Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/KantVsHume: regains the comprehensibility of the natural laws, but not the comprehensibility of the meaning. >Nature/Kant, >Laws of nature/Kant, >Understanding/Kant. Nature is the domain of natural laws, and therefore without any meaning. The empirical world, however, is not outside the concepts. I 136 Natural laws/meaning: mandatory rules do not have to be known. Understanding/McDowell: must also play a role where it is a matter of grasping mere events without all meaning. Understanding/comprehensibility/modernity/today/McDowell: the field of comprehensibility is the realm of natural laws - albeit without meaning. We can, however, refuse to equate this area of comprehensibility with nature, and even more so with what is real. >Nature/McDowell. I 140 Experience/Content/Understanding/McDowell: Empirical content is only understandable in a context that allows us to make the direct rational control of the mind through the world itself insightful. >Experience/McDowell. It is impossible for a fact to exert an impression on a person that perceives. However, the image of openness to the world brings the idea of direct access to the facts. Only that we cannot be certain in any case that it is not a deception. --- II 55 Understanding/McDowell: understanding your own utterances: ability to know what a theoretical description of this ability would do - knowing truths conditions - not truth! - Even in sentences which are not decidable by means of evidence - but this does not mean that the truth condition for each sentence either exists or does not exist, even if we cannot say that it exists or does not exist. >Truth condition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Universal History | Weber | Habermas III 225 Universal History/Weber/Habermas: For Weber, the main question is: why outside Europe, "neither scientific nor artistic nor national nor economic development should be directed in the direction of rationalization that is characteristic by the Occident".(1) >Rationalization, >Art, >Culture, >Economy, >Science. Western Culture/Weber/Habermas: Weber counts among the achievements of Western rationalism: the modern natural science, the systematic specialized company of the university organized sciences, the printed products produced for the market, the art business, the harmonious music with the work forms of sonata, symphony, opera and orchestra instruments, the use of the linear and air perspective in painting, scientifically systematized jurisprudence, the institutions of formal law and jurisprudence by legally trained civil servants, modern state administration on the basis of a fixed law, predictable private law transactions and the profit-oriented working capitalist enterprise, which requires the separation of budget and business, i.e. requires the legal separation of personal and company assets.(2) >Western rationalism, >Rationality, >Purpose rationality, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Society, >Culture, >Cultural transmission. 1. Zur Bibliografie: C. Seyfarth, G. Schmidt, Max Weber Bibliografie, Stuttgart 1977; G. Roth, Max Weber, A Bibliographical Essay, in: ZfS, 1977, p. 91ff; D. Käsler (Hg.) Klassiker des Soziologischen Denkens, Bd II, München 1978, p. 424ff. 2. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, Vol. I, Hamburg 1973, p. 20 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Universalism | Habermas | III 222 Universalism/Habermas: Prehistory: 19th century research in the humanities and cultural studies had sharpened the view of the wide variety of social lifestyles, traditions, values and norms. Historism had sharpened this basic experience of the relativity of its own traditions and ways of thinking to the problem of whether the rationality standards presupposed in the empirical sciences are themselves components of a regionally and temporally limited culture, precisely of modern European culture, and thus lose their universalistic claim. >Historicism, >Historiography, >W. Dilthey, >Rationalization/Habermas. Max Weber has adopted a cautiously universalistic position; he did not consider processes of rationalization to be a special phenomenon of the occident, even though the rationalization that can be proven in all world religions initially only led to a form of rationalism in Europe, which at the same time has special, namely occidental and general, features that characterize modernity at all. >Modernism. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Universalism | Weber | Habermas III 222 Universalism/Weber/Habermas: Weber has adopted a cautiously universalist position; he did not consider processes of rationalization to be a special phenomenon of the occident, although the rationalization that can be proven in all world religions initially led only in Europe to a form of rationalism that at the same time has special features, namely occidental and general, that characterize modernity at all. >Western rationalism, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Rationalization, >Religion, >Religious belief. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Utopia | Habermas | III112 Utopia/Habermas: the attempt to state an equivalent for what was once meant by the idea of good life must not tempt us to derive an idea of good life from the procedural concept of rationality, with which we have left behind the decentralized understanding of the world of modernity. >Modernity, >Society, >Values, >Life, >Rationality. Wellmer: "For this reason, we can only state certain formal conditions of a reasonable life." (1) >Conditions, >Reason. 1. A Wellmer, Thesen über Vernunft, Emanzipation und Utopie, MS (1979), S. 53. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Utopianism | Wellmer | Habermas III 111 Utopianism/A. Wellmer/Habermas: a modernist error complementary to the illusion of objectifying thinking is utopianism, which means that we could "at the same time win the ideal of a form of life (1) that has become completely rationalized" from the concept of the decentralized understanding of the world and procedural rationality. >Rationality, >Utopias, >World, >Reification, >World/Thinking. Habermas: Forms of life do not only consist of world views, which we can classify as more or less decentralised from a structural point of view, but not only of institutions that fall under the aspect of justice. >Worldviews, >Institutions, >Justice. Habermas III 112 Utopia/Habermas: the attempt to state an equivalent for what was once meant by the idea of good life must not tempt us to derive an idea of good life from the procedural concept of rationality, with which we have left behind the decentralized understanding of the world of modernity. Wellmer: "For this reason, we can only state certain formal conditions of a reasonable life."(2) >Modernism, >The good, >Life. 1. A Wellmer, Thesen über Vernunft, Emanzipation und Utopie (MS (1979), S. 32. 2. ibid. p. 53. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Weber | Habermas | III 207 Weber/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: the following inconsistency is instructive: Weber analyses the process of disenchantment in the history of religion, which should fulfil the necessary internal conditions for the appearance of occidental rationalism, with the help of a complex but largely unclear concept of rationality;... III 208 ...on the other hand, in his analysis of social rationalization, as it prevails in modernity, he is guided by the limited idea of purpose-rationality. >Rationalization/Weber, >Procedural rationality, >Western rationalism. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Western Rationalism | Mbembe | Brocker I 915 Western rationalism/Mbembe/Herb: "It has never been easy to talk sensibly about sub-Saharan Africa" (Mbembe 2016(1), 39). Mbembe blames the dogmatic image of the West for this, in which Africa appears primarily as a sign of lack, absence and non-existence, as a place of cannibalism, pandemics and plague, in short as the absolutely different of the West. Brocker I 916 In this respect, it is precisely this that gives the West access to its own unconscious and justifies the shape of its own subjectivity. Many are involved in the creation of this image. In the wake of the great thinkers of modernity from >Hegel to Weber, namely all those who celebrate subjectivity, individuality and rationality as exclusive achievements of the West. (>Subjectivity/Mbembe). In contrast, all other cultures appear traditional, primitive and underdeveloped, unable to follow the rules of the universal grammar of the West. Mbembe names the unholy alliance of modernity, rationality and occidentality in the Eurocentric self-image and wants to overcome it. He calls for a fundamental philosophical critique of Western epistemes. Thus he sees the violence of Western discourse still at work in the social sciences and humanities today. Economic and political sciences, for example, however meagre their Africa expertise may be, continued in their own way the practices of colonial subjugation with their demands for good governance, free market and neoliberal world order. In such criticism, Mbembe maintains an equal distance to Marxist theories of dependence and to discourses of Foucault, neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist façon. >Subjectivity/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Derrida, J. | McDowell Vs Derrida, J. | I 123 Meaning/nature/McDowell: it s a good lesson of modernity, that the range of natural laws is of no importance. McDowellVsDerrida: we are not compelled to read the flight of the bird as text. The constitutive elements of the laws of nature are not conceptually connected, as it is in the space of reasons. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Küng, H. | Mackie Vs Küng, H. | Stegmüller IV 507 Religion/Küng: (Existiert Gott?, Küng, H. 1978): Küng tends to classify arguments as "modern" or "unmodern". MackieVsKüng: enormous erudition, at the same time confused. Too strong an emphasis on "modernity". IV 508 So it only depends on whether an argument is right or wrong. Küng: Thesis: "...after the difficult walk through the history of modern times, a clear, convinced "yes" answered by critical reason can be given as an answer to the question "Does God exist?" But the question is, what does this "yes" refer to? To the God of traditional theism, or to a substitute God? Küng: Thesis: both the naively anthropomorphic and the enlightened-deistic conception of God are obsolete. God is neither a supernatural being in the clouds, nor an extraterrestrial being in the metaphysical sky. Rather he is in this world and this world is God. God is the infinite in the finite, the absolute in the relative. That which works constantly, that which has the possibility as an absolute of becoming history. Küng seems to agree with the tradition of a negative theology: God is not to be understood by any concept, even the concept of being does not override him, because he is not an existing being. The God of the Bible is not a person like a human, but a God who establishes personality, so he cannot be apersonal. Thus one can also accept the God of the Bible as a God with a human face. IV 509 MackieVsKüng: 1. He obviously takes advantage of the fact that he tries to have everything at the same time: this can be seen in his remarks about miracles: these are all that the human is "surprised" about. Mackie: 2. If this was all, miracles would in no way support any kind of supernaturalism or theism! 3. Retreat to such an indefinite and unclear concept of God that it no longer provides any starting point at all to critically discuss the question of existence. God/Existence/Proof of God/Küng: Thesis: Argument for the existence of God: the danger of nihilism. The question is not whether we can infer from our knowledge about the world, consciousness and morality further specific theistic conclusions. Rather, modern thought is threatened by nihilism. Nihilism/Küng: (classical representative: Nietzsche): Vs three classical transcendentals: there is 1. no unity 2. no truth 3. no goodness. IV 510 Küng: admits that nihilism is not only possible, but irrefutable. Question: Can it be overcome? Truth/Rationalism/MackieVsKüng: he refers to a wrongly understood concept of critical rationality in Popper (KüngVsPopper). Küng believes that he renounces any critical examination of the foundations of our knowledge. IV 510/511 ad 2: the assumption that there is order in the world, i.e. regularity, which does not necessarily have to be causal determination, makes sense in two ways: 1. as a regulative principle, 2. as a far-reaching hypothesis. (Küng seems to understand above all the latter by it.) ad. 3. no goodness: here (the one quoted by Küng) Mackie has already given sufficient answers before. Values/Küng: after all, we have to assume something like objective value from which standards can be derived. MackieVsKüng: this is clearly wrong: every value is a human and social product. IV 512 Atheism/Küng: also atheists and agnostics can strive for humanity and morality. Belief/God/Küng: but the basic trust in identity, meaningfulness, and value of reality is ultimately only justified if the reality itself, to which the human also belongs, does not remain groundless, unfounded and aimless. MackieVsKüng: no, that is not clearly visible. It is just wrong. The basic trust is reasonable in itself for the reasons mentioned! And exactly the same applies to the development of values. Whereby Küng accepts this indirect proof as the only proof of God at all, i.e. he does not want any demonstrative proof. IV 513 MackieVsKüng: This seems to amount to the assertion that in the execution of belief it proves to be true. Küng constantly fluctuates between a reference to a pleasant and purely subjective security and the reference to the ontological argument explicitly rejected by himself before. Nihilism/Küng: the first appearance of senselessness results from the fact that reality is not God, the second appearance that the human is not God. MackieVsKüng: also in these two respects the God hypothesis is not better than naturalism! IV 514 Explanation/MackieVsKüng: with him everything boils down to God being the one who somehow gives reason, stability and purpose to reality. But this is no explanation at all: one cannot explain a being by what it does. A "somehow acting". Nihilism/MackieVsKüng: ironically, he himself collected the material to show how nihilism can be met on a purely human level (without the God hypothesis). Namely by what Küng calls "basic trust" (>James, see above). Mackie: this trust is already reasonable out of itself. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Luhmann, N. | Habermas Vs Luhmann, N. | I 426 Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies. I 430 HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment. I 431 Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life. Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true). I 434 HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself. I 435 Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that! I 437 HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution. I 438 HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events. I 441 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension. Luhmann II 136 Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness." II 141 HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice. II 165 System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action. AU Cass.12 HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Moore, G.E. | Prior Vs Moore, G.E. | I 21 Correspondence Theory/Prior: now we can handle the fact that truth and falsity are not only applied to propositions, but also to beliefs and assertions. Truth/Belief/Logical Form/Prior: E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, and there will be one." (X believes that) p and p. (Parenthesis). Falsity: E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, but there not will be one." ((s) but = and.) X believes that p and ~p. Correspondence Theory: Aquinas' "adaequatio intellectus et rei" goes back to the Jewish Neo-Platonist Isaac Israeli from the 10th century. Locus classicus of modernity: Correspondence Theory/Moore: (G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, New York 1953) I 22 Example: Suppose a friend falsely believed that he (Moore) went on holiday and says: Moore: We should say, of course, that if this belief is true, then I must have gone on holiday, and vice versa (conversely): we should say that if I went, this belief is true, of course. Prior: so far it is Aristotelian. Now Moore continues, however, and says: Although its absence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the belief of his friend to be true, it cannot be what is meant by saying that the belief is true! Because: Moore: if we say "the belief that I'm gone, is true", we mean that the belief has a specific property that it shares with other true beliefs. But if we say: "I'm gone", we do not attribute a property to any proposition! We only express a fact, and this fact could also exist if no one believed that! Point/Moore: if no one believes it, the belief does not exist, and then this belief must be false, even if I'm away! ((s) then it must not be false, because nothing that does not exist must be anything or have any properties per se.) PriorVsMoore: he is forced to say that, because he assumes that belief consists in a relation between this belief and a fact. A relation that is not definable, but "familiar". ((s) > "overarching general": if the belief itself consists in a relation between (itself) the belief and a fact, the belief occurs twice. Problem: if it should be defined by this relation. But neither Moore nor Prior say that here. Instead: separating of levels. Belief/Name of the Belief). Moore: the "name of the belief" is to be: "The belief that I'm gone." Name of the fact: "I'm gone." Correspondence/Moore: relation between "the name of the belief and the name of the fact" is what he calls the correspondence. PriorVsMoore: (he probably discarded it later anyway). this is doubtful in two respects: 1) The reason he indicates for the fact that his absence should be constitutive for the truth of the belief of his friend, is at the same time the reason to say that "the former [was] no sufficient and necessary condition for the latter". 2) But if we corrected this with a truly sufficient condition, this correction would also give us a definition. I.e. the belief is true if X believes that p and it is the case that p. Correspondence would not be more, then. (Simply accordance with the facts). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
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| Forgery | Bolz, N. | Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 S 42 Forgery / Bolz: new digital media: Thesis: modernity is a culture of forgery. By historicizing the forgery loses explosiveness and is a survival strategy. |
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