Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Identity | Parfit | Lewis IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Parfit: when it comes to survival, both answers (continuity and identity) cannot be correct, so we must choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) Continuity: (and connection) (e. g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one and gradual. >Continuity. Parfit: therefore, it is the continuity and connection that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival). >Temporal identity, >Personal identity, >Person. c) what is important for survival is not identity therefore! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problematic cases do not occur. >Relations, >Identity/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Individuation/Lewis. LewisVsParfit: someone else might just as well represent the argument in the other direction, and put identity as relevant. And of course, identity is that what counts in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connection are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity. Borderline case/Parfit: Problem: borderline cases have to be decided arbitrarily. Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it is definitely about identity. Namely, literally identity! IV 58 Definition R-relation/identity/continuity/person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? IV 59 I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: the two are identical because they are coextensive! >Coextension. IV 61 Identity/Fusion/Split/Person/State/Lewis: is one to one, in the sense that a thing is never identical with several things. However, this does not apply to the I and R relations. Many of their other states are states of the same person and related to this and also to each other. But that is not what Parfit means when he says that R relations are one to many. Parfit: means that there can be several states to which a state is related, but which are not related to each other. (fusion and splitting of the person). That means the R relation would not be transitive. Split: the forward-related R relation is one many, backward: many one, simpliciter: transitive. IV 65 Methuselah example/Person/Identity/Lewis: (Original passage): Connectivity/mental states/Parfit: thesis: the connection of mental states disappears with time. IV 67 Person/Fusion/Parfit: For example, if you merge with someone very different, the question is of who survives. But there is no specific, hidden answer. Rather, the important point is that the R-relationship is only available to a very small degree. IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: one should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. IV 74 Lewis: I had written, what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually Ir to states in the distant future such as S2, namely over the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But is that not the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants to survive (C1), then this wish is not fulfilled. LewisVsParfit: but I do not think he can have that wish at all! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought he has must be shared. He cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. On the other hand, if C1 and C2 are supposed to share something every day, then it must be a "plural" wish, "Let's survive". IV 75 Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both of us knew before the split that there would be a split. Now: Variant: both do not know about the coming split. Question: cannot we share the wish: "Let me survive!"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the same desire is due to the wrong presupposition that they are one person. Meaning the "me" is a false description. It cannot refer to C1 in C1's thoughts and not to C2 in its thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least the one of C2 and the one of C1 is not differentiated. Then their wish cannot consist only in the unfulfillable singular wish. They both must also have the weak plural desire, even if they do not know the split beforehand. |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Opacity | Lewis | IV 49 Not referentially transparent opaque/Opacity/Lewis: e.g. "I" in "It could be the case that I and my body are not the same today" - this is possible, because the truth conditions of the terms "I" and "my body" involve designations from other worlds - in other worlds they might differ. Cf. >Actuality/Lewis, >truth conditions, >reference. Cf. >LewisVsParfit. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Person | Lewis | IV 47 Person/body/materialism/Lewis: according to materialism person and body are identical. Vs: people could change their body. Thesis: T/Lewis: if a person occupies a body at time t, both are identical at that time. IV 48 Person/body/Lewis: before birth and after death, body and person are not identical, because the person will not exist - e.g. also the change of a person into another body is possible. Cf. >LewisVsParfit, >Continuants. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Parfit, D. | Lewis Vs Parfit, D. | IV 55 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Lewis: Problem: we asked a question and got two answers: a) Identity: can only be total identity. b) Continuity: can be gradual. Which of these two should be relevant for survival? If we had to choose, we should prefer everyday platitude to philosophical subtlety. The only hope is that identity view and continuity version are somehow reconcilable. That I would like to defend VsParfit. IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Person/Parfit: Thesis: not both answers (continuity and identity) can be right, so we have to choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) Continuity: (and connectedness) (e.g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one as well as gradual. Parfit: therefore it is the continuity and connectedness that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival). c) what is important for survival is not identity! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problem cases do not occur. LewisVsParfit: someone else could just as well represent the argument in the other direction and make identity relevant. And of course, identity is what matters in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connectedness are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity. Border case/Parfit: Problem: Border cases have to be decided arbitrarily somehow. Identity/continuity/survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it's definitely about identity. It is literally about identity! Def Identity/Lewis: the relation in which everything stands to itself and to nothing else. ...+.... R-relation, I-Relation IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connectedness among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the previous ones? But of course there are also I-Relations between the individual states! IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: we should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. For example, shortly after the split, one of the two dP (continuants) dies, the other lives for a very long time. S is the state divided to t0 (before the split), but after it is known that the split will take place. Then the thought that we found in S is the desire for survival, and extremely like common sense and quite unphilosophical. Since S is a shared state (stage), it is also a shared desire. Problem: C2 has the survival he desires and he depends on mental continuity and connection. (RR) but what about C1 (the prematurely dying continuant)? IV 74 Lewis: I had written that what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually IR to states in the distant future such as S2, namely via the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But isn't that the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants him to survive (C1), then that wish is not fulfilled. (Lewis, however, deals with the more difficult problem): LewisVsParfit: but I don't think he can have this wish! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought it has must be shared. It cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. If, on the other hand, C1 and C2 are to share something that is understandable in everyday life, then it must be a "plural" wish, "let us survive". Here we must now distinguish between two pluralistic wishes: a) weak: lets at least one of us survive b) strong: lets us both survive. Because these desires are plural and not singular, they are not common sense. This is because everyday psychological survival is understood in terms of survival of dP rather than of relations of states. The weak desire of C1 corresponds to the desire for IR for future states. Then the IR also corresponds to the RR. and the corresponding wish. If C1's wish is strong, he will not be satisfied. Then it does not correspond to the "philosophical wish" either. IV 75 After RR for future stages and parfit is right VsLewis. LewisVsParfit: but should we say that C1 even has this strong desire? I don't think so. Because if C1 can have it, C2 can also have it. Example Suppose (according to Justin Leiber): a wish is recorded from time to time, but deleted after a certain time. This corresponds to the weak desire for survival, but not the strong one. Suppose the recording takes place at the time of the split, C1 dies shortly afterwards due to an accident. C2, survives. Additional complication: C" then undergoes a body transplant. If his desire to survive is to be fulfilled, then it is predominantly the weak desire. Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both knew before the split that there would be a split. Now Suppose (variant): both do not know about the coming split. Question: can we not perfectly share the wish: "Let me survive"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the desire is based on the false presupposition that they are one person. I.e. the "me" is a wrong identification. It cannot refer to C1 in C1' thoughts and not to C2 in his thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least that of C2 and that of C1 is not different. Then their wish cannot only consist in the unfulfillable singular wish. They must both also have a weak pluralistic desire, even if they do not know the division beforehand. N.B.: that then also applies to all of us, although we are not often divided, many of our current desires are not current occurrences: E.g. The desire to be spared unimaginable pain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |