Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Commands | Frege | II 53 Commands/intention: Frege: the thought has an "oblique meaning" (German: "ungerade Bedeutung"). The imperative is "oblique speech" (German: "ungerade Rede"). It has no "meaning" only "sense". Command and wish are no thoughts, but they are on the same level. The "meaning" of the imperative is the command. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Meaning, >Sense, >Thoughts, >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Counterfactuals | Frege | II 64 f Counterfactual/Frege: "If iron was lighter than water, it would float on water." Here, we have the two notions that iron is not lighter, and that something that is lighter floats on water. The subordinate clause again expresses the one notion and a part of the other notion. >Thought, >Clause, E.g. "After Schleswig-Holstein was cut off from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarreled." Here, the subordinate clause expresses not only one notion, but also part of the other. Therefore, it cannot be replaced generally by another of the same truth value. >Truth value. II 64 Cases in which this simply does not work: 1) That the subordinate clause means no truth value because it only expresses part of a thought. 2) That it does mean a truth value, but does not limit itself to it, because its sense still comprises a portion of the other thought and not only one thought. The first case occurs: a) In the case of the odd meaning of the words. b) If a part of the sentence only vaguely suggests, instead of being a proper name. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Proper names, >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Intentionality | Frege | II 52 Purpose/intention: Frege: the purpose is a thought, therefore it has an "oblique meaning" (German: ungerade Bedeutung). Imperative: is "oblique speech" (German: ungerade Rede) and has no "meaning" only "sense". Command and wish are no thoughts, but on the same level. The "meaning" of the instruction sentence: is the command. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique speech (= quote to the point), >Thought, >Intention. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Propositional Attitudes | Mates | I 101f Propositional attitudes / opaque context / meaning / significance / Frege / Mates: expression changes meaning depending on the context - after "believe that" an expression has as the meaning, which usually makes up his sense and any sense as something else (indirect meaning). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique meaning, >Oblique sense, >Citations, >Sense, >Meaning, >G. Frege, >Propositions, >That-clauses. Meaning: meaning is then the proposition (instead of a truth value) >Truth values. Sense: sense in a opaque context: an indirect sense corresponds to our "direct token", a name or identification. >Opacity, >Occurrence, >Names of sentences, >Descriptions. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Quote/Disquotation | Frege | II 64 Quotation/Frege: a quotation has no truth value in itself. >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning, >Truth value, >Terminology/Frege. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Sentences | Frege | II 48 Truth Value/Frege: a truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object (truth value = object). II 51 Sentence/Frege/(s): a sentence consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (>that-sentence, >opaque contexts, >propositional attitudes) have a thought as meaning, not a truth value. II 74 Sentence: the idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject (>Ramsey). We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one. II 77 Sentence: the three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: no matter how we group them together, we do not get a sentence. >Propositions, >Clauses, >Truth conditions. I 7 Sentence/Frege: a sentence does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) but for a truth value. There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. Vs: there is a problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Sentence/Frege: except for the idea (what can be true/false) there are two other aspects: a) "content" b) "imagination". >Content, >Imagination. Tugendhat II 243 Oblique Meaning/German Original: "odd"/Frege: the oblique meaning is the name of a sentence. Complex sentences: have truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote). Nominalized Subset/Frege: a nominalized subset is only part of a thought. TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value. Tugendhat II 245 Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. Exception: causal and conditional clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Terminology | Frege | Frege, German Original: "gerade Rede" = "normal speech", i.e. "gerade" = normal. Normal speech/Frege: normal speech is a literal quote. Oblique speach is an analogous quote. The oblique meaning (of a word) is its normal sense (!) Chisholm II 146 Frege/saturated/unsaturated: by Husserl: are dependent/independent clauses. --- Frege II 58 Hypothetical Judgment/German original: "hypothetisches Urteil"/Frege: a hypothetical judgment is an implication. --- I I29 Unsaturated: is e.g. "capital city of". Saturated: is e.g. "Deutsches Reich". I 72f Term = is the meaning of a predicate, unsaturated, predicative, of something. Subject matter: is saturated and never the whole meaning of a predicate. A proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Thought: a part must be unsaturated, as a binder - example: "falls under". I 87 Function: is unsaturated. I 88 Function/Frege: a function sign is unsaturated, e.g. "sin" (sine). On the other hand: it is saturated by connection with numeric signs (argument): e.g. "sin 1" - is each time a number. Value of the function. I 89 Thus, we can also call functions self-unsaturated. I 88 Number sign/Frege: e.g. "2" is saturated. On the other hand: the function sign, e.g. "sin" (sine) is unsaturated. --- IV 70/71 Body/Frege: the body does not need to be supplemented. > ((s) objects are saturated). IV 11 Terminology/Frege: "subter": is an individual/class or subject/term and corresponds to "ε". Epsilon/Frege/ (s): epsilon always denotes that an individual is contained, not a subset. On the other hand: "sub": is a class/class or term/term - this corresponds to the horseshoe ⊂ (subset). IV 73 ff Mental structure/Frege: 1. type: A u B - 2. type: ~(A u B). - 3. type: ~A u ~ B. - 4. type: ~(~A u ~B). 1.-4. are interchangeable in order. 5. type ~A u B - 6. type: ~(~A u B). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |