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The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertions | Tugendhat | I 244 Assertion/Asymmetry/Tugendhat: the affirmation or negation both times refer to something on the part of the speaker, not on the part of the listener. Therefore, the situation does not correspond to the stimulus-reaction scheme. >Situations, >Stimuli, >Communication, >Negation. I 273 Game/Profit/Tugendhat: is important because it is about the motivation to take over one or the other side in the game - mixing of assertion and responsibility. >Scorekeeping, >Robert Brandom, >Attribution, >Predication, cf. >Game-theoretical semantics. I 279 Assertion/Object/Truth//Tugendhat: what is characteristic about the assertoric speech is that it is based on truth and therefore it is object-based - we can call these objects "facts" or "thoughts" or "propositions" - unlike Frege : not truth as an object >Meaning/Frege, >Judgments. I 281ff Assertion is a necessary part of meaning, because the truth conditions are part of the meaning. >assertion stroke, judgment stroke/Frege. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Tugendhat | I 162ff complex/Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism): "complex is not equal to fact" - see Terminology/Tugendhat: theory of objects: facts = subject (TugendhatVs). I 298 Composition/Tugendhat: deeper concept: common dependency - what someone says when he claims the sentence ’p and q’ must somehow depend on what he says, if he uses the sentence ’p’, and of what he says when he used the sentence "q". >Scorekeeping, >Communication, >Facts, >Understanding, >Statements. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Descriptions | Lewis | I (a) 10 Description/Lewis: it always is also about the meaning of the terms used. - Therefore, it is pointless to point out several differences. Description: a true sentence about things of any kind as such is not about those things by themselves, but about them together with the meaning of the expressions you use. It is therefore useless to point out various differences. In the case of >identity theory, we can explain these differences without denying the body/mind identity. Detailed descriptions lead to deviations due to the expressions used. IV 240 Definite Description/Lewis: necessary: something outstanding, relative prominence - not: uniqueness. - The prominence changes constantly during the conversation. Denotation by a definite description then depends on the score keeping. >Scorekeeping model. Alignment rule: Prominence of an object is affected by the course of the conversation. Boundaries/Lewis: it is easier to expand the boundaries than to narrow them. --- I (b) 26/27 Failed descriptions are not meaningless. (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are meaningless.) LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they are similar failed descriptions. "The Mars moon" and "The Venus moon" name nothing here in our real world (in any normal way); but they are not meaningless, because we know very well what they denote in certain other possible worlds. >Senseless/ Sensible, >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Implication | Lorenzen | Berka I 267f Implication/dialogical logic/Lorenzen: here it is different than in the case of "and", "or", where only the proponent is affected by instructions. In "if, then", there are also obligations for the opponent. If P asserts a > b, the dialogical meaning of > is that P is obliged to assert also b if O on its part asserts a and defends it against P successfully. Cf. Brandom: >commitment, >Scorekeeping model. Lorenzen: from this determination it follows already that P can always win an assertion of the form (A v B) u C > (A u C) v (B u C) (With statement variables A, B, ...). Spelling/(s): Lorenzen writes the main operator with a point above it: E.g. A v B u' C > A u C v' B u C. Could also be written like this, e.g. A v B u C > A u C v B u C. Winning strategy/dialogical logic/Lorenzen: one can write it as follows: O P (A v B) u C > (A u C) v (B u C) (A v B) u C ? A v B, C ? A I B (A u C) v (B u C) ? I ? A u C I B u C ? I ? A, C I B, C This corresponds precisely to the semantic tableaux of Beth. Implication/winning strategy: because the Gs of P are such that it can only assert those primacy statement which have already been asserted by O, P can obtain any statement of this form. If, on the other hand, P may be forced by O to assert a primacy statement in any other assertion which O has not yet asserted, then P will not be able to obtain every statement of the asserted form. He may not be able to prove precisely the primacy statement that has to be asserted.(1) 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Knowledge | Lorenzen | Wessel I 346 Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: it is assumed a certain group of people has accepted a certain system of statements W as true. From these people, all statements which follow logical from these statements are then recognized as true. >Dialogical logic, cf. >Logical omniscience, cf. >Scorekeeping model. Lorenzen regards this as meaningful only for future statements. Knowledge/Lorenzen/Wessel: for Lorenzen, it follows that everything we know is necessary with regard to this knowledge. >Necessity. Tradition: For example, if we know that in a pea pod are five peas and that it contains protein. This is only the second necessary knowledge. According to Lorenzen, both statements are necessary knowledge. (WesselVsLorenzen). >Facts, >Contingency. Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: too broad a view. That all knowledge is supposed to be necessary is a "fatalistic consequence". >Fatalism. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Logical Constants | Lorenzen | Berka I 267f Logical Particles/Logical Constants/Dialogical Logic/Lorenzen: if a, b ... are dialogical statements (for example, proof definite), so we have to determine what the dialogue partners have to do. For example, if P asserts a u b, it is bound to assert both a and b. All instructions are only for the proponent at first! That is, these are not real dialogues yet. Different: Implication. >Implication.(1) >cf. >Scorekeeping model. 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Ontological Commitment | Field | I 151 Ontological commitment/Quine/Field: belongs to the sentences that the speaker accepts in the strict sense. Cf. >Scorekeeping, >Ontology, >Ontology/Quine. >Acceptance. III IX Ontological commitment/Field: can be scaled down by extending the logic. >Logic, >Expansion. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quantifiers | Lorenzen | Berka I 269 Quantifiers/Dialogical Logic/Lorenzen: Existential quantification: whoever claims (Ex)A(x), must claim A(n) for an n chosen by himself. (s) It does not matter whether proponent or opponent. Universal quantification: whoever claims (x)A(x) must claim A(n) for every n chosen by the opponent.(1) >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Dialogical logic, cf. >Scorekeeping model. 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200 |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Rationality | Habermas | III 25 Rationality/Habermas: has less to do with acquisition than with the use of knowledge. Knowledge can be criticized as unreliable. III 26 This is where the ability to justify comes into play. For example, actions which the actor himself/herself considers to be hopeless cannot be justified. >Justification, >Reasons, >Contradictions, >Knowledge. III 30 Rationality/Realism/Phenomenology/Habermas: two approaches differ in the way propositional knowledge is used: a) The "realistic" position is based on the ontological premise of the world as the epitome of what is the case, in order to clarify on this basis the conditions of rational behaviour. The realist can limit himself/herself to the conditions for objectives and their realization. b) The "phenomenological" position reflects on the fact that the rational actors themselves must presuppose an objective world. >Propositional knowledge. III 31 It makes the ontological preconditions a problem and asks about the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. It must be regarded by the subjects as one and the same world in order to gain objectivity. >Lifeworld, >Rationality/Pollner. III 33 The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, derived from the realistic approach, can be added to the broader phenomenological concept of rationality. There are relationships between the ability of decentral perception and manipulation of things and events on the one hand and the ability of intersubjective communication on the other. (See also Cooperation/Piaget), >Cooperation. III 36 Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their lifeworld would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. >Descriptions, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Score keeping. III 44 Those who use their own symbolic means of expression dogmatically behave irrationally. Cf. >Language use. IV 132 Rationality/Habermas: we can trace the conditions of rationality back to conditions for a communicatively achieved, justified consensus. Linguistic communication, which is designed for communication and does not merely serve to influence one another, fulfils the prerequisites for rational expressions or for the rationality of subjects capable of speaking and acting. The potential for rationalization (...) can be released (...) to the extent that the language fulfils functions of communication (and) coordination of action (...) and thus becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place. >Language/Habermas. Rorty I I 92 RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Understanding | Sellars | Brandom I 649 Understanding/Sellars: in order to understand reports, one must be able to distinguish which further allegations follow from them and what allegations would provide evidence for it. Therefore, not all reports can be observational. >Inferences, >Consequences, cf. >Scorekeeping, >World/thinking, >Implication, >Rationalism, >Perception, >Knowledge/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Utterances | Habermas | III 171 Utterances/Interpretation/action/observation/sociology/Habermas: If we ignore an actor's expressions as claims of validity, we neutralize the claims to truth and success by treating opinions and intentions as expressive utterances; and this could only be objectively judged in terms of truthfulness and authenticity. >Interpretation, >Action, >Observation, >Sociology, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Validity claims. III 172 If, on the other hand, we take the statements of the actor just as seriously as he means them rationally, we subject his (supposed) chances of success to criticism based on our knowledge. >Statements, >Assertions, >Judgments, cf. >Scorekeeping. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intention | Grice, P.H. | Meggle I 140 Welker thesis: spokesman assume responsibility for ensuring that they have the intention to bring about certain effects on the listener ((s)> Brandoms scorekeeping model). |
Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
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