Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Prior | Cresswell II 146 Belief/Prior/Cresswell: Thesis: Belief should not be considered a predicate of that-sentence - but instead believes-that should be seen as a syntactic unit that is applied directly to a sentence. Cf. >That-sentences, >Predicates, >Beliefs, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Prior I 6f Belief/Prior: no adequate approach without distinction between mind state of belief and that which is believed (state/content). >Belief state/Perry, >Mind state. Prior: in case of false beliefs: instead of non-existing object: attribution: E.g. Othello attributes infidelity to Desdemona. >`Attribution, >Predication, >Non-existence. PriorVsRussell: Problem: above it is abstract loyalty. >Abstract objects, >Abstractness. In case of falsity, the belief relation would then need to have an additional position (to the true fact). >Relation theory. I 11 False Belief/Russell: false facts fail in truth-making. >Truthmakers, >Facts. Montague: points in the wrong direction. >R. Montague. PriorVs: not for a neutral observer. >Intentionality, >Thinking. I 27 Belief/Prior: belief is no relation - E.g. ...that nothing is perfect: there is no object. >Generality, >Generalization. I 53 Belief Function/Prior: E.g. X believes that ... is not identical in identical propositions: e.g. ...is a bachelor/...is an unmarried man. although one may feel that the propositions are self-identical. I 81 Belief/Prior: you do not have to believe rightly that you believe something. >about/Prior) You can also simultaneously believe p and not-p. You can believe something contradictory. E.g. the fear that God will punish you for your disbelief. >Thinking, >Logic. You can find out that you did not believe what was thought you believed. - If someone believes what he says when he says that he mistakenly believes that it is raining, then this belief is not necessarily mistaken. >Error, >Deception, >Falsehood, >Levels/order, >Description levels. No epistemic logic ist necessary, propositional calculus is sufficient. >Epistemic logic, >Propositional calculus. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Content | Field | I 253 Modality/Possibility//Physics/Field: a prefixed modal operator would change the content of a physical law. - ((s) This goes beyond the purely logical case p > Mp). >Modal operator. I 254 Content/Field/(s): content is not preserved, although arbitrary conflicting conclusions may be believed as well. - Requirement: separation into two components, one of which remains fixed. - E.g. physics/mathematics. >Method, cf. >Invariants, >Covariance. II 107 Belief state/Contents/Deflationism/Truth Conditions/Field: if belief can be described as the state of acceptance of the sentence "snow is white", it can be described: a) as belief state that snow is white and b) as a state with the truth conditions that snow is white. >Truth conditions. N.B.: the connection of that-sentences with truth conditions is loosened. - (VsFrege, VsRussell). >That-clauses. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Designation | Meixner | I 70 f Naming/Meixner: Naming different from expressions. To name: a name is saturated (it stands for an object). >Saturated/unsaturated, >Expressions/Meixner. Difference: functions can also be expressed by unsaturated expressions. >Functions. I 102 Expression/naming/Meixner: facts are expressed by sentences and named by a phrase (subordinate clauses). >That-sentences, >States of affairs. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Expressions | Meixner | I 71 Expression/Express/Meixner: expressing something is not referencing. >Reference. Functions can be expressed by unconfirmed expressions. >Functions, >Unsaturated. Predicate: expresses a property, it does not denominate it! >Predicates, >Properties, >Naming, >Denotation. Predicate: is a linguistic indicator of universals, more direct than names. >Universals, >Names. I 102 Expression/Denominating/Meixner: Facts are expressed by sentences and denominated by that-sentences (subordinate clauses). >States of affairs, >That-sentences, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Exemplification. I 118 Expressions/Expressing/Meixner: sentences can express something that is not in line with their meaning, e.g. "the sentence on page n line 1 is wrong ...". >Propositions, cf. >Paradoxes. I 152 Expressing: sentence expresses both a proposition and a fact (if it expresses something different from its meaning) - proposition: content of the sentence - fact: is unambiguously determined by this sentence content (proposition). >Content. I 153 Expressing: concepts such as universals through predicates. Satisfaction: concepts are satisfied by entities. >Satisfaction. Exemplification: universals by entities - instantiating/instantiation: concepts and universals by entities (inverse to instantiation: concepts and universals apply to entities) Cf. >True of. I 154 Expression/Expressing: Predicates express concepts or properties (universals). - concepts do not express anything, universals do not express anything, properties express nothing, they are expressed. Sentence: expresses proposition or fact. Fact, proposition: express nothing, they are expressed. E.g. "author of Waverley", "the person who is identical with Scott" do not express the same universal singularisation, but they do denominate the same individual. E.g. "brother of..."/"only brother of": ((s) can apply to the same individual, or "only" to none.) |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Folk Psychology | Boer | I XIII Folk psychology/Boer: presupposes a concept of normality and provides a network of contrafactual conditionals for the role that internal states play. Contrafactual conditional: attributes that-sentences. Believe/wish: is then a relation to a particular content. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Formal Speech | Prior | I 25 Formal speech/Carnap: solution for "x is neither a fact nor a falsehood" - "x" does not name an object. Nothing is named by a true sentence (equally not by a that-clause). >That sentences, >Naming, >Names, >Objects. Prior per, but for a different reason than why "Pegasus" nothing shall appoint. >Pegasus example, >Non-existence. ((s) >Quine: relative clause = general term.) >Relative Clause/Quine, >General Terms/Quine, |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Inflationism | Field | II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content. >Truth conditions. Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory. >Deflationism. Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition. >Verification conditions. Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism. II 126 Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white). >Homophony. II 114 Deflationism: can assume facts. >Facts, cf. >Nonfactualism. Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p". II 126 Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks. >Language dependence. Inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts). II 220 Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy. >Indeterminacy, >Translation. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: Inflationism needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald". Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositionally. >Compositionality. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Linguistic View | Field | II 159 Linguistic view/Field: does not assume any meanings as mind-independent entities - but assigns the words of a speaker to interpreter's words. - The relations are based on other characteristics - that is, on inferences that contain that word. - This is what I call "meaning-characteristic" - e.g. II 160 ChurchVsLinguistic view/Translation/Field: (Church 1950)(1): ("translation argument"): allegdly says: that if the word "lapin" means [rabbit], then it says that "lapin" means the same as "rabbit", then its German translation should be: ""lapin" means [rabbit]"" instead of ""lapin" means [Kaninchen]"" (Kaninchen, sic). ChurchVs: but this disagrees with the purpose and normal use of translations. Schiffer dito: E.g. two monolingual German speakers: Karl is told that Pierre said something in French that is equivalent to "Schnee ist weiß" (german, sic) - Fritz : ... equivalent to "snow is white". Problem: absurd: then Karl thinks rather than Fritz that Pierre said that Schnee ist weiß (sic, german) - but only because of the linguistic view. FieldVsVs: the linguistic view only has to be formulated more cautiously. Solution: >quasi-translation or > quasi-meaning. II 162 Leeds/linguistic view/LeedsVsChurch/Meaning/Extension/Field: (Leeds, 1979)(2): literal meaning/Leeds: E.g. the German word "bedeutet" means literally not the same as the English word "means": it does not even have the same extension. N.B.: (hereinafter "Hund", sic) "means" refers to "Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund", but not to "dog". - "Means": "dog" refers to "dog" and "Hund" to "dog" but not to "Hund". But: "bedeutet" and "means" are nevertheless in an important homology relation: Homology/meaning/Field: E.g. following two predicates are extensively different: a) "the temperature-in-Fahrenheit of x is r" and b) "the temperature-in-celsius of x is r". Solution: this homology makes it sensibly to translate "bedeutet Hund" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important. We cannot get it. Field dito. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Michael Dummett. II 165 Linguistic view: Alternative to it: a) to assume that that-sentences do not denote and "means that" are "believes that" operators - E.g. inference of "Susan believes that E = mc²" to "Susan believes Einstein's theory". Then the first is only the abbreviation of the second. - Then that-sentences are still singular terms. b) That-sentences and parentheses refer to intentional entities. 1. Church, Alsonzo, 1950. On Carpa's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis 10, pp. 97-9. 2. Leeds, Stephen, 1979. Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of PHilosophy 9, 43-51 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Proper Names | Meixner | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity. "Being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property (property name). >That-sentences, >States of affairs, >Properties. ad I 42 Excursion/(s): Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties. ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!) Cf. >Semantic Ascent. I 71 Saturated: e.g. names - saturated expressions only name saturated entities - Example unsaturated entity: "the paternal descent relation". >Saturated/unsaturated. I 153 Names: of facts and propositions: that-expressions. >Propositions. Name of the universal: means the property - name of the concept: means the concept (cannot be possessed like a property). >Universals. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Redundancy Theory | Tugendhat | I 252 Redundancy theory / Tugendhat: there is a surplus in the expression ’p’ incomparison to the incomplete expression ’that p’ - it is this plus that the addition of ’is true’ expressed - that is not at all trivial. - It would be trivial if one presupposes that one already understands the use of assertoric sentences. - "True" can be eliminated - (Tugendhat per redundancy theory) I 266 TugendhatVsredundancy theory: if truth is necessary for determining the meaning of a sentence (by truth conditions), then "true" should not be eliminable. >Truth conditions, >Understanding, >Meaning. I 315 Redundancy theory / Tugendhat: presupposes that the difference between ("it is said") "that p" and "p" is already understood. Cf. >That-sentences, >Levels, >Description levels, >Truth. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Reference | Cresswell | II 33 Reference/that-clause / Cresswell: reference of the that-clause: here: the structure that is the sense. Meaning/sense/Cresswell: here: the structure which results from the references of the components of the complement clause. >That-sentences, >That/Cresswell, >Meaning, >Structures, >Sentence meaning, >Clauses, >Names of sentences. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Sentences | Prior | I 6 Sentences/Prior: sentences are different from what we want to say with them - as well as what we think is different from what we think about. >Sentences, >Propositions, >"About", >Intentionality, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 13 Sentences/Prior: not about propositions - e.g. "The sentence S is only seemingly about propositions" is itself only seemingly about propositions." (solution: it is a sentence about the sentence) - E.g. "the proposition that the sun is hot, is true" about the sun. >Predication. I 19 Sentences/Prior: sentences denote nothing, just names. >Designation, >Proper names, >Sentences. Sentence: no relation between two names but between name and predicate that is expressed by the clause - expressing instead denoting. >Expressions, >Predicates. Instead of "fear +" that -sentence": "fear that" + sentence. Left hand side: predicate - rightright hand side: connection. >That, >That sentences. I 52f Sentence/PriorVsFrege: sentences denote nothing, not even "truth". >Truth value/Frege, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean meaning. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| States of Affairs | Meixner | I 74f Facts/Meixner: the function expressed by "the opposite of a fact" is also a fact, but not a property. - So not every function is a property. - But every property is a function. >Properties, >Functions, >Function/Meixner, >Ontology. I 125 Fact/Meixner: sum of all facts: fixed under all circumstances ((s) "everything", "everyone": fact in every possible world...). Meixner: but the name of the sum does not fixedly denominate the same thing under all circumstances! >Names of expressions, >Names. I 129 Necessarily real/Meixner: there are necessarily real things, but not with the individuals, but among the facts - actuality is therefore relative to the circumstances. >Circumstances, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Possibility/Mexiner, >Individuals/Meixner, >Necessity, >Reality. I 153 Names: of facts and propositions: that-expressions. >That-sentences. Name of a universal: means the property. Name of the concept: means the concept (it cannot be possessed like a property). >Concepts, cf. >"Doctrine of non-possession". |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Prior Vs Abstraction | I 132 Thinking/Grammar/Prior: Othello thinks of Desdemona that she ...becomes ...thinks that... Difference: whether the gap for the verb is filled, but not that for the name. Nominalization: ("old game"): instead of "Desdemona is faithful": "It is true of Desdemona that she is faithful." (Introduction of "that"). That-Sentences: pronouns are almost always through abstracta (quasi-names). (>Cook Wilson): Subject/Predicate/Wilson: E.g. "Jones's musical": here it is not predicated "is musical", or "that he is musical," but "musicality". I 133 PriorVsWilson: but the difference is not very large. Moreover, the true relation is that between "Jones" and "he". Better. Attribution of musicality. The introduction of abstractions such as "ness", etc. is always a trick. Verb/Prior: is like a sentence: its job is to make names of sentences. A verb is a sentence with one or more gaps. Verbs can be composed in the same way as sentences. Every composition of a sentence is ipso facto a composition of the verbs it contains. I 134 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the formal presentation of ordinary language sentences requires abstraction. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Burge, T. | Loar Vs Burge, T. | Stalnaker II 202 That-Sentence/Psychological Content/Loar: Thesis: psychological content is not always identical to what is captured by a that-sentence. There is only one loose match. Ascription/attribution/content/Principle/attribution principles/ascription principles/Loar/Stalnaker: there are two principles that Loar wants to prove false: 1. equality (Sameness) de dicto or indirect ascriptions implies equality of psychological content. 2. differences de dicto and indirect ascriptions imply differences in psychological content. LoarVsBurge: he accepts these two principles when he says that in normal declarations of conduct we actually attribute broad content. LoarVsBurge: if we negate the two principles, we can avoid assuming that it is further content that we attribute. StalnakerVsLoar: I do not understand his two principles because I do not see how to distinguish the content of normal belief ascriptions from the references of that-sentences. One could at best say a) the expressions (that-sentences) are either the same or different, b) the referencces (the that-sentences) are the same or different. Ad a): then the principles have no sense at all. The 1st principle (that the equality of belief ascriptions requires equality of content) would be wrong if the that-sentences are context-dependent. Loar forbids index words here, but also general terms can be context dependent, then the principle is wrong even for broad content! II 205 Privileged Access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with anti-individualism. (Camp: Loar pro internalism, Loar pro individualism). II 206 Loar: Thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - provided Freud exists timelessly. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Representation | Brandom Vs Representation | I40 VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes). I125 BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression! I 132 Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough." I 292 Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.) I 404 BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege) I 405 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel. 4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates. I 412 BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 690 Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental. II 69 Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. Rorty VI 181 BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty: instead: "making real inferential connections between claims". If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers". Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Salmon, N. | Schiffer Vs Salmon, N. | I 277 "Fido"-Fido-Theory/meaning = reference/Nathan Salmon: (1986): Thesis: pro FFT: (Vs almost all other theorists on belief). I 278 Salmon: would argue that the that-sentences in (2) and (6) (dog/shmog) refer to the same proposition, because of the identity of doghood and shmoghood. He would argue that the that-sentences in E.g. Lois Lane does not recognize that Clark Kent is Superman. and Lois Lane does not recognize that Superman is Superman. refer to the same proposition, because of the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. Schiffer: and he would also say that the following two that-sentences refer to the same proposition. E.g. my statement I believe that I am a paragon of virtue. And (Pointing to a photo of me on which I do not recognize me): I do not believe that he is a paragon of virtue. The joint proposition should then be here: SchifferVsSalmon, Nathan: E.g. Assume the Superman story is real and we have a naive non-philosopher Floyd, who made the following statement: (A) Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent can fly. Floyd: insists that (A) is true. And that he expressed his belief with his statement.. Salmon: would say that both are wrong! (A) can not be true, for Salmonella, because Clark = Superman. (A) is logically equivalent to (B) Lois Lane does not know that Superman can fly. and that is wrong. Salmon: the common singular proposition is: Statement/Salmon/Pointe: Floyd does not make the statement, because he does not believe it! Belief/Salmon/Schiffer: for Salmon belief is a binary relation between a believer and a proposition. But this would be (to Salmon!)to be explained by a three-digit belief relation BEL that exists between a believer, a proposition and a w.o.g. (Way of givenness): B(x,p) iff (Em) BEL (x,p,m). Solution/Salmon: x can believe p under a BT and do not believe it in another BT. ((s) This is the unanimous opinion and Frege's solution). Terminology/Salmon: calls the w.o.g. mostly "guise", "appearance" or "way of taking". SchifferVsSalmon: he does not give a representation of the third term, the w.o.g. (…+…). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Strawson Vs Wittgenstein | Horwich I 195 Fact/situation/VsStrawson: it could be argued that they (because they are connected to that-sentences) are used as placeholders for yet to be specified expressions. Just as E.g. "thing" for nouns E.g. "event " for certain verbs, etc. StrawsonVsVs: the answer is twofold: World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. All the charm of these expressions like "situation", "state" (state of affairs), "fact", etc. is that we look at them as things or quantities of things. (StrawsonVs). StrawsonVsAustin: this urge is overwhelming. Austin does not resist it. He needs for concealment "feature" (feature) as a substitute for "fact". Definition feature/feature/Strawson: E.g. nose can be a feature of a face. E.g. a mountain feature a landscape.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson II 265 StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. --- Wittgenstein VI 172 StrawsonVsWittgenstein/Schulte: actually one should only talk in very specific cases of the meaning of names: E.g. "Peter" (Pierre) means "stone". Schulte: that is quite foreign to Wittgenstein. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| propos Quantific. | Grover, D. | II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "Facts and propositions".) Ramsey: Example "He's always right." Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). ((s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: It is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier. II 146 Propositional Quantification/pQ/Grover: Thesis: They exist in everyday language (English). Prior: (1967) ditto. StrawsonVsPrior/StrawsonVsGrover: They do not exist in everyday language. |
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| Variables | Grover, D. | II 57 Grover: Thesis: the grammar of the variables in the "philosophical English" is determined by that of the variables in the formal language. II 58 Propositional Variables/Quantification/Suppes/Heidelberger: (Heidelberger 1968, S 214): Thesis: propositional variables must take either names of propositions, that-sentences, or names of sentences. HeidelbergerVsRamsey: (ad Ramsey: "facts and propositions") Ramsey: Example He's always right: Paraphrase: (p)(if he claims p then p). (s) without "that"!) HeidelbergerVsRamsey: it is not clear whether the last occurrence of "p" falls within or outside the range of the universal quantifier. |
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| T-Predicate | Grover, D. | II 47 T-Predicate/Everyday Language/Grover: p: takes sentences as substituents. Question: how is "Epp" or "(p)(If Jon knows that p then p)" translated? Grover: Thesis: We need a harmless extension of English for this. II 48 Thesis: Sentences as substituents of propositional variables make sense. However, in § 3 we will discuss other theories which require that these must be names of sentences or that-sentences. A summary is given in § 4. II 151 Truth/True/T-Predicate/Proset Theory/Grover: Thesis: Consent is expressed by saying "the same thing". The theory that truth is a property of sentences changes the subject in this case. II 157 T-predicate/"true"/Grover: Thesis: The occasions in which the predicate is used (property-writing, for sentences) are probably those (if any) if there is a reason to speak about sentences (meta-language). II 158 Example Quine; if he needs the T-predicate for generalization, he uses it as a property-attributable. (Truth as property of sentences). |
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| Salmon, N. | Schiffer I 277 "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Meaning = Reference/Nathan Salmon: (1986): Thesis pro "Fido"-Fido-Theory: (Vs almost all other theorists about belief): I 278 Salmon: would claim that the sentences in (2) and (6) (dog/shmog) refer to the same proposition because of the identity of dog and shmogh-ness. In addition, he would claim that the that-sentences in the example Lois Lane does not recognize that Clark Kent is Superman and Lois Lane does not recognize that Superman is Superman refers to the same proposition because of the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Relation Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 49 Thesis: the "propositional" theory of belief as relation to propositions needs natural art concepts. (see below). I 54 Classical Propositional Position/Schiffer: Thesis: predicates in that-sentences simply refer to the properties and relations they express and introduce directly into the propositions. I 55 2. Possible position: Frege's view: Thesis: the proposition provides the whole content of belief, but does not contain dog-ness but a way of being given dog-ness that is not explicit in (2). But that is how Tanya imagines dog-ness. (Frege is concerned with belief de re of normal physical objects.) A representative of this view would deny that the that-sentence in (2) refers to the full content. According to him, (2) is best represented in this way: (Em)(m is a way of givenness of dog-ness & B (Tanya, )). I 93 Relation Theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: new thesis: a sentence S has its truth condition 1. by the bR of some of its parts and properties - 2. by certain causal relations to things (for the explanation of reference and denotation) - thus ultimately reliability determining for the truth conditions, because the combination of bR/causality plays a role in the maximization of reliability - this also explains the nature of reliability. |
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