Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conceptual Schemes | Davidson | I (c) 41/42 Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: Language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons. - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation is not intended, it only appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear. Conceptual relativism: The conceptual scheme is a human creation; it is arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty". I (c) 44 DavidsonVsQuine: There are no last data, therefore no subtraction. I (e) 87ff Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism. I (e) 96 Scheme/Contents: Both have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair. - Then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. >Representation/Davidson. I (e) 98 Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Deception/Davidson: Deception is no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds. - All the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality. Glüer II 133 Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (Third Dogma). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Deceptions | Davidson | Rorty VI 214 Deception/Davidson/Rorty: bring us through a causal process to represent true or false beliefs depending on the programming. >Beliefs/Davidson. Davidson I 38 Error/Belief/Davidson: that I do not deceive myself in the majority of cases is essential for the fact that I have a language - that makes "inner objects" superfluous. >Objects of Belief. Instead: history of language acquisition. >Language acquisition, >Causal theory of knowledge. Truth conditions for the speaker: sentence is true when e.g. the Kohinoor is a crown jewel. - ((s) conditional: non-empirical - for the listener: empirical.) --- Davidson I (e) 98 Third dogma/scheme/content/error/deception/Davidson: deception after abolition of the separation schema/content is no longer a problem, no question whether we are capable of the knowledge of the world and of the foreign-psychological - even more: how - but these are no longer epistemological questions, but rather questions about the nature of rationality. >Conceptual scheme. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Economic Calculation | Mises | Coyne I 11 Calculation/Mises/Coyne/Boettke: „The fundamental objection advanced against the practicability of socialism refers to the impossibility of economic calculation. It has been demonstrated in an irrefutable way that a socialist commonwealth would not be in a position to apply economic calculation ... A socialist management ofproduction would simply not know whether or not what it plans and executes is the most appropriate means to attain the ends sought. It will operate in the dark, as it were. It will squander the scarce factors of production both material and human (labour). Chaos and poverty for all will unavoidably result.“ Ludwig von Mises (1922/ 1981(1)), 535. Coyne I 12 Coyne/Boettke: Economic calculation is the ability of economic actors to determine the expected value added of a potential use of a scarce resource. By comparing the expected value across potential alternatives, decision-makers are able to gauge which activities will have the highest value from the perspective of consumers. Judging the expected value across alternatives requires market-determined prices, which capture the relative scarcity of resources while allowing for a common unit for comparison. Mises: Mises argued that without property rights in the means of production, which the socialists wanted to abolish, there could be no economic calculation because there would be no money prices. His argument proceeded in three steps. First, without private ownership of the means ofproduction, a market for the means of production would not exist. You cannot have voluntary trade without the ownership of resources that allows for the exchange of those resources by owners. Second, without this market, there would not be money prices for the means of production. Monetary prices, which arise through market trade, are exchange ratios that capture the opportunity cost of a resource. If a cup of coffee is $ 1 and a bottle of soda is $2, this means that the price of a soda is two cups of coffee. By providing a common unit for comparison across goods and services, money prices allow people throughout the economy to judge the opportunity cost, or trade off, of engaging in one course of action over another. >Opportunity costs. Finally, without money prices for the means of production rational economic calculation is not possible because there is no way for decision-makers to judge the expected value added of alternative courses of action. Price/Mises: Money prices, according to Mises, emerge as the unintended outcome of the voluntary interaction of a multitude of individuals pursuing their separate and often conflicting plans in a market setting characterized by private ownership allowing for exchange. >Price. Coyne I 12 The prices that emerge in the market convey general knowledge about the relative scarcities of particular goods, and thus serve as "aids to the human mind" for calculating how resources should be used. MisesVsSocialism: In the absence of a market for the means of production, Mises asked, how would the Central Planning Board know which projects were economically feasible and which were not? Example: (…) how would planners know whether or not to use platinum to construct railroad tracks? Platinum, after all, is technologically feasible as an input to construct railways. In a market system, economic decisionmakers responsible for constructing the railroad would look at the price of platinum, which captures its relative scarcity, and attempt to gauge whether they expected to make a profit given the cost of the inputs (platinum being one). MisesVsSocialism: Abolishing prices - through the joint abolition of property rights and mone - would mean that planners would be unable to determine whether platinum or some other good should be used to construct railroad tracks. The result would be economic chaos in contrast to the rational order promised by proponents of the socialist system. SocialsmVsVs: The socialists took Mises's critique seriously and revised their vision. The result was a model of "market socialism," offered by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner, which sought to maintain the desirable features of the socialist system while addressing the critiques raised by Mises. Solution: The market socialist model included the use of money and allowed for a free market in final consumer goods and in labour markets. The means of production would still be nationalized. A Central Planning Board would be responsible for providing provisional ("shadow") prices for inputs to firms. Based on these provisional prices, firms would be instructed to select the combination of inputs that minimized the cost ofproducing the level of outputs that maximized profits. Problem: But how were firms to know this level of output? Solution: The Central Planning Board would instruct firms to follow the dictates of the perfectly competitive model by setting their prices equal to the marginal costs ofproduction and to produce those levels of output that minimize average costs. >Planned economy, >Planned Economy/Soviet Union, >Socialism/Mises, >Socialism/Hayek. 1. Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1981). German editions, 1922, 1932. English translation by J. Kahane, 1936; enlarged with an Epilogue, Planned Chaos, 1951; Jonathan Cape, 1969. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Enlightenment | Ancient Philosophy | Taureck I 35 Enlightenment/Taureck: Question. Can we compare the modern features of Sophists with the Enlightenment? E.g. Nomos/Sophists: "Laws of the Gods" are no longer enough to explain the social binding forces. Enlightenment/Taureck: 18th century; Main representatives are d'Alembert, Diderot, Rousseau and Voltaire. They were not strongly interested in the Sophists. >d'Alembert, >Rousseau, >Voltaire. Encyclopédie 1765. I 36 Enlightenment/Taureck: today one can see 5 characteristics of the Enlightenment: 1. Nature-legal justification of political and legal norms. Non-factual traditional norms, but natural determinations of people who demand freedom, equality and fraternity. (Rousseau, however, is against the abolition of social institutions, which means only the replacement of corruption by brigandage (gangsterism)). At that time the absolute monarchy was the most common form of government almost everywhere in Europe. I 37 Sophists/Taureck: sophists were in a situation where they were looking for foundations for the practice of a "direct" democracy that was lived in Athens and other cities without being bound to universal value judgments, because these did not exist. The physis could obviously be understood (according to Plato's Callicles) as a legal title for an empowerment of the strong against the community. Enlightenment/Taureck: 2. Characteristic: Definition Deism: deism is a natural religion, which includes rationality and tolerance of religions: God as the creator of nature, reason enables human beings to fulfill the moral prescriptions of the creator. >Deism. I 39 Enlightenment/Taureck: 3. Characteristic: Replacement of metaphysics by epistemology. Definition Metaphysics/Encyclopedie: "Science about the reasons of things". Because all painters, musicians, surveyors, poets need reasons, everyone has their own metaphysics. This leads to an empty and "contemptuous" science. I 39 Metaphysics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the concept which was later developed by Plato and Aristotle. In any case, they were more oriented towards epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck: 4. Characteristic: Reorientation of the natural sciences. I 40 Newton, GalileoVsAristotle: Movement is no longer to be understood as a goal-directed phenomenon, but by causality. >Natural science. Mechanics/Physics/Sophists/Taureck: the sophists did not yet know the teleology of Aristotle. >Epistemology. Enlightenment/Taureck: 5. Characteristic: Aesthetic theory, according to which beauty is to be judged independent of social standards. >Aesthetics. |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Good | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. >Knowledge/Hegel, >Absolute/Hegel. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of the good under the caption of the idea of "recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand. >Recognition/Hegel. I 184 Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of recognition", which in its turn is split into the "idea of truth" and the "idea of the good". Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship. >Dialectic/Hegel. The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of the good" in practical action. Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". >Experience/Kant, >I. Kant, >Reason, >Experience/Hegel, >Practice. I 185 Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it. I 186 Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good. The executed good would be the abolition of otherness. With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed. Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of truth and the idea of good is abolished. Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality. After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection. I 187 Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression! |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Happiness | Augustine | Höffe I 102 Happiness/redemption/Augustinus/Höffe: The final salvation, the participation of human beings in extra- and supernatural happiness, depends on the unavailable and unpredictable grace of God. HöffeVsAugustine: On the other hand, the question arises whether an achievement of Christianity, the abolition of all ethnic limitation in favour of all people of good will, is not weakened here, because the ethnic limitation gives way to a selection of grace. >Recognition/Augustine. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Industrial Revolution | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 197 Industrial Revolution/institutions/Acemoglu/Robinson: The Industrial Revolution was manifested in every aspect of the English economy. There were major improvements in transportation, metallurgy, and steam power. But the most significant area of innovation was the mechanization of textile production and the development of factories to produce these manufactured textiles. This dynamic process was unleashed by the institutional changes that flowed from the Glorious Revolution. This was not just about the abolition of domestic monopolies, which had been achieved by 1640, or about different taxes or access to finance. It was about a fundamental reorganization of economic institutions in favor of innovators and entrepreneurs, based on the emergence of more secure and efficient property rights. Acemolgu I 198 Property: Underlying the transportation revolution and, more generally, the reorganization of land that took place in the eighteenth century were parliamentary acts that changed the nature of property ownership. Land ownership: Common land could often be used only for traditional uses. There were enormous impediments to using land in ways that would be economically desirable. Parliament began to change this, allowing groups of people to petition Parliament to simplify and reorganize property rights, alterations that were subsequently embodied into hundreds of acts of Parliament. This reorganization of economic institutions also manifested itself in the emergence of an agenda to protect domestic textile production against foreign imports. Acemolgu I 202 Innovations/technology: By 1760 the combination of all these factors - improved and new property rights, improved infrastructure, a changed fiscal regime, greater access to finance, and aggressive protection of traders and manufacturers - was beginning to have an effect. After this date, there was a jump in the number of patented inventions, and the great flowering of technological change that was to be at the heart of the Industrial Revolution began to be evident. Acemoglu I 207 Institutions: It was the inclusive nature (>Terminology/Acemoglu) of English institutions that allowed this process to take place. Those who suffered from and feared creative destruction were no longer able to stop it. Geographical factors: why [did it happen] in England? The Industrial Revolution started and made its biggest strides in England because of her uniquely inclusive economic institutions. These in turn were built on foundations laid by the inclusive political institutions brought about by the Acemoglu I 208 Glorious Revolution. It was the Glorious Revolution that strengthened and rationalized property rights, improved financial markets, undermined state-sanctioned monopolies in foreign trade, and removed the barriers to the expansion of industry. This outcome was a consequence of the drift in English institutions and the way they interacted with critical junctures. >Institutional drift/Acemoglu, >Critical junctures/Acemoglu. Literature: Our overview of the economic history of the Industrial Revolution rests on Mantoux (1961)(1). Our argument about the causes of the Industrial Revolution is highly influenced by the arguments made in North and Thomas (1973)(2), North and Weingast (1989)(3), Brenner (1993)(4), Pincus (2009)(5), and Pincus and Robinson (2010)(6). These scholars in turn were inspired by earlier Marxist interpretations of British institutional change and the emergence of capitalism; see Dobb (1963)(7) and Hill (1961(8), 1980(9)). 1.Mantoux, Paul (1961). The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century. Rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row. 2.North, Douglass C. and Robert P. Thomas (1973). The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3.North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast (1989). “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49: 803–32. 4.Brenner, Robert (1993). Merchants and Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 5.Pincus, Steven C. A. (2009). 1688: The First Modern Revolution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 6. Pincus, Steven C. A., and James A. Robinson (2010). “What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?” Unpublished. http://scholar.harvard.edu/jrobinson. 7.Dobb, Maurice (1963). Studies in the Development of Capitalism. Rev. ed. New York: International Publishers. 8.Hill, Christopher (1961). The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 9. - (1980). “A Bourgeois Revolution?” In Lawrence Stone, ed. The British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Industrial Revolution | Robinson | Acemoglu I 197 Industrial Revolution/institutions/Acemoglu/Robinson: The Industrial Revolution was manifested in every aspect of the English economy. There were major improvements in transportation, metallurgy, and steam power. But the most significant area of innovation was the mechanization of textile production and the development of factories to produce these manufactured textiles. This dynamic process was unleashed by the institutional changes that flowed from the Glorious Revolution. This was not just about the abolition of domestic monopolies, which had been achieved by 1640, or about different taxes or access to finance. It was about a fundamental reorganization of economic institutions in favor of innovators and entrepreneurs, based on the emergence of more secure and efficient property rights. Acemolgu I 198 Property: Underlying the transportation revolution and, more generally, the reorganization of land that took place in the eighteenth century were parliamentary acts that changed the nature of property ownership. Land ownership: Common land could often be used only for traditional uses. There were enormous impediments to using land in ways that would be economically desirable. Parliament began to change this, allowing groups of people to petition Parliament to simplify and reorganize property rights, alterations that were subsequently embodied into hundreds of acts of Parliament. This reorganization of economic institutions also manifested itself in the emergence of an agenda to protect domestic textile production against foreign imports. Acemolgu I 202 Innovations/technology: By 1760 the combination of all these factors - improved and new property rights, improved infrastructure, a changed fiscal regime, greater access to finance, and aggressive protection of traders and manufacturers - was beginning to have an effect. After this date, there was a jump in the number of patented inventions, and the great flowering of technological change that was to be at the heart of the Industrial Revolution began to be evident. Acemoglu I 207 Institutions: It was the inclusive nature (>Terminology/Acemoglu) of English institutions that allowed this process to take place. Those who suffered from and feared creative destruction were no longer able to stop it. Geographical factors: why [did it happen] in England? The Industrial Revolution started and made its biggest strides in England because of her uniquely inclusive economic institutions. These in turn were built on foundations laid by the inclusive political institutions brought about by the Acemoglu I 208 Glorious Revolution. It was the Glorious Revolution that strengthened and rationalized property rights, improved financial markets, undermined state-sanctioned monopolies in foreign trade, and removed the barriers to the expansion of industry. This outcome was a consequence of the drift in English institutions and the way they interacted with critical junctures. >Institutional drift/Acemoglu, >Critical junctures/Acemoglu. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Language | Black | II 13 Languages/Black: different if speakers do not understand each other. >Understanding. II 16 Talk/Black: prevalence over writing. >Speaking, >Writing. II 20 New: no fully articulated thought possible without symbolic representation. >Representation. Words/Malinowski: the same part and equivalents of the action. >Actions, >Words. II 31 Language/Black: Text linear - thinking nonlinear. >Texts, >Thinking. II 30 Linguistics/Black: the tradition boasts about not considering the "impure meaning". II 63 BloomfieldVsTradition: phonemes must be compared with respect to meaning - only if the examiner finds out which statements are similar and which different in their meaning, he can learn to recognize the phonemic differences. Nevertheless, Bloomfiled per purely formal linguistics/per Ockham: meanings should not be used without need. One should rather rely on differences in meaning than on substantive meaning details. II 74f Language/Black: an infinite number of sentences is possible. - Therefore language is an open system like e.g., chess, chemical compositions, tunes. ((s) For the discussion whether there are infinitely many possible sentences, see >Researchgate.) II 87 Def Language/Black: too complex to be definable - Features: anchored in speech - speech act is targeted and self-regulating. Language is an institution (language community) - system built on units - meaning supporting, effect triggering, pliable II 130 Language/Locke/Black: for transmission of thoughts - (ideas). >Thoughts, >Imagination. II 161 VsLanguage/Berkeley: knowledge is confused and obscured through abuse. Locke: ditto. Whitehead: incomplete, only a transitional stage. Risk: false confidence in them. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Examples from literature: Swift: Gulliver: abolition of all words ... II 166 Sartre: disgust: Roquentin wants to withdraw into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Marx | Höffe | Höffe I 369 Marx/Höffe: Alienation:HöffeVsMarx: It is (...) not wrong to intertwine two concepts of alienation: the socio-psychological alienation, that "someone or something becomes a stranger to you", and the economic-legal alienation, that "someone sells property". But Marx argues the more far-reaching thesis that both alienations are two sides of one and the same process. Because this thesis is neither substantiated nor plausible, the socio-political goal cannot convince that a change in the economic form, the abolition of private property, the socio-psychological change, will bring about the person who is no longer alienated. >Alienation. Changes/HöffeVsMarx: (...) a change in economic form [comes about] only through a change in people. In Hegel's terms, "objective morality", the world of institutions, is only a counterpart to "subjective morality", human responsibility, not a substitute for it. Höffe I 370 In Hegelian terms, [Marx] generally overestimates the weight of the economy over that of law and state within the framework of objective morality. >Customs/Hegel. Theory/HöffeVsMarx: Even a theory that is compelling in argumentative terms cannot produce the corresponding practice itself. For this it needs an essentially practical moment: the approval of the allegedly compelling theory, its recognition. >Practise. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Memory | Margalit | Morozov I 280 Memory/Delete/Data/Forgetting/Margalite/Morozov: Avishai Margalit makes a distinction between forgiveness as an extinction, which he calls "blotting out" and forgiveness as an uncovering, which he calls "crossing out".(1) Morozov: i. e. making invisible or preserving an original inscription. For Margalit, preserving while crossing out is morally preferable.(2) Morozov: while technology helps us quickly and easily with extinguishing, it is not so easy to use it for forgiveness. cf. >Abolition. 1. Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 189. 2. ibid. |
Margalit I Avishai Margalit The Ethics of Memory Cambridge, MA 2004 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Method | Piketty | Bofinger I 104 Method/Empirical/Data/Piketti/BofingerVsPiketti: The most astonishing experience when reading Piketty's book is on page 472(1), where the reader comes across diagram 10.10 (…). It describes the empirical relationship between r and g for the long period from the birth of Christ to the year 2200. >Piketty hypothesis, >Piketty formula. At first glance, one finds here the empirical evidence for Piketty's fundamental law, according to which r is greater than g. Bofinger I 105 At second glance, one is surprised that for the period from 1913 to 2012, the exact opposite is the case: g is greater than r. Now, when looking at a period of more than two millennia, one could consider a temporary deviation for a period of 100 years as an exception to the rule. But that is not easy when one realizes that not only is the most reliable data available for this phase, but it is also the period that was shaped by modern capitalism. Bofinger I 106 [There has been] little discussion about the fact that the very gloomy assumption of a gradual abolition of all capital gains taxes is not insignificant for the forecast of r > g in the 21st century.(2) It is also astonishing that no one seems to be bothered by the fact that the data for the real return on capital, which are presented as "worldwide" in Piketty's graphs, obviously only come from France for the period from 1700 to 2012.(3) 1. Piketty, T. 2014. Das Kapital im 21. Jahrhundert. München: Beck. 2. Piketty deducts a tax rate of 30 percent from the pre-tax return in the period from 1913 to 2012. In the period from 2012 to 2050, he assumes a tax rate of 10 percent, which is reduced to 0 percent from 2050. If one assumes that international tax competition does not lead to a reduction in capital gains tax in the future, g > r would still apply until 2050 according to Piketty's data. 3. Table TS6.2 of the Data Appendix contains the data basis for the development of the return on capital in France, which Piketty then aggregates over long periods of time for Table TS10.3 and the associated graphics 10.9 to 10.11 and calls it the "global return on capital." If capital gains taxes and depreciation are deducted from the disaggregated data, as Piketty does to calculate the return on capital shown above, r can be calculated for the individual ten-year periods since 1820. If this is compared with the growth rate of national income in France, r > g applies from the 1980s onwards. However, if one compares the return on capital with the global growth rate from Table TS2.4, as Piketty does, r > g only seems to have applied in the 1990s, while the relationship has reversed again thereafter. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. Peter Bofinger und Philipp Scheuermeyer. 2015.“Das „Kapital“ im 21. Jahrhundert“.In: Thomas Piketty und die Verteilungsfrage. Ed. Peter Bofinger, Gustav A. Horn, Kai D. Schmid und Till van Treeck. 2015. |
Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Bofinger II Peter Bofinger Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments Oxford 2001 |
| Naturalism | McDowell | I 18 Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: refuses to acknowledge that the relationships that constitute the logical space of the reasons are not natural. >Space of reasons. I 92 Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: denies that the spontaneity of the mind is sui generis. The blunt naturalism aims to place the conceptual abilities in nature, presented as the realm of natural laws. Abolition of the distinction between the space of reasons and nature. This means that what is natural is disenchanted. (Disenchantment of nature). --- I 102 Naturalism/McDowell: a different kind of naturalism than the blunt naturalism equates nature with the field of natural laws. But it is a different concept of updating our nature: We must bring the susceptibility for the meaning back into the operations of our natural sensibilities as such. This does not mean, however, that susceptibility for the meaning can be captured naturalistically (in the sense of natural laws). >Meaning/McDowell, >Understanding/McDowell, >Nature/McDowell. This looks as if we had to stand with one foot inside and with the other outside nature. This is not naturalism at all. But we must not see ourselves as divisive, the exercise of our spontaneity belongs to our way of realizing ourselves as animals. >Spontaneity/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Nature | Adorno | Grenz I 25 Nature/Adorno/Grenz: Nature assumes an anthropomorphic character in which survival is no longer directly endangered. The overpressure of nature is reflected in the production conditions. The reign of nature over the human is superseded by that of the human over the human. This is necessary when the emancipation of nature should persist. >History/Adorno, >Progress/Adorno. Grenz I 48 Nature/Adorno/Grenz: True would be the pure natural, if this existed. But the fact that it does not exist forces the abolition of the concept of nature, and thus that of its normative force. >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. Grenz I 58 Nature/History/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno often speaks of reconciliation, but never of reconciliation of nature and history. I 59 Primacy of Nature/Adorno/Grenz: History is a moment of nature, just like the nature-breaking, ruling nature, as this is inherently conceived of nature. Subjectivity/Adorno/Grenz: only the determination allows the transition from the interpretation of the genesis of purposive rationality and its enforcement with regression as the western late period of anthropogenesis to the interpretation of the same process as a prehistory of subjectivity and as a natural history at the same time. >Subjectivity, >Subjectivity/Adorno, >Purpose Rationality. Veil/Adorno/Grenz: by interpreting anthropogenesis as a natural-historical event, the subjective aspect of the mind comes precisely in its negative form... I 60 ...as an ideological veil, as rationalization, which makes identification with the attacking existence possible and makes one's own suffering forgotten, to objective meaning. Grenz I 72 Second Nature/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno traces back the idea of the naturalness of the human inner to this concept.(1) >Second nature. Second nature is the social character of the substance of the individual(2), a proliferation of society.(2) (Negative Dialektik, p.73). I 73 "Under the aspect of the essay, the second nature gets hold of itself."(3) 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik. In: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970. p. 348, vgl. p.46, 73f 2. Th. W. Adorno. Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben. In: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 4, 1. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1980, p. 10, 3. Th. W. Adorno. Noten zur Literatur I, In: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 11, 1. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1980, p. 43. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Negation | Hegel | Höffe I 327 Certain Negation/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel masters the ability to think against himself, to observe himself while doing so and to record the observed data. Thinking can be constantly trained and in the end, so the claim, find its no longer increasable perfection in the absolute. >Method/Hegel. The methodical core of this procedure lies in the certain negation: In that a statement, the thesis, on closer inspection proves to be false in a well-defined respect, so the counterstatement, the antithesis, in the certainty of the false, something new emerges, which proves to be better and truer. But, since the foregoing does not appear to be wrong per se, but only in a certain sense, the new, the synthesis, retains the limited truth of the old. >Abolition/Aufhebung/Hegel. Abolition/Aufhebung: The suspension, of which Hegel then speaks, therefore has three meanings; it means a preserving, an eliminating, and a lifting. >Method/Hegel, >Dialectic/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Planned Economy | Hayek | Coyne I 11 Planned economy/Mises/Hayek/Coyne/Boettke: During what became known as the "socialist calculation debate," Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek engaged in an intellectual debate over the feasibility of socialism as a means of economic organization. Socialist thinkers argued that advanced material production could be achieved through central economic planning while avoiding the various ills of capitalism - market failure, economic downturns, unemployment. For the first wave of socialist thinkers, central planning involved the abolition of money and property rights in the means of production. In place of markets, comprehensive economic planning by a government agency would determine what was to be made, how it was to be produced, and how it was to be distributed. Mises challenged this vision by arguing that rational economic calculation under socialism was impossible in an advanced industrial economy. >Socialism/Mises, >Calculation, >Price/Mises, >Planned Economy/Soviet Union. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Planned Economy | Soviet Union | Coyne I 12 Planned Economy/Soviet Union/Coyne/Boettke: MisesVsSocialism: Abolishing prices - through the joint abolition of property rights and mone - would mean that planners would be unable to determine whether platinum or some other good should be used to construct railroad tracks. The result would be economic chaos in contrast to the rational order promised by proponents of the socialist system. >Socialism/Mises, >Calculation, >Price/Mises, >Planned economy/Mises. SocialsmVsVs: The socialists took Mises's critique seriously and revised their vision. The result was a model of "market socialism," offered by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner, which sought to maintain the desirable features of the socialist system while addressing the critiques raised by Mises. Solution: The market socialist model included the use of money and allowed for a free market in final consumer goods and in labour markets. The means of production would still be nationalized. A Central Planning Board would be responsible for providing provisional ("shadow") prices for inputs to firms. Based on these provisional prices, firms would be instructed to select the combination of inputs that minimized the cost ofproducing the level of outputs that maximized profits. Problem: But how were firms to know this level of output? Solution: The Central Planning Board would instruct firms to follow the dictates of the perfectly competitive model by setting their prices equal to the marginal costs of production and to produce those levels of output that minimize average costs. Coyne I 13 The market socialists were aware that the Central Planning Board might select the incorrect provisional prices - that is, prices that did not reflect the true underlying scarcity. They argued, however, that this would not pose a problem because adjustments could be made on a trial-and-error basis based on inventories that would be observable to the planning board. Just as markets tended to correct for surpluses by putting downward pressure on prices, so too could the Central Planning Board by adjusting prices in the face of excess inventories. Similarly, just as markets respond to shortages with increases in prices, so too would planners who would dictate higher prices in the face of a lack of inventory. According to the market socialists, this process would mimic, if not exceed, the effciency of markets while maintaining the economic, social, and political goals of socialism. Socialism/HayekVsSocialism: It is here that F.A. Hayek entered the debate. The market socialists, Hayek argued, were preoccupied with a static notion of equilibrium where all relevant economic knowledge was given, known, and frozen. >Socialism/Hayek. |
Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Politics | Christianity | Höffe I 92 Politics/Christianity/Höffe: While Plato links political thinking with almost all areas of his philosophical thinking, Aristotle and Cicero here limit themselves to the interlocking of politics with ethics and a philosophically demanding rhetoric. In this way, practical philosophy becomes largely autonomous: it has its own object (...).under the influence of Christianity, this autonomy, both thematic and methodological, is lost. Political thinking is permeated by religion in its interior, its essence. Mere politics, at best linked with ethics and rhetoric, has lost its right. >Aristotle, >Cicero. Man: The fact that according to Genesis man - to emphasize: every human being - is created in the image of God unfolds its full explosive power only after a long time. Judaism: First, in Christianity, the ethnic limitation of Judaism Höffe I 93 is lifted in favor of all people of good will, thus realizing the potential of universalization first suggested by Jewish prophets. >Judaism. Politics and Religion: In the canon of Christianity, in the New Testament, the sentence "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's"(1) puts into perspective the combination of politics and religion that was prevalent in the Old Orient and still resonated in Cicero's recourse to Roman sacral law. >Religion, >State (Polity), >Christian Church. Slavery: Paul's call to treat the runaway Onesimus "like a brother" seeks for a legal and social offence, slavery, a solution from the core of Christianity, charity. But it displaces the legal and at the same time genuinely political solution, the abolition of the institution of slavery. For the one who is treated as a brother remains a slave. >Slavery. Höffe I 94 Two-realms doctrine: Although it does not dominate the whole of Christianity, it is dominant in many phases of its history of influence. It is based on the message of Jesus, for example the statement "My kingdom is not of this world" (2) and the mentioned verse of Matthew "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's."(1) Höffe: Both empires are not of equal rank; instead of a secondary order, there is a priority in the sense of a hierarchy in the literal sense of a holy dominion. The divine rule pushes the secular one into the second rank, often into the almost insignificant background. State of authority/rule: In a text highly significant for the Christian theory of the political, in the Letter to the Romans, the apostle Paul calls upon the Roman community to be subject to its authority. He justifies this entitlement of an authoritarian state Höffe I 95 with a theological argument that for centuries has made it almost impossible for Christians to protest, if necessary to resist political violence: "For there is no authority but of God: but where there is authority, it is appointed by God."(3) In this sentence the political claim raised by princes until well into modern times is based on being rulers "by the grace of God". John Vs authority: But the Christian canon also contains a true counter-text. In the Revelation of John, the Apocalypse also called the "Secret Revelation", the authority appears as a satanic dragon (13) and as the harlot of Babylon (17) in contrast to the New Jerusalem (21). Apolitical attitude: Elsewhere, especially in the four gospels, apart from the separation of spheres, the genuinely political plays almost no role. In the foreground, particularly clearly in the Sermon on the Mount, the rather apolitical, because above all for free close relations the obligation to love one's neighbour is valid. In addition, there is the frequently given command to imitate the corresponding behaviour of the master: "Go and do the same"(4). Life style: It depends (...) on a living together determined by the commandment to love, which essentially takes place in the pre-political, even if social area. >Community, >Society. 1. Matthew 22:21 2. John 18:36 3. Romans 13,1 4. Luke 10,37 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Price | Mises | Rothbard III 754 Price/Mises/Rothbard: „Prices are a market phenomenon.... They are the resultant of a certain constellation of market data, of actions and reactions of the members of a market society. It is vain to meditate what prices would have been if some of their determinants had been different.... It is no less vain to ponder on what prices ought to be. Everybody is pleased ifthe prices of things he wants to buy drop and the prices of the things he wants to sell rise.... Any price determined on a market is the necessary outgrowth of the interplay of the forces operating, that is, demand and supply. Whatever the market situation which generated this price may be, with regard to it the price is always adequate, genuine, and real. It cannot be higher if no bidder ready to offer a higher price turns up, and it cannot be Iower if no seller ready to deliver at a Iower price turns up. Only the appearance of such people ready to buy or sell can alter prices. Economics ... does not develop formulas which would enable anybody to compute a "correct" price different from that established on the market by the interaction of buyers and sellers.... This refers also to monopoly prices.... No alleged "factfinding" and no armchair speculation can discover another price at which demand and supply would become equal. The failure of all experiments to find a satisfactory solution for the limited-space monopoly of public utilities clearly proves this truth.“(1) >Monopoly price/Economic theories, >Monopolies, >Social goods, >Supply, >Demand. 1. Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 392-94. Coyne I 12 Price/Mises/Coyne/Boettke: Money prices, according to Mises, emerge as the unintended outcome of the voluntary interaction of a multitude of individuals pursuing their separate and often conflicting plans in a market setting characterized by private ownership allowing for exchange. allowing for exchange. The prices that emerge in the market convey general knowledge about the relative scarcities of particular goods, and thus serve as "aids to the human mind" for calculating how resources should be used. MisesVsSocialism: In the absence of a market for the means of production, Mises asked, how would the Central Planning Board know which projects were economically feasible and which were not? Example: (…) how would planners know whether or not to use platinum to construct railroad tracks? Platinum, after all, is technologically feasible as an input to construct railways. In a market system, economic decisionmakers responsible for constructing the railroad would look at the price of platinum, which captures its relative scarcity, and attempt to gauge whether they expected to make a profit given the cost of the inputs (platinum being one). MisesVsSocialism: Abolishing prices - through the joint abolition of property rights and mone - would mean that planners would be unable to determine whether platinum or some other good should be used to construct railroad tracks. The result would be economic chaos in contrast to the rational order promised by proponents of the socialist system. SocialsmVsVs: The socialists took Mises's critique seriously and revised their vision. The result was a model of "market socialism," offered by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner, which sought to maintain the desirable features of the socialist system while addressing the critiques raised by Mises. Solution: The market socialist model included the use of money and allowed for a free market in final consumer goods and in labour markets. The means of production would still be nationalized. A Central Planning Board would be responsible for providing provisional ("shadow") prices for inputs to firms. Based on these provisional prices, firms would be instructed to select the combination of inputs that minimized the cost of producing the level of outputs that maximized profits. Problem: But how were firms to know this level of output? Solution: The Central Planning Board would instruct firms to follow the dictates of the perfectly competitive model by setting their prices equal to the marginal costs of production and to produce those levels of output that minimize average costs. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Rate of Profit | Rothbard | Rothbard III 509 Rate of profit/entrepreneur/Rothbard: The capitalist-entrepreneur buys factors or factor services in the present; his product must be sold in the future. He is always on the alert, then, for discrepancies, for areas where he can earn more than the going rate of interest. >Rate of interest/Rothbard, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Factor market/Rothbard. What gave rise to this realized profit, this ex post profit fulfilling the producer’s ex ante expectations? The fact that the factors of production in this process were underpriced and undercapitalized - underpriced in so far as their unit services were bought, undercapitalized in so far as the factors were bought as wholes. >Time/Rothbard, >Capitalization/Rothbard. In either case, the general expectations of the market erred by underestimating the future rents (MVPs) of the factors. >Marginal product/Rothbard. Rothbard III 510 What function has the entrepreneur performed? By recognizing the discrepancy and doing something about it, he shifted factors of production (obviously nonspecific factors) from other productive processes to this one. Marginal product: He detected that the factors’ prices did not adequately reflect their potential DMVPs (discounted marginal products); by bidding for, and hiring, these factors, he was able to allocate them from production of lower DMVP to production of higher DMVP. >Discounting/Rothbard. Rate of profit: It is clear that there is no sense whatever in talking of a going rate of profit. There is no such rate beyond the ephemeral and momentary. For any realized profit tends to disappear because of the entrepreneurial actions it generates. Interest rate: The basic rate, then, is the rate of interest, which does not disappear. If we start with a dynamic economy, and if we postulate given value scales and given original factors and technical knowledge throughout, the result will be a wiping out of profits to reach an ERE (Evenly Rotting Economy) with a pure interest rate. >Evenly Rotating Economy, >Gain and Loss/Rothbard. Rothbard III 513 „Rate of loss“: The absurdity of the concept of “rate of profit” is even more evident if we attempt to postulate a rate of loss. Obviously, no meaningful use can be made of “rate of loss”; entrepreneurs will be very quick to leave the losing investment and take their capital elsewhere. With entrepreneurs leaving the line of production, the prices of the factors there will drop and the price of the product will rise (with reduced supply), until the net return in that branch of production will be the same as in every branch, and this return will be the uniform interest rate of the ERE. It is clear, therefore, that the process of equalization of rate of return throughout the economy, one that results in a uniform rate of interest, is the very same process that brings about the abolition of profits and losses in the ERE (Evenly Rotating Economy). |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Revolution | Marx | Habermas IV 499 Revolution/Marx/Habermas: Marx not only wants to show how the systemically independent process of self-exploitation of capital is experienced from the lifeworld perspective of wage workers as continuous exploitation, how the subsumption of labour power under the commodity form pulls workers out of their traditional living conditions, first uproots corporative ways of existence plebeianly and then proletarianises them. >Labor/Marx, >Labor Power/Marx, >Alienation/Marx, >Commodity. Rather, Marx drafts a practical-political perspective of action which, in its prerequisites, is exactly contrary to the perspective tacitly adopted by system functionalism. Systems theory presupposes that the process of instrumentalizing the lifeworld has already come to a conclusion. Habermas IV 500 In contrast, Marx envisages a future state in which the objective appearance of the capital has melted away and the world held captive under the dictates of value law has been returned to its spontaneity. He foresees the formation of a movement that seizes political power only to revolutionize society; together with private ownership of means of production, it will destroy the institutional foundations of the medium through which the capitalist economy has been differentiated and bring the systemically independent process of economic growth back into the horizon of the lifeworld. Terminology/Marx: In Marx, the system and lifeworld appear under the metaphors of the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom". >Lifeworld. WeberVsMarx/Habermas: compared to Marx's revolutionary expectations that theoretical criticism only has to solve the magic that rests on the work that has become abstract, Weber is proved right: "that the abolition of private capitalism...would by no means mean a break-up of the steel housing of modern industrial work...".(1) >M. Weber. HabermasVsMarx: his error can be traced back to the dialectical link between system and environment analysis, which (...) does not allow a separation between the (...) Habermas IV 501 level of system differentiation and the class-specific forms of its institutionalization. >Lifeworld, >Systems Theory. Brocker I 203 Permanent Revolution/Marx: Marx already used the term "permanent revolution" for the first time in his paper "On the Jewish Question", 1844(4), where he declared the Jacobin rule in the French Revolution as a violent attempt to establish the political superstructure of bourgeois society. This can only be achieved by declaring the revolution permanent. The political drama therefore ends just as necessarily with the restoration of religion, private property, all elements of bourgeois society, as the war ends with peace.(2) >Judaism, >French Revolution, >Bourgeoisie. This had nothing to do with the idea of a permanent revolution to bring the proletariat to power. Permanent Revolution/Marx/Engels: later it is about making the revolution permanent and carrying it to all countries until the competition of the proletarians in these countries has stopped.(3) 1.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Köln 1964 2. Marx, Karl, »Zur Judenfrage« [1844], in: ders./Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin [DDR] 1956, Bd. 1, 347-377. 3. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, »Ansprache der Zentralbehörde an den Bund vom März 1850«, in: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin [DDR] 1960, Bd. 7, 244-254. 4. Karl Marx: Zur Judenfrage. In: Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Paris 1844, S. 182 ff. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Substance | Kant | Strawson V 187 Substance/StrawsonVsKant: it is wrong, to conclude an underlying substance from the variability of the things - even according to his own principles - because if it should be a condition of experience, then it is circlular. >Circular reasoning. --- Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is according to him unique in its very nature, infinite, and indivisible. >Substance/Spinoza. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thinking conditions of the substantial unity of the world and the experience conditions of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance in which "all that one had thought to be true, has perished". This, however, reveals the actual thinking condition, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. Kant draws from this the consequence of establishing the unity of the world in the priority of thinking. The unity is then only transcendental or subjectively idealistic justified. HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to establish the unity of existence in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history. >Thinking/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Substance | Spinoza | Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished." >Unity/Spinoza, >Appearance, >World, >Order, >World/Thinking. This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. Holz I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". >Unity and multiplicity. If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. >Reduction, >Reductionism. Holz I 62 Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears). >Identity, >Self-identity, >Whole, >Totality. Adequacy does not matter here. >Adequacy. "Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori. Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza. Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite." However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals. Holz I 63 VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza. He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God. With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God. Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism. Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Realism. Höffe I 232 Substance/Spinoza/Höffe: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the different basic forms of reality are nothing else but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). It excludes a transcendent concept of God that transcends the world and, although its system starts from a concept of God, it brings Spinoza the then almost fatal accusation of atheism(1). >Pantheism, >God. 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Terminology | Agamben | Brocker I 823 Exception/Terminology/Agamben: on the one hand, the exception is excluded from the norm as an individual case, but on the other hand, what is special about the exclusion relation is "that what is excluded is therefore not completely without relation to the norm; on the contrary, it remains connected with it in the form of its abolition". (1) Homo sacer/Agamben: the "Holy Human": is not protected from the outset, but on the contrary a possible sacrifice; see Holiness/Agamben. Brocker I 827 The exceptional conditions infect politics as a whole and this mutates into an administration of states of emergency; this is Agamben's central insight. See Politics/Agamben. Brocker I 830 The spell: is the original political relationship - and not the treaty, as the liberal democracies make it believe. Sovereign power: is originally aimed at the production of naked life, which represents the threshold of the connection between "zōḗ" and "bíos" - the figure of the citizen and his political freedoms therefore appears as a power-political illusion. The camp replaces the state as the biopolitical paradigm of the West - and thus also sheds a radically different light on the current understanding of public space. 1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 27. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Terminology | Klein | Brocker I 939 Terminology/Klein: Branding: the creation of brand awareness and thus a corresponding consumer behaviour, which dramatically increased their profit margins in the 1990s. This process of creating new demand markets - no longer the material product, but only the brand is produced, advertised, demanded and bought in any material product - runs parallel to the abolition of traditional industrial production and conventional forms of work and employment in the global North. >Jobs/Klein. Klein calls the sports shoe marketer Nike, who does not own any of the production factories in which he has his shoes manufactured, the 'prototype of the product-free brand'(1). Brocker I 933 "Branding Breakthrough"/Klein: brand penetration: for consumers no price is too high for brand awareness: "For brand obsessed Brocker I 934 buyers consuming almost turned into a fetish and the brand name is attributed a talisman-like power"(2) This allows companies to engage in an ever-increasing range of economic activities. Brocker I 937 »Culture-Jamming«: Klein describes the practice of parodying advertising and intelligently subverting its message as 'an X-ray of the unconscious content of an advertising campaign'(3). >Advertising. Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Toronto 2000. (Tenth Anniversary Edition with a New Introduction by the Author, New York 32010.) Dt.: Naomi Klein, No Logo! Der Kampf der Global Players um Marktmacht – Ein Spiel mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern, Frankfurt/M. 2015 (zuerst 2001) p. 202 2. Ibid. p. 152 3. Ibid. p. 282 Christine Bauhardt, „Naomi Klein, No Logo! (2000)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Thinking | Hegel | Gadamer I 472 Thinking/Hegel/Gadamer: The abolition of the difference between speculative and dialectical, which we find in Hegel's speculative science of the term, shows how much he knows himself to be the perfecter of Greek logos philosophy. >Speculation/Hegel, >Dialectic/Hegel. Dialectic: What he calls dialectic and what Plato called dialectic is based on the subjugation of language to the "statement". Statement: But the concept of statement, the dialectical intensification of the contradiction, is now in extreme contrast to the nature of hermeneutic experience and the linguistic nature of human experience of the world in general. Admittedly, Hegel's dialectic also actually follows the speculative spirit of language. But according to Hegel's self-understanding, he only wants to listen to language's reflective play of its thought determinations and raise thinking to the self-consciousness of the concept by means of dialectical mediation in the totality of known knowledge. >Speculation/Hegel, >Concept/Hegel. GadamerVsHegel: Thus it remains in the dimension of what has been said and does not reach the dimension of linguistic world experience. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Zeno | Hegel | Bubner I 72 Zeno/Hegel/Bubner: his peculiarity is dialectic. Reason makes the beginning (Hegel pro). >Dialectic/Hegel, >Method/Hegel. The advantage over Parmenides is that assertions are not made in such a way, which presuppose an abstraction and are therefore not at all suitable for an actual beginning. >Beginning/Hegel. The zenonian reason does not intervene when something is developed when something is posed, because it allows the impossibility of opposite conception on the thing itself. Impossibility: because the one gets into contradictions who attributes the many, rather than the one being of Parmenides. >Zeno as an author, >About Zeno, >Parmenides. Paradoxes/Movement/Zeno/Hegel/Bubner: Hegel takes over Aristotle's solution: the introduced distinction of two aspects in space and time, namely, continuity and discretion. Bubner: this is unhistorical, because Zenon could not be yet aware of it. Solution: the continuum introduced by Aristotle makes the infinite divisibility of space and time compatible with its unity. Hegel: "the self-equality, continuity is absolute connexion, the dissolution of all distinction, all negativity, of being-for-itself. >Mediation/Hegel. The point, on the other hand, is the pure being-for-itself, the absolute self-differentiation, and the abolition of all equality and connexion with others. But these two are placed in space and time in one, space and time the contradiction (!). It is closest to show it in the movement: For the movement also places something opposite for the presentation. >Motion, >Paradoxes. BubnerVsHegel: Here, Hegel discovers more than the translation can give. It is anachronistic to raise Zenon to the dialectician. Anachronisms, however, are the price of structural comparisons that are philosophically illuminating. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkeley, G. | Kant Vs Berkeley, G. | Putnam I 167 Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth. I 167/168 KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory". BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Frege, G. | Quine Vs Frege, G. | Quine I 425 VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. I 209 Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object) "a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object. Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs). I 264 according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited. I 266 Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function. II 201 Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear. II 202 "So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write: "{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment). (i.e.the inversion of "so that"). Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes! We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality. The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular. II 203 It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory: (1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx}) This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! III 98 Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates. III 99 Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences. Applying: Terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs. III 100 Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person. Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension. QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes"). Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes. VII (f) 108 Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are. Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities. VII (f) 109 Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71). Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements. Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language: Names are one kind of expression and statements are another! QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements. Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme. "p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111) VII (f) 115 Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names. IX 216 Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT! Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again. NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands. Ad 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks). XI 55 QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")". QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy). 2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization (Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7)) comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Kant | Hegel Vs Kant | Leibniz I 32 Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified. HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history. --- Rorty II 153 HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible. Rorty VI 195 HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism. VI 203 HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. --- Vollmer I 220 Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress. This is approximately: SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular. HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water. Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson". |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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