Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 242 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adverse Selection | Barr | Gaus I 213 Adverse Selection/public goods/welfare state//Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. >Welfare state, >Society. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). >Insurances. Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998(2): 190—2). >Moral Hazard. 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Allocation | Mankiw | Mause I 152 Allocation/Mankiw/Taylor: any balanced allocation in a perfect market is welfare maximizing. (1) Def Welfare: "social surplus", the sum of consumer and producer surpluses. Def consumer surplus: the amount of money that households "save" that would have been ready to pay a higher price for the goods than the equilibrium market price. Def producer surplus: the (short-term) profit of enterprises, as the surplus of total proceeds over the costs below the marginal costs up to the equilibrium quantity. 1. Gregory N. Mankiw, Mark P. Taylor, Grundzüge der Volkswirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart 2016, p. 249 |
EconManki I N. Gregory Mankiw Mark P. Taylor Economics German Edition: Grundzüge der Volkswirtschaftslehre Stuttgart 2016 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Altruism | Mayr | I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)(2): 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Altruism | Quine | XIII 3 Altruism/Quine: altruism is the main stem of morality and the main purpose of moral principles. XIII 4 Rational argument: 1. The moral behaviour is in one's own interest. 2. We are all better off then. Fallacy: it is false to assume that the individual will then also be better off. Should we then say that selfishness is still a guarantee for altruism when we have institutionalised police and punishment? No we should not, for two reasons: 1. Punishment requires only moderate altruism and leaves the supererogatory untouched. 2. Self-interest also touches certain unaltruistic behaviour when the person sees chances of escaping the police. Altruism: the enlightened altruist recognizes that self-interest does not require a truly rational basis. Def Altruism/Enlightened/Quine: altruism simply praises the welfare of others as one's own. Vs: some moralists believe that morality is threatened by this lack of rationality. QuineVsVs: virtue is their own reward. XIII 5 Motive/Quine: there are simply other motives than self-interest, namely proper ones. Altruism/Evolution/Quine: evolution is sometimes explained by an interest in preserving the gene pool. QuineVs: Altruism is not always as abundant as we would like it to be, nor is it always reinforced by self-interest. Altruism/Quine: it is one thing to strengthen it in our less receptive contemporaries - another thing to expand its scope. Evolution explains altruism only in relation to the family. Problem: many of us also take care of animals, etc. The human heart is only satisfied when it encompasses the whole world. Moral/Ethics/Quine: we have no outstanding feature for them. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Animals | Rothbard | Rothbard III 171 Animals/economics/Rothbard: Animals are “economic land,” because they are equivalent to physical land in being original, nature-given factors of production. Yet will anyone deny title to a cow to the man that finds and domesticates her, putting her to use? For this is precisely what occurs in the case of land. Previously valueless “wild” land, like wild animals, is taken and transformed by a man into goods useful for man. The “mixing” of labor gives equivalent title in one case as in the other. >Nature/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard. Production/Rothbard: We must remember, also, what “production” entails. When man “produces,” he does not create matter. He uses given materials and transforms and rearranges them into goods that he desires. >Production/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard. If animals are also “land” in the sense of given original nature factors, so are water and air. We have seen that “air” is inappropriable, a condition of human welfare rather than a scarce good that can be owned. However, this is true only of air for breathing under usual conditions. For example, if some people want their air to be changed, or “conditioned,” then they will have to pay for this service, and the “conditioned air” becomes a scarce good that is owned by its producers. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Arendt | Dagger | Gaus I 173 Arendt/Dagger: [for Pocock a] source of inspiration was the political theorist Hannah Arendt: 'In terms borrowed from or suggested by the language of Hannah Arendt, [The Machiavellian Moment] has told part of the story of the revival in the early modern West of the ancient ideal of homo politicus (the zöon politikon of Aristotle), who affirms his being and his virtue by the medium of political action' (1975(1): 550). >Republicanism/Pocock. Dagger: It would be unwise to say that a thinker as multi-farious as Arendt was first, last, and above all a republican, but there is certainly a strong streak of republicanism in her writings (Canovan, 1992)(2), esp. ch. 6). This streak is most evident in her recurring concern for what I have called the cornerstones of republicanism - publicity and self-government. To some commentators this concern seems little more than misplaced nostalgia for the ancient polis (e.g. O'Sullivan, 1975(3)). Modernism/Arendt: But Arendt's complaint is not so much that civic life in modern democracies has declined dramatically from some golden age, as that it has failed to realize the promise of republican citizenship. Technology/Arendt: Technology has eased the burdens of labour and freed us to act as citizens in the public realm, she argued in The Human Condition (1958)(4), yet we forsake public life in favour of private consumption. Government/Arendt: We want government to provide for the welfare of the citizenry, she declared in On Revolution, but we 'deny the very existence of public happiness and public freedom' as we 'insist that politics is a burden' (1965(5): 273). >H. Arendt. 1. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975) The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 3. O'Sullivan, Noel (1975) 'Hannah Arendt: Hellenic nostalgia and industrial society'. In A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue, eds, Contemporary Political Philosophers. New York: Dodd, Mead. 4. Arendt, Hannah (1958) The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 5. Arendt, Hannah (1965) On revolution New York: Viking. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Arrow’s Theorem | D’Agostino | Gaus I 242 Arrow’s Theorem/pluralism/diversity/D’Agostino: Consider a collection of individuals, each of whom has well-behaved preferences (or judgements) over a domain of alternative social arrangements. The problem of collective choice is to specify a procedure, meeting (at least) minimal conditions of fairness, that will deliver a rating of these alternative arrangements, based on individuals' assessments, that is sufficiently determinate to warrant the selection of one of them as the collectively binding arrangement for this group. Arrow: What Arrow shows, and what much subsequent tinkering has confirmed, is that there is no formal procedure of amalgamation that can be relied on for this purpose (see Arrow, 1979(1); and, for helpful commentary, see Mueller, 1989(2), and Sen, 1970(3)). In so far as a procedure fairly recognizes the antecedent assessments of the various individuals, it will, on certain profiles of assessments, fail to achieve determinacy, and, hence, will fail to identify a collectively binding social arrangement. D’Agostino: I tried elsewhere (D' Agostino, 1996)(4) to show that this result provides a model for theorizing about ideals, such as 'public reason', that are, at least nowadays, directly associated with liberalism per se (see also Gaus, 1996(5); and D' Agostino and Gaus, 1998(6)). Democracy/diversity/procedures/Arrow/D’Agostino: the point of Arrow's Theorem is not that formal procedures never work, but rather that they don't always work. And this point is ethico-politically significant for two reasons. 2) When we apply a procedure in concrete circumstances, we typically will not be able to tell, antecedently, whether or not it will work in these circumstances. 2) Even if we can determine that it will not work in these circumstances, we have, according to Arrow's Theorem, no alternative procedure (of the same type) to use instead, except, of course, another that also will not work. Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S1: Winner S1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. (The alternative to such arbitrariness is simple indeterminacy: none of the options can be identified as the collectively binding best for the group.) Cf. >Chaos Theorem/Social Choice Theory. Elections/democracy/solutions: (...) once such diversity among individuals' assessments is 'managed', exactly the indeterminacy of such formal procedures as voting (and other modes of amalgamation) disappears. Suppose, for instance, that through some programme of socialization and education, individuals' assessments are sufficiently 'homogenized' that one of the alternative social arrangements that individuals are assessing is 'dominant' in the sense that it is best from all relevant points of view. In this case, we might have the configuration in Table II of preferences. Table II of preferences S1: A 1st – B 1st – C 1st S2: A 2nd – B 3rd – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 2nd Given this configuration, there would be no difficulty with collective choice, either statically or dynamically. There is a unique collectively best option whose identification as such is not dependent on arbitrary factors and whose selection as such cannot be destabilized (so long as individuals' assessments themselves remain constant). Value monism/pluralism//D‘Agostino: Of course, Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. (For D’Agostino’s solution see >Diversity/Liberalism.) 1. Arrow, Kenneth (1979) 'Values and collective decision making'. In Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Sen, Amartya (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. 4. D'Agostino, Fred (1996) Free Public Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. D' Agostino, Fred and Gerald Gaus, eds (1998) Public Reason. Aldershot: Dartmouth. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Asymmetry | Arrow | Mause I 166 Asymmetry/Information Markets/Arrow: Market participants are often confronted not only with a lack of information of the type incomplete information, but also with a lack of information of the type asymmetric information. (1)(2) Example: A buyer is less informed about a used car than the seller. Terminology: this is described in the literature with the terms "principal" (seller, superior; holds more information) and "agent" (buyer, employee; holds less information). Problem: a) a buyer who is not aware of his information deficit will be disadvantaged, b) a buyer who is aware of this deficit may not enter into a contractual relationship. See Information/Arrow. 1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53, (5) , 1963, p. 941– 973. 2. G. A. Akerlof, The market for ‚Lemons‘: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3) 1970 p. 488– 500. |
EconArrow I Kenneth J. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Authors/Titles | Welfare Economics | Welfare Economics |
|
| Average Utility | Rawls | I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Behavior | Benkler | Benkler I 386 Behavior/Institutional Ecology/Law/Society/Equilibrium/Path Dependence/Benkler: First, law affects human behavior on a micro-motivational level and on a macro-social organizational level. This is in contradistinction to, on the one hand, the classical Marxist claim that law is epiphenomenal, and, on the other hand, the increasingly rare simple economic models that ignore transaction costs and institutional barriers and simply assume that people will act in order to maximize their welfare, irrespective of institutional arrangements. >Epiphenomenalism. Second, the causal relationship between law and human behavior is complex. Simple deterministic models of the form “if law X, then behavior Y” have been used as assumptions, but these are widely understood as, and criticized for being, oversimplifications for methodological purposes. However, they also shape social norms with regard to behaviors, psychological attitudes toward various behaviors, the cultural understanding of actions, and the politics of claims about behaviors and practices. Some push back and nullify the law, some amplify its I 387 effects; it is not always predictable which of these any legal change will be. Third, and as part of the complexity of the causal relation, the effects of law differ in different material, social, and cultural contexts. The same law introduced in different societies or at different times will have different effects. It may enable and disable a different set of practices, and trigger a different cascade of feedback and counter-effects. Fourth, the process of lawmaking is not exogenous to the effects of law on social relations and human behavior. One can look at positive political theory or at the history of social movements to see that the shape of law itself is contested in society because it makes (through its complex causal mechanisms) some behaviors less attractive, valuable, or permissible and others more so. Different societies will differ in initial conditions and their historically contingent first moves in response to similar perturbations, and variances will emerge in their actual practices (…). The term “institutional ecology” refers to this context-dependent, causally complex, feedback-ridden, path-dependent process. I 388 The possibility of multiple stable equilibria alongside each other evoked by the stories of radio and print media is a common characteristic to both ecological models and analytically tractable models of path dependency. Both methodological approaches depend on feedback effects and therefore suggest that for any given path divergence, there is a point in time where early actions that trigger feedbacks can cause large and sustained differences over time. >Path dependence. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Behavior | Mayr | I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)(2): 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Benefit | Mueller | Mause I 271 Benefits/Welfare Economics/Mueller: for the establishment of a welfare function it is necessary to assume cardinal and also individual benefit measures. (1) Problem: these requirements for social welfare functions are more demanding and therefore less realistic than those raised by other microeconomic theory, see Hands (2). See also Welfare Economics/Mueller. 1, Dennis C. Mueller, Public choice III. Cambridge 2003, S. 565-567. 2.Wade D. Hands, Paul Samuelson and revealed preference theory. History of Political Economy 46, (1) 2014, S.85– 116. |
EconMuell I Dennis C. Mueller Public Choice III Cambridge 2003 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Benefit Principle | Rothbard | Rothbard III 922 Benefit principle/taxation/Rothbard: Still another attempt at neutral taxation is the benefit principle, which states that a tax should be levied equal to the benefit which the individuals receive from the government service. >Cost Principle/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Economic theories, >Neutral taxation/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard. Costs: Rothbard: It is not always realized what this principle would mean: e.g., that recipients of welfare benefits would have to pay the full costs of these benefits. Each recipient of government welfare would then have to pay more than he received, for he would also have to pay the "handling" costs of government bureaucracy. >Bureaucracy/Rothbard. VsBenefit principle: Obviously, there would be no such welfare or any other subsidy payments if the benefit principle were maintained. Service: Even if we again confine the discussion to services like police protection, grave flaws still remain. Rothbard III 923 Measurements/VsBenefit Principle: A fatal problem is that we cannot measure benefits or even know whether they exist. As in the head tax and cost principles, there is here no free market where people can demonstrate that they are receiving a benefit from the exchange greater than the value of the goods they surrender. In fact, since taxes are levied by coercion, it is clear that people's benefits from government are considerably less than the amount that they are required to pay, since, if left free, they would contribute less to government. The "benefit," then, is simply assumed arbitrarily by government offcials. Benefit/utility/free market: Furthermore, even if the benefit were freely demonstrable, the benefit principle would not approach the process of the free market. For (…) individuals pay a uniform price for services on the free market, regardless of the extent of their subjective benefits. Taxation/market principle: To tax everyone in accordance with the benefit he receives, then, is diametrically opposed to the market principle. Government service: Finally, if everyone's benefit is taxed away, there would be no reason for him to make the exchange or to receive the government service. Marginal utility: On the market, not all people, not even the marginal buyers, pay the full amount of their benefit. The supramarginal buyers obtain unmeasurable surplus benefit, and so do the marginal buyers, for without such a surplus they would not buy the product. Inequalities: Moreover, for such services as police protection, the benefit principle would require the poor and the infirm to pay more than the rich and the able, since the former may be said to benefit more from protection. >Progressive tax/Rothbard, >Excess Profits Tax/Rothbard, >Poll tax/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Capacity Management | Economic Theories | Mause I 462f Capacity management/Economic Theory: e.g. transport policy: At first glance, reducing delays leads to an increase in welfare. Problem: this is thought too short: e.g. allocation of slots at airports: these are divided into: a) caused by the airline (technical problems with the aircraft) Mause I 463 b) caused by the airport (infrastructure), c) deviations from the planned flight route, d) reactionary delays (caused by earlier delays); the latter is the most frequent cause. Reactionary delay: a) rotational: the return flight is delayed due to the delayed outbound flight of the same airline), b) non-rotational: a non-rotational delay occurs when a flight has to wait for passengers on a delayed flight (possibly of another airline). In this way, delays can spread worldwide. Costs: a) Passenger time costs, b) "hard", c) "soft" costs of the airline. Hard costs of the airline: operating and personnel costs, costs for rebooking and refunds. Soft costs of the airline: customer losses due to dissatisfaction. Passenger time costs: can largely be understood as opportunity costs. Opportunity costs: in this case the time evaluated in monetary terms, which could have been used better otherwise. (1) (2) Slots: are managed by the European Union. Capacity bottlenecks can be solved by voluntary coordination. In addition, there are many regional airports that are not fully utilized. Delays can be minimized by reducing the number of approvals and equalizing the flight plan. Problem: from an economic point of view, minimising delays in this way does not increase welfare per se: the maximum number of arrivals and departures is reduced, thereby a) increasing average costs per flight, but also b) reducing network effects at hubs. Network effects: Airlines are interested in hub airports because they can bundle many flights in one time window. There is then a trade-off between the network effects due to additional approvals and the increased susceptibility to delays. Mause I 465 Capacity reduction: makes sense from a theoretical point of view, depending on whether the airport is to the right or left of the optimum value resulting from the total cost curve at the current capacity utilisation. (3) This example can also be applied to rail traffic or platforms at railway stations (see Swaroop et al. 2012, p. 1240). Problem: the existing practice is criticized from an economic point of view, since permits are free of charge and trade with them is prohibited. (See also Emissions Trading). The system is referred to as "off-market". Solution: an auction of slots could generate profits. A secondary market could ensure that the airline with the highest benefit (and thus the highest willingness to pay) would receive an approval. 1. University of Westminster. 2015. The cost of passenger delay to airlines in Europe. http:// ansperformance. eu/ references/ library/ passengerdelayco st. pdf. (Access date 25.11.2016 2. Bratu, Stephane, und Cynthia Barnhart. 2006. Flight operations recovery: New approaches considering passenger recovery. Journal of Scheduling 9( 3): 279– 298. 3. Swaroop, Prem, Bo Zou, Michael O. Ball, und Mark Hansen. 2012. Do more US airports need slot controls? A welfare based approach to determine slot levels. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 46( 9): 1239– 1259. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Capitalism | Mises | Mause I 71 Capitalism/Mises: Thesis: Capitalism is the only conceivable and possible form of social economy.(1) >Welfare state, >Social Market economy, >Social Policy, >Social state. 1. L von Mises, Die Gemeinwirtschaft. Jena 1922, p. 210. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Carbon Taxation Strategies | Fankhauser | Fankhauser I 6 Carbon Taxation Strategies /Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Another defining feature of a carbon tax is how its revenues are proposed to be spent. The literature has explored three revenue recycling strategies in particular: the earmarking of revenues to support emission reduction projects, the redistribution of revenues to achieve a fairer (less fiscally regressive) outcome, and the reduction of other taxes to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome. Using tax revenues for additional emissions reduction reassures voters that the tax will be effective and the environmental objective will be met (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Kallbekken et al., 2011(2); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). 1. Earmarking proceeds: The attractiveness of earmarking carbon tax revenues has been established in a range of contexts (cf. Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Bristow, Wardman, Zannia, & Chintakayalab, 2010(5); Carattini et al., 2017(6); Clinch & Dunne, 2006(7); Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006(8); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015(10); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(11); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(3); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). The interest in earmarking reflects two voter concerns. The first is a lack of trust in government [.] The second concern is doubt about the effectiveness of carbon taxes (…). Earmarking signals to the public that efforts are being made to make low-carbon options both technologically and commercially more viable and so will reduce the personal cost of changing behavior (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010)(11). Earmarking is also seen as a potential solution to a perceived underinvestment in low-carbon research and development. It should, however, be noted that earmarking revenues for environmental purposes may not be a universal solution. A Swedish survey conducted by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(14) showed that respondents were unwilling to increase carbon tax rates, as they felt the carbon taxes they paid on transport fuels were high enough already. Respondents preferred alternative Fankhauser I 7 such as decreasing taxes on clean energy sources, expanding public transport, and increasing information campaigns about vehicles' contribution to climate change. Additional evidence suggests that preferences for revenue recycling may be context dependent. Carattini et al. (2017)(6) found that providing information about the environmental effectiveness of different carbon tax designs reduces the preference for environmental earmarking. 2. Compensating low-income households: Several strategies have been put forward in the literature to address potential adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, including in the influential perspectives of Speck (1999)(15), Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000)(16), and Metcalf (2009)(17). [There are two main options on compensation:] compensation via lump-sum transfers and social cushioning. Fankhauser I 8 (…) when there is a clear trade-off in the use of revenues between environmental earmarking and socially progressive redistribution forms, people tend to prefer to use revenues for environmental earmarking (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). In the study by Carattini et al. (2017)(6), the most favored options for using revenue were redistribution through lump-sum transfers, and social cushioning. 3. Cutting other taxes and secur[ing …] full or partial revenue neutrality: Empirical studies show that cutting other taxes is the least popular redistribution strategy among the public (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). This is in contrast to many economists, for whom using tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes is the ideal solution. By using carbon tax revenues levied on “bads,” such as greenhouse gas emissions, to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, profits, or consumption, which discourage desirable activities, one can hope to achieve higher economic output on top of emissions abatement, and so obtain a “double dividend” (cf. Goulder, 1995)(18). One reason for public opposition is that voters do not necessarily buy into the logic behind the double dividend. They perceive these to be separate problems requiring separate solutions. Another reason for public opposition is a lack of trust in politicians and fiscal authorities (Hammar & Jagers, 2006)(19). Once the policy is implemented, governments could use information devices to increase the visibility of the tax shift. Compensation can be made visible by displaying the amount of income that is rebated on payslips, tax slips, or in contributions to social insurance (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006(20); Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006(21); Hsu et al. 2008(22)). Below we [Carattini, Carvalho, Fankhauser] offer some concrete design options that appear particularly promising to increase public support. Fankhauser I 9 1. Phasing in carbon taxes over time: By phasing in carbon taxes gradually, policymakers can take advantage of the fact that aversion tends to abate once people have experienced a policy. A slow ramp-up, or even a trial period, provides individuals with the opportunity to gauge the costs and benefits of the tax. Taxes can then be raised progressively until they reach the level required to meet the environmental objective. Note that this may imply renouncing to allowing the carbon tax rate to fluctuate depending on the business cycle, although this type of flexibility might be welfare improving (cf. Doda, 2016)(23). The risk with this strategy is that carbon taxes may be frozen at a level that is not sufficient to achieve their intended objectives. There are two potential, and complementary, solutions to overcome this risk. The first solution relies on societal learning. The second solution uses commitment devices. 2. Earmarking tax revenues for additional climate change mitigation: Voters have a preference for earmarking tax revenues and using the proceeds for additional greenhouse gas emissions reductions. They are particularly keen on support for low-carbon research and development, along with subsidies to promote deployment. The demand for environmental earmarking may decrease over time as people observe the impact of the tax and update their beliefs. Governments can again support this process by providing effective information about emissions trends, the distributional effects of the tax, and any ancillary benefits. Revenues may then be freed up gradually to address other sources of voter aversion, or to obtain economic gains. Tapering the degree of earmarking can also allay a government's concerns about fiscal management. 3. Redistributing taxes to improve fairness: Carbon taxes can be made more acceptable if tax revenues are used to address important societal concerns. Fankhauser I 10 While the objective of a carbon tax is to address the climate externality, and not to address the issue of raising inequalities, there may still be the expectation that carbon taxes are designed in a way that at least does not lead to a more unequal distribution. Carbon taxes can be designed to be both revenue neutral and progressive through lump-sum transfers and social cushioning measures to reduce costs for low-income households. Some voters may, however, be suspicious about a government's long-term commitment to redistribution. To allay those fears, governments can use commitment devices, such as explicit plans on how revenues are to be redistributed. 4. Information sharing and communication: A final suggestion applies to all efforts to implement a carbon tax, regardless of the use of revenues, or level of stringency. As soon as policymakers start considering the design of a carbon tax, they should provide detailed information (obtained through analysis and perhaps model simulations) to navigate the process of public consultations and to pre-emptively address voter concerns. This disclosure would ideally occur before voters are called to a ballot, or before lawmakers consider a carbon tax bill in the parliament. Fankhauser I 11 Communication efforts need to continue once the policy is implemented. Because the effects of carbon taxes are often not visible, governments are encouraged to measure their effects regularly and inform their citizens about them transparently. Communication strategies may need to be adapted to the beliefs and worldviews of the targeted population (Cherry et al., 2017)(24), and also take into account the potential implications of political polarization and bipartisan divides (Hart & Nisbet, 2012(25); Kahan et al., 2011(26)). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 2. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. 3. Sælen, H., & Kallbekken, S. (2011). A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 2181–2190. 4. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 5. Bristow, A. L., Wardman, M., Zannia, A. M., & Chintakayalab, P. K. (2010). Public acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax. Ecological Economics, 69(9), 1824–1837. 6. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 7. Clinch, J. P., & Dunne, L. (2006). Environmental tax reform: An assessment of social responses in Ireland. Energy Policy, 34(8), 950–959. 8. Deroubaix, J.-F., & Lévèque, F. (2006). The rise and fall of French ecological tax reform: Social acceptability versus political feasibility in the energy tax implementation process. Energy Policy, 34, 940–949. 9. Dresner, S., Jackson, T., & Gilbert, N. (2006). History and social responses to environmental tax reform in the United Kingdom. Energy Policy, 34(8), 930–939. 10. Gevrek, Z. E., & Uyduranoglu, A. (2015). Public preferences for carbon tax attributes. Ecological Economics, 118, 186–197. 11. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 12. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 13. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 14. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 15. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 16. Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J., & Speck, S. (2000). A future for carbon taxes. Ecological Economics, 32(3), 395–412. 17. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 18. Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2), 157–183. 19. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 20. Clinch, J. P., Dunne, L., & Dresner, S. (2006). Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy, 34(8), 960–970. 21. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 22. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 23. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 24. Cherry, T. L., Kallbekken, S., & Kroll, S. (2017). Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 85, 193–204. 25. Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang effects in science communication: How motivated reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation policies. Communication Research, 39(6), 701–723. 26. Kahan, D., Wittlin, M., Peters, E., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2011). The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture conflict, rationality conflict, and climate change (SSRN Scholarly Paper). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26. |
Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018 |
| Cartels | Economic Theories | Mause I 381f Cartels/Economic Theory: cartels are those where at least one competitive parameter is contractually defined between at least two companies and thus withdrawn from competition.(1)(2) If the agreement is informal, it is referred to as a collusion. Horizontal Price Cartel: here the price is agreed between companies that are in direct competition with each other. From an entrepreneurial point of view, this is only profitable (and therefore rational) if either all companies in the market or at least most of them are involved, otherwise most of the customers will migrate to those competitors who compete with the cartel on price, thus eventually offering a better price-performance ratio. >Price, >Competition, >Markets. VsCartels: If the price cartel is market-wide, it can behave like a monopoly. This is generally harmful to welfare because competition comes to a standstill. Other forms of a cartel are the innovation cartel, the conditions cartel, the standardisation cartel, the procurement and distribution cartel, etc. No general statement can be made here about the damage to competition. For example innovation cartel: here the resources of several companies for research and further development of products can be bundled. For example, standardization cartels: can develop uniform standards for connectors, connections, adapters, etc. 1. Choi, Jay Pill, und Heiko Gerlach, Cartels and collusion: Economic theory and experimental economics. In The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, Hrsg. Roger D. Blair und D. Daniel Sokol, Vol. 2, 415– 441. Oxford 2015 2. Levenstein, Margaret C., und Valerie Y. Suslow, Cartels and collusion: Empirical evidence. In The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, Hrsg. Roger D. Blair und D. Daniel Sokol, Vol. 2, 442– 463. Oxford 2015. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Citizens | Böckenförde | Brocker I 784 Citizen/citizens/Democracy/Böckenförde: "Citizens should experience ((s) themselves) on fundamental issues Brocker I 785 of political order as "equal" and "united" and their fellow citizens "not as existentially different or foreign". On this basis, they should be "ready for compromises and loyal acceptance of majority decisions". (1) See Democracy/Böckenförde. This unity is subject to a development process. It itself cannot be produced democratically. (2) It is a prerequisite of democracy, not its result. Ethos: 1) According to Böckenförde, the citizens should be supported by a democratic ethos, i.e. an attitude of recognition also of the political opponent and quite fundamentally of the rules of democracy, in particular that the once achieved own majority is not set permanently and the minority retains its chance to become the majority itself. (3) 2) the horizon of policy-making should be normatively oriented towards the general interest (4) See Constitution/Böckenförde, State/Böckenförde: this is one of the conditions from which democracy lives and on which it depends for its existence. The democratic constitutional state cannot guarantee these conditions. Solution/Böckenförde: The state can support the conditions that contribute to public spirit and public welfare orientation, for example through schools, as places of learning for critical judgment. However, the state must not influence the content of the individual consciences of citizens. 1. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung – Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt/M. 1992 (zuerst 1991), S. 332f. 2. Ibid. p. 350 3. Ibid. p. 359f. 4. Ibid. p. 362ff. Tine Stein, „Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung- Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Böckenf I Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, London 1991 German Edition: Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Frankfurt 1976 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Citizenship | Marshall | Gaus I 218 Citizenship/welfare state/T.H. Marshall/Moon: T. H. Marshall (1977)(1) offers a classical account of the welfare state as the necessary result of the universal extension of citizenship. He traces the emergence of universal citizenship by observing three successive phases, the first involving the general extension of civil rights, the second the universalization of the suffrage, and the third the growth of the welfare state and the creation of the 'social rights of citizenship'.* >Welfare state, >Civil rights, >Citizens, >Bourgeois/Citizen. Gaus I 219 David Harris: In some solidaristic accounts, the emphasis on work invokes an older language of duties. In Harris's account, for example, the duties correlative to our welfare rights are 'strict obligations' and may be enforced by 'coercion' (1987(2): 161). Marshall: In this, [Harris] echoes Marshall, who looked beyond the social rights of citizenship to consider the duties of the enriched and inclusive model of citizenship he advocated, including 'the duty to work', which he thought was of 'paramount importance'. * Like so much of social science, Marshall's account is blind to issues of gender, as he depicts these phases as a historical succession, the completion or virtual completion of one laying the basis for the realization of the next. His stages describe the gradual extension of the rights associated with citizenship for men, but they ignore the experience of women (and, I might add, other non-class-based exclusions), who often were able to claim various welfare rights (e.g. widows' pensions) before they were entitled to political or even full civil rights. 1. Marshall, T. H. (1977 119501) 'Citizenship and social class'. In his Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Marshall A I Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics, 1st edn 1890, 8th edn 1920, reset and reprinted 1947. London: Macmillan. London 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Citizenship | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 216 Citizenship/Welfare economics/Moon: Because concepts of positive rights and equal opportunity are not well defined outside of specific social contexts, they are often combined with arguments appealing to ideals of citizenship and social solidarity. The basic argument is that the welfare state should guarantee the inclusion of all citizens as full members of a democratic society, which requires that an extensive range of social rights be provided. The reasoning is fairly straightforward: just as citizens must have civil and political rights, they must be guaranteed certain social rights if they are to be full members of a society, and specifically if they are to participate in democratic politics. The key premise in this argument is that citizenship must be universal. All who are capable of intentional or responsible action must be full citizens. The only legitimate basis for exclusion is incapacity for responsible action. T. H. Marshall: T. H. Marshall (1977)(1) offers a classical account of the welfare state as the necessary result of the universal extension of citizenship. He traces the emergence of universal citizenship by observing three successive phases, the first involving the general extension of civil rights, the second the universalization of the suffrage, and the third the growth of the welfare state and the creation of the 'social rights of citizenship'. * Individualism: There are a number of variants of this argument, but a common theme is a deep suspicion of the market and at least certain forms of individualism. Efficiency/solidarity: Whereas arguments from efficiency take the market as a baseline, and justify social policies on the ground that they can correct market failures, arguments from solidarity begin with something close to the opposite assumption - projecting an ideal in which all activities are organized through collective associations, in which individuals are oriented principally towards common needs and aspirations. Social order: Richard Titmuss (1972)(2) extols the 'gift relationship', and David Harris (1987)(3) speaks of the family as a model for social life. More concretely, Claus Offe (1984)(4) and Gosta Esping-Andersen (1985)(5) once expressed the hope that the growth of collective consumption and other forms of decommodification will eventually displace capitalism, leading to a socialist order of society. >Society/David Harris. * Like so much of social science, Marshall's account is blind to issues of gender, as he depicts these phases as a historical succession, the completion or virtual completion of one laying the basis for the realization of the next. His stages describe the gradual extension of the rights associated with citizenship for men, but they ignore the experience of women (and, I might add, other non-class-based exclusions), who often were able to claim various welfare rights (e.g. widows' pensions) before they were entitled to political or even full civil rights. 1. Marshall, T. H. (1977 119501) 'Citizenship and social class'. In his Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Titmuss, Richard (1972) The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. New York: Random House. 3. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 4. Offe, Claus (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1985) Politics against Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Climate Change | Utilitarianism | Norgaard I 342 Climate Change/Utilitarianism/VsPresentism: One prominent alternative to presentism is classical utilitarianism, an ethical framework that dates to the seminal work of Jeremy Bentham (1823)(1). According to utilitarians, social institutions and public policies should be designed to maximize total utility or well‐being in society with equal weight attached to the welfare of each and every person. Mill (1863)(2) termed this criterion the ‘greatest happiness principle.’ Singer (2002: 42)(3) discusses the implications of utilitarianism for climate stabilization policy. On the one hand, utilitarians favor an approach that balances the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, they also attach special importance to the interests of people suffering material deprivation. >Utilitarianism/Bentham, >Utilitarianism/Singer, >Presentism/Nordhaus. Climate Costs/Utilitarianism/Singer, P.: According to Singer (…) the costs of climate change mitigation should be borne disproportionately by the wealthiest members of the international community since a dollar of net benefits provides less utility to a rich person than to a poor person. For this same reason, utilitarians are especially concerned about the potential threat that climate change poses to incomes and livelihoods in low‐income, developing countries that are resource dependent and therefore especially vulnerable to changes in environmental conditions (Anthoff et al. 2009a)(4). Utilitarianism: (…) utilitarianism provides no basis for attaching different weights to the welfare of present and future generations. On the contrary, utility is viewed as equally Norgaard I 343 valuable regardless of who experiences it in either space or time (Broome 2008)(5). (…) much of moral philosophy is concerned with understanding and managing the conflicts that exist between the pursuit of self‐interest and the performance of one's moral duties. Utilitarianism approaches this problem by asserting that people's decisions should aim to maximize total utility in society without attaching special weight to personal needs and concerns. Norgaard I 344 In this sense, utilitarianism is in tension with the moral principles that support liberal‐ democratic political, economic, and legal institutions, which attach paramount importance to the extension and preservation of individual rights and freedoms. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Bentham, J. 1823. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: W. Pickering. 2. Mill, J. S. 1863. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son & Bourn. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Anthoff, D., Hepburn, C., and Tol, R. S. J. 2009a. Equity weighting and the marginal damage costs of climate change. Ecological Economics 68: 836–49. 5. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Coase Theorem | Coase | Mause I 416f Coase theorem/intervention/environmental policy/externalities/CoaseVsPigou: Coase 1960 (3): in the case of (environment-related) external effects, there are no "polluters" or "victims" per se. Rather, a reciprocal character of external effects is to be assumed, i.e. if environmental impacts are allowed there are disadvantaged people, if these are prevented, there are also disadvantaged people. The reason for this is that environmental problems contain rival claims to use of environmental goods, which can basically be corrected in two possible directions (Hartwig 1992, p. 140 ff.(4); Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 141 ff.(5)). Example: An improvement of injured parties leads to costs on the part of the polluters. Solution/Coase: Coase theorem: if there are no transaction costs, there is no need for government intervention to internalise external effects, as in this case the market leads to an optimal solution of the environmental problem in the form of private negotiations between the parties concerned. (See Transaction Costs/Coase). Against: PigouVsCoase: Interventions/environmental policy/Pigou: Although not originally developed on the basis of environmental problems, Pigou (1920) took the view early on that the market cannot be left to itself in the case of external effects. Rather - so the argumentation - sovereign interventions are required, that contribute to an internalisation of externalities according to polluters since only by means of such state interventions can private and social costs or benefits be covered with the aim of increasing the welfare of society as a whole. In order to prevent the misallocation of scarce (environmental) resources and thus a sub-optimal market supply of private goods, external costs or external income must be internalised by way of taxation (so-called Pigou taxes) or state subsidisation (Hansjürgens 1992, p. 28ff (1); Endres 2000, p. 94ff (2)). Coase theorem: The Coase theorem thus contains both an efficiency and an invariance statement: In the event of non-existence of transaction costs, optimal (or more efficient) environmental protection is always achieved, regardless of how the rights to use the natural resources are distributed between the actors concerned in the initial situation. VsCoase: In reality, however, such private negotiated solutions often involve specific problems that can lead to a failure of the pure market solution of environmental problems (Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 147 ff.; Endres 2000, p.41ff.) On the one hand, it must be taken into account that the distribution of usage rights in the initial situation does not impair the efficiency effect of the negotiation result, but rather its distributional effect. 1. Bernd Hansjürgens, Umweltabgaben im Steuersystem. Zu den Möglichkeiten einer Einfügung von Umweltabgaben in das Steuer- und Abgabensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Baden-Baden 1992.. 2. Alfred Endress, Umweltökonomie, Stuttgart 2000. 3. Ronald Coase. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1– 44. 4. Karl-Hans Hartwig, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, Hrsg. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Bd. 2, 5. Aufl., 122– 162. München 1992. 5. Eberhard Feess, & Andreas Seeliger. 2013. Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4. Aufl. München 2013. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Coase Theorem | Miceli | Parisi I 19 Coase theorem/Miceli: Coase’s original motivation in writing his seminal paper on externalities(1) was to offer a critique of the Pigovian view, which asserted that some form of government intervention (taxes, fines, or liability) was required to internalize external harm, such as that caused by straying cattle or railroad sparks. Causation/Pigou: Absent such intervention, the Pigovian view maintained, the “cause” of the harm (the rancher or the railroad) would over-engage in the harmful activity. CoaseVsPigou: Coase challenged this view by first noting that causation is reciprocal in the sense that both the injurer and victim must be present for an accident to occur. The designation of one party as the “injurer” is therefore arbitrary and in fact represents an implicit awarding of the right to be free from harm to the other party (the “victim”). Pigovian view: (...) the farmer has the right to be free from crop damage - whether from straying cattle or spewing sparks - and so the rancher or the railroad should be compelled to pay the farmer’s cost. Problem: (...) suppose the farmer-victim is in a better position to avoid the harm, say by moving his crops or not locating near the railroad or ranch in the first place. In that case, the designation of the rancher/railroad as the injurer may actually preclude the identification of more efficient ways of avoiding the harm. Coase’s point in raising the causation issue was to evaluate the conditions under which court-imposed liability is needed to internalize the external harm. Suppose, for example, that in the rancher–farmer dispute the court does not intervene to assign liability to the rancher. Does that necessarily mean that the rancher’s herd will expand inefficiently? Marginal benefit/marginal cost: The answer, of course, is no, provided that the parties can bargain, because if bargaining is possible, the farmer would be able to bribe the rancher to reduce the herd to the point where the marginal benefit from the last cow equals the marginal cost. In this case, property rights in straying cattle effectively belong to the rancher, and the farmer has to “purchase” them, which he will do up to the point where the two parties value the last cow equally. VsPigovian view: Note that this is the reverse of what happens under the Pigovian solution, where the farmer is (implicitly) awarded rights to the straying cattle and the rancher has to purchase them by paying the court-imposed damages. Efficiency: In both cases, however, the outcome will be efficient. Coase: This conclusion - that the initial assignment of property rights does not affect the final distribution of resources, which is efficient - is the Coase Theorem. External costs: [Key point]: When the conditions for the Coase Theorem are satisfied - that is, when bargaining is possible - the assignment of liability for external harms does not affect efficiency because the parties will rearrange any initial assignment of rights to the point where the gains from trade are exhausted. In this sense, the law does not matter for efficiency (though it does affect the distribution of wealth).* Law: When bargaining is not possible, in contrast, the law does matter because the parties will not be able to rearrange inefficient assignments of rights. As a result, the law must be designed with the explicit goal of efficiency in mind. In this way, the Coase Theorem defines the efficient scope for legal intervention (Demsetz, 1972)(2). >Liability/Calabresi/Melamed. * The conclusion that the efficient allocation of resources will be achieved regardless of the initial assignment of legal rights mirrors the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, which says that market exchange will be efficient regardless of how property rights are initially assigned. The >Coase Theorem thus shows that externalities need not preclude this outcome as long as bargaining costs are low. Cf. >Liability/Calabresi/Melamed. 1. Coase, Ronald (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Demsetz, Harold (1972). “When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?” Journal of Legal Studies 1: 13 - 28. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Collective Goods | De Viti De Marco | Rothbard III 1030 Collective goods/De Viti De Marco/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. De Viti De Marco: Antonio De Viti De Marco defined "collective wants" as consisting of two categories: a) wants arising when an individual is not in isolation and b) wants connected with a conflict of interest. RothbardVsDe Viti De Marco: Vs a) The first category, however, is so broad as to encompass most market products. There would be no point, for example, in putting on plays unless a certain number went to see them or in publishing newspapers without a certain wide market. Must all these industries therefore be nationalized and monopolized by the government? Vs b) The second category is presumably meant to apply to defense. This, however, is incorrect. Defense, itself, does not reflect a conflict of interest, but a threat of invasion, against which defense is needed. Furthermore, it is hardly sensible to call "collective" that want which is precisely the least likely to be unanimous, since robbers will hardly desire it!(1) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Antonio De Viti De Marco, First Principles of Public Finance (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 37-41. Similar to De Viti's first category is Baumol's attempted criterion of "jointly" financed goods, for a critique of which see Rothbard, "Toward A Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics," pp. 255-60. |
De Viti De Marco I Antonio De Viti De Marco La Politica Commerciale E Gl’interessi Dei Lavoratori Charleston, South Carolina 2010 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Collective Goods | Economic Theories | Rothbard III 1030 Collective goods/Economic theories/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Molinari: Molinari, for example, trying to establish defense as a collective good, asserted: "A police force serves every inhabitant of the district in which it acts, but the mere establishment of a bakery does not appease their hunger." RothbardVsMolinari: But, on the contrary, there is no absolute necessity for a police force to defend every inhabitant of an area or, still more, to give each one the same degree of protection. Furthermore, an absolute pacifist, a believer in total nonviolence, living in the area, would not consider himself protected by, or receiving defense service from, the police. On the contrary, he would consider any police in his area a detriment to him. Hence, defense cannot be considered a "collective good" or "collective want." Similarly for such projects as dams, which cannot be simply assumed to benefit everyone in the area.(1) De Viti De Marco: Antonio De Viti De Marco defined "collective wants" as consisting of two categories: a) wants arising when an individual is not in isolation and b) wants connected with a conflict of interest. RothbardVsDe Viti De Marco: Vs a) The first category, however, is so broad as to encompass most market products. There would be no point, for example, in putting on plays unless a certain number went to see them or in publishing newspapers without a certain wide market. Must all these industries therefore be nationalized and monopolized by the government? Vs b) The second category is presumably meant to apply to defense. This, however, is incorrect. Defense, itself, does not reflect a conflict of interest, but a threat of invasion, against which defense is needed. Furthermore, it is hardly sensible to call "collective" that want which is precisely the least likely to be unanimous, since robbers will hardly desire it!(2) Immaterial goods/service: Other economists write as if defense is necessarily collective because it is an immaterial service, whereas bread, autos, etc., are materially divisible and salable to individuals. RothbardVs: But "immaterial" services to individuals abound in the market. Must concert-giving be monopolized by the state because its services are immaterial? Rothbard III 1031 Samuelson: In recent years, Professor Samuelson has offered his own definition of "collective consumption goods," in a so-called "pure" theory of government expenditures. Def Collective consumption goods/Samuelson: Collective consumption goodss according to Samuelson, are those "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good." For some reason, these are supposed to be the proper goods (or at least these) for government, rather than the free market, to provide.(3) VsSamuelson: Samuelson's category has been attacked with due severity. Professor Enke(4), for example, pointed out that most governmental services simply do not fit Samuelson's classification - including highways, libraries, judicial services, police, fire, hospitals, and military protection. In fact, we may go further and state that no goods would ever fit into Samuelson's category of "collective consumption goods." Margolis: [Julius] Margolis(4), for example, while critical of Samuelson, concedes the inclusion of national defense and lighthouses in this category. But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources committed in certain definite and concrete ways - and these resources are necessarily scarce. A ring of defense bases around New York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available around San Francisco. Furthermore, a lighthouse shines over a certain fixed area only. Not only does a ship within the area prevent others from entering the area at the same time, but also the construction of a lighthouse in one Place limits its construction elsewhere. In fact, if a good is really technologically "collective" in Samuelson's sense, it is not a good at all, but a natural condition of human welfare, like air - superabundant to all, and therefore unowned by anyone. Indeed, it is not the lighthouse, but the ocean itself—when the Ianes are not crowded - which is the "collective consumption good," and which therefore remains unowned. Obviously, neither government nor anyone else is normally needed to produce or allocate the ocean.(4) Rothbard III 1032 Tiebout: Charles M. Tiebout(5), conceding that there is no "pure" way to establish an optimum level for government expenditures, tries to salvage such a theory specifically for local government. Realizing that the taxing, and even voting, process precludes voluntary demonstration of consumer choice in the governmental field, he argues that decentralization and freedom of internal migration renders local government expenditures more or less optimal - as we can say that free market expenditures by firms are "optimal"—since the residents can move in and out as they please. Certainly, it is true that the consumer will be better off if he can move readily out of a high-tax, and into a Iow tax, community. But this helps the consumer only to a degree; it does not solve the problem of government expenditures, which remains otherwise the same. There are, indeed, other factors than government entering into a man's choice of residence, and enough People may be attached to a certain geographical area, for one reason or another, to permit a great deal of government depredation before they move. Furthermore, a major problem is that the world's total land area is fixed, and that governments have universally pre-empted all the land and thus universally burden consumers.(5) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Gustave de Molinari, The Society of Tomorrow. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904. Reprinted by Taylor & Francis, 1972. p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., Ibid., p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., "Spencer As His Own Critic," Liberty, June, 1904, and Merlin H. Hunter and Harry K. Allen, Principles of Public Finance (New York: Harpers, 1940), p. 22. Molinari had not always believed in the existence of "collective goods," as can be seen from his remarkable "De la production de la sécurité," Journal des Economistes, February 15, 1849 , and Molinari, "Onziéme soirée" in Les soirées de la Rue Saint Lazare (Paris, 1849). 2. Antonio De Viti De Marco, First Principles of Public Finance (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 37-41. Similar to De Viti's first category is Baumol's attempted criterion of "jointly" financed goods, for a critique of which see Rothbard, "Toward A Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics," pp. 255-60. 3. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review ofEconomics and statistics, November, 1954, pp. 387-89. 4. Stephen Enke, "More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder," Review of Economics and statistics, May, 1955, pp. 131-33 ; Julius Margolis, "A Comment On the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 19 5 5, pp. 347-49. In his reply to critics, Samuelson, after hastening to deny any possible implication that he wished to confine the sphere of government to collective goods alone, asserts that his category is really a "polar" concept. Goods in the real world are supposed to be only blends of the "polar extremes" of public and private goods. But these concepts, even in Samuelson's own erms, are decidedly not polar, but exhaustive. Either A's consumption of a good diminishes B's possible consumption, or it does not: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. In effect, Samuelson has abandoned his category either as a theoretical or as a practical device. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 350-56. 5. Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, October, 1956, pp. 416 - 24. At one point, Tiebout seems to admit that his theory would be valid only if each person could somehow be "his own municipal government." Ibid., p. 421. In the course of an acute critique of the idea of competition in government, the Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph wrote as follows: „Were the taxpayer free to act as a customer, buying only those services he deemed useful to himself and which were priced within his reach, then this competition between governments would be a wonderful thing. But because the taxpayer is not a customer, but only the governed, he is not free to choose. He is only compelled to pay.... With government there is no producer-customer relationship. There is only the relation that always exists between those who rule and those who are ruled. The ruled are never free to refuse the services of the products of the ruler.... Instead of trying to see which government could best serve the governed, each government began to vie with every other government on the basis of its tax collections.... The victim of this competition is always the taxpayer.... The taxpayer is now set upon by the federal, state, school board, county and City governments. Each of these is competing for the last dollar he has.“ (Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph, July 16, 1958) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Collective Goods | Margolis | Rothbard III 1031 Collective goods/Margolis/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Margolis: [Julius] Margolis(1), for example, while critical of Samuelson, concedes the inclusion of national defense and lighthouses in this category. But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources committed in certain definite and concrete ways - and these resources are necessarily scarce. >Collective goods/Samuelson. A ring of defense bases around New York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available around San Francisco. Furthermore, a lighthouse shines over a certain fixed area only. Not only does a ship within the area prevent others from entering the area at the same time, but also the construction of a lighthouse in one place limits its construction elsewhere. In fact, if a good is really technologically "collective" in Samuelson's sense, it is not a good at all, but a natural condition of human welfare, like air - superabundant to all, and therefore unowned by anyone. Indeed, it is not the lighthouse, but the ocean itself - when the Ianes are not crowded - which is the "collective consumption good," and which therefore remains unowned. Obviously, neither government nor anyone else is normally needed to produce or allocate the ocean.(1) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Julius Margolis, "A Comment On the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 347-49. In his reply to critics, Samuelson, after hastening to deny any possible implication that he wished to confine the sphere of government to collective goods alone, asserts that his category is really a "polar" concept. Goods in the real world are supposed to be only blends of the "polar extremes" of public and private goods. But these concepts, even in Samuelson's own erms, are decidedly not polar, but exhaustive. Either A's consumption of a good diminishes B's possible consumption, or it does not: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. In effect, Samuelson has abandoned his category either as a theoretical or as a practical device. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 350-56. |
Margolis I Julius Margolis The Public Economy of Urban Communities Abingdon 2015 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Communicative Practice | Pettit | Brocker I 857 Communicative Practice/Community/PettitVsHabermas/Pettit: There is nothing to suggest that Pettit is giving a culture of public debate a truly constructive contribution to the generation and maintenance of public welfare orientations. In the later work, Pettit tends to envisage, as legitimate guardians of the common good, councils, expert groups or committees of inquiry, which, so to speak, are exclusively dedicated to the common good. >Democracy, >Deliberative democracy, >Welfare economics. He is convinced that they have the merit of being removed from the public opinion struggle, and he himself, provocatively and misleadingly, sees them as elements of an Brocker I 858 "depoliticization".(1) >Politics/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 S. 53 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Communitarianism | Freeden | Gaus I 10 Communitarianism/Freeden: As a rule, though, the core of twentieth-century liberalism constituted an appeal for the release of a flow of free, vital and spontaneous activity emanating from individuals, one that would spread across the globe not through an internal rational logic but through a successful appeal to the intellects and emotions of the oppressed and underprivileged (Hobhouse, 1911(1); Freeden, 2001b: 21–2)(2). However, the otherwise strong liberal origins of that argument have been obscured because recent political philosophers have erroneously modelled liberalism as highly individualistic. One consequence is the false exclusion of ‘communitarians’ from the plural camp of liberalisms, under the impact of a philosophical dichotomy between liberals and communitarians that is not borne out by the complexity of liberal ideology (Taylor, 1989(3); Simhony and Weinstein, 2001(4)) [see also Chapter 30]. That ideology has developed strong appeals to mutual support and collective well-being at the heart of twentieth-century welfare state thinking (...). >Liberalism, >Libertarianism. 1. Hobhouse, L. T. 1911. Liberalism. London: Williams and Norgate. 2. Freeden, M. 2001b. ‘Twentieth-century liberal thought: development or transformation?’ In M. Evans, ed., The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 21-2 3. Taylor, C. 1989. ‘Cross-purposes: the liberal– communitarian debate’. In N. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Simhony, A. and D. Weinstein, eds. 2001. The New Liberalism: Reconciling Liberty and Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Community | Pettit | Brocker I 853 Community/Republicanism/Pettit: In his "neo-Roman" version of Republicanism (see Republicanism/Pettit), Pettit even refers historically to the theoretical-historical origin in "classical" Rome. The Aristotelian variant, which proceeds more clearly than the Roman variant from a sociability of the human expressed in collective life, from which both potentials of a successful self-development as well as yields for a common welfare-oriented living together can be gained, he does not take note at all as an independent model. Instead, he explicitly distances himself from "civil republican" models that address the political sphere from the perspective of interaction and community building. >Republic, >State, >Community/Aristoteles. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Community | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 152 Community/Thomas/Höffe: Since no human can live for him- or herself alone in accordance with his or her purpose, it was given to him or her by nature to "live sociably with many"(1). This living together - here Thomas Aquinas shows himself to be a republican. - There should be a Höffe I 153 a "Society of free men." >Society. Governance: According to another partial argument, the gap between the personal and the common good, there is a need for an authority that guides people. Only for this reason, because the welfare of the individual can run counter to the welfare of the community, does a rule become necessary. For it is only with its help that the multiplicity of individuals becomes the unity of a community. Monarchy: The factual follow-up question of whether one or more persons should rule, i.e. the question of the best constitution, is answered by Thomas Aquinas, although in the aforementioned sense a Republican, in favour of sole rule, namely the monarchy. >State (Polity). However, he does impose one condition on it: it must be exercised fairly, which in Thomas Aquinas' case, as is customary with Aristotle, Stoa and Cicero, means serving the common good. >Aristotle, >Cicero, >Stoicism as an author, >About stoicism. Righteous rule: Righteous is a rule that serves not the ruler but the community. Thomas Aquinas' sees its core in inner peace, which is not only suggested by the historical situation when the Sicilian Empire of Frederick II. fell apart and an interregnum ("intermediate rule") prevailed in the Roman-German Empire after the end of the Staufer dynasty. Community: Surprisingly, the definition of the commonwealth as a legal order, which is important in the Iex tract of the sum of theology, plays no role in the writing On the Rule of Princes. ThomasVsAristotle: [Thomas Aquinas' goes beyond Aristotle here]: Following his model of communities, the kingdoms of the time - not the Greek city republics as Aristotle did - he does not only follow the house and the village (qua clan) with civitas, the citizenship and city community. Cf. >Polis. In addition, he introduces the provincia or regnum, a community that spans several cities and landscapes. Only this greater unity makes it possible - according to medieval experience - to guarantee all the necessities of life almost autonomously. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri I, 1 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Condorcet Jury Theorem | Condorcet | Parisi I 494 Condorcet Jury Theorem/Condorcet/Nitzan/Paroush: Condorcet (1785)(1) makes the following three-part statement: 1) The probability that a team of decision-makers would collectively make the correct decision is higher than the probability that any single member of the team makes such a decision. 2) This advantage of the team over the individual performance monotonically increases with the size of the team. Parisi I 495 3) There is a complete certainty that the team’s decision is right if the size of the team tends to infinity, that is, the probability of this event tends to one with the team’s size. A “Condorcet Jury Theorem” (henceforth, CJT) is a formulation of sufficient conditions that validate the above statements. There are many CJTs, but Laplace (1815)(2) was the first to propose such a theorem. >Condorcet Jury Theorem/Laplace. Parisi I 496 VsCondorcet: In contrast to the first two parts of Condorcet’s statement, the survival of the third part is somehow surprising. Many attempts have been made to prove the validity of the third part in case of heterogeneous teams (see Boland, 1989(3); Fey, 2003(4); Kanazawa, 1998(5); and Owen, Grofman, and Feld, 1989(6)). 1. De Condorcet, N. C. (1785). Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix. Paris: De l’imprimerie royale. 2. Laplace, P. S. de (1815). Theorie analytique des probabilities. Paris: n.p. 3. Boland, P. J. (1989). “Majority systems and the Condorcet jury theorem.” The Statistician 38(3): 181–189. 4. Fey, M. (2003). “A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority rules.” Social Choice and Welfare 20(1): 27-32. 5. Kanazawa, S. (1998). “A brief note on a further refinement of Condorcet Jury Theorem for heterogenous groups.” Mathematical Social Sciences 35(1): 69-73. 6. Owen, G., B. Grofman, and S. Feld (1989). “Proving a distribution free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem.” Mathematical Social Sciences 17(1): 1-16. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Condo I N. de Condorcet Tableau historique des progrès de l’ esprit humain Paris 2004 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Condorcet Jury Theorem | Economic Theories | Parisi I 494 Condorcet Jury Theorem/Economic theories/Nitzan/Paroush: Condorcet (1785)(1) makes the following three-part statement: 1) The probability that a team of decision-makers would collectively make the correct decision is higher than the probability that any single member of the team makes such a decision. 2) This advantage of the team over the individual performance monotonically increases with the size of the team. Parisi I 495 3) There is a complete certainty that the team’s decision is right if the size of the team tends to infinity, that is, the probability of this event tends to one with the team’s size. A “Condorcet Jury Theorem” (henceforth, CJT) is a formulation of sufficient conditions that validate the above statements. There are many CJTs, but Laplace (1815)(2) was the first to propose such a theorem. >Condorcet Jury Theorem/Laplace. Parisi I 496 VsCondorcet: In contrast to the first two parts of Condorcet’s statement, the survival of the third part is somehow surprising. Many attempts have been made to prove the validity of the third part in case of heterogeneous teams (see Boland, 1989(3); Fey, 2003(4); Kanazawa, 1998(5); and Owen, Grofman, and Feld, 1989(6)). In fact, the following is a well-known version of CJT: “If a team of decision-makers utilizes a simple majority rule, the decision would be perfectly correct in the limit given that the size of Parisi I 497 the team tends to infinity, even if the individual competencies, the pis, are different, provided that pi ≥ 1∕2+ε, where the value of ε is a positive constant regardless of how small it is.” The proof of the theorem relies on the proof of Laplace where P = 1∕2+ε combined with the fact that Π is an increasing function of the team members’ competencies. >Decision theory, >Decision-making processes. 1. De Condorcet, N. C. (1785). Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix. Paris: De l’imprimerie royale. 2. Laplace, P. S. de (1815). Theorie analytique des probabilities. Paris: n.p. 3. Boland, P. J. (1989). “Majority systems and the Condorcet jury theorem.” The Statistician 38(3): 181–189. 4. Fey, M. (2003). “A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority rules.” Social Choice and Welfare 20(1): 27-32. 5. Kanazawa, S. (1998). “A brief note on a further refinement of Condorcet Jury Theorem for heterogenous groups.” Mathematical Social Sciences 35(1): 69-73. 6. Owen, G., B. Grofman, and S. Feld (1989). “Proving a distribution free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem.” Mathematical Social Sciences 17(1): 1-16. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Consequentialism | Sen | Gaus I 418 Consequentialism/Sen/Weinstein: Sen concedes that his modified consequentialism turns even Williams into a consequentialist (though Williams would likely respond that, with Sen, we have an unholy hodgepodge that is no longer remotely consequentialist). Perhaps Sen's theory of equality can assist us here. >Equality/Sen, >Egalitarianism/Sen. SenVsDwoorkin/SenVsRawls: Sen rejects Rawlsian primary goods equality and Dworkin's resource equality as well as welfare equality in favour of capability equality. Capability equality is a modified needs account of equality similar to Miller's. >Egalitarianism/Miller. For Sen, functionings and capability functionings determine well-being. That is, a person's life goes well when she not only manages to do various things (functions) but also possesses the where-withal (capabilities) to choose to do these things from many alternatives. >Capabilities/Sen. Equality/Sen: Everyone deserves equal basic nourishment but not equal happiness. Freedom itself is elementary, too, and therefore everyone also deserves equal basic freedom or capability equality. Consequentialism: In sum, morality is complex though fundamentally 'consequence-based'. Moral evaluation measures how effectively freedom and rights are promoted, duties are honoured and well-being is maximized. And these metrics are prermsed, in turn, on all enjoying the basic capability equality of 'being adequately nourished, having mobility' and 'taking part in the life of the community' (Sen, 1993(1): 36—7). Weinstein: Notwithstanding the intricacies of measuring behaviour according to such diverse consequences, we still might insist that Sen's consequentialism is consequentialist in name only. 1. Sen, Amartya (1993) 'Capability and well-being'. In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 30-53. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Constitutional Economics | Persson | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Constitutional Economics | Tabellini | Parisi I 205 Constitutional Economics/Tabellini/Persson/Voigt: Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) is a major contribution to Positive Constitutional Economics (PCE). They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely electoral system and form of government. >Electoral Rules/Persson/Tabellini. Parisi I 206 District size: Beyond electoral rules, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(1) also deal with potential effects of both district size and ballot structure. Suppose (…) that single-member districts are combined with plurality rule. In this situation, a party needs only 25 % of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts: Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)(2). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that this gives parties under PR a strong incentive to offer general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the constituents' preferences. Ballot structure: Regarding the ballot structure, MR systems frequently rely on individual candidates, whereas proportional systems often rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. Persson and Tabellini (2000(3), ch. 9) argue that corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. Parisi I 207 Costs/economic variables: [Persson and Tabellini] (…) found that electoral systems are significantly correlated with a number of economic variables. (1) In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP lower than under PR. (2) Expenditures for social services ("the welfare state") are some 2-3 % lower in majoritarian systems. (3) The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1-2% below that of systems with PR. (4) A higher proportion of individually elected candidates is associated with lower levels of (perceived) corruption. (5) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. (6) A larger proportion of individually elected candidates is correlated with higher output per worker. (7) Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. Blume, Müller, Voigt and Wolf (2009)(4) replicate and extend PT's analysis, finding that with regard to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of individually elected candidates is more significant - both substantially and statistically - than the electoral rule itself. Bias/VsTabellini/VsPersson: Iversen and Soskice (2006)(5) notice that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left under PR. In other words, the results Parisi I 208 from Persson and Tabellini might suffer from omitted variable bias: it could be that both the electoral system as well as government expenditure are determined by the prevailing ideological preferences of the population. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121—1161. 4. Blume, L., J. Müller, S. Voigt, and C. Wolf (2009a). "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating - and Extending - Persson and Tabellini." Public Choice 139: 197—225. 5. Iversen, T. and D. Soskice (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100: 165-181. Voigt, Stefan, “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Consumption (Economics) | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 296 Consumption/Utility/Climate Change/Ecological Theories: It is commonly assumed that each individual's utility can be estimated on the basis of their aggregate consumption of goods and services, using a utility function that is common to all of them. The impact of climate change, and of responses to it (i.e. adaptation and mitigation), is measured as a change in this consumption. Norgaard I 300 Aggregate consumption per capita in empirical studies is simply derived from a future prediction of economic output (i.e. gross domestic product or GDP) per capita, by netting out investment. The impacts of climate change, and responses to it, are then estimated as equivalent changes in consumption, and added to this baseline flow of consumption per capita. Thus every effect of climate change, of adaptation, and of mitigation must be priced. Consumption is transformed into utility by means of a utility function. (…) the marginal utility of consumption diminishes as one becomes richer. The effect of this is to place less (more) weight on the impacts of climate change and response strategies on rich (poor) individuals. Since consumption happens to be distributed unequally across time, space, and states of nature, this is how (…) the utility function affects the social discount rate, risk and inequality aversion. Certainly any approach that takes seriously (i) the consequences of policy choices for (ii) human well‐being can be insightful (Sen 1999)(1). Vs: (…) the narrowness of the approach also gives rise to some serious concerns, which have been expressed more generally about welfare economics in numerous other settings. Perhaps the most obvious one is that the approach apparently ignores several factors that contribute to human well‐being. In particular, what role do changes in environmental, political and social circumstances play? (…) if they can be estimated as equivalent changes in consumption—monetized—then they can be included in the estimation of utility. (…) the baseline for utility is (…) essentially individual income [and it] does ignore other non‐monetary constituents. Second, it is in practice very difficult to place money values on many of the effects of climate change, and it is well known that the Norgaard I 301 IAMs [integrated assessment models] used to conduct economic evaluation omit some potentially important changes in environmental, political and social conditions (Watkiss and Downing 2008)(2). Third, the approach does not pay nearly enough attention to the distinction that is suggested to exist between the things that human beings vitally need, and the things that they merely desire (e.g. O'Neill, Holland, et al. 2008)(3). 1. Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. 2. Watkiss, P., and Downing, T. E. 2008. The social cost of carbon: Valuation estimates and their use in UK policy. Integrated Assessment 8(1): 85–105. 3. O'Neill, J., Holland, A., et al. 2008. Environmental Values. London: Routledge. Dietz, Simon: “From Efficiency to Justice: Utility as the Informational Basis for Climate Strategies, and Some Alternatives”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Conventions | Turiel | Upton I 126 Conventions/Turiel/Upton: (Turiel 1983(1)) Thesis: morality is structured by concepts of harm, welfare and fairness. In contrast, actions that are matters of social convention have no intrinsic interpersonal consequences. For example, in school, children usually address their teacher using their title and surname (…). However, there is no intrinsic reason that this is any better than addressing the teacher by their first name (…). Only social convention (…) makes ‘Mr Smith’ more appropriate than ‘Joe’. These conventions are arbitrary in the sense that they have no intrinsic status, but are important to the smooth functioning of the social group as they provide a way for members of society to coordinate their social exchanges. Understanding of convention is therefore linked to the child’s understanding of social organisation. Recent research into children’s beliefs about social exclusion suggests that children are able to separate these two aspects of moral reasoning, but that their ability to tell the difference between morality and social convention increases during adolescence (Killen and Stangor, 2001(2); Killen. 2007(3)). >Morality/Kohlberg, >Morality/Turiel; (TurielVsKohlberg). 1. Turiel, E (1983) The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kilien, M and Stangor, C (2001) Children’s social reasoning about inclusion and exclusion in gender and race peer group contexts. Child Development, 72: 174-86. 3. Killen. M (2007) Children’s social and moral reasoning about exclusion. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16: 32-6. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Corruption | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 209 Corruption/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: Gerring and Thacker (2004)(1) find that parliamentary systems suffer from significantly less corruption than do presidential ones. They argue (2004(3), p. 314) that "effective accountability arises from a highly structured relationship between voters and political parties and from the relatively clear lines of authority instituted by a centralized political apparatus." Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005)(2) also find that parliamentary systems suffer less from corruption than do presidential ones and also draw on the concept of accountability to explain why. Their argument is that parliamentary systems "allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature... " They conclude that after "political institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of corruption… lose virtually all their relevance." In his survey, Treisman (2007)(3) replicates these results but finds that presidentialism becomes insignificant as soon as one controls for Catholicism or when a dummy for South America is included. Parisi I 210 Geography/history: In a recent study, Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2013)(4) find a large degree of heterogeneity across the characteristics usually attributed to the forms of government and conclude (2013(4), p. 3): "Indeed, knowing whether a constitution is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential is less helpful in predicting a constitution's executive-legislative structure ... than is knowing the geographic region in which the constitution was produced or when it was written." Cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. Parisi I 211 Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(5). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Gerring, J. and S. Thacker (2004). "Political Institutions and Corruption: the Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 34:295—330. 2. Lederman, D., N. Loayza, and R. Soares (2005). "Accountability and Corruption." Economics and Politics 17(1): 1-35. 3. Treisman, D. (2007). "What have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Annual Review of Political Science 10: 211-244. 4. Cheibub, J., Z. Elkins, and T. Ginsburg (2013). "Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." British Journal of Political Science 44(3):515-544. 5. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Cost-Benefit Analysis | Hicks | Parisi I 357 Cost-benefit analysis/Hicks: Benefit and costs are determined in principle by the measure developed by J. Hicks (1939)(1) known as the “compensating variation” (CV). In practice the measures are usually “consumer and producer surpluses” which are approximations of the Hicksian measure. Consumer surplus is approximately the amount one would pay minus the amount actually paid. Thus if a price is a cup of coffee is $1.00 and the willingness to pay for it is $2.50 (absent other vendors), the consumer surplus is $1.50. Producer surplus is the economic rent or the amount that could be taken away without affecting Parisi I 358 affecting supply. For example, considered as a whole, most of the wages of college football coaches is economic rent since, were their salaries lowered en masse, they would be unlikely to leave for other jobs. The measures correspond to willingness to pay (WTP) for gains and willingness to accept (WTA) payment to bear costs, which measures are consistent with the psychological (utility) effects associated with prospect theory, which is steeper for losses than gains, convex in losses, and concave in gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)(2). >Willingness to pay/Tversky/Kahneman, >Cost-benefit analysis/Zerbe. 1. Hicks, John R. (1939). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics.” Economic Journal 49: 696. 2. Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992). Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 29. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
EconHicks I John R. Hicks Mr. Keynes and the "classis"; a suggested reinterpreation 1937 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Culture Shift | Habermas | IV 576 Change of values/culture shift/culture change/cultural change/change in values/value change/Inglehart/Habermas: In the developed societies of the West, conflicts have developed in recent decades that deviate in several respects from the welfare state pattern of the institutionalized distribution conflict. Lately it is more about the implementation of reformed lifestyles, about questions of the grammar of life forms. An example of this is: the term Silent Revolution/Ronald Inglehart: (1). IV 577 New are the problems of quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, participation and human rights. (2) This new policy finds stronger support in the new middle class, in the younger generation and in the groups with qualified school education. Habermas: these phenomena fit the thesis of internal colonization See Terminology/Habermas. 1. R. Inglehart, Wertwandel und politisches Verhalten, in: J. Matthes, (Hrsg.) Sozialer Wandel in Europa, Frankfurt, NY 1979. 2. K.Hildebrandt, R.J. Dalton, Die neue Politik, in: PVS, Jg. 19,1977, S. 230ff. S.H. Barnes, M. Kaase et al., Political Action, Beverly Hills/London 1979. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Customs/Morality | Hegel | Brocker I 791 Sittlichkeit/HegelVsHobbes/Hegel/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings.(1) Hegel develops a concept of morality that has a principally progressive thrust and therefore also points "beyond the institutional horizon" of Hegel's own present.(2) The social struggle of individuals for recognition is characterized by a distinctive dynamic; for Hegel, it proves to be an event that is open to the future and can never be finally concluded. With the motif of recognition, Hegel inscribes a principal tension in his understanding of social life, which integrates the social conflicts between individuals and groups into the historical horizon of a moral process of progress that is open to the future. >Recognition/Honneth, >Identity/Honneth. 1. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 334 Morality/Hegel/Höffe: The basic lines(1) reach their climax, the synthesis as reconciliation of abstract law and subjective morality, morality, in a will that is free both externally, qua law, and internally, qua morality. This includes social forms and institutions in which a free >self-consciousness can recognize and acknowledge itself. Because they realize a far higher degree of rationality, they have an "infinitely more solid authority and power than the being of nature" (§ 146). Polis: To his thought of morality Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states. HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois Höffe I 335 society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel. Normative elements are clearly included in the description of the process. a) Hegel begins with the "immediate by-oneself", the family shaped by love. According to a further triune section this is divided into marriage, in which an initially only external unity is transformed, by free consent, into a spiritual unity of a self-conscious love. b) According to the antithesis, marriage requires a "lasting and secure possession, a property" (§ 170), for the acquisition of which, according to Hegel, the man is primarily responsible. c) According to the synthesis, the children who guarantee the progress of humanity have the right to be nourished and educated from the common family property. Alienation: With the coming of age of the children, the possibility of new families of their own arises, in which the transition to the next step, the antithesis within morality, becomes apparent. Their essence is alienation from the family, including history and religion. It is the economic and working society, known as the "civil society", which on the one hand is necessary for the development of freedom, but on the other hand does not get rid of its problem of poverty and wealth. Welfare state: The welfare state as a corrective does not come into view here. In order for bourgeois society to "function", it needs a legal system that Hegel calls the state of necessity and understanding. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Decision Rules | Democratic Theory | Parisi I 497 Decision Rules/democratic theory/decision-making processes/democracy/Nitzan/Paroush: Allowing heterogeneous decisional capabilities, Shapley and Grofman (1981, 1984)(1) and Nitzan and Paroush (1982(2), 1984b(3)) find that the optimal decision rule is a weighted majority rule (WMR) rather than a simple majority rule (SMR). By maximization of the likelihood that the team makes the better of the two choices it confronts, they also establish that the optimal weights are proportional to the log of the odds of the individuals’ competencies, that is, the weights, wi, are proportional to log[pi ∕(1-pi)]. Parisi I 498 For instance, in a five-member team there exist seven different efficient potentially optimal rules. These rules include the “almost expert rule,” the “almost majority rule,” and the “tie-breaking chairman rule.” The number of efficient rules increases very rapidly with the team size. For instance, in a team of nine members the number of efficient rules is already 172,958 (see Isbell, 1959)(4). Now the following question is raised: Is there a mathematical relation between the size of the team and the exact number of efficient rules? This simple question is still an open one. The existence of order relations among decision rules is first noted in Nitzan and Paroush (1985(5), p. 35). The existence of such an order means, Parisi I 499 first, that the number of rankings of m efficient rules is significantly smaller than the theoretical number m! of all possible rankings of these rules and, second, that its existence is independent of the team’s competence. Beyond the theoretical interest in studying order among efficient decision rules, the information about the order has useful applications. Since the order relations are independent of the specific competencies of the decision-makers, the knowledge about the order of the rules is important in cases where the competencies are unknown or only partially known. For instance, if for some reason (e.g. excessive costs) the optimal rule cannot be used, then even in the absence of knowledge about the decisional competencies, the team can identify by the known order of the decision rules the second-best rule, the third-best, and so on. Parisi I 501 In the context of Condorcet’s setting, given the individuals’ common objective and diverse information which yields their decisions, the optimal collective decision rule can be identified (…). >Condorcet Jury Theorem. However, in a binary setting and diverse preferences, one can reach these same optimal collective decision rules by their unique axiomatic characterization. In a more general multi-alternative setting, however, the potential success of the axiomatic approach is clouded by the classical Impossibility Theorems of Arrow (1951)(6) and his followers. As is well known, if few reasonable axioms have to be satisfied by the aggregation rule, a social welfare function does not exist. 1. Shapley, L. and B. Grofman (1984). “Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependence.” Public Choice 43(3): 329-343. 2. Nitzan, S. and J. Paroush (1981). “The characterization of decisive weighted majority rules.” Economics Letters 7(2): 119-123. 3. Nitzan, S. and J. Paroush (1984b). “A general theorem and eight corollaries in search of a correct decision.” Theory and Decision 17(3): 211-220. 4. Isbell, J. R. (1959). “On the enumeration of majority games.” Mathematical Tables and Other Aids of Computation 13(65): 21-28. 5. Nitzan, S. and J. Paroush (1985). Collective Decision Making: An Economic Outlook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: John Wiley & Sons). Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Discrimination | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 224 Discrimination/Utilitarianism/Lamont: While many utilitarians claim that economic or legal discrimination against ethnic minorities will not maximize overall utility, they do not provide the evidence required to support their claims against the populist politicians advocating such policies. Partly, this is due to the complexity of the required evidence, but a further counterintuitive element of the theory is that the consequences, for overall welfare, of discriminatory practices include such contingencies as the size of the ethnic minority and whether the majority has racist beliefs and preferences. Few reasonable people, outside academia, are willing to embrace a theory according to which racist policies and institutions are morally right so long as the ethnic minority is small enough. So substantial stumbling blocks have been encountered in the utilitarian justification for expanding the government's role from improving the welfare of the poor to maximizing overall welfare. >Racism, >About utilitarianism. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Distributive Justice | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 223 Distributive Justice/Political philosophy/Lamont: the conceptual terrain produced by modern theories of distributive justice is multi-dimensional. One way to gain insights is to view the different theories according to the importance they afford the competing considerations of welfare (or utility) and responsibility, since the relative importance of these considerations is a constant theme in political discussion throughout the world. a) At one end of the spectrum, a utilitarian approach to the distributive problem would identify welfare as the only morally relevant consideration in the design of distributive systems, with other moral considerations, including responsibility, entering the calculation not at all, or only in so far as they increase welfare. >Utilitarianism. b) Alternatively, an approach with responsibility as the primary moral consideration would endeavour to allocate goods and services only on the basis of factors for which individuals are fully responsible. Institutions: (...) the distributive institutions under such an approach would be designed to reduce the influence of factors that are the converse of responsibility, those over which people have little or no control (...). >Institutional utilitarianism/Gaus, >Institutions, >Institutionalization. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Distributive Justice | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 223 Distributive Justice/Utilitarianism/Lamont: Over the last couple of centuries, one traditional answer to the question of how the goods and services of a society should be distributed has been that they should be distributed in a way that increases the welfare ofthe poor. Gaus I 224 Under utilitarianism, the right distribution is that which maximizes overall welfare, or 'utility', variously interpreted as net positive happiness, preference satisfaction, pleasure, or well-being (Bayles, 1978(1); Kelly, 1990(2); Smart and Williams, 1973(3)). VsUtilitarianism: problems: Unfortunately, through such extension, the theory makes the requirement to benefit the poor a contingent matter, according to the degree such help will maximize overall welfare. Utilitarians, who tend to accept the diminishing marginal utility of resources, believe resources will tend to produce more good when redistributed to the poor than to the rich. Nevertheless, there are easily describable conditions, such as in the case ofa poor but satisfied person and a non-satiated rich person, under which utilitarianism would prescribe forcibly transferring goods from the poor to the rich person. Because of prescriptions such as this, and others, which systematically violate common sense morality (Scheffler, 1988(4); 1994(5)), the ongoing movement in utilitarian theory, in the last two decades, has been towards variations of 'indirect' and 'institutional' utilitarianism (Bailey, 1997(6); Goodin, 1988(7); 1995(8); Pettit, 1997(9)). The most forceful idea of these theories is to restrict the application of utilitarianism to guide the choice of practices, institutions or public policies rather than to guide individual actions. >About utilitariansism. 1. Bayles, Michael D., ed. (1978) Contemporary Utilitarianism. Gloucester, MA: Smith. 2. Kelly, P. J. (1990) Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams (1973) Utilitarianism For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Scheffler, Samuel, ed. (1988) Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Scheffler, Samuel (1994) The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. edn. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Bailey, James Wood (1997) Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Goodin, Robert E. (1988) Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Goodin, Robert E. (1995) Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 9. Pettit, Philip (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Distributive Justice | Walzer | Mause I 199f Distributive Justice/Walzer: Walzer represents an egalitarian position with regard to the distribution of goods. However, it is not a matter of levelling, but of a variety of goods whose distribution follows specific rules depending on the goods. >Egalitarianism. Social Goods/Walzer: e.g. membership and affiliation, security and welfare, money and goods, offices, hard work, leisure time, upbringing and education, kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, political power. Dominant goods also allow their owners to acquire goods from another sphere while disregarding the distribution rules of that sphere. This is the case when persons hold offices in a society on the basis of mere party membership (and not on the basis of qualifications and performance) or when money (and not talent) decides on access to education. Dominant goods are unjust because they violate the internal logic of the spheres of justice and establish a principle of rule that exists across the spheres. >Social goods. Solution/Walzer: "complex equality": In communities with complex equality there are no dominant goods, the autonomy of the different spheres of justice is preserved. The principle of distribution of complex justice is formally as follows: "No social good X, regardless of its meaning, should be distributed to men and women who own a good Y solely because they possess this Y". (1) Because no sphere is subordinated to the other, different individual development possibilities are opened up. If the sphere-specific distribution principles are observed, the distribution result can be open-ended, i.e. unequal. VsWalzer: the practical question arises, how the autonomy and mutual independence of the spheres of justice can be preserved. Walzer's goal of reducing dominance requires a demarcation of the spheres. Ultimately, this can only be achieved by a state power. However, this contradicts the role of community activities and civil society involvement. (VsCommunitarism). >Communitarianism, >Justice, >Inequalities. VsWalzer: Question: Do his principles not only defend the status quo when they are so strongly tied to traditions and beliefs of a particular community? (2) 1. M. Walzer, Sphären der Gerechtigkeit. Ein Plädoyer für Pluralität und Gleichheit. Frankfurt a. M. 1992, S. 50. 2. Bernd Ladwig, Gerechtigkeitstheorien zur Einführung. Hamburg 2013. S. 167. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Distributive Justice | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 213 Distributive justice/welfare economics/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure, >State provision/Moon, >Adverse selection/Barr, >Privatization/Moon, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. Gaus I 214 The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income (...). Efficiency- based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies delib- erately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency.* Privatization/problems: any private system of provision is limited to pooling the shared risks that people face in the future, and so presupposes a 'baseline' of a given distribution of advantages and disadvantages. But from a larger point of view, this restriction to a given status quo is arbitrary. Redistribution: (...) any distribution of 'the advantages of social co-operation' must be justified, whether it results from market transactions or from welfare state policies specifically designed to redistribute income. The presumption that distributions that result from 'government' action must be justified, and that pretax and pretransfer distributions are presumptively just, appears to be widespread at least in America, leading to hostility on the part of some towards the welfare state. Libertarianism/Nozick: Strong libertarians like Nozick hold that taxation to redistribute resources from some taxpayers to others is not only presumptively but actually unjust because it violates citizens' property rights (...) (Nozick 1974(1)). MoonVs: This critique obviously presupposes that the right we have to our property, including income from employment or business activity, is not created by the state, but exists in some sense 'prior' to political life, and so limits what governments may legitimately do. If such a theory of natural or prepolitical rights could be vindicated, it would block redistributive welfare state programmes. >Fundamental rights/Political philosophy. * The argument that the alleviation of poverty is a public good, discussed above, would be an example of justifying redistribution on efficiency grounds. 1. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Ecology | Sessions | Singer I 252 Ecology/biosphere/George Sessions/Bill Devall/Singer, P.: W. Devall and G. Sessions, Deep Ecology, Living As If Nature Mattered, Salt Lake City (1985): Thesis: The idea of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have the same right to life and the right to their individual development possibilities. All organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as part of a coherent whole, have the same intrinsic value. P. SingerVsSessions, George/P. SingerVsDevall, Bill/Singer, P.: there are strong intuitive objections, for example: 1. That the welfare of adults is more important than the well-being of yeast and that the rights of gorillas are higher than the rights of grass. 2. If humans, gorillas, yeasts and grasses are all parts of a coherent whole, one can still ask why this gives the same intrinsic value to all elements. a) Even if there is an intrinsic value in the realm of micro-organisms and the plant kingdom, this does not show that individual micro-organisms and individual plants also have an intrinsic value, because their survival as individuals is irrelevant to the survival of the ecosystem as a whole. b) The fact that all organisms are part of a coherent whole does not show that they all have an intrinsic value, let alone the same intrinsic value. It could still be that the whole thing has only one value, because it promotes the existence of conscious beings. |
Sessions I George Sessions Deep Ecology - Living as If Nature Mattered Santa Barbara 1987 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Economic Growth | Economic Theories | Parisi I 300 Economic growth/efficiency/wealth/Economic theories: Richard Posner (1979(1), 1980(2), 1981a(3), 1981b(4)) once argued that a wealth maximization norm justifies law and economics’ emphasis on efficiency. Several scholars doubt that wealth maximization constitutes a normative value justifying a central place for it in Parisi I 301 law (Dworkin, 1980a(5); Weinrib, 1980(6); Coleman, 1980(7), 1982(8); Kronman, 1980(9); Mercuro and Ryan, 1984(10)). These critiques aim squarely, although not always explicitly, at Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. >Nicholas Kaldor. Dworkin: Because government decisions usually come about because of disputes among people, they rarely if ever can be Pareto optimal (Dworkin, 1980a(5), 1980b(11); Calabresi, 1991(12)). In practice, therefore, law and economics scholars implicitly rely on a very different efficiency concept than the concept used in the economic analysis of markets, that of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the idea that a legal decision is efficient if it increases the wealth of the people benefiting from it more than it decreases the wealth of others (Posner, 2014(13); Coleman, 1988(15); Kronman, 1980(9); e.g., Driesen, 2011a(16)). Kaldor–Hicks efficient legal decisions increase net wealth (Kronman, 1980(9); Posner, 1980(2)). Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is said to be good, because those benefiting from the decision could compensate those harmed for their losses. This criterion, however, does not require that the law’s beneficiaries actually compensate those whom the law harms and therefore may rationalize theft or government takings without compensation, both of which may transfer assets to beneficiaries who value the good more than the current owner. In any case, scholars have sharply criticized the normative value of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency and claimed that Pareto efficiency cannot generally govern legal decisions (e.g. Coleman, 1988(15); Calabresi, 1991(13)). Scholars criticizing wealth maximization argue that wealth functions as a means toward other ends. Accordingly, its maximization is neither good nor bad in and of itself, but rather good insofar as it advances ends that its defenders have not identified. Moral philosophers often endorse justice as a goal for society and do not consider wealth maximization as having any normative value independent of justice (compare Kaplow and Shavell, 2001(14)). Nussbaum/Sen/Purdy: Some scholars seeking to define justice more precisely have argued for a “capabilities” approach to human flourishing, which casts doubt on wealth maximization as an ideal (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993(16); Nussbaum, 2000(17); Williams, 2002(18); Purdy, 2005(19); Chon, 2006(20); Alexander et al., 2009(21); Sen, 2009(22); Roesler, 2011(23)). Proponents of this approach link human flourishing not to wealth aggregation but to the spread of capacities vital to human flourishing to all members of a society, for example, by improving public health. They criticize law and economics (and utilitarianism generally) for neglecting distribution, rights and freedoms, and the tendency of those suffering persistent harms to adapt (see Sen, 1999(24); Nussbaum, 2000(17)). 1. Posner, Richard A. (1979). “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory.” Journal of Legal Studies 8: 103–140. 2. Posner, Richard A. (1980). “The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 487–507. 3. Posner, Richard A. (1981a). The Economics of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Posner, Richard A. (1981b). “A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Economic Theory of the Common Law.” Hofstra Law Review 9: 775–794. 5. Dworkin, Ronald (1980a). “Is Wealth a Value?” Journal of Legal Studies 9: 191–226. 6. Weinrib, Ernest J. (1980). “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory.” University of Toronto Law Journal 30: 307–332. 7. Coleman, Jules (1980). “Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 509–551. 8. Coleman, Jules (1982). “The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice (Book Review).” Stanford Law Review 34: 1105–1132. 9. Kronman, Tony (1980). “Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle.” Journal of Legal Studies 9: 227–242. 10. Mercuro, Nicholas and Timothy P. Ryan (1984). Law, Economics and Public Policy. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 11. Dworkin, Ronald (1980b). “Why Efficiency?: A Response to Calabresi and Posner.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 563–589. 12. Calabresi, Guido (1991). “The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further.” Yale Law Journal 100: 1211–1238. 13. Posner, Richard A. (2014). Economic Analysis of Law. 9th edition. Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer. 14. Kaplow, Louis and Steven M. Shavell (2001). “Fairness Versus Welfare.” Harvard Law Review 114: 961–1388. 15. Coleman, Jules (1988). Markets, Morals, and the Law. New York: Cambridge University Press. 16. Nussbaum, Martha C. and Amartya Sen, eds. (1993). The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17. Nussbaum, Martha C. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 18. Williams, Cynthia A. (2002). “Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization.” U.C. Davis Law Review, 35: 705–778. 19. Purdy, Jedediah (2005). “A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates.” University of Chicago Law Review 72: 1237–1298. 20. Chon, Margaret (2006). “Intellectual Property and the Development Divide.” Cardozo Law Review 27: 2821–2912. 21. Alexander, Gregory S., Eduardo M. Penalver, Joseph William Singer, and Laura S. Underkuffler (2009). “A Statement of Progressive Property.” Cornell Law Review 94: 743–745. 22. Sen, Amartya (2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 23. Roesler, Shannon M. (2011). “Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rulemaking.” West Virginia Law Review 114: 49–107. 24. Sen, Amartya (1999). Development As Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. Mause I 220f Def Economic Growth/Economic Theory: the increase in the production or value added potential of an economy dependent on available production factors and the increase in factor productivity as a function of technological progress. The conceptual separation of the concept of the economy is not always clear. Example: Def Economic fluctuations: are generally defined as perennial, more or less regular fluctuations in overall economic activity or fluctuations in the degree of utilisation of production potential. (1) 1. G. Tichy, Konjunkturpolitik. Quantitative Stabilisierungspolitik bei Unsicherheit, Berlin/ Heidelberg 2008, S. 8. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Economic Policies | Friedman | Mause I 57 Economic Policies/Friedman/FriedmanVsKeynesianism/FriedmanVsKeynes: Thesis: monetary policy can only achieve short-term success, but is neutral in the long term. Although expansionary monetary policy could initially increase demand and employment, workers would not be subject to monetary illusion and would demand a compensation for the inflation-related reduction in their real wages, i.e. an increase in nominal wages, which would cancel out the initial employment effect. In the long term, unemployment would therefore remain constant; monetary policy would only have caused prices to rise and would not have had any real employment effects. "Real" problems (e.g. unemployment) could only be solved by "real" measures (e.g. facilitating the recruitment of workers by relaxing employment protection, minimum wage and similar regulations). The monetarists therefore recommend a steady monetary policy with the objective of price stability. (1) Brocker I 398 Economic Policy/Friedman: Friedman was afraid that the welfare state would increasingly interfere in the pursuit of individual economic interests and... Brocker I 399 ...restrict market participants. Monetary policy deals with macroeconomic problems, the average values of employment and inflation. Individual liberty rights are affected indirectly at most. >Welfare State. Brocker I 400 Economic Policy/Politics/Friedman: Friedman rejects conscription and describes the efficiency and development possibilities of the market economy system in such bright colours that there is no room and no need for government intervention, bureaucratic controls or state-organized sectors. >Interventions. The educational system, for example, which from a conservative point of view serves not least to convey "state-preserving" values and ways of thinking, would have to be privatized, as would the media, transport and energy sectors, with the result that political groups lose some of their beloved power, influence and earning potential. >Education. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 1. M. Friedman, The role of monetary policy. American Economic Review 58, 1968, pp. 1-17. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Education | Economic Theories | Mause I 513 Education/investment/Economic Theory: How are pensions (welfare gains of human capital investment) divided between employers and employees? Each party will try to take in the largest part. See Williamson 1985 (1). Varieties of Capitalism analysis: emphasises the complementarity of human capital and labour input on the one hand and the qualification system on the other. In addition, the financial institutions, social policy and coordination mechanisms are part of the overall institutional structure (Hall and Soskice 2001) (2). Education/Economic Theory: Question: Is class size decisive for educational effects? For the USA this has been investigated (Hanushek 2002) (3). The result is that smaller classes do not improve students' performance. The 1995 TIMSS study found for Germany that larger classes even lead to better performance. Statistical problem: it must be taken into account that worse pupils often go to lower secondary schools that have smaller classes. However, this aspect was taken into account in the study. 1. Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. New York 1985. 2. Hall, Peter A., und David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford 2001. 3. Hanushek, Eric A. Publicly provided education. In Handbook of public economics, Hrsg. Alan J. Auerbach und Martin Feldstein, 4. Aufl., 2045– 2141. Amsterdam 2002. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Efficiency | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 205 Efficiency/constitutional economics/Voigt: Normative constitutional economics (…) reinterprets the >Pareto criterion in a twofold way: It is not outcomes but rules or procedures that lead to outcomes that are evaluated using the criterion. The evaluation is not carried out by an omniscient scientist or politician but by the concerned individuals themselves: "In a sense, the political economist is concerned with 'what people want' " (Buchanan, 1959(1), p. 137). In order to find out what people want, Buchanan proposes to carry out a consensus test. The specification of this test will be crucial as to which rules can be considered legitimate. In 1959, Buchanan had actual unanimity in mind and those citizens that expect to be worse off due to some rule changes would have to be compensated. This test would thus be equivalent to a modified Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Later in life, Buchanan seems to have changed his position: hypothetical consent deduced by an economist will do in order to legitimize some rule (see, e.g., Buchanan, 1977(2), 1978(3), 1986(4)). VsBuchanan: This position can be criticized because a large variety of rules seem to be legitimizable depending on the assumptions of the scientist who does the process. Scientists arguing in favor of an extensive welfare state will most likely assume risk-averse individuals, while scientists who argue for cuts in the welfare budgets will assume people to be risk-neutral. >Constitutional economics, >Costs/Buchanan, >Constitutions/constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. (1959). "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy." Journal of Law and Economics 2: 124-138. 2. Buchanan, J. M. (1977). Freedom in Constitutional Contract - Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station, TX/London: Texas A&M University Press. 3. Buchanan, J. M.(1978). "A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy," Nomos 19: 29-42 4. Buchanan, J. M. (1986). "Political Economy and Social Philosophy," in: J. M. Buchanan; Liberty, Market and State—political Economy in the 1980s, 261—274. New York: Wheatsheaf Books. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Efficiency | Economic Theories | Parisi I 300 Economic growth/efficiency/wealth/Economic theories: Richard Posner (1979(1), 1980(2), 1981a(3), 1981b(4)) once argued that a wealth maximization norm justifies law and economics’ emphasis on efficiency. Several scholars doubt that wealth maximization constitutes a normative value justifying a central place for it in Parisi I 301 law (Dworkin, 1980a(5); Weinrib, 1980(6); Coleman, 1980(7), 1982(8); Kronman, 1980(9); Mercuro and Ryan, 1984(10)). These critiques aim squarely, although not always explicitly, at Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. >Nicholas Kaldor. Dworkin: Because government decisions usually come about because of disputes among people, they rarely if ever can be Pareto optimal (Dworkin, 1980a(5), 1980b(11); Calabresi, 1991(12)). In practice, therefore, law and economics scholars implicitly rely on a very different efficiency concept than the concept used in the economic analysis of markets, that of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the idea that a legal decision is efficient if it increases the wealth of the people benefiting from it more than it decreases the wealth of others (Posner, 2014(13); Coleman, 1988(15); Kronman, 1980(9); e.g., Driesen, 2011a(16)). Kaldor–Hicks efficient legal decisions increase net wealth (Kronman, 1980(9); Posner, 1980(2)). Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is said to be good, because those benefiting from the decision could compensate those harmed for their losses. This criterion, however, does not require that the law’s beneficiaries actually compensate those whom the law harms and therefore may rationalize theft or government takings without compensation, both of which may transfer assets to beneficiaries who value the good more than the current owner. In any case, scholars have sharply criticized the normative value of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency and claimed that Pareto efficiency cannot generally govern legal decisions (e.g. Coleman, 1988(15); Calabresi, 1991(13)). Scholars criticizing wealth maximization argue that wealth functions as a means toward other ends. Accordingly, its maximization is neither good nor bad in and of itself, but rather good insofar as it advances ends that its defenders have not identified. Moral philosophers often endorse justice as a goal for society and do not consider wealth maximization as having any normative value independent of justice (compare Kaplow and Shavell, 2001(14)). Nussbaum/Sen/Purdy: Some scholars seeking to define justice more precisely have argued for a “capabilities” approach to human flourishing, which casts doubt on wealth maximization as an ideal (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993(16); Nussbaum, 2000(17); Williams, 2002(18); Purdy, 2005(19); Chon, 2006(20); Alexander et al., 2009(21); Sen, 2009(22); Roesler, 2011(23)). Proponents of this approach link human flourishing not to wealth aggregation but to the spread of capacities vital to human flourishing to all members of a society, for example, by improving public health. They criticize law and economics (and utilitarianism generally) for neglecting distribution, rights and freedoms, and the tendency of those suffering persistent harms to adapt (see Sen, 1999(24); Nussbaum, 2000(17)). 1. Posner, Richard A. (1979). “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory.” Journal of Legal Studies 8: 103–140. 2. Posner, Richard A. (1980). “The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 487–507. 3. Posner, Richard A. (1981a). The Economics of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Posner, Richard A. (1981b). “A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Economic Theory of the Common Law.” Hofstra Law Review 9: 775–794. 5. Dworkin, Ronald (1980a). “Is Wealth a Value?” Journal of Legal Studies 9: 191–226. 6. Weinrib, Ernest J. (1980). “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory.” University of Toronto Law Journal 30: 307–332. 7. Coleman, Jules (1980). “Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 509–551. 8. Coleman, Jules (1982). “The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice (Book Review).” Stanford Law Review 34: 1105–1132. 9. Kronman, Tony (1980). “Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle.” Journal of Legal Studies 9: 227–242. 10. Mercuro, Nicholas and Timothy P. Ryan (1984). Law, Economics and Public Policy. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 11. Dworkin, Ronald (1980b). “Why Efficiency?: A Response to Calabresi and Posner.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 563–589. 12. Calabresi, Guido (1991). “The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further.” Yale Law Journal 100: 1211–1238. 13. Posner, Richard A. (2014). Economic Analysis of Law. 9th edition. Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer. 14. Kaplow, Louis and Steven M. Shavell (2001). “Fairness Versus Welfare.” Harvard Law Review 114: 961–1388. 15. Coleman, Jules (1988). Markets, Morals, and the Law. New York: Cambridge University Press. 16. Nussbaum, Martha C. and Amartya Sen, eds. (1993). The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17. Nussbaum, Martha C. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 18. Williams, Cynthia A. (2002). “Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization.” U.C. Davis Law Review, 35: 705–778. 19. Purdy, Jedediah (2005). “A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates.” University of Chicago Law Review 72: 1237–1298. 20. Chon, Margaret (2006). “Intellectual Property and the Development Divide.” Cardozo Law Review 27: 2821–2912. 21. Alexander, Gregory S., Eduardo M. Penalver, Joseph William Singer, and Laura S. Underkuffler (2009). “A Statement of Progressive Property.” Cornell Law Review 94: 743–745. 22. Sen, Amartya (2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 23. Roesler, Shannon M. (2011). “Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rulemaking.” West Virginia Law Review 114: 49–107. 24. Sen, Amartya (1999). Development As Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. Mause I 420 Efficiency/Economic Theory: Different types of efficiency are distinguished in connection with the question of state intervention in environmental policy. Ecological effectiveness: Accuracy in achieving specified environmental goals (volume targets) Static efficiency: Achieving an environmental goal at the lowest overall economic cost. Dynamic efficiency: Incentive for the improvement of given damage avoidance technologies of an instrument. (1)(2)(3) 1. Alfred Endress, Ujmweltökonomie, Stuttgart, 2000, Sp105f 2. Michaelis, Peter. Ökonomische Instrumente in der Umweltpolitik. Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung. Heidelberg 1996. 3. Hartwig, Karl-Hans, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, ed. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Vol. 2, 5. Aufl., 122– 162. München 1992. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Efficiency | Neoclassical Economics | Mause I 54f Efficiency/Neoclassical Theory: A situation is called pareto-optimal in which no individual can be better off without another individual being worse off; the terms "pareto-optimal" and "efficient" are used synonymously in the total analysis. This pareto optimum is the content of the first main clause of welfare economics. Ultimately, this result is the basis for the neoclassical justification of the performance or superiority of the market economy. Problem: the conditions necessary for equilibrium are never fulfilled in reality. >Neoclassical economics. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Efficiency | Weale | Gaus I 217 Equality/democracy/efficiency/welfare state/Weale/Moon: (...) the commitment to equality can sometimes sit uneasily with the commitment to democracy. Consider, for example, Albert Weale's argument for earnings-related welfare state schemes, such as social security in the US. Weale argues that such schemes increase the total volume of government transfers, thus leading to greater 'egalitarian effectiveness'. Weale explains this egalitarian effectiveness in part as follows: ‚Of course, there is no necessary incentive to redistribute savings in the public earnings-related system, but equally there is little practical opportunity to resist any modest redistribution that managers of the public scheme determine. Denied the 'exit' option of shopping around, the typical citizen is confronted merely with the costly 'voice' option of changing the terms of the public scheme. Since people are often highly ignorant of the details of pension schemes, participation to change their terms is extremely costly.‘ (1990(1): 481) Moon: In short, because democratic control is difficult, popular opposition to redistribution will be ineffective, allowing elites to achieve greater 'egalitarian effectiveness' than citizens would be willing to support directly. >Equal opportunities/Welfare economics. 1. Weale, Albert (1990) 'Equality, social solidarity, and the welfare state'. Ethics, 100: 473—88. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
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| Empiricism | Economic Theories | Parisi I 30 Empiricism/Economics theories/Gelbach/Klick: The central problem in much empirical work is omitted variables bias. a) Sometimes this problem can be solved by controlling for more covariates—if the problem is omission, then inclusion should be a good solution. But this solution is often not feasible, because many omitted variables will be unknown to the researcher, and still others that theory suggests should be included will be unavailable or unquantifiable. Despite these issues, simply adding more control variables was standard operating procedure in empirical law and economics before the mid-1990s. b) Another approach was to admit the existence of the bias but to assert that the bias necessarily is in a given direction or to speculate about its probable magnitude. But if there are multiple omitted variables, this approach is more problematic, because the sign and magnitude of the bias from excluding omitted variables then depends on the relationship between the policy variable of interest and all the omitted variables, as well as the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on those omitted variables’ coefficients.* Randomized controlled experiments: In the mid-1990s, many empirical micro-economists began to shift focus to research designs they motivated in terms linked to the method of randomized controlled experiments. Omitted variable bias is not a concern in such experiments since the “treatment” is assigned randomly, so that assignment is statistically independent of any otherwise important omitted variables. In a random assignment experiment, average treatment effects can then be measured simply, using the average change in the outcome of interest for the experimental treatment group, minus the average change in the experimental control group. Parisi I 30 FN Estimation: (...)that average effects are not the only type of treatment effects that can be esti- mated. For examples of studies that consider distributional effects, see Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997)(3) and Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006)(4). Parisi I 31 Randomized controlled experiments: Empirical law and economics embraced this approach, implementing so-called difference-in-differences research designs to examine a host of legal changes. In general, this approach compares the change in outcomes in jurisdictions adopting a given policy with any contemporaneous change in non-adopting jurisdictions. Policy changes: Some studies bearing the “natural experiments” moniker (...) use instrumental variables to purge their estimates of endogenous policy choice. A valid instrumental variable in this context is one that is correlated with the adoption of a policy change, but not otherwise correlated with the outcome of interest. The first requirement is easy Parisi I 32 to demonstrate empirically, if it holds. But the second requirement, which is an “exactly identifying assumption,” cannot be tested and therefore is adopted only because it appears reasonable in context; intuition may be the only real guide to whether the second condition holds. Causality: Obtaining causal estimates from non-experimental data always requires a judgment that omitted variables bias can be eliminated, so that treatment and comparison jurisdictions can be made comparable. This might be done by adding covariates, by using difference in differences, by using instrumental variables, or by using some other approach (...). Experiments/generalization: (...) perhaps the most important limitation on the usefulness of natural experiments-motivated work, involves the degree of generalizability, or “external validity.” The most plausibly exogenous natural experiments may be the ones in which the “shocks” inducing identifying variation are the most limited in terms of what they can tell us about the effects of policy change in other settings. That is, precisely the oddity that gives rise to the shock may make the effects we can estimate from the shock least relevant to other circumstances of interest. This problem has contributed both to Angus Deaton’s criticism of the natural experiment methodology (2010)(5) and to other authors’ arguments in favor of structural econometric methods to generate estimates that can be more policy relevant than those provided by quasi-experimental methods (see, e.g., Nevo and Whinston, 2010(6); Heckman and Urzúa, 2010(7). For a response, see Imbens, 2010)(8) (ImbensVsKeckman). Internal validity: Even regarding internal validity, the credibility of a quasi-experimental research design depends crucially on untestable assumptions concerning which treatment and comparison groups are sufficiently comparable. (...)(see, e.g., Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010(9). More generally, see Rosenbaum, 2010(10)). Natural experiments: Some natural experiment designs also generate problems with respect to statistical inference, to the degree that the policy shocks are sticky over time, necessitating careful attention to hypothesis testing and covariance estimation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004(11); Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008(12), 2011(13)). *On omitted variables bias with multiple omitted variables, see Greene (2012)(1); for an approach to the omitted variables bias formula that views omitted variables bias in terms of the joint heterogeneity due to all omitted variables bias simultaneously, see Gelbach (2016)(2). 1. Greene, William H. (2012). Econometric Analysis. 7th edition, Upper Saddle Lake, NJ: Prentice Hall. 2. Gelbach, Jonah B. (2016). “When Do Covariates Matter? And Which Ones, and How Much?” Journal of Labor Economics 34: 509–543. 3. Heckman, James J., Jeffrey Smith, and Nancy Clements (1997). “Making the Most Out of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting for Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts.” Review of Economic Studies 64(4): 487–535. 4. Bitler, Marianne P., Jonah B. Gelbach, and Hilary W. Hoynes (2006). “What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments.” American Economic Review 96(4): 988–1012. 5. Deaton, Angus (2010). “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 424–455. 6. Nevo, Aviv and Michael D. Whinston (2010). “Taking the Dogma Out of Econometrics: Structural Modeling and Credible Inference.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(2): 69–82. 7. Heckman, James J. and Sergio Urzúa (2010). “Comparing IV with Structural Models: What Simple IV Can and Cannot Identify.” Journal of Econometrics 156(1): 27–37. 8. Imbens, Guido W. (2010). “Better LATE than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 399–423. 9. Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller (2010). “Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 105(490): 493–505. 10. Rosenbaum, Paul R. (2010). Observational Studies (Springer Series in Statistics). 2nd edition. Springer-Verlag New York: New York. 11. Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1): 249–275. 12. Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller (2008). “Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors.” Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3): 414–427. 13. Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller (2011). “Robust Inference with Multi-way Clustering.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29(2): 238–249. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Environmental Ethics | Pelluchon | Environmental Ethics/Pelluchon: (...) the holistic vision defended by environmental ethics in the 1970s was too abstract: because it only addressed reason and not affects, it could not persuade individuals to change their lifestyle. Nor did this thinking succeed in inspiring an ecological policy to put the economy at the service of living things and to reorganize production in such a way that it takes into account the limits of the planet and frees certain sectors such as agriculture, livestock and care from the economic dictates of maximum efficiency. >Existence/Pelluchon, >Ecology/Pelluchon. If you ask what we live on, it no longer makes sense to bring the ecological end of the world and the empty wallet at the end of the month, humanism and animal welfare in opposition to each other. Because the moment I eat, live, work or travel somewhere, I am (...) in relation to the people who produce foodand build my house. I am also in a relation with the animals and the natural resources. >Body/Pelluchon. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020 |
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| Environmental Protection | Economic Theories | Mause I 403/404 Environmental protection/economic policy/economic theory: From an economic point of view, the environmental problems that still exist (...) do not lead to the demand for maximum environmental protection. From an economic point of view (...) the natural environment as such has no intrinsic value, but rather requires a reference to satisfaction of individual needs related to the use of environmental goods. Accordingly, the task of environmental policy is seen as supplying environmental goods for such uses that increase social welfare. From this allocation-theoretical perspective, it is not the minimization of environmental damage, but the realization of an optimal level of environmental protection with consideration of all advantages and disadvantages of environmental protection measures that represents the fundamental objective of an economically expedient environmental policy (Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 1f.(1); Endres 2000, p. 26 ff.(2)). >Social Good. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Feess, Eberhard, und Andreas Seeliger, Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4.ed. München 2013 2. Endres, Alfred, Umweltökonomie, 3. ed. Stuttgart: 2000. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equal Opportunities | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 215 Equal opportunities/welfare economics/Moon: Fair equality of opportunity requires not only that there be no 'arbitrary' barriers to the life choices one may make, such as restrictions on occupational or educational opportunity based on race or gender, but that everyone has access to the resources and experiences necessary to qualify for the different positions and careers that exist in society. Institutions: arguably, fair equality of opportunity supports not only a social minimum state, but an institutional welfare state, in which education, including perhaps early childhood education, and medical care are provided on a common basis for all. Problems: but, like welfare rights generally, the requirements of fair equality of opportunity cannot be specified except in specific social contexts; the kind Gaus I 216 of educational opportunities necessary in a largely agrarian society, to take an obvious example, are very different from those required in a postindustrial setting. (...) it is necessary to make trade- offs between equal opportunity and other values, such as the privacy and autonomy of families. >Citizenship/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political Philosophy. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Equality | Sen | Gaus I 231 Equality/Sen/Lamont: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)(1), Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. In his lecture, Sen was addressing a debate over two candidate metrics, welfare (or utility) on the one hand, and Rawlsian primary goods on the other. >J. Rawls. At issue between these were questions about the extent to which the welfare metric unfairly caters to morally wrongful preferences or expensive tastes. Between these extremes, Sen introduced 'capability equality' , where capabilities refer to what various goods do for people, apart from the welfare they achieve (Sen, 1985(2); 1987(3)). Cf. >Equal Opportunities, >Welfare, >Distributive Justice. This introduced another variable into the 'equality of what' literature which had been dominated by arguments between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity advocates (for more recent contributions see Bowie, 1988(4)). A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990(5)) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000(6)), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989(7); 1990(8); 1991(9)), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)(10), and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)(11). >Justification/Lamont. 1. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 2. Sen, Amartya (1985) Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 3. Sen, Amartya (1987) On Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 4. Bowie, Norman (1988) Equal Opportunity. Boulder, CO: Westview. 5. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 6. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 8. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 9. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 10. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 11. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Equality | Weale | Gaus I 217 Equality/democracy/efficiency/welfare state/Weale/Moon: (...) the commitment to equality can sometimes sit uneasily with the commitment to democracy. Consider, for example, Albert Weale's argument for earnings-related welfare state schemes, such as social security in the US. Weale argues that such schemes increase the total volume of government transfers, thus leading to greater 'egalitarian effectiveness'. Weale explains this egalitarian effectiveness in part as follows: ‚Of course, there is no necessary incentive to redistribute savings in the public earnings-related system, but equally there is little practical opportunity to resist any modest redistribution that managers of the public scheme determine. Denied the 'exit' option of shopping around, the typical citizen is confronted merely with the costly 'voice' option of changing the terms of the public scheme. Since people are often highly ignorant of the details of pension schemes, participation to change their terms is extremely costly.‘ (1990(1): 481) Moon: In short, because democratic control is difficult, popular opposition to redistribution will be ineffective, allowing elites to achieve greater 'egalitarian effectiveness' than citizens would be willing to support directly. >Equal opportunities/welfare economics. 1. Weale, Albert (1990) 'Equality, social solidarity, and the welfare state'. Ethics, 100: 473—88. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Equilibrium | Walras | Mause I 54 Equilibrium/Neoclassical Theory: The demand for and supply of various goods and the corresponding market equilibrium with equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity can be derived from the behaviour of individual households and companies. However, it is not this partial analysis of individual markets that is of central importance for the evaluation of markets and market equilibria, but rather the total analysis, i.e. the simultaneous consideration of all markets in an economy and the interdependencies between them (general equilibrium theory). The pioneer of total analysis was Léon Walras.(1) In its modern form it was coined by Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Arrow 1951(2); Arrow and Debreu 1954(3)). In a first step, the existence of a general market equilibrium can be proven. The relative prices of all goods are determined exclusively by real economic conditions (e.g. the production technology, resources euipment or demand structure); money only plays a role insofar as the price level (in accordance with quantity theory) depends on the money supply; moreover, it is neutral. Problem: the conditions necessary for the equilibrium are never fulfilled in reality. Solution: in theory, the existence of the equilibrium is proven, but not its stability. >Neoclassical economics, >K. Arrow. 1. L. Walras, Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure. Teile I– III (1874), Teile IV– VI (1877). Lausanne 1874/ 1877. 2. K.J. Arrow, An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics. In Proceedings of the second Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability, Hrsg. J. Neyman, Berkeley 1951 3. K. J. Arrow, G. Debreu Existence of equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22: 82– 109. |
EconWalras I Léon Walras Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure Lausanne 1874 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equilibrium Theory | Neoclassical Economics | Mause I 54 Equilibrium/Neoclassical Theory: The demand for and supply of various goods and the corresponding market equilibrium with equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity can be derived from the behaviour of individual households and companies. However, it is not this partial analysis of individual markets that is of central importance for the evaluation of markets and market equilibria, but rather the total analysis, i.e. the simultaneous consideration of all markets in an economy and the interdependencies between them (general equilibrium theory). The pioneer of total analysis was Léon Walras.(1) In its modern form it was coined by Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Arrow 1951 (2); Arrow and Debreu 1954 (3)). In a first step, the existence of a general market equilibrium can be proven. The relative prices of all goods are determined exclusively by real economic conditions (e.g. the production technology, resources euipment or demand structure); money only plays a role insofar as the price level (in accordance with quantity theory) depends on the money supply; moreover, it is neutral. Problem: the conditions necessary for the equilibrium are never fulfilled in reality. Solution: in theory, the existence of the equilibrium is proven, but not its stability. >K. Arrow. 1. L. Walras, Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure. Teile I–III (1874), Teile IV– VI (1877). Lausanne 1874/ 1877. 2. K.J. Arrow, An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics. In Proceedings of the second Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability, Hrsg. J. Neyman, Berkeley 1951. 3. K. J. Arrow, G. Debreu Existence of equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22: 82–109. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equivalence Theorem | Barro | Mause I 277 Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed. Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned. For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon. Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed. Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2) This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments. VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto: Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant. BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems see >Growth/Diamond. 1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095– 1117. 2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977. 3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971. |
EconBarro I Robert J. Barro Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy 1976 EconBarro II Robert J. Barro David B. Gordon Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policcy 1983 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equivalence Theorem | Ricardo | Mause I 277 Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed. Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned. For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon. Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed. Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2) This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments. VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto: Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant. BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems see >Growth/Diamond. 1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095 – 1117. 2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977. 3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Exchange Rate Volatility | Rogoff | Feldstein I 447 Exchange Rate Volatility/Rogoff: Though simply bringing down inflation is not enough, it is possible in principle to stabilize the yen-dollar and mark-dollar exchange rates should global monetary authorities attach a sufficiently high weight to that objective. For example, the United States and Japan could in principle slavishly peg their currencies to the euro. Other mechanisms for fixing exchange rates might allocate the right to steer global monetary policy more evenly, but as the European experience has shown us, the coordination problems involved in such a system can be quite severe, absent political integration. I will return to these issues in the final section of this paper. Problem: How serious are the costs of exchange rate volatility, and how great would the gains be to removing it? Hedging: An obvious point to make is that the ability of firms and individuals to hedge against exchange rate risk places an upper bound on the size of the costs. Hedging may be expensive, but not infinitely so, especially as international capital markets deepen and opportunities for portfolio diversification multiply. Demand: (…) the ability of individuals and companies to shift demand across time and goods tempers the costs of volatility. >Exchange rates/Rogoff. Problem: there is no way for the world as a whole to hedge against global risks. For this reason, much of literature on risk premiums in forward exchange markets- or in stocks and bonds, for that matter - neglects the inconveniences of the trading of individual risk and focuses on the equilibrium costs of global risks. Feldstein I 448 Even if this risk cannot be diversified away, it is not easy to construct models where the welfare effects are large.(1),(2) Thus the benefits of eliminating exchange rate volatility must lie elsewhere, since the benefits of reducing consumption volatility (and consumption is presumably the ultimate welfare objective) are not likely to be very large even if exchange rates truly are a major cause. Of course, all of this discussion is predicated on the assumption that markets are very complete and global volatility is what matters. This view is too extreme, even if it is true that global capital market innovation is constantly reducing the costs of diversification. Still, these kinds of considerations should cause one to question just how great an evil exchange rate volatility can be. Empirical evidence comparisons on the volatility of output and trade under fixed versus flexible exchange rates tend to underscore the difficulty of detecting the real effects of exchange rate volatility. >Fixed Exchange Rates, >Floating Exchange Rates. The open question, however, is whether real exchange rate volatility has an effect on any Feldstein I 449 other macroeconomic variables. Are trade flows greater under fixed rates than flexible rates? Is output, consumption, or investment more volatile? The small number of studies that have looked at this question tend to find that the exchange rate regime has little or no influence on volatility of macroaggregates (see Baxter and Stockman 1989(3); Flood and Rose 1995(4)). Admittedly, the evidence is far less conclusive or systematic than the evidence on real exchange rate variability. But at the very least, it appears that differences do not (or at least have not yet) jumped out of the data. A (…) reason why exchange rate volatility may not be all that problematic comes out of recent efforts to provide microfoundations for the classic exchange rate theories of the 1970s (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996(5), chap. 10). This new research suggests that while exchange rate volatility may have adverse effects, they are not necessarily first order. If the major distortions in the economy include factors such as labor market distortions, tax distortions, and monopoly distortions, then the welfare effects of exchange rate movements depend to a large extent on whether they exacerbate or ameliorate these distortions. At the moment, the empirics of this question are not resolved. Feldstein I 450 Central banks: (…) the reason exchange rate attacks can still succeed, even where the central bank has more than adequate reserves, is that governments are often extremely reluctant to raise interest rates to the extent necessary to fend off a major sustained attack. Feldstein I 452 Central banks have been remarkably successful in subduing inflation in recent years, but the level of exchange rate volatility among the big three currencies (dollar, euro, and yen) has subsided only slightly. >Exchange rates, >Fixed exchange rates, >Floating exchange rates. 1. Lucas, Robert. 1988. Models of business cycles. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of international macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September. 3. Baxter, Marianne, and Alan Stockman. 1989. Business cycles and the exchange rate regime: Some international evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 23 (May): 377-400. 4. Flood, Robert, and Andrew Rose. 1995. Fixing exchange rates: A virtual quest for fundamentals. Journal of Monetary Economics 36 (August): 3-37. 5. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of international macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September. Kenneth Rogoff. „Perspectives on Exchange Rate Volatility.“ In: Martin Feldstein (ed). International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. |
Rogoff I Kenneth S. Rogoff The purchasing power parity puzzle 1996 Feldstein I Martin Feldstein (ed.) International Capital Flows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999. Chicago 1999 |
| Fairness | Economic Theories | Gaus I 232 Fairness/distributive justice/Economic Theories/Lamont: (...) [an] approach to fairness, favoured by economists, has developed in the context of modern game theory. The most common strategy is to introduce an 'envy-free' requirement: a distribution is deemed fair when none of the relevant parties to the distribution are envious of others' allocations. Microjustice: This and related notions of fairness are commonly applied to 'microjustice' issues which arise in more everyday or localized situations rather than distribution for the whole society (Baumol, 1986(1); Brams and Taylor, 1996(2); Le Grand, 1991(3); Varian, 1975(4); Young, 1994(5)). The difficulties these theories face is to specify real allocations satisfying the envy-free criterion, but which do not achieve this by unreasonable extensions of our everyday notion of being envy-free. Despite these difficulties, some theorists have extended the analysis within the broader context of bargaining theory to deal with the traditional problems of distributive justice (Barry, 1989(6); Binmore, 1994(7); 1998(8); Zajac, 1995(9)). This trend is likely to continue in the future with more engagement between economists, political theorists and philosophers. >Fairness/Political theories, >Distributive justice. 1. Baumol, William J. (1986) Superfairness: Applications and Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Brams, Steven J. and Alan D. Taylor (1996) Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Le Grand, Julian (1991) Equity and Choice: An Essay in Economics and Applied Philosophy. London: Harper Collins. 4. Varian, Hal R. (1975) 'Distributive justice, welfare economics, and the theory of fairness'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4:223-47. 5. Young, H. Peyton (1994) Equity: In Theory and Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 6. Barry, Brian (1989) Theories of Justice. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Binmore, Ken (1994) Game Theory and the Social Contract. vol. 1, Playing Fair. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 8. Binmore, Ken (1998) Game Theory and the Social Contract. Vol. 2, Just Playing (Economic Learning and Social Evolution). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 9. Zajac, Edward E. (1995) Political Economy of Fairness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Federalism | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 210 Federalism/Constitutional Economics/Voigt: (…) the conjectured economic benefits of federalism are expected to arise from the competition between constituent governments; its costs are based on the necessity of cooperating on some issues. Hayek: Thus, Hayek (1939)(1) argues that competition between governments will reveal information on efficient ways to provide public goods. Assuming that governments have incentives to make use of that information, government efficiency should be higher in federations, ceteris paribus. Tiebout: In Tiebout's ( 1956)(2) famous model, the lower government levels compete Parisi I 211 for taxpaying citizens, thus giving lower-level governments an incentive to cater to these citizens' preferences. Costs: (…) if the number of states is large, economies of scale in the provision of public goods could remain unrealized. For example, Tanzi (2000)(3) suspects that those providing public goods will be insufficiently specialized. Moral hazard: Also, federal states need to deal with a moral hazard problem that is not an issue in unitary states.* The federal government will regularly issue "no-bail-out clauses" but they will not always be credible.** With regard to the issue of overborrowing, Wildasin (1997)(6) argues that large states can become "too big to fail." On the other hand, it has been argued (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7) that large member states can internalize more of the benefits generated by responsible fiscal policies. Solution: A number of factors might mitigate this free-rider problem: If strong, disciplined parties are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, then party leaders may be able to prevent state officials from externalizing the negative effects of overborrowing (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002)(7). Corruption: To the question of whether corruption is more prevalent under federal or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi, 2000)(3). Therefore, corruption levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. Vs: The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare- enhancing activities will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. Parisi I 212 Government spending: For a long time, the evidence concerning the effects of federalism on overall government spending was mixed. Over the last several years, though, this appears to have changed. Rodden (2003)(8) shows for a cross-country study covering the period 1980 to 1993 that in countries in which local and state governments have the competence to set the tax base, total government expenditure is lower. >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics. * The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be more aptly described drawing on principal-agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For such a view, see Seabright (1996)(4). ** Rodden (2002(5), p. 6 72) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if it does not bail out the constituent governments. 1. Hayek, F. (1939). "Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federalism." New Commonwealth Quarterly 2: 131-149. 2. Tiebout, Ch. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 3. Tanzi, V. (2000). "Some politically incorrect Remarks on Decentralization and Public Finance," in J.-J. Dethier, ed., Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, 47-63. Boston, MA: Kluwer. 4. Seabright, Paul (1996). "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model." European Economic Review 40:61-89. 5. Rodden, J. (2002). "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World." American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 670-687. 6. Wildasin, D. (1997). "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations." Nashville, TN: Mimeo. 7. Rodden, J. and E. Wibbels (2002). "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism - Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." World Politics 54: 494-531. 8. Rodden, J. (2003). "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government." International Organization 57: 695-729. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Feminism | Ball | Gaus I 23 Feminism/Ball: 1) A feminist or gender-centred approach to the history of political thought began in the 1960s when women were looking for a ‘usable past’, a history that connected present struggles with previous ones largely neglected by historians, most of whom were male. Feminist historians of political thought sought heroines – and heroes – who had championed the cause of women’s rights and related causes. 2) In [an] angrier - and arguably more accurate - second phase, feminist scholars set out to expose and criticize the misogyny lurking in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Gaus I 24 Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, and Marx, amongst many others. >Plato, >Aristotle, >N. Machiavelli, >Th. Hobbes, >J. Locke, >J.-J. Rousseau, >J. Bentham, >J.St. Mill, >K. Marx. The public/private dichotomy and the concept of consent in liberal theory are a sham, the social contract is a ‘fraternal’ construct, and the modern welfare state is a covertly patriarchal institution (Pateman, 1989)(1). >C. Pateman. 3) A third phase followed in which the ostensibly civic virtues of men were turned into vices – the hunger for power, domination, or simply showing off – that women supposedly lacked. Men are domineering, women nurturing; men competitive, women co-operative; men think and judge in abstract and universal categories, women in concrete and particular instances; and so on. A new phrase – ‘maternal thinking’ – was coined to cover this gently militant momism (Ruddick, 1989)(2). On this view, men are absent fathers and domineering patriarchs; women are caring and concerned mothers speaking ‘in a different voice’ (Gilligan, 1982)(3). This represents something of a return to the ‘biology-is-destiny’ essentialism and ‘functionalism’ criticized so vigorously by Okin and others. >S.M. Okin. It also accepts the public/private distinction criticized by Pateman and others, upending and reifying that dichotomy so that the ‘private’ realm of the family is taken to be superior to the ‘public’ area of politics, power, aggression, and war (Elshtain, 1987)(4). >J.B. Elshtain. Maternalism: The new ‘maternal thinking’ – and the new maternalists’ approach to the history of political thought, in particular – did not want for critics. Against the maternalists’ valorization of the private realm and the celebration of mothering, Mary Dietz (1985)(5) and other feminist critics held out the prospect of an active and engaged civic feminism, or ‘citizenship with a feminist face’. 1. Pateman, Carole (1989) The Disorder of Women. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2. Ruddick, Sara (1989) Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon. 3. Gilligan, Carol (1982) In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987) Women and War. New York: Praeger. 5. Dietz, Mary G. (1985) ‘Citizenship with a feminist face: the problem with maternal thinking’. Political Theory, 13: 19–37. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Fundamental Rights | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 214 Fundamental rights/welfare state/ welfare rights/Political philosophy/Moon: (...) many of the considerations that can be invoked to support strong property rights also support welfare or 'positive' rights, and so can be used to justify the redistributive activities of a welfare state. vities of a welfare state. When we think about why we are attracted to the idea that humans have rights at all, including a (defeasible) right not to be coerced by others, the reasons we are likely to come up with will support the idea that people ought to be accorded certain basic welfare rights, rights to goods and services necessary for human functioning. >Rights, >Society, >Community, >State. Nozick/Moon: For example, Nozick refers to the idea that people are capable of leading meaningful lives, and so they have (or should have) a right against being coerced by others because such a right is necessary to protect that fundamental human capacity. I can only create projects for myself, and organize my life to realize those projects, and thus find meaning in my life, if I am free from coercion by others: they can't force me to do their bidding rather than fulfil my own aspirations. >R. Nozick. Problem: This is a powerful argument, but it is equally true that to live my own life requires not only protection against interference from others, but also access to the resources necessary to life itself. If those resources can be appropriated as private property, then a person could be deprived of anything resembling a decent life, or even life itself, because she lacked the necessary resources. Fundamental rights/Waldron: Jeremy Waldron (1993(1): 309-38) gives the example of a homeless person, in a setting in which all land and other amenities, such as toilets or sleeping places, are pri- vately owned. Under those circumstances, she would not be able to live, or at least to live without violating someone's 'rights'. But what reason would she have to acknowledge a duty not to take Gaus I 215 what she needed, when her life depended on it? It is hard to see why people, recognizing the possibility that they might become impoverished, would have reason to accept a system of property rights that could leave them in such desperate straits. Property rights: As Waldron (1993(1): ch. I and passim) argues, the only system of property rights that all have a reason to endorse would be one that ensured that no one need be deprived of essential resources, and the obvious way of achieving that would be to make property holdings subject to taxation, so that the state could provide essential goods and services, or at least a minimum income, when necessary.* >Property. Social minimum state/Moon: This line of argument supports what might be called a social minimum state, not necessarily an institutional welfare state. The core argument is that some fundamental human values - the idea of a meaningful life, personal autonomy, or life itself - can be realized (or at least guaranteed) only if there are government programmes providing enough income at least for subsistence. Welfare state/social minmum/Hayek: F. A. Hayek, for example, is renowned as a critic of the welfare state, but he accepts the idea of a social minimum, arguing that citizens may feel that there is 'a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who cannot help themselves' and so the society could provide 'a uniform minimum income... outside the market' to those who are indigent (1976(2): 87).** >Welfare State. Political theories: Others have argued that people have prepolitical welfare rights, on all fours with the 'negative' rights to non-interference such as the right to bodily integrity, and that it is the government's responsibility to secure those rights. Welfare rights/Political philosophy: The view that we have welfare rights that are, in some sense, prepolitical, which require that the state provide various goods and services, is subject to well known difficulties. The standards defining the scope of such rights claims are notoriously vague. Plant: Raymond Plant et al. (1980)(3), for example, base positive rights claims in 'needs', but what are the boundaries of need? I may 'need' an enormously expensive kind of medical treatment in order to prolong my life, if only for a few days, but is it plausible to say that I have a right to such treatment? Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin argues the traditional practice of medicine may be based on the 'rescue principle' , which answers that question affirmatively: 'it says we should spend all we can [on health care] until the next dollar would buy no gain in health or life expectancy at all', but he insists that 'No sane society would try to meet that standard' (2000(4): 309): it would require sacrificing too many competing goods, including other rights claims, like the right to an education or a minimal standard of living. >Ronald Dworkin. Gewirth: Alan Gewirth views positive rights claims as implicit in the commitment to human agency, a commitment one necessarily undertakes in performing any intentional action, because doing so presupposes that one views oneself as an agent, and so is implicitly committed to those conditions necessary for the exercise of agency, which include access to certain resources. (...) when I cannot meet my needs through my own efforts, others have an obligation 'posi tively to assist' me (1978(5): 134). Moon: But what standards are they to use to determine what constitutes a reasonable effort on my part? Holmes/Sunstein: These concerns may not be decisive to reject the idea of basic welfare rights, but they do mean that specifying them is impossible in the absence of some political process through which the standards governing responsibility and trade-offs among conflicting uses can be determined (see Holmes and Sunstein, 1999)(6). And because these rights cannot be specified except through a political process, it is implausible to view them as establishing a pre-political standard of justice to which that political process must conform. >Equal opportunities/Welfare economics. * See Lomasky (1987)(3) for a rights-based defence of a mmimal welfare state, which taxes people to provide for a minimum standard of living for all. ** Although generally critical of the welfare state, Hayek seems to allow for certain forms of public provision and compulsory insurance (1960(4):285-394). 1. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 2. Hayek, Friedrich (1976). The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Plant, Raymond, H. Lesser and P. Taylor-Gooby (1980) Political Philosophy and Social Welfare: Essays on the Normative Basis of Welfare Provision. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 4. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Gewirth, Alan (1978) Reason and Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Holmes, Stephen and Cass Sunstein (1999) The Cost of Rights. New York: Norton. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Gender | Poststructuralism | Gaus I 279 Gender/Poststructuralism/state/Mottier: Influenced by poststructuralist, postmodern, and comparative perspectives, current feminist analyses of the state thus usefully challenge the a priori assumption that the state (always or necessarily) acts as an agent of male domination. They increasingly turn away from the theorization of relations between gender and the state in general terms, to focus instead on the construction of gender within specific state discourses and practices. State: It is important to recognize that relations between the state and gender are not intrinsically positive or negative. Feminist analyses of the state need to take into account its historical complexity, its variations within different political contexts such as liberal democracy, colonialism or state socialism, and its dynamic relationship to gendered power relations (Waylen, 1998(1): 7). It is important for feminist analysis to develop instead more sophisticated models which consider the complex, multidimensional and differentiated relations between the state and gender. Such models should recognize that the state can be a positive as well as a negative resource for feminists, and they should emphasize the gendered nature of concepts such as the welfare state or citizenship while also taking into account historical and spatial national variations (...). >State/Poststructuralism, >State/Gender Theory, >State/Feminism. 1. Waylen, Georgina (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 1—17. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| General Will | Rousseau | Höffe I 277 General Will/Rousseau/Höffe: The core idea of Rousseau's social contract(1) consists in a collective common will, the volonté générale. It comes into being as soon as several people unite as a single body with a single will. Unlike the "distributive" common will, the sum of individual private interests and individual intentions, and the mutable will of all (volonté des tous), Rousseau's common will is by its very nature "always constant, unchangeable and pure". Common good: Since [the common good] is oriented towards the good of the whole, both the common preservation and the general welfare, it always and without restriction has normative precedence over the (particular) will of the individuals. The common good is based on the will of those concerned. Höffe: Question: How is this will determined? [Rousseau] votes (...) for an empirical reading of the common will. Cf. >Human rights/Rousseau, >Parliamentarism/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Generational Justice | Rawls | I 128 Generational Justice/Rawls: it is a question of whether the persons in an assumed initial state of a society to be established have duties and obligations towards third parties, in particular their direct descendants. >Fairness/Rawls, >Society/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. However, the principle of justice as fairness does not want to derive its principles from such considerations. Nevertheless, I assume that although the individuals do not consider their own life span in continuity, their goodwill will extend over at least two generations. I 208 Generational Justice/Rawls: since the members of society have an interest in securing equal rights of freedom for their descendants, there is no conflict over the choice of the principle of equal freedoms. For example, a son could not argue that the father neglected his interests if he accepted the principle of equal freedoms. The father would have to argue to the detriment of others if they departed from it that these other benefits would arise when they grow up. I 284 Generational Justice/Rawls: this question challenges every ethical theory. It depends on how the minimum social standards are defined. I 286 Social minimum standards/Rawls: there are two problems here: a) there is not enough to save or b) taxation gets too strong when the minimum is raised. Then the situation of the worst-off starts to deteriorate. The question of the savings rate has often been discussed(1)(2)(3)(4)(5). I 287 Generational Justice/Rawls: The conclusion is that the greater benefits of future generations will be sufficiently great to compensate for the present victims. This can be true simply because future generations have better technology at their disposal. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: this forces us to impose greater sacrifices on the poorer people for the later ones, who may be better off as a result of other circumstances. However, this counting up between generations does not make as much sense as between contemporaries. >Utilitarianism, >VsUtilitarianism. Contract theory/contract doctrine/Rawls: it considers the problem from the perspective of the initial situation of a society to be established. Here, the participants do not know to which generation they belong if they are to decide on the form of the company and its structure. Now they should ask themselves how much they are prepared to save if everyone else does the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. >Contract Theory. I 288 Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but no one knows to which generation they belong. I 289 However, the principle of fair saving does not force us to continue saving forever. Details have to be clarified at a later point of time. Each generation has its own appropriate goals. Generations are no more subject to each other than individuals. No generation has special demands. I 290 Savings/Savings Rate/Prosperity/Rawls: the last stage does not have to be one of abundance. The principle of justice does not require previous generations to save money so that later generations will have more. Rather, saving is about enabling a fair society and equal freedoms to become more effective. If more is saved, it is for other purposes. It would be a misunderstanding to think that the realisation of a good and fair society must wait until a high standard of living has been achieved. I 291 Generational Justice/Alexander Herzen/Rawls: Herzen thesis: human development is a kind of chronological unfairness, because the later ones benefit from the work of the former without paying the same price(6). >A. Herzen. Generational fairness/Kant: he saw it as strange that earlier generations would bear their burden only for the benefit of later generations and that they would be the only ones who would be lucky enough to be allowed to live in a finished building(7). >Generational Justice/Kant. 1. See A. K. Sen „On Optimizing the Rate of Saving“, Economic Journal, Vol. 71, 1961. 2. J. Tobin, National Economic Policiy, New Haven, 1966, ch. IX. 3. R.M. Solow, Growth Theory, New York, 1970, ch. V. 4. Frank P. Ramsey, „A Mathematical Theory of Saving“, Economic Journal, Vol. 38, 1928, reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics. 5. T.C. Koomans, „On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth“ (1965), In: Scientific Papers of T. C. Kopmans, Berlin, 1970. 6. Quote from Isaiah Berlin’s Einführung zu Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, New York, 1960 p. xx. 7. Kant: „Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose“, quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Goods | Rothbard | Rothbard III 161 Goods/exchangeable goods/exchange/production/stock keeping/Rothbard: Economics, (…), is not a science that deals particularly with “material goods” or “material welfare.” It deals in general with the action of men to satisfy their desires, and, specifically, with the rocess of exchange of goods as a means for each individual to “produce” satisfactions for his desires. Rothbard III 162 These goods may be tangible commodities or they may be intangible personal services. The principles of supply and demand, of price determination, are exactly the same for any good, whether it is in one category or the other. The foregoing analysis is applicable to all goods. Thus, the following types of possible exchanges have been covered by our analysis: A commodity for a commodity; such as horses for fish. A commodity for a personal service; such as medical advice for butter, or farm labor for food. A personal service for a personal service; such as mutual log-rolling by two settlers, or medical advice for gardening labor, or teaching for a musical performance. Rothbard III 163 Exchange/trade: One evident reason for the confusion of exchange with a mere trade of material objects is the fact that much intangible property cannot, by its very nature, be exchanged. A violinist may own his musicianly ability and exchange units of it, in the form of service, for the services of a physician. But other personal attributes, which cannot be exchanged, may be desired as goods. Thus, Brown might have a desired end: to gain the genuine approval of Smith. This is a particular consumers’ good which he cannot purchase with any other good, for what he wants is the genuine approval rather than a show of approval that might be purchased. Inalienability: In relation to exchange, this intangible good is an inalienable property of Smith’s, i.e., it cannot be given up. On the other hand, when property that can be alienated is transferred, it, of course, becomes the property - under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction - of the person who has received it in exchange, and no later regret by the original owner can establish any claim to the property. Rothbard III 165 Goods-substitute: suppose that Jones deposits a good (…) in a warehouse for safekeeping. He retains ownership of the good, but transfers its physical possession to the warehouse owner, Green, for safekeeping. Green gives Jones a warehouse receipt for the [good], certifying that the [good] is there for safekeeping and giving the owner of the receipt a claim to receive the [good] whenever he presents the receipt to the warehouse. On an unhampered market, the claim would be regarded as absolutely secure and certain to be honored, and therefore Jones would be able to exchange the claim as a substitute for actual physical exchange of the [good]. >Stock keeping/Rothbard. Rothbard III 166 Shares: (…) the share is evidence of part-ownership, or a claim to part-ownership, of a good. This property right in a proportionate share of the use of a good can also be sold or bought in exchange. Credit: A third type of claim arises from a credit exchange (or credit transaction). In a credit transaction, a present good is exchanged for a future good, or rather, a claim on a future good. Prices in such exchanges are determined by value scales and the meeting of supply and demand schedules, just as in the case of exchanges of present goods. >Credit/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Governance | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 148 Governance/Community/Thomas Aquinas/Höffe: The authorities must (...) not act arbitrarily. To enact any laws and not being authorized, it has to concretize the highly general law of nature in relation to the historical situation, and where necessary to develop it further. Law: It should serve the welfare of the community and prevent harm to the people by prohibiting murder and theft. Exceptions: Because of the situation the detailed regulations can vary, and can also be changed again. >Equity. Höffe I 151 About the reign of Princes/Thomas: (De regno): Despite its fragmentary character Thomas Aquinas' intention becomes clear (...): Aristotle's political philosophy should (...) come alive as an independent thought, additionally concretized under the conditions of the time. The preface points to God as the "King of all kings and Lord of all rulers". It determines as object "the origin of royal rule (regni origo) and everything that is connected with the profession of a king". Realistic view: Thomas remains (...) true to his basic intellectual attitude that the human is able to recognize the things essential to him or her by means of his or her autonomous and experience-enriched reason, even without revelation. Höffe I 152 De regno: The text can be simplified into four parts: (1) the justification of rule, which includes a plea for the monarchy and against tyranny (Book I, chap. 1-6: ratio regiminis), (...) (2) an indirect mirror of princes, namely a reflection on the motives of a just ruler (1 7-11: ratio regentis) (...) (3) which correspond to the tasks of government (1 12-15: ratio gubernationis),(...) (4) the unfinished Book II [discusses] the most important task of government, the foundation of a a community, a city or an empire (...) (II 1-4). Monarchy: is not considered by Thomas Aquinas to be naturally legitimate. Human/Citizen/Anthropology: Aristotle's definition of the human being as a political being by nature is further developed into the concept of the animal sociale et politicum, the social and political being. (...) [Thomas Aquinas'] view is that the human, both a deficient and a rational being, must take care of his or her own life with his or her own hands and work. Höffe I 155 Common good: In the ruler's commitment to the common good [Thomas Aquinas] again proves to be a realist open to experience. For he does not bind this obligation to an altruistic sense of responsibility. ThomasVsCicero: Against Cicero, the appropriate reward does not consist in honor or fame, which are held in low esteem by the good, Höffe I 156 and, moreover, result in such dangerous evils as pernicious warfare and hypocrisy. >Cicero. Corruption: It should come down to money even less what is reminiscent of Plato(2). Rather, what counts is the reward to be expected from God, the highest degree of heavenly bliss(3). Expectation of salvation: Both the expectation of this worldly good and the other worldly good motivate the king to rule well, rather than to become a tyrant(4). >Tyranny. 1. Thomas De regno ad regem Cypri 2. Ibid. I, 7 3. Ibid. I, 9 4. Ibid. I, 10f |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Government Spending | Economic Theories | Mause I 276/277 Government Expenditure/Economic theories: Problems in determining optimal government spending arise in connection with public goods. Their value can hardly be determined, since there are an indefinite number of individuals who do not contribute to the costs (free rider problem). See Public Goods, especially Public Goods/Samuelson. For newer solutions Frey and Stutzer.(1) 1.Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer. 2011. The use of happiness research for public policy. Social Choice and Welfare 38 (4): 659– 674. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Governmental Structures | Persson | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Governmental Structures | Tabellini | Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Head Tax | Rothbard | Rothbard III 921 Head tax/Poll tax/Rothbard: Taxation neutrality: Far from being "neutral" to the free market, then, a proportional income tax follows a principle which, if consistently applied, would eradicate the market economy and the entire monetary economy itself. Poll tax/head tax: It is clear, then, that equal taxation of everyone - the so-called "head tax" or "poll tax" - would be a far closer approach to the goal of neutrality. But even here, there are serious flaws in its neutrality, entirely apart from the ineluctable taxpayer-tax-consumer dichotomy. For one thing, goods and services on the free market are purchased only by those freely willing to obtain them at the market price. Since a tax is a compulsory levy rather than a free purchase, it can never be assumed that each and every member of society would, in a free market, pay this equal sum to the government. Rothbard III 922 Government services/head tax: (…) let us assume that the head tax is being paid [for police protection]. The free-market rule is that equal prices are paid for equal services; but what, here, is an "equal service"? Surely, the service of police protection is of far greater magnitude in an urban crime center than it is in some sleepy backwater, where crime is rare. Police protection will certainly cost more in the crime-ridden area; hence, if it were supplied on the market, the price paid there would be higher than in the backwater. Furthermore, a person under particular threat of crime, and who might require greater surveillance, would have to pay a higher police fee. A uniform tax would be below market price in the dangerous areas and above it in the peaceful areas. To approach neutrality, then, a tax would have to vary in accordance with the costs of services and not be uniform.(1) This is the neglected cost principle of taxation. Benefit principle/taxation/Rothbard: Still another attempt at neutral taxation is the benefit principle, which states that a tax should be levied equal to the benefit which the individuals receive from the government service. VsBenefit principle: Obviously, there would be no such welfare or any other subsidy payments if the benefit principle were maintained. Service: Even if we again confine the discussion to services like police protection, grave flaws still remain. Rothbard III 923 Measurements: A fatal problem is that we cannot measure benefits or even know whether they exist. As in the head tax and cost principles, there is here no free market where people can demonstrate that they are receiving a benefit from the exchange greater than the value of the goods they surrender. In fact, since taxes are levied by coercion, it is clear that people's benefits from government are considerably less than the amount that they are required to pay, since, if left free, they would contribute less to government. The "benefit," then, is simply assumed arbitrarily by government offcials. >Cost Principle/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Economic theories, >Neutral taxation/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard, >Bureaucracy/Rothbard, >Benefit principle/Rothbard, >Progressive tax/Rothbard, >Excess Profits Tax/Rothbard. 1. We are not here conceding that "costs" determine "prices." The general array of final prices determines the general array of cost prices, but then the viability of firms is determined by whether the price that people will pay for their particular products will be enough to cover the costs, which are determined throughout the market. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Human Rights | Rousseau | Höffe I 271 Human Rights/Rousseau/Höffe: According to Rousseau, there is no natural law, no law of nature that precedes the civil state. The right arises only in political society and with it.(1) >State/Rousseau. >Natural State/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by the means of a free consent, i.e. the >Social Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement which is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully (2). >Justification/Rousseau, >State/Rousseau, >Social Contract/Rousseau. Höffe I 278 Common good: Since [the common good] is oriented towards the good of the whole, both the common preservation and the general welfare, it always and without restriction has normative precedence over the (particular) will of the individuals. The common good is based on the will of those concerned. Höffe: Question: How do you determine this will? A conception of the common will (volonté général) as a thought experiment could lead to a criterion of consentability: The answer could (...) consist in human rights according to this strict understanding, i.e. in rights that are due to a person simply because he or she is a human being. Rousseau/Höffe: Even if one can interpret some references in this sense, Rousseau does not defend such rights in the articles of association. Instead, he votes for an empirical reading of the common will. >General Will/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Ignorance | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 63 Ignorance/inequalities/economy/poorness/Acemoglu/Robinson: The ignorance hypothesis maintains that poor countries are poor because they have a lot of market failures and because economists and policymakers do not know how to get rid of them and have heeded the wrong advice in the past. Acemoglu I 64 AcemogluVsIgorance hypothesis: neither Ghana’s disappointing performance after independence nor the countless other cases of apparent economic mismanagement can simply be blamed on ignorance. After all, if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies. Corruption instead of ignorance: It wasn’t differences in knowledge or intentions between John Smith and Cortés that laid the seeds of divergence during the colonial period, and it wasn’t differences in knowledge between later U.S. presidents, such as Teddy Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson, and Porfirio Díaz that made Mexico choose economic institutions that enriched elites at the expense of the rest of society at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries while Roosevelt and Wilson did the opposite. Rather, it was the differences in the institutional constraints the countries’ presidents and elites were facing. Similarly, leaders of African nations that have languished over the last half century under insecure property rights and economic institutions, impoverishing much of their populations, did not allow this to happen because they thought it was good economics; they did so because they could get away with it and enrich themselves (...). Acemogu I 66 The ignorance hypothesis differs from the geography and culture hypotheses in that it comes readily with a suggestion about how to “solve” the problem of poverty: if ignorance got us here, enlightened and informed rulers and policymakers can get us out and we should be able to “engineer” prosperity around the world by providing the right advice and by convincing politicians of what is good economics. [But] (...) the main obstacle to the adoption of policies that would reduce market failures and encourage economic growth is not the ignorance of politicians but the incentives and constraints Acemoglu I 67 constraints they face from the political and economic institutions in their societies. >Economic policies/Acemoglu, >Institutions/Acemoglu. The idea that ignorance explains comparative development is implicit in most economic analyses of economic development and policy reform: for example, Williamson (1990)(1); Perkins, Radelet, and Lindauer (2006)(2); and Aghion and Howitt (2009)(3). A recent, forceful version of this view is developed in Banerjee and Duflo (2011)(4). 1.Williamson, John (1990). Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics. 2.Perkins, Dwight H., Steven Radelet, and David L. Lindauer (2006). Development Economics. 6th ed. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 3.Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt (2009). The Economics of Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 4.Banerjee, Abhijit V., Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster (2008). “Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System.” System.” Journal of the European Economic Association 7: 487–500. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Ignorance | Robinson | Acemoglu I 63 Ignorance/inequalities/economy/poorness/Acemoglu/Robinson: The ignorance hypothesis maintains that poor countries are poor because they have a lot of market failures and because economists and policymakers do not know how to get rid of them and have heeded the wrong advice in the past. Acemoglu I 64 AcemogluVsIgorance hypothesis: neither Ghana’s disappointing performance after independence nor the countless other cases of apparent economic mismanagement can simply be blamed on ignorance. After all, if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies. Corruption instead of ignorance: It wasn’t differences in knowledge or intentions between John Smith and Cortés that laid the seeds of divergence during the colonial period, and it wasn’t differences in knowledge between later U.S. presidents, such as Teddy Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson, and Porfirio Díaz that made Mexico choose economic institutions that enriched elites at the expense of the rest of society at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries while Roosevelt and Wilson did the opposite. Rather, it was the differences in the institutional constraints the countries’ presidents and elites were facing. Similarly, leaders of African nations that have languished over the last half century under insecure property rights and economic institutions, impoverishing much of their populations, did not allow this to happen because they thought it was good economics; they did so because they could get away with it and enrich themselves (...). Acemogu I 66 The ignorance hypothesis differs from the geography and culture hypotheses in that it comes readily with a suggestion about how to “solve” the problem of poverty: if ignorance got us here, enlightened and informed rulers and policymakers can get us out and we should be able to “engineer” prosperity around the world by providing the right advice and by convincing politicians of what is good economics. [But] (...) the main obstacle to the adoption of policies that would reduce market failures and encourage economic growth is not the ignorance of politicians but the incentives and constraints Acemoglu I 67 constraints they face from the political and economic institutions in their societies. >Economic policies/Acemoglu, >Institutions/Acemoglu. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Imitation | Post-communist Countries | Krastev I 58 Imitation/Post-communist countries/Krastev: Imitating the way post-1945 Germany dealt with history turned out to be problematic for Central and East Europeans in at least four respects. 1) (...) post-Second World War German democracy was to some extent built on the worry that nationalism, given unlimited room to grow, may gradually lead to a rebirth of Nazism (...). Krastev I 59 Central and Eastern European countries, by contrast, find it difficult to share such a comprehensively negative view of nationalism (...). 2) (...) postwar German democracy was organized in response to the way the Nazis came to power through competitive elections. This is why non-majoritarian institutions like the Federal Constitutional Court and the Bundesbank are not only powerful but also among the most trusted institutions in Germany. Krastev I 60 [There was a] slowly developing domestic resistance, two decades after 1989, to reorganizing these states in line with two alternative foreign models: the new German idea of a decentralized state and American multiculturalism. 3) (...) when sharing their postwar transformation experience of incorporation into the West with the post-communist countries, the Germans fell into a trap. They were proud of the success of their transition from a totalitarian society into a model democracy but at the same time, in many cases, they counselled the Central and East Europeans not to do what they did in the 1950s and 1960s but to do what they believed they themselves should have done back then. While Nazism was officially denounced after the war, it was not a subject that Germans were eager to discuss in any detail. For one thing, there were many ex-Nazis among the postwar West German elite. But when time came for the incorporation of East Germany into a unified liberal-democratic Germany, the approach was the opposite. The silent treatment became a gabfest. 4) (...) Germany was and is very proud of both its welfare state and its system of co-determination, by which labour unions were given a pivotal role in corporate governance. But these were aspects of their political system that the West Germans never pressed the EU to export to the East. The official reason they gave was that Central and East Europeans could not afford them, but perhaps they also expected that weakened state protections for Central and Eastern European workers and citizens would create favourable investment opportunities for German industry. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Imperfect Competition | Rothbard | Rothbard III 719 Monopolistic Competition/Rothbard: The theory of monopoly price has been generally superseded in the literature by the theories of "monopolistic" or "imperfect" competition.(1) As against the older theory, the latter have the advantage of setting up identifiable criteria for their categories - such as a perfectly elastic demand curve for pure competition. >Competition/Rothbard, >Monopoly price/Economic theories, >Monopolies/Rothbard. RothbardVs: Unfortunately, these criteria turn out to be completely fallacious. Essentially, the chief characteristic of the imperfect-competition theories is that they uphold as their "ideal" the state of "pure competition" rather than "competition" or "free competition." Def Pure competition: Pure competition is defined as that state in which the demand curve for each firm in the economy is perfectly elastic, i.e., the demand curve as presented to the firm is completely horizontal. >Elasticity, >Demand/Rothbard. Market/price/Rothbard: In this supposedly pristine state of affairs, no one firm can, through its actions, possibly have any influence over the price of its product. Its price is then "set" for it by the market. Any amount it produces can and will be sold at this ruling price. In general, it is this state of affairs, or else this state without uncertainty ("perfect competition"), that has received most of the elaborate analysis in recent years. This is true both for those who believe that pure competition fairly well represents the real economy and for their opponents, who consider it only an ideal with which to contrast the actual "monopolistic" state of affairs. Rothbard: Both camps, however, join in upholding pure competition as the ideal system for the general welfare, in contrast to various vague "monopoloid" states that occur when there is departure from the purely competitive world. RothbardVsPure competition theory: The pure-competition theory, however, is an utterly fallacious one. It envisages an absurd state of affairs, never realizable in practice, and far from idyllic if it were. In the first place, there can be no such thing as a firm without influence on its price. Rothbard III 720 The monopolistic-competition theorist contrasts this ideal firm with those firms that have some influence on the determination of price and are therefore in some degree "monopolistic." Yet it is obvious that the demand curve to a firm cannot be perfectly elastic throughout. At some points, it must dip downward, since the increase in supply will tend to Iower market price. As a matter of fact, it is clear from our construction of the demand curve that there can be no stretch of the demand curve, however small, that is horizontal, although there can be small vertical stretches. Rothbard III 721 Elasticity: Of course, the demand curve for each small wheat farm is likely to be very highly, almost perfectly, elastic. And yet the fact that it is not "perfect" destroys the entire concept of pure competition. For how does this situation differ from, say, the Hershey Chocolate Company if the demand curve for the latter firm is also elastic? Once it is conceded that all demand curves to firms must be falling, the monopolistic-competition theorist can make no further analytic distinctions. >Monopolistic competition/Harrod, >Oligopolies/Rothbard, >Pure competition/Rothbard. 1. In particular, see Edward H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, and Mrs. Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition. For a lucid discussion and comparison of the two works, see Robert Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940). |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Incommensurability | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 240 Incommensurability/pluralism/Political Philosophy/D’Agostino: The notion of incommensurability is therefore crucially important in the debate between monists and pluralists (see, especially, Chang, 1997(1); Raz, 1986(2): ch. 13). Pluralists needn't, of course, insist on across-the-board incommensurability. >Pluralism. As Barry already argued in 1965, with his use of economists' 'indifference curves' (1990(3): ch. I, s. 2), and as James Griffin (1986(4): 89—90) and others have reaffirmed subsequently, a single, unequivocal ranking of options is possible, even with multiple underlying bases of assessment, so long as these values 'trade off' against one another. Indeed, pluralism and incommensurability are logically independent; even a pluralist who believes that trade-offs are always possible does not thereby become a monist (see Dancy, 1993(5): 121). She has a basis, for instance, which the genuine monist seems to lack, for conceptualizing the regret that we frequently experience even when we choose the best option (see Stocker, 1997(6): 1997). Rhetorically, it is nevertheless understandable that pluralists have tended to focus on cases where, because trade-offs seem impossible or inappropriate, incommensurability is evident. For pluralists identify their position at least partly in opposition to monism, and incommensurability is incompatible with full-blooded monism. (This is the significance, for utilitarianism, of the debate about 'interpersonal comparability' of welfare. Comparibility: Without such comparability, utilitarianism becomes a pluralist approach, lacking the single overall normative standard whose importance Mill stressed. See, for instance, Elster and Roemer, 1991(7). ) 1. Chang, Ruth, ed. (1997) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge , MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Fæedom. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Barry, Brian (1990) Political A,'gument: A Reissue with a New Introduction. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 4. Griffin, James (1986) Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon. 5. Dancy, Jonathan (1993) Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Stocker, Michael (1997) 'Abstract and concrete value: plurality, conflict, and maximization'. In Ruth Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Elster, Jon and John Roemer, eds (1991) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Individuals | Arendt | Brocker I 363 Individual/Arendt: The modern individual is incapable of referring to its fellow human beings. On the one hand, it is active for itself, but on the other hand, it works for the "progress" of mankind. It is driving a "development" that makes the question of the welfare of the community seem obsolete. >Progress, >Community, >Society, >Benefit, >Modernity. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Inequalities | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 51 Inequalities/Acemoglu/Robinson: The great inequality of the modern world that emerged in the nineteenth century was caused by the uneven dissemination of industrial technologies and manufacturing production. It was not caused by divergence in agricultural performance. Cf. >Geographical factors/Montesquieu, Geographical factors/Sachs, >Geographical factors/Acemoglu, >Cultural differences/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 63 Ignorance hypothesis: [one] popular theory for why some nations are poor and some are rich is the ignorance hypothesis, which asserts that world inequality exists because we or our rulers do not know how to make poor countries rich. Acemoglu I 64 Markets: the so-called First Welfare Theorem, identifies the circumstances under which the allocation of resources in a “market economy” is socially desirable from an economic point of view. A market economy is an abstraction that is meant to capture a situation in which all individuals and firms can freely produce, buy, and sell any products or services that they wish. When these circumstances are not present there is a “market failure.” Such failures provide the basis for a theory of world inequality, since the more that market failures go unaddressed, the poorer a country is likely to be. Ignorance: The ignorance hypothesis maintains that poor countries are poor because they have a lot of market failures and because economists and policymakers do not know how to get rid of them and have heeded the wrong advice in the past. Acemoglu I 64 AcemogluVsIgorance hypothesis: neither Ghana’s disappointing performance after independence nor the countless other cases of apparent economic mismanagement can simply be blamed on ignorance. After all, if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies. >Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 104 World inequality dramatically increased with the British, or English, Industrial Revolution because only some parts of the world adopted the innovations and new technologies (...).The response of different nations to this wave of technologies, which determined whether they would languish in poverty or achieve sustained economic growth, was largely shaped by the different historical paths of their institutions. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Inequalities | Burke | Rawls I 300 Inequality/Burke, E. /Rawls: many authors, including Edmund Burke, believed that some kind of hierarchical social structure and a ruling class with inherited prerogatives are essential for the development of public goods. >Public good, >Society. Political power should be exercised by experienced men whose ambitions are moderated by their privileges and advantages of their position. >Power. Burke believed that the great families of the ruling class, through their wisdom of exercising power, were deceiving from generation to generation for the general welfare. (E. Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London, 1910), p. 49; John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London, 1963), vol. I, pp. 346-351.) >Generational Justice. I 301 RawlsVsBurke: it is not enough to accept how Burke and Hegel did, that these forms of inequality also benefited the poorer people. We would also have to accept as a condition that, by correcting these injustices, the prospects of those who are worse off would be further worsened. The argumentation that all would benefit would only apply if the lexical order of principles (processing sequentially, See Principles/Rawls) were to be abolished. >Principles/Rawls. 1. E. Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London, 1910), p. 49. 2. John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London, 1963), vol. I, pp.346-351 |
BurkeE I Edmund Burke A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 2nd Revised ed. Edition Oxford 2015 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Inequalities | Robinson | Acemoglu I 51 Inequalities/Acemoglu/Robinson: The great inequality of the modern world that emerged in the nineteenth century was caused by the uneven dissemination of industrial technologies and manufacturing production. It was not caused by divergence in agricultural performance. Cf. >Geographical factors/Montesquieu, Geographical factors/Sachs, >Geographical factors/Acemoglu, >Cultural differences/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 63 Ignorance hypothesis: [one] popular theory for why some nations are poor and some are rich is the ignorance hypothesis, which asserts that world inequality exists because we or our rulers do not know how to make poor countries rich. Acemoglu I 64 Markets: the so-called First Welfare Theorem, identifies the circumstances under which the allocation of resources in a “market economy” is socially desirable from an economic point of view. A market economy is an abstraction that is meant to capture a situation in which all individuals and firms can freely produce, buy, and sell any products or services that they wish. When these circumstances are not present there is a “market failure.” Such failures provide the basis for a theory of world inequality, since the more that market failures go unaddressed, the poorer a country is likely to be. Ignorance: The ignorance hypothesis maintains that poor countries are poor because they have a lot of market failures and because economists and policymakers do not know how to get rid of them and have heeded the wrong advice in the past. Acemoglu I 64 AcemogluVsIgorance hypothesis: neither Ghana’s disappointing performance after independence nor the countless other cases of apparent economic mismanagement can simply be blamed on ignorance. After all, if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies. >Institutions/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 104 World inequality dramatically increased with the British, or English, Industrial Revolution because only some parts of the world adopted the innovations and new technologies (...).The response of different nations to this wave of technologies, which determined whether they would languish in poverty or achieve sustained economic growth, was largely shaped by the different historical paths of their institutions. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Information | Arrow | Mause I 167f Information Economics/Information/Asymmetry/Arrow: (1)(2) Terminology: "principal" (seller, superior; holds more information) - "agent" (buyer, employee; holds less information). Four possible constellations of information asymmetry: 1. Hidden action: the principal cannot fully observe the agent's actions after the contract is concluded. For example, an employee acquires a better level of information than the employer. ((s) See master-slave dialectic/Fukuyama). Moral hazard (temptation): the employee can take advantage of this by reducing his work performance (shirking). 2. Hidden information: after conclusion of the contract, the principal is not in a position to adequately assess the work performance (quality) of the agent, as he himself lacks expertise. e.g. car repair, medical treatment errors. (3) Mause I 168 3. Hidden characteristics: this is about the characteristics of the property to be sold. This is an ex-ante information asymmetry. It is often found in used car markets (4) and insurance markets. 4. Hidden intention: asymmetric distribution of information before conclusion of contract: the principle has less information available in this case. Example: A trainee has the desire to switch to the competition right from the start. 1. K. J. Arrow, The economics of agency. In Principals and agents: The structure of business, Hrsg. John W. Pratt und Richard J. Zeckhauser, 37– 51. Boston 1985. 2.K. Spremann, Asymmetrische Information. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 60 (5/ 6), 1990, S. 561– 586. 3 U. Dulleck, R. Kerschbamer, On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The economics of credence goods. Journal of Economic Literature 44, (1) 2006, S. 5– 42. 4.G: A. Akerlof, The market for ‚Lemons‘: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, (3), 1970, S. 488– 500. Benkler I 36 Information/Arrow/Benkler: As Kenneth Arrow put it in 1962, “precisely to the extent that [property] is effective, there is underutilization of the information.”(1) Benkler: Because welfare economics defines a market as producing a good efficiently only when it is pricing the good at its marginal cost, a good like information (and culture and knowledge are, for purposes of economics, forms of information), which can never be sold both at a positive (greater than zero) price and at its marginal cost, is fundamentally a candidate for substantial nonmarket production. I 37 From the perspective of a society’s overall welfare, the most efficient thing would be for those who possess information to give it away for free—or rather, for the cost of communicating it and no more. Nonrivalry, moreover, is not the only quirky characteristic of information production as an economic phenomenon. The other crucial quirkiness is that information is both input and output of its own production process. In order to write today’s academic or news article, I need access to yesterday’s articles and reports. 1. Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. Richard R. Nelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 616-617. |
EconArrow I Kenneth J. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Information | Benkler | Benkler I 36 Information/Arrow/Benkler: As Kenneth Arrow put it in 1962, “precisely to the extent that [property] is effective, there is underutilization of the information.”(1) Benkler: Because welfare economics defines a market as producing a good efficiently only when it is pricing the good at its marginal cost, a good like information (and culture and knowledge are, for purposes of economics, forms of information), which can never be sold both at a positive (greater than zero) price and at its marginal cost, is fundamentally a candidate for substantial nonmarket production. I 37 From the perspective of a society’s overall welfare, the most efficient thing would be for those who possess information to give it away for free—or rather, for the cost of communicating it and no more. Nonrivalry, moreover, is not the only quirky characteristic of information production as an economic phenomenon. The other crucial quirkiness is that information is both input and output of its own production process. In order to write today’s academic or news article, I need access to yesterday’s articles and reports. Benkler I 311 Information in developed countries/Information Goods/Information/Benkler: One can usefully idealize three types of information-based advantages that developed economies have, and that would need to be available to developing and less-developed economies if one’s goal were the improvement in conditions in those economies and the opportunities for innovation in them. 1. Information-Embedded Goods: These are goods that are not themselves in formation, but that are better, more plentiful, or cheaper because of some technological advance embedded in them or associated with their production. Pharmaceuticals and agricultural goods are the most obvious examples in the areas of health and food security, respectively. While there are other constraints on access to innovative products in these areas—regulatory and political in nature—a perennial barrier is cost. I 312 2. Information-Embedded Tools: One level deeper than the actual useful material things one would need to enhance welfare are tools necessary for innovation itself. In the areas of agricultural biotechnology and medicines, these include enabling technologies for advanced research, as well as access to materials and existing compounds for experimentation. Access to these is perhaps the most widely understood to present problems in the patent system of the developed world, as much as it is for the developing world—an awareness that has mostly crystallized under Michael Heller’s felicitous phrase “anti-commons,” or Carl Shapiro’s “patent thicket.” I 313 3. Information: The distinction between information and knowledge is a tricky one. I use “information” here colloquially, to refer to raw data, scientific reports of the output of scientific discovery, news, and factual reports. I use “knowledge” to refer to the set of cultural practices and capacities necessary for processing the information into either new statements in the information exchange, or more important in our context, for practical use of the information in appropriate ways to produce more desirable actions or outcomes from action. Three types of information that are clearly important for purposes of development are scientific publications, scientific and economic data, and news and factual reports. >Information/Arrow, >Terminology/Benkler. I 314 4. Knowledge: In this context, I refer mostly to two types of concern. The first is the possibility of the transfer of implicit knowledge, which resists codification into what would here be treated as “information”—for example, training manuals. The primary mechanism for transfer of knowledge of this type is learning by doing, and knowledge transfer of this form cannot happen except through opportunities for local practice of the knowledge. The second type of knowledge transfer of concern here is formal instruction in an education context (as compared with dissemination of codified outputs for self-teaching). I 315 Here, there is a genuine limit on the capacity of the networked information economy to improve access to knowledge. Individual, face-to-face instruction does not scale across participants, time, and distance. However, some components of education, at all levels, are nonetheless susceptible to improvement with the increase in nonmarket and radically decentralized production processes. >Terminology/Benkler. 1. Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. Richard R. Nelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 616-617. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Information Production | Benkler | Benkler I 35 Information Production/Benkler: There are no noncommercial automobile manufacturers. There are no volunteer steel foundries. You would never choose to have your primary source of bread depend on voluntary contributions from others. Nevertheless, scientists working at noncommercial research institutes funded by nonprofit educational institutions and government grants produce most of our basic science. Widespread cooperative networks of volunteers write the software and standards that run most of the Internet and enable what we do with it. I 36 Because welfare economics defines a market as producing a good efficiently only when it is pricing the good at its marginal cost, a good like information (and culture and knowledge are, for purposes of economics, forms of information), which can never be sold both at a positive (greater than zero) price and at its marginal cost, is fundamentally a candidate for substantial nonmarket production. I 37 Incentive: Authors and inventors or, more commonly, companies that contract with musicians and filmmakers, scientists, and engineers, will invest in research and create cultural goods because they expect to sell their information products. Over time, this incentive effect will give us more innovation and creativity, creativity, which will outweigh the inefficiency at any given moment caused by selling the information at above its marginal cost. Nonrivalry (…) is not the only quirky characteristic of information production as an economic phenomenon. The other crucial quirkiness is that information is both input and output of its own production process. >Information/Arrow. I 38 If we pass a law that regulates information production too strictly, allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high on today’s innovators, then we will have not only too little consumption of information today, but also too little production of new information for tomorrow. >Information/Economic Theories, >Intellectual Property/Benkler, >Intellectual Property/Economic Theories. I 39 Where does innovation and information production come from, then, if it does not come as much from intellectual-property-based market actors, as many generally believe? The answer is that it comes mostly from a mixture of (1) nonmarket sources - both state and non state - and (2) market actors whose business models do not depend on the regulatory framework of intellectual property. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Institutional Utilitarianism | Gaus | Gaus I 224 Institutional Utilitarianism/Gaus/Lamont: The move to indirect and institutional utilitarian- ism has breathed new life into utilitarian theory, but at a high price. Under institutional utilitarianism, the theoretical criterion for accepting an institution or policy is straightforward: does it maximize the aggregate utility of the population? The problem arises at the practical level, where the information requirements needed to determine which institutions or policies maximize aggregate utility are almost always too great (Gaus, 1998(1)). For example, consider the question of whether institutional utilitarianism would recommend welfare payments to the poor unemployed. This question would be more easily answered if all people obtained the same amount of welfare from all the goods and services available, and if the amount of welfare obtained from a good declined as more of the good is received (that is, if all people had identical diminishing marginal utility functions). Under these conditions we would have some reason to believe that taking goods from the rich and giving them to the poor would increase overall utility. However, every individual has a different utility function and, of course, nobody knows what these functions are. The informational requirements for determining whether utilitarianism recommends welfare payments seem impossible to meet. Unfortunately, the same situation arises for the full range of policies. This problem is compounded by analogues to the common sense morality objections that plagued earlier versions of utilitarianism. Cf. >Utilitarianism. 1. Gaus, Gerald (1998) 'Why all welfare states (including laissez-fai,æ ones) are unreasonable'. Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (2): 1-33. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Institutions | Barr | Gaus I 212 Institutions/welfare state/Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). >Adverse selection/Barr. 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Institutions | Levitsky | Levitsky I 124 Institutions/Levitsky/Ziblatt: A (...) norm that is decisive for the existence of democracies is what we call institutional restraint(1). Levitsky I 125 Where the norm of restraint is strong, politicians, even if they are legally allowed to do so, do not fully utilize their institutional prerogatives because this would endanger the existing system(2). The origins of institutional restraint go back to pre-democratic times. At a time when kings invoked their divine grace, that is, when religious sanctioning underpinned the monarch's authority, their power was not limited by any rights conceived by mortals(3). Nevertheless, many of Europe's pre-democratic monarchs acted with restraint. After all, a pious, God-fearing life required wisdom and self-restraint(4). >Society, >Democracy. 1. We have adopted this term from Alisha Holland; see Alisha Holland, »Forbearance«, in: American Political Science Review 110, No. 2 (Mai 2016), pp. 232-246; Forbearance as Redistribution. The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America, New York 2017; cf. also Eric Nelson, »Are We on the Verge of the Death Spiral That Produced the English Revolution of 1642–1649?«, in: History News Network, 14th Dezember 2014, http:// historynewsnetwork.org/article/157822. 2. Whittington, »The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States«, p. 106. 3. Reinhard Bendix, Könige oder Volk, Frankfurt am Main 1980, Teil I, p. 18–20. 4. Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People. The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, New York 1988, p. 21; Bendix, Könige oder Volk, Teil I, p. 331 f. |
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| Institutions | Menger | Parisi I 268 Institutions/Money/Menger: Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian approach, stated that social scientists must explain “how can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development come into being without a common will directed toward establishing them” (Menger, 1963/1883(1), p146.) Parisi I 269 Menger’s question links the Austrian approach to Scottish Enlightenment scholars, who explained the spontaneous orders as “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design” (Ferguson, 1782/1767(2), p. III, S.2). Menger argued that the emergence of money is one such example of spontaneous development of institutions. To solve the problem of the double co-incidence of wants, individuals find more highly valued commodities to exchange, and therefore add an exchange value to the use value of these goods, increasing the demand. As more individuals participate in such exchange, they converge to one or two generally accepted media of exchange, which we call money (Menger, 1892)(3). >Carl Menger. 1. Menger, C. (1963/1883). Problems of Economics and Sociology. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 2. Ferguson, A. (1782/1767). An Essay on the History of Civil Society. 5th edition. London: T. Cadell. 3. Menger, C. (1892). “On the origin of money.” The Economic Journal 2(6): 239–255. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Meng I K. Menger Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics (Vienna Circle Collection) 1979 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Institutions | Ziblatt | Levitsky I 124 Institutions/Levitsky/Ziblatt: A (...) norm that is decisive for the existence of democracies is what we call institutional restraint(1). Levitsky I 125 Where the norm of restraint is strong, politicians, even if they are legally allowed to do so, do not fully utilize their institutional prerogatives because this would endanger the existing system(2). The origins of institutional restraint go back to pre-democratic times. At a time when kings invoked their divine grace, that is, when religious sanctioning underpinned the monarch's authority, their power was not limited by any rights conceived by mortals(3). Nevertheless, many of Europe's pre-democratic monarchs acted with restraint. After all, a pious, God-fearing life required wisdom and self-restraint(4). >Society, >Democracy. 1. We have adopted this term from Alisha Holland; see Alisha Holland, »Forbearance«, in: American Political Science Review 110, No. 2 (Mai 2016), pp. 232-246; Forbearance as Redistribution. The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America, New York 2017; cf. also Eric Nelson, »Are We on the Verge of the Death Spiral That Produced the English Revolution of 1642–1649?«, in: History News Network, 14th Dezember 2014, http:// historynewsnetwork.org/article/157822. 2. Whittington, »The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States«, p. 106. 3. Reinhard Bendix, Könige oder Volk, Frankfurt am Main 1980, Teil I, p. 18–20. 4. Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People. The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, New York 1988, p. 21; Bendix, Könige oder Volk, Teil I, p. 331 f. |
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| Insurances | Barr | Gaus I 212 Insurance/welfare state/adverse selection/moral hazard/Barr/Moon: [in a welfare state] voluntary welfare provision may (...) be unable to cover everyone in a society. Many people in the heyday of mutual aid societies were not members, and non-members were often among the least advantaged, those without steady jobs and a secure place within the community. Adverse selection: organizations offering protection recognize that those most likely to need protection have Gaus I 213 the greatest incentive to seek it, and so to join a mutual aid society or to purchase insurance, while those facing the lowest risks have an incentive to stay out. As a result of this process of 'adverse selection' , risks tend to be spread over a smaller and smaller part of the population, and premiums must rise accordingly. This process of adverse selection can continue to the point where most of those in need of protection are unable to afford it, because premiums have to rise so high that all but the most vulnerable drop out. The welfare state can combat the problem of adverse selection by making membership compulsory: 'because low risks cannot opt out, it makes possible a pooling solution' (Barr, 1992(1): 755). >Adverse Selection. Moral hazard: adverse selection is reinforced by a second process or condition, called 'moral hazard'. People who are insured against a certain risk may be more willing to take chances than they would be in the absence of insurance. Knowing that if I get sick or injured, my medical bills will be covered, may make me more willing to engage in risky behaviour, such as downhill skiing. To the extent that this occurs, organizations may face higher claims, thereby forcing them to raise their charges, and discouraging others from purchasing protection. More obviously, unemployment insurance schemes are subject to moral hazard, for knowing that I will be covered in the event that I am unemployed, I have an incentive to quit (or arrange to be fired) and/or not to seek or accept employment. Of course, state schemes are subject to moral hazard as well, but the key point is that if the genuine risk of losing one's job is to be covered at all, it must be covered through a public programme (see Barr, 1998(2): 190—2). >Moral hazard, >Free riders. For all of these reasons organizations offering protection will try to limit use, to prevent too many high risk people from joining, and to charge them more in order to hang on to their other members. In the case of voluntary groups, such as neighbourhood-, work- or craft-based mutual aid societies, informal patterns of social surveillance and affinity may function to exclude outsiders and others who are thought to be especially likely to need benefits. Similarly, private firms may use various underwrit- ing mechanisms to screen out high risk individuals or groups. The overall result may well be that certain groups may receive no or inadequate coverage, and the cost of services may be much greater than they would be if they were provided through a compulsory plan that spread risks more widely and rationed services to avoid overuse.* * An example of how a system dominated by private provision both is more expensive, and provides protection to a smaller proportion of the population, may be medical care in the US. The US spends a far higher proportion of its GDP (12.9 percent in 1998 compared with Germany's 10.3 or the UK's 6.8) on medical care than other rich countries, but fails to provide coverage for over 20 percent of its population. Ironically, public provision of medical care in the US is larger than that of the UK (5.8 versus 5.7 percent of GDP), not even counting the implicit subsidy represented by the favourable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance (OECD health statistics). 1. Barr, Nicholas (1992) 'Economic theory and the welfare state'. Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (2): 741-803. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interest Groups | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 184 Interest Groups/Public choice theory/Farber: The problem of selective participation has been a particular focus of public choice theory. To illustrate the problem, consider the situation of a regulated monopoly. Monopolies: The monopolist does not need to overcome any >collective action problem in order to take political action, since a single entity encompasses an entire industry. But its consumers may find it difficult to organize in order to obtain an effective political voice because of the free-rider problem. Minorities/majority: Thus, collective action problems may allow concentrated minority interests such as monopolists to exploit diffuse majorities. Interest group theories predate public choice but have been a focal point of one prong of public choice scholarship (Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, 2006(1), pp. 85-9). Early public choice theorists told a simple and very plausible story about the differential political power of groups (Mashaw, 2010(2)). Transaction costs: Organizing a group involves transaction costs, including the need to motivate participation in the face of incentives to free-ride. It seems very reasonable to postulate that these costs increase along with the size of the group, all else being equal. It is obviously easier to get one person with a $ 1000 stake to join an organization and take action than it is to get a thousand people with $1 stakes to do so (Stearns and Zywicki, 2009(3), pp. 55-62). Small groups: Early public choice theorists then concluded that politics would be dominated by smaller, easily organized special interests at the expense of the public as a whole (Stigler, 1971)(4). So government should mostly function as a mechanism for transferring wealth from the public to special interest groups of various kinds (Mashaw, 2010)(2). Vs: This is a seductive argument but turns out to be far too facile, as well as inconsistent with much recent evidence about collective action (Ginsburg, 2002(5), pp. 1144-1149). Environmental groups: It suggests, for instance, that environmental groups should not form at all, and that environmental legislation should not exist. Yet groups such as the Sierra Club are very much alive and well, and industry complains constantly about the burdens created by environmental legislation (Mashaw, 2010(2), pp. 28-31; Croley, 2010(6), pp. 52-53). On closer examination, the story of special interest dominance has many holes (Croley, 2010)(6). While small groups have advantages, so do large ones: in particular, large groups represent many voters, whose support is needed by politicians. The question of just how organizations influence political outcomes remains unanswered: putting aside outright bribery, they presumably benefit politicians by supporting their re-election, but we need an explanation of how they are able to do so more effectively as organizations than their individual members could achieve on their own (Croley, 2010(6), p. 58). The theory also does not do well at explaining the existence of even relatively small groups: enough individual members of the group still have enough of an incentive to free-ride to make the group's viability seem questionable. Finally, small groups may sometimes act as proxies Parisi I 185 for the broader public interest, so the activities of these small groups may actually improve social welfare. For instance, producer groups may favor trade barriers, but large retailers such as Walmart have an interest in opposing those barriers that often coincides with the interests of their consumers. >Political elections/Public choice theory. 1. Eskridge, W. N., P. P. Frickey, and E. Garrett (2006). Legislation and Statutory Interpretation. 2nd edition. St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press. 2. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Stearns, M. L. and T. J. Zywicki (2009). Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law. St. Paul, MN: Thomas Reuters. 4. Stigler, G. J. (1971). "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1):3-21. 5. Ginsburg, T. (2002). "Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricisms and the Theory in Legal Scholarship." University of Illinois Law Review 4: 1 139-1166. 6. Croley, S. (2010). "Interest Groups and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 49—86. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Interventionism | Mises | Rothbard IV 30 Socialism/Interventionism/Mises/Rothbard: Austrian economics had always implicitly favored a free-market policy, but in the quiet and relatively free world of the late nineteenth century, the Austrians had never bothered to develop an explicit analysis of freedom or of government intervention. In an environment of accelerating statism and socialism, Ludwig von Mises, while continuing to develop his business cycle theory, turned his powerful attention to analyzing the economics of government intervention and planning. His journal article of 1920, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,”(1) was a blockbuster: demonstrating for the first time that socialism was an unviable system for an industrial economy; … MisesVsSocialism: …for Mises showed that a socialist economy, being deprived of a free-market price system, could not rationally calculate costs or allocate factors of production efficiently to their most needed tasks. Mises incorporated his insights into a comprehensive critique of socialism, Socialism (1922)(2). Interventions/Mises: If socialism cannot work, then neither can the specific acts of government intervention into the market which Mises dubbed “interventionism.” In a series of articles during the 1920s, Mises criticized and disposed of a host of statist economic measures, articles which were collected into Kritik des Interventionismus (1929)(3). If neither socialism nor interventionism were viable, then we are left with “laissez-faire” liberalism, or the free-market economy, and Mises expanded on his analysis of the merits of classical liberalism in his notable Liberalismus(4) (1927). In Liberalismus, Mises showed the close interconnection between international peace, civil liberties, and the free-market economy. >Laisser-faire, >Liberalism. 1. “Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen,” in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften 47 (1920): 86–121. Translated into English by S. Adler and inluded in F.A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies of the Possibilities of Socialism (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1935). 2. Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1981). German editions, 1922, 1932. English translation by J. Kahane, 1936; enlarged with an Epilogue, Planned Chaos, 1951; Jonathan Cape, 1969. 3. Ludwig von Mises, A Critique of Interventionism, trans. by Hans F. Sennholz (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1977); reprinted 1996 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Original German edition in 1976 by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Darmstadt, Germany), with a Foreword by F.A. Hayek. 4. Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition, trans. Ralph Raico, Arthur Goddard, Ludwig von Mises, ed. (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978); 1962 edition, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand). Coyne I 29 Interventionism/Mises/Coyne/Boettke: (…) Interventionism (…) requires employing the discretionary power of the administrative state to replace the preferences of private economic actors with those of policymakers. (…) government interference in a market generates a range of interrelated effects on economic activity. In addition, subsequent attempts by policymakers to counteract the emergence of unintended consequences and to make the initial intervention yield the desired results leads to increasingly extensive controls over economic activity, which threatens the dynamism of the market process. Cf. >Spontaneous order, >Markets. Interventionism is a form of non-comprehensive planning. It does not abolish ownership over the means of production or attempt to plan all economic activity, as under socialism. But it does involve piecemeal economic planning. Under Piece-meal planning, policymakers replace what emerged through the market process with their own judgments of what they believe should exist. >Planning, >Planned economy. The underlying implicit assumption of interventionism, therefore, is that policymakers have access to the economic knowledge necessary to engage in piecemeal planning to achieve their ends. More specifically, there are three types of economic knowledge that policymakers are assumed to possess. 1) First, since government interventions into the market are justified as a means of improving social welfare, the policymakers are assumed to possess knowledge of ways of allocating scarce resources that are superior to the market alternative. 2) Second, intervenors are assumed to possess knowledge of how to adjust interventions in the face of constant change. As broader economic conditions change, so too will the effcacy of even well-intentioned interventions. Given the goal of improving social welfare, past intervention will need to be continually revised, and perhaps removed or replaced, in the face of changing circumstances. This requires that policymakers possess knowledge of the new conditions as well as the knowledge of how best to revise existing regulations or introduce new regulations that improve social welfare in the face of circumstances different from those in the past. 3) Third, the policymakers are assumed to possess knowledge of what would have emerged absent the intervention. Claiming an intervention is necessary to achieve an outcome implies that the same outcome, or an even better outcome, would not have emerged in future periods absent the intervention. Knowledge/Mises/Hayek: The main constraint on policymakers in obtaining each of these categories of economic knowledge is the knowledge problem that Mises and Hayek highlighted during the socialist calculation debate. Absent the ability to rely on market-determined prices and profit and loss, there is no way for policymakers to know the highest-valued uses of scarce resources. >Ignorance/Kirzner. VsInterventionism/Problems: This ignorance poses issues for the initial design of interventions because there is no way for policymakers to acquire the tacit and context-specific knowledge of dispersed actors throughout society. As a result, they cannot have superior knowledge, relative to market participants, about the allocation of resources. This same issue also plagues attempts by policymakers to revise interventions as conditions change. Since they are unable to acquire the economic knowledge of time and place necessary to determine the best allocation of scarce resources, there is no way to ensure that interventions will be revised and adjusted to improve social welfare. Finally, since the market is an open-ended process of competition, discovery, and change, there is no way for policy-makers to know what would have emerged through voluntary interaction and exchange absent the intervention. This makes it impossible for policymakers to determine if an intervention has produced an outcome that is superior to the counterfactual - namely, the spontaneous order that would have emerged if economic actors were left to engage without intervention in discovery and exchange. >Interventions/Austrian School. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Interventionism | Pigou | Mause I 415f Interventions/Environmental Policy/Pigou: Although not originally developed on the basis of environmental problems, Pigou (1920) took the view early on that the market cannot be left to itself in the case of external effects. Rather - so the argumentation - sovereign interventions are required, that contribute to an internalisation of externalities according to polluters since only by means of such state interventions can private and social costs or benefits be covered with the aim of increasing the welfare of society as a whole. In order to prevent the misallocation of scarce (environmental) resources and thus a sub-optimal market supply of private goods, external costs or external income must be internalised by way of taxation (so-called Pigou taxes) or state subsidisation (Hansjürgens 1992, p. 28ff (1); Endres 2000, p. 94ff (2)). Intervention/Externalities/CoaseVsPigou: Coase 1960 (3): in the case of (environmental) external effects, there are no "polluters" or "victims" per se. Rather, a reciprocal character of external effects is to be assumed, i.e. if environmental impacts are allowed there are disadvantaged people, if these are prevented, there are also disadvantaged people. The reason for this is that environmental problems contain rival claims to use of environmental goods, which can basically be corrected in two possible directions (Hartwig 1992, p. 140 ff.(4); Feess und Seeliger 2013, p. 141 ff.(5)). Example: An improvement of injured parties leads to costs on the part of the polluters. Solution/Coase: Coase theorem: if there are no transaction costs, there is no need for government intervention to internalise external effects, as in this case the market leads to an optimal solution of the environmental problem in the form of private negotiations between the parties concerned. (See Transaction Costs/Coase). 1. Bernd Hansjürgens, Umweltabgaben im Steuersystem. Zu den Möglichkeiten einer Einfügung von Umweltabgaben in das Steuer- und Abgabensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Baden-Baden 1992.. 2. Alfred Endress, Umweltökonomie, Stuttgart 2000. 3. Ronald Coase. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1– 44. 4. Karl-Hans Hartwig, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, Hrsg. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Vol. 2, 5.ed., 122– 162. München 1992. 5. Ebernhard Feess, & Andreas Seeliger. 2013. Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 4.ed. München 2013. |
EconPigou I Arthur C. Pigou The Economics of welfare London 1920 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Interventionism | Schumpeter | Sobel I 36 Interventionism/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: ture" (ESC(1): 108), and "the state . enlarges . deep into the flesh of the private economy" (ESC(1): 110-111). Schumpeter had serious concerns that high levels of taxation associated with the expansion of government size were already eroding the incentives to innovate and produce: "almost all countries have shot way beyond the mark in this or that case of indirect taxation and have burdened some articles to such an extent that the fiscal interest of the state itself has been hurt" (ESC(1): 113). This gradual transition toward more and more government control and economic intervention in Schumpeter's view is aided by democracy and the march of "democratic socialism". According to Schumpeter, "democratic methods have become an element of the moral credo of the average American ... I do expect a slow progress in regulation, which will only cease when there is nothing unregulated left" (ESC(1): 313). It will consist of "extending the democratic method, that is to say the sphere of 'politics', to all economic affairs" (CSD(2): 299). "In any case, that democracy will not mean increased personal freedom" (CSD(2): 302). Sobel/Clemens: It is clear that Schumpeter viewed a movement away from capitalism and toward socialism as resulting in less personal freedom, as well as Iower levels of economic prosperity, in the long run. This is not surprising as Schumpeter is widely known for his writings illustrating the benefits and essential role of private-sector entrepreneurship in the capitalist, free-market system. Schumpeter noted this transition was "not by economic necessity" and would result in a "sacrifice of economic welfare, into an order of things which it will be merely matter of taste and terminology to call Socialism or not" (EOE(3): 72). Thus, while Schumpeter, like Marx, believed that the economic system of capitalism had built-in features that would lead to its demise and replacement with socialism, the two authors had not only different rationales but also different prognoses for the impact it would have on the well-being of the individuals in society. >Capitalism/Schumpeter, >Socialism. 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1991). The Economics of Sociology and Capitalism [ESC]. Edited by Richard Swedberg. Princeton University Press. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 3. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2008). Essays on Entrepreneurs, Innovations, Business Cycles, and the Evolution of Capitalism. Edited by Richard V. Clemence. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Interventions | Austrian School | Coyne I 30 Interventions/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: Because policymakers rely on their limited reason and knowledge to intervene in the market process, which is a complex system beyond the full grasp of the human mind, unintended consequences emerge. >Interventionism/Mises. These unintended consequences can be broken into three general categories. 1) The first is the obfuscation of current and future profit opportunities that would exist absent the intervention. Absent a government-granted license that restricts entry, for instance, there might be profit opportunities pursued by entrepreneurs. However, because these entrepreneurs lack a state-issued license, they are not able to pursue those opportunities. This reduces the welfare of both the entrepreneurs and the customers who would have been made better off by their products. >Entrepreneurship, >Markets, >Consumption. 2) Second, interventions often create new opportunities for entrepreneurial activity that do not enhance wealth. For example, entrepreneurs may seek to avoid regulations by paying bribes or investing resources in influencing regulators. These behaviours benefit the individual entrepreneurs, but they are harmful to society because they represent resources and entrepreneurial talent that are diverted from satisfying consumers to instead avoiding the consequences of government interventions. 3) Third, interventionism can lead to "regime uncertainty," which refers to the inability of economic actors to accurately gauge the future actions of the government as it pertains to interventions. A well-functioning market economy requires stable and predictable rules. The resulting relative certainty allows people to make better plans for the future. The future is always characterized by some uncertainty, but that uncertainty can be reduced if rules are expected to remain constant over time. Time/Time preference/decisions: To understand why this matters, consider the thought process of an entrepreneur who is deciding whether or not to pursue a venture that might only yield profits in a decade. If the entrepreneur believes that there is a good chance that the government will change the rules and confiscate her wealth over the next decade, she will have a weaker incentive to invest. If, in contrast, the entrepreneur has confidence that the existing rules, which allow entrepreneurs to keep the profits from their investments, will remain constant over the next decade, she will be more likely to invest in the long-term project. The broader point is that interventionism, to the extent that it results in unpredictable or overly burdensome interference in economic activity, poses a threat to the entrepreneurial dynamism of the market process. An appreciation of the problems posed by interventionism - the knowledge problem and unintended consequences - is at the core of the Austrian critique of standard welfare economics. >Welfare economics/Austrian School. |
Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Jigsaw Method | Social Psychology | Haslam I 223 Jigsaw method/Social Psychology: Within social psychology, the theoretical contribution of the jigsaw strategy (Aronson et al. 1978(1); >Jigsaw method/Aronson; >Jigsaw method/psychological theories) was limited because of difficulty in clarifying the underlying mechanisms that accounted for the effects obtained. Indeed, moving into the contemporary era, this focus on outcomes rather than process limited the kind of theory development that was becoming critically important for publication within social psychology. (…) the phrase ‘jigsaw classroom’ has not appeared in the title of an article published in a leading social psychology journal (…). Preliminary work: Contact hypothesis: Beginning with research in the 1930s but catalysed by Allport’s (1954)(2) classic book The Nature of Prejudice, the contact hypothesis had represented the state-of-the art intervention for improving intergroup relations (see Dovidio et al., 2003)(3). Aronson’s work drew heavily on Sherif et al.’s (1961)(4) concept of superordinate goals in the Robbers Cave study, helped to revitalize interest in the way intergroup contact can improve intergroup relations. And although it may seem that the jigsaw classroom was somewhat neglected by social psychologists, this is certainly not the case today. (Paluck and Green(2009)(5). Explanations: It was the development of two other contemporaneous frameworks – social cognition and social identity – that ultimately provided the essential insights into the underlying processes (e.g., after Fiske and Taylor, 1984(6); Tajfel and Turner, 1979(7)). Categorization/social cognition: intergroup biases are conceptualized as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information that people encounter daily. One fundamental aspect of this process is the tendency to categorize individuals as members of social groups based on distinguishing characteristics, Haslam I 224 often socially constructed as essential qualities. >Categorization/Dovidio. Haslam I 225 Social identity theory: According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979(7); see also Abrams and Hogg, 2010)(8), the other important development around the time of Aronson and colleagues’ (1978)(1) original work on the jigsaw strategy, a person’s experience of identity varies along a continuum that ranges at one extreme from the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements, to another extreme in which the self is the embodiment of a social collective or group. Individual level: here, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. Group level: here, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own, and the group’s welfare is paramount. Intergroup relations: begin when people think about themselves as group members rather than solely as distinct individuals. (See Sherif (1961(4) and Tajfel and Turner (1979(7)). 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Allport, G.W. (1954) The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley. 3. Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L. and Kawakami, K. (2003) ‘The Contact Hypothesis: The past, present, and the future’, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6: 5–21. 4. Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood, W.R. and Sherif, C.W. (1961) Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. 5. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 6. Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984) Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. 7. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Juridification | Habermas | IV 524 Juridification/Habermas: the expression refers in general to the tendency to increase written law in modern societies. We can distinguish between an expansion and a consolidation of the right. (1) Otto Kirchheimer introduced the concept into the discussion during the Weimar Republic and at that time primarily had in mind the institutionalisation of the class conflict (...) under tariff- and labour law. Habermas: We can roughly distinguish four epochal legal processes: 1. to the bourgeois state, at the time of absolutism, 2. to the constitutional state, in the monarchy in 19th century Germany, IV 525 3. To the democratic constitutional state following the French Revolution in Europe and North America. 4. to the social and democratic constitutional state in 20th century Europe. Ad 1.: The sovereign is exempt from orientation towards individual content or certain state purposes and is defined in terms of instruments, i.e. solely in relation to the means of the legal exercise of bureaucratically organized rule. The means of effectively allocating power becomes the sole purpose. >Power, >Control media. IV 526 The self-conception of this epoch has found its most consistent expression in Hobbes' Leviathan. >Th. Hobbes. IV 527 The further juridification shifts can be understood in such a way that they gradually bring to bear the demands of the market and absolutist rule in a lifeworld that was initially at the disposal of the market. >Markets, >Lifeworld. Only in this way can the bourgeois state gain a non-parasitic legitimacy appropriate to the level of modern justification. In the end, the structurally differentiated lifeworld on which modern states depend functionally remains the only source of legitimacy. >Legitimacy/Habermas. IV 528 Ad 2: This impetus means the constitutional standardization of an authority that until then was limited and bound only by the legal form and bureaucratic means of exercising power. Now citizens as private individuals receive actionable subjective-public rights against a sovereign, in whose decision-making they certainly do not yet participate democratically. IV 529 Ad 3: The juridification of the legitimation process becomes established in the form of universal and equal suffrage and the recognition of freedom of organization for political associations and parties. >Organization, >Political Parties, >Institutions. IV 530 Ad 4: The development towards a social and democratic constitutional state can be understood as the constitutionalisation of a social power relationship anchored in the class structure. Classical examples are the limitation of working hours, union freedom of association and tariff autonomy, protection against dismissal, social security, etc. Here, too, the balance of power within an area of action that has already been legally constituted is at stake. IV 531 However, the freedom-guaranteeing character of the welfare state does not apply to all areas. Thus, from the beginning there is the ambivalence of guaranteeing freedom and deprivation of liberty.(2) Problem/Habermas: the negative effects (...) do not appear as side effects, they result from the structure of juridification itself. It is now the means of guaranteeing freedom itself that endanger the freedom of the beneficiary. For example, legal claims to monetary income in the event of an insured event represent progress compared to traditional poor welfare. However, this legalisation of life risks demands a remarkable price in the form of restructuring interventions in the lifeworlds of those entitled. >Freedom, >Liberty. IV 532 The bureaucratization leads to a de-individualization and to a decrease of partner-like assistance in the private sector. >Bureaucracy. IV 534 Dilemma: the welfare state guarantees are intended to serve the goal of integration and nevertheless promote the disintegration of life contexts. IV 538 This ambivalence cannot be traced back to a dialectic of law as an institution and law as a medium, because the alternative of guaranteeing and depriving freedom only comes from the perspective of the lifeworld, i.e. only in relation to legal institutions. >Law, >Rights, >Society. 1.R.Voigt Verrechtlichung in Staat und Gesellschaft, in: ders (Hrsg.), Verrechtlichung Frankfurt 1980 S. 16. 2.T.Guldimann, M. Rodenstein, U. Rödel, F. Stille, Sozialpolitik als soziale Kontrolle, Frankfurt, 1978. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Justice | Aristotle | Höffe I 55 Justice/Aristoteles/Höffe: Characteristic of justice is the property of being Höffe I 56 owed. Aristotle hints at it where he speaks of the allotrion agathon, of the "foreign good", a good to which the other has a claim. In doing so, he anticipates the modern separation of law and morality: Justice differs from generosity and magnanimity in that it alone is owed and only in it may the coercive law intervene. Sub-areas within justice: According to the subject area, he distinguishes justice in so far as it constitutes the entire virtue that "general justice" (iustitia generalis), by the "special justice" (iustitia particularis). This deals with external goods such as offices and dignity, income or money and health or security. Social goods: For these "basic social goods" Aristotle, in contrast to the modern welfare state, did not envisage any redistribution. In contrast to Plato(1), both [forms of justice] are directed only at others, not also at themselves. For an injustice against oneself can only be spoken of in a metaphorical sense. >Justice/Plato, >Social goods. 1 Plato, Nomoi, I 631c-d Gaus I 313 Justice/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle's account of justice and injustice is one expression of his naturalism. The prime justificatory principle in the Politics is that everything within the sphere of social conduct that is (un)natural is (unjust (Pol. I.3.1253b20-3, 5.1254al 7-20, 1255a1-3, 10.1258a40-b2; III.16.1287a8-18, 17.1287b37-9; VII.3.1325b7-lO, 9.1329a13-17). >Nature/Aristotle. Ethics: in the Ethics Aristotle distinguishes universal justice (or lawfulness) from particular justice (or fairness) and divides the latter into distributive and corrective justice (EN V .1-4). His theory of distributive justice consists in the combination of his justice-of-nature principle with the Platonic principle of proportional equality. By this theory a just constitution is one under which political power is distributed in proportion to worth, where worth is assessed according to the standard of nature - the standard of a polis with a completely natural social and political structure. Aristotle describes such a polis in Politics VII-VIII, and virtue, rather than wealth or freedom, turns out to be nature's standard (for details see Keyt, 1991a(1)). >Nature/Aristotle, >Stasis/Aristotle. Pol: Aristotle Politics EN: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. Keyt, David (1991a) 'Aristotle's theory of distributive justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justice | Rawls | I 3 Justice/Rawls: justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth is for thought systems. Justice as an untrue theory must be rejected or revised, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. >Injustice, >Laws. Each person has an inviolability based on justice that cannot be overridden even by the welfare of a society as a whole. Therefore, a loss of the freedom of some cannot be offset by a greater good, which is given to several. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism, RawlsVsSinger, Peter) >Utilitarianism, >P. Singer. I 4 The rights guaranteed by justice are not the subject of political negotiation or social interests. Cf. >Human Rights, >Fundamental Rights. Just as the acceptance of a faulty theory is only justified by the absence of a better theory, injustice is only tolerable if necessary to avoid greater injustice. To investigate whether these too strong claims are justified, we must develop a theory of justice. >Society/Rawls. I 5 Justice/Society/Rawls: although people are at odds about which principles to accept, we still assume that they all have an idea of justice. That is, they understand that such principles are necessary to determine basic rights and obligations and to monitor their distribution. Therefore, it seems reasonable to contrast a concept of justice with different notions of justice. I 6 Justice/Rawls: justice cannot stop at distribution justice. It must become a feature of social institutions. I 54/55 Justice/Principles/Rawls: the principles of justice are very different depending on whether they apply to individuals or institutions. >Principles/Rawls. I 237 Natural justice/Rawls: the principles of natural justice are intended to ensure the integrity of the legal process.(1) >Natural justice. I 310 Justice/Idealization/RawlsVsLeibniz/RalwsVsRoss, W. D. /Rawls: one should not equate or try to define justice with an "ideal happiness"(2)(3). >G.W. Leibniz. I 311 What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. I 312 The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available. 1. Cf. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 21,26-28,57f. 2. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) ed. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 353. 3. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) Hrsg. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), S. 353. Gaus I 94 Justice/Rawls/Waldron: Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(2): 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn , and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1, C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(1): 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2, … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1, and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justification | Lamont | Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877(1); Sidgwick, 1890(2)). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991(3)). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982(4); Gauthier, 1987(5); Levin, 1982(6)). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986(7); Morris, 1998(8): ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991(9)). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979(10); Rakowski, 1991)(11). >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)(12), Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990(13)) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)(14), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989(15); 1990(16); 1991(17)), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)(18), and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)(19). Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996(20); Gaus, 1996(21)). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Kaldor-Hicks Criterion | Economic Theories | Parisi I 364 Kaldor-Hicks Criterion/Economic theories: It is reasonably clear that KH as historically constituted is not likely to remain the mainstream view. The modern view contains KH as a limiting case (Adler and Posner, 2001(1); Adler, 2003(2); Sunstein, 2001(3); Thaler and Sunstein, 2009(4); Knetsch, 1995(5); Zerbe, 2007(6)). Zerbe and Scott (2014)(7) call the new view the Expanded Kaldor–Hicks test (EKH). The new view can be reasonably characterized by the following assumptions: 1) the use of the Pareto requirement itself furnishes a justification for the use of BCA ((s) benefit-costs analysis) so that 2) the PCT test ((s) potential compensation test) can be dropped and replaced with the simple requirement that the net present value of a project be positive, where 3) the definition of benefits and losses are grounded in law and in the WTP and WTA; where 4) there is recognition that all goods for which there is a WTP are to be included in principle in any BCA analysis, so that EKH adds to KH the requirements that all ethical values for which there is a WTP ((s) willingness to pay) or WTA ((s) willigness to accept) are included in the analysis, including those concerning distributional and ethical considerations; 5) the understanding that proper use of ethical BCA is to furnish information and predictions and not to furnish the decision; and Parisi I 365 6) that transactions cost economics rather than market failure is the basis for a justification that government intervention might be useful. The rationale for the judgment that the Pareto approach itself applies directly to a justification for EKH is found in a demonstration by Zerbe and Scott (2014)(7), showing that under reasonable and even somewhat extreme assumptions biased against their hypotheses, almost all individuals gain from the use of BCA across a portfolio of projects. >Pareto Optimum. 1. Adler, Matthew and Eric Posner (2001). Cost–Benefit Analysis: Economic, Philosophical, And Legal Perspectives. University of Chicago Press. 2. Adler, Matthew (2008). “Risk Equity: A New Proposal.” Harvard Environmental Law Review 32. 3. Sunstein, Cass R. (2001). “Cost–Benefit Default Principles.” Michigan Law Review 99: 1651, 1663–1666. 4. Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein (2009). Nudge. New York: Penguin Press. 5. Knetsch, Jack L. (1995). “Assumptions, Behavior Findings, and Policy Analysis.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14(1): 68–78. 6. Zerbe, Richard O. (2007). “The Legal Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis.” 2 Charleston Law Rev. 2: 93. 7. Zerbe, Richard O. (2014). “Welfare Economics for Law with Costly Markets,” in Richard O. Zerbe, ed., Efficiency in Law and Economics. Series editors Richard Posner and Francesco Parisi. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Kaldor-Hicks Criterion | Hicks | Parisi I 360 Kaldor-Hicks Criterion/Kaldor: Before [the introduction of the Kaldor-Hicks-Criterion] it was generally assumed that each individual had an “equal capacity for enjoyment,” and that gains and losses among different individuals could be directly compared. By 1939, however, leading British economists, including the future Nobel Prize winner Sir John Hicks, were raising questions about such policy prescriptions because they involved interpersonal comparisons of utility (Hicks, 1939)(2). Kaldor provided a solution: he acknowledged the inability of economists to establish a scientific basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility but suggested that this difficulty could be made irrelevant (Kaldor, 1939)(1). He argued that policies that led to an increase in aggregate real income are always desirable because the potential exists to make everyone better off (…). Kaldor: “[T]he economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of the comparability of individual satisfaction, since in all such cases it is possible to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people better off without making anybody worse off.” (Kaldor, 1939(1), pp. 549–550) Parisi I 361 According to Kaldor, a project is desirable if the money measure of gains exceeds the money measure of losses. With regard to the potential compensation that could turn losers into winners in such situations, Kaldor notes that whether actual compensation should take place “is a political question on which the economist, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion” (Kaldor, 1939). Hicks, perhaps the most prominent economist of the time, accepted the Kaldor approach, which eventually became known as the KH criterion (Hicks, 1939(2), 712). KH attempts to avoid interpersonal utility comparisons by separating equity from efficiency. Kaldor proposed that decision-makers address ethical values regarding equity outside the purview of BCA ((s benefit costs analysis). The change in aggregate gains was to be the measure of efficiency, so according to KH there is a separation of efficiency and distributional effects (Kaldor, 1939(1), 551). Kaldor endorsed the procedure adopted by Pigou, which Kaldor describes as “dividing welfare effects into two parts: the first relating to Parisi I 362 production, and the second to distribution.” A full description of the KH assumptions is reasonably characterized by: 1) the use of WTP ((s) willingsn3ss to pay) for gains and for losses; 2) a reliance on potential compensation tests so that a project is KH efficient only when winners could hypothetically compensate losers, i.e. it passes a potential compensation test (PCT); 3) an emphasis on efficiency that is separated from equity; 4) an assumption that a dollar is to be treated the same regardless of who receives it, so that a dollar is assumed to have the same value to each person (equal and constant marginal utility of income); 5) a recognition and inclusion of non-pecuniary effects; 6) the omission of values represented by ethical considerations; 7) a reliance on externalities and market failure to determine where BCA might be useful in making corrections; 8) an assumption that transactions costs are zero; 9) the treatment of BCA as a mechanism to provide the answer rather than as an approach providing information as part of an ongoing discussion. >Cost-benefit analysis, >Willingness to pay. 1. Kaldor, Nicholas (1939). “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Economic Journal 49: 549. 2. Hicks, John R. (1939). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics.” Economic Journal 49: 712. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
EconHicks I John R. Hicks Mr. Keynes and the "classis"; a suggested reinterpreation 1937 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Kaldor-Hicks Criterion | Kaldor | Parisi I 360 Kaldor-Hicks Criterion/Kaldor: Before [the introduction of the Kaldor-Hicks-Criterion] it was generally assumed that each individual had an “equal capacity for enjoyment,” and that gains and losses among different individuals could be directly compared. By 1939, however, leading British economists, including the future Nobel Prize winner Sir John Hicks, were raising questions about such policy prescriptions because they involved interpersonal comparisons of utility (Hicks, 1939)(2). Kaldor provided a solution: he acknowledged the inability of economists to establish a scientific basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility but suggested that this difficulty could be made irrelevant (Kaldor, 1939)(1). He argued that policies that led to an increase in aggregate real income are always desirable because the potential exists to make everyone better off (…). Kaldor: “[T]he economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of the comparability of individual satisfaction, since in all such cases it is possible to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people better off without making anybody worse off.” (Kaldor, 1939(1), pp. 549–550) Parisi I 361 According to Kaldor, a project is desirable if the money measure of gains exceeds the money measure of losses. With regard to the potential compensation that could turn losers into winners in such situations, Kaldor notes that whether actual compensation should take place “is a political question on which the economist, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion” (Kaldor, 1939)(1). Hicks, perhaps the most prominent economist of the time, accepted the Kaldor approach, which eventually became known as the KH criterion (Hicks, 1939(2), 712). KH attempts to avoid interpersonal utility comparisons by separating equity from efficiency. Kaldor proposed that decision-makers address ethical values regarding equity outside the purview of BCA ((s benefit costs analysis). The change in aggregate gains was to be the measure of efficiency, so according to KH there is a separation of efficiency and distributional effects (Kaldor, 1939(1), 551). Kaldor endorsed the procedure adopted by Pigou, which Kaldor describes as “dividing welfare effects into two parts: the first relating to Parisi I 362 production, and the second to distribution.” A full description of the KH assumptions is reasonably characterized by: 1) the use of WTP ((s) willingsn3ss to pay) for gains and for losses; 2) a reliance on potential compensation tests so that a project is KH efficient only when winners could hypothetically compensate losers, i.e. it passes a potential compensation test (PCT); 3) an emphasis on efficiency that is separated from equity; 4) an assumption that a dollar is to be treated the same regardless of who receives it, so that a dollar is assumed to have the same value to each person (equal and constant marginal utility of income); 5) a recognition and inclusion of non-pecuniary effects; 6) the omission of values represented by ethical considerations; 7) a reliance on externalities and market failure to determine where BCA might be useful in making corrections; 8) an assumption that transactions costs are zero; 9) the treatment of BCA as a mechanism to provide the answer rather than as an approach providing information as part of an ongoing discussion. >Cost-benefit analysis, >Willingness to pay. 1. Kaldor, Nicholas (1939). “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Economic Journal 49: 549. 2. Hicks, John R. (1939). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics.” Economic Journal 49: 712. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Kaldor-Hicks Criterion | Zerbe | Parisi I 360 Kaldor-Hicks criterion /Zerbe: Kaldor–Hicks is the standard for BCA ((s) Benefit-costs analysis). It arose during the late 1930s out of discussions among prominent British economists about repealing the Corn Laws (Kaldor, 1939(1); Harrod, 1938(2); Robbins, 1938(3); Hicks, 1939(4)). >Cost-benefit analysis. Before that time it was generally assumed that each individual had an “equal capacity for enjoyment,” and that gains and losses among different individuals could be directly compared.7 By 1939, however, leading British economists, including the future Nobel Prize winner Sir John Hicks, were raising questions about such policy prescriptions because they involved interpersonal comparisons of utility (Hicks, 1939)(4). Kaldor provided a solution: he acknowledged the inability of economists to establish a scientific basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility but suggested that this difficulty could be made irrelevant (Kaldor, 1939)(1). He argued that policies that led to an increase in aggregate real income are always desirable because the potential exists to make everyone better off (…). 1. Kaldor, Nicholas (1939). “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Economic Journal 49: 549. 2. Harrod, Roy F. (1938). “Scope and Method of Economics.” Economic Journal 48: 383. 3. Robbins, Lionel (1938). “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment.” Economic Journal 48: 635. 4. Hicks, John R. (1939). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics.” Economic Journal 49: 696. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Labour | Giddens | Gaus I 219 Labour/Welfare state/Giddens/Moon: [the] obligation to work is not, or is not merely, a demand to be made on the individual, one which he might reasonably wish to resist, for ultimately it is rooted in an ideal of social inclusion and active citizenship through which the individual's own interests and needs can be realized. Anthony Giddens sounds this theme in his call for 'the positive welfare society', in which 'the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the development of self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility become the prime focus' (1998(1): 128). >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Labour/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. Giddens: Replacing the traditional 'welfare state' with the 'social investment state' , the task of government would be to invest in 'human capital' rather than 'the direct provision of economic maintenance' (1998(1): 117). Although he allows that full employment might not be realized, he calls for the redistribution of work to include as many as possible, and various forms of payment for participation in the 'social economy' , the sphere of civil society traditionally maintained by voluntary work. >Labour/Welfare economics. 1. Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Labour | Mead | Gaus i 219 Welfare state/work/Lawrence Mead/Moon: One can acknowledge that people rely upon 'welfare' because their options are so limited, and so their condition represents an indictment of the society rather than the individuals concerned, but the fact remains that receipt of social assistance does not enable one to attain full citizenship or membership in society. It simply sustains one in a marginalized condition. Social inclusion requires more than receiving benefits. Lawrence Mead: this line of argument has been advanced by a number of 'conservative' critics of the welfare state. Lawrence Mead (1992)(3), for example, argues that the character of poverty at least in America has changed in the past several decades, and that the social exclusion represented by poverty reflects the inability of poor people to act as rational agents in pursuit even of their own interests.*The key to overcoming this exclusion is to inculcate in the passive poor the capacities for agency, for acting to promote their own interests and to control their own lives, by imposing adequate disciplinary controls on them. If poverty creates social exclusion, and so is a barrier to citizenship, then the state must ensure that its citizens develop the capacities that enable them to escape poverty. The key policy, in Mead's view, is workfare; the poor must be required to work as a condition of support, for unless they develop the discipline and sense of accomplishment that work involves, they will be unable to escape the conditions of dependency. Social policy must take on an explicitly 'paternalistic' character, and the state self-consciously assume a tutelary role. Mead holds out the possibility that 'public paternalism might help regenerate informal (social) controls, by involving community organizations in directive programs' (1997: 27-8). In that case, 'paternalism in its public sense might not have to be permanent', but only because the necessary disciplines are imposed through other social agencies. * It should be noted that Mead would reject the charactenzation of his position as 'conservative', arguing that at least in America the conservative position shares the liberal assumption that the poor are 'competent', and believes that the problem of poverty is caused by the way in which welfare programmes distort the incentives poor people face. The solution, then, is not to reform the poor, but to abolish welfare programmes. No doubt this view reflects the thinking of some conservatives, but other self-identified conservatives do view the issue in terms similar to Mead's. >Social politics, >Paternalism. 1. Mead, Lawrence M. (1992) The New Politics of Poverty. New York: Basic. 2. Mead, Lawrence M., ed. (1997) The New Paternalism. Washington: Brookings Institution. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 |
| Labour | Rose | Gaus I 219 Labour/welfare state/Rose/Moon: Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the emphasis on paid employment is not a monopoly of the right: 'From the "social democratic left", too, work [is] now seen as the [principal] mode of inclusion, and absence from the labour market the most potent source of exclusion' (1999(1), 163). (...) the contemporary 'organization of freedom' views individuals as best able to 'fulfil their political obligations in relation to the wealth, health and happiness of the nation not when they are bound into relations of dependency and obligation, but when they seek to fulfil themselves as free individuals', which depends 'upon the activation of the powers of the citizen' (1999(1): 166). >Labour/Welfare economics. 1. Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Labour | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 218 Labour/work/welfare state/Welfare economics/Moon: the argument about the necessity for effective functioning, as opposed simply to having access to resources, has been most heated in the area of work. Cf. >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. If democratic citizenship requires that all be enabled to participate fully in society, then people must have not only certain resources, but also certain capacities, skills, and dispositions. Gaus I 219 One can acknowledge that people rely upon 'welfare' because their options are so limited, and so their condition represents an indictment of the society rather than the individuals concerned, but the fact remains that receipt of social assistance does not enable one to attain full citizenship or membership in society. It simply sustains one in a marginalized condition. Social inclusion requires more than receiving benefits. Lawrence Mead: this line of argument has been advanced by a number of 'conservative' critics of the welfare state. Lawrence Mead (1992)(1), for example, argues that the character of poverty at least in America has changed in the past several decades, and that the social exclusion represented by poverty reflects the inability of poor people to act as rational agents in pursuit even of their own interests.* >Labour/Lawrence Mead. Nikolas Rose: Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the emphasis on paid employment is not a monopoly of the right: 'From the "social democratic left", too, work [is] now seen as the [principal] mode of inclusion, and absence from the labour market the most potent source of exclusion' (1999(2), 163). David Harris: In some solidaristic accounts, the emphasis on work invokes an older language of duties. In Harris's account, for example, the duties correlative to our welfare rights are 'strict obligations' and may be enforced by 'coercion' (1987(3): 161). Marshall: In this, [Harris] echoes Marshall, who looked beyond the social rights of citizenship to consider the duties of the enriched and inclusive model of citizenship he advocated, including 'the duty to work', which he thought was of 'paramount importance'. Gotmann/Thompson: Similarly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson offer a justification for enforcing work obligations that draws on the idea of citizenship, arguing that 'work should be seen as a necessary part of citizenship' (1996(4): 293), because it is 'essential to social dignity'. Since 'earning is not only a means of making a living but also a mark of equal citizenship', paid employment has a 'political dimension' that 'provides a further justification for the obligation to work' (1996(4): 302). Giddens: But this obligation to work is not, or is not merely, a demand to be made on the individual, one which he might reasonably wish to resist, for ultimately it is rooted in an ideal of social inclusion and active citizenship through which the individual's own interests and needs can be realized. Anthony Giddens sounds this theme in his call for 'the positive welfare society', in which 'the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the development of self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility become the prime focus' (1998(5): 128). Nikolas Rose: (...) the contemporary 'organization of freedom' views individuals as best able to 'fulfil their political obligations in relation to the wealth, health and happiness of the nation not when they are bound into relations of dependency and obligation, but when they seek to fulfil themselves as free individuals', which depends 'upon the activation of the powers of the citizen' (1999(2): 166). * It should be noted that Mead would reject the charactenzation of his position as 'conservative', arguing that at least in America the conservative position shares the liberal assumption that the poor are 'competent', and believes that the problem of poverty is caused by the way in which welfare programmes distort the incentives poor people face. The solution, then, is not to reform the poor, but to abolish welfare programmes. No doubt this view reflects the thinking of some conservatives, but other self-identified conservatives do view the issue in terms similar to Mead's. 1. Mead, Lawrence M. (1992) The New Politics of Poverty. New York: Basic. 2. Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 3. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 4. Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Laisser-faire | Ricardo | Rothbard II 92 Laisser-faire/Ricardo/Rothbard: We see (…) the pernicious implications of the fallacious view that any part of the expense of production is in some way, from a holistic or social point of view, ‘really’ not a part of cost. >Costs/Ricardo. For if an expense is not part of cost, it is in some sense not necessary to the factor's contribution to production. And therefore this income can be confiscated by the government with no ill effect. Despite the deep pessimism of Ricardo about the nature and consequences of the free market, he oddly enough cleaved strongly, and more firmly than Adam Smith, to laissez-faire. Probably the reason was his strong conviction that virtually any kind of government intervention could only make matters worse. Taxation should be at a minimum, for all of it cripples the accumulation of capital and diverts it from its best uses, as do tariffs on imports. Poor laws - welfare systems - only worsen the Malthusian population pressures on wage rates. And as an adherent of Say's law, he opposed government measures to stimulate consumption, as well as the national debt. VsLaisser-faire: In general, Ricardo declared that the best thing that government can do to stimulate the greatest development of industry was to remove the obstacles to growth which government itself created. While Adam Smith's free market views concentrated on the sinister nature of predatory government action, Ricardo was particularly struck by government's pervasive ineptness and counterproductivity. >Economy/Ricardo, >Ricardian theory, >Welfare economics. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Language | Hobbes | Bubner I 194 Language/Hobbes/Bubner: language belongs, on its part, to the arbitrary inventions of civilization, with which the human frees himself from pre-legal existence. If language is not a gift of nature, the question arises as to its utility. Hobbes: threefold utilitas: 1. Counting, measuring. 2. People can teach each other linguistically. 3. Give commands and understand commands. Without these, there would be no community and no peace. The welfare of the Leviathan is identical with the continuity of the legal system. This is, because of the contract, also never controversial. Not even the sovereign can question it. >Contracts/Hobbes, >Law, >Community. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Law | Dworkin | Rawls I 349 Laws/rules/Dworkin, R./Rawls: whether our rights and duties as citizens or also rules of the game are connected with moral duties is a question that can be determined independently of the content of these rules. This also applies if the standards used by judges and others to interpret the law remind of or are identical with the principles of law and justice. For example, in a well-ordered society, the two principles of justice (See Principles/Rawls) may be applied by courts to interpret the parts of the Constitution that deal with freedom of thought and consciousness as well as the protection of equal rights (See Ronald Dworkin, "The Model of Rules", University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 35 (1967) esp. pp. 21-29.) Rawls: then there is still a difference between what law dictates and what justice demands. For example, the rule of keeping a promise determined by conventions is not to be confused with the principle of fiduciary duty (which is a special case of the principle of fairness). I 350 This principle is only hypothetical. All we need is for it to be followed. We assume that a fair practice exists. Brocker I 595 Law/DworkinVsHart, H. L. A./Dworkin: Hart Thesis: Law and morals form two independent systems of norms. A principle of moral only becomes part of positive law through an ultimately conventional rule of cognition. See Law/Hart: Division of legal rules: a) Rules of action, b) Rules for the creation of rules. (1) Dworkin: Thesis: Any attempt at conceptual definition and description of law inevitably involves us in normative questions of justification. DworkinVsHart/DworkinVsPositivism/DworkinVsLegalPositivism: law should not be reconstructed as a system of rules. In particular, it cannot be understood as a system of primary and secondary rules (rules via rules). ((s) Background: H. L. A. Hart was influenced by rules of the late Wittgenstein when setting up a system. >Rules/Hart, Law/Hart. Jurisprudence/Dworkin: When judges decide on rights and duties, they consider not only rules but also objectives and principles. While objectives such as the promotion of social welfare belong primarily to the level of legislation, principles are particularly relevant at the level of finding justice.(2) Brocker I 596 Law/DworkinVsHart: 1. law cannot be distinguished from other norms by means of a conventional rule of cognition. There is no such rule. The dispute among lawyers does not even stop at the foundations and limits of law. 2. Law is not logically independent of morality: moral content comes into law in the form of principles.(3) Brocker I 598 3. Dworkin criticizes the idea of strong judicial discretion as it follows from Hart's rule model. 1. Hart, H. L. A., Der Begriff des Rechts. Mit einem Postskriptum von 1994 und einem Nachwort von Christoph Möllers, Berlin 2011. 2. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 56f. 3. Ibid. p. 304 Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Law | Hayek | Parisi I 282 Law/Hayek/Menger: The process of rule evolution or generation in a common law system is based on trial and error (Hayek, 2011/1960(1), pp. 122–125). Therefore at any given point in time some rules or application of rules will simply be wrong. In other words, they will be ripe for revision as the process continues. For Hayek, the primary focus is on the overall system. The system is or should be the primary object of normative evaluation. Its mistakes are in a sense simply part of the process. Menger: It should be noted that Menger did not share Hayek’s presumption that common law was more conducive to the general welfare than statutory law. He argued, “For common law has also proved harmful to the common good often enough, and on the contrary, legislation has just as often changed common law in a way benefitting the common good” (1985(2), p. 233). Menger believed that common law could serve the common welfare without a single mind directing its development, but this need not occur. 1. Hayek, F. A. (2011/1960). Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Menger, C. (1985). Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences. New York: New York University Press. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Law | Honneth | Brocker I 798 Law/Honneth: Following on from Hegel (see Law/Hegel), Honneth works out the sequence of stages of a productive continuation of the struggle for recognition in modernity within the legal sphere: the material content and the social scope of status as a legal person are expanded. Liberal freedom rights, in turn, result in successive political rights of participation and finally social welfare rights. (1) Thus, a social dynamic is inherent in the sphere of law, in which each stage of recognition that has been achieved generates new struggles for the fulfilment of as yet unfulfilled claims to equality and against forms of disregard, in particular structural forms of "deprivation of rights" (2), thus contributing to moral progress in social development. Problem: the moral potential of the sphere of law is also limited. Honneth follows Hegel by concluding from the self-contradictions a transition to a new level of recognition problems. (3) Problem: since in law "every person, as the bearer of the same claims, is equally respected, it ((s) the law) cannot serve precisely as a medium for respecting the particular life history of every individual". (4) 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 185-195 2. Ibid. p. 216 3. Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, Berlin 2010, p. 44 4. Honneth 2014, p. 95. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Law | Thomas Aquinas | Höffe I 147 Right/Thomas/Höffe: (...) Thomas Aquinas [distinguishes] four ranked types. 1. (...) the eternal law (lex aeterna(1)), the Höffe I 148 epitome of all rational principles according to which God rules the world. 2. (...) the plan of the world, the natural law (lex naturali(2)), which can be discerned from the order of creation through reason. According to the Apostle Paul(3), "written into the heart of man" by God, it means a participation of the law in us(4). To this secondly ranked natural law which appears with the claim to overpositive obligation, belong self-preservation, preservation of the species and a life according to the nature of reason(5), and in detail the prohibitions of robbery and insult. 3. (...) the divine law (lex divina(6)) of revelation, found in the Old and New Testaments and interpreted by the Church. 4. (...) human law (lex humana(7)), which acts with coercive power and is issued by the authority responsible for the community. However, the authorities must not act arbitrarily. Law/Thomas: It should serve the welfare of the community and by means of prohibitions, e.g. of murder and theft, it should avert harm from the people. Exceptions: Because of the situation reference the closer regulations can turn out differently, they can also be changed. >Equity. Natural justice: The power of the legislature in the context of its guiding task, the service of the common good, to enact laws appropriate to the situation can be regarded as a moderate natural law approach and at the same time as moderate legal positivism. >Natural justice. 1. Thomas Summa lIa Ilae, qu. 93 2. Ebenda qu.94 3. Römer 2, 15 4. Summa Iia Iiae qu.96,2 5.Ebenda qu.94,2 6. Ebenda, qu. 91, 5 7. Ebenda, qu. 95. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Legal Policy | Kaplow | Parisi I 12 Legal policy/Kaplow/Shavell/Miceli: Kaplow and Shavell (2002)(1) have argued that social welfare, which they define as the aggregation of some index of the well-being of all members of society, should be the sole basis for evaluating legal policy. According to this view, fairness matters for legal rule-making, but only insofar as it affects people’s well-being (that is, to the extent that they care about fairness). Wealth as measure: At the same time, narrow concepts of efficiency like pure wealth maximization (or Kaldor–Hicks efficiency) are inappropriate because they exclude factors (like fairness) that people value. It is nevertheless the case that most law and economic analysis focuses on wealth maximization as the objective. >Efficiency. Distribution: Although changes in legal rules will often affect the distribution of income, it will usually be quite difficult to ascertain these effects, and in any case, tinkering with legal rules will not generally be the best means of achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth, or will entail a trade-off between fairness and efficiency. For example, the assignment of liability for product-related damages will likely affect both the distribution of wealth between businesses and consumers, and their incentives to avoid accidents. The fact that there exist alternative mechanisms for redistributing wealth that have no relation to products liability (such as the income tax and welfare systems) suggests that the liability system should be used solely for creating incentives to minimize accident costs.* Thus, the mainstream approach to law and economics, most often associated with the “Chicago school,” has for the most part employed the wealth-maximization approach to the development of economic models of law. * See the discussion in Shavell (2004(2), ch. 28). For a contrary view, see Sanchirico (2000(3)). 1. Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell (2002). Fairness versus Welfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Shavell, Steven (2004). Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 3. Sanchirico, Chris (2000). “Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Journal of Legal Studies 29: 797–820. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
EconKapl I Louis Kaplow The optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation 1996 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Liberalism | Friedman | Brocker I 401 Liberalism/Friedman: Friedman presents himself as a liberal of the classical era: he denies politicians not only the competence but also, in essence, the political justification to act in the alleged interests of the citizens. Liberty is the best way to prosperity and social equality, while modern liberalism in the USA initially sees more egalitarian prosperity as a prerequisite or also as an alternative to individual freedom(1); (cf. Lerner 1963 (2)). >Autonomy/Friedman, >Democracy/Friedman, >Economic policies/Friedman, >Education policy/Friedman, >Inequalities/Friedman, >Liberty/Friedman, >Neoliberalism/Friedman, >Paternalism/Friedman, >Welfare State/Friedman. 1. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago 1962. Dt.: Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, München 2004, S. 28 2. Lerner, Abba P., »Book Review: Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom«, in: American Economic Review 53/3, 1963, 458-460. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberalism | Fukuyama | Brocker I 813 Liberalism/Fukuyama: it was objected against Fukuyama (BurnsVsFukuyama (1)) that he understood the spread of democracies with simultaneous regression of a struggle for recognition as modernization. Fukuyama is uncritical of capitalist development and the Western model of democracy. At the same time, the victims of capitalist development processes would also be marginalized. (2) FukuyamaVsVs: the real danger lies precisely in such a criticism that evokes the end of modernism. A de-ideologized form of liberalism, in which all ideologies occupy an equal place for the benefit of individual expressionism, is not possible without abolishing liberalism itself. (3) It would then no longer be possible to weigh up the various rights on the basis of a higher principle. VsFukuyama: See Democracy/Fukuyama. Cf. >End of history/Fukuyama, >History/Fukuyama, >Liberty/Fukuyama, >State/Fukuyama, >Universal History/Fukuyama, >Welfare State/Fukuyama. 1. Timothy Burns, After History? Francis Fukuyama And His Critics, Lanham 1994 2. Francis Fukuyama, „Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later“, in: History and Theory 34/2, 1995, p. 34 3. Ibid. p. 36f. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Liberalism | Lamont | Gaus I 233 Liberalism/Lamont: A. Content: 'Liberalism' or a 'liberal position' usually indicates an emphasis on individual liberty. That is, government institutions are thought by liberal philosophers to work in the interests of individuals, as opposed to groups defined by ethnicity, geographic location, community identity, gender, or class. Individualism: The rights and obligations defended by liberals are held by individuals. Usually, these include political institutions which protect a set of civil liberties, such as free speech, freedom of thought and of religion, freedom of association, a free press, due process under the law, etc. Neutrality: Liberals usually also believe that the freedom of individuals entails that government institutions be 'neutral', in the sense that the government is not in the business of promoting or discouraging particular views, religions, lifestyles, or conceptions of the good, except where this is required to protect the basic liberties of individuals (Hampton, 1997(1): 170—81; Nussbaum, 1999(2)). Distribution: Within this framework (...), liberals divide on questions of distribution. a) Classical liberals generally favour minimal government involvement in the marketplace, or in other distributive institutions, such as those that distribute education or health care. These theorists commonly argue for their positions by reference to the value of individual liberty, and they see government interference as a threat to, rather than a protector of, liberty. b) Welfare liberals, at the other end of the spectrum, view markedly unequal distributive outcomes as, among other things, a threat to individual liberty. They argue for government involvement in the marketplace and in the delivery of important resources such as health care or education, in order to limit the degree of inequality that might emerge from the unhampered pursuit of individual liberty (Hampton, 1997(1): 172). B. Methodology: (...) 'liberalism' sometimes refers to a kind of methodology whereby arguments are crafted largely a priori, abstracting away from the particular history, culture, or empirical conditions associated with a particular society. Such arguments might appeal to human nature, universal characteristics of persons, or a priori reasons, and might even idealize, referring to ideal conditions or ideal persons which are only hypothetical but nevertheless generate an ideal principle to guide our necessarily imperfect institu- tions (Buchanan et al., 2000(3): 371—82). 'Contractarianism', 'rights-based' theories, and 'utilitarianism' are all, in different ways, examples of justifications of this type. Neutrality: The ideals that liberals specify are proposed as constraints on the development and operation of cultures; they are viewed as a way to ensure that cultures develop freely and justly. They do not, for the most part, employ a methodology that takes distributive ideals to arise from specific cultural practices, or historical struggles specific to a community. In this respect, communitarians and post-modern theorists have objected to the methodology of liberalism as abstract, individualistic, universalistic, and anti-democratic (MacIntyre, 1984(4); Mulhall and Swift, 1996(5); Sandel, 1982(6); Walzer, 1983(7)). >Communitarianism/Lamont. 1. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 2. Nussbaum, Martha C. (1999) Sex and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Buchanan, Allen, et al. (2000) From Chance to Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 5. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift, eds (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Cambridge: Blackwell. 6. Sandel, Michael J. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Martin Robertson. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Liberalism | Smith | Mause I 40 Liberalism/Adam Smith: Smith pro Liberalism: the liberal order of competition was considered to be Smith's natural and best order. For the "invisible hand" of competition would ensure that the overall interest is simultaneously promoted in the pursuit of individual interests. The state had to limit itself to fulfilling a few tasks (such as external defence and ensuring legal certainty in the national territory). >Competition, >Competition/Smith, >Welfare State/Smith. Other representatives of liberalism in economics: Jean Baptiste-Say (1767-1832) and David Ricardo (1772-1823). Say became known above all by "Say's Law" that was named after him. (1) >J.-B. Say, >D. Ricardo. 1. Say, Jean-Baptiste. Traité d’Economie Politique, Paris 1803, S. 153. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Liberalism | Spencer | Brocker I 401 Liberalism/Spencer: Spencer saw society as an evolutionary organism with no legitimate reason and no meaningful criteria for state influence. For him, liberalism originally meant "individual economic market freedom in contrast to control by the authorities, but this resulted in a change in meaning in the direction of a state forced system in the alleged interest of individual welfare".(1) See also Inequality/Friedman, Interventionism/Friedman. 1. MacPherson, Crawford B., »Elegant Tombstones. A Note on Friedman’s Freedom«, in: Canadian Journal of Political Science 1/1, 1968, 95-106. Peter Spahn „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Libertarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 229 Libertarianism/Political philosophy/Lamont: (...) fruitful arguments for libertarianism are based on the value of liberty itself. The most famous twentieth-century champion of such arguments was Friedrich Hayek (1944(1); 1976a(2); 1976b(3)), though there are many varieties, often inspired by John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty (1982)(4). This group of libertarians have responded to critics with greater depth. To see this, consider two of the more general criticisms of libertarianism (Haworth, 1994)(5). 1) VsLibertarianism: First, critics complain that libertarianism excludes state measures to improve the lives of the people, including the provision of public goods (Morris, 1998(6): ch. 9; Van Parijs, 1995(7)). 2) VsLibertarianism: Second, libertarianism is also charged with preventing state measures to alleviate deprivation and suffering. Lamont: Most ownership-based libertarian theories have failed to respond to the first criticism, parting com- pany at this point with neoclassical economists, who have generally taken the public goods problem more seriously than political libertarians. The most common responses to the second criticism have been various versions of 'tough luck': while it might be nice if individuals transfer some of their property rights to others in order to relieve suffering, people cannot justly be coerced to do so. >Coercion, >Property, >Society, >Equality, >Egalitarianism. Nozick: Nozick's view, for instance, is that respect for people's absolute property rights is more important than improving the lot of the least fortunate. The harshness of this reply has been unappealing to the majority in liberal democracies. >Liberalism, >Democracy. Hayek/Mill: Millean and Hayekian versions of libertarianism have been able to provide more fruitful replies, by appealing more directly to the values of liberty and autonomy (Lomasky, 1987)(8). >J. St. Mill, >F. A. v. Hayek. People's optimism about the government's ability to aid and empower people grew in the first 60 years of the twentieth century, but stalled in the late 1960s and the 1970s. VsInterventionism: Greater government intervention in the economy, particularly to increase welfare in the general population rather than just for the most needy, proved considerably less successful than preceding interventions targeted only to the poor. Hayek's explanation for this failure was that governments do not, and never will, have the information required for successful intervention to help the majority of the population. Mill: In agreement, Mill 's view was that individuals themselves are in the best informational position for improving their own situation, so the government should allow them the liberty to act upon it. Gaus I 230 Interventions/costs: a related contribution of Millean and Hayekian libertarianism is to highlight the costs of govern- ment intervention. >Interventions, >Interventionism. Public choice: Public choice theorists, inspired by libertarians such as James Buchanan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985(9); Buchanan and Tullock, 1962(10); Buchanan, 1975(11); Rowley et al., 1988(12)), also argued forcefully that increasing government size substantially increases rent-seeking by lobby groups, professions, and other powerful groups, distorting economic distribution in their favour. Lamont: Once these and other consequences are taken into account, the success of government interventions in realizing their intended benefits is quite uncertain, compared with the clear and demonstrable detrimental effects these interventions have on people's liberty and autonomy. >Freedom, >Autonomy. 1. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge. 2. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976a) Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 2, The Mirage ofSocial Justice. London: Routledge. 3. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976b) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge. 4. Mill (1982. 4. Mill, J. St. (1892) On Liberty. London: Longmans, Green 5. Haworth, Alan (1994) Anti-Libertarianism. London: Routledge. 6. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Van Parijs, Philippe (1995) Real FreedomforA11: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 9. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michi Press. 11. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 12. Rowley, C. K., R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds (1988) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Majorities | Buchanan | Brocker I 569 Majorities/State/Constitution/Economic Theory/Buchanan: (see State/Buchanan, Constitution/Buchanan): Change. Buchanan leaves no doubt that unanimity is for him the only acceptable normative yardstick on which the legitimacy of any decision-making process regarding the creation and financing of public goods must be based. That therefore (...) only state service beyond legal protection is legitimate which is in everyone's interest; for only if it is in everyone's interest can it be assumed that they would have agreed to it. ((s) Cf. Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.) Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them. (1) 1. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Marginal Product | Rothbard | Rothbard III 453 Marginal Product/factors of production/Rothbard: The currently fashionable account of this subject hinges on the fixity or variability in the proportions of the combined factors used per unit of product. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard: If the factors can be combined only in certain fixed proportions to produce a given quantity of product, it is alleged, then there can be no determinate price; if the proportions of the factors can be varied to produce a given result, then the pricing of each factor can be isolated and determined. Let us examine this contention. Suppose that a product worth 20 gold ounces is produced by three factors, each one purely specific to this production. Suppose that the proportions are variable, so that a product worth 20 gold ounces can be produced either by four units of factor A, five units of factor B, and three units of factor C, or by six units of A, four units of B, and two units of C. How will this help the economist to say anything more about the pricing of these factors than that it will be determined by bargaining? The prices will still be determined by bargaining, and it is obvious that the variability in the proportions of the factors does not aid us in any determination of the specific value or share of each particular product. Since each factor is purely specific, there is no way we can analytically ascertain how a price for a factor is obtained. RothbardVs: The fallacious emphasis on variability of proportion as the basis for factor pricing in the current literature is a result of the prevailing method of analysis. A typical single firm is considered, with its selling prices and prices of factors given. Then, the proportions of the factors are assumed to be variable. Rothbard III 454 It can be shown, accordingly, that if the price of factor A increases compared to B, the firm will use less of A and more of B in producing its product. From this, demand curves for each factor are deduced, and the pricing of each factor established. The fallacies of this approach are numerous. The chief error is that of basing a causal explanation of factor pricing on the assumption of given factor prices. On the contrary, we cannot explain factor prices while assuming them as given from the very beginning of the analysis.(1) Solution/Rothbard: The one technological conclusion that we know purely from praxeology is the law of returns, (…). According to the law of returns, there is an optimum of proportions of factors, given other factors, in the production of any given product. This optimum may be the only proportion at which the good can be produced, or it may be one of many proportions. The former is the case of fixed proportions, the latter of variable proportions. >Praxeology. Rothbard III 456 The key question, in fact, is not variability, but specificity of factors.(2) >Factor Market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 466 Marginal value product: What, (…) determines the position and shape of the MVP (marginal value product) schedule? What is the marginal value product? It is the amount of revenue intake attributable to a unit of a factor. >Factor market/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard. And this revenue depends on two elements: (1) the physical product produced and (2) the price of that product. If one hour of factor X is estimated by the market to produce a value of 20 gold ounces, this might be because one hour produces 20 units of the physical product, which are sold at a price of one gold ounce per unit. Or the same MVP might result from the production of 10 units of the product, sold at two gold ounces per unit, etc. In short, the marginal value product of a factor service unit is equal to its marginal physical product times the price of that product.(3) Marginal physical product (MPP): (…) [what are] the determinants of the marginal physical product (MPP). In the first place, there can be no general schedule for the MPP as there is for the MVP, for the simple reason that physical units of various goods are not comparable. How can a dozen eggs, a pound of butter, and a house be compared in physical terms? Yet the same factor might be useful in the production of any of these goods. There can be an MPP schedule, therefore, only in particular terms, i.e., in terms of each particular production process in which the factor can be engaged. For each production process there will be for the factor a marginal physical production schedule of a certain shape. The MPP for a supply in that process is the amount of the physical product imputable to one unit of that factor, i.e., the amount of the product that will be lost if one unit of the factor is removed. Rothbard III 467 If the supply of the factor in the process is increased by one unit, other factors remaining the same, then the MPP of the supply becomes the additional physical product that can be gained from the addition of the unit. The supply of the factor that is relevant for the MPP schedules is not the total supply in the society, but the supply in each process, since the MPP schedules are established for each process separately. >Returns to scale/Rothbard. Rothbard III 468 APP: = average physical product. What is the relationship between the APP and MPP? The MPP is the amount of physical product that will be produced with the addition of one unit of a factor, other factors being given. The APP is the ratio of the total product to the total quantity of the variable factor, other factors being given. Rothbard III 474 Factors of production: A factor will always be employed in a production process in such a way that it is in a region of declining APP and declining but positive MPP. >Factor market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 475 Discounted marginal value product/DMVP/Rothbard: The price of a unit of any factor will (… ) be established in the market as equal to its discounted marginal value product. This will be the DMVP as determined by the general schedule including all the various uses to which it can be put. Now the producers will employ the factor in such a way that its DMVP will be equalized among all the uses. If the DMVP in one use is greater than in another, then employers in the former line of production will be in a position to bid more for the factor and will use more of it until (according to the principle of diminishing MVP) the DMVP of the expanding use diminishes to the point at which it equals the increasing DMVP in the contracting use. The price of the factor will be set as equal to the general DMVP (…). 1. The mathematical bent toward replacing the concepts of cause and effect by mutual determination has contributed to the willingness to engage in circular reasoning. See Rothbard, “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” p. 236; and Kauder, “Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School.” 2. This justifies the conclusion of Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. p. 336, as compared, for example, with the analysis in George J. Stigler’s Production and Distribution Theories. Mises adds the important proviso that if the factors have the same fixed proportions in all the processes for which they are nonspecific, then here too only bargaining can determine their prices. 3. This is not strictly true, but the technical error in the statement does not affect the causal analysis in the text. In fact, this argument is strengthened, for MVP actually equals MPP (marginal physical product) x "marginal revenue", and marginal revenue is always less than, or equal to, price. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Marginal Utility | Mises | Rothbard IV 13 Money/Marginal Utility/Mises/Rothbard: Ludwig von Mises set out to repair [the] split [between money, “price levels,” “national product,” and spending], and to ground the economics of money and its purchasing power (miscalled the “price level”) on the Austrian analysis of the individual and the market economy: to arrive at a great integrated economics that would explain all parts of the economic system.(1) >Austrian School. Rothbard IV 14 Individuals/MisesVsFisher, Irving: At last, economics was whole, an integrated body of analysis grounded on individual action; there would have to be no split between money and relative prices, between micro and macro. The mechanistic Fisherine view of automatic relations between the quantity of money and the price level, of “velocities of circulation” and “equations of exchange” was explicitly demolished by Mises on behalf of an integrated application of the marginal utility theory to the supply and demand for money itself. >Irving Fisher. Specifically, Mises showed that, just as the price of any other good was determined by its quantity available and the intensity of consumer demands for that good (based on its marginal utility to the consumers), so the “price” or purchasing power of the money-unit is determined on the market in the very same way. In the case of money, its demand is a demand for holding in one’s cash balance (in one’s wallet or in the bank so as to spend it sooner or later on useful goods and services). The marginal utility of the money unit (the dollar, franc, or gold-ounce) determines the intensity of the demand for cash balances; and the interaction between the quantity of money available and the demand for it determines the “price” of the dollar (i.e., how much of other goods the dollar can buy in exchange). Quantity theory: Mises agreed with the classical “quantity theory” that an increase in the supply of dollars or gold ounces will lead to a fall in its value or “price” (i.e., a rise in the prices of other goods and services); but he enormously refined this crude approach and integrated it with general economic analysis. >Quantity theory. Rothbard IV 15 Marginal utility/Mises: (…) [von Mises] showed that this movement is scarcely proportional; an increase in the supply of money will tend to lower its value, but how much it does, or even if it does at all, depends on what happens to the marginal utility of money and hence the demand of the public to keep its money in cash balances. Furthermore, Mises showed that the “quantity of money” does not increase in a lump sum: the increase is injected at one point in the economic system and prices will only rise as the new money spreads in ripples throughout the economy. If the government prints new money and spends it, say, on paper clips, what happens is not a simple increase in the “price level,” as non-Austrian economists would say; what happens is that first the incomes and the prices of paper clips increase, and then the prices of the suppliers of the paper clip industry, and so on. So that an increase in the supply of money changes relative prices at least temporarily, and may result in a permanent change in relative incomes as well. >Money supply/Mises. Rothbard IV 16 Marginal utility/Money/Mises/Rothbard: In applying marginal utility to money, Mises had to overcome the problem which most economists saw as insuperable: the so-called “Austrian circle.” Economists could see how the prices of eggs or horses or bread could be determined by the respective marginal utilities of these items; but, unlike these goods, which are demanded in order to be consumed, money is demanded and kept in cash balances in order to be spent on goods. No one, therefore, can demand money (and have a marginal utility for it) unless it already was in existence, commanding a price and purchasing power on the market. But how then can we fully explain the price of money in terms of its marginal utility if money has to have a pre-existing price (value) in order to be demanded in the first place? Regression theorem: In his “Regression theorem,” Mises overcame the “Austrian circle” in one of his most important theoretical achievements; for he showed that logically one can push back this time component in the demand for money until the ancient day when the money commodity was not money but a useful barter commodity in its own right; in short, until the day when the money-commodity (e.g., gold or silver) was demanded solely for its qualities as a consumable and directly usable commodity. >Regression theorem. Not only did Mises thus complete the logical explanation of the price or purchasing power of money, but his findings had other important implications. For it meant that money could only originate in one way: on the free market, and out of the direct demand in that market, for a useful commodity. And this meant that money could not have originated either by the government proclaiming something as money or by some sort of one-shot social contract; it could only have developed out of a generally useful and valuable commodity. Menger had previously shown that money was likely to emerge in this way; but it was Mises who established the absolute necessity of this market origin of money. Value of money/Rothbard: But this had still further implications. For it meant, in contrast to the views of most economists then and now, that “money” is not simply arbitrary units or pieces of paper as defined by the government: “dollars,” “pounds,” “francs,” etc. Money must have originated as a useful commodity: as gold, silver, or whatever. The original money unit, the unit of account and exchange, was not the “franc” or the “mark” but the gold gram or the silver ounce. Rothbard IV 17 Gold standard/Central Banks/Mises/Rothbard: This analysis, combined with Mises’s demonstration of the unmitigated social evils of the government’s increase of the supply of arbitrarily produced “dollars” and “francs,” points the way for a total separation of government from the monetary system. For it means that the essence of money is a weight of gold or silver, and it means that it is quite possible to return to a world when such weights will once again be the unit of account and the medium of monetary exchanges. A gold standard, far from being a barbarous fetish or another arbitrary device of government, is seen able to provide a money produced solely on the market and not subject to the inherent inflationary and redistributive tendencies of coercive government. A sound, non-governmental money would mean a world where prices and costs would once more be falling in response to increases in productivity. >Gold standard/Mises, >Marginal Utility/Austrian School. Rothbard IV 19/20 Marginal utility/Mises/Rothbard: Building on the insight of his fellow student at the Böhm-Bawerk seminar, the Czech, Franz Cuhel, Mises devastatingly refuted the idea of marginal utility being in any sense measurable, and showed that marginal utility is a strictly ordinal ranking, in which the individual lists his values by preference ranks (“I prefer A to B, and B to C”), without assuming any mythological unit or quantity of utility. Rothbard IV 20 If it makes no sense to say that an individual can “measure his own utility,” then it makes even less sense to try to compare utilities between people in society. Yet statists and egalitarians have been trying to use utility theory in this way throughout this century. If you can say that each man’s marginal utility of a dollar falls as he accumulates more money, then cannot you say also that the government can increase “social utility,” by taking a dollar away from a rich man who values it little and giving it to a poor man who will value it highly? Mises/Rothbard: Mises’s demonstration that utilities cannot be measured completely eliminates the marginal utility case for egalitarian policies by the State. And yet, while economists generally pay lip service to the idea that utility cannot be compared between individuals, they presume to go ahead and try to compare and sum up “social benefits” and “social costs.” Rothbard IV 58 Thus, if we take the utility to the consumer of a carton of a dozen eggs, it is impermissible to make this utility some sort Rothbard IV 59 of a "total utility," in some mathematical relation to the "marginal utility of one egg." Instead, we are merely dealing with marginal utilities of different-sized units. In one case a dozen-egg package, in the other case of one egg. The only thing we can say about the two marginal utilities is that the marginal utility of a dozen eggs is worth more than one egg. Period. Mises's correction of his mentors was consistent with the fundamental Austrian methodology of focusing always on the real actions of individuals, and allowing no drift into relying on mechanistic aggregates.(2) >Individuals/Austrian School. 1. Ludwig von Mises. 1912. The Theory of Money and Credit (Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Translated by H.E. Batson in 1934; reprinted with “Monetary Reconstruction» (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953). Reprinted by the Foundation for Economic Education, 1971; reprinted with an Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard, Liberty Press Liberty Classics, 1989. 2. For a discussion of this point, see Murray N. Rothbard, Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, [1956] 19 77), pp. 9-15. Franz Cuhel's contribution is in his Zur Lehre von den Bedürfnissen (Innsbruck, 1906), pp. 186ff. Böhm-Bawerk's attempt to refute Cuhel can be found in Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest (South Holland, 111.: Libertarian Press, 1959), 111, pp. 124-36. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Maternalism | Feminism | Gaus I 282 Maternalism/Feminism/Mottier: Forceful as (...) criticisms have been, it would be premature to assume the demise of maternal thinking within feminist theory. >Maternalism/Dietz, >Maternalism/Nussbaum. Despite its contested nature, its influence remains felt, particularly in feminist analyses of the welfare state and in ecofeminist thought.* However, current feminist critiques of citizenship tend to engage more explicitly with liberal thought, and to reappropriate critically some of its key elements. >Maternalism/Political philosophy. *Ecofeminism similarly draws upon the idea of women having different dispositions, which can serve as a basis for public morality - in this case, the care for nature with which women have conventionally been associated. In the same way that it is rare nowadays to find feminists who feel comfortable with the much-derided label of essentialism, most ecofeminists also argue that women's traditional association with 'nature' rather than 'culture' can be evaluated positively, while routinely rejecting the charge that this necessarily entails an essentialist position (for example, Sturgeon, 1997)(1). 1. Sturgeon, Noel (1997) Ecofeminist Natures. New York: Routledge. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Mechanism Design | Economic Theories | Parisi I 490 Mecanism design/economic theories/Güth: (…) there is a long tradition of using auctions (see Milgrom, 1989)(1), partly very delicate applications like auctions to “trade” slaves. For the German-speaking areas, (…) Gandenberger (1961)(2) who documents an impressive constancy in relying on the lowest bid price procurement auction. Whether as procurement auctions by which a buyer wants to contract with one of the potential suppliers or as sales auctions where a seller wants to find a buyer, the literature now offers a lot of auction theory (Wilson, 1985)(3), auction experiments (e.g. Kagel, 2016)(4), and related field studies (Milgrom, 1989(1)). The voluntary supply of public projects, most typically in the form of pure public goods (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995) or common pool resources (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992)(5), also has a long tradition of applications. Rather than as a problem of mechanism design, it is usually studied by social dilemma games where community members nevertheless manage to cooperate to some extent, for example, due to repeated interaction, or some other aspects of their social life like monitoring and punishing (those who “free-ride”). Especially, the group in Bloomington has done an immense amount of field research and has also run experiments to study voluntary provision of public projects (see Ostrom, 2015)(6). Mechanism design, however, has a more recent, already very successful history (the Nobel laureates in 2007, L. Hurwicz, E. S. Mascin, and R. B. Myerson, were awarded for their achievements in the theory Parisi I 491 of mechanism design). Hurwicz (1960(7), 1973(8)) introduced the notion of incentive compatible mechanisms which in the form of dominance solvability were applied by Groves and Ledyard (1977)(9) to voluntary public good provision. The Revelation Principle had been propagated by Myerson (1979,(10) 1981(11), 1982(12)); Baron and Myerson (1982)(13); Maskin (1999)(14); Dasgupta, Hammond, and Mascin (1979)(15); Meyerson and Sattertwaithe (1983)(16); and Wilson (1985)(3), where we exclude the exercises for “large economies” (e.g. Bierbrauer and Hellwig, 2011)(17). The Revelation Principle is now a standard tool of mechanism design theory (see the more recent contributions like Bergemann and Morris, 2005(18) and Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001(19)). >Decision-making processes, >Auctions, >Cooperation. 1. Milgrom, P. (1989). “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3): 3–22. 2. Gandenberger, O. (1961). Die Ausschreibung. Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer. 3. Wilson, R. (1985). “Incentive efficiency of double auctions.” Econometrica 53(5): 1101–1115. 4. Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E. (2016). The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 5. Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner (1992). “Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible.” American Political Science Review 86(2): 404–417. 6. Ostrom, E. (2015). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Hurwicz, L. (1960). “Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes,” in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences, 27–46. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 8. Hurwicz, L. (1973). “The design of mechanisms for resource allocation.” American Economic Review 63(2): 1–30. 9. Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977). “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem.” Econometrica 45(4): 783–809. 10. Myerson, R. B. (1979). “Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.” Econometrica 47(1): 61–73. 11. Myerson, R. B. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1): 58–73. 12. Myerson, R. B. (1982). “Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1): 67–81. 13. Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson (1982). “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 4: 911–930. 14. Maskin, E. S. (1999). “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.” Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 23–38. 15. Dasgupta, P. S., P. J. Hammond, and E. S. Mascin (1979). “The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility.” Review of Economic Studies 46: 185–216. 16. Myerson, R. B. and M. A. Satterthwaite (1983). “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.” Journal of Economic Theory 29(2): 265–281. 17. Bierbrauer, F. and M. Hellwig (2011). Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2011/31. 18. Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005). “Robust mechanism design.” Econometrica 73(6): 1771–1813. 19. Jehiel, P. and B. Moldovanu (2001). “Efficient design with interdependent valuations.” Econometrica 69(5): 1237–1259. Werner Güth. “Mechanism design and the law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Money | Menger | Parisi I 268 Institutions/Money/Menger: Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian approach, stated that social scientists must explain “how can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development come into being without a common will directed toward establishing them” (Menger, 1963/1883(1), p146.) Parisi I 269 Menger’s question links the Austrian approach to Scottish Enlightenment scholars, who explained the spontaneous orders as “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design” (Ferguson, 1782/1767(2), p. III, S.2). Menger argued that the emergence of money is one such example of spontaneous development of institutions. To solve the problem of the double co-incidence of wants, individuals find more highly valued commodities to exchange, and therefore add an exchange value to the use value of these goods, increasing the demand. As more individuals participate in such exchange, they converge to one or two generally accepted media of exchange, which we call money (Menger, 1892)(3). >Carl Menger. 1. Menger, C. (1963/1883). Problems of Economics and Sociology. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 2. Ferguson, A. (1782/1767). An Essay on the History of Civil Society. 5th edition. London: T. Cadell. 3. Menger, C. (1892). “On the origin of money.” The Economic Journal 2(6): 239–255. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Meng I K. Menger Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics (Vienna Circle Collection) 1979 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Monopolistic Competition | Rothbard | Rothbard III 719 Monopolistic Competition/Rothbard: The theory of monopoly price has been generally superseded in the literature by the theories of "monopolistic" or "imperfect" competition.(1) As against the older theory, the latter have the advantage of setting up identifiable criteria for their categories - such as a perfectly elastic demand curve for pure competition. >Competition/Rothbard, >Monopoly price/Economic theories, >Monopolies/Rothbard. RothbardVs: Unfortunately, these criteria turn out to be completely fallacious. Essentially, the chief characteristic of the imperfect-competition theories is that they uphold as their "ideal" the state of "pure competition" rather than "competition" or "free competition." Def Pure competition: Pure competition is defined as that state in which the demand curve for each firm in the economy is perfectly elastic, i.e., the demand curve as presented to the firm is completely horizontal. >Elasticity, >Demand/Rothbard. Market/price/Rothbard: In this supposedly pristine state of affairs, no one firm can, through its actions, possibly have any influence over the price of its product. Its price is then "set" for it by the market. Any amount it produces can and will be sold at this ruling price. In general, it is this state of affairs, or else this state without uncertainty ("perfect competition"), that has received most of the elaborate analysis in recent years. This is true both for those who believe that pure competition fairly well represents the real economy and for their opponents, who consider it only an ideal with which to contrast the actual "monopolistic" state of affairs. Rothbard: Both camps, however, join in upholding pure competition as the ideal system for the general welfare, in contrast to various vague "monopoloid" states that occur when there is departure from the purely competitive world. RothbardVsPure competition theory: The pure-competition theory, however, is an utterly fallacious one. It envisages an absurd state of affairs, never realizable in practice, and far from idyllic if it were. In the first place, there can be no such thing as a firm without influence on its price. Rothbard III 720 The monopolistic-competition theorist contrasts this ideal firm with those firms that have some influence on the determination of price and are therefore in some degree "monopolistic." Yet it is obvious that the demand curve to a firm cannot be perfectly elastic throughout. At some points, it must dip downward, since the increase in supply will tend to Iower market price. As a matter of fact, it is clear from our construction of the demand curve that there can be no stretch of the demand curve, however small, that is horizontal, although there can be small vertical stretches. Rothbard III 721 Elasticity: Of course, the demand curve for each small wheat farm is likely to be very highly, almost perfectly, elastic. And yet the fact that it is not "perfect" destroys the entire concept of pure competition. For how does this situation differ from, say, the Hershey Chocolate Company if the demand curve for the latter firm is also elastic? Once it is conceded that all demand curves to firms must be falling, the monopolistic-competition theorist can make no further analytic distinctions. >Monopolistic competition/Harrod, >Oligopolies/Rothbard, >Pure competition/Rothbard. 1. In particular, see Edward H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, and Mrs. Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition. For a lucid discussion and comparison of the two works, see Robert Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940). |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Moral Hazard | Economic Theories | Mause I 540f Def Moral Hazard/Health Policy/Economic Theory: (moral hazard is usually translated as "moral temptation") It is about the fact that an opportunism for the use of contractual services arises after the conclusion of a contract. Health policy: Important work on ex post moral hazard behavior comes from Nyman (2004 (1), 2008(2)) and Zweifel and Manning (2000 (3)). Based on the microeconomic demand model, these studies show that the incentives for (insured) demanders change with the introduction of health insurance. As a result, the introduction or extension of insurance cover increases health expenditure ceteris paribus. For empirical results: Newhouse 1993 (4). The use of health services decreases when payments have to be made. (Brook et al. 2006).(5) >Free rider. 1. Nyman, John A. 2004. Is ‚Moral Hazard‘ inefficient? The policy implications of a new theory. Health Affairs 23( 5): 194– 199. 2. Nyman, John A. 2008. Health insurance theory: The case of the missing welfare gain. European Journal of Health Economics 9( 4): 369– 380. 3. Zweifel, Peter, und Willard G. Manning. Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care. In Handbook of health economics, Hrsg. Anthony J. Culyer und Joseph P. Newhouse, Bd. 1, 409– 459. Amsterdam 2000. 4Newhouse, Joseph P. Free for all? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Cambridge 1993 5. Brook, Robert H., Emmett B. Keeler, Kathleen N. Lohr, Joseph P. Newhouse, John E. Ware, William H. Rogers, Allyson Ross Davies, Cathy D. Sherbourne, George A. Goldberg, Patricia Camp, Caren Kamberg, Arleen Leibowitz, Joan Keesey und David Reboussin. 2006. The Health Insurance Experiment: A classic RAND study speaks to the current health care reform debate. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Morality | Turiel | Upton I 125 Morality/Turiel/TurielVsKohlberg/Upton:. In his domain theory, Turiel (1983)(1) argues that the child’s concepts of morality and social convention develop from the recognition that certain actions or behaviours are intrinsically harmful and that these are therefore different from other actions that have social consequences only. For example, hitting another person has intrinsic effects (the harm that is caused) on the well-being of the other person. Such intrinsic effects occur regardless of any social rules that may or may not be in place concerning hitting. The core features of moral cognition are therefore centred around thinking about the impact of Upton I 126 actions on well-being, and morality is structured by concepts of harm, welfare and fairness. In contrast, actions that are matters of social convention have no intrinsic interpersonal consequences. Cf. >Morality/Kohlberg, >Conventions/Turiel. 1. Turiel, E (1983) The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Morals | Hume | I 27 Moral/Hume: there are no conclusions here. 1. Moral affections (part of the circumstances). 2. Exceeding (knowledge). In nature, there is no whole - in contrast to moral. >Mind/Hume, >Nature/Hume. I 154 f Moral/Hume: moral does not come from reason. Principles of association cannot choose. Therefore, there is no moral from principles. But moral is similar to action. This is beyond the relations. Searching for pleasure is not content, but the work of principles. --- Stegmüller IV 238 Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue belongs to biological equipment. The moral philosophers have referred to it exclusively before Hume, e.g. generosity, forbearance, benevolence, charity, moderation, impartiality (basis: human sympathy). Artificial virtue: is nothing more than human inventions, e.g. respect of property, rules for ownership transfer, pledges, commitment, to satisfy contracts, loyalty to the government. This does not come from benevolence, because then it would depend on whether it is for the welfare of all. It also does not come from sympathy, because that is gradually, respect however must not be gradual. >Sympathy/Hume. Stegmüller IV 290 Moral/ethics/Hume/Stegmüller: we can ascribe to him that he would have rejected a justification of moral. But he would have insisted on an investigation of our terms of norms and institutions. Then, it is not a task of the philosopher to call for compliance. >Morals/Hume, >Ethics/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Multiculturalism | Indigenous Peoples | Gaus I 258 Multicuturalism/Indigenous peoples/Kukathas: Generally, multiculturalism is assumed to speak not only for the interests of immigrant cultural minorities but also for the aboriginal peoples who are minorities in modern states. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, no less than Fiji, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and most of South and Central America, are home to peoples whose ancestry may be traced back to premodern times, and their interests are sometimes thought to be addressed by the development of the institutions of a multicultural society. Indigenous peoples VsMulticulturalism: Yet for many indigenous peoples multiculturalism is less than welcome, for its implication is the further marginalization of their communities and culture in a modern state more attuned to the needs of migrants than to those of aborigines. Kymlicka’s theory: The recognition of this issue has shaped the development of Kymlicka's theory, which is particularly aware of the distinctive concerns of indigenous peoples. His model of group-differentiated rights deliberately makes space for national minorities, as distinct from polyethnic groups. >Minorities/Kymlicka, >Diversity/Multiculturalism, >Minority rights/Kymlicka. Kukathas: Whether or not Kymlicka's theory is defensible, however, aboriginal groups around the world have pressed the case for the rights of indigenous minorities. (For a sceptical assessment of the notion of indigenous rights see Mulgan, 1989a(1). Mulgan, 1989b(2) also suggests that, in the case of New Zealand, the land is occupied by two indigenous peoples: the Maori and Pakeha, or descendants of white settlers.) Moreover, many indigenous groups have insisted that, unlike immigrant peoples, what they need is not only recognition of their independent status but also rectification for past injustice. Indigenous rights/society/incorporation: Extended treatments of the problem of incorpo- rating aboriginal peoples into modern liberal democratic society, in a way that respects the integrity of aboriginal traditions, have been offered by Tully (1995)(3) and, more recently, Ivison (2002)(4). Both suggest that a viable liberal order requires the establishment of a constitutional modus vivendi that incorporates recognition of aboriginal custom and culture. However, as Ivison argues, mere incorporation of indigenous law may not be enough given that circumstances vary and both society and indigenous societies are themselves changing (2002(4) 141-62). Rectification: the problem of rectification for past injustice, however, remains a serious difficulty, particularly when the effluxion of time has made the matter of ascribing to present generations responsibility for past injustice a difficult one, morally, legally, and politically. Waldron: Jeremy Waldron (1992)(5), for one, has suggested that public policy should focus on future welfare rather than past injustice if the aim is to do justice to the concerns of aboriginal people (see also Sher, 1981(6); Goodin, 2001(7)). Though others have offered theories of rectification that might do justice to the demands of aboriginal peoples (Kukathas, 2003a(8); Hill, 2002(9)), it seems unlikely that those demands will ever be met philosophically,(...). 1. Mulgan, Richard (1989a) 'Should indigenous peoples have special rights?' Orbis, 33 (3): 375—88. 2. Mulgan, Richard ( 1989b) Maori, Pakeha and Democracy. Auckland: Oxford University Press. 3. Tully, James (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ivison, Duncan (2002) Postcolonial Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Waldron, Jeremy (1992) 'Superseding historic injustice'. Ethics, 103: 4-28. 6. Sher, George (1981) 'Ancient wrongs and modern rights'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1): 3-17. 7. Goodin, Robert E. (2001) 'Waitangi tales'. Australasian Journal ofPhi10sophy, 78 (3): 309-33. 8. Kukathas, Chandran (2003a) 'Responsibility for past injustice: how to shift the burden'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2 (2): 165-88. 9. Hill, Renée A. (2002) 'Compensatory Justice: Over Time and Between Groups'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 10 392-415. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nature | Rothbard | Rothbard III 169 Nature/economics/ownership/Rothbard: (…) the origin of all property is ultimately traceable to the appropriation of an unused nature-given factor by a man and his “mixing” his labor with this natural factor to produce a capital good or a consumers’ good. >Action/Rothbard, >Property/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard. For when we trace back through gifts and through exchanges, we must reach a man and an unowned natural resource. In a free society, any piece of nature that has never been used is unowned and is subject to a man’s ownership through his first use or mixing of his labor with this resource. How will an individual’s title to the nature-given factor be determined? If Columbus lands on a new continent, is it legitimate for him to proclaim all the new continent his own, or even that sector “as far as his eye can see”? Clearly, this would not be the case in the free society that we are postulating. Columbus or Crusoe would have to use the land, to “cultivate” it in some way, before he could be asserted to own. Rothbard III 170 There is no requirement, however, that land continue to be used in order for it to continue to be a man’s property. Interaction: (…) the question whether or not labor has been mixed with land is irrelevant to its market price or capital value; in catallactics, the past is of no interest. Rothbard III 171 VsRothbard: Some critics, especially the Henry Georgists, assert that, while a man or his assigns may be entitled to the produce of his own labor or anything exchanged for it, he is not entitled to an original, nature-given factor, a “gift of nature.” For one man to appropriate this gift is alleged to be an invasion of a common heritage that all men deserve to use equally. RothbardVsVs: This is a self-contradictory position, however. A man cannot produce anything without the co-operation of original nature-given factors, if only as standing room. In order to produce and possess any capital good or consumers’ good, therefore, he must appropriate and use an original nature-given factor. He cannot form products purely out of his labor alone; (…). >Animals/Rothbard, >Land/Rothbard. Rothbard III 172 Production/Rothbard: We must remember, also, what “production” entails. When man “produces,” he does not create matter. He uses given materials and transforms and rearranges them into goods that he desires. >Production/Rothbard, >Goods/Rothbard. Property/ownership: When we are considering legitimacy of title, the fact that land always embodies past labor becomes extremely important.(1) If animals are also “land” in the sense of given original nature factors, so are water and air. We have seen that “air” is inappropriable, a condition of human welfare rather than a scarce good that can be owned. However, this is true only of air for breathing under usual conditions. For example, if some people want their air to be changed, or “conditioned,” then they will have to pay for this service, and the “conditioned air” becomes a scarce good that is owned by its producers. Radio waves: Furthermore, if we understand by “air” the medium for the transmission of such things as radio waves and television images, there is only a limited quantity of wave lengths available for radio and for television purposes. This scarce factor is appropriable and ownable by man. In a free society, ownership of these channels would accrue to individuals just like that of land or animals: the first users obtain the property.(2) 1. See the vivid discussion by Edmond About, Handbook of Social Economy (London: Strahan & Co., 1872), pp. 19–30. Even urban sites embody much past labor. Cf. Herbert B. Dorau and Albert G. Hinman, Urban Land Economics (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1928), pp. 205–13. 2. [Ronald] Coase has demonstrated that Federal ownership of airwaves was arrogated, in the 1920’s, not so much to alleviate a preceding “chaos,” as to forestall this very acquisition of private property rights in airwaves, which the courts were in the process of establishing according to common law principles. Ronald H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission,” Journal of Law and Economics, October, 1959, pp. 5, 30-32. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Neoclassical Synthesis | Samuelson | Mause I 101f Neoclassical Synthesis/Samuelson: in the western world after the end of the Second World War, there was broad agreement that the market economy needed political embedding and that the nation states should be given sufficient scope to pursue their own (anti-cyclical) economic policies. Components: (1) growing state social services, (2) a broad public sector, (3) full employment as a priority of state policy, employee participation within companies and (5) corporatist coordination of trade unions and employers' associations. Post-war Economy/Samuelson: the "Neoclassical Synthesis" (1) founded by Samuelson forms the background for welfare capitalism (1945-1973 ((s) oil price shock 1973), which was later described by some authors (2) as the "Golden Age". Samuelson: tried to reconcile the ideas of John Maynard Keynes with the conventional idea of an equilibrium of neoclassicism. ">"Mixed Economy". >Neoclassics, >J.M. Keynes, >Keynesianism, >Equilibrium, >Equilibrium theory. 1. Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of economic analysis. Cambridge 1948. 2. A. Giddens, Europe in the global age, Cambridge 2007. |
EconSamu I Paul A. Samuelson The foundations of economic analysis Cambridge 1947 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Neoliberalism | Crouch | Mause I 73f Neoliberalism/Crouch: Crouch does not use the term "neoliberalism" in the sense of economic theory. The process of post-democratization (see Post-Democracy/Crouch) is attributed to the influence of neoliberalism. Crouch thesis: Neoliberalism gives economic interests priority over the welfare state and an egalitarian understanding of the common good, and sees the free market as the best means of satisfying individual and social needs. CrouchVsNeoliberalism: "Overlap": Market economy logic is no longer used only in the sphere of economy, but also in the political and social sphere. (1) 1. C. Crouch, Das befremdliche Überleben des Neoliberalismus. Frankfurt a. M. 2011, S. 153f. |
PolCrouch I Colin Crouch Henry Farrell Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004 PolCrouch II Colin Crouch Post-democracy London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Neoliberalism | Streeck | Mause I 76 Neoliberalism/Streeck: Thesis: the democratic and the market principles are fundamentally incompatible, since they follow different and incommensurable guiding principles: The market follows the principles of performance and market justice, while the democratic welfare state follows the ideal of social justice. >Democracy, >Markets, >Justice, >Equal opportunities, >Social state, >Welfare state. However, there is an asymmetry of power between social state democracy and capitalism.(1) Capitalism/Streeck: Thesis: The critique of capitalism overestimates its economic possibilities. >Capitalism. By contrast, the main problem in Western democracies since the 1970s has been the postponement of the "final crisis". Therefore, these democracies would have to "buy time".(2) 1. Cf.W. Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus. Berlin 2013. 2. Chr. Möllers, Krise? Verschieben! Wolfgang Streeck beerdigt den demokratischen Kapitalismus. Aber ist damit die Demokratie am Ende? DIE ZEIT 2013, Nr. 11: 55. |
PolStreeck I Wolfgang Streeck Kathleen Thelen Beyond continuity. Institutional change in advanced political economies Oxford 2005 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Network Models | Kranton | Kranton I 425 Network Model/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: In the “network communication model”, agents are organized along a social network. Kranton I 426 The “network model” represents an environment where individuals communicate privately to colleagues or friends, such as in texts, e-mails, and phone calls. People know each others’ types and can pass on information, but again the original source of the information is unknown (…). >Public Broadcasting/Kranton. Kranton I 427 Differences of the network model in contrast to the public broadcast model: 1. Agents communicate pairwise. 2. Agents’ types are common knowledge. The combination of these two features can allow communication even when no truthful communication is possible in public broadcast. With pairwise transmission of messages and knowledge of where agents of different types are located, agents can judge the veracity of a message transmitted through a particular part of the network and block it from reaching others. This blocking then increases the veracity of other messages that then circulate. In the network model a pair of agents i and j have a link, denoted by ij, if they have the potential to communicate, and we say agent i is agent j ’s neighbor and vice versa. Although the underlying structure of the social network is undirected, communication could occur in either, both, or neither direction. To indicate the direction of any communication, let (i, j ) denote the directed link from i to j, (j, i) denote the directed link from j to i, and let G denote the set of all directed links. G and individual agents’ types are common knowledge. We assume that the network is connected; that is, every agent has at least one neighbor. (…) agents are connected in such a way that a message can reach any individual through only one route. Equilibrium/Network Model: an equilibrium in the network model consists of message creation strategies, transmission strategies, and beliefs (Mi, ti, ρi) for each agent i such that each agent’s strategy is sequentially rational given the beliefs and strategies of others, and beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule from the strategies whenever possible. >Communication Equilibria/Bayesianism, >Communication Activity/Kranton. Kranton I 434 Agent Replacement/Agents/Networks/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We perform a comparative static exercise on the number of biased agents; we replace one biased agent with one unbiased agent and consider the effect of this replacement on individual welfare. The replacement of an unbiased agent by a biased agent j decreases the utility of unbiased agents but could increase or decrease the expected utility of biased agents. There are three effects (…): 1. a direct effect on the number of votes for collective action 1, 2. a direct effect on information transmission because a message m = 1 is always created when the signal is received by agent j , and 3. an indirect effect on information transmission as messages m = 1 are more likely to be blocked by unbiased agents, since the message is less likely to be credible. For unbiased agents who receive the same message as the unbiased agent whose status has switched, all effects concur to reduce expected utility. For biased agents, there is a trade-off. Both direct effects result in an increase in expected utility, but the indirect effect may induce a decrease in the number of unbiased agents who Kranton I 435 receive and believe message m = 1. The negative effect of adding biased agents stands in sharp contrast to models of rumors and opinion formation based on fixed laws of diffusion or adoption. In such models, it is always beneficial for biased agents to increase their numbers. Here, where agents strategically transmit messages from others, the introduction of more biased agents can reduce their expected utility, depending on where the agents are located in the network. Kranton I 436 General Networks/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We identify three key simplifying assumptions that render the analysis of the general network similar to the analysis of a tree. 1. If agents transmit a message, they send the message to all their neighbors (except the one from whom they have received a message). Communication is multicast, and agents cannot endogenously choose which route to send the message along. 2. The time it takes a message to travel along a path is proportional to the length of the path. This assumption is needed to guarantee that agents can identify the agents from whom they receive the message the first time as those agents who are at a shortest distance in the network. Absent this assumption, agents would have to make complex computations to identify the set of agents from whom they receive the message the first time. 3. [Most importantly] agents only decide whether or not to transmit the message the first time they receive it; that is, although a message could reach an agent along several paths and an agent could therefore receive several messages, they ignore all messages but the first one. Kranton I 437 However, we observe that, even under the three assumptions on agents’ behavior, MCEs might not be defined when the network contains cycles. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
| Norms | Cooter | Parisi I 167 Norms/Cooter/Wangenheim: Cooter (1994)(1) [discusses] how the lex mercatoria, a set of rules that enforces and regulates contracts between merchants despite their not being subject to any common jurisdiction, evolved spontaneously, that is, without design or enforcement by governments. Nevertheless, so Cooter argues, judges deduce the law they impose on merchants by deducing their decisions from their observations of these social norms. Cooter argues that one may expect this set of norms to be efficient because they evolved in a framework that should tend toward efficiency. Clay: In a similar vein, Clay (1997)(2) describes merchants in California who traded long before any state was established in the area. Cooter: Not the least, Cooter (1994)(1) himself uses the positive description mainly as a starting point for his normative argument that courts should, under certain conditions, draw the rules they use to adjudicate and thereby transform into law, from the social Parisi I 168 norms. The conditions that in his opinion ensure that social norms tend to be efficient are the following: social norms should be generally accepted inside the group, should not serve to extract welfare from outsiders, and should not be the expression of an inefficient evolutionary lock-in. Problems: The last condition casts doubts on the practicability of the idea, since it requires that the courts are able to identify inefficient rules, an ability that would make reliance on social norms as a guide unnecessary. Kraus: Kraus (1997)(3) adds as condition that the evolutionary process of social norms should be fast enough, which it need not be: it might be that technological evolution is so fast that the cultural evolution of social norms cannot keep pace with it. Then social norms will not be efficient. Predecessors: Cooter (1994)(1) was not the first to argue in this direction. Hayek (1973)(4) argues the same, though with weaker conditions. >Norms/Economic theories, >Legal history/Economic theories. Law: The reverse influence, that is the one that the law has on social norms, has also been studied by too few law-and-economics authors to expect anything close to profound knowledge in the field. A prominent starting point for the discussion is Cooter's (1998)(5) article on expressive law and economics. He argues that the evolution of social norms may have multiple attractors and that the law may guide social-norm evolution to one or the other. Schelling: Up to this point, Cooter's argument is not much beyond what Schelling said in his 1978(6) book. However, Cooter goes further. By a model similar to the one by Kuran (1989)(7) on the sudden revolutions in Eastern Europe, he shows that a change in legal rules may express (whence the name of his theory) that enough individuals in society favor the new rule to make them law. Even if this law is not enforced, this expression of opinions may tip some further individuals' opinions on what social norm they think to be just, which in turn provides new information for yet further individuals who were close to changing their minds on what social norm to adhere to. Like an avalanche, this may trigger more and more individuals to change their minds on social norms so that the new norm may become widely accepted. 1. Cooter, R. D. (1994). "Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law." International Review of Law and Economics 14: 215-231. 2. Clay, K. (1997). "Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 13: 202-231. 3. Kraus, J. S. (1997). "Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms." Journal of Legal studies 26: 377-411. 4. Hayek, F. A. v. (1973). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I: Rules and Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 5. Cooter, R. D. (1998). "Expressive Law and Economics." Journal of Legal studies 27: 585-608. 6. Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton. 7. Kuran, T. (1989). "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory Of Unanticipated Political Revolution." Public Choice 8:235-284. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Norms | Policy of the United States | Levitsky I 17 Norms/Policy of the United States/Levitsky/Ziblatt: The American separation of powers is supported by two basic norms that we take for granted: mutual respect, or in other words, agreement that competing parties regard each other as legitimate rivals, and restraint, that is, politicians should exercise their institutional prerogatives carefully and with tact. Levitsky I 18 The erosion of our democratic norms began in the 1980s and 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s. When Barack Obama became president, many Republicans in particular questioned the legitimacy of their Democratic Party rivals, and they had abandoned restraint in favor of a strategy of winning at all costs. Levitsky I 118 Constitution/USA/Levitsky/Ziblatt: If it was (...) not the constitution drafted in Philadelphia in 1787 that protected American democracy for so long, what was it? Levitsky I 119 In our view, the development of strong democratic norms is an essential part of this. All successful democracies are based on informal rules that are not laid down in the constitution, but are widely known and respected. In the case of American democracy, this is a decisive factor. Levitsky I 120 There are unwritten rules everywhere in American politics, from the functioning of the Senate and the College of Elected Representatives to the format of presidential press conferences (2). But two norms are particularly important for the functioning of a democracy: mutual respect and institutional restraint. Levitsky I 124 Institutional restraint: [The] norm decisive for the existence of democracies is what we call institutional restraint (3). Levitsky I 125 Where the norm of restraint is strong, politicians, even if they are legally allowed to do so, do not make full use of their institutional prerogatives because this would jeopardize the existing system (4). 1. See Gretchen Helmke/Steven Levitsky (Ed.), Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore 2006. 2. A classic representation of the norms or traditions of the US Senate is: Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1960. 3. 33Wir haben diesen Begriff von Alisha Holland übernommen; siehe Alisha Holland, »Forbearance«, in: American Political Science Review 110, Nr. 2 (Mai 2016), S. 232-246; dies., Forbearance as Redistribution. The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America, New York 2017; vgl. auch Eric Nelson, »Are We on the Verge of the Death Spiral That Produced the English Revolution of 1642–1649?«, in: History News Network, 14. Dezember 2014, http:// historynewsnetwork.org/article/157822 4. Whittington, »The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States«, S. 106. |
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| Oligopolies | Rothbard | Rothbard III 721 Oligopolies/VsOligolopies/Rothbard: According to the monopolistic-competition theorists, the two influences sabotaging the possible existence of pure competition are "differentiation of product" and "oligopoly," or fewness of firms, where one firm influences the actions of others. As to the former, the producers are accused of creating an artificial differentiation among products in the mind of the public, thus carving out for themselves a portion of monopoly. And Chamberlin(1) originally attempted to distinguish "groups" of producers selling "slightly" differentiated products from old-fashioned "industries" of firms making identical products. RothbardVs: Neither of these attempts has any validity. If a producer is making a product different from that of another producer, then he is a unique "industry"; there is no rational basis for any grouping of varied producers, particularly in aggregating their demand curves. Furthermore, the consuming public decides on the differentiation of products on its value scales. There is nothing "artificial" about the differentiation, and indeed this differentiation serves to cater more closely to the multifarious wants of the consumers.(2) It is clear, of course, that Ford has a monopoly on the sale of Ford cars; but this is a full "monopoly" rather than a "monopolistic" tendency. >Monopolies/Rothbard. Also, it is diffcult to see what difference can come from the number of firms that are producing the same product, particularly once we discard the myth ofpure competition and perfect elasticity. >Elasticity. Much ado indeed has been made about strategies, "warfare," etc., between oligopolists, but there is little point to such discussions. Either the firms are independent and therefore competing, or they are acting jointly and therefore cartelizing. There is no third alternative. Rothbard III 720 Once the perfect-elasticity myth has been discarded, it becomes clear that all the tedious discussion about the number and size of firms and groups and differentiation, etc., becomes irrelevant. It becomes relevant only for economic history, and not for economic analysis. VsVs: It might be objected that there is a substantial problem of oligopoly: that, under oligopoly, each firm has to take into account the reactions of competing firms, whereas under pure competition or differentiated products without oligopoly, each firm can operate in the blissful awareness that no competitor will take account of its actions or change its actions accordingly. >Pure competition/Rothbard. Demand/Rothbard: These alleged diffculties are nonexistent, however. There is no reason Why the demand curve to a firm cannot include expected reactions by other firms.(3) The demand curve to a firm is the set of a firm's expectations, at any time, of how many units of its product consumers will buy at an alternative series of prices. What interests the producer is the hypothetical set of consumer demands at each price. He is not interested in what consumer demand will be in various sets of nonexistent situations. >Imperfect competition/Rothbard, >Competition/Rothbard. 1. H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, and Mrs. Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition. For a lucid discussion and comparison of the two works, see Robert Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940). 2. 112] Recently, Professor Chamberlin has conceded this point and has, in a series of remarkable articles, astounded his followers by repudiating the concept of pure competition as a welfare ideal. Chamberlin now declares: "The welfare ideal itself... is correctly described as one of monopolistic competition.... [This] seems to follow very directly from the recognition that human beings are individual, diverse in their tastes and desires, and moreover, widely dispersed spatially." Chamberlin, Towards a More General Theory of Value, pp. 93-94; also ibid., pp. 70-83; E.H. Chamberlin andJ.M. Clark, "Discussion," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950, pp. 102-04; Hunter, "Product Differentiation and Welfare Economics," pp. 53 3-52; Hayek, "The Meaning of Competition" in Individualism and the Economic Order, p. 99; and Marshall I. Goldman, "Product Differentiation and Advertising: Some Lessons from Soviet Experience," Journal of Political Economy, August, 1960, pp. 346-57. 3.This definition of the demand curve to the firm was Mrs. Robinson's outstanding contribution, unfortunately repudiated by her recently. Triffin castigated Mrs. Robinson for evading the problem of "oligopolistic indeterminacy," whereas actually she had neatly solved this pseudo problem. See Robinson, Economics of lmperfect Competition, p. 21. For other aspects of oligopoly, see Willard D. Arant, "Competition of the Few Among the Many," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, August, 1956, pp. 3 27-45. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Order | Hayek | Mause I 104 Order/Hayek: Building on the ideas of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and Adam Smith, Hayek created a comprehensive doctrine of "spontaneous order", i.e. political and economic self-organisation. (1) HayekVsSocial Engineering: "fateful arrogance". (2) This inevitably leads into the "path to bondage". (3) Cf. >Welfare state, >Social market economy, >Adam Smith. 1. Cf. F. A. Hayek, The constitution of liberty. London 1960. 2. F. A. Hayek The fatal conceit. The errors of socialism. The collected works of F.A. von Hayek, Vol. 1. London 1988. 3. F. A. Hayek The road to serfdom. Chicago 1944. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Overproduction | Rothbard | Rothbard III III 725 Overproduction/VsOverproduction/Rothbard: Perhaps the most important conclusion of the theory of monopolistic or imperfect competition is that the real world of monopolistic competition (where the demand curve to each firm is necessarily falling) is inferior to the ideal world of pure competition (where no firm can affect its price). This conclusion was expressed simply and effectively by comparing two final equilibrium states: under conditions of pure and monopolistic competition. >Monopolistic competition/Rothbard, >Pure competition/Rothbard, >Competition/Rothbard, >Equilibrium. Rothbard III 727 The only assumption we need in drawing the average-cost curve is that, for any plant in any branch of production, there will be some optimum point of production, i.e., some level of output at which average unit cost is at a minimum. All levels of production Iower or higher than the optimum have a higher average cost. Pure competition: In pure competition, where the demand curve for any firm is perfectly elastic, (…) each firm will eventually adjust so that its (…) curve will be (…) in equilibrium; (…) Monopolistic competition: (…) monopolistic competition yields higher prices and less production—i.e., a Iower standard of living - than pure competition. Furthermore, output will not take place at the point of minimum average cost - clearly a social "optimum," and each plant will produce at a Iower than optimum level, i.e., it will have "excess capacity." This was the "welfare" case of the monopolistic-competition theorists. III 728 Vs: (…) Chamberlin and others have shown that this analysis does not apply if we are to take consumer desire for diversity as a good to besatisfied.(1) Many other effective and sound attacks have been made from different directions. One basic argument is that the situations of pure and of monopolistic competition cannot be compared because the AC curves would not, in fact, be the same. Chamberlin(2,3) has pursued his revisionism in this realm also, declaring that the comparisons are wholly illegitimate, that to apply the concept of pure competition to existing firms would mean, for example, assuming a very large number of similar firms producing the identical product. Ifthis were done, say, with General Motors, it would mean that either GM must conceptually be divided up into numerous fragments, or else that it be multiplied. If divided, then unit costs would undoubtedly be higher, and then the "competitive firm" would suffer higher costs and have to subsist on higher prices. This would clearly injure consumers and the standard of living; thus, Chamberlin follows Schumpeter's criticism that the "monopolistic" firm may well have and probably will have Iower costs than its "purely competitive" counterpart. If, on the other hand, we conceive of the multiplication of a very large number of General Motors corporations at existing size, we cannot possibly relate it to the present world, and the whole comparison becomes absurd.(4) 1. And the product differentiation associated with the falling demand curve may well lower costs of distribution and of inspection (as well as improve consumer knowledge) to more than offset the supposed rise in production costs. In short, the AC curve above is really a production-cost, rather than a total-cost, curve, neglecting distribution costs. Cf. Goldman, “Product Differentiation and Advertising.” Furthermore, a genuine total-cost curve would then not be independent of the firm’s demand curve, thus vitiating the usual “cost-curve” analysis. See Dewey, Monopoly in Economics and Law, p. 87. 2. H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, and Mrs. Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition. For a lucid discussion and comparison of the two works, see Robert Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940). 3. Recently, Professor Chamberlin has conceded this point and has, in a series of remarkable articles, astounded his followers by repudiating the concept of pure competition as a welfare ideal. Chamberlin now declares: "The welfare ideal itself... is correctly described as one of monopolistic competition.... [This] seems to follow very directly from the recognition that human beings are individual, diverse in their tastes and desires, and moreover, widely dispersed spatially." Chamberlin, Towards a More General Theory of Value, pp. 93-94; also ibid., pp. 70-83; E.H. Chamberlin andJ.M. Clark, "Discussion," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950, pp. 102-04; Hunter, "Product Differentiation and Welfare Economics," pp. 53 3-52; Hayek, "The Meaning of Competition" in Individualism and the Economic Order, p. 99; and Marshall I. Goldman, "Product Differentiation and Advertising: Some Lessons from Soviet Experience," Journal of Political Economy, August, 1960, pp. 346-57. 4. See Chamberlin, “Measuring the Degree of Monopoly and Competition” and “Monopolistic Competition Revisited” in Towards a More General Theory of Value, pp. 45-83. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Pain | Attachment Theory | Corr I 250 Psychological pain/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: According to Mikulincer, Shaver and Pereg (2003)(1), the pain caused by the unavailability of attachment figures in times of need can be experienced in different ways and result in different kinds of fears and defences. Mikulincer, Gillath, Sapir-Lavid et al. (2003)(2) described two kinds of psychological pain: (a) the distress caused by failing to achieve or maintain proximity to an attachment figure, and (b) the sense of helplessness caused by ineffective co-regulation of distress and the appraisal of oneself as alone and vulnerable. >State of mind/attachment theory, >About the Attachment theory. 1. Mikulincer, M., Shaver, P. R. and Pereg, D. 2003. Attachment theory and affect regulation: the dynamics, development, and cognitive consequences of attachment-related strategies, Motivation and Emotion 27: 77–102 2. Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O., Sapir-Lavid, Y., Yaakobi, E., Arias, K., Tal-Aloni, L. and Bor, G. 2003. Attachment theory and concern for others’ welfare: evidence that activation of the sense of secure base promotes endorsement of self-transcendence values, Basic and Applied Social Psychology 25: 299–312 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Developmental, psychodynamic and optimal-functioning aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Pareto Optimum | Neoclassical Economics | Mause I 54f Pareto-Optimum/Neoclassical Theory: A situation in which no individual can be better off without another individual being worse off; the terms "pareto-optimal" and "efficient" are used synonymously in the total analysis. >Neoclassical economics, >Efficiency. This pareto ooptimum is the content of the first main clause of welfare economics. Ultimately, this result is the basis for the neoclassical justification of the performance or superiority of the market economy. Problem: the conditions necessary for equilibrium are never fulfilled in reality. >Equilibrium, >Equilibrium theories. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Pareto Optimum | Sen | Gaus I 106 Pareto optimum/utilitarian liberalism/Sen/Gaus: (...) the Pareto criterion avoids the problem identified by Rawls: sacrificing the welfare of the few to benefit the many is excluded. Thus Paretian welfarism would seem at least consistent with liberalism. >Pareto Optimum/Rawls. SenVs: Amartya Sen, however, has proven this is not necessarily the case. Sen (1970)(1) shows that if rights are understood as conferring individual authority to decide between at least two social states, then if there are two rights holders, liberal rights may conflict with unrestricted Paretian welfarism. Some have contested Sen’s characterization of rights as jurisdictions over the selection of social states (for a discussion, see Mueller, 2003(2): 650–51); recent work on the theory of rights, however, has shown the independent plausibility of such a jurisdictional theory (Mack, 2000(3); Gaus, 1996(4): 199–204). Gaus: Sen’s result is important as it shows that in principle even a very minimal form of welfarism may be inconsistent with liberalism. More generally, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (2002)(5) have argued recently that almost any non-welfarist principle can conflict with the Pareto criterion. 1. Sen, Amartya K. (1970) ‘The impossibility of a Paretian liberal’. Journal of Political Economy, 78 (Jan./Feb.): 152–7. 2. Mueller, Dennis C. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Mack, Eric (2000) ‘In defense of the jurisdiction theory of rights’. The Journal of Ethics, 4: 71–98. 4. Gaus, Gerald F. (1996) Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay in Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell (2002) Fairness versus Welfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Path Dependence | Political Philosophy | Mause I 583 Path Dependence/Political Theories: according to comparative welfare research, political maneuverability in social policy (...) is limited by past decisions. This is described by the term path dependency (Pierson 1996 (1), 2004 (2) Seal 2002 (3)). Example: Statutory pension insurance schemes financed by social security contributions give reasons for ownership on the part of the insured. The longer such a system exists, the stronger the restrictions on possible changes to this system will be. >Social policy, >Politics, >Political decisions. 1. Pierson, Paul. 1996. The new politics of the welfare state. World Politics 48: 143– 179. 2. Pierson, Paul. Politics in time. History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton 2004 3. Siegel, Nico A. Baustelle Sozialpolitik. Konsolidierung und Rückbau im internationalen Vergleich. Frankfurt a. M. 2002. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Pigovian Tax | Pigou | Mause I 159 Def Pigou Tax/Pigovian Tax/Pigou: The state taxes (subsidizes) the perpetrators of negative (positive) externalities in such a way that the social and private marginal costs coincide with the welfare-optimized supply quantity of the goods concerned in the behavioral equilibrium. (1) >Carbon Tax. 1.A.C. Pigou, The economics of welfare. London 1920. |
EconPigou I Arthur C. Pigou The Economics of welfare London 1920 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Plato | Popper | Höffe I 45 Plato/Popper/Höffe: After [Popper's] work The Open Society and its Enemies (1957)(1) Plato appears in the Politeia as an opponent of an open society and advocate of collectivist utilitarianism. >Utilitarianism. Höffe: It is true that Plato's main work contains many highly objectionable elements. For example, he subjects the guardian state to strict rules of reproduction; he allows censorship, even a political lie, i.e. a deception, provided it serves the common good. Euthanasia/Platon: Furthermore he advocates a rigorous euthanasia - not uncommon in antiquity, of course - he allows infanticide and refuses medical help for people who are malignant and incurable according to their soul. Equality/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: But it is also true that Plato opposes the inequality of men and women that prevailed at that time and considers institutional precautions against corruption. HöffeVsPopper: One can hardly blame the philosopher for not being aware of the openness and dynamics of modern societies, even to a limited extent, for not correctly assessing the measure that was already possible back then. More importantly, Plato is concerned with an element that also deprives modernity of openness and dynamism, the basic and framework conditions of the community. Idiopragy/Plato: With Plato, the idiopragy formula is considered unchangeable; in modernity it is democracy in conjunction with fundamental rights and separation of powers. On the other hand, the idiopragy formula allows for openness and dynamism, and accordingly gifted people are open to advancement(2). 2. popperVsPlaton: Popper's second accusation, that Plato subjects the individual to the collective good, can refer to the beginning of Book IV, according to which it does not matter that any group (ethnos: tribe) is particularly happy, but the whole polis (3). Polis/PlatonVsVs/Höffe: A Platonic polis does not sacrifice the welfare of individuals or groups for the common good. Rather, it is set up in such a way that everyone, groups as well as individuals, can become happy. The above-mentioned passage only formulates, in provocative exaggeration of Plato's basic intention, that no one may pursue his interests in an exclusiveness that robs others of the same right to pursue their interests. >K. Popper, >VsPopper. 1. K.Popper 1945. Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. London: Routledge 2. Politeia III 415 b–c 3. 420b |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Pluralism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 240 Pluralism/Political Philosophy/D’Agostino: The notion of incommensurability is therefore crucially important in the debate between monists and pluralists (see, especially, Chang, 1997(1); Raz, 1986(2): ch. 13). Pluralists needn't, of course, insist on across-the-board incommensurability. As Barry already argued in 1965, with his use of economists' 'indifference curves' (1990(3): ch. I, s. 2), and as James Griffin (1986(4): 89—90) and others have reaffirmed subsequently, a single, unequivocal ranking of options is possible, even with multiple underlying bases of assessment, so long as these values 'trade off' against one another. >Incommensurability, >B. Barry. Indeed, pluralism and incommensurability are logically independent; even a pluralist who believes that trade-offs are always possible does not thereby become a monist (see Dancy, 1993(5): 121). She has a basis, for instance, which the genuine monist seems to lack, for conceptualizing the regret that we frequently experience even when we choose the best option (see Stocker, 1997(6): 199). Rhetorically, it is nevertheless understandable that pluralists have tended to focus on cases where, because trade-offs seem impossible or inappropriate, incommensurability is evident. For pluralists identify their position at least partly in opposition to monism, and incommensurability is incompatible with full-blooded monism. (This is the significance, for utilitarianism, of the debate about 'interpersonal comparability' of welfare. Comparibility: Without such comparability, utilitarianism becomes a pluralist approach, lacking the single overall normative standard whose importance Mill stressed. See, for instance, Elster and Roemer, 1991(7). ) Diversity: There are, of course, a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986(8)), such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993(9): ch. Il, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993(9): 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reasonable and workable political agreement' (1993: 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993(9): 57, n. 10). ((s) For strong and weak pluralism see >Pluralism/D’Agostino.) 1. Chang, Ruth, ed. (1997) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge , MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Fæedom. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Barry, Brian (1990) Political A,'gument: A Reissue with a New Introduction. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 4. Griffin, James (1986) Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon. 5. Dancy, Jonathan (1993) Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Stocker, Michael (1997) 'Abstract and concrete value: plurality, conflict, and maximization'. In Ruth Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Elster, Jon and John Roemer, eds (1991) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Cherniak, Christopher (1986) Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 9. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Pluralism | Waldron | Gaus I 89 Pluralism/Waldron: Where different faiths and cultures rub shoulders, there is likely to be friction and offence: one group’s worship or festivities might seem like a reproach or an attack on another group, and as values and philosophies compete in the marketplace of ideas, the competition will often seem disrespectful as each creed tries to discredit its opponents and gain adherents for itself. It is not easy to define the duty of mutual toleration under these circumstances, or to sustain the distinction between harm and offence that a pluralistic regime requires. The line between public and private, between issues of policy and social welfare on the one hand and individual ethics and religious or cultural observance on the other, is always going to be an issue. Certain cultures and religions in a pluralistic society may aspire to be a society unto themselves. Homogenity/pluralism/law: To make law and policy for a pluralistic society is thus a greater challenge than for a society that is religiously and culturally homogeneous. The latter just needs to settle on a single set of answers and enforce them. But the former has to deal with the fact that its members are already firmly wedded to disparate answers. The various answers may be incommensurable; but even if they are mutually intelligible, they may not present themselves simply as rival political opinions about how to solve the problems faced by the larger society. >Toleration/Waldron. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Political Economy | Rawls | I 259 Political economy/Rawls: by this I mean economic arrangements and political arrangements as well as the background institutions that are related to them. Welfare economics/K. J. Arrow/Rawls: Defines welfare economics in a similar way(1)(2)(3). Welfare/Rawls: I do not use this expression because it is reminiscent of utilitarianism. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism). >Utilitarianism, >Welfare economics, >Welfare state. The theory of justice as fairness treats social forms as closed systems. An economic system is also shaped by existing needs and necessities. The current cooperation between people in meeting these needs affects the way in which the needs of the future will look. These things are known and shared by such diverse authors as Marx and Marshall(4) >Fairness/Rawls, >Society/Rawls. I 260 Social order/Rawls: Problem: how does this reciprocal influence of needs, satisfaction and new needs in the initial situation of a society to be established, where people stand behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their future position, affect the possible shaping? Solution: only the most general assumptions about primary public goods (e. g. freedoms) are made. >Veil of ignorance. I 263 Economy/disagreement/RawlsVsArrow, K. J/Rawls: different from what K. J. Arrow(5) assumes, disagreement between parties is not a particular feature of idealism. In contract theory, it is part of the initial situation of a society to be established. It forms the content of the theory of justice as fairness. It tries to combine Kant's concept of the realm of purposes with that of autonomy and the categorical imperative. In this way, we can avoid metaphysical assumptions. >Contract Theory, >Purposes/Kant, >J.K. Arrow. 1. See K. J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare, Homewood, 1969, p. 1. 2. A. Bergson, essays in Normative Economics, Cambridge, MA, 1966, pp 35-39,60-63,68f. 3. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970, pp. 56-59. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, London, 1965. 5. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963, pp. 74f, 81-86. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Political Elections | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 184 Political Elections/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) the most obvious shortfall of [public choice] theory is that it cannot explain why so many people turn out to vote (Mashaw, 2010(1), p. 33). The chance that an individual voter will change the outcome of an election is virtually zero except in the smallest village, yet millions of people vote in national elections. Efforts have been made to explain away these "anomalies." (See Stearns and Zywicki, 2009(2), pp. 21-26 for a survey of the efforts with respect to the electorate.) But these explanations turn out to be vacuous (people vote because they derive welfare from the act of voting) or simply false (organizations representing large groups succeed only by offering non-political services to members) (Mashaw, 2010)(1). >Interest groups/Public choice theory, >Governmental structures/Public choice theory. On closer examination, the story of special interest dominance has many holes (Croley, 2010)(3). >Interest groups/Public choice theory, >Jury theorem/Public choice theory, >Arrow’s theorem/Public choice theory. 1. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Stearns, M. L. and T. J. Zywicki (2009). Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law. St. Paul, MN: Thomas Reuters. 3. Croley, S. (2010). "Interest Groups and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 49—86. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Political Parties | Economic Theories | Mause I 284f Political Parties/Economic Theories: most models have in common that they expect left-wing governments to pursue a much more expansionary fiscal policy.(For references see Political Parties/Hibbs.) There are arguments to the contrary. It could be a strategy of right-wing parties to show paradoxical behaviour and to get into debt in order to take away the financial leeway for future left-wing governments for higher social spending (see, for example, Persson and Svensson 1989 (1); Milesi-Feretti and Spoalore 1994) (2) It could also be that left-wing governments with low unemployment have no incentive for expansionary deficit spending and reduce deficits to create a future fiscal leeway (see Carlsen 1997 (3); Cusack 1999 (4)). Numerous empirical studies in the period that followed show that left-wing governments spend more than right-wing governments. The thesis that left and right-wing parties are converging in spending policy in the face of pressure for reform and increasing interdependence was not confirmed. (5), (6). 1. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson. 1989. Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (2): 325– 345. 2. Gian M. Milesi-Feretti & Enrico Spoalore. 1994. How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending. Journal of Public Economics 55: 121– 140. 3. Fredrik Carlsen, Fredrik. 1997. Counterfiscal policies and partisan politics: Evidence from industrialized countries. Applied Economics 29: 145– 151. 4. Thomas R. Cusack, 1999. Partisan politics and fiscal policy. Comparative Political Studies 32( 4): 464– 486. 5, James P. Allan & Lyle Scruggs. 2004. Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies. American Journal of Political Science 48 (3): 496– 512. 6. Niklas Potrafke. 2009. Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. Public Choice 140 (1): 105– 124. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Politics | Freeden | Gaus I 8 Politics/Freeden: Politics is not just about physical force and the clash of economic interests, but also about the assignment of contested meaning to social phenomena. It is not just about the use of the law, of the police, or of illegitimate forms of violence, nor is it just about the maximization of economic assets through the manipulation of markets, or about the impact of personality on public life. It is also about deciding on the range of meanings attributed to concepts such as welfare (e.g. a mechanism of social parasitism or the institutional enabling of human flourishing) or freedom (e.g. the uninhibited assertion of individual powers against others or the rational expression of self-developing choices), and about selecting which of these meanings will be accorded legitimacy and supremacy in formulating public policy. Hence the control of political language, through which the understanding of such contested political concepts is mediated, is a cardinal and typical way of capturing the high ground of the social meanings and interpretations available to a given society. >Ideology/Freeden. Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Politics | Pettit | Brocker I 858 Politics/Depoliticization/Pettit: Pettit defines "depoliticization"(1) as distancing political decision-making from an emotionally charged, moralizing and clichédly prejudiced struggle of opinion in which he fears that simple and polarizing platitudes rather than public welfare-oriented considerations will prevail. Instead of, however, in a good republican tradition, branding this shift from public welfare orientation to strategic, effect-hasty incitement as a process of "de-politicization", as an alarming loss of civic political judgement, Pettit understands de-politicization exactly the other way round as a taming of the downright dreaded will of the people by a rationality examination of the arguments, which circulate and meet in the public opinion struggle exercised by experts.(2) ((s) PettitVsHabermas). ((s) "Government of Experts", "Government of Technocrats", "Technical Cabinets": see also Sartori). PettitVsRepublicanism: Pettit obviously does not share the republican punch line that "politicization" is precisely the measure for the ability to make intuitive and conscious references to the common good. John P. McCormickVsPettit: In this respect, says disrespectfully that Pettit has made a democratically forgotten, institution-centred "senatorial move" and shows the tendency to neglect the problem horizon of nurturing and sharpening the political judgement of citizens, a genuine and central concern of Republican thought.(3) RichterVsPettit: Pettit did not succeed in resolving the tension between state trust and criticism of power, between civic participation and elite trust which he is building. PettitVsRawls: see Justice/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 p. 53 2. Ibid. p. 63 3. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 108 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Poll Tax | Rothbard | Rothbard III 921 Head tax/Poll tax/Rothbard: Taxation neutrality: Far from being "neutral" to the free market, then, a proportional income tax follows a principle which, if consistently applied, would eradicate the market economy and the entire monetary economy itself. Poll tax/head tax: It is clear, then, that equal taxation of everyone - the so-called "head tax" or "poll tax" - would be a far closer approach to the goal of neutrality. But even here, there are serious flaws in its neutrality, entirely apart from the ineluctable taxpayer-tax-consumer dichotomy. For one thing, goods and services on the free market are purchased only by those freely willing to obtain them at the market price. Since a tax is a compulsory levy rather than a free purchase, it can never be assumed that each and every member of society would, in a free market, pay this equal sum to the government. Rothbard III 922 Government services/VsHead tax/VsPoll tax: (…) let us assume that the head tax is being paid [for police protection]. The free-market rule is that equal prices are paid for equal services; but what, here, is an "equal service"? Surely, the service of police protection is of far greater magnitude in an urban crime center than it is in some sleepy backwater, where crime is rare. Police protection will certainly cost more in the crime-ridden area; hence, if it were supplied on the market, the price paid there would be higher than in the backwater. Furthermore, a person under particular threat of crime, and who might require greater surveillance, would have to pay a higher police fee. A uniform tax would be below market price in the dangerous areas and above it in the peaceful areas. To approach neutrality, then, a tax would have to vary in accordance with the costs of services and not be uniform.(1) This is the neglected cost principle of taxation. Benefit principle/taxation/Rothbard: Still another attempt at neutral taxation is the benefit principle, which states that a tax should be levied equal to the benefit which the individuals receive from the government service. VsBenefit principle: Obviously, there would be no such welfare or any other subsidy payments if the benefit principle were maintained. Service: Even if we again confine the discussion to services like police protection, grave flaws still remain. Rothbard III 923 Measurements: A fatal problem is that we cannot measure benefits or even know whether they exist. As in the head tax and cost principles, there is here no free market where people can demonstrate that they are receiving a benefit from the exchange greater than the value of the goods they surrender. In fact, since taxes are levied by coercion, it is clear that people's benefits from government are considerably less than the amount that they are required to pay, since, if left free, they would contribute less to government. The "benefit," then, is simply assumed arbitrarily by government offcials. >Cost Principle/Rothbard, >Neutral taxation/Economic theories, >Neutral taxation/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard, >Bureaucracy/Rothbard, >Benefit principle/Rothbard, >Progressive tax/Rothbard, >Excess Profits Tax/Rothbard. 1. We are not here conceding that "costs" determine "prices." The general array of final prices determines the general array of cost prices, but then the viability of firms is determined by whether the price that people will pay for their particular products will be enough to cover the costs, which are determined throughout the market. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Post-Democracy | Crouch | Mause I 73f Post-Democracy/Crouch: The discussion about Post-Democracy results from the discussion about neoliberalism. Neoliberalism. Crouch Thesis: all Western democracies are in the process of post-democratization. Characteristics of Post-Democracy: 1) The basic democratic institutions and procedures are losing influence. (1) 2) Party politics is becoming increasingly meaningless. Content is being replaced by personalised election campaign strategies. The mediating function of the parties would increasingly be transferred to opinion research institutes. The behaviour of the "political class" is similar to that of companies towards their customers. 3) Political content is determined by these "companies". They arise from the interaction of political and economic actors. They are no longer primarily public welfare oriented, but profit-oriented. (2) 4) Citizens are deprived of power, if not de jure, then de facto. As a result of this development, policy is being made behind closed doors. (3) 1.C. Crouch, 2008. Postdemokratie. Frankfurt a. M. 2008, p. 10ff 2. Ibid. p. 63-69 3. Ibid. p. 10. Brocker I 946 Post-Democracy/Crouch/Heidbrink: Crouch adopts the term - without mentioning the sources - among others from Jacques Rancière (2002)(1), who wrote of the disappearance of politics through legalization - and Sheldon S. Wolin (2001)(2), who denounced the political consumerism and latent totalitarianism of late-capitalist sham democracies. Heidbrink: Post-democracy also ties in with the concept of "subpolitics" (U. Beck, 1993); related concepts are neo-democracy and reflexive democracy, in which new actors, alliances, and governance regimes have a say in world politics. Crouch Thesis: "Paradoxical situation": More and more nation states are based on democratic institutions and procedures, while at the same time the capacity of democratic politics to act diminishes and dissatisfaction with it grows.(3) >Democracy/Crouch. Brocker I 947 Def Post-Democracy/Crouch: refers to a community in which elections are still held, elections that even lead to governments having to say goodbye, but in which competing teams of professional PR experts control the public debate during the election campaigns to such an extent that it degenerates into a pure spectacle in which one discusses only a series of problems previously selected by the experts. The majority of the citizens play a passive, silent, even apathetic role, they only react to the signals given to them. In the shadow of this political staging, real politics are made behind closed doors: by elected governments and elites, who above all represent the interests of the economy.(4) Problem: this leads to a decline of egalitarian politics and welfare corporatism. Brocker I 949 Causes of the Phenomenon/Crouch: among others the disintegration of the social classes, in particular the decline of the working class and the dwindling importance of the trade unions. >Political Parties/Crouch. Other causes: privatization of state tasks and economization of political processes. >Public Private Partnership/Crouch. VsCrouch: see StreckVsCrouch: >Government Policy/Crouch. Brocker I 956 HeidbrinkVsCrouch: Crouch goes far beyond the goal of an adequate social theory. Thus he ignores the emergence of alternative political styles and social movements that are not about dismantling, but about transforming democratic procedures and conditions. This is particularly evident in the unclear role of civil society, which is supposed to contribute to a revitalization of democracy through more civic participation, while at the same time being attested to act self-interested and without political ethos. Crouch cannot imagine that citizens, as consumers of political styles, are able to develop a reflexive attitude to their own life practice and, despite material interests, to engage in sustainable economic and environmental policy, just as the ecological transformation of democracy as a whole is not further addressed. Brocker I 957 HeidbrinkVsCrouch: his concept of "post-democracy" lacks a plausible normative foundation. Crouch thinks and argues in templates and contrasts of left-wing welfare politics and right-wing market politics that obstruct the view of new forms of welfare production beyond the triad of state, market and civil society. 1. Jacques Rancière, Das Unvernehmen. Politik und Philosophie, Frankfurt/M. 2002. 2. Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville between Two Worlds. The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life, Princeton/Oxford 2001. 3. Colin Crouch, Postdemocrazia, Rom/Bari 2003 (engl.: Oxford 2004). Dt.: Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie, Frankfurt/M. 2008, p. 7 4. Ibid. p. 10 Ludger Heidbrink, „Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolCrouch I Colin Crouch Henry Farrell Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004 PolCrouch II Colin Crouch Post-democracy London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Praxeology | Rothbard | Rothbard III 73 Praxeology/Rothbard: To sum up the relationship and the distinctions between praxeology and each of the other disciplines, we may describe them as follows: Why man chooses various ends: psychology. What men’s ends should be: philosophy of ethics. also: philosophy of aesthetics. How to use means to arrive at ends: technology. What man’s ends are and have been, and how man has used means in order to attain them: history. The formal implications of the fact that men use means to attain various chosen ends: praxeology. Economics: What is the relationship between praxeology and economic analysis? Economics is a subdivision of praxeology - so far the only fully elaborated subdivision. Logic/Rothbard: The suggestion has been made that, since praxeology and economics are logical chains of reasoning based on a few universally known premises, to be really scientific it should be elaborated according to the symbolic notations of mathematical logic.(1) RothbardVs: This represents a curious misconception of the role of mathematical logic, or “logistics.” In the first place, it is the great quality of verbal propositions that each one is meaningful. ((s) For logical symbols cf. >Connectives/Philosophical theories.) On the other hand, algebraic and logical symbols, as used in logistics, are not in themselves meaningful. Praxeology asserts the action axiom as true, and from this (together with a few empirical axioms—such as the existence of a variety of resources and individuals) are deduced, by the rules of logical inference, all the propositions of economics, each one of which is verbal and meaningful. Rothbard III 306 Praxeology/utility/measuring/Rothbard: The key problem in utility theory, neglected by the mathematical writers, has been the size of the unit. Under the assumption of mathematical continuity, this is not a problem at all; it could hardly be when the mathematically conceived unit is infinitely small and therefore literally sizeless. In a praxeological analysis of human action, however, this becomes a basic question. The relevant size of the unit varies according to the particular situation, and in each of these situations this relevant unit becomes the marginal unit. There is none but a simple ordinal relation among the utilities of the variously sized units. >Utility/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Jevons. Rothbard III 308 The error in reasoning on the basis of "indifference" is the failure to appreciate the fact that a problem important in the field of psychology may have no significance in the realm of praxeology, to which economics belongs. Psychology deals with the problem of how or why the individual forms value scales, and for this question it is relevant to consider whether the individual is decisive or inclined to be "indifferent" between various alternatives. >Indifference curve/Rothbard. Praxeology, however, is a logical science based on the existence of action per se; it is interested in explaining and interpreting real action in its universal sense rather than in its concrete content. Its discussion of value scales is therefore a deduction from the nature of human action and not a speculative essay on the internal workings of the mind. It is consequently irrelevant for praxeology whether a man, in having to decide between alternatives A and B, makes a choice firmly and decisively, or whether he decides by tossing a coin. This is a problem for psychology; praxeology is concerned only with the fact that he chooses (…). Behaviorism/Rothbard: Neither is praxeology based on behaviorist psychology. In fact, in so far as praxeology touches on psychology, its principles are the reverse of those of behaviorism. >Behaviorism/Philosophy. 1. Cf. G.J. Schuller, "Rejoinder," American Economic Review, March, 1951, p. 188. For a reply, see Murray N. Rothbard, "Toward a Reconstruction ofUtility and Welfare Economics" in Mary Sennholz, ed. on Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 19 5 6), p. 227. Also see Boris Ischboldin, "A Critique of Econometrics," Review ofsocial Economy, September, 1960, pp. 110—27; and Vladimir Niksa, "The Role of Quantitative Thinking in Modern Economic Theory," Review ofSocial Economy, September, 19 59, pp. 151-73. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Preference Utilitarianism | Gaus | Gaus I 106 Preference Utilitarianism/economic theories/Gaus: Many standard economic utilitarian cases for liberalism presuppose interpersonal comparisons of utility. Although economists are sensitive to problems of comparing the utilities of different people, a great deal of political economy does so (Mueller, 2003(1): 566ff). If, instead, we suppose that the utilities (or happiness, or pleasure) of different people are incommensurable, we confront the problems of pluralism and social incommensurabilities (...). Even given incommensurable personal utilities, we still can make some minimal overall welfarist judgements. Pareto optimum: According to the Pareto criterion, (1) social state S1 is Pareto-superior to S2 if and only if at least one person is better off in S1 than in S2 and no one is worse off in S1 than in S2 ; and (2) if no state is Pareto-superior to S1 , then S1 is in the set of Pareto-optimal social states. These criteria, of course, may identify a large set of Paretooptimal states, and so might often be indecisive among the choices open to us. Even though it may often be indecisive, at least the Pareto criterion avoids the problem identified by Rawls: sacrificing the welfare of the few to benefit the many is excluded. Thus Paretian welfarism would seem at least consistent with liberalism. >Pareto optimum/Sen. 1. Mueller, Dennis C. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Preferences | Harsanyi | Gaus I 244 Preferences/diversity/pluralism/rational choice/Harsanyi/D’Agostino: (...) Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. If the price for the avoidance of chaos is the abandonment of pluralism, this is anyway warranted by the fact that all apparent diversity is ethico-politically insignificant and merely conceals a deeper uniformity of assessments that sustains coherence in social arrangements. Harsanyi: This reading is implicit, for instance, in John Harsanyi's (1977)(1) attempt to show that, even when they differ in their assessments of options, individuals can be brought to share the same 'extended preferences' about social arrangements, and that coherent collective choice procedures can be defined on the basis of such ('extended') assessments. And, of course, it has indeed been suggested, more pertinently, that specifically liberal doctrines and institutions are incompatible with pluralism and, hence, with the evaluative diversity which this family of doctrines and arguments sanctions (see Kekes, 1992(2); Crowder, 1994(3)). D’Agostino: Much recent liberal political theory can, however, profitably be interpreted, I submit, as an attempt to find a principled basis for acknowledging the demands both of diversity and of coherence. >Arrow’s Theorem/Weale, >Diversity/D’Agostino, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. 1. Harsanyi, John (1977) 'Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility'. In his Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2. Kekes, John (1992) 'The incompatibility of liberalism and pluralism'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 141-51. 3. Crowder, George (1994) 'Pluralism and liberalism'. Political Studies, 42: 293-305. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Presentism | Nordhaus | Norgaard I 339 (Def) Presentism/Political philosophy: Presentism is a moral framework that is implicitly adopted by climate economists such as Manne (1995)(1), Nordhaus (1992(2), 2008)(3), and Anthoff et al. (2009b)(4). In this perspective, policy decisions should be based strictly on the preferences of the current generation with no explicit moral standing afforded to members of future generations. The rub is that presentism implies that the Norgaard I 340 weight attached to the welfare of future generations should be based strictly on the degree of altruism that people exhibit through their private decisions (Arrow et al. 1996)(5). Advocates of presentism attach special importance to the market rate of return on capital investment, which they argue reveals people's willingness to give up present economic benefits for the sake of their children and grandchildren (Goulder and Stavins 2002)(6). Pro Presentism/Nordhaus: Nordhaus (1992(7), 2008(3)), for example, has long advocated a presentist approach in which major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be deferred into the long‐run future. In Nordhaus's analysis, the future benefits provided by climate stabilization are too small to justify imposing significant short‐run costs given the degree of intergenerational altruism people reveal through their private decisions. VsPresentism: One line of critique argues that the market return on capital investment reveals the preferences that people hold regarding their own present and future well‐being, not the conceptually distinct values they hold regarding the appropriate resolution of intergenerational conflicts (Burton 1993)(8). In the economic models employed by presentists, these two behavioral motives are typically reduced to a single parameter for the sake of tractability and simplicity. VsVs: Authors such as Howarth and Norgaard (1992)(9), however, argue that this modeling approach is theoretically unsound and that fresh insights arise through the use of models that distinguish between personal time preference and intergenerational ethics. VsPresentism: (…) critics also charge that presentism involves the unjust treatment of posterity because it denies the principle that all human beings—including members of future generations—should have full and equal moral standing (Broome 2008)(10). Along these lines, Singer (2002: 26)(11) argues that the moral salience of impacts such as ‘suffering and death, or the extinction of species’ does not diminish with the passage of time. In a similar vein, Ramsey (1928)(12) argues that favoring the interests of present over future generations is ‘a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.’ PresentismVsVs: Advocates of presentism, however, counter that the strength of intergenerational altruism has been sufficient to ensure that the quality of life has steadily improved in the centuries following the industrial revolution. If one assumes that economic growth will Norgaard I 341 continue for some time into the future, it follows that our descendants in future generations are likely to be substantially more wealthy than we are today. VsPresentism: (…) climatic impacts may be severe enough to threaten the sustainability and productivity of economic activity (Hoel and Sterner 2007)(13). This point of view is supported by the findings of Woodward and Bishop (1997)(14), Weitzman (2009)(15), and Gerst et al. (2010)(16). Pro Presentism/Parfit: More radically, authors such as Parfit (1983a)(17) question the notion that present decision makers have any obligations to future generations aside from ensuring that future persons have lives that are minimally worth living. (…) suppose that wholly different sets of potential persons would live in: (a) a low‐income future characterized by a degraded natural environment; and (b) a high‐income future characterized by a flourishing environment. Parfit's argument is that the individuals living in the degraded state would be thankful for the fact that present decisions fostered the conditions necessary for them to come into being. Steps to stabilize climate would (…) lead to a different world in which they would never be born. VsParfit: “Our obligations to future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations and into the future…If one accepts the idea of a community in one generation, including the principle that this entails certain obligations to other members, then one should accept the idea of a transgenerational community extending into the future, hence recognizing obligations to future generations.” (De‐Shalit 1995: 14–15)(18). VsParfit/VsPresentism: Alternatively, Gosseries (2008)(19) notes that Parfit's argument abstracts away from a key fact of human demographics: At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined. If one accepts the plausible premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh‐and‐blood progeny, a ‘chain of obligation’ is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of more distant generations (Howarth 1992)(20). >Generational Justice, >Climate Change/Utilitarianism. 1. Manne, A. S. 1995. The rate of time preference: Implications for the greenhouse debate. Energy Policy 23: 391–4. 2. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19. 3. Nordhaus, W. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighting the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Anthoff, D. Tol, R. S. J. and Yohe, G. W. 2009b. Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon. Environmental Research Letters 4: 1–7. 5. Arrow, K. J., Cline, W. R., Mäler, K. G., Munasinghe, R., Squitieri, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1996. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Goulder, L. H., and Stavins, R. N. 2002. An eye on the future. Nature 419: 673–4. 7. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19. 8. Burton, P. S. 1993. Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 119–32. 9. Howarth, R.B. and Norgaard, R. B. 1992. Environmental valuation under sustainable development. American Economic Review 80: 473–7. 10. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102. 11. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 12. Ramsey, F. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38: 543–59. 13. Hoel, M., and Sterner, T. 2007. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change 84: 265–80. 14. Woodward, R. T., and Bishop, R. C. 1997. How to decide when experts disagree: Uncertainty‐based choice rules in environmental policy. Land Economics 73: 492–507. 15. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19. 16. Gerst, M., Howarth, R. B., and Borsuk, M. E. 2010. Accounting for the risk of extreme outcomes in an integrated assessment of climate change. Energy Policy 38: 4540–8. 17. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy policy and the further future: The identity problem. In D. MacLean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 166–179. 18. De‐Shalit, A. 1995. Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. London: Routledge. 19. Gosseries, A. 2008. On future generations' rights. Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 446–74. 20. Howarth, R. B. 1992. Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation. Environmental Values 1: 133–40. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
EconNordh I William D. Nordhaus The political business cycle 1975 Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Presentism | Parfit | Norgaard I 339 (Def) Presentism/Political philosophy: Presentism is a moral framework that is implicitly adopted by climate economists such as Manne (1995)(1), Nordhaus (1992(2), 2008)(3), and Anthoff et al. (2009b)(4). In this perspective, policy decisions should be based strictly on the preferences of the current generation with no explicit moral standing afforded to members of future generations. The rub is that presentism implies that the Norgaard I 340 weight attached to the welfare of future generations should be based strictly on the degree of altruism that people exhibit through their private decisions (Arrow et al. 1996)(5). Advocates of presentism attach special importance to the market rate of return on capital investment, which they argue reveals people's willingness to give up present economic benefits for the sake of their children and grandchildren (Goulder and Stavins 2002)(6). Pro Presentism/Nordhaus: Nordhaus (1992(7), 2008(3)), for example, has long advocated a presentist approach in which major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be deferred into the long‐run future. In Nordhaus's analysis, the future benefits provided by climate stabilization are too small to justify imposing significant short‐run costs given the degree of intergenerational altruism people reveal through their private decisions. VsPresentism: One line of critique argues that the market return on capital investment reveals the preferences that people hold regarding their own present and future well‐being, not the conceptually distinct values they hold regarding the appropriate resolution of intergenerational conflicts (Burton 1993)(8). In the economic models employed by presentists, these two behavioral motives are typically reduced to a single parameter for the sake of tractability and simplicity. VsVs: Authors such as Howarth and Norgaard (1992)(9), however, argue that this modeling approach is theoretically unsound and that fresh insights arise through the use of models that distinguish between personal time preference and intergenerational ethics. VsPresentism: (…) critics also charge that presentism involves the unjust treatment of posterity because it denies the principle that all human beings—including members of future generations—should have full and equal moral standing (Broome 2008)(10). Along these lines, Singer (2002: 26)(11) argues that the moral salience of impacts such as ‘suffering and death, or the extinction of species’ does not diminish with the passage of time. In a similar vein, Ramsey (1928)(12) argues that favoring the interests of present over future generations is ‘a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.’ PresentismVsVs: Advocates of presentism, however, counter that the strength of intergenerational altruism has been sufficient to ensure that the quality of life has steadily improved in the centuries following the industrial revolution. If one assumes that economic growth will Norgaard I 341 continue for some time into the future, it follows that our descendants in future generations are likely to be substantially more wealthy than we are today. VsPresentism: (…) climatic impacts may be severe enough to threaten the sustainability and productivity of economic activity (Hoel and Sterner 2007)(13). This point of view is supported by the findings of Woodward and Bishop (1997)(14), Weitzman (2009)(15), and Gerst et al. (2010)(16). Pro Presentism/Parfit: More radically, authors such as Parfit (1983a)(17) question the notion that present decision makers have any obligations to future generations aside from ensuring that future persons have lives that are minimally worth living. (…) suppose that wholly different sets of potential persons would live in: (a) a low‐income future characterized by a degraded natural environment; and (b) a high‐income future characterized by a flourishing environment. Parfit's argument is that the individuals living in the degraded state would be thankful for the fact that present decisions fostered the conditions necessary for them to come into being. Steps to stabilize climate would (…) lead to a different world in which they would never be born. VsParfit: “Our obligations to future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations and into the future…If one accepts the idea of a community in one generation, including the principle that this entails certain obligations to other members, then one should accept the idea of a transgenerational community extending into the future, hence recognizing obligations to future generations.” (De‐Shalit 1995: 14–15)(18). VsParfit/VsPresentism: Alternatively, Gosseries (2008)(19) notes that Parfit's argument abstracts away from a key fact of human demographics: At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined. If one accepts the plausible premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh‐and‐blood progeny, a ‘chain of obligation’ is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of more distant generations (Howarth 1992)(20). >Generational Justice, >Climate Change/Utilitarianism. 1. Manne, A. S. 1995. The rate of time preference: Implications for the greenhouse debate. Energy Policy 23: 391–4. 2. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19. 3. Nordhaus, W. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighting the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Anthoff, D. Tol, R. S. J. and Yohe, G. W. 2009b. Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon. Environmental Research Letters 4: 1–7. 5. Arrow, K. J., Cline, W. R., Mäler, K. G., Munasinghe, R., Squitieri, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1996. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Goulder, L. H., and Stavins, R. N. 2002. An eye on the future. Nature 419: 673–4. 7. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19. 8. Burton, P. S. 1993. Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 119–32. 9. Howarth, R.B. and Norgaard, R. B. 1992. Environmental valuation under sustainable development. American Economic Review 80: 473–7. 10. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102. 11. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 12. Ramsey, F. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38: 543–59. 13. Hoel, M., and Sterner, T. 2007. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change 84: 265–80. 14. Woodward, R. T., and Bishop, R. C. 1997. How to decide when experts disagree: Uncertainty‐based choice rules in environmental policy. Land Economics 73: 492–507. 15. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19. 16. Gerst, M., Howarth, R. B., and Borsuk, M. E. 2010. Accounting for the risk of extreme outcomes in an integrated assessment of climate change. Energy Policy 38: 4540–8. 17. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy policy and the further future: The identity problem. In D. MacLean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 166–179. 18. De‐Shalit, A. 1995. Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. London: Routledge. 19. Gosseries, A. 2008. On future generations' rights. Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 446–74. 20. Howarth, R. B. 1992. Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation. Environmental Values 1: 133–40. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Privatization | Moon | Gaus I 213 Privatization/welfare state/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure, >State provision/Moon, >Adverse selection/Barr. The recognition that public provision can involve greater costs than voluntary programmes has led to calls for 'privatization' of some welfare state activities during the past 20 or 25 years. Different groups have advocated devolving to private parties those activities once performed by the state, ranging from the sale of nationalized industries to contracting with private firms to provide public services, such as running schools or supplying cleaning services to a government bureaucracy. In a similar vein, recent years have seen efforts to increase choice and simulate market processes within public programmes, such as the use of vouchers in public education, or the 'internal market' in Britain's National Health Service. In all of these initiatives, the hope is to increase efficiency, to make service providers more responsive to clients, and to enable people to receive more individualized services, reflecting their specific needs and interests. Problems: On the other hand, these developments raise the concern that even 'quasi-market' choice in areas such as pensions or education will adversely affect disadvantaged groups. For example, when the successful school in a system relying upon vouchers or other 'parental choice' mechanisms is able to attract more students than it has space for, the fear is that it may Gaus I 214 respond by excluding 'problem' children, possibly leaving them even worse off than before. Whether the issue is pensions, education, health care, or other areas of the welfare state, efficiency arguments for public versus private provision involve a balancing of their relative costs. * * For an excellent range of studies of the 'revolution in social policy' created by the move to 'quasi-markets' in a variety of policy areas and countries, see Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand (1998)(1). 1. Bartlett, Will, Jennifer Roberts and Julian Le Grand, eds (1998) A Revolution in Social Policy: Quasi-Market Reforms in the 1990s. Bristol: Policy. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Progress | Weizenbaum | I 48 Progress/Computer/Organisation/Weizenbaum: the extremely complex processes in management, technology and science in the decades before the Second World War and especially during the war were solved without the involvement of the computer. I 49 Most people may think that the Apollo project (space flight, moon landing) could not have been accomplished without the help of the computer. The history of the Manhattan project (development of the atomic bomb in the USA during World War II - it was developed without a computer) probably disproves this view. If the computer had already been available at that time, I have no doubt that the scientists would have called it indispensable. I 53 Computers, once they're around, develop their own logic of persistence. The establishment of a bloated and computer-dependent social welfare administration in the US has created an interest in maintaining it. Such interests quickly become obstacles to innovation. >Innovations. I 54 It is often said that the computer is "just in time" for solving complex problems. But in time for what? It came just in time to keep social and political structures intact - and even seals them off - which otherwise would have either been radically renewed or become unstable. So when the computer was introduced to stabilize existing structures,... I 55 ...then there hasn't been a computer revolution. >Computers. I 63 There is a myth that today (mid-1970s) computers make the most important decisions that people used to make in earlier times. Problem: Weizenbaum: thesis: a computer system that allows only certain types of questions, only certain types of "data" and that cannot even be understood in principle by those who rely on it, such a system has shut many doors once and for all that were open before its installation. >Artificial intelligence, >Strong artificial intelligence, >Artificial general intelligence, >Problem solving. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Property | Rothbard | Rothbard III 91 Property/market/contracts/Rothbard: (…) in order for a person to exchange anything, he must first possess it, or own it. He gives up the ownership of good X in order to obtain the ownership of good Y. >Exchange/Rothbard, >Market/Rothbard. Ownership by one or more owners implies exclusive control and use of the goods owned, and the goods owned are known as property. Freedom from violence implies that no one may seize the property of another by means of violence or the threat of violence and that each person’s property is safe, or “secure,” from such aggression. What goods become property? Obviously, only scarce means are property. General conditions of welfare, since they are abundant to all, are not the objects of any action, and therefore cannot be owned or become property. On the free market, it is nonsense to say that someone “owns” the air. Only if a good is scarce is it necessary for anyone to obtain it, or ownership of it, for his use. The only way that a man could assume ownership of the air is to use violence to enforce this claim. Such action could not occur on the unhampered market. On the free, unhampered market, a man can acquire property in scarce goods as follows: (1) In the first place, each man has ownership over his own self, over his will and actions, and the manner in which he will exert his own labor.(2) He acquires scarce nature-given factors either by appropriating hitherto unused factors for his own use or by receiving them as a gift from someone else, who in the last analysis must have appropriated them as hitherto unused factors.(3) He acquires capital goods or consumers’ goods either by mixing his own labor with nature-given factors to produce them (…). Rothbard III 92 (4) He may exchange any type of factor (labor service, nature-given factor, capital good, consumers’ good) for any type of factor. Exchange: In order for the giving or exchanging of goods to take place, they must first be obtained by individual actors in one of these ways. The logical sequence of events is therefore: A man owns himself; he appropriates unused nature-given factors for his ownership; he uses these factors to produce capital goods and consumers’ goods which become his own; he uses up the consumers’ goods and/or gives them and the capital goods away to others; he exchanges some of these goods for other goods that had come to be owned in the same way by others.(1),(2) >Person/Philosophical theories, >Market/Rothbard. In contrast to general conditions of welfare, which on the free market cannot be subject to appropriation as property, scarce goods in use in production must always be under someone’s control, and therefore must always be property. Market: On the free market, the goods will be owned by those who either produced them, first put them to use, or received them in gifts. Similarly, under a system of violence and hegemonic bonds, someone or some people must superintend and direct the operations of these goods. Whoever performs these functions in effect owns these goods as property, regardless of the legal definition of ownership. This applies to persons and their services as well as to material goods. 1. On self-ownership and the acquisition of property, cf. the classic discussion ofJohn Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, Second Treatise" in Ernest Barker, ed., social Contract (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 15-30. 2. The problem of self-ownership is complicated by the question of children. Children cannot be considered self-owners, because they are not yet in possession of the powers of reason necessary to direct their actions. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Public Sector | Galbraith | Rothbard III 986 Public sector/Galbraith/VsPublic sector/Rothbard: (…) there is a problem of the "public sector"; scarcities and conflicts keep appearing in government services, and in these fields alone, e.g., juvenile delinquency, traffc jams, overcrowded schools, lack of parking space, etc. We have seen above that the Single remedy that proponents of government activity can offer is for more funds to be channeled from private to public activity. >Government services/Rothbard, >Government spending/Rothbard. RothbardVsGalbraith: (…) however, (…) such scarcity and ineffciency are inherent in government operation of any activity. RothbardVsGalbraith: Instead of taking warning from the ineffciencies of government output, writers like Galbraith turn the blame from government onto the taxpayers and consumers, just as government water offcials characteristically blame the consumers for water shortages. At no time does Galbraith so much as consider the possibility of mending an ailing public sector by making that sector private. Social balance/RothbardVsGalbraith: How would Galbraith know when his desired "social balance" was achieved? What criteria has he set to guide us in knowing how much shift there should be from private to public activity? The answer is, none; Galbraith cheerfully concedes that there is no way of finding the point of optimum balance: "No test can be applied, for none exists." But, after all, precise definitions, "precise equilibrium," are not important; for to Galbraith it is crystal "clear" that we must move now from private to public activity, and to a "considerable" extent. We shall know when we arrive, for the public sector will then bask in opulence. And to think that Galbraith accuses the perfectly sound and logical monetary theory of inflation ofbeing "mystical" and "unrevealed magic“.(1) 1. A brief, and therefore bald, version of Galbraith's thesis may be found in John Kenneth Galbraith, "Use of Income That Economic Growth Makes Possible .. ." in Problems of United States Economic Development (New York: Committee for Economic Development, January, 1958), pp. 201-06. In the same collection of essays there is in some ways a more extreme statement of the same position by Professor Moses Abramovitz, who presses even further to denounce leisure as threatening to deprive us of that "modicum of purposive, disciplined activity which ... gives savor to our lives." Moses Abramovitz, "Economic Goals and Social Welfare in the Next Generation," ibid., p. 195. It is perhaps apropos to note a strong resemblance between coerced deprivation of leisure and slavery, as well as to remark that the only society that can genuinely "invest in men" is a society where slavery abounds. In fact, Galbraith writes almost wistfully of a slave system for this reason. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958)., pp. 274-75. |
Galbraith I John Kenneth Galbraith The Affluent Society London 1999 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Public Sector | Rawls | I 266 Public sector/Rawls: has two aspects: 1. the first relates to the ownership of means of production. Thus, for example, the public sector in socialism is larger than in capitalism. It is smaller in privately organised systems and mainly affects public institutions and transport. 2. characteristic: relates to the proportion of resources spent on public goods (infrastructure, etc.). Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. --- I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). --- I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself/herself, even if he/she will never be exposed to this infection. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. (1) See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. (2) Buchanan, Kap. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. (3) See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Public Sphere | Habermas | IV 509 Public sphere/Habermas: The political system ensures mass loyalty in both positive and negative ways; positive through the prospect of the redemption of welfare state programs, selective by excluding topics and contributions from public debate. This can be done through socio-structural filters, through the bureaucratic deformation of the structures of public communication or through manipulative control of communication flows. The interaction of these variables explains why the symbolic self-representation of the political elites in public can be largely decoupled from the real decision-making processes within the political system.(1) This corresponds to the segmentation of the voter role. IV 510 The election decision generally only has an influence on the recruitment of management personnel and its motives are beyond the reach of discursive decision-making. This amounts to a neutralization of the possibilities of political participation legally opened up by the citizenship role. >Political elections, >Electoral systems, >Democracy, >Society, >Discourse, >Discourse theory, >Deliberative democracy, >Politics. 1.M. Edelmann, The symbolic use of politics, Urbana 1964; D.O. Sears, R.R. Lau, T. R. Tyler, H. M. Allen, Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics, Am. Pol. Rev. 74, 1989, p. 670ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ramsey Rule | Ramsey | Mause I 272 Ramsey-Rule/Ramsey: (pi – MC)/pi ej ________ = __ (pj – MC)/pj ei Pi = price of the i-th good; MC = marginal good in the markets of the i-th good; ei = Price elasticity of demand for the i-th good. Thus, for two goods i and j selected from the quantity of all existing goods, the tax rates levied on consumption of i and j will be in inverse proportion to the price elasticities of demand. With relatively low price elasticity, relatively high tax revenues can be achieved without causing major substitution effects (and thus welfare losses). (RamseyVsEdgeworth, see Taxation/Edgeworth, Taxation/Ramsey. The rule therefore says something about the optimal ratio of tax rates on consumer goods to each other. However, this does not say anything about the amount of the tax. See also economic theories on taxation Mause I 273 VsRamsey: Problem: if goods with very low price elasticity of demand are, for example, staple foods or drinking water, the Ramsey Rule can quickly have undesirable, strongly regressive distribution effects. The tax system would place a disproportionate burden on relatively poor households. Solution/DiamondVsRamsey/MirrleesVsRamsey: those goods that are heavily consumed by individuals whose welfare still has a strongly positive marginal effect on social welfare should be taxed less. (1)(2) This integrates the weighing of pure efficiency goals and ideas of distributive justice. 1. Peter A. Diamond und James Mirrlees. 1971. Optimal taxation and public production I/ II. American Economic Review 61( 1): 8– 27 und 61( 3): 261– 278. 2. Peter A. Diamond, 1975. A many person Ramsey tax rule. Journal of Public Economics 4 (4). S. 335– 342. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Rationality | Rawls | I 143 Rationality/Rawls: our view here is broadly in line with the standard model in social theory.(1)(2) The rational person/Rawls: be a person with a coherent set of preferences between options open to him/her. The person assesses the options with a view to his/her purposes. The person follows the plan that fulfils most of his/her wishes and has the better chances of success. >Goals, >Purposes, >Purpose/means rationality. Rawls: in addition, I rule out resentment. I 145 Initial state of a society to be established/Rawls: here we must assume that the persons involved have a sense of justice and the compliance of their principles and can expect this from others. They will know that agreements are not in vain. >Society/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance. I 418 Rationality/Rawls: the duration of a rational consideration must be taken into account, so that it becomes irrational at some point to look for the best plan. >Planning/Rawls. It is rational to follow a satisfactory plan if the expected results of further consideration do not compensate for the disadvantages of the loss of time. This assumes that a person has a certain decision-making competence with regard to his or her own situation when making rational decisions. I 422 The guiding principle for a rational individual in the pursuit of his or her plans should be that he or she will never have to blame himself or herself for the way in which these plans are ultimately realized. As an identical individual in time, it must be able to say that it has done in every moment what requires or at least allowed a weighing of the reasons.(3)(4) >Personal identity, >Responsibility. 1. Cf. Amartya Sen, Cellective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970. 2. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963. 3. See Charles Fried, Anatomy of Values, (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 158-169. 4. Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1970), esp. ch. VIII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Regulatory Economics | Economic Theories | Mause I 377 Regulatory Economics/coordination/Economic Theories: competitive markets as a decentralised coordination mechanism have a number of social advantages: they increase welfare (equipping the economy with scarce goods) through efficient allocation (distribution of production factors among suppliers), the creation of incentives for innovation (dynamic efficiency), the promotion of consumer sovereignty (adaptation of goods production to the preferences of consumers) and adaptive efficiency (adaptability of the economy to exogenous shocks and crises). Moreover, economic freedom and competitive markets are interdependent (Röpke 1949; Eucken 1952). See also Regulatory Economics/Hayek, See Regulatory Economics/Political Theory. 1. Röpke, Wilhelm. 1949. Civitas humana – Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform, 3. ed. Erlenbach/ Zürich: Rentsch. 2. Eucken, Walter, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik. Tübingen 1952. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Regulatory Economics | Political Philosophy | Mause I 378f Regulatory Economics/Political Theory: Economically oriented political science is primarily interested in interventions that are not justified by dysfunctionalities, but it is about the realization of overarching social, i.e. public welfare-oriented goals. >Community welfare, >Markets, >Regulatory economics. Mause I 379 Regulation/Regulatory Economics/Political theory: based on Theodore J. Lowi's distinction between four policy areas a) distributive, b) redistributive, c) regulative, c) constitutive policies (1), state regulation is discussed by these authors: competition law: (Windhoff-Héritier 1987, p. 40) (2), regulatory state: (Majone 1994) (3), regulatory governance: (Eckert 2011 (4); Levi-Faur 2007 (5) regulatory capitalism: (Braithwaite 2008; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005) (6). >Politics/Lowi. 1. Theodore J. Lowi, 1972. Four systems of policy, politics, and choice. Public Administration Review 32 (4): 298– 310. 2. Windhoff-Héritier, Adrienne, Policy Analyse – Eine Einführung. Frankfurt/ New York 1987 3. Majone, Giandomenico. 1994. The rise of the regulatory state in Europe. West European Politics 17( 3): 77– 101. 4. Eckert, Sandra. 2011. European regulatory governance. In Handbook on the politics of regulation, Hrsg. David Levi-Faur, 513– 524. Cheltenham: 5. Levi-Faur, David, Regulatory governance. In Europeanization. New research agendas, Hrsg. Paolo Graziano und Maarten P. Vink, 102– 114. Basingstoke 2007. 6. Braithwaite, John, Regulatory capitalism. How it works, ideas for making it work better. Cheltenham 2008. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Rights | Utilitarianism | Gaus I 106 Rights/Utilitarianism/Gaus: Utilitarians, or more broadly, consequentialists, have spent a good deal of effort investigating in what ways personal rights might enter into a utilitarian system. Sen (1990)(1) offers a version of consequentialism that takes rights satisfaction as part of the utility of a state of affairs (cf. Scanlon, 1977(2); Nozick, 1974(3): 166). Mill’s complicated utilitarianism – which seems to integrate rules into the concept of a morality – has often been used as a model for utilitarian rights (Lyons, 1978(4); Frey, 1984(5)) (...). Russell Hardin (1988(6); 1993) has advocated an ‘institutional utilitarianism’ that takes account of knowledge problems in designing utilitarian institutions, which he offers as an alternative to both act and rule utilitarianism. According to Hardin, ‘[w]e need an institutional structure of rights or protections because not everyone is utilitarian or otherwise moral and because there are severe limits to our knowledge of others, whose interests are therefore likely to be best fulfilled in many ways if they have substantial control over the fulfillment.’ Gaus I 107 That, he adds, ‘is how traditional rights should be understood’ (1988(6): 78). >Rights/Consequentialism. 1. Sen, Amartya K. (1990) ‘Rights consequentialism’. In Jonathan Glover, ed., Utilitarianism and its Critics. London: Macmillan, 111–18. 2. Scanlon, Thomas (1977) ‘Rights, goals and fairness’. Erkenntnis, 11 (May): 81–95. 3. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 4. Lyons, David (1978) ‘Mill’s theory of justice’. In A. I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds, Values and Morals. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1–20. 5. Frey, R. G. (1984) ‘Act-utilitarianism, consequentialism and moral rights’. In R. G. Frey, ed., Utility and Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, 61–95. 6. Hardin, Russell (1988) Morality within the Limits of Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 601 Rights/Utilitarianism: for utilitarianism, maximising the overall well-being is the central objective. Rights, for example in the form of ownership guarantees, can also benefit the overall welfare. It can never be excluded that sacrificing fundamental individual interests of individuals or groups could increase the overall benefit. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Rights always protect the individual with reference to fundamental and central interests.(1) >Utilitarianism/Dworkin, >Utilitarianism. 1.cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Road Pricing | Economic Theories | Mause I 466f Road Pricing/Economic Theories: A basic microeconomic principle is that any relative price change has an impact on the consumption decisions of individual economic actors and triggers substitution processes. Therefore, if a road user has to pay a fee in addition to his time and operating costs for the use of a section of road during a congestion-prone period (e.g. rush hour traffic), there is an incentive to switch to an alternative point in time, an alternative route or an alternative means of transport. The optimum amount of this additional fee corresponds exactly to the additional costs for all other road users caused by each additional road user on an overused road section (cf. Yan and Lam 1996, p. 319) (1). Tolls are not about rivalry in consumption, but the problem of non-excludability. >Externalities. Since a toll changes the price ratio between different road sections or means of transport, substitution processes can be triggered for congested road sections. Mause I 467 Problems: 1. the monetary evaluation of the time costs of road users, 2. complex interdependencies within the transport network. As a result, the theoretically best solution (first-best) cannot be implemented in practice and only an approximation (second-best) can be achieved. (cf. Samll and Verhoef 2007, p. 137) (2). Value: can be divided into two aspects: a) value of the reduction in travel time, b) value of reliability in relation to the time used. (Carrion and Levinson, 2012, p. 721. (3)) Road user fee/Toll: can be seen as a product differentiation. The consumer wonders how much he/she is prepared to pay for a more convenient product variant. (see Small & Yan, 2001, p. 311). >Preference. Mause I 468 Welfare increase: Tolls can lead to an increase in welfare and must therefore be supported from an economic point of view. Problem: the introduction creates redistributive effects. If the revenue of the fee is not redistributed within road users, but goes to the state, there are (...) "losers" through the introduction of a road user charge. 1. Yan, Hai, und William H. K. Lam. 1996. Optimal road tolls under conditions of queueing and congestion. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 30 (5): 319– 332. 2. Small, Kenneth A., und Erik T. Verhoef..The economics of urban transportation. London/ New York 2007. 3. Carrion, Carlos, und David Levinson. 2012. Value of travel time reliability: A review of current evidence. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 46 (4): 720– 741. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Scitovsky Paradox | Zerbe | Parisi I 368 Scitovsky Paradox/cost-benefit analysis/Zerbe: There have also been strong statements of BCA inadequacy on technical grounds, mainly on the possibility of Scitovsky reversals. The Scitovsky reversal paradox (Scitovsky 1941)(2) arises when, starting from state of the world A, position B appears superior to A, but when starting from B, A appears superior to B. However, reversal paradoxes such as Scitovsky’s are purely creatures of the PCT (potential compensation test). They arise from the PCT assumption that compensation is costless and that potential compensation is the correct measure. The legal philosopher Coleman (1980(1), pp. 519f) uses an example of reversibility to argue that the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation test is not a useful criterion for decision-making. >Cost-benefit analysis, >Kaldor-Hicks criterion, >Decision-making. Parisi I 369 (…) in a recent book, Markovits (2008)(3) writes, “This Scitovsky Paradox invalidates the Kaldor–Hicks test because it implies that, if the test were accurate and a Scitovsky paradox arose, both the policy and its reversal would be economically efficient and, hence, the policy would simultaneously be economically efficient and economically inefficient.” (p. 53) 1. Coleman, Jules L. (1980). “Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization.” Hofstra Law Review 8: 509. 2. Scitovsky, T. De (1941). “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics.” Review of Economic Studies 9: 77–88. 3. Markovits, Richard S. (2008). Truth or Economics: On the Definition, Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Richard O. Zerbe. “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Legal Decision-making.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Self-Realization | Hobhouse | Gaus I 415 Self-realization/Hobhouse/Weinstein: New liberals joined Bosanquet in combining a moralized theory of freedom and strong rights with a communitarian social ontology. >Liberty/Bosanquet. For Green, Ritchie, Hobhouse and Hobson, moral self-realization was unconditionally good. Realizing oneself morally meant being fully free by being both 'out- ward[ly]' and 'inward[ly]' free (Green, 1986(1): 234—5). It meant having the enabling 'positive power or capacity of doing ... something worth doing' and actually 'doing ... something worth doing' (1986(1): 199). Self-realization/Hobhouse: As Hobhouse put it, self-realization consists in 'social' as well as 'moral' freedom. Whereas the former concerns external harmony between citizens or 'freedom of man in society', the latter is 'proportionate to the [self'sl] internal harmony' (Hobhouse, 1949(2): 51, 57).* Self-realization/liberalism: For new liberals as well, rights indirectly promoted everyone's self-realization by enabling each to flourish. And to the extent that each flourished morally, each, in turn, promoted common good by respecting the rights of others. Thus, for Hobhouse, common good was 'the foundation of all personal rights' (1968(3): 198). In Green's words, rights realize our moral capacity negatively by 'securing the treatment of one man by another as equally free with himself, but they do not realise positively, because their possession does not imply that the individual makes a common good his own' (1986(1): 26). New Liberalism: However, new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not Gaus I 416 subvert equal opportunity. Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(4): xii).ll New liberals, then, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.** * Also see Ritchie (1895(5): 430). Ritchie's new liberalism eclectically blends utilitarianism, neo-Hegelianism and Darwinism. >Individualism/Ritchie. ** Idealists, like Jones and >Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government. 1. Green, T. H. (1986 [1895]) Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Essays, eds Paul Harris and John Morrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 194-212. 2. Hobhouse, L. T. (1949 [1922]) The Elements of Social Justice. London: Allen and Unwin. 3. Hobhouse, L. T. (1968 [1911]) Social Evolution and Political Thought. Port Washington: Kennikat. 4. Hobson, J. A. (1974 [1909]) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble. 5. Ritchie, D. G. (1895) 'Free-will and responsibility'. International Journal of Ethics, 5: 409-31. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Contract | Rousseau | Höffe I 273 Social Contract/Rousseau/Höffe: In contrast to his contract-theoretical predecessors Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, references to the Old and New Testament no longer play a role. The confessional wars are long over, but censorship still prevails. State: The counter-model that [Rousseau] has devised for the alienated societies is the bourgeois Höffe I 274 order in the sense of a state, for which he does not develop a natural history, but only examines its justification(1). Individualism: In doing so, he follows the legitimatory individualism of his predecessors in contract theory. The final basis for the justification of a community that is nevertheless entitled to coercive powers lies with the individual concerned: Each individual must freely consent. Natural state: RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: In contrast to Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >State/Rousseau, >Human/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Because [the] basic treaty is concluded unanimously, Rousseau can, despite his first state theory thesis that every human being is born free and as master of him- or herself (>Freedom/Rousseau), put forward the fourth thesis of the legitimacy (>Justification/Rousseau) of a community with the power of coercion. Because of the unanimity, the social contract may even be considered "the freest act in the world"(2). >Freedom/Rousseau. Höffe I 277 Justification: Under Rousseau's own principle of self-preservation, the social contract is only worthy of approval if it guarantees (not only physically understood) self-preservation, at least not endangers it. >Justification/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 Wilson I 24 Social Contract/Rousseau/Wilson, E. O.: Rousseau had issued the slogan "Freedom, Equality, Fraternity" in his social contract. E. O. WilsonVsRousseau: at the same time he had conceived the fatal abstraction of "collective will" in order to achieve these goals. This collective will, he wrote, forms itself into a "moral law which is objectively justified", since it is the only interest of the "rational will of free individuals" to serve the welfare of society and each of its members. This social contract should create "equal conditions for all". "Each one of us places together his or her person and all of his or her strength under the supreme direction of the common will, and we accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole." Wilson: Those who did not want to give in to this collective will were regarded as dissenters and had to face the "necessary violence" exercised by the assembly. >General Will. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Social Contract | Wilson | I 24 Social contract/Rousseau/Wilson, E. O.: In his social contract, Rousseau had issued the slogan "Freedom, Equality, Fraternity". E. O. WilsonVsRousseau: at the same time he had conceived the fatal abstraction of the "common will" in order to achieve these goals. This common will, he wrote, forms itself into a "moral law which is objectively justified", since it is the only interest of the "rational will of free individuals" to serve the welfare of society and each of its members. This social contract should create "equal conditions for all". "Each one of us places together his or her person and all his or her strength under the supreme direction of the common will, and we accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole." Wilson: Those who did not want to give in to this community will were regarded as dissenters and had to face the "necessary violence" exercised by the assembly. |
WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Social Goods | Aristotle | Höffe I 64 Social goods/Aristoteles/Höffe: Aristotle proposes a "mixed property system", by which he rejects both a complete nationalisation of land and a purely private ownership of property. For the public tasks, which today are financed by taxes, at that time for the ritual acts and the common meals, there should be a common property (state land), the "rest" should become private property. Each citizen is given two parcels of land, one towards the national border and one in the interior of the country, both for reasons of justice and to achieve unanimity against hostile neighbours. In the social tasks of common property there are approaches to the welfare state, but the scope of this should not be overestimated. Aristotle, for example, rejects attendance fees, although they allow all citizens to participate in the People's Assembly. >Property/Aristotle, >Community/Aristotle, >Justice/Aristotle. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Goods | Economic Theories | Mause I 275 Public goods/Economic theories: Problem: because of the free rider problem (the use of public goods by non-paying members) the value of public goods cannot be determined. >Public Goods/Samuelson. Solution: Suggestion: certain incentive mechanisms should encourage individuals to disclose their true willingness to pay. (Clarke 1971 (1), Groves & Loeb 1975 (2)) VsClarke/VsGrove/VsLoeb: Problem: 1. unwanted side effects due to the high complexity, 2. there are infinitely many Pareto optima, since the sum of the marginal willingness to pay depends on the distribution positions of the individuals in the society. Mause I 276 Public Goods/Economic theories: in a world of distorting taxes, the expenditure side cannot be viewed without the revenue side. The optimal supply of public goods then depends on which taxes can be used and to what extent these taxes lead to welfare losses due to their incentive-distorting effect. Solution/Browning/Dahlby: the marginal costs of public goods are multiplied by one that represents the marginal costs of public funds.(3)(4)(5) For counter arguments see >Public Goods/Kaplow. 1. Edward H. Clarke. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11 (1): 17– 33. 2.Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb. 1975. Incentives and public inputs. Journal of Public Economics 4: 211– 226. 3. Edgar K. Browning, 1976. The marginal cost of public funds. Journal of Political Economy 84: 283– 298. 4. Bev Dahlby, 2008. The marginal cost of public funds: Theory and applications. Cambridge, MA 5. Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton. 1992. Distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6( 3): 117– 131. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Goods | Rawls | I 92 Public goods/social goods/Rawls: primary social goods are rights and freedoms, opportunities and powers, income and prosperity. These goods are social because of their connection with the basic structure of a society; freedoms and powers are defined by the rules of the larger institutions; income distribution and prosperity are regulated by them. Rawls: The theory of common goods goes back to Aristotle and is shared by such diverse authors as Kant and Sidgwick. It is also controversial between utilitarianism and contract theory. >Contracts, >Contract theory, >Utilitarianism, >I. Kant, >H. Sidgwick. I 93 Goods/Rawls: a good is the fulfilment of a rational interest. We can assume that a rational individual has a plan that can fulfill different desires without mutual interference. Def rational plan/Rawls: be a plan that cannot be improved. I. e. there is no other plan that is preferred. >Planning. Def primary goods/Rawls: are those that all need, even if their plans differ. For example, intelligence, prosperity and opportunities are means of achieving goals that a person could not achieve by other means. In the initial state (of a society to be established), where people do not yet know what role they will play, these goods are what they know they are striving for. >Veil of ignorance. Problem: to create an index of available primary social and natural resources. Our principles, when processed in lexical order, help to do this. >Principles/Rawls. I 266 Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). >Free riders. I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. >Externalities. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Environmental damage. I 270 Economic form: the proportion of public goods in the economy as a whole is independent of the economic form - be it socialist or private - because the proportion of social resources spent on their production is independent of the question of the ownership of the means of production. >Socialism, >Capitalism. 1. See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. 2. Buchanan, ch. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. 3. See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Social Goods | Walzer | Mause I 199 Social Goods/Walzer: e.g. membership and affiliation, security and welfare, money and goods, offices, hard work, leisure time, upbringing and education, kinship and love, divine grace, recognition, political power. Dominant goods also allow their owners to acquire goods from another sphere while disregarding the distribution rules of that sphere. This is the case when persons hold offices in a society on the basis of mere party membership (and not on the basis of qualifications and performance) or when money (and not talent) decides on access to education. Dominant goods are unjust because they violate the internal logic of the spheres of justice and establish a principle of rule that exists across the spheres. >Distributive Justice/Walzer, >Justice. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Movements | Offe | Gaus I 269 Social Movements/Claus Offe/West: Closest to the Marxist paradigm - indeed almost continuous with schools of Western and neo-Marxism, which acknowledge the changing nature of capitalism and corresponding decline of working- class activism - are theories of new social movements as a response to the crises of 'welfare state' capitalism (WSC) (Offe, 1984(1); 1985(2)). Welfare state capitalism: A starting-point for such theories is the neocorporatist inclusion of the working class into the institutional structures of capitalist society through trade union and party political representation. The social democratic legal order characteristic of WSC supplements civil and political rights (cherished by Gaus I 270 liberal democracy) with 'social welfare rights' realized through provision of social welfare (health, education, housing), social security (unemployment, sickness and retirement benefits), measures of economic redistribution (progressive taxation) and Keynesian economic policies (full employment, demand management) (Marshall, 1963(3): 74—126; Offe, 1985(2): 821—5). >Liberalism, >Democracy, >Democratic theory. State capitalism: These developments involve a considerable expansion of the state's activities in comparison with liberal capitalism. Production: The associated decline of working-class activism is reinforced by the changing nature of production in the transition from 'Fordism' or 'Taylorism' to 'post-Fordism' and 'post-Taylorism' (Lash and Urry, 1987)(4). >S. Lash, >J. Urry. This involves, in the first place, the decline of traditional manufacturing and the rise of the service sector, which is geographically more dispersed and indus- trially less organized. But, second, the Fordist model - of mass, assembly-line production of a relatively small range of products for mass consumption - is gradually replaced by more diversified and decentralized forms of production and consumption. Classes/identity: Both developments undermine traditional forms of working-class solidarity and organization and tend to support a multiplication and diversification of forms of identity apart from class. Citizens/welfare state: If the welfare state denies the escalating demands of citizens, then it risks a loss of authority or legitimacy (Offe, 1985(2): 818—20; Habermas, 1976(5)). >J. Habermas. But the demands of citizens must inevitably grow, because the expansion of the state's responsibilities erodes such 'uncontested and non-contingent premises of politics' as the family, religion and the work ethic (Offe, 1985(2): 819). Neoliberalism/Huntington: It is, of course, precisely this 'crisis of governability' (Huntington, 1975(6); O'Connor, 1973(7)) that has motivated neoliberal attempts to revive the less expansive state of liberal capitalism. Social movements: The changing nature of capitalism is (...) related not only to diminishing activism of the traditional working class but also to the rise of the women's, peace and environmental movements (Offe, 1985(2): 825—32). For Offe, [New Social Movements] (NSMs) offer a potentially more promising response to the crisis of the welfare state in the form of a reconstituted civil society independent of the state. >Civil Society. 1. Offe, Claus (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. John Keane. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Offe, Claus (1985) 'New social movements: challenging the boundaries of institutional politics'. Social Research, 52 (4): 817-68. 3. Marshall, T. H. (1963) Sociologv at the Crossmads and Other Essays. London: Hememann. 4. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. 5. Habermas, Jürgen (1976) Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy. London: Heinemann. 6. Huntington, S. P. (1975) 'The United States'. In M. Crozier et al., eds, The Crisis of Democracy. New York: New York Umversity Press. 7.O’Connor 1973 West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Offe I Claus Offe Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates Frankfurt/M. 1972 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Social Norms | Carbonara | Parisi I 466 Social Norms/Carbonara: In the study of social norms, “efficiency” has several standard meanings, notably Pareto efficiency, cost–benefit efficiency, and welfare maximization. “Unfairness” also has several possible meanings, but the most frequently discussed today is discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. In some circumstances, social norms are efficient and fair, requiring no regulation so long as private and criminal law operate in the background. In other circumstances, unregulated social norms waste resources or discriminate against individuals or groups. The main issue (…) is that the social norms prevailing at some historical moment may be just an equilibrium among multiple equilibriums. >Efficiency, >Equilibrium. Parisi I 467 Legal norms: Legal norms seemingly reinforce existing social norms, bending them towards the law when discrepancy exists and favoring their creation where social norms do not exist. Parisi I 469 Social norms/Carbonara: (…) we could define a “perfect social norm” as a behavioral regularity caused by coordination, non-legal sanctions, and internalization. Efficiency; On the efficiency of social norms, see Posner (1996)(1) and Mahoney and Sanchirico (2000)(2). Fairness: The interplay of honor, stigma, and the law is often responsible Parisi I 470 for the perpetuation of such rules. Banabou and Tirole (2011)(3) show how such forces, together with the expressive power of the law, may explain why people resist legal changes that would enhance efficiency and lead to more “effective” laws. >Path dependence/Carbonara. 1. Posner, Eric A. (1996). “Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144: 1697–1744. 2. Mahoney, P. G. and C. W. Sanchirico (2000). “Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149: 2027–2062. 3. Banabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011). “Laws and Norms.” NBER Working Paper 17579. Emanuela Carbonara. “Law and Social Norms”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Social Policy | Esping-Andersen | Mause I 577f Social Policy/Esping-Andersen: Terminology: Def Decommodification factor/Decommodification index: indicates the degree to which individuals or families can maintain a socially acceptable standard of living, regardless of market participation. (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.37 (1). See also Esping-Andersen 1999(2). It is therefore a question of protection against dependency. The application of this indicator by Clare Bambra in 1998/99 showed a stronger protection against market forces in Northern Europe than in English speaking countries.(3) Esping-Andersen's model is characterised by an expanded social services sector. The aim of state social policy is to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their employment status, receive the highest possible level of basic social security. Mause I 579 VsEsping-Andersen: The three-part structure of social systems in different countries is criticized by Esping-Andersen. See Smith 2005.(4) 1. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 3. Bambra, Clare. 2006. Research note: Decommodification and the worlds of welfare revisited. Journal of European Social Policy 16 (1): 73– 80. 4. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, 3. Aufl. Wiesbaden 2005 |
EconEsp I Gøsta Esping-Andersen The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton Princeton 1990 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Policy | Friedman | Brocker I 408 Social Policy/Friedman: ultimately, the norm of individual choice also shapes ideas about the welfare state. In Friedman's free capitalism there is certainly a place for social, tax and distribution policy (1). However, poverty should not be combated in a paternalistic way by giving the lower income groups free state benefits and thus restricting their free choice of consumption. The existing welfare state is less criticised for its objectives than for its patronising and inefficient instruments. Friedman's proposal is to cancel all individual social and distributional measures and replace them with a negative income tax. This saves a lot of bureaucracy and the idea of self-determination of individual lifestyles is given an economic basis(2). >Taxation/Friedman. 1. Breul, Frank R., »Capitalism and Freedom: An Essay Review«, in: Social Service Review 37/2, 1963, 201-207. 2. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago 1962. German: Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, München 2004. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Policy | Mill | Höffe I 352 Social Policy/Mill/Höffe: From the strong interest in reform - the principles (1) bear the extended title "with some of their applications to social philosophy" - Mill assigns to the community a number of tasks of a welfare state character. For example, although the state is not supposed to found schools itself, it does force parents to send their children to school. >Education, >Education Policy. Child labor: Child labor must also be restricted by law. Furthermore, in order to prevent exploitation and damage to health, the state should monitor working hours and combat poverty, but without creating new dependencies. Mill also demands that cruelty to animals Höfe I 353 is prohibited by law and charitable trusts are to be monitored by the state. 1. J. St. Mill, Principles of Political Economy 1848 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Society | Harris | Gaus I 216 Society/David Harris/Moon: Because concepts of positive rights and equal opportunity are not well defined outside of specific social contexts, they are often combined with arguments appealing to ideals of citizenship and social solidarity. The basic argument is that the welfare state should guarantee the inclusion of all citizens as full members of a democratic society, which requires that an extensive range of social rights be provided. David Harris: Harris offers a communitarian version of the argument from solidarity. He argues that 'full membership' in a society requires that each person be able to enjoy 'a certain style of life' and 'certain life chances' (1987(1): 147). Although he recognizes that modern societies include a plurality of different groups, he insists that there are more or less common standards of what an individual must be able to do and how one must be able to live if one is not to be excluded or socially marginalized. These standards determine the needs of members of that society, and should be equally available to all citizens as a matter of right, for only in that way can the equal status of members be recognized and respected (1987(1): 154-7). Moon: This line of argument supports the institutional welfare state in which services are provided in kind in part because 'citizens have a right to that specific resource', such as 'edu-cation', rather than a right 'to income which may or may not be spent on education' (1987(1): 150). Further, the universal provision of certain services is expressive of, and may contribute to, a sense of community and equal citizenship. Finally, providing services in kind may be a form of 'justified paternalism' to the extent that 'some persons may be imprudent or wasteful or be unable to make adequate use of cash' (1987(1): 150-1). Family: Harris's account relies upon an analogy between political society and the family: just as we have obligations towards, and rights against, members of our family, irrespective of what they may have done for us individually, so we have obligations towards, and rights against, our fellow citizens. Moon: The stress on obligations is crucial, for the possibility of enjoying one's rights depends upon the willing support of social policies on the part of the citizenry, and to claim one's rights one must be prepared to fulfil the 'system of duties' that 'underlies the structure of citizen rights' (1987(1): 160). Fundamental needs: (...) Harris goes on to argue that the pragmatic difficulties involved in determining whether someone's unfulfilled needs are a result of his own choices are so great that we should presume that there are no such cases, and should rely upon a 'sense of duty or community to prevent or minimize abuse of the system' (1987(1): 161). Gaus I 217 MoonVsHarris: 1) (...) the founding of rights and obligations on 'membership' is deeply problematic, in as much as it begs the question of whether the social order of which we are to be members is just. 2) (...) ironically, welfare states have a systematic tendency to undermine the very communitar- ian sentiments and relationships that would support the values of solidarity and equality. Although participating in a common programme, such as a national health service or medicare, may give rise to feelings of solidarity with others, what people actually experience may often be quite different. In many cases it is more like being reduced to the status of a client, attempting to meet one's needs through an impersonal and unresponsive bureaucracy.* 3) (...) the commitment to equality can sometimes sit uneasily with the commitment to democracy. Consider, for example, Albert Weale's argument for earnings-related welfare state schemes, such as social security in the US. Weale argues that such schemes increase the total volume of government transfers, thus leading to greater 'egalitarian effectiveness'. >Equality/Weale, >Solidarity/Welfare economics. *This is an important theme in Wolfe's analysis and critique of state provision (see 1989(2): esp. chs 4 and 5). 1. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 2. Wolfe, Alan (1989) Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
LingHarris I Zellig S. Harris A Theory of Language and Information: A Mathematical Approach Oxford 1991 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Solidarity | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 217 Solidarity/justice/Welfare economics/Moon: An adequate account of the welfare state, one that can justify its redistributive aims, must ultimately be based upon a theory of justice, and the most promising theories are those which Phillipe Van Parijs calls 'solidaristic conceptions of justice' (1995(1): 28), such as those offered by Rawls, Dworkin, Amartya Sen, and Van Parijs himself. Solidaristic conceptions of justice are based upon a commitment to 'equal concern' for the interests of all, and to 'equal respect, that is, the view that what counts as a just society should not be determined on the basis of some particular substantive conception of the good life' (1995(1): 28). Liberalism: The 'liberal' commitment to equal respect in solidaristic theories of justice underlies their support for the standard 'negative' and democratic rights characteristic of the welfare state, and the commitment to equal concern underlies their accounts of social justice and so the redistributive elements of the welfare state. >Van Parijs. Institutions: No theory, by itself, directly supports the institutional welfare state. Van Parijs, for example, rejects it in favour of a system providing the highest possible basic income for all, and Rawls explicitly rejects the welfare state on the grounds that it tolerates the highly unequal distribution of wealth produced by a capitalist society, and so undermines democracy by concentrating too much economic and political power in a wealthy elite. Solidaristic approaches: Still, solidaristic theories can supply the deficiencies, noted above, in justifications of the welfare state that appeal to membership and solidarity, and to the baseline problem in efficiency-based arguments. Membership: with regard to the appeal to membership, solidaristic theories of justice provide grounds for the value of social inclusion on a principle of equality. And they address the serious lacunae in efficiency-based arguments, specifically the fact that they take a market generated outcome as their starting point, and ask whether that outcome could be improved through some government policy. Distributive equality: But because there is nothing privileged about market generated outcomes, market institutions and the 'initial' distribution of resources must themselves be morally justified, and solidaristic theories of justice address that problem. Welfare state: while solidaristic arguments do not necessarily justify the welfare state as the ideal regime, they do Gaus I 218 provide grounds for central welfare state policies. Rawls: Rawls's ideal regimes, a property-owning democracy or market socialism, would have to be welfare states in the sense I have used the term here: that is, they would have to have social policies that would collectively provide for certain needs, justified in terms of efficiency and their redistributive conse- quences. Van Parijs: (...) Van Parijs allows significant scope for collective provision including the area of medical care.* * See Rawls (2001(2): 135—40) and the preface to the revised edition of his Theory of Justice (1999)(3) for his discussion of politico-economic regimes; and see Van Parijs (1995(1): 41-5). 1. Van Parijs, Philippe (1995) Real Freedom for All. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1999) A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Buchanan | Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. (1) Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan, >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.(2) 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| State (Polity) | Feminism | Gaus I 278 State/feminism/Mottier: For a long time, feminist theory paid scant attention to the role of the state in gender relations. There are obvious historical reasons for this initial 'state-blindness' of gender analysis. At its inception in the 1970s, the new women's movement was deeply suspicious of mainstream politics and the state, which were seen as fundamentally patriarchic in nature. Many feminists intended to avoid conventional strategies and power games in favour of anti-hierarchical action within new social movements outside of the formal political arena (...). Politics: At the level of practical political action, this critical stance was nevertheless often combined with an appeal to the state, in key areas of feminist struggles such as abortion, pornography, or anti-rape legislation (Petchesky, 1986(1); Randall 1998(2)). Theory: The analytical consequence of the movement's distrust of mainstream politics was an under-theorization of the role of the state. Since the mid 1980s, there has been a revaluation of the central role of the state in the structuration and institutionalization of relations between men and women, and in establishing and policing the frontiers between public and private spheres. Somewhat paradoxically, at a time when the importance of the state itself is eroded by supranational processes, the state has been brought back into feminist theory. >State/Gender theory, >State/MacKinnon, >Welfare state/Gender Theory, >State/Poststructuralism. 1. Petchesky, Rosalind (1986) Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom. London: Verso. 2. Randall, Vicky (1998) 'Gender and power: women engage the state'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 185-205. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Gender Theory | Gaus I 278 State/Gender theory/Mottier: Initially, as Waylen (1998)(1) points out, gender theorists tended to view the state in primarily negative terms. Socialists: Socialist feminists in particular integrated the oppression of women within the Marxist perspective. They consequently saw the state as an instrument of domination in the hands of the ruling class, and emphasized the importance of the role of women in the reproduction of the workforce within the family for the development of capitalism. Radical feminism: like socialist feminists, radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon also conceptualized the liberal state as a monolithic entity which institutionalizes the interests of dominant groups, particularly through the law; only this time the latter were not the bourgeois classes described by Marxist theorists but the category of male citizens. The liberal legal system, mainstream politics and the state were seen as instruments of the subordination of women to men, and of the legitimization of male interests as the general interest. As MacKinnon put it, 'liberal legalism is thus a medium for making male dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society' (1989(2): 237). Institutionalization: within these approaches, the state was perceived above all as a patriarchal instrument which institutionalizes and reproduces male domination. From the late 1980s, such an understanding of the state has been challenged by a number of alternative perspectives. The latter question, 1) (...) whether the impact of the state on gender relations should be conceptualized in negative terms only; and 2) (...) whether the state is adequately theorized as a homogeneous actor. Ad 1): >Welfare state/Gender theory, Ad 2): >State/Poststructuralism. 1. Waylen, Georgina (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 1—17. 2. MacKinnon, Catharine (1989) Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State (Polity) | Humboldt | Mause I 43 State/Society/Humboldt: Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) sums up the "free work of the nation among themselves" in his ideas written in 1792 as an attempt to determine the limits of the effectiveness of the state, "it is actually which preserves all goods whose longing leads people into a society. The actual state constitution is subordinate to it, as its purpose, and is always chosen only as a necessary means and, since it is always associated with restrictions of freedom, as a necessary evil". (1) >Freedom, >Society. 1.W. v. Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen, Hrsg. Robert Haerdter, Stuttgart 1967, S. 192. Höffe I 322 State/Humboldt/Höffe: In his ideas(1) (...) and in other political writings, Humboldt sets narrow limits on all state activity. As a liberal thinker of the state, whom Mill holds in high esteem, he pleads for a free and functional constitutional state, but rejects the paternalistic welfare state. For a government that is committed to the physical and moral well-being of the population would fall into the "worst and most oppressive despotism". Freedom: [Humboldt] calls for the fight against feudalism. Equal rights: He stands up for the equal rights of the Jews, not only gradually, but immediately. For it was against the "true concept of human dignity" to treat someone not as an individual but as a member of a race. >Rule of law, >Welfare state, >Racism. 1.Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1792) |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Poststructuralism | Gaus I 278 State/Poststructuralism/Gender Theory/Mottier: poststructuralist research. Feminists who draw on poststructuralist (especially Foucauldian) theories argue that it is problematic to consider the state as an homogeneous, unitary entity which pursues specific interests. They consider the state as a plurality of arenas of struggle, rather than as unified actors (...). Consequently, poststructuralist analyses of the state introduce less dichotomous perspectives which take into account the local, diverse and dispersed nature of sites of gender power (see, for example, Pringle and Watson, 1992)(1). They consider feminist attempts to define what 'women's interests' might be by authors such as Virginia Sapiro (1981)(2) and Irene Diamond and Nancy Hartsock (1981)(3) as problematic, since these treat as pre-given both the state and the notion of interests. Drawing on poststructuralist theory, R. Pringle and S. Watson point out that the analytical focus needs to shift instead to the discursive practices which construct specific interests, including Gaus I 279 those by femocrats. Comparative research has similarly led to scepticism towards a vision of the state and its role in structuring gender relations that is too unilateral. Comparative analyses of welfare states suggest that the impact of the state on gender relations varies greatly from one welfare regime to another, and importantly allow for the universalizing of the experience of individual states to be avoided (Sainsbury, 1994(4); Lewis, 1997(5); Fraser and Gordon, 1994(6)). >State/Gender Theory, >State/Feminism, >Welfare state/Gender Theory. It is important to recognize that relations between the state and gender are not intrinsically positive or negative. Feminist analyses of the state need to take into account its historical complexity, its variations within different political contexts such as liberal democracy, colonialism or state socialism, and its dynamic relationship to gendered power relations (Waylen, 1998(7): 7). 1. Pringle, R. and S. Watson (1992) '"Women's interests" and the poststructuralist state'. In Michele Barrett and Anne Phillips, eds, Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates. Cambridge: Polity, 53—73. 2. Sapiro, Virginia (1981) 'When are women's interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women'. The American Political Science Review, 75 (3): 701-16. 3. Diamond, Irene and Nancy Hartsock (1981) 'Beyond interests in politics: a comment on Virginia Sapiro's "When are interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women'". The American Political Science Review, 75: 717-21. 4. Sainsbury, Diane (1994) 'Women's and men's social rights: gendering dimensions of welfare states'. In Diane Sainsbury, ed., Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage, 150—69. 5. Lewis, Jane (1997) 'Gender and welfare regimes: further thoughts'. Social Politics, 4 (2): 160-77. 6. Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon (1994) 'A genealogy of dependency: tracing a keyword of the U.S. welfare state'. Signs, 19 (2, Winter): 309-36. 7. Waylen, Georgina (1998) 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview'. In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds, Gende'; Politics and the State. London: Routledge, 1—17. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| State Provision | Moon | Gaus I 213 State provision/welfare state/institutions/public goods, moral hazard/Moon: It is important to stress that state provision is not necessarily superior to private provision. Even if there are clear examples of 'market failures' , areas in which voluntary provision is incapable of providing an optimal level of services of one sort or another, it does not follow that government action will be superior. Just as real-world markets are subject to market failure, so real-world governments are subject to non-market failure. >Market failure. For example, while mandatory programmes can avoid the problem of adverse selection, by requiring low risk individuals to participate in the risk-sharing scheme, they may exacerbate the problem of moral hazard, by giving individuals incentives not to provide for themselves (e.g. by reducing their savings rate, or not taking a job) and relying upon the public programme of pensions or unemployment compensation to meet their needs. >Moral hazard, >Adverse selection, >Privatization/Moon. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| States of Mind | Attachment Theory | Corr I 250 State of mind/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: A. One state of mind is based on the failure of attachment behaviours to achieve a positive result (closeness, love or protection) and on being punished (with inattention, rejection or hostility) for enacting these behaviours. In such a state, seeking proximity to an attachment figure is likely to become a major source or threat of psychological pain. B. A very different state of mind emerges from emphasizing the failure to co-regulate distress and worrying that one does not have the capacity to deal with threats alone. This state of mind encourages a person to work harder to gain attention, cooperation and protection from an attachment figure, i.e., to hyperactivate the attachment system. Mikulincer, Gillath, Sapir-Lavid et al. (2003)(1) described an array of external and internal factors that contribute to the relative strength of these two different states of mind. Avoidant deactivation seems to be encouraged by (a) consistent inattention, rejection or angry responses from an attachment figure; (b) threats of punishment for proximity-seeking signals and behaviours; (c) violent or abusive behaviour on the part of an attachment figure; and (d) explicit or implicit demands for greater self-reliance and inhibition of expressions of need and vulnerability. >About the Attachment theory. 1. Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O., Sapir-Lavid, Y., Yaakobi, E., Arias, K., Tal-Aloni, L. and Bor, G. 2003. Attachment theory and concern for others’ welfare: evidence that activation of the sense of secure base promotes endorsement of self-transcendence values, Basic and Applied Social Psychology 25: 299–312 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Developmental, psychodynamic and optimal-functioning aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Strategic Voting | Economic Theories | Parisi I 504 Strategic voting/Economic theories/Nitzan/Paroush: (…) it is possible that individuals have an incentive to vote insincerely. Using a game-theoretic analysis, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)(1) show that non-strategic voting may be inconsistent with Nash equilibrium, Parisi I 505 equilibrium, even when all members have identical preferences and beliefs. >Nash equilibrium. More precisely, if the number of voters is sufficiently large, then voting based on private information only (informative voting) is generically not a Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game that formally represents a CJT [Condorcet Jury Theorem]. >Condorcet Jury Theorem, >Jury theorem. The general idea is that an individual’s vote affects the collective decision only when it is pivotal. But if all the others vote informatively, the fact that they are tied may be very informative in the sense that this reveals more precise information than that privately held by the individual. Following this newly revealed information, it may be rational not to vote according to one’s own private information. [E.g.,] consider three individuals with identical preferences over two alternatives, A and B. There is uncertainty about the true state of the world, which may be either state A or state B. In each state, individuals receive a pay-off of one if the alternative of the specific state is chosen and a payoff of zero otherwise. There is a common prior probability that the true state is A. Individuals have private information about the true state of the world. Majority rule is used to select an alternative. There are two additional assumptions on individuals’ beliefs: (1) sincere voting is informative; and (2) the common prior belief that the true state is A is sufficiently strong, such that if any individual were to observe all the three individual signals, then that individual believes B is the true state only if all the available evidence supports the true state being B. In this example sincere voting is not rational. Suppose that you are playing this game and the two other individuals vote sincerely. You must then be in one of the three following situations: (1) the others have observed that the state is A and accordingly vote for A; (2) the others have both observed B and vote for B; or (3) the others have observed different signals and one votes for A and the other for B. In the first two scenarios the aggregated outcome is independent of your own vote, and in the third scenario your vote is decisive. However, if you are in the third scenario your best decision is to vote for A. Therefore, voting sincerely is not a Nash equilibrium. In response to the above finding, McLennan (1998)(2) and Wit (1998)(3) found conditions under which Nash equilibrium behavior, although it may be inconsistent with non-strategic voting, still predicts that groups are more likely to make correct decisions than individuals. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997(4), 1998(5)) adapt the general framework of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)(1) to the specific case of jury procedures in criminal trials. In their model it is never a Nash equilibrium for all jurors to vote non-strategically under the unanimity rule. Moreover, Nash equilibrium behavior leads to higher probabilities of both convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty under the unanimity rule than under alternatives rules, including the simple majority rule. Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007)(6) examine the question of strategic voting when voters are solely concerned with the common collective interest. They find that under the optimal WMR, individuals do not have an incentive to vote strategically and non-informatively. >Decision rules. Such strategy-proofness does not hold under second-best anonymous voting rules. Thus, assigning the proper weight to each voter achieves the optimal team performance and guarantees sincere voting. 1. Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1996). “Information aggregation, rationality and the Condorcet jury theorem.” American Political Science Review 90(1): 34-45. 2. McLenan, A. (1998). “Consequences of the Condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational agents.” American Political Science Review 92(2): 413-418. 3. Wit, J. (1998). “Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem.” Games and Economic Behavior 22(2): 364–376. 4. Feddersen, T. J. and W. Pesendorfer (1997). “Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information.” Econometrica 65(5): 1029-1058. 5. Feddersen, T. J. and W. Pesendorfer (1998). “Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimity jury verdicts under strategic voting.” American Political Science Review 92(1): 23-35. 6. Ben-Yashar, R. and I. Milchtaich (2007). “First and second best voting rules in committees.” Social Choice and Welfare 29(3): 453-486. Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush. “Collective Decision-making and the Jury Theorems”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Structural Modeling | Gelbach | Parisi I 33 Structural modeling/economics/Gelbach/Klick: Econometric studies come in two basic flavors: structural and reduced form. Structural modeling involves writing down an explicit mathematical and statistical representation of the determinants of individual, firm, or organizational behavior, such that these relationships can be captured with a finite collection of parameter estimates. Demand: For example, it is a consequence of Roy’s identity that any parametric specification of individual demand for a good can be converted into a parametric utility function (see, e.g., Hausman, 1981(1); Auerbach and Feldstein, 1985(2)). Thus, if one estimates a parametric demand equation, one is estimating parameters of individual utility functions, which are structural parameters that can be used to estimate the effects of future changes in policies. Structural modeling is an approach that generally has not been used in empirical law and economics. * Reduced form: see >Economic models/Gelbach/Klick. * One exception is in the field of industrial organization ("IO"), the microeconomic field that focuses on understanding how market structure affects consumer and producer welfare. Structural modeling has flourished in IO; see, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)(3); Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015)(4); Roberts and Sweeting (2013)(5). For a non-IO structural example, see Teitelbaum, Barseghyan, and Prince (2011)(6). 1. Hausman, Jerry A. (1981). “Exact Consumer’s Surplus and Deadweight Loss.” American Economic Review 71(4): 662–676. 2. Auerbach, A. J. and M. Feldstein, eds. (1985). Taxes and Labour Supply. Handbook of Public Economics. Vol. I. North-Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 3. Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes (1995). “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63(4): 841–890. 4. Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Town (2015). “Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry.” American Economic Review 105: 172–203. 5. Roberts, James W. and Andrew Sweeting (2013). “Airline Mergers and the Potential Entry Defense.” August 29. Available at: http://public.econ.duke.edu/~jr139/pedef_airline_merger.pdf?new_window=1 6. Teitelbaum, Joshua C., Levon Barseghyan, and Jeffrey Prince (2011). “Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data.” American Economic Review 101: 591–631. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Tax Substitution | Economic Theories | Parisi I 323 Tax evasion/tax substitution/Economic theories: The literature on optimal redistributional instruments - both in law and economics and in public finance - is dominated by the tax substitution argument. The tax substitution argument shows that any redistribution effected outside the labor earnings tax system can be better accomplished by making appropriate adjustments to labor earnings taxation. >Tax systems. The implication is that the government should pursue distributional goals exclusively through the labor earnings tax system, while setting other policies without regard to their distributional impact. Both proponents and detractors of the tax substitution argument recognize that, like any argument, it requires assumptions. Controversy surrounds the nature of these assumptions. Proponents of the tax substitution argument refer to its key assumption as a “qualification” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000(1), p. 822). Adopting the assumption is said to generate the “natural model” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000(1), p. 821). Conversely, prescriptions of the model sans assumption are viewed as “exotic” (Bankman and Weisbach, 2007(2), p. 793), or as “theoretical curiosities” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000(1), p. 822). Vs: Critics of the tax substitution argument regard its key assumption as result-driving, empirically ungrounded, and indeed facially implausible once clearly revealed (Sanchirico, 1997(3); 2000(4), p. 813; 2001(5), p. 1058; 2010a(6), pp. 874–875, 940; 2011a(7)). 1. Kaplow, Louis and Steven M. Shavell (2001). “Fairness Versus Welfare.” Harvard Law Review 114: 961–1388. 2. Bankman, Joseph and David A. Weisbach (2006). “The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax.” Stanford Law Review 58: 1413–1456. 3. Sanchirico, Chris William (1997). “Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Discussion Paper No. 9798-04, Columbia Economics Department, available at 4. Sanchirico, Chris William (2000). “Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Journal of Legal Studies 29: 797–820. 5. Sanchirico, Chris William (2001). “Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale.” Cornell Law Review 86: 1003–1089. 6. Sanchirico, Chris William (2010a). “A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income.” Tax Law Review 63: 867–956. Web appendix available at 7. Sanchirico, Chris William (2011a). “Tax Eclecticism.” Tax Law Review 64: 149–228. Web appendix available at Chris William Sanchirico. “Optimal Redistributional Instruments in Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Taxation | Edgeworth | Mause I 272 Optimal Taxation/Edgeworth: Problem: How is a given financing need of the state distributed among the different individuals in such a way that the total welfare lost is kept as low as possible? Solution/Edgeworth: an identical marginal victim should be demanded. For example, if the marginal benefit of another euro of net income decreases with increasing income levels, then with increasing taxation the marginal individual benefit loss increases more rapidly, and any redistribution of the tax burden to an individual who experiences a lower marginal benefit loss increases social welfare. VsEdgeworth: Problem: In a heterogeneous population it is hardly possible to obtain information about the utility functions of individual households. If, instead, identical preference orders are assumed, the demand for the same marginal victim is identical to the demand for an equal distribution of net income. See also Taxation/Ramsey. 1. Edgeworth, Francis Y. The pure theory of taxation. Economic Journal 7, 1897. S. 46– 70. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
EconEdge Francis Ysidro Edgeworth Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences London 1881 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Taxation | Friedman | Gaus I 212 Taxation/minimal welfare state/public goods/Friedman/Moon: (...) are typical welfare goods public goods (...)? To some degree, perhaps. If we all wanted to live in a society where no one suffered from destitution, and were willing to pay something to see that achieved, then we would all be better off if the government provided a safety net. Reasoning along these lines, Milton Friedman (1962(1):191) has argued for a minimal welfare state, in which a 'negative income tax' would be employed to provide a subsistence income to people without other means of support. The minimal welfare state would not, however, be an 'institutional welfare state', since its main concern would be to ensure that everyone had enough income to avoid destitution. Presumably, it would also provide other public goods such as public health and sanitation, for each of us is better off if others are inoculated against infectious diseases, or if the town disposes of every household's sewage and garbage in a sanitary manner. Vs: but many welfare programmes do not seem to provide public goods: the principal beneficiary of an old age pension is the pensioner, the principal beneficiary of a high school or college education is the student whose skills are improved and whose life is enriched, the principal beneficiary of open heart surgery is the patient whose life is saved, and so forth. >Welfare State/Political Philosophy, >Institutions/Barr, >Unemployment/Moon. 1. Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Brocker I 408 Taxation/Friedman: Friedman's proposal is to cancel all individual social and distributional measures and replace them with a negative income tax. This saves a lot of bureaucracy and the idea of self-determination of individual lifestyles is given an economic basis. (1) 1. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago 1962. Dt.: Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, München 2004. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Taxation | Ramsey | Mause I 272 Optimal Taxation/RamseyVsEdgeworth/Ramsey: how should the use ((s) instead of the amount) of income be taxed? Problem: taxation, which causes welfare losses for individuals only in the form of negative income effects, would have to take the form of flat-rate tax amounts that are levied independently of income. (1) Solution: tax household consumption, i.e. set a separate tax rate for each consumer good. Problem: as long as not all goods are taxed identically, this leads to efficiency losses resulting from substitution effects. Citizens change their plans when prices change. ((s) Substitution problem: shift in demand to less taxed goods). Solution: the task of the state is then to reduce efficiency losses. This changes the focus of the theory: it is no longer first and foremost about the distribution of burdens to individual households, but about the question of which goods should be taxed and how high in order to keep the overall welfare losses as low as possible. 1. Frank P. Ramsey, A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal 37, 1927, S. 47– 61. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Terminology | Buchanan | Brocker I 562 Terminology/Buchanan: "protective state": Provides citizens with protection in the form of legal certainty. Productive state: here, citizens agree on what public goods they want to provide, in what quantities and at what cost to whom. Both forms complement each other according to Buchanan's concept of economic liberalism. In this way, the state separates itself from the extremes of utopian anarchy (in the sense of a spontaneous, morally harmonizing coexistence order) and a threatening, expanding bureaucracy of a welfare state by Leviathan. See Buchanan 1975 (1). 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Terminology | Dawkins | I 27 Def Altruistic/Dawkins: An organism behaves altruistically when it increases the welfare of another at its expense. I 28 Def Well-Being/Dawkins: Well-being is defined as survival chances even if the effect on the actual outlook is so small that it can seem negligible. Egoism/Altruism/Dawkins: oriented on actual behavior, not on intentions. No psychology of motives! I 32 Altruism/Dawkins: Altruism is often falsely attributed: when living creatures actually behave in a way that benefits the "well-being of the species" or "well-being of the group". I 126 Def ESS/Dawkins: an evolutionarilly stable strategy is one that - if the majority of a population adopts it - cannot be overruled by any alternative strategy. ((S) Not defined.) I 447 Narrower Def ESS: a strategy that performs well against copies of itself. It will often encounter copies of itself, since a successful strategy is predominant in a population. I 227 Fitness/Dawkins: The expression should not be used, because it falsely emanates from the individual! Instead, the selfish gene is the only entity that matters! Genes in children are selected because of their ability to override parents, genes in the parents' body vice versa. I 377 Def Extended phenotype/Dawkins: phenotypic effects of a gene are all the effects of a gene on the body in which it sits. But it also affects "the world"! E.g. beavers' dams, birds' nests, shell of the quiver flies (movable cement houses). In difference to the eye as a "miracle of nature", we do not have to attribute these achievements to processes that occur within the mothers' interior. They are achievements of the creating individual. (Usually called "instinct"). I 386 Def haplodiploid: unfertilized eggs develop into males. I.e., e.g., male bark beetles have no father (as is the case with bees and ants). But in the case of the bark beetles something must penetrate the eggs. This task is performed by bacteria. (Parasites). |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Theories | Lamont | Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877(1); Sidgwick, 1890(2)). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991(3)). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982(4); Gauthier, 1987(5); Levin, 1982(6)). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986(7); Morris, 1998(8): ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991(9)). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979(10); Rakowski, 1991)(11). >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)(12), Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990(13)) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)(14), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989(15); 1990(16); 1991(17)), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)(18), and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)(19). Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996(20); Gaus, 1996(21)). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Thinking | Arendt | Brocker I 356 Thinking/Arendt: Thesis: A new type of thinking corresponds to human actions in modernism (see Modernism/Arendt). Scientific abstraction increasingly takes the place of communicative and judgmental thinking and speaking (1). Philosophy has fallen victim to this development in that it has turned away from the world and turned towards abstract thinking. Once a servant of theology and queen of science, it has become an appendage of technology and science. Philosophers would explain the course of the world only post festum (2). Brocker I 362 The common understanding about the welfare of the community has receded behind the active life (working and producing). From now on, thinking has to be constantly in need of proof to be applicable and useful. This would result in an insolvable dilemma: Creating meaning together does not result from the automatic processes of labour and production. But if labour (and production) are declared the only foundation for meaning and legitimacy in the lives of individuals and in society, then that dimension of common in freedom that goes beyond life is missing. 1. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago 1958. Dt.: Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben, München/Zürich 61989 (zuerst 1960), S. 10f. 2.Ibid. p. 286f. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Time Preference | Rawls | I 293 Time-Preference/Rationality/Sidgwick/Rawls: Rationality implies that it applies to the entire span of our lives; that something happens sooner or later is no reason to take it into account more or less strongly. However, the immediate present or near future may be a deciding factor in assessing safety or probability and we should consider the effect of our immediate situation. Rawls I 294 But none of this justifies a preference of a good because of its temporal positioning(1)(2). I 294 Time preference/Generational justice/Rawls: (See Time Preference/Sidgwick, Time Preference/Sen): Sidgwick's thesis: that something happens sooner or later is no reason to take it more or less strongly into account. Sen thesis: The situation is symmetrical: There is no reason for the parties to give special weight to the pure positioning in the course of time. I 295 Rawls: rejecting a time preference is not incompatible with considering uncertainties and changing circumstances. Nor does it rule out the possibility of investment funds paying interest for a limited period of time. It is only excluded that in the initial situation of a society to be established, a certain generation is preferred. Democracy: Question: does this not contradict the principles of democracy, which require that the wishes of the present generation be taken into account(3)(4)? I 296 Rawls: that depends on the interpretation. Once the public will has been expressed, it cannot be ignored. I 297 For a more general design, however, our principles of justice are decisive. 1. H. Sidgwick The Methos of Ethics, 7nd ed. London, 1907, p. 381. 2. See also F. P. Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving", Economic Journal, vol. 38,1928, (reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics). 3. Cf. A. Sen, "On Optimizing the Rate of Savings", Economic Journal, 71, (1960) p. 482. 4. S. A. Marglin, "The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment", Quarterly Journal of Iconomics, vol. 77 (1963), pp. 100-109. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Time Preference | Sidgwick | Rawls I 293 Time-Preference/Rationality/Sidgwick/Rawls: Rationality implies that it applies to the entire span of our lives; that something happens sooner or later is no reason to take it into account more or less strongly. >Rationality, >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future. However, the immediate present or near future may be a deciding factor in assessing safety or probability and we should consider how our immediate situation affects. >Probability, >Situation, >Actions. Rawls I 294 But none of this justifies a preference for a good because of its temporal positioning.(1) >Justification. 1. H. Sidgwick The Methos of Ethics, 7nd ed. London, 1907, p. 381; See also F. P. Ramsey,"A Mathematical Theory of Saving", Economic Journal, vol. 38,1928., reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics.) |
Sidgwick I Henry Sidgwick Methods of Ethics 2017 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Unemployment | Moon | Gaus I 212 Unemployment/welfare state/institutions/Moon: (...) private firms and voluntary organizations are poorly equipped to protect individuals from income loss due to unemployment. Non-governmental risk-pooling schemes work best when the chances that one person will suffer a given condition - say disability or death - are more or less independent of anyone else's chances, and when the overall risks facing the group are known. Under these conditions, each individual can pay into the fund, which can accumulate enough to provide beneflts to the unfortunate. But if the risks in question are not independent, if one person's suffering increases the likelihood that others will suffer as well, then a private scheme may collapse, as more and more people shift from being contributors to being claimants, and the group's reserves are depleted. Unemployment is (in part) cyclical, which means that in a downturn some people lose their jobs, and as a result reduce their consumption, thereby leading other firms to lay off workers, in an expanding cycle. Thus, a private firm or voluntary association offering unemployment insurance would run the risk of going out of business as fewer and fewer people held jobs (and so paid into the fund) and more and more people lost their jobs, and so became claimants. Because state-sponsored schemes, unlike private associations, are able to run deficits, and to the extent that these deficits actually contribute to expanding demand and so reducing unemployment and stabilizing the economy, they can deal with problems that non-state schemes cannot. >Welfare state/Political philosophy, >Minimal welfare state/Friedman, >Public goods, >Economic cycles, >Institutions/Barr. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Universalism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 230 Universalism/free trade/international realations/Political philosophy/Lamont: Libertarians argue that keeping trade barriers up in order to protect low wage workers in First World countries makes much poorer people in Third World countries worse off. >Libertarianism, cf. >Liberalism. The poorer people's liberty to engage in consensual trade with consumers in First World countries is restricted, thereby denying them an important means of improving their economic well-being (Lomasky, 2001)(1). >Freedom, >Inequality. This issue arises as a result of technological advances that have overcome distance, leading to economic globalization and with it the capacity of countries and corporations, through their policies and actions, dramatically to influence the freedom and well-being of people around the globe. >Progress, >Technology. Singer: Peter Singer (2002)(2), for example, asks whether political leaders should see their role as promoting the interests of their own citizens or whether they should be concerned with the welfare of people everywhere. >P. Singer. Impartiality: This question is connected to the more general problem of partiality/impartiality in moral theory: are we morally permitted or even sometimes required to give priority to the interests of one's own citizens, or indeed to one's own family (Barry, 1995(3); Friedman, 1989(4); 1991(5))? >Impartiality. Pogge: Thomas Pogge argues from a position of moral universalism to the conclusion that the standard attitude of recognizing greater obligations to alleviate the conditions of the poor or oppressed at home than those of the poor abroad counts as arbitrary discrimination (Pogge, 2001a(6); 2001b(7); Jones, 1999(8)). In one form or another, this question is crucial for all distributive justice theories. Ever increasing globalization will require greater attention to this area of research in each of the theories (...). >Globalization. 1. Lomasky, Loren (2001) 'Toward a liberal theory of national boundaries'. In David Miller and Sohail Hashmi, eds, Boundaries and Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press, 55-78. 2. Singer, Peter (2002) One World: The Ethics of Globalisation. Melbourne: Text. 3. Barry, Brian (1995) Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Friedman, Marilyn (1989) 'The impracticality of impartiality'. Journal of Philosophy, 86 (l l): 645-56. 5. Friedman, Marilyn (1991) 'The practice of partiality'. Ethics, 101 (4): 818-35. 6. Pogge 2001a 7. Pogge, Thomas (2001b) 'Global justice'. Metaphilosophy, 32 (1 and 2): 1-5. 8. Jones, Charles (1999) Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarianism | Dworkin | Brocker I 601 Utilitarianism/Rights/Dworkin: for utilitarianism, maximizing the overall well-being is the central objective. Rights, for example in the form of ownership guarantees, can also benefit the overall welfare. It can never be ruled out that sacrificing fundamental individual interests of individuals or groups could increase the overall benefit. >Rights. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Rights always protect the individual with reference to fundamental and central interests. Dworkin does not mean to say that all rights absolutely apply as well as the prohibition of torture. The fundamental point is again a logical one: rights only play their own normative role if they outdo collective goals in cases of conflict. Otherwise, any justification could be directly related to the objective (1). DworkinVsUtilitarianism: central objection: Utilitarianism can also take external preferences "impartially" into account such as discrimination against dark-skinned. (2) Problem: The purely aggregative ((s) summing up) thought of the best possible satisfaction of all possible preferences of all possible people knows no distinction between relevant and irrelevant, acceptable and unacceptable preferences. >Relevance, >Acceptability. PerfectionismVsDworkin: there are many kinds of external preferences that should be exempted from Dworkin's criticism: For example, external preferences such as taking sides with members of disadvantaged groups to which you yourself do not belong.(3) >Perfectionism. Brocker I 605 LadwigVsDworkin: Dworkin, when he wrote the essays gathered in Civil Rights taken seriously, still believed he could draft an ethically completely neutral theory of rights and justice (so also Dworkin 1985 (4)). >Civil rights. This may explain his strange assumption that the logical distinction between personal and external preferences is sufficient for criticism of utilitarianism, regardless of their content. DworkinVsDworkin: In later writings (Dworkin 1990b (5); 2011 (6)), however, Dworkin professes an ethical basis of his liberalism. The organizing idea behind his ever-increasing attempts to recognize unity in the world of values is now dignity. >Liberalism. 1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 161f. 2. Ibid. p. 382-385 3. Cf. Coleman, Jules L., »The Rights and Wrongs of Taking Rights Seriously«, in: Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 4204, 1978, p. 916f. 4. Ronald Dworkin, , A Matter of Principle, Oxford 1985. 5. Ronald Dworkin. »Foundations of Liberal Equality«, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, XI, Salt Lake City 1990 (b), 1-191. 6. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, Mass./London 2002. Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Utilitarianism | Gaus | Gaus I 105 Utilitarianism/happiness/utility/liberalism/Gaus: It does seem, (...) that if one accepts that (1) I value my own happiness, (2) because happiness is good, and (3) indeed is the only good and (4) more good is better than less good, then (5) assuming that we can interpersonally compare the happiness of different people, (6) one ought to seek the greatest happiness. Each step of this argument is controversial (and remains so regardless of whether ‘pleasure’ or ‘preference satisfaction’ is substituted for ‚happiness‘ (...). RawlsVsUtilitarinamis: Rawls (1971)(1), of course, argued that it was, at best, uncertain whether a principle that aims at maximizing the aggregate amount of utility (happiness, pleasure, etc.) would yield an equal distribution of liberty. If greater happiness for many could be achieved by granting a few a lesser liberty, then the principle of utility would apparently justify illiberal policies. >Utilitarian liberalism/Gaus, >Liberalism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Rawls. Most of the great classical political economists were utilitarians of some sort (Gaus, 1983b)(2), as probably are most economists today. The theory of the market is, in effect, a sophisticated argument showing that, under certain conditions, the best way to maximize aggregate utility is for each person to act to promote her own welfare. >Markets/J.R. McCulloch, cf. >Preference Utilitarianism. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2.Gaus, Gerald F. (1983b) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utilitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 414 Utilitarianism/Political Philosophy/Weinstein: Contemporary English utilitarians have championed liberal utilitarianism with increasing subtlety and sophistication. Rule utilitarianism: Rule utilitarians stress utilitarianism's compatibility with accepted moral rules and intuitions (Hare, 1981(1); Harsanyi, 1985(2); Hooker, 2000(3)), whereas ... Liberal utilitarianism: ... liberal utilitarians marry utilitarianism with strong liberal rights (Gray, 1983(4); Riley, 1988(5)). All such accounts nevertheless constitute different versions of what is now commonly known as indirect utilitarianism. Indirect utilitarianism: For indirect utilitarians, according to James Griffin, the principle of utility serves as a 'criterion' for assessing classes of actions. By contrast, established moral rules and/or basic liberal rights function as sources of direct obligation (or 'decision procedures') for guiding individual actions (Griffin, 1994(6): 179). Actions are morally wrong if they violate these decision procedures. Indirect utilitarians hold that respecting such decision procedures will best maximize general utility overall, though not necessarily in short-term individual cases. In other words, sometimes acting rightly is doing wrong. But why should I act rightly if acting rightly happens not to be for the utilitarian best in a given situation? Why should I be a mindless, rule-worshipping sucker?* Fundamental rights/equal rights/Liberal utilitarianism: (...) for liberal utilitarianism, fundamental rights function as critical decision procedures, making it more juridical than rule utilitarianism. Rights indirectly steer our actions along inviolable channels of acceptable behaviour that purportedly generate overall general utility. But liberal utilitarianism is not simply a more juridical version of indirect utilitarianism. VsLiberal unitiltarianism: Contemporary liberal utilitarianism is often criticized in the same way as Mill's contemporary opponents assailed him for trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. For instance, John Gray (1989(7): 218—24) has recanted his earlier enthusiasm for liberal utilitarianism, agreeing with liberal utilitarianism's critics that it futilely seeks to join multiple ultimate normative criteria, namely utility and indefeasible moral rights. Gray: For Gray, either maximizing utility logically trumps rights, or rights (in so far as they possess authentic moral weight) trump maximizing utility. Liberal utilitarianism fails logically because it pulls in opposite normative directions, instructing us to maximize utility when doing so violates rights and to respect rights when doing so fails to maximize utility. We sometimes must choose between our liberalism and our utilitarianism. Egalitarian utilitarianism: Egalitarian liberals, in contrast to utilitarians, feature equality over utility as their overriding normative concern. Still, utilitarians are not indifferent to equality and distributive justice. As we have just seen, indirect utilitarians take these values seriously, though not so seriously that they trump maximizing utility as the ultimate normative standard. Utilitarians also prize equality in the sense that impartiality is constitutive of the principle of is counted for utility. Each person's 'happiness exactly as much as another's' (Mill, 1969(8): 257).** >J. St. Mill, >Egalitarianism. For egalitarian liberals, however, equality plays a more commanding role because many of them favour internalist arguments for equality.*** And because equality matters for them up front, they also tend to be more preoccupied with questions about equality of what rather than why. Cf. >Individuals/Bradley, >Liberty/Bosanquet, >Self-realization/Hobhouse. Gaus I 415 New Liberalism: (...) new liberals favoured a more robust threshold of equalizing opportunity rights. Although they concurred with >Bosanquet that possessing property was a potent means of 'self-utterance' and therefore crucial to successfully externalizing and realizing ourselves, they also stipulated that private property was legitimate only in so far as it did not Gaus I 416 subvert equal opportunity. >Equal opportunities. Hobson: In Hobson's words, 'A man is not really free for purposes of self-development who is not adequately provided' with equal and easy access to land, a home, capital and credit. Hobson concludes that although liberalism is not state socialism, it nevertheless implies considerably 'increased public ownership and control of industry' (1974(9): xii).ll New liberals, then, transformed English liberalism by making social welfare, and the state's role in promoting it, pivotal. They crafted welfare liberalism into a sophisticated theoretical alternative.**** >Liberalism, >Idealism. * For critics of contemporary indirect utilitarianism, rule-worshipping suckers are irrational because rule utilitarianism is not merely paradoxical, but illogical. Acting rightly can never sometimes entail doing wrong as if acting and doing mean different things. Rule utilitarians have responded by distinguishing between idealistic rule utilitarianism, actual state rule utilitarianism and conditional rule utilitarianism. Ideal rule utilitarianism holds that actions are right if they comport with rules whose general acceptance would promote utility. Actual state rule utilitariamsm adds the condition that these rules must, in fact, be generally accepted. Conditional rule utilitarianism is weaker still as it further stipulates that actions are right if they conform to rules that always maximize utility. ** Mill continues, 'The equal claim of everybody to happiness . involves an equal claim to all the means to happiness (1969(8): 257). In a revealing footnote about Spencer, Mill adds that 'perfect impartiality between persons' supposes that 'equal amounts of happmess are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons'. These egalitarian implications of impartiality are not identical and entail vastly different redistributive strategies. *** For Gerald Gaus (2000(10): 136-45), utilitarian arguments for equality are external because they endorse equal treatment for the sake of advancing some external value, namely happiness. Arguments from fundamental human equality justify equal treatment on the basis of some (internal) attribute according to which people are purportedly equal in fact. **** Idealists, like Jones and Collingwood, similarly favoured vigorously expanding equal opportunities through government. 1. Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking. Oxford: Oxford mversity Press. 2. Harsanyi, John (1985) 'Rule utilitarianism, equality and justice'. Social Philosophy and Policy, 2: 115-27. 3. Hooker, Brad (2000) Ideal code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge. 5. Riley, Jonathan (1988) Liberal Utilitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Griffin, James (1994) 'The distinction between a criterion and a decision procedure', Utilitas, 6: 177-82. 7. Gray, John (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence. London: Routledge. 8. Mill, J. S. (1969) Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of J. S. Mill, vol. 10. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 9. Hobson, J. A. (1974 119091) The Crisis of Liberalism. Brighton: Barnes and Noble. 10. Gaus, Gerald (2000) Political Concepts and Political Theories. Boulder, CO: Westview. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Utility | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 296 Consumption/Utility/Climate Change/Ecological Theories: It is commonly assumed that each individual's utility can be estimated on the basis of their aggregate consumption of goods and services, using a utility function that is common to all of them. The impact of climate change, and of responses to it (i.e. adaptation and mitigation), is measured as a change in this consumption. Norgaard I 300 Aggregate consumption per capita in empirical studies is simply derived from a future prediction of economic output (i.e. gross domestic product or GDP) per capita, by netting out investment. The impacts of climate change, and responses to it, are then estimated as equivalent changes in consumption, and added to this baseline flow of consumption per capita. Thus every effect of climate change, of adaptation, and of mitigation must be priced. Consumption is transformed into utility by means of a utility function. (…) the marginal utility of consumption diminishes as one becomes richer. The effect of this is to place less (more) weight on the impacts of climate change and response strategies on rich (poor) individuals. Since consumption happens to be distributed unequally across time, space, and states of nature, this is how (…) the utility function affects the social discount rate, risk and inequality aversion. Certainly any approach that takes seriously (i) the consequences of policy choices for (ii) human well‐being can be insightful (Sen 1999)(1). Vs: (…) the narrowness of the approach also gives rise to some serious concerns, which have been expressed more generally about welfare economics in numerous other settings. Perhaps the most obvious one is that the approach apparently ignores several factors that contribute to human well‐being. In particular, what role do changes in environmental, political and social circumstances play? (…) if they can be estimated as equivalent changes in consumption—monetized—then they can be included in the estimation of utility. (…) the baseline for utility is (…) essentially individual income [and it] does ignore other non‐monetary constituents. Second, it is in practice very difficult to place money values on many of the effects of climate change, and it is well known that the Norgaard I 301 IAMs [integrated assessment models] used to conduct economic evaluation omit some potentially important changes in environmental, political and social conditions (Watkiss and Downing 2008)(2). Third, the approach does not pay nearly enough attention to the distinction that is suggested to exist between the things that human beings vitally need, and the things that they merely desire (e.g. O'Neill, Holland, et al. 2008)(3). 1. Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. 2. Watkiss, P., and Downing, T. E. 2008. The social cost of carbon: Valuation estimates and their use in UK policy. Integrated Assessment 8(1): 85–105. 3. O'Neill, J., Holland, A., et al. 2008. Environmental Values. London: Routledge. Dietz, Simon: “From Efficiency to Justice: Utility as the Informational Basis for Climate Strategies, and Some Alternatives”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Utility | Edgeworth | Rawls I 170 Benefits/Politics/Edgeworth/RawlsVsEdgeworth/Rawls: the argumentation of Edgeworth (F. Y. Edgeworth 1888(1), 1897(2)) can be modified to justify almost any political norm. Edgeworth thesis: under certain reasonable assumptions, it is rational for self-interested parties to agree with the principle of utility in assessing social policy, because the political process is not a competitive market. That is why, according to Edgeworth, we need the Utility Principle as a criterion. He seems to think that in the long run, the policy of maximizing benefits will prevail in order to generate the greatest benefit for each individual. Appropriate application on tax legislation and property regulation should bring about the best results from everyone's point of view. RawlsVsEdgeworth: the error is that the assumptions required for this are extremely unrealistic. (Here, I use an argument against Edgeworth from I. M. D. Little 1957(3): We must assume that the impact of decisions on political processes is not independent and can therefore never be very large, because otherwise they would not be independent. In order for the various benefits to be distributed randomly, people would either have to live for a very long time and change their positions by chance, or there would have to be a legislative mechanism guided by the average principle which distributes the benefits equally in the long term. However, society is not a stochastic process that takes place in this way. 1. F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, London, 1888, pp. 52-56; 2. F.Y. Edgeworth „The Pure Theory of Taxation“, Edonomic Journal, vol 7, 1897. 3. I. M. D. Little, Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1957. |
EconEdge Francis Ysidro Edgeworth Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences London 1881 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Wages | Rothbard | Rothbard III 558 Wages/Rothbard: A wage is the term describing the payment for the unit services of a labor factor. A wage, therefore, is a special case of rent; it is labor’s “hire.” On a free market this rent cannot, of course, be capitalized, since the whole labor factor—the man—cannot be bought and sold for a price, his income to accrue to his owner. This is precisely what occurs, however, under a regime of slavery. The wage, in fact, is the only source of rent that cannot be capitalized on the free market, since every man is necessarily a self-owner with an inalienable will. >Inalienability/Rothbard, >Slavery/Rothbard, >Labour/Rothbard, >Production factors/Rothbard, >Service/Rothbard. One distinction between wages and land rents, then, is that the latter are capitalized and transformed into interest return, while the former are not. >Capitalization/Rothbard. Rothbard III 580 Wages/Rothbard: It is “total wage rates” that are determined on the market. They tend to be equalized on the market and to be set at the DMVP (descounted marginal value product) of the worker. Total wage rates are the money paid out by the employer for labor services. They do not necessarily correspond to the “take-home pay” of the worker. The latter may be called the “overt wage rates.” Thus, suppose that there are two competing employers bidding for the same type of labor. One employer, Mr. A, pays out a certain amount of money, not in direct wages, but in pension funds or other “welfare” benefits. These benefits, it must be realized, will not be added as a gift from the employer to the workers. They will not be additions to the total wage rates. Overt wage rates paid out by Mr. A will instead be correspondingly lower than those paid out by his rival, Mr. B, who does not have to spend on the “welfare” benefits. To the employer, in other words, it makes no difference in what form workers cost him money, whether in “take-home pay” or in welfare benefits. But he cannot pay more than the worker’s DMVP; i.e., the worker’s total wage income is set by this amount. The worker, in effect, chooses in what form he would like his pay and in what proportion of net wage rates to “welfare” benefits. >Labour/Rothbard, >Economy/Rothbard. Rothbard III 583 Wages/unemployment/Keynesianism/Rothbard: RothbardVsKeynesianism: (…) the whole modern and Keynesian emphasis on employment has to be revalued. For the great missing link in their discussion of unemployment is precisely the wage rate. To talk of unemployment or employment without reference to a wage rate is as meaningless as talking of “supply” or “demand” without reference to a price. And it is precisely analogous. The demand for a commodity makes sense only with reference to a certain price. In a market for goods, it is obvious that whatever stock is offered as supply, it will be “cleared,” i.e., sold, at a price determined by the demand of the consumers. No good need remain unsold if the seller wants to sell it; all he need do is lower the price sufficiently, in extreme cases even below zero if there is no demand for the good and he wants to get it off his hands. The situation is precisely the same here. Here we are dealing with labor services. Whatever supply of labor service is brought to market can be sold, but only if wages are set at whatever rate will clear the market. >Free market/Rothbard. The problem, then, is not employment, but employment at an above-subsistence wage. >Unemployment/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Welfare Economics | Arrow | Mause I 271 Welfare Economics/Arrow: Def Arrow theorem: it is impossible to democratically derive from the unrestricted preferences of individuals a consistent social welfare function that cannot be manipulated by adding irrelevant alternatives and fulfils the Pareto criterion. (1) ArrowVsNeoclassical theories, See Welfare Economics/Neoclassical Economics. Problems: See Benefit/Mueller, Dennis C. 1.Kenneth J. Arrow, Social choice and individual values. New Haven 1951. |
EconArrow I Kenneth J. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Welfare Economics | Austrian School | Coyne I 31 Welfare economics/Austrian School/Coyne/Boettke: (…) consider the thought process of an entrepreneur who is deciding whether or not to pursue a venture that might only yield profits in a decade. If the entrepreneur believes that there is a good chance that the government will change the rules and confiscate her wealth over the next decade, she will have a weaker incentive to invest. If, in contrast, the entrepreneur has confidence that the existing rules, which allow entrepreneurs to keep the profits from their investments, will remain constant over the next decade, she will be more likely to invest in the long-term project. The broader point is that interventionism, to the extent that it results in unpredictable or overly burdensome interference in economic activity, poses a threat to the entrepreneurial dynamism of the market process. An appreciation of the problems posed by interventionism - the knowledge problem and unintended consequences - is at the core of the Austrian critique of standard welfare economics. Welfare economics studies how resource allocations affect social well-being. Standard welfare economics, which serves as the economic rationale for government intervention, concerns itself with finding the best use of available resources under the assumption that all the relevant information concerning preferences and production techniques is known and given. AustrianVsWelfare economics: The economic problem, under such circumstances, is a simple computational problem of employing the right means to obtain the appropriate ends. Adoption of policy is based on how well the market can handle the static economic problem confronting society. To the extent that the market does not approximate the ideal, it is said to fail and government is called upon to push the economy closer to the solution of the economic problem through interventionism. >Interventions/Austrian School, >Interventionism/Mises. Austrians argue that this is not the economic problem society confronts. The problem is rather one of discovering and using the dispersed and tacit knowledge that emerges from interactions. Thus, while mainstream economics models the competitive market as a type of supercomputer, Austrians view the market as a means of mobilizing and using the context-specific knowledge dispersed throughout society. Free Market: The bias that Austrians share towards the free market, therefore, is grounded in the effectiveness of this system at using and conveying the various bits and pieces of knowledge necessary to allocate resources in a value-added manner. >Free Market/Rothbard. Knowledge: The emphasis on the division of knowledge and the market process as a means of discovering and using this knowledge is the crux of the Austrian criticism of both comprehensive and piecemeal government intervention into a freely operating market. Government's inability to obtain the knowledge necessary to plan or regulate the price system is the fundamental economic criticism of intervention into the market order. >Knowledge/Hayek, >Markets. We emphasize the term "economics" to highlight that this is not an ideological argument in favour of markets, but rather a subtle argument in technical economics about the type of knowledge, and the source of that knowledge, necessary to use scarce resources in a way that improves human welfare. Cf. >Price control, >Sales ban, >Sales tax. |
Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Welfare Economics | Classical Economics | ||
| Welfare Economics | Lamont | Gaus I 223 Welfare economics/economic theories/Lamont: The various positions on offer usually describe idealized distributive systems, which often attract the criticism that such systems could never be realized — 'they don't apply to the real world' is how the complaint is expressed. LamontVs: his criticism is misguided, as it misconstrues the practical influence of normative theories of distributive justice. These theories should be viewed not as holding out a utopian dream, but as proposing ideals against which the messiness of real-world systems can be understood and evaluated. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare Economics | Mueller | Mause I 271 Welfare Economics/Mueller: for the establishment of a welfare function it is necessary to assume cardinal and also individual benefit measures. (1) Problem: these requirements for social welfare functions are more demanding and therefore less realistic than those raised by other microeconomic theory, See Hands (2) Vs: some authors argue that the results of empirical happiness research can be used to construct cardinal and interpersonal comparable utility measures. (3)(4) >Utility, >Utilitarianism. VsVs: in practice, there are several reasons against this approach, including in particular political manipulability and the possibility of a strategic response to corresponding surveys. (5) Solution: the theory of optimal fiscal policy has always been based on simplistic assumptions that significantly reduce the complexity of the analysis. For example, the assumption of identical benefit functions for all members of the population. Then one can concentrate more on the observable distribution of goods. >Idealization. 1, Dennis C. Mueller, Public choice III. Cambridge 2003, S. 565-567. 2.Wade D. Hands, Paul Samuelson and revealed preference theory. History of Political Economy 46, (1) 2014, S.85– 116. 3. Ng, Yew-Kwang. A case for happiness, cardinalism and interpersonal comparability. Economic Journal 107, 1997. S. 1848– 1858. 4. Norbert Hirschauer, Mira Lehberger, und Oliver Musshoff. Happiness and utility in economic thought – Or: What can we learn from happiness research for public policy analysis and public policy making? Social Indicators Research 121, 2015. S.647– 674. 5. Bruno S. Frey und Alois Stutzer. The use of happiness research for public policy. Social Choice and Welfare 38 (4), 2011. S. 659– 674. |
EconMuell I Dennis C. Mueller Public Choice III Cambridge 2003 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Welfare Economics | Neoclassical Economics | 269ffWelfare Economics/Neoclassics: Welfare Economics is an essential part of the neoclassical paradigm. It makes use of methodological individualism and pursues an approach of marginal utility. It is orientated utilitarian, i.e. that the respective benefit estimation of the individuals is taken into account. (Bentham's welfare function (1)). W = W(y1, y2, ..., yn) Methodical Problem: the individual benefit estimates are in turn aggregated to a social welfare value. This cannot be founded on an individualistic basis. Mause I 270 Problem: this form of redistribution can lead to injustice if the individual pecuniary situation of individuals is not taken into account. Solution: one has to go back one step and use the general functional form of a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function. (2)(3) Welfare maximum: one condition for its achievement is Pareto efficiency. Def Pareto efficiency: exists when no member of society can be better off without putting another member worse. If this condition is not met, efficiency reserves must still be used. Another condition for an optimal fiscal policy: there must be no unused potential for exchange profits, i.e. that the individual goods are allocated to the consumers. Problem: there are theoretically infinitely many allocations that are Pareto efficient, but only one maximizes social welfare. Def First theorem of welfare economics: any market equilibrium produces Pareto efficiency during full competition and absence of external effects. Def Second theorem of welfare economics: each of these market equilibria can be achieved through an appropriate distribution of resources in the initial situation without loss of efficiency. (4) 1. Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate public economics, Cambridge, MA, 2013. 2. Bergson, Abram. 1938. A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 52 (7), 1938, S. 314– 344. 3. Paul A. Samuelson, The foundations of economic analysis. Cambridge, MA 1947. 4. Nicola Acocella, The foundations of economic policy: Values and techniques. Cambridge 1998 S. 72-77. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Welfare State | Friedman | Gaus I 212 Welfare state/public goods/Friedman/Moon: (...) are typical welfare goods public goods (...)? To some degree, perhaps. If we all wanted to live in a society where no one suffered from destitution, and were willing to pay something to see that achieved, then we would all be better off if the government provided a safety net. Reasoning along these lines, Milton Friedman (1962(1): 191) has argued for a minimal welfare state, in which a 'negative income tax' would be employed to provide a subsistence income to people without other means of support. The minimal welfare state would not, however, be an 'institutional welfare state' , since its main concern would be to ensure that everyone had enough income to avoid destitution. Presumably, it would also provide other public goods such as public health and sanitation, for each of us is better off if others are inoculated against infectious diseases, or if the town disposes of every household's sewage and garbage in a sanitary manner. Vs: but many welfare programmes do not seem to provide public goods: the principal beneficiary of an old age pension is the pensioner, the principal beneficiary of a high school or college education is the student whose skills are improved and whose life is enriched, the principal beneficiary of open heart surgery is the patient whose life is saved, and so forth. >Welfare state/Political philosophy, >Unemployment/Moon. 1. Friedman, Milton (1962): Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Gender Theory | Gaus I 278 Welfare state/Gender theory/Mottier: Scandinavian authors such as Drude Dahlerup (1987)(1), Birte Siim (1988)(2), and Helga Hernes (1984(3); 1987(4)) argue that the welfare state has a positive effect on gender relations, in that it makes for a lessening of financial dependency of women towards men. Liberalism: Liberal authors defend a similarly more benign view, in that they conceptualize the liberal state as a neutral arbiter between groups rather than as an instrument of male domination (see also Waylen, 1998)(5). Institutionalization/femocracy: other analyses, developed particularly in the Australian, Dutch and Scandinavian context, argue that the state offers scope for the subversion and transformation of gendered power relations. They emphasize the possibilities of institutionalization - and therefore of promotion - of women's interests within the state, either through the action of 'femocrats' (feminist bureaucrats) working from within the state system to empower women, or when the state itself acts in a way to further women's status (Stetson and Mazur 1995)(6). Gender mainstreaming: in this context, an important policy tool has been gender mainstreaming, by which is meant the systematic incorporation of gender concerns into policies rather than as an 'afterthought' or, alternatively, the emphasis on gender issues in specific policies. >State/Poststructuralism, >State/Gender Theory. 1. Dahlerup, Drude (1987) 'Confusing concepts - confusing reality: a theoretical discussion of the patriarchal state'. In A. Showstack Sassoon, ed., Women and the State. London: Routledge, 93-127. 2. Siim, Birte (1988) 'Towards a feminist rethinking of the welfate state'. In Kathleen B. Jones and Anna G. Jonasdottir, eds, The Political Interests of Gender. London: Sage, 160—86. 3. Hernes, Helga (1984) 'Women and the welfare state: the transition from private to public dependence'. In H. Holter, ed., Patriarchy in a Welfare Society. Oslo: Universitetsvorlag, 26—44. 4.Hernes, Helga (1987) State and Woman Power. Oslo: Norwegian University Press. 5. Stetson, D. and A. Mazur, eds (1995) Comparative State Feminism. London: Sage. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Giddens | Gaus I 219 Labour/Welfare state/Giddens/Moon: [the] obligation to work is not, or is not merely, a demand to be made on the individual, one which he might reasonably wish to resist, for ultimately it is rooted in an ideal of social inclusion and active citizenship through which the individual's own interests and needs can be realized. Anthony Giddens sounds this theme in his call for 'the positive welfare society', in which 'the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the development of self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility become the prime focus' (1998(1): 128). >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Labour/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Political philosophy. Giddens: Replacing the traditional 'welfare state' with the 'social investment state' , the task of government would be to invest in 'human capital' rather than 'the direct provision of economic maintenance' (1998(1): 117). Although he allows that full employment might not be realized, he calls for the redistribution of work to include as many as possible, and various forms of payment for participation in the 'social economy' , the sphere of civil society traditionally maintained by voluntary work. >Labour/Welfare economics. 1. Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Brocker I 871 Welfare State/Giddens: Giddens adopts important "points of criticism of the right" in the field of the welfare state, which is decisive for the theory and practice of social democracy: "The welfare state is undemocratic in principle, because it is based on a redistribution of resources from top to bottom. Its concern is protection and care, but it does not leave enough room for personal freedom. Some institutions of the welfare state are bureaucratic, alienating and inefficient; moreover, social benefits can partly do the opposite of what they are supposed to achieve. The policy of the third way nevertheless sees these difficulties not as a trigger to dismantle the welfare state, but as an occasion to reshape it".(1) Solution/Giddens: Overcoming the welfare state that subsequently repairs and distributes social services through a strategy of targeted "social investment" in human skills. This involves above all education, training, lifelong learning, retraining in the event of structural job losses and assistance in setting up smaller enterprises. On the one hand, this reduces the tension between economic productivity and the welfare state, which in the old social democracy was always highly strained, both in terms of financing and the passivating consequences of a mere redistribution policy. On the other hand, citizens are "trained" for involvement in civil society, which both presupposes and in turn "trains" the self-responsible involvement of citizens. 1. Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg. Die Erneuerung der sozialen Demokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1999, p. 132. Thomas Meyer, „Anthony Giddens, Der dritte Weg“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Welfare State | Habermas | IV 510 Welfare State/Habermas: the social, i.e. initially private consequential burdens of the class conflict cannot be kept away from the political public. Thus the welfare state becomes the political content of mass democracy. This shows that the political system cannot emancipate itself from the utility value orientations of the citizens without trace; it cannot produce mass loyalty to any extent, but must also make verifiable offers of legitimacy with the social state program. Tariff policy: the legal institutionalisation of collective bargaining has become the basis of a reformist policy that has led to pacification of the class conflict by the welfare state. IV 511 Problem: Social policy faces the dilemma that is expressed at the fiscal level in the zero-sum game of public budgets for social policy tasks on the one hand and for tasks of economic and growth-promoting infrastructure policy on the other. Both the direct negative effects of the capitalist employment system and the dysfunctional side effects of economic growth controlled by capital accumulation on the lifeworld must be absorbed. The welfare state must not violate the conditions of stability and mobility requirements, because corrective interventions generally only do not trigger reactions on the part of the privileged groups if they do not affect vested rights. This means that not only the scope of welfare state services, but also the nature and organisation of services of general interest must be adapted to the structure of the exchange regulated by money and power IV 512 between the formally organised areas of action and their environments. The accumulation process must only be guarded by state intervention and must not be changed in any way. Austromarxism: interprets this as the result of a class compromise. Representatives: Otto Bauer, Karl Renner. HabermasVsAustromarxism: Rather, the social opposition with its institutionalization loses its structuring power for the lifeworld of social groups. IV 515 Democracy/social state/Habermas: mass social state democracy is an arrangement that makes the class antagonism still built into the economic system harmless under one condition, namely that the growth dynamics guarded by state interventionism does not slacken. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Welfare State | Hayek | Gaus I 214 Welfare state/social minimum/Hayek/Moon: Property rights: As Waldron (1993(1): ch. I and passim) argues, the only system of property rights that all have a reason to endorse would be one that ensured that no one need be deprived of essential resources, and the obvious way of achieving that would be to make property holdings subject to taxation, so that the state could provide essential goods and services, or at least a minimum income, when necessary.* >Property. Social minimum state/Moon: This line of argument supports what might be called a social minimum state, not necessarily an institutional welfare state. The core argument is that some fundamental human values - the idea of a meaningful life, personal autonomy, or life itself - can be realized (or at least guaranteed) only if there are government programmes providing enough income at least for subsistence. >Minimal state, >Social minimum. Welfare state/social minmum/Hayek: F. A. Hayek, for example, is renowned as a critic of the welfare state, but he accepts the idea of a social minimum, arguing that citizens may feel that there is 'a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who cannot help themselves' and so the society could provide 'a uniform minimum income... outside the market' to those who are indigent (1976(2): 87).** >Fundamental rights/Political philosophy. * See Lomasky (1987)(3) for a rights-based defence of a mmimal welfare state, which taxes people to provide for a minimum standard of living for all. ** Although generally critical of the welfare state, Hayek seems to allow for certain forms of public provision and compulsory insurance (1960(4):285-394). 1. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 2. Hayek, Friedrich (1976). The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Lomasky, Loren (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 4. Hayek, Friedrich (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: Umversity of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Mayer | Gaus I 218 Welfare state/Susan Mayer/Moon: In a recent study aptly titled What Money Can Buy (1997(1)), Susan Mayer has examined the 'functionings' of children, adolescents, and young adults, and correlated them with family income. Her findings, consistent with Sen’s general argument about the relationship between resources and functionings, (>Welfare state/Sen) are that, above a basic level, in most cases 'additional parental income does not improve children's chances for success' (1997(1): 2). Mayer hypothesizes that the reason that income has such a limited effect is that other parental characteristics, such as 'skills, diligence, honesty, good health, and reliability, also improve children's life chances, independent of their effect on parents' income. Children of parents with these attributes do well even when their parents do not have much income' (1997(1): 3). The more general point here is that functionings that are important for full membership or citizenship depend upon internalized dispositions and skills and not merely on access to external resources. Thus, it might be concluded, ensuring equal citizenship requires programmes that go beyond the provision of external resources. >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/ Political philosophy. 1. Mayer, Susan (1997) What Money Can 't Buy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Mead | Gaus i 219 Welfare state/work/Lawrence Mead/Moon: One can acknowledge that people rely upon 'welfare' because their options are so limited, and so their condition represents an indictment of the society rather than the individuals concerned, but the fact remains that receipt of social assistance does not enable one to attain full citizenship or membership in society. It simply sustains one in a marginalized condition. Social inclusion requires more than receiving benefits. Lawrence Mead: this line of argument has been advanced by a number of 'conservative' critics of the welfare state. Lawrence Mead (1992)(3), for example, argues that the character of poverty at least in America has changed in the past several decades, and that the social exclusion represented by poverty reflects the inability of poor people to act as rational agents in pursuit even of their own interests.*The key to overcoming this exclusion is to inculcate in the passive poor the capacities for agency, for acting to promote their own interests and to control their own lives, by imposing adequate disciplinary controls on them. If poverty creates social exclusion, and so is a barrier to citizenship, then the state must ensure that its citizens develop the capacities that enable them to escape poverty. The key policy, in Mead's view, is workfare; the poor must be required to work as a condition of support, for unless they develop the discipline and sense of accomplishment that work involves, they will be unable to escape the conditions of dependency. Social policy must take on an explicitly 'paternalistic' character, and the state self-consciously assume a tutelary role. Mead holds out the possibility that 'public paternalism might help regenerate informal (social) controls, by involving community organizations in directive programs' (1997: 27-8). In that case, 'paternalism in its public sense might not have to be permanent', but only because the necessary disciplines are imposed through other social agencies. * It should be noted that Mead would reject the charactenzation of his position as 'conservative', arguing that at least in America the conservative position shares the liberal assumption that the poor are 'competent', and believes that the problem of poverty is caused by the way in which welfare programmes distort the incentives poor people face. The solution, then, is not to reform the poor, but to abolish welfare programmes. No doubt this view reflects the thinking of some conservatives, but other self-identified conservatives do view the issue in terms similar to Mead's. 1. Mead, Lawrence M. (1992) The New Politics of Poverty. New York: Basic. 2. Mead, Lawrence M., ed. (1997) The New Paternalism. Washington: Brookings Institution. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 |
| Welfare State | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 210 Welfare state/Political philosophy/Moon: Some of the programmes of the welfare state, such as public schools and old age pensions, were first developed in the nineteenth century, but what might be called the 'institutional' welfare state did not fully emerge until after World War Il, when most democratic countries adopted a more or less integrated range of programmes of welfare provision and policies of economic management. The institutional welfare state is characterized by a range of programmes designed to meet different needs and to provide security against various contingencies. >Institutions, >Institutionalism, >Education, >Education Policy, >Welfare economics. Brian Barry: At least as an ideal, as Brian Barry (1990)(1) points out, the institutional welfare state would not even require a general safety net, since specialized programmes would cover all of the different conditions that prevent people from meeting their needs. In reality, of course, there will always be some who fall between the cracks, and so the welfare state must have a programme of 'social assistance' to cover residual cases. The emergence of the institutional welfare state is reflected in the enormous growth of government expenditures to finance its programmes, both in absolute terms and in relation to national income. In the UK, for example, social expenditure increased from less than 6 percent of GNP in 1920 to 25 percent in 1996—7 (Barr, 1998(2): 171). Political theories on welfare state: tional frameworks. Students of the welfare state have offered a variety of classifications of welfare regimes, and disagree among themselves even about whether particular countries (notably, the US) even qualify as welfare states. Some students of welfare politics emphasize the difference between selective and universal welfare states (e.g. Rothstein, 1998)(3); others discern liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes (e.g. Esping- Andersen, 1990)(4); while yet others distinguish among social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and wage-earner welfare states (Huber and Stephens, 2001)(5). More philosophically oriented theorists place the welfare state in the context of different traditions of political thought, and differ- ent ideals and/or patterns of justification. Thus, some discuss the minimal state and the arguments for and against it (e.g. Nozick, 1974(6); Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998(7)); others consider the 'residual' versus the 'institutional' welfare state (e.g. Barry, 1999)(8); yet others find four distinct strands, laissez-faire, feminism, socialism, and Fabianism (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987(9)). While most recognize that class is a major concern of the welfare state, an increasing number of theorists see that gender is at least as important (Gordon, 1990(10); Fraser, 1997(11)). Cf. >Minimal State. Moon: As a political formation the welfare state tends todivide theorists who in other respects share a view Gaus I 211 of politics. Thus, defenders and critics of the welfare state include people who identify themselves as (inter alia) >conservatives, >liberals, >communitarians, >socialists, and postmodernists, and so both its critics and its defenders find themselves with strange allies and opponents. Common features: In spite of the great variability mentioned above, welfare states share important features; four of the most important are a democratic political system, a largely private market economy, a wide range of public programmes that provide monetary support or services as a matter of right, and an active role for the state in managing the economy to dampen the business cycle and to regulate economic activities. Efficiency: (...) many welfare services are provided through market transactions, such as the purchase of life or medical insurance. Why, then, should the state be involved in providing welfare, either directly in the form of specific services (such as health care or education) or in the form of resources or income to enable people to meet their own needs? Government programmes, after all, both involve an element of coercion and impose uniformity. Gaus I 212 Market: The alternative to state provision is often taken be the market, where profit-seeking firms provide consumers with goods and services. But this is an oversimplification, as families and voluntary associations also lay key roles. Private provision: The rise of the welfare state with its compulsory programmes has led to the demise of many of these voluntary associations and private firms reducing citizens' autonomy and imposing uniformity on them. The more extensive the welfare state, the more it has displaced other welfare institutions.* Efficiency: One reason for substituting state for private provision is that state provision (either of services or of resources) can sometimes be more effective than private provision, either because it can provide services or resources more cheaply, or because private provision is incapable of providing an optimal (or even adequate) level of services. For Problems: see >Market failure, >Public goods. For a Minimal welfare state: >Welfare state/Friedman. Gaus I 214 Distributional justice: A second line of argument supporting the welfare state appeals to the idea of justice rather than efficiency. The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income. Efficiency-based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies deliberately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency. >Distributive justice/welfare economics. VsEfficency-based approaches: (...) the appeal to e Iciency is itself problematic, in as much as the pretax/pretransfer baseline it takes for granted must be justified. There are some risks which we face, when we think of our lives taken as a whole, that cannot be covered by any form of private provision, because they reflect conditions into which we are born, such as congenital handicaps, genetic predispositions to certain diseases, and the cultural and economic disadvantages one's parents may suffer. >Distributive justice/Welfare economics. * See Paul (1997)(12), particularly the articles by Beito, Davies, and the references cited therein for an account of non-state forms of welfare. 1. Barry, Brian (1990) 'The welfare state versus the relief of poverty'. Ethics, 100 (June): 503-29. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 5. Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2001 ) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 7. Schmidtz, David and Robert Goodin (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 8. Barry, Norman (1999) Welfare, 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 9. Clarke, John, Allan Cochrane and Carol Smart (1987) Ideologies of Welfare. London: Hutchinson. 10. Gordon, Linda, ed. (1990), Women, State, and Welfare. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 11. Fraser, Nancy (1997) Justice Interruptus. New York: Routledge. 12. Paul, Ellen, ed. (1997) The Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Mause I 579ff Welfare State/Political Theories: given the empirical diversity of the structure of the welfare state in the various countries, one must assume that one is dealing with a mixed system in the specific case of an examined country. The term welfare state is criticized as conservative. (Schmidt 2005) (1). For the division into system types see Esping-Andersen 1990(2) and 1999(3). Mause I 581 History of the welfare state: the oldest strand of comparative welfare research used key socio-economic variables such as the state of economic development, the spread of employees in the non-agricultural sector ("employment rate") and other concepts of macro-sociological modernisation. (Customs officer 1963 (4); Wilensky 1975 (5). Functionalistic explanations: here we are concerned, among other things, with the diffusion of social policy effects across territorial borders, e.g. social learning (Hall 1993) (6). Garbage can theory: this is about the contingent interaction of political processes, one example being the multiple streams approach. (Kingdon 1984)(7). Newer approaches, on the other hand, focused on concepts such as power, conflict and institutions and examined decision-making processes. Party Difference Thesis/Hibbs: (Hibbs 1977) (8): The party-political composition of governments is significantly reflected in internationally and historically variable levels of social expenditure. (Castles 1982 (9); Schmidt 2005 ) 1. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 3. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 4. Zöllner, Detlev. Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ein zeitlicher und internationaler Vergleich. Berlin 1963. 5. Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley 1975. 6. Peter A. Hall, 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25( 3): 275– 296. 7. Kingdon, John W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston/ Toronto 1984. 8. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467– 1487. 9. Castles, Francis G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states, Hrsg. Francis G. Castles, 21– 96. London 1982. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Welfare State | Sen | Gaus I 218 Welfare state/Sen/Moon: Ironically, [the] (...) commitment to freedom and solidarity is subject ßto a certain inner tension [within the dicsussion of the welfare state]. One way to think about this is to see that the effort to empower individuals and to promote social inclusion also leads to new forms of marginalization and control. One major reason for this is that the goal of social inclusion cannot be achieved merely by providing people with resources, for what is ultimately required is that people be able to participate effectively in the social and political 'life of the community' (Sen, 1992(1): 5). Thus, we must be concerned not simply with citizens' command of extemal resources, but with what they can do with them, as Amartya Sen argues. He distinguishes between 'functionings' , which 'represent parts of the state of a person - in particular, the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life', and a person's 'capability', which 'reflects the alternative combinations of fimctionings the person can achieve' (Sen, 1993(2): 31). Functionings can be very complex performances or states of being, or ensembles of performances and states of being, such as 'being in good health' or 'achieving self respect or being socially integrated' (1993(2): 31). >Welfare state/Welfare economics, >Welfare state/Susan Mayer. 1. Sen, Amartya (1992) Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Sen, Amartya (1993) 'Capability and well-being'. In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Smith | Mause I 153 Welfare State/Adam Smith: That the price on the market is welfare maximizing is the subject of the famous theorem of the invisible hand by Adam Smith (1723-1790). If all market participants behave selfishly (rationally), according to Smith the market coordinates the individual partial interests towards the welfare maximum. >Markets, >Price, >Rationality, >Egoism. For the economic driving force here is not the "goodwill of the butcher, brewer and baker" (Smith [1776] 1978,(1)), but the respective self-interest of the market participants. Invisible Hand/Smith: The individual concerns of each one are guided across the market "by an invisible hand to promote a purpose which he has no intention whatsoever to fulfil". (2) 1, A. Smith Der Wohlstand der Nationen. München 1978, p. 17. 2. Ibid. p. 371. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Welfare State | Welfare Economics | Gaus I 218 Welfare state/Welfare economics/Moon: In spite of the importance of functioning as opposed to possessing, most evaluations of welfare state performance focus on what people have, rather than on what they can do. Rothstein: One common measure, for example, is 'percentage of poor households lifted out of poverty as a result of taxes and transfers', where poverty is defined as having an income below 50 percent of adjusted median household income of the country in which one lives (Rothstein, 1998(1): 183—4). But if the objective of the welfare state is to enable citizens to participate effectively, this measure is problematic because income, or income alone, does not provide the capability to achieve many of the most important functionings. Susan Mayer: In a recent study aptly titled What Money Can Buy (1997(2)), Susan Mayer has examined the 'functionings' of children, adolescents, and young adults, and correlated them with family income. Work: The argument about the necessity for effective functioning, as opposed simply to having access to resources, has been most heated in the area of work. If democratic citizenship requires that all be enabled to participate fully in society, then people must have not only certain resources, but also certain capacities, skills, and dispositions. Gaus I 219 One can acknowledge that people rely upon 'welfare' because their options are so limited, and so their condition represents an indictment of the society rather than the individuals concerned, but the fact remains that receipt of social assistance does not enable one to attain full citizenship or membership in society. It simply sustains one in a marginalized condition. Social inclusion requires more than receiving benefits. Lawrence Mead: this line of argument has been advanced by a number of 'conservative' critics of the welfare state. Lawrence Mead (1992)(3), for example, argues that the character of poverty at least in America has changed in the past several decades, and that the social exclusion represented by poverty reflects the inability of poor people to act as rational agents in pursuit even of their own interests. * >Labour/Lawrence Mead. Nikolas Rose: Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the emphasis on paid employment is not a monopoly of the right: 'From the "social democratic left", too, work [is] now seen as the [principal] mode of inclusion, and absence from the labour market the most potent source of exclusion' (1999(4), 163). David Harris: In some solidaristic accounts, the emphasis on work invokes an older language of duties. In Harris's account, for example, the duties correlative to our welfare rights are 'strict obligations' and may be enforced by 'coercion' (1987(5): 161). Marshall: In this, [Harris] echoes Marshall, who looked beyond the social rights of citizenship to consider the duties of the enriched and inclusive model of citizenship he advocated, including 'the duty to work', which he thought was of 'paramount importance'. Gotmann/Thompson: Similarly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson offer a justification for enforcing work obligations that draws on the idea of citizenship, arguing that 'work should be seen as a necessary part of citizenship' (1996(6): 293), because it is 'essential to social dignity'. Since 'earning is not only a means of making a living but also a mark of equal citizenship', paid employment has a 'political dimension' that 'provides a further justification for the obligation to work' (1996(6): 302). * It should be noted that Mead would reject the charactenzation of his position as 'conservative', arguing that at least in America the conservative position shares the liberal assumption that the poor are 'competent', and believes that the problem of poverty is caused by the way in which welfare programmes distort the incentives poor people face. The solution, then, is not to reform the poor, but to abolish welfare programmes. No doubt this view reflects the thinking of some conservatives, but other self-identified conservatives do view the issue in terms similar to Mead's. 1. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mayer, Susan (1997) What Money Can 't Buy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Mead, Lawrence M. (1992) The New Politics of Poverty. New York: Basic. 4. Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 5. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell. 6. Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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| Hume, D. | Mackie Vs Hume, D. | Armstrong III 57 MackieVsHume: (1979) (Stove, et al.): overlooked the possibility that observational premises, while they do not contain any conclusion about the unobserved, still can yield a logical possibility, e.g. 99% of Fs are Gs. Then it is obviously rational to conclude that a is a G. So one can say that the observed cases provide a logical opportunity for unobserved cases. Purely mathematical argument about distribution. VsTheory of Regularity: yet there is a coherent reason why the principles of logical possibility alone cannot solve the problem of the theory of regularity. The issue with logical possibility is that it cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural classes. Ex.: grue as an unnatural predicate cannot readily be ruled out. III 58 That all emeralds are grue, has the same logical possibility (the same percentage as the green ones). Stegmüller IV 238 Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue: is part of biological provisions. Moral philosophers before Hume exclusively referred to these virtues. Ex: generosity, forbearance, charitableness, altruism, moderation, impartiality. (Basis: human sympathy). artificial virtue: nothing but human inventions. Ex: respect for property; rules of transfer of property, promise, commitment to adhere to contracts, loyalty towards the government. IV 239 Artificial virtues have no natural origin. Ex: respecting other's property: 1. cannot originate from benevolence towards others: for then the respectation would depend on whether the property serves the welfare of all. 2. also, it cannot depend on whether the person concerned seems sympathetic or not. 3. sympathy is imaginable in gradations, respect for property is not. This applies mutatis mutandis to all artificial virtues. IV 240 Morality/Hume: I cannot base my duties on whether someone seems sympathetic or not. natural virtue/MackieVsHume/Stegmüller: to begin with, one would expect that the discussion of the natural virtues is much easier, since the first step (about the genesis) does not apply. Problem: (also recognized by Hume) if the natural virtues were an effluence of sympathy, they would have to run parallel. But this is not the case. Our sympathies are self-centered! We have more sympathy for people who are closest to us. IV 241 But we expect from moral judgments that they are impersonal and impartial. Thus, the seemingly absolute difference between natural and artificial virtues must partially be abandoned. The "natural" virtues, too, thus form a system of conventions. They are supposed to serve the "long-term interests" of all. The natural virtues then are such artificial virtues in which we find instinctive inclination to act accordingly. In the artificial virtues, we find no such basis. They are merely socialized. Stegmüller IV 355 Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability is always to be qualified by the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference: a) question: on grounds of the reports, which hypotheses about laws should be assumed? b) the weight of the evidence itself. Miracle/MackieVsHume: also the reporter himself requires the notion of a well-founded natural law in order to classify the event as a miracle. IV 356 Hume does not anywhere considere the strengthening by several independent witnesses. IV 412 Teleological proof of God's existence/MackieVsHume: (by and large pro Hume): but one can interpret the conclusion by analogy in a way that God is introduced as that which caused the natural world and explains it. IV 413 But also here Hume would be proved to be correct that no further consequences arise therefrom. In particular, the relationship between God and the world remains unexplained. Science/theory/Mackie: Darwinian theory of evolution, too, does not facilitate any predictions! IV 414 Order/theory of evolution/Mackie/Stegmüller: in Darwinism order is not explained by the proposition, that God created the world for us, but that we have adapted to it. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Utilitarianism | Mackie Vs Utilitarianism | Stegmüller IV 311 Intention/Mackie: "straight rule": acoording to that one is responsible for all of one's own deliberate acts. IV 312 Ex. I continue despite lack of experience - one can taunt me of having taken the consequences into account. Punishment/praise/criticism/VsUtilitarianism/Mackie: Vs utilitarian justification: here, the only justification of punishment is deterrence. Since one can only be deterred of deliberate acts, only those should be linked to sanctions. This is a mistake: IV 313 Ex. it's quite possible that a potential murderer is deterred more effectively if everyone who kills someone (even unintentionally) is punished in the same manner as if only those are punished who did it on purpose. Intention/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: one can say that a moral system certainly has an influence on the intentions of an actor! The awareness of one's own moral duplicity is somewhat like a punishment in itself. "Straight rule:" according to that one is responsible for all one's own deliberate acts. Thereby it becomes comprehensible that we want to apply this moral principle also to our legal penalties. IV 314 Punishment/Mackie: is appropriate if it appears to be justified in moral categories. Ex. negligence: moral and legal considerations do not need to coincide. Ex. the same action may have less harmful effects occur in a specific case. From a moral perspective, it seems unfair that then punishment were less severe. Ex. sale of contaminated food due to contingency (despite due diligence) is just as severely punished as in case of intent: here the utility argument of the welfare of the community has to be taken into account. IV 315 Deviations can be explained by three schemes: a) spontaneous, impulsive actions, rage b) Temporary confusion, disorders of personal identity. c) "Irresistible psychological coercion." |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Future | Fukuyama, F. | Rorty VI 331 Francis Fukuyama / Rorty: Thesis: The future offers us nothing more than boredom once we have acknowledged that bourgeois-democratic welfare states are the best community. Rorty per. Fukuyama finds that regrettable. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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