Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conjunction | Aristotle | Geach I 16/17 Conjunction/Aristotle/Geach: In his early work, Aristotle considered conjunctions to be either true or false, but he later changed his mind. He considers what we might call a “merging of predicates”: e.g., “is white” and “is a man” to “is a white man.” This works. But: Example: “is good” and “is a cobbler” cannot be combined in this way to form “is a good cobbler.” Example: A compound noun such as “morse” (man and horse) cannot appear as the subject of a predication. This is because it does not designate anything, even or especially because it is required that “man horse” should combine all corresponding predicates. I 18 Geach: 1. That is actually questionable, but in any case it is not a conjunction if one attributes predicates to such a subject: Example: “S” is a “lawyer politician.” Then neither: “Every S is a scoundrel” nor “Some S are honest” can be considered a conjunction of predications that would be obtained by first substituting “lawyer” and then ‘politician’ for “S.” GeachVsAristotle: So his argument against the composite subject is irrelevant. 2. If the composite subject “morse” is regarded as the intended equivalent of a combination of two predications, then the result of the juxtaposition (antiphasis?) is not necessarily true and false. This shows that “morse” cannot be understood as a predication. Example: “Some morse is white” will be true if some man and some horse are white. “No morse is white” is true if no man and no horse are white. Problem: if no man is white but some horse is white, then we get true for one side and false for the other: “Some horse is white” “No horse is white”. (nsert, unity). So “Some horse is white” is not a well-formed sentence. (s) Unambiguity could be achieved if, at the same time, no man and no horse, or all men and all horses share the predicate in question. Example: In the case of four-leggedness, again, no sentence could be formed. Conjunction/GeachVsAristotle: However, this does not show that the conjunction Example: “Some men are white and some horses are white” would not be a sentence! Conjunction /Aristotle: (late, Sophistici elenchi): denies that conjunctions can be w/f. It would be the “ruin of discourse” to answer “Is it the case that p and q and r...?” with ‘yes’ or “no.” Even if it seems harmless because all terms might be true or false. GeachVsAristotle: Modern logic has no problem with this at all: the conjunction is true if all terms are true, otherwise false. Only a confused person would conclude from “no” that all terms must be false. Example Aristotle: “Are Koriscus and Kallias at home?” as if it were the same as “Is it the case that p and q?” I 19 GeachVsAristotle: but that is not exactly the same sentence as “Koriskus is at home and Kallias is at home.” (Everyone at home?). ((s) Are the subjects “summarized” or the predicates? It is impossible to separate them here.) Geach: “d and b are P's” or “d is (a) P and b is (a) P” (as Aristotle thought). But there are cases where the attribution in the plural becomes illegitimate, even though it is permissible in the singular. Example (see above). Parmenides/The Third Man Argument: Solution: if we concede that the predicate “large” can be said of itself and at the same time of many large things. However, this presupposes that we do not allow this form of “great” in the plural (ta polla megala/tanta megala) to be assumed to apply to itself at the same time. “Analogy”/Middle Ages/GeachVs: from the example “God is wise and Plato is wise,” one should not be able to conclude: “God and Plato are two wise men.” (sapiens/sapientes, plural, nominalization of the predicate). Structure: if d is P and b is P and a is a class of Ps, then we cannot conclude that “P” can be stated (predicated) in the plural by a class that has exactly a and b or only d as elements. (predication/singular/plural). Whether such a set is permissible at all depends on the accepted set theory. Aristotle: uses a devilish example to show that the plural form of the predicate cannot be attributed if it is in the singular form. Example Aristotle: Two animals “d” and “b” are blind. Is this equivalent to: “d is blind and b is blind”? Aristotle: (Sophistici elenchi): Even that is not permissible! (GeachVsAristotle). 1. “Blind” means: by nature capable of seeing, but without the ability to see. 2. If d and b are by nature capable of seeing, then they either have the ability to do so or they do not. I 20 3. If d and b are by nature sighted but do not have the ability, they are blind. 4. Therefore, if d and b are by nature sighted, either both have the ability or both do not. 5. If d has the ability and b is blind, then d and b are by nature sighted. 6. Therefore, if d has the ability and b is blind, either both have the ability or both are blind. Which is absurd. (Aristotle). Solution/Aristotle: Plural questions such as “Are they by nature sighted?” or “Are they blind?” should be banned. GeachVsAristotle: that is drastic and unnecessary. “Having the ability to see” can be constructed grammatically in two different ways: a) that no one in a class has the ability b) that not everyone in a class has the ability. Geach: To do step 3 correctly, it must say: every element of the class does not have the ability. I 25 Conjunction/Aristotle/Geach: A. Own proof of his metatheorem: Premises: should be “A is white” (of a valid syllogism) Conclusion: “B is large.” Then the premises of a presumed syllogism cannot be true: (14) If A is not white, then B is large. The syllogism itself should be represented by: (15) If A is white, then B is large. (15) leads to the contraposition (16) If B is not large, then A is not white. Then (1) and (14) lead to the conclusion in what Aristotle calls the “hypothetical syllogism”: (17) If B is not large, then B is large. Aristotle calls this “absurd.” VsAristotle: some authors: the form “If not p then p” does not have to be absurd! (Geach pro). Example: It can be used to achieve “p” itself (?). In geometry: “If AB and CD are not parallel, then they are parallel, so they are parallel.”(?). VsVs: but in this case, that overlooks the fact that “B is large” is not a proposition (statement, sentence) in the sense of a traditional syllogism: such as “Every X is Y.” GeachVsAristotle. He claims to have shown here that if we have two valid syllogistic schemata with a conjunction of the premises “p and q” and “not p and not q,” then if both yield the conclusion “Every X is Y,” we should be obliged to recognize the general validity of the formula: “If not every X is Y, then every X is Y,” and that is indeed absurd. ((s) Difference from above: If B is not large, then B is large. Does not contain “every” or “not every”: difference between contrary and contradictory). GeachVsAristotle: the error lies in his incorrect understanding of contradiction. He is right in saying that a conjunction is a proposition. Punchline: if “A is white” is supposed to represent a premise conjunction “p and q,” then its negation, “A is not white,” cannot represent “not p and not q.” Rather, the correct negation is “not both p and q.” Negation: A conjunction: ~(p u q) = (plq) not (~p u ~q). Not both, not “neither.” Example (s) “A is white”: Negation: “A is not white” not “A is not white and also not an object.” I 26 GeachVsAristotle: because he only implicitly assumed that conjunctions are sentences (Geach pro), he did not properly consider the question of what the contradiction of a conjunction actually is. (see below) In his later work, Aristotle explicitly recognized conjunctions as propositions with the ingenious invention of “A” and “B” etc. as sentence letters. (Sentence variables). >Modal logic/Geach, >Facts/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Law | Rawls | I 135 Law/Rawls: a conception of law is a set of principles of general form and universal application, which must be publicly known as the last appeal in the order of conflicts of moral persons. >Conflicts, >Justice, >Judicial system, >Legislation. These conditions exclude dictatorship and free-rider problems. >Dictatorship, >Free riders. Justice: their principles, on the other hand, are determined by their special role and the object to which they are applied. >Justice/Rawls. Generality/general validity: however, principles do not exclude general egoism. >Generality, >General validity. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Loewenheim | Hilbert | Berka I 340 Loewenheim/Hilbert/Ackermann: Loewenheim has shown that every expression that is universal for the countable domain has the same property for every other domain. In Loewenheim, however, the sentence appears in the dual version: Every formula of the function calculus is either contradictory or can be satisfied within a countable infinite range of thought. >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability, >Models, >Model theory, >Functional calculus, >Countability. General Validity/Hilbert/Ackermann: examples of formulas which are valid in each domain are all formulas that can be proved from axioms of a system. >Validity, >Universal validity. Loewenheim/Hilbert/Ackermann: Loewenheim has made another remarkable proposition: in the treatment of the logical formulas one can restrict oneself to those in which only function symbols with a maximum of two vacancies occur(1). This corresponds to: Schroeder: the general relative calculus can be traced back to the binary calculus(2). >Logical formulas. 1. L. Löwenheim: Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül, Math. Annalen 76 (1915), pp. 447-470, p. 459. 2. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann: Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik, Berlin, 6. Aufl. Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1972, § 12. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Meaning Change | Adorno | Rorty III 103 Meaning Change/Adorno/Dialectic of Enlightenment: Adorno thought that concepts were subject to historic change! Period provides the right concepts for each case. Dissolution of these concepts deprives the period of the right to further existence. >History/Adorno, >Concepts, >Texts/Adorno, >Theory change. Meaning Change/Adorno: E.g. "general validity in contrast to the relative validity" "morality in contrast to intelligence." Even the concepts of the mind, the truth, even of the Enlightenment itself have become animistic magic. (Ricouer: "hermeneutics of suspicion"). >P. Ricoeur, >Mind, >Truth, >Hermeneutics. --- XIII 208 Meaning Change/Theory Change/SchopenhauerVsFichte/Schopenhauer/Adorno: it is sometimes the case that strictly identical motifs assume completely different meanings. For example, Schopenhauer's philosophy of will is not so far away from the philosophy of action. Nevertheless, even the same concepts, for instance, the absolutely self-imposed principle, which in Fichte is called the subject, and in Schopenhauer will, mean in both truths exactly the opposite. Therefore all the categories that arise from it have a completely different meaning. >A. Schopenhauer, >J.G. Fichte. XIII 237 Meaning Change/Theory Change/Adorno: To do justice to a thinker always means doing wrong to him at the same time. The philosophies require the reflections (...) so that they may come to their own right or possibly to their own wrong. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rational Reconstruction | Rational Reconstruction, theory of science, philosophy: rational reconstruction is a collective term for attempts to justify a theory by constructing models of it that meet certain requirements such as rationality, economy, area-specific adequacy and general validity as well as verifiability. Models are the structures which result from the use of designations for objects instead of the abstract designations used in the theorems. Models can only be created for consistent statements. See also reduction, interpretation, models, empiricism, rationality. |
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| Universal Validity | Gödel | Berka I 314 Universal Validity/Goedel: universal validity leads to universal quantification: for formulas with free individual variables A(x,y,...w) this means the general validity of (x)(y)...(w) A(x,y,...w). >Universal quantification, >Quantification, >Existential quantification. Def Satisfiability/Goedel: "satisfiability" leads to >existence quantification. ((s)"there is a model".) This is then correspondingly the fulfillability of (Ex)(Ey)...(Ew) A. Then one can say: "A is universally valid" means: "~A is not fulfillable". >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. Refutability: refutability is the provability of negation. >Negation, >Proofs, >Provability. I 310 Provability/universal validity/Goedel:... here we have proved the equivalence between "universally valid" and "provable". Over-countable/Goedel: N.B.: this equivalence contains a reduction of the over-countable to the countable for the decision problem because "generally valid" refers to the over-countable totality of the functions, while "provable" presupposes only the countable totality of the proof figures.(1) >Decision problem, >Countability. 1. K. Gödel: Die Vollständighkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, in: Mh, Math. Phys. 37 (1930), pp. 349-360. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Validity | General validity: within a calculus: a formula that is satisfied by any interpretation (variable assignment with expressions for objects) is valid. See also satisfaction, satisfiability, interpretation. |
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