Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 123 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaption | Deacon | I 330 Adaptation/brain/language/Deacon: when it comes to whether the brain adapts to certain requirements of language processing and language acquisition, the following is crucial: apart from the fact that a noun remains a noun and a change of time a change of time, regardless of the words involved, there must be more constant things between individuals, certain functions that are always processed in the same way in different ways under all conditions. There must be certain invariant sensory motoric or mnemonic features that could be adapted. >Language acquisition, >Invariance, >Covariance, >Language processing. I 331 Such characteristics are present in the case of alarm calls from animals, e.g. when a distinction is made between enemies on the ground and enemies of the air. I 331/332 Symbols/symbolic learning/adaptation/Deacon: it is precisely the complex structure that forms symbols among each other that make it impossible for them to be genetically assimilated. >Symbols/Deacon. Most grammatical operations have no direct connection to things in the world. Therefore, there is hardly any innate reference in the human language. The grammatical peculiarities also change from language to language, so that there is little consistency for possible adaptation. Deep structure: maybe this is what is open to adaptation? In order to adapt a function, it is not necessary for a certain place in the brain to remain constant for this function. Newer theories speak more of "language programs" and "data structures". >Deep structure, >Grammar, >Symbolic learning. I 333 The way these structures are distributed in the brain should remain invariant when assimilated in an evolutionary process. >Language origins. Speech processing: interestingly, it is not the logical operations but the analysis of the physical signals that are assigned to specific brain regions. This has major consequences. The grammatical structures are the ones that have had the least chance of establishing a fixed place in the brain for their processing. >Brain/Deacon. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Adaption | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 331 Adaption/Climate Change/Climate Justice/Ecological Theories: The logic of adaptation as a matter of justice is, at one level, quite straightforward: if a person or community has been put at risk from anthropogenic climate change, and that risk can be reduced or eliminated by some kind of proactive investment supported by those who have caused the risk, there is a moral obligation to make that investment. (…) the obligations implied by ‘adaptation’ could be justified by an ‘ability to help’ principle, even in the absence of causal responsibility for the imposition of risk (Jamieson 1998(1); Caney 2009(2)). VsAdaption: (…) because the populations most at risk from anthropogenic climate change are by and large the same populations most at risk from ‘normal’ climatic variability and extreme weather events, it is conceptually very difficult if not impossible to separate investments that address only the ‘additional’ risk from anthropogenic change. (…) where it is possible to separate those who are most vulnerable to anthropogenic climate change, offering them protection through pro‐active adaptation implies directing assistance not to those who are most vulnerable to climate‐mediated harm, but to those whose vulnerability is increased by anthropogenic warming. Adaption/Development: It is widely recognized that ‘adaptation’ looks very similar to ‘development’. Indeed, it is one of the ironies that the logic of effective adaptation implies integrating adaptation funding and activities with existing development planning, policies, and projects (so‐ called ‘mainstreaming—e.g. Huq et al. 2004(3); Yamin 2005(4)), while the desire of developing countries Norgaard I 332 to increase the level of transfers and their control over it has led to demands for adaptation assistance to be separated from and demonstrably ‘additional’ to existing development aid, and under the control of new, UNFCCC‐directed institutions. >Climate justice, >Environmental ethics. 1. Jamieson, D. 1998. Global responsibilities: Ethics, public health and global environmental change. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5: 99–120. 2. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Huq, S. et al. 2004. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Climate Policy 4(1): 25–43. 4. Yamin, F. 2005. The European Union and future climate policy: Is mainstreaming adaptation a distraction or part of the solution? Climate Policy 5: 349–61. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Adaption | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 267 Adaption/evolutionary psychology/Figueredo: There are essentially three solutions to the problem of adaptation to environments that are variable or heterogeneous in either time or space (including ‘ecological space’): (1) developmental plasticity, (2) genetic diversity, and (3) spatial migration. According to Brunswikian Evolutionary Developmental (BED) theory, ecologies that are variable over evolutionary time select for organisms that are phenotypically plastic enough to adapt by means of learning over developmental time (Figueredo, Hammond and McKiernan 2006)(1). However, such behavioural development depends critically on the existence of reliable and valid cues that signal which alternative phenotype is optimal under each set of localized conditions in time, space and ecology. >Niches/Figueredo, >Ecology/evolutionary psychology. 1. Figueredo, A. J., Hammond, K. R. and McKiernan, E. C. 2006. A Brunswikian evolutionary developmental theory of preparedness and plasticity, Intelligence 34: 211–27 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Adaption | Gould | I 198 Adaptation/Preadaption/Gould: Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions have been fulfilled in the initial stages, e.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. Gould: the concept of preadaptation is indispensable, but it is not appropriate to demonstrate continuity in all cases. I 199 For example, in two genera of Biodae (giant snakes) on Mauritius there is a divided maxillary bone (with elastic connection), which is not found in any other vertebrate on earth. Here, a discontinuous transition is preferable because a jaw cannot be half broken. Examples: I 195 For example, fish with jaws are related to their ancestors without jaws. Macroevolution (the larger structural transitions) is nothing but an expanded microevolution (e. g. the change of flies in closed containers). I 196 For example, if black moths replace whites within a century, reptiles can become birds by gently summing up countless changes over a few million years. II 51 Adaptation/Gould: we do not have to choose between limitation and beauty of adaptation, because only both together provides the necessary tension to regulate evolution. Selection/Gould: GouldVs: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, or the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found in an organism results from the selection. Behavior/adaptation: each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation, e. g. breeding behaviour of the gannet. II 52 Behavior/animal/Gould: the sources of organic forms and behaviours are diverse and contain at least three primary categories: a) instantaneous adaptation (the behaviour of the offspring), b) the potential non-adaptive consequences of basic structural designs that act as restrictions on adaptation, and c) adaptations of ancestors now used by the descendants in other ways. II 153 Adaptation/GouldVsAdaptionism/Gould: for example, special characteristics of some abnormal human children cannot be described as adaptation. We do not inhabit a perfect world in which natural selection ruthlessly checks all organic structures and then shapes them for optimal utility. In many cases, evolution reflects more inherited patterns than current environmental demands. II 152 We tend (incorrectly) to view each structure as if it were created for a particular purpose. IV 27 Adaptation/adjustment/Gould: we should not conclude that Darwin's assumed adaptability to a local environment has unrestricted power to generate theoretically optimal designs for all situations. The natural selection can only use existing material. This is the classic dilemma of evolutionary theory. Question: how do the intermediate steps arise? Structuralists (like Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, 1772-1844): thesis: first, the form changes and then finds a function. Functionalists (like Lamarck): thesis: organisms must first adopt a different way of life before the forms develop. DarwinVsStructuralism: the environment does not pass on its requirements for adaptation directly to the organism. Rather indirectly through more survivor's descendants of those who were lucky enough to vary towards a better adaptation to their local environment. IV 28 Lamarck: in fact, it was he who had found the right answer (like Darwin): he merely proposed a false mechanism for transferring information between the environment and the organism. His functionalist solution contains an elegant simplification that is accepted today by almost all evolutionary researchers. It is neither the shape of the body nor the form of its opponents that gives rise to the habits of the animals, but on the contrary, it is the habits and living conditions that have formed the shape of the body over time".(1) Gould: this is considered correct today. >Lamarckism. 1. Lamarck, J.B. (1809/1984). Zoological Philosophy. Chicago: University Press. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Affectional Bond | Ainsworth | Slater I 15 Affectional Bond/Ainsworth: Ainsworth (1989)(1) emphasized that affectional bonds differed on the basis of the behavioral system that motivated bond formation. Whereas children’s bonds with caregivers were motivated by the attachment system, the adult’s bond to the child was motivated by the caregiving system. Bonds to a peer may be motivated by either affiliation in the case of friends or sexual and reproductive systems in the case of adult pair bonds. >Attachment theory. Slater I 18 A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)(2). Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) at 12 and 18 months. Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)(3). The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)(4). >Stages of development. 1. Ainsworth, M. S. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. American Psychologist, 44, 709–716. 2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press 4. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Allostasis | McEwen | Corr I 208 Allostasis/McEwen/Elovainio/Kivimäki: future. McEwen (1998(1); McEwen and Stellar 1993(2)) has described the prevailing conditions where the adaptive functioning may be impaired and the possible health debilitating effects of stress start to emerge. Cf. >Stress/Selye, >Stress/Lazarus. Def Allostasis/McEwen: McEwen defines allostasis as the adaptive process for actively maintaining stability through change. Allostatic load can be described as cumulative wear and tear, and it refers to the cost to the body arising from repeated activation or inadequate managing of mediators of allostasis (e.g., adrenal hormones, immuno-cytokines and neurotransmitters). According to McEwen, there are four basic sources of allostatic load: (1) frequent stress; (2) lack of adaptation to repeated similar stressors; (3) inability to shut off allostatic responses when the stress is terminated; and (4) deficient responses by some allostatic system leading to compensatory increases in other systems (McEwen 1998)(1). 1. McEwen, B. S. 1998. Protective and damaging effects of stress mediators, mediators, New England Journal of Medicine 338: 171–9 2. McEwen, B. S. and Stellar, E. 1993. Stress and the individual: mechanisms leading to disease, Archives of Internal Medicine 153: 2093–101 Marko Elovainio and Mika Kivimäki, “Models of personality and health”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Appraisal Theory | Psychological Theories | Corr I 55 Appraisal theory/emotions/psychologcal theories/Reisenzein/Weber: The appraisal of an event determines not only whether or not this event elicits an emotion, but also which emotion it elicits. Hedonically positive (i.e., experientially pleasant) emotions occur if an event is evaluated as motive-congruent, whereas hedonically negative (experientially unpleasant) emotions occur if an event is evaluated as motive-incongruent. Emotions are distinguished by a) on the kind of evaluation made, for example, on whether an event is evaluated as just personally undesirable or as morally wrong (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988)(1). b) they depend on particular factual (non-evaluative) appraisals, including the appraisal of the event’s probability, unexpectedness, controllability, and the appraisal of one’s own or other people’s responsibility for bringing it about (see Ellsworth and Scherer 2003)(2). The relations between appraisals and specific emotions have been spelled out in several structural appraisal models (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(1); Roseman, Antoniou and Jose 1996(4); Scherer 2001(5)). Information-processing models for appraisal theories: (for overviews, see e.g., Power and Dalgleish 1997(6); Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001(7); Teasdale 1999(8)). Corr I 56 Modes of appraisal: a) non-automatic: non-automatic appraisal processes are conscious inference strategies, b) automatic appraisals are unconscious and are ‘triggered’ fairly directly by the perception of eliciting events. >Emotion. Like other mental processes, initially non-automatic, conscious appraisals can become automatized as a result of their repeated execution (e.g., Reisenzein 2001(9); Siemer and Reisenzein 2007(10)). Automatic appraisals can explain why emotions frequently follow eliciting events rapidly. They may also explain moods, that is, emotional experiences which seem to lack concrete objects (for further discussion of moods, see Schwarz and Clore 2007(11); Siemer 2005(12)). >Appraisal theory/Reisenzein. 1. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 2. Ellsworth, P. C. and Scherer, K. R. 2003. Appraisal processes in emotion, in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer and H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), Handbook of affective sciences, pp. 572–95. Oxford University Press 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A. and Jose, P. E. 1996. Appraisal determinants of emotions: constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory, Cognition and Emotion 10: 241–77 5. Scherer, K. R. 2001. Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 92–120. Oxford University Press 6.Power, M. and Dalgleish, T. 1997. Cognition and emotion: from order to disorder. Hove: Psychology Press 7. Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A. and Johnstone, T. 2001. Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press 8. Teasdale, J. D. 1999. Multi-level theories of cognition-emotion relations, in T. Dalgleish and M. Power (eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion, pp. 665–81. Chicester: Wiley 9. Reisenzein, R. 2001. Appraisal processes conceptualized from a schema-theoretic perspective: contributions to a process analysis of emotions, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 187–201. Oxford University Press 10. Siemer, M. and Reisenzein, R. 2007. The process of emotion inference, Emotion 7: 1–20 11. Schwarz, N. and Clore, G. L. 2007. Feelings and phenomenal experiences, in A. W. Kruglanski and E. T. Higgins (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, 2nd edn, pp. 385–407. New York: Guilford Press 12. Siemer, M. 2005. Moods as multiple-object directed and as objectless affective states: an examination of the dispositional theory of moods, Cognition and Emotion 19: 815–45 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Appraisal Theory | Reisenzein | Corr I 61 Appraisal theory/Reisenzein/Weber: One strength of the appraisal theory of emotion is that it can readily explain how inter-individual differences in emotional reactions to the same event arise at the psychological level (Roseman and Smith 2001)(1). (…) these differences in appraisal, in turn, are due to inter-individual differences in the cognitive and motivational structures (e.g., memory schemas) that underlie appraisal processes. At least some of these structures are sufficiently stable to be regarded as components of personality. >Personality, >Emotion, >Situations. These are, in particular, relatively stable and general desires, and relatively stable and general beliefs about the world and the self (Lazarus 1991(2); Pekrun 1988(3); Smith and Kirby 2001(4)). Viewed from an information-processing perspective, these personality determinants of appraisal concern the content of the cognitive and motivational structures that underlie the appraisal of concrete events (Reisenzein 2001)(5). >Self, >Desires, >Beliefs. The information-processing perspective suggests that the personality determinants of appraisal may comprise, in addition, inter-individual differences in the chronic accessibility of appraisal-relevant cognitive and motivational structures (e.g., memory schemas; for support see e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein and Strauman 1986)(6) as well as differences in the procedures habitually used for processing appraisal-relevant information (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty and Feinstein 1996)(7). Although clarifying the personality determinants of appraisals, and thereby those of emotions, was already declared a main task of emotion psychology by Lazarus, Averill and Opton (1970)(8), so far only limited systematic research has been devoted to this issue. Nearly all of this research has been concerned with the effects of stable, general desires and beliefs on emotional states. Corr I 62 Appraisal theory postulates that emotions arise if an event is appraised as motive-congruent or motive-incongruent, and that the intensity of the resulting emotions depends on the strength of the motive, or the subjective importance of the goal (i.e., the content of the desire) at stake. VsAppraisal theory: Motive and goal theorists commonly assume that the goals that a person has in a specific situation are derived from more fundamental goals for which the specific goals are viewed as means to ends (e.g., Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998(9); Reiss 2000)(10). At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)(10). >Goals. 1. Roseman, I. J. and Smith, C. A. 2001. Appraisal theory: overview, assumptions, varieties, controversies, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 3–19. Oxford University Press 2. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 3. Pekrun, R. 1988. Emotion, Motivation und Persönlichkeit [Emotion, motivation and personality]. Munich: Psychologie Verlags Union 4. Smith, C. A. and Kirby, L. D. 2001. Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory, in K. R. Scherer A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 121–38. New York: Oxford University Press 5. Reisenzein, R. 2001. Appraisal processes conceptualized from a schema-theoretic perspective: contributions to a process analysis of emotions, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 187–201. Oxford University Press 6. Higgins, E. T. Bond, R. N., Klein, R. and Strauman, T. 1986. Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: how magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 5–15 7. Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E. and Feinstein, J. 1996. Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation: the life and times of individuals varying in need for cognition, Psychological Bulletin 119: 197–253 8. Lazarus, R. S., Averill, J. R. and Opton, E. M. Jr. 1970. Toward a cognitive theory of emotion, in M. B. Arnold (ed.), Feelings and emotions, pp. 207–32. New York: Academic Press 9. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508 10. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Behavioral Ecology | Corr I 277 Behavior/Behavioral Ecology/Gosling: researchers in Behavioural Ecology and Ethology are primarily interested in learning about the ecological and evolutionary implications of consistent individual differences in behaviour (e.g., Carere and Eens 2005(1); Dall, Houston and McNamara 2004(2); Dingemanse and Reale 2005(3); McElreath and Strimling 2006(4); Nettle 2006(5)). Problem: for [a property] to be identified in a species it is necessary for variation to exist, with different individuals expressing different levels of [this property]; if all individuals in a species had exactly the same levels of [this property] then that trait would be said to be characteristic of the species and would not be considered a personality trait. Problem: The necessity for individual variation raises some theoretical issues within the context of evolutionary processes because selection tends to reduce or eliminate differences. ((s) For the philosophical discussion in relation to the problems with properties, concepts and introduction of concepts for properties see >Introduction/Strawson, >Concepts/Quine, >Properties/Putnam, >Individuation, >Specification). 1. Carere, C. and Eens, M. 2005. Unravelling animal personalities: how and why individuals consistently differ, Behaviour 142: 1149–57 2. Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I. and McNamara, J. M. 2004. The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective, Ecology Letters 7: 734–9 3. Dingemanse, N. J. and Reale, D. 2005. Natural selection and animal personality, Behaviour 142: 1159–84 4. McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2006. How noisy information and individual asymmetries can make ‘personality’ an adaptation: a simple model, Animal Behaviour 72: 1135–9 5. Nettle, D. 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American Psychologist 61: 622–31 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Ethology | Corr I 277 Behavior/Ethology/Gosling: researchers in Behavioural Ecology and Ethology are primarily interested in learning about the ecological and evolutionary implications of consistent individual differences in behaviour (e.g., Carere and Eens 2005(1); Dall, Houston and McNamara 2004(2); Dingemanse and Reale 2005(3); McElreath and Strimling 2006(4); Nettle 2006(5)). Problem: for [a property] to be identified in a species it is necessary for variation to exist, with different individuals expressing different levels of [this property]; if all individuals in a species had exactly the same levels of [this property] then that trait would be said to be characteristic of the species and would not be considered a personality trait. Problem: The necessity for individual variation raises some theoretical issues within the context of evolutionary processes because selection tends to reduce or eliminate differences. ((s) For the philosophical discussion in relation to the problems with properties, concepts and introduction of concepts for properties: >Introduction/Strawson, >Concepts/Quine, >Properties/Putnam, >Individuation, >Specification.) 1. Carere, C. and Eens, M. 2005. Unravelling animal personalities: how and why individuals consistently differ, Behaviour 142: 1149–57 2. Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I. and McNamara, J. M. 2004. The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective, Ecology Letters 7: 734–9 3. Dingemanse, N. J. and Reale, D. 2005. Natural selection and animal personality, Behaviour 142: 1159–84 4. McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2006. How noisy information and individual asymmetries can make ‘personality’ an adaptation: a simple model, Animal Behaviour 72: 1135–9 5. Nettle, D. 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American Psychologist 61: 622–31 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Gould | II 52 Behavior/Adaption/Animal/Gould: The sources of organic forms and behaviours are diverse and contain at least three primary categories: a) Instantaneous adaptation (the behaviour of the offspring), b) The potential non-adaptive consequences of basic structural designs that act as restrictions on adaptation. c) Adaptations of ancestors now used by the descendants in other ways. >Adaption, >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Brain | Deacon | I 45 Brain/Deacon: in the co-evolution of language and brain, the relationship between cause and effect was reversed in that the new ability of the symbolic reference (which is reserved exclusively for the human species) was decoupled from genetic transmission. >Symbolic Reference, >Symbols/Deacon. If it is true that there has been a pressure in selection on symbolic organisms, our unique mental ability must also be understood in these terms. Then the architecture of our brains should also show systematic deviations from the architecture of monkey brains. >Animals, >Animal language. Size: is only an insignificant feature. What is more important is the transformation, the re-engineering of the architecture. I 146 - 164 Brain/Learning/Deacon: Brain size has probably something to do with intelligence, but there are many other factors to consider, such as the proportion of brain capacity required to control the musculoskeletal system. Learning. I 164 Second level learning, i.e. the development of new reactions to new situations only occurs in organisms that live longer. In more short-lived species, such an ability would not pay off. >Behavior. I 166 Small dogs with correspondingly small brains are very similar to big dogs in their brain performances. Their cerebralization (i.e. their brain performance relative to their weight) is even slightly greater than that of their larger conspecifics. I 170 Cerebralisation/encephalisation: the origin of their increase in primates is not in the head! It is in the relatively slower growth of their bodies. I 183 To compare the brains of animals with those of humans, we do not need to compare sizes in general, but we need to compare the sizes of the individual parts of the brain. The structure of the brain or the control of the relative growth of individual body parts at all. Is controlled by homeotic genes. I 194 The brain adapts to the rest of the body during evolution. This explains the otherwise extremely improbable result that adding further components of this extremely networked structure leads to an increase in functions and does not restrict them. Solution: the brain itself plays a systemic role in the design of its parts. Neurons - unlike other cell types - are designed for communication and thus for tuning the function with remote cells. Cf. Learning, >Learning/Hebb. I 195 In this way, the nervous system itself can participate in the process of its construction. Cf. >Neural Networks. I 199 Xenotransplantation of brain parts between different animal species showed that growth and interconnection with foreign tissue is possible. The molecular processes are identical in the different animal species. I 202 In foreign tissue, neurons begin to produce an increased number of axons, some of which turn out to be less suitable and are then used less frequently. This is a Darwin-like process of selective elimination. I 474 Deacon thesis: the initial unspecific connectivity and subsequent competition of the connections influences cognitive processes through tendencies in neural computation resulting from superior patterns due to regional distribution. This is how differences between the species develop. Cf. >Computation, >Information Processing/Psychology. I 205 Cells in different brain regions have not previously gotten their compounds dictated and can specialize in different directions. Literally every developing brain region adapts to the body in which it is located. I 207 Displacement/Deacon: if a genetic variation strengthens the relative size of a population of nerve cells, the axons will shift from smaller to larger regions. I 212 We do not have to speculate about special brain functions, which are reserved solely for humans when we understand the shift that does not depend on the sheer size of the brain. The course for the division of regions for individual brain functions is set shortly after birth. I 213 The formation and differentiation of the brain regions of the human being takes place along the formation of the functions of its body parts and other bodily functions such as eyes, ears, musculoskeletal system. This formation is very different to the formation of small and large dogs. I 214ff Thought experiment: Assuming that a human embryonic brain is transplanted into a gigantic monkey body. It is possible to predict quite accurately which brain regions develop and how, adapted to the body functions and their relative expression. Factors such as the deviating size of the retina or the competition of the brain cells for the control of muscle cells are decisive. These changes are not isolated adaptations. I 220 Langauge/Brain/Deacon: Thesis: Increasing vocalization can be traced back to motor projections of the midbrain and brain stem, while symbolic learning can be traced back to the extension of the prefrontal cortex and competition for synapses throughout the brain. DeaconVsTradition: early on it was assumed that musicians, for example, have a particularly large brain region for processing auditory signals. That turned out to be wrong. I 221 There is competition between central and peripheral regions of the brain as well as between neighbouring regions. A selection is made not only with regard to regions, but also in terms of functions. >Selection. I 253 Language/mammals/Deacon: most mammals are unable to speak because the connection between motor cortex and vocal control instances in the brain stem has been cut during early development. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing the combinatorial relations, which regulate the use of symbols and associations, are located in the prefrontal cortex. I 277 The cerebellum is very fast in the formation of predictions. Linking to the cerebellum is, for example, beneficial for fast conjugations that are used in the formation of sentences. The prefrontal cortex is then responsible for filtering out the right associations. I 343 Brain/Human/Evolution: What is decisive is not an absolute growth in the size of the brain, but a growth in size relative to an increase in body height within species. And we can see that, in addition to this relative growth in size in the case of the human being, it has led to an increase in the size of the prefrontal cortex. This corresponds to a shift in learning disposition. I 345 This development can only be understood in terms of Baldwin's evolution (Baldwin effect). Cf. >Evolution/Deacon. I 346 Tool use/Deacon: passed on from individual to individual, i.e. learned and is not a characteristic that is reflected in the brain structure. >Culture, >Nature, >Evolution. I 347 The first tools were used by living beings whose brains were not well adapted for the use of symbols. However, experiments with monkeys such as Kanzi show that even such brains with considerable social training are able to learn to use symbols. >Symbols/Deacon. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Burden Sharing | Climate Policy | Norgaard I 329 Burden sharing/Resource Sharing/Emissions/Climate Policy: (…) ‘burden sharing’ (like Kyoto‐style percentage reduction targets) focuses on dividing the total costs or total amount of emissions reductions, whereas ‘resource sharing’ (like equal per capita allocations) focuses on the right to make use of global carbon sinks as an economic resource, and how to share those rights. (…) resource‐sharing formulae are not necessarily more favorable to poor countries than burden‐sharing formulae; for example, a resource‐sharing formula which transitions from grandfathering to equal per capita allocations over time can be significantly less generous to many developing countries than (for example) a burden‐sharing formula like ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ (Baer et al. 2008(1), 2010(2)) (…). VsResource Sharing: [Resource‐sharing formulae] offer no good solution to the problem of funding adaptation or liability for climate damages. Under equal per capita allocations, revenue from surplus permit sales would (for at least some countries) provide a source of funds for adaptation activities, but there is no reason to think that this would be sufficient in total or appropriately distributed. (...) using these funds for adaptation would reduce the ability to use them to supply low‐carbon energy sources needed in the future when permit allocations become scarce. (…) resource‐sharing approaches do not usually address the wide variation in income levels across parties with similar levels of emissions. Since some high emitters are poor and some low emitters are rich, equal per capita allocations can be criticized as ‘treating the unequal equally’, and thus as unfair. >Climate justice, >Environmental ethics. 1. Baer, P. et al. 2008. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. 2nd edn., Heinrich Böll Stiftung, EcoEquity, Stockholm Environment Institute and Christian Aid. Available at (http://gdrights.org/wp‐content/uploads/2009/01/thegdrsframework.pdf) (Link not available as of 12/04/19) 2. Baer, P. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Cartels | Rothbard | Rothbard III 636 Cartels/Rothbard: (…) is not monopolizing action a restriction of production, and is not this restriction a demonstrably antisocial act? Let us first take what would seem to be the worst possible case of such action: the actual destruction of part of a product by a cartel. This is done to take advantage of an inelastic demand curve and to raise the price to gain a greater monetary income for the whole group. >Elasticity, >Demand/Rothbard. We can visualize, for example, the case of a coffee cartel burning great quantities of coffee. In the first place, such actions will surely occur very seldom. Actual destruction of its product is clearly a highly wasteful act, even for the cartel; it is obvious that the factors of production which the growers had expended in producing the coffee have been spent in vain. Clearly, the production of the total quantity of coffee itself has proved to be an error, and the burning of coffee is only the aftermath and reflection of the error. Yet, because of the uncertainty of the future, errors are often made. Man could labor and invest for years in the production of a good which, it may turn out, consumers hardly want at all. If, for example, consumers' tastes had changed so that coffee would not be demanded by anyone, regardless of price, it would again have to be destroyed, with or without a cartel. Error is certainly unfortunate, but it cannot be considered immoral or antisocial; nobody aims deliberately at error. If coffee were a durable good, it is obvious that the cartel would not destroy it, but would store it for gradual future sale to consumers, thus earning income on the "surplus" coffee. >Durable goods/Rothbard, >Consumer goods/Rothbard. Rothbard III 637 Free market: The whole concept of "restricting production," then, is a fallacy when applied to the free market. In the real world of scarce resources in relation to possible ends, all production involves choice and the allocationof factors to serve the most highly valued ends. In Short, the production of any product is necessarily always "restricted." Such "restriction" follows simply from the universal scarcity of factors and the diminishing marginal utility of any one product. But then it is absurd to speak of "restriction" at all.(1) Rothbard: We cannot, then, say that the cartel has “restricted production.” Rothbard III 638 If there are anticartelists who disagree with this verdict and believe that the previous structure of production served the consumers better, they are always at perfect liberty to bid the land, labor, and capital factors away from the jungle-guide agencies and rubber producers, and themselves embark on the production of the allegedly “deficient” 40 million pounds of coffee. Since they are not doing so, they are hardly in a position to attack the existing coffee producers for not doing so. As Mises succinctly stated: „Certainly those engaged in the production of Steel are not responsible for the fact that other People did not likewise enter this field of production.... If somebody is to blame for the fact that the number of people who joined the voluntary civil defense organization is not larger, then it is not those who have already joined but those who have not.“ Rothbard III 640 Free market/Rothbard: Criticism of steel owners for not producing "enough" steel or of coffee growers for not producing "enough" coffee also implies the existence of a caste system, whereby a certain caste is permanently designated to produce Steel, another caste to grow coffee, etc. Only in such a caste society would such criticism make sense. Yet the free market is the reverse of the caste system; indeed, choice between alternatives implies mobility between alternatives, and this mobility obviously holds for entrepreneurs or lenders with money to invest in production. Rothbard III 642 VsCartels: A common argument holds that cartel action involves collusion. For one firm may achieve a "monopoly price" as a result of its natural abilities or consumer enthusiasm for its particular product, whereas a cartel of many firms allegedly involves "collusion" and "conspiracy." >Monopolies. RothbardVs: These expressions, however, are simply emotive terms designed to induce an unfavorable response. What is actually involved here is co-operation to increase the incomes of the producers. For what is the essence of a cartel action? Individual producers agree to pool their assets into a common lot, this single central organization to make the decisions on production and price policies for all the owners and then to allocate the monetary gain among them. But is this process not the same as any sort ofjoint partnership or theformation ofa Single corporation? What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? >Corporations/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and, (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. >Mergers/Rothbard. Rothbard III 651 Instability: Analysis demonstrates that a cartel is an inherently unstable form of operation. Ifthe joint pooling of assets in a common cause proves in the long run to be profitable for each of the individual members of the cartel, then they will act formally to merge into one large firm. The cartel then disappears in the merger. On the other hand, if the joint action proves unprofitable for one or more members, the dissatisfied firm or firms will break away from the cartel, and (…) any such independent action almost always destroys the cartel. The cartel form, therefore, is bound to be highly evanescent and unstable. Rothbard III 652 If the cartel does not break up from within, it is even more likely to do so from without. To the extent that it has earned unusual monopoly profits, outside firms and outside producers will enter the same field of production. Outsiders, in short, rush in to take advantage of the higher profits. Rothbard III 657 The problem of „The One Big Cartel“: (…) the free market placed definite limits on the size of the firm, i.e., the limits of calculability on the market ((s) see above III 612). In order to calculate the profits and losses of each branch, a firm must be able to refer its internal operations to external markets for each of the various factors and intermediate products. When any of these external markets disappears, because all are absorbed within the province of a single firm, calculability disappears, and there is no way for the firm rationally to allocate factors to that specific area. The more these limits are encroached upon, the greater and greater will be the sphere of irrationality, and the more diffcult it will be to avoid losses. One big cartel would not be able rationally to allocate producers' goods at all and hence could not avoid severe losses. Consequently, it could never really be established, and, if tried, would quickly break asunder. Rothbard III 660 Production factors: What about the factors? Could not their owners be exploited by the cartel? In the first place, the universal cartel, to be effective, would have to include owners of primary land; otherwise whatever gains they might have might be imputed to land. To put it in its strongest terms, then, could a universal cartel of all land and capital goods "exploit" laborers by systematically paying the latter less than their discounted marginal value products? Could not the members of the cartel agree to pay a very Iow sum to these workers? Ifthat happened, however, there would be created great opportunities for entrepreneurs either to spring up outside the cartel or to break away from the cartel and profit by hiring workers for a higher wage. This competition would have the double effect of (a) breaking up the universal cartel and (b) tending again to yield to the laborers their marginal product. As long as competition is free, unhampered by governmental restrictions, no universal cartel could either exploit labor or remain universal for any length of time.(3) >Monopolies/Rothbard. 1. In the words of Professor Mises: „That the production of a commodity p is not larger than it really is, is due to the fact that the complementary factors of production required for an expansion were employed for the production of other commodities. . . . Neither did the producers of p intentionally restrict the production of p. Every entrepreneur’s capital is limited; he employs it for those projects which, he expects, will, by filling the most urgent demand of the public, yield the highest profit. An entrepreneur at whose disposal are 100 units of capital employs, for instance, 50 units for the production of p and 50 units for the production of q. If both lines are profitable, it is odd to blame him for not having employed more, e.g., 75 units, for the production of p. He could increase the production of p only by curtailing correspondingly the production of q. But with regard to q the same fault could be found by the grumblers. If one blames the entrepreneur for not having produced more p, one must blame him also for not having produced more q. This means: one blames the entrepreneur for the fact that there is a scarcity of the factors of production and that the earth is not a land of Cockaigne.“ (Mises, Planning for Freedom, pp. 115–16) 2. Ibid. p. 115. 3. Cf. Mises, Human Action New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998., p. 592. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Climate Impact Assessment | Economic Theories | Norgaard I 206 Climate Impact Assessment/Economic theories/social sciences: Early global climate change impact assessments focused principally on climate‐society interactions drawing heavily from the tradition of natural hazards research (e.g. Burton et al. 1978)(1). As outlined in a now‐classic book edited by Kates et al. (1985)(2), the key challenge of climate impact assessment is to isolate climate sensitivities in biophysical and social systems. The influence of any given climate stress is therefore traceable through direct influences on biophysical attributes, to sequential (and more indirect) impacts on social activities and attributes (Kates et al. 1985)(2). This approach formed the basis of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s by the climate change research community, and eventually evolved into a framework of ‘vulnerability’ assessment adopted by the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Climate impact assessment was designed to be compatible with climate change modeling and simulation experiments, emphasizing the mechanisms and processes by which a specific climate signal translates into a measurable impact on the biophysical environment (e.g. crop yields, streamflow, forest growth) and, through the material and economic ties of society to a resource, into (second‐ or third‐order) social and economic impacts (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Integrated modeling of climate change impacts typically focused on specific geographic regions, scaled to a spatial resolution where climate parameters could be well understood and modeled, and often focused on a specific suite of biophysical or economic measures where the mechanism of climate influence could be directly argued (e.g. Rosenberg 1982(4); Rosenzweig 1985(5); Liverman et al. 1986(6)). Norgaard I 207 Estimates of proxies for social processes such as demographic change and technological innovation were incorporated into these models to parameterize projections of greenhouse gas emissions and anticipate changes in the sensitivities of key system drivers. Serious critiques of this modeling approach emerged surrounding the realism of the underlying assumptions of human behavior (Dowlatabadi 1995(7); Berkhout and Hertin 2000(8); Kandlikar and Risbey 2000(9)). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. (eds.) 1978. The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H., and Berberian, M. (eds.) 1985. Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society. SCOPE 27. Chichester: Wiley. 3. Carter, T. R., Parry, M. L., Harasawa, H., and Nishioka, S. 1994. IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 59. Department of Geography, University College London and Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, London, UK, and Tsukuba, Japan. 4. Rosenberg, N. J. 1982. The increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and its implication on agricultural productivity, Part II: Effects through CO2‐induced climatic change. Climatic Change 4: 239–54. 5. Rosenzweig, C. 1985. Potential CO2‐induced climate effects on North American wheat‐producing regions. Climatic Change 7: 367–89. 6. Liverman, D., Terjung, W. H., Hayes, J. T., and Mearns, L. O. 1986. Climatic Change and Grain Corn Yields in the North American Great Plains. Climatic Change 9: 327–47. 7. Dowlatabadi, H. 1995. Integrated assessment models of climate change. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 289–96. 8. Berkhout, F., and Hertin, J. 2000. Socio‐economic scenarios for climate impact assessment. Global Environmental Change 10: 165–8. 9. Kandlikar, M., and Risbey, J. 2000. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change: If Adaptation is the Answer, What is the Question? An Editorial Comment. Climatic Change 45: 529–39. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Impact Assessment | Social Sciences | Norgaard I 206 Climate Impact Assessment/Economic theories/social sciences: Early global climate change impact assessments focused principally on climate‐society interactions drawing heavily from the tradition of natural hazards research (e.g. Burton et al. 1978)(1). As outlined in a now‐classic book edited by Kates et al. (1985)(2), the key challenge of climate impact assessment is to isolate climate sensitivities in biophysical and social systems. The influence of any given climate stress is therefore traceable through direct influences on biophysical attributes, to sequential (and more indirect) impacts on social activities and attributes (Kates et al. 1985)(2). This approach formed the basis of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s by the climate change research community, and eventually evolved into a framework of ‘vulnerability’ assessment adopted by the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Climate impact assessment was designed to be compatible with climate change modeling and simulation experiments, emphasizing the mechanisms and processes by which a specific climate signal translates into a measurable impact on the biophysical environment (e.g. crop yields, streamflow, forest growth) and, through the material and economic ties of society to a resource, into (second‐ or third‐order) social and economic impacts (Carter et al. 1994)(3). Integrated modeling of climate change impacts typically focused on specific geographic regions, scaled to a spatial resolution where climate parameters could be well understood and modeled, and often focused on a specific suite of biophysical or economic measures where the mechanism of climate influence could be directly argued (e.g. Rosenberg 1982(4); Rosenzweig 1985(5); Liverman et al. 1986(6)). Norgaard I 207 Estimates of proxies for social processes such as demographic change and technological innovation were incorporated into these models to parameterize projections of greenhouse gas emissions and anticipate changes in the sensitivities of key system drivers. Serious critiques of this modeling approach emerged surrounding the realism of the underlying assumptions of human behavior (Dowlatabadi 1995(7); Berkhout and Hertin 2000(8); Kandlikar and Risbey 2000(9)). Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. (eds.) 1978. The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H., and Berberian, M. (eds.) 1985. Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society. SCOPE 27. Chichester: Wiley. 3. Carter, T. R., Parry, M. L., Harasawa, H., and Nishioka, S. 1994. IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 59. Department of Geography, University College London and Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, London, UK, and Tsukuba, Japan. 4. Rosenberg, N. J. 1982. The increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and its implication on agricultural productivity, Part II: Effects through CO2‐induced climatic change. Climatic Change 4: 239–54. 5. Rosenzweig, C. 1985. Potential CO2‐induced climate effects on North American wheat‐producing regions. Climatic Change 7: 367–89. 6. Liverman, D., Terjung, W. H., Hayes, J. T., and Mearns, L. O. 1986. Climatic Change and Grain Corn Yields in the North American Great Plains. Climatic Change 9: 327–47. 7. Dowlatabadi, H. 1995. Integrated assessment models of climate change. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 289–96. 8. Berkhout, F., and Hertin, J. 2000. Socio‐economic scenarios for climate impact assessment. Global Environmental Change 10: 165–8. 9. Kandlikar, M., and Risbey, J. 2000. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change: If Adaptation is the Answer, What is the Question? An Editorial Comment. Climatic Change 45: 529–39. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Coincidence | Darwin | Gould II 329 According to Darwin, chance could not provide the order that is so obvious in our world. The groups of individuals must first develop a large number of inheritable variations to provide the raw material for later influences. The opponents of Darwin always bring the same litany: Darwin must be wrong: the order cannot arise from chance. (E.g., KoestlerVsDarwin) But that is precisely what Darwin never claimed. Chance only produces the raw material. >Order. Gould: the newer evolutionary theory moves away from the strict Darwinism that has prevailed over the last 30 years. Chance is perhaps not only at work in the generation of the variations: it could also be an equally important part of the evolutionary change. II 330 Chance has a bad reputation, which is due to the role Darwin assigned to it in the production of the raw material. Chance is a candidate as bearer of evolutionary change, but does not threaten natural selection in the area of adaptation. >Selection, >Adaption. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Coincidence | Mayr | I 105 Coincidence/Mayr: we call a certain mutation coincidental if it is not related to present needs of the organism and is otherwise unpredictable. >Mutation, cf. >Necessity. I 250 Coincidence/Mayr: dominates the variation Necessity/Mayr: dominates in selection. >Selection. Selection: there is no "selective force"! I 252 Selection: Bates' discovery of mimicry (1862)(1) in edible and poisonous butterflies: first proof of natural selection. Benefit/Biology: what is the benefit of the emergence of a trait for survival: adaptionist program. >Adaptation, >Benefit, >Emergence. 1. H.W. Bates (1862). Contributions to an Insect Fauna of the Amazon Valley. In: Trans Linn. Soc. London 23. S. 495-566. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Colour | Deacon | I 116 Colour Words/Language Origin/Deacon: The development of color words in different languages and societies converges. >Color words. In principle, the combination of colour tones and sounds can be arbitrary. In fact, however, the mapping relations are in some respects universal. >Image, >Picture theory, >Word meaning, >Signs. I 117 But that does not mean they are somehow built into the brain. Colour word/colours/Berlin/Kay/Deacon: In different societies, black (dark) and white (light) are the first distinctions, later on the distinction red/green is added. If there are three or four colour terms in a language, yellow or blue will be added next. If there are more terms, the pattern is not so clear to predict(1). >Distinctions. Surprisingly, the colours that are considered to be typically red or green (best red/best green) are similar all over the world(2). I 118 Explanation: this is where the brain's ability to differentiate or highlight differences comes into play, which goes beyond the specifics of the use of language in individuals or societies. I 119 Language evolution/colour words: the patterns of typical errors contribute to the fact that the language use adapts itself to the neurophysiological conditions of perception. This is a case of neurological tendency as selection pressure in social evolution. >Language emergence, >Selection, >Perception. Suppose we wanted to introduce a new word for a very special hue of colour between known colours. In the long run, this new name will disappear again in favour of old colour words. Certain prominent colours will dominate. The tendency of our brains to remember certain colours better corresponds to the natural selection of certain variants instead of other variants. Thus, the reference of colour words will develop in adaptation to the human nervous system. >Reference, >Nervous system. I 120 However, this development is due to non-genetic forces. Without these social universals, the use of colour words would be idiosyncratic, i.e. limited to single individuals. Nevertheless, it is clear that colour terms are not firmly anchored in the brain. What is universally anchored is rather certain tendencies of the group, which are not linguistic. The division of colour terms as they are is not a necessary feature of language and is not an innate linguistic category. >Classification, >Order, >Categorization. 1. Berlin, B., und Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. (2) Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In: E. Rosch, & B. B. Lloyd (Hrsg.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 28-49). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Confucianism | Weber | Habermas III 290 Confucianism/Taoism/Weber/Habermas: In his study about the economic ethics of the world religions Max Weber assesses Confucianism and Taoism solely from the point of view of ethical rationalization. Therefore he arrives at his well-known (and controversial) assessment of the low rationalization potential of these worldviews. >Rationalization, >Worldviews, >Religion, >Religious Belief. Weber: "The inner prerequisite of this ethics of unconditional world affirmation and adaptation to the world was the unbroken continuity of purely magical religiosity, beginning with the position of the emperor, whose personal qualification was responsible for the good behaviour of spirits, the occurence of rain (...), to the (...) cult of ancestral spirits (...)". (1) >Renaissance, cf. >Western Rationalism. J. NeedhamVsWeber/Habermas: thanks to the groundbreaking research of J. Needham (2) it is now known that the Chinese between the 1st century B.C. and the 15th century AD were apparently more successful than the West in the development of theoretical knowledge and its use for practical needs. It was only in the Renaissance that Europe took the clear lead in this field. Confucianism/Needham: contains the fundamentals of a world view capable of rationalization. With the concept of a concrete world order, the diversity of phenomena is systematically grasped and related to principles. However, the dominant redemption motives that exacerbate the dualism between the world of appearances and principles that transcend the world are missing. >Principles, >Appearance. III 292 Like the Greek philosophers, the Chinese educational class could not rely on an "academic" life devoted to contemplation and distanced from practice, on a bios theoretikos. >Ancient Philosophy. HabermasVsNeedham: I suspect that the Chinese traditions would be put in a different light if they were compared with classical Greek traditions, not primarily from the point of view of ethics but theory. In any case, it is not a matter of salvation paths, as is the case with conviction ethically redemption religions, but of ways of assuring the world. Cf. >Ethics of conviction. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S. 515. 2. J. Needham, Wissenschaftlicher Universalismus, Frankfurt 1977. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Consumption (Economics) | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 296 Consumption/Utility/Climate Change/Ecological Theories: It is commonly assumed that each individual's utility can be estimated on the basis of their aggregate consumption of goods and services, using a utility function that is common to all of them. The impact of climate change, and of responses to it (i.e. adaptation and mitigation), is measured as a change in this consumption. Norgaard I 300 Aggregate consumption per capita in empirical studies is simply derived from a future prediction of economic output (i.e. gross domestic product or GDP) per capita, by netting out investment. The impacts of climate change, and responses to it, are then estimated as equivalent changes in consumption, and added to this baseline flow of consumption per capita. Thus every effect of climate change, of adaptation, and of mitigation must be priced. Consumption is transformed into utility by means of a utility function. (…) the marginal utility of consumption diminishes as one becomes richer. The effect of this is to place less (more) weight on the impacts of climate change and response strategies on rich (poor) individuals. Since consumption happens to be distributed unequally across time, space, and states of nature, this is how (…) the utility function affects the social discount rate, risk and inequality aversion. Certainly any approach that takes seriously (i) the consequences of policy choices for (ii) human well‐being can be insightful (Sen 1999)(1). Vs: (…) the narrowness of the approach also gives rise to some serious concerns, which have been expressed more generally about welfare economics in numerous other settings. Perhaps the most obvious one is that the approach apparently ignores several factors that contribute to human well‐being. In particular, what role do changes in environmental, political and social circumstances play? (…) if they can be estimated as equivalent changes in consumption—monetized—then they can be included in the estimation of utility. (…) the baseline for utility is (…) essentially individual income [and it] does ignore other non‐monetary constituents. Second, it is in practice very difficult to place money values on many of the effects of climate change, and it is well known that the Norgaard I 301 IAMs [integrated assessment models] used to conduct economic evaluation omit some potentially important changes in environmental, political and social conditions (Watkiss and Downing 2008)(2). Third, the approach does not pay nearly enough attention to the distinction that is suggested to exist between the things that human beings vitally need, and the things that they merely desire (e.g. O'Neill, Holland, et al. 2008)(3). 1. Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. 2. Watkiss, P., and Downing, T. E. 2008. The social cost of carbon: Valuation estimates and their use in UK policy. Integrated Assessment 8(1): 85–105. 3. O'Neill, J., Holland, A., et al. 2008. Environmental Values. London: Routledge. Dietz, Simon: “From Efficiency to Justice: Utility as the Informational Basis for Climate Strategies, and Some Alternatives”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Corporations | Rothbard | Rothbard III 642 Corporations/Rothbard: What happens when a partnership or corporation is formed? Individuals agree to pool their assets into a central management, this central direction to set the policies for the owners and to allocate the monetary gains among them. In both cases, the pooling, lines of authority, and allocation of monetary gain take Place according to rules agreed upon by all from the beginning. There is therefore no essential difference between a cartel and an ordinary corporation or partnership. It might be objected that the ordinary corporation or partnership covers only one firm, while the cartel includes an entire "industry" (i.e., all firms producing a certain product). But such a distinction does not necessarily hold. Various firms may refuse to enter a cartel, while, on the other hand, a Single firm may well be a "monopolist" in the sale of its particular unique product, and therefore it may also encompass an entire "industry." The correspondence between a co-operative partnership or corporation - not generally considered reprehensible - and a cartel is further enhanced when we consider the case of a merger of various firms. Mergers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. >Mergers/Rothbard, >Cartels/Rothbard, >Cartels/Mises, >Monopolies/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Cultural Tools | Vygotsky | Upton I 14 Cultural tools/human history/Vygotsky/Upton: Vygotsky thesis: human history is created through the construction and use of cultural tools (Vygotsky 1930/1978)(1). It is this inventive use of tools that makes humans unique. A hammer is a physical example of a cultural tool. It is a means of knocking sharp objects such as nails into surfaces, in order to create a new structure. The form and function of the hammer are Upton I 15 the result of generations of cultural evolution and adaptation. The meaning and use of a hammer are not immediately obvious to someone who has never come across one before, or who has never needed to knock nails in. The information about how to use tools is also culturally transmitted. >Use, >Understanding, >Actions, >Explanations. Each generation may adapt the hammer for its own needs or use it in new ways. Vygotsky calls this ‘appropriation’. >Culture. Upton I 16 Language/Vygotsky: One of the most important cultural tools people use is language. Like the hammer, the language we use today is the result of long-term cultural development, adaptation, transmission and appropriation. >Language, >Language use, >Language community. 1. Vygotsky, LS (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Vygotsky I L. S. Vygotsky Thought and Language Cambridge, MA 1986 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Culture | Huntington | Brocker I 835 Culture/Huntington: Thesis: Western culture is in decline, while the economically strengthened Chinese and the rapidly growing demographically Islamic culture are becoming new challengers. Brocker I 836 Thesis: "Culture and the identity of cultures, i.e. the identity of cultural areas at the highest level", are decisive for current and future global patterns of order. (1) Brocker I 836 Huntington: Cultural areas are not closed, demarcable entities; however, we are still able to comprehend the rise and decline of certain cultural orders. Huntington differentiates seven or eight cultural areas: He distinguishes between Sinian, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Slavic-orthodox Brocker I 837 and Latin American, while the existence of a genuinely African culture is not conclusively established. (2) Relations between these cultural areas have so far taken place in two phases: 1) As "encounters": in the second until about 1500 AD, but limited by spatial and temporal distance. 2) The offensive extension of European rule to other continents led to significant intercultural relations under Western dominance, founded on the technological strength of the West. 3) We are currently witnessing real interactions between cultural centres. At this point Huntington uses Hedly Bull's system definition (1977 (3)), according to which states see themselves as part of the international system. See State/Huntington. Brocker I 838 Universal Culture/cultural universalism: the development of a "universal culture" appears to Huntington as naive wishful thinking. In fact, there is neither a universal language that goes beyond mere understanding nor a universal religion that is capable of breaking down cultural boundaries. This idea is a "typical product of Western culture". (4) The idea of such a culture is based on fallacy which the West believes in after the victory over Soviet Communism. Liberal democracy is by no means the only alternative to socialist ideas of order; nor can global trade and communication turn Western universalism into reality. Western culture is not the only modern culture. (5) A shift in the balance of power in favour of other cultural areas is "gradual, unstoppable and fundamental". (6) Brocker I 840 Culture/EspositoVsHuntington: the heart of Huntington's argument for a new world order is based on a monolithic understanding of culture. (7) Brocker I 847 Robert JervisVsHuntington: he regards cultural areas as given, unchanging units Brocker I 848 and thereby breaks with the constructivist perspective of the finiteness of identity. (8) Edward SaidVsHuntington: Said Thesis: Cultures are not ahistorical and uniform, but full of internal oppositions, adaptations, counter-concepts and variations that play no role in Huntington's crude abstractions. (9) Amartya SenVsHuntington: People are not just members of a single culture. Possible alternative attributes must not be hidden. (10) Dieter SenghaasVsHuntington: It remains unclear why certain cultures are belligerent - which is certainly due to the lack of theoretical support for the culture-behavior nexus. (11) Bruce LawrenceVsHuntington: Internal cultural heterogeneities are deliberately overlooked, giving the impression that large cultural circles can be given a united voice. The accusation of cultural racism is obvious here. (12) 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996. Dt.: Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, München/Wien 1998 (zuerst 1996).S. 19 2. Ebenda S. 57-62 3. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New York 1977. 4. Huntington ebenda, S. 92 5. Ebenda S. 98 6. Ebenda S. 119. 7. John L. Esposito The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?, New York/Oxford 1999, S. 229 8. Robert Jervis »Review: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington«, in: Political Science Quarterly 112/2, 1997, 307-308. 9. Edward Said, »The Clash of Definitions. On Samuel Huntington«, in: ders., Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays, London. 2001, p. 569-590, S. 578f. 10. Amartya Sen Die Identitätsfalle. Warum es keinen Krieg der Kulturen gibt, München 2007, S. 54f. 11. Dieter Senghaas, Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst, Frankfurt/M. 1998, S. 140 12. Bruce Lawrence, 2002, »Conjuring with Islam, II«, in: The Journal of American History 89/2, 2002, 485-497, S. 489 Philipp Klüfers/Carlo Masala, „Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHunt I Samuel P. Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order New York 1996 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Dark Triad Traits | Paulhus | Corr II 246 Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Paulhus and Williams (2002)(1) examined the possibility that narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism constituted a Dark Triad of personality traits. >Narcissism, >Psychopathy, >Machiavellianism, >Personality traits. The measures of narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism had moderate correlations with each other in this sample showing that an individual who reported a high score for one of these traits was also likely to report relatively high scores for the other traits. (…) the Dark Triad personality traits had similar negative associations with the personality trait of agreeableness but often had divergent associations with the personality trait of neuroticism (…). >Neuroticism. The conclusion reached by Paulhus and Williams (2002)(1) was that the Dark Triad personality traits were distinct constructs that had important similarities to each other but were far from interchangeable. II 251 To develop a more complete understanding of the Dark Triad traits, it may be helpful to consider their potential evolutionary origins. The idea underlying (…) evolutionary perspectives is that the self-serving, manipulative and exploitative strategies that characterize the Dark Triad traits may be adaptive under certain conditions. >Evolutionary psychology. One of the earliest scholars to advocate for an evolutionary perspective for any of the Dark Triad traits was Mealey (1995)(2), who suggested that psychopathy may be the expression of a frequency-dependent life strategy that is selected in response to varying environmental circumstances. Another approach to understanding the origins of the Dark Triad traits has been to consider their links with life II 252 history strategies which concern how individuals resolve the various trade-offs that must be made due to time and energy limitations (e.g., Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005)(3). These trade-offs focus on: (1) somatic effort vs. reproductive effort; (2) parental effort vs. mating effort; (3) quality of offspring vs. quantity of offspring; and (4) future reproduction vs. present reproduction. This perspective argues that individuals differ along a continuum with regard to the reproductive strategies they employ to resolve these trade-offs (e.g., Buss, 2009)(4). >D.M. Buss. II 253 [Various] results suggest the possibility that the Dark Triad traits may represent specialized adaptations that allow individuals to exploit particular niches within society such as those concerning opportunistic mating (e.g., Furnham et al., 2013)(5). The Dark Triad traits tend to have similar — but not identical — associations with a range of aversive outcomes (…). Although many of the results concerning the Dark Triad provide an unpleasant view of these traits, other studies reveal that the Dark Triad traits may be beneficial or at least neutral in certain areas of life. For example, these traits may be helpful for individuals pursuing leader ship positions especially when they are combined with factors such as intelligence and physical attractiveness (Furnham, 2010)(6) (…). II 255 VsDark Triad Traits: Other than perhaps following the ‘rule of three’ (Dundes, 1968)(7), there is no intrinsic reason why the set of dark personality traits should be limited to a triad. In fact, Chabrol, Van Leeuwen, Rodgers and Séjourné (2009)(8) have provided compelling evidence that sadism belongs with these other traits, creating a ‘Dark Tetrad’. We have argued that there are numerous additional dark traits that merit study and that could be included in the types of studies that have examined the Dark Triad (e.g., Marcus & Zeigler-Hill, 2015(9); Zeigler-Hill & Marcus, 2016(10)). 1. Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556—563. 2. Mealey, L. (1995). The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 5 23—599. 3. Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history theory and evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 4. Buss, D. M. (2009). How can evolutionary psychology successfully explain personality and individual differences? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 359—366. 5. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 199—2 16. 6. Furnham, A. (2010). The elephant in the boardroom: The causes of leadership derailment. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Dundes, A. (1968). The number three in American culture. In A. Dundes (Ed.), Every man his way: Readings in cultural anthropology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice—Hall. 8. Chabrol, H., Van Leeuwen, N., Rodgers, R., & Séjourné, N. (2009). Contributions of psychopathic, narcissistic, Machiavellian, and sadistic personality traits to juvenile delinquency. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 734—73 9. 9. Marcus, D. K., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2015). A big tent of dark personality traits. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9,434—446. 10. Zeigler-Hill, V., & Marcus, D. K. (2016). A bright future for dark personality features? In V. Zeigler-Hill & D. K. Marcus (Eds.), The dark side of personality: Science and practice in social, personality, and clinical psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Dark Triad Traits | Williams | Corr II 246 Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Paulhus and Williams (2002)(1) examined the possibility that narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism constituted a Dark Triad of personality traits. >Narcissism, >Psychopathy, >Machiavellianism, >Personality traits. The measures of narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism had moderate correlations with each other in this sample showing that an individual who reported a high score for one of these traits was also likely to report relatively high scores for the other traits. (…) the Dark Triad personality traits had similar negative associations with the personality trait of agreeableness but often had divergent associations with the personality trait of neuroticism (…). >Neuroticism. The conclusion reached by Paulhus and Williams (2002)(1) was that the Dark Triad personality traits were distinct constructs that had important similarities to each other but were far from interchangeable. II 251 To develop a more complete understanding of the Dark Triad traits, it may be helpful to consider their potential evolutionary origins. The idea underlying (…) evolutionary perspectives is that the self-serving, manipulative and exploitative strategies that characterize the Dark Triad traits may be adaptive under certain conditions. >Evolutionary psychology. One of the earliest scholars to advocate for an evolutionary perspective for any of the Dark Triad traits was Mealey (1995)(2), who suggested that psychopathy may be the expression of a frequency-dependent life strategy that is selected in response to varying environmental circumstances. Another approach to understanding the origins of the Dark Triad traits has been to consider their links with life II 252 history strategies which concern how individuals resolve the various trade-offs that must be made due to time and energy limitations (e.g., Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005)(3). These trade-offs focus on: (1) somatic effort vs. reproductive effort; (2) parental effort vs. mating effort; (3) quality of offspring vs. quantity of offspring; and (4) future reproduction vs. present reproduction. This perspective argues that individuals differ along a continuum with regard to the reproductive strategies they employ to resolve these trade-offs (e.g., Buss, 2009)(4). >D.M. Buss. II 253 [Various] results suggest the possibility that the Dark Triad traits may represent specialized adaptations that allow individuals to exploit particular niches within society such as those concerning opportunistic mating (e.g., Furnham et al., 2013)(5). The Dark Triad traits tend to have similar — but not identical — associations with a range of aversive outcomes (…). Although many of the results concerning the Dark Triad provide an unpleasant view of these traits, other studies reveal that the Dark Triad traits may be beneficial or at least neutral in certain areas of life. For example, these traits may be helpful for individuals pursuing leader ship positions especially when they are combined with factors such as intelligence and physical attractiveness (Furnham, 2010)(6) (…). II 255 VsDark Triad Traits: Other than perhaps following the ‘rule of three’ (Dundes, 1968)(7), there is no intrinsic reason why the set of dark personality traits should be limited to a triad. In fact, Chabrol, Van Leeuwen, Rodgers and Séjourné (2009)(8) have provided compelling evidence that sadism belongs with these other traits, creating a ‘Dark Tetrad’. We have argued that there are numerous additional dark traits that merit study and that could be included in the types of studies that have examined the Dark Triad (e.g., Marcus & Zeigler-Hill, 2015(9); Zeigler-Hill & Marcus, 2016(10)). >Personality/Traits. 1. Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556—563. 2. Mealey, L. (1995). The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 5 23—599. 3. Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history theory and evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 4. Buss, D. M. (2009). How can evolutionary psychology successfully explain personality and individual differences? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 359—366. 5. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 199—2 16. 6. Furnham, A. (2010). The elephant in the boardroom: The causes of leadership derailment. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Dundes, A. (1968). The number three in American culture. In A. Dundes (Ed.), Every man his way: Readings in cultural anthropology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice—Hall. 8. Chabrol, H., Van Leeuwen, N., Rodgers, R., & Séjourné, N. (2009). Contributions of psychopathic, narcissistic, Machiavellian, and sadistic personality traits to juvenile delinquency. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 734—73 9. 9. Marcus, D. K., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2015). A big tent of dark personality traits. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9,434—446. 10. Zeigler-Hill, V., & Marcus, D. K. (2016). A bright future for dark personality features? In V. Zeigler-Hill & D. K. Marcus (Eds.), The dark side of personality: Science and practice in social, personality, and clinical psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Darwinism | Gould | I 70 Darwin/Gould: Darwin's theory of selection represents a creative transfer of Adam Smiths' fundamental thesis of a rational economy to biology: equilibrium and order are not created by a higher, external (divine) power or by the existence of laws that directly affect the whole, but by the struggle between individuals for their own advantage. (modern variant: to transfer their genes to future generations through a particular success in reproduction). II 9 Darwinism/adaptation/Gould: Darwin's disciples later designed a version of his theory that was much narrower than Darwin himself would ever have allowed: this "adaptionist program" referred evolution to every single part of the body, ignoring the fact that organisms are integrated entities whose development potential is limited by inheritance (GouldVs.) II 11 This exaggerated strict Darwinism emphasizes the numerous, small random variations and implies that macroevolution is a summation of the countless small steps. This "extrapolationist" theory denied macroevolution every independence. It would thus also deny the other levels, both below (e. g. genes) and above (species) any direct causal significance. II 171 Definition Strict Darwinism/Gould: thesis: all characteristics are adaptations, and evolution as a whole is a struggle for survival at the lowest level between all individuals. >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Deceptions | Sterelny | I 364 Deception/error/correction/sense/perception/Sterelny: an organism that can register its environment only through a single stimulus is more susceptible, and has very limited control and adaptation of its behavior. >Stimuli, >Behavior. Changes to the environment often distort the input. >Circumstances, >Situations. Sterelny: it is better to track down functionally relevant features of the environment over more than one channel. (Definition "stimulus-dependent": only one channel). Cf. >Information/Sterelny. It is also possible for two independent stimuli to penetrate through the same channel: For example, a zebra can assess the degree of danger of a hyena by its attitude and viewing direction, both of which are perceived through vision. The difference between the use of multiple stimuli and a generalization is difficult to draw. After all, no two attempts at approaching an enemy will produce exactly the same retina stimulus. >Generality, >Generalization. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Desire | Appraisal Theory | Corr I 62 Desires/appraisal theory/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)(1). These assumptions entail that the emotional reaction to a concrete event should be influenced by the degree to which superordinate desires are affected by this event, as well as the strength of these desires. >Motives, >Motivation. A number of tests of this assumption have been made. For example, Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001)(2) asked participants to recall the single most satisfying event experienced during the last month and to rate the extent to which this event satisfied each of ten candidate basic desires (e.g., the desire for competence, security, relatedness, popularity and personal autonomy). Other research has focused on an intermediate level of the motive hierarchy, where the top-level desires (e.g., the achievement motive) are concretized to more specific desires that represent what the person wants to attain in her current life situation (e.g., getting good grades; see Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998)(3). For example, Emmons (1986)(4) related these intermediate-level desires, called personal strivings, to emotions using an experiencing-sampling method… (for additional information, see Emmons 1996(5); Brunstein, Schultheiss and Maier 1999(6). Corr I 63 Beyond relating positive and negative emotions to desire fulfilment and desire frustration, respectively, appraisal theorists have linked particular emotions to particular kinds of desires (e.g., Lazarus 1991(7); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(8); Roseman 1979)(9). An important distinction in this context is that between wanting versus diswanting a state of affairs (Roseman 1979(9)), or between having an approach goal versus an avoidance goal. Several theorists (e.g., Gray 1994(10); see Carver 2006(11) for a review) proposed (a) that the pursuit of approach versus avoidance goals activates one of two different, basic motivational systems, a behavioural approach system (BAS) or a behavioural inhibition (BIS) system; and (b) that people differ in central parameters of these systems, specifically in the relative strength of their general approach and avoidance motivation. Carver (2004)(12) found that a measure of inter-individual differences in general approach motivation (BAS sensitivity) predicted the intensity of sadness and anger in response to frustration (the non-occurrence of an expected positive event). >Reinforcement sensivity, >Jeffrey A. Gray. 1. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam 2. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y. and Kasser, T. 2001. What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80: 325–39 3. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508 4. Emmons, R. A. 1986. Personal strivings: an approach to personality and subjective well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 1058–68 5. Emmons, R. A. 1996. Striving and feeling: personal goals and subjective well-being, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 313–37. New York: Guilford Press 6. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Maier, G. W. 1999. The pursuit of personal goals: a motivational approach to well-being and life adjustment, in J. Brandtstädter and R. M. Lerner (eds.), Action and self-development: theory and research through the life span, pp. 169–96. New York: Sage 7. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 8. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Gray, J. A. 1994. Three fundamental emotion systems, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 243–8. Oxford University Press 11. Carver, C. S. 2006. Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action, Motivation and Emotion 30: 105–10 12. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Distinctions | Rutter | Slater I 206 Distinctions/order/forms of thinking/Rutter: (Rutter 1987)(1): it is a critical question as to whether (…) factors represent something distinct from widely established (…) factors (…) or the positive pole of bi-polar dimensions. In other words, has something “new” been identified or are we rediscovering the full range of key variables that relate to adaptation along a continuum from negative to positive? In a well-known passage on the utility of naming the opposite poles of the same underlying dimension, Rutter discussed the value of ”up” and “down” the stairs as distinct in connotation from “up” and “not-up.” He argues that distinct words focus attention on where the action may be and may well carry different connotations. More importantly, he notes that the meaning is in the functional processes and not simply in designating the positive or negative pole of a bi-polar dimension. >Order, >Levels, >Classification. [E.g.,] Inoculations are described as protective because their purpose is directed at stimulating the immune system to make antibodies that will fend off more serious invasions by infectious agents. Compromised immune function (perhaps from malnutrition), on the other hand, would be described in terms of vulnerability because the functional significance is to exacerbate the risk for ill health or poor response to infection. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Division of Labour | Spencer | Habermas IV 175 Division of Labour/Spencer/Durkheim/Habermas: Spencer thesis (according to Durkheim): social life, like life in general, can only be organized through an unconscious and spontaneous adaptation, under the simultaneous pressure of needs, and not according to a deliberate, intelligent plan. (…) Cf. >Planning, >Rationality. Habermas IV 176 The type of social relationship would be the economic relationship (...).(1) Spencer/Durkheim: the unifying mechanism is the market. Integration by the market is "spontaneous" in so far as orientations for action are coordinated not by moral rules but by functional interrelationships. Question: how can the division of labour be both a natural law of evolution and the mechanism of production for a certain form of social solidarity?(2) Solution/Spencer: the division of social labour, controlled by the non-normative market mechanism, merely finds its normative expression in the "giant system of private contracts". >Markets, >Contracts, >Contract Theory. 1.E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Paris 1930, German Frankfurt 1977, S. 242f 2. Ebenda, S. 81. |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Emotion System | Cosmides | Corr I 61 Emotion system/evolution/Tooby/Cosmides: Applied to emotional dispositions, Tooby and Cosmides’ argument (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(1) is that, if differences in emotionality (e.g., low versus high fearfulness) had been subject to selection pressure, they would not have prevailed over evolutionary times but would have converged to an optimal level of emotionality (e.g., medium fearfulness). VsTooby/VsCosmides: However, as noted by Penke, Denissen and Miller (2007)(2), inter-individual differences in emotionality could have evolved if, as seems plausible, a generally optimal level of fearfulness, irascibility, etc. did not exist in our evolutionary past, but different levels of emotionality were most adaptive in different environments or social niches. >Emotion system/psychological theories. 1. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 2. Penke, L., Denissen, J. J. A. and Miller, G. F. 2007. The evolutionary genetics of personality, European Journal of Personality 21: 549–87 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotion System | Psychological Theories | Corr I 56 Emotion System/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: the emotion system seems to consist at its core of a mechanism that (1) monitors the relevance of cognized events for the person’s desires or motives, and (2) communicates detected motive-relevant changes to other personality sub-systems and simultaneously proposes particular action goals (Frijda 1994(1); Reisenzein 2009(2)). A person can to a considerable degree decide to heed versus ignore the ‘suggestions’ made by her emotions, as well as control or regulate the emotions themselves. As Frijda (1986(3) put it, ‘people not only have emotions, they also handle them’. >Emotions, >Emotional intelligence, >Behavior, >Self-knowledge, >Consciousness Corr I 60/61 it is widely accepted today that emotions have adaptive effects, which were the reason why the emotion system (at least its core) emerged in evolution. This raises the question of whether individual differences in emotionality (e.g., fearfulness or irascibility) are likewise, at least in part, the product of natural selection. Although there is now strong evidence for the partial heritability of the Big Five (e.g., Bouchard (2004)(4) and hence for the heritability of basic inter-individual differences in emotionality, this does not imply that these heritable inter-individual differences are adaptive. adaptive. On the contrary, it has been argued that the very existence of heritable variation in a trait signals a lack of adaptive significance (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(5). >emotion system/Tooby, >emotion system/Cosmides. 1. Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 112–36. Oxford University Press 2. Reisenzein, R. 2009. Emotions as metarepresentational states of mind: naturalizing the belief-desire theory of emotion, Cognitive Systems Research 10: 6–20 3. Frijda, N. H. 1986. The emotions. Cambridge University Press, p. 401 4. Bouchard, T. J. Jr. 2004. Genetic influence on human psychological traits, Current Directions in Psychological Science 13: 148–51 5. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotion System | Tooby | Corr I 61 Emotion system/evolution/Tooby/Cosmides: Applied to emotional dispositions, Tooby and Cosmides’ argument (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(1) is that, if differences in emotionality (e.g., low versus high fearfulness) had been subject to selection pressure, they would not have prevailed over evolutionary times but would have converged to an optimal level of emotionality (e.g., medium fearfulness). VsTooby/VsCosmides: However, as noted by Penke, Denissen and Miller (2007)(2), inter-individual differences in emotionality could have evolved if, as seems plausible, a generally optimal level of fearfulness, irascibility, etc. did not exist in our evolutionary past, but different levels of emotionality were most adaptive in different environments or social niches. >Emotion system/psychological theories. 1. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 2.Penke, L., Denissen, J. J. A. and Miller, G. F. 2007. The evolutionary genetics of personality, European Journal of Personality 21: 549–87 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotions | Psychological Theories | Corr I 54 Emotions/personality psychology/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: there is widespread agreement among emotion researchers that the objects of their inquiry are, centrally, the transitory states of persons denoted by ordinary language words Corr I 55 such as ‘happiness’, ‘sadness’, ‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘pity’, ‘pride’, ‘guilt’, and so forth. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies, >Personality traits, >Personality, >States of mind. There is also agreement that emotion episodes normally occur as reactions to the perception or imagination of ‘objects’ (typically events or states of affairs), and that they have both subjective and objective (intersubjectively observable) manifestations. Subjectively, emotions manifest themselves as pleasant or unpleasant feelings that seem to be directed at the eliciting, see Reisenzein 1994(1); Russell 2003(2)). >Intersubjectivity, >Other minds. Objectively, emotions manifest themselves, at least at times, in particular actions. Most classical and many contemporary emotion theorists, following common-sense psychology, identify emotions with the mentioned subjective experiences. However, some theorists (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Scherer 1984(4)) define emotions more broadly as response syndromes that include not only mental but also bodily components, such as facial expressions and physiological arousal. ReisenseinVsScherer/ReisenzeinVsLazarus: This definition of emotions is problematic, however, because the correlations between the mental and bodily components of emotion syndromes are typically low (Reisenzein 2007)(5). Today, the dominant theory of emotion generation is the cognitive or appraisal theory of emotion (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(6); Scherer 2001(7); see Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001(8), for an overview). Appraisal theory assumes that emotions arise if an event is appraised in a motive-relevant manner, that is, as representing an actual or potential fulfilment or frustration of a motive (= desire, wish). >Appraisal theory/psychological theories. (…) apart from cognitions in the narrow sense (i.e., beliefs), emotions also presuppose motives (Lazarus 1991(3); Roseman 1979(9); see Reisenzein 2006(10), for further discussion). 1. Reisenzein, R. 1994. Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 525–39 2. Russell, J. A. 2003. Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion, Psychological Review 110: 145–72 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Scherer, K. R. 1984. On the nature and function of emotion: a component process approach, in K. R. Scherer and P. Ekman (eds.), Approaches to emotion, pp. 293–317. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 5. Reisenzein, R. 2007. What is a definition of emotion? And are emotions mental-behavioural processes?, Social Science Information 46: 424–8 6. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 7. Scherer, K. R. 2001. Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 92–120. Oxford University Press 8. Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A. and Johnstone, T. 2001. Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Reisenzein, R. 2006. Arnold’s theory of emotion in historical perspective, Cognition and Emotion 20: 920–51 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Emotions | Reisenzein | Corr I 56 Emotions/function/psychological Theories/Reisenzein/Weber: during the past twenty-five years, the view has increasingly increasingly gained acceptance that,(…) emotions are overall adaptive. The adaptive effects of emotions are their (evolutionary) functions: the reasons why the emotion system came into existence in the first place. >Evolution, >Selection, >Adaption. The two main, over-arching functions of emotions are widely thought to be the motivational and the informational functions of emotions (e.g., Frijda 1994)(1). >Motivation. A. The motivational function of emotions consists in their adaptive effects on motivation (the action goals of the person) and, thereby, on action itself. Corr I 57 There can be little doubt that emotions influence motivation partly through the hedonistic route (see e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall and Zhang 2007(2)). However, many emotion theorists believe that this is neither the only nor even the most important route from emotion to action (e.g., Frijda 1986(3); McDougall 1928(4); Lazarus 1991(5); Weiner 1995(6)). Rather, according to these theorists, at least some emotions (e.g., fear) evoke adaptive action tendencies (e.g., to flee or to avoid) directly, that is, without the mediation of hedonistic desires (see Reisenzein 1996(7)). B. The informational function of emotions consists in their making adaptively useful information available and/or salient to other sub-systems of personality (e.g., Forgas 2003(8); Schwarz and Clore 2007(9); Slovic, Peters, Finucane and MacGregor 2005(10)). 1. Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 112–36. Oxford University Press 2. Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N. and Zhang, L. 2007. How emotion shapes behaviour: feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation, Personality and Social Psychology Review 11: 167–203 3. Frijda, N. H. 1986. The emotions. Cambridge University Press 4. McDougall, W. 1928. An outline of psychology, 4th ed. London: Methuen 5. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 6. Weiner, B. 1995. Judgments of responsibility: a foundation for a theory of social conduct. New York: Guilford 7. Reisenzein, R. 1996. Emotional action generation, in W. Battmann and S. Dutke (eds.), Processes of the molar regulation of behaviour, pp. 151–65. Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers 8. Forgas, J. P. 2003. Affective influences on attitudes and judgments, in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), Handbook of affective sciences, pp. 596–618. Oxford University Press 9. Schwarz, N. and Clore, G. L. 2007. Feelings and phenomenal experiences, in A. W. Kruglanski and E. T. Higgins (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, 2nd edn, pp. 385–407. New York: Guilford Press 10. Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L. and MacGregor, D. G. 2005. Affect, risk, and decision making, Health Psychology 24: 35–40 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Environment | Developmental Psychology | Slater I 19 Environment/Developmental Psychology: new attention has been directed toward the substantial variability in how children respond to their environments. >Parent-Child Relationship/psychological theories, >Situation/Harlow, >Experiment/Harlow, >Situation/Ainsworth. Many children raised under adverse conditions, ranging from institutions to neglectful or abusive parenting, have shown remarkable recovery in later emotional and cognitive functioning. Child characteristics that contribute to “resilience” have been investigated in a wide range of human and animal studies (Sameroff, 2010)(1). These “child effects” have been conceptualized and measured at the genetic, physiological, and behavioral levels of analysis (Obradovic & Boyce, 2009)(2). Molecular analyses have centered primarily on identifying genetic polymorphisms that increase or reduce the child’s vulnerability to adverse environments. Physiological measures have focused on autonomic or neuroendocrine measures of reactivity to stressful events, while behavioral measures have focused on individual differences in temperament conceived in terms of shy/inhibited or impulsive/aggressive dimensions (Suomi, 2006)(3). Cf. >Environment/Molecular Genetics The ability to measure variability in both the caregiving environment and in children’s susceptibility to environmental exposures has fostered new research on the mechanisms through which early experience affects later adaptation (Meaney, 2010)(4). This dynamic transaction between the child and the caregiving environment is evident in studies of gene/environment interactions associated with psychiatric disorders (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006)(5). Work in rodents has identified how early experience can influence gene expression and produce stable epigenetic modifications that alter individual phenotypes across the lifespan (Roth & Sweatt, 2011(6). 1. Sameroff, A. (2010). A unified theory of development: A dialectic integration of nature and nurture. Child Development, 81, 6–22 2. Obradovic, J., & Boyce, W. T. (2009). Individual differences in behavioral, physiological, and genetic sensitivities to contexts: implications for development and adaptation. Developmental Neuroscience, 31, 300–308. 3. Suomi, S. J. (2006). Risk, resilience, and gene x environment interactions in rhesus monkeys. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1094, 52–62 4. Meaney, M. (2010). Epigenetics and the biological definition of gene × environment interactions. Child Development, 81, 41–79. 5. Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. (2006). Gene-environment interactions in psychiatry: joining forces with neuroscience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7, 583–590 6. Roth, T. L., & Sweatt, J. D. (2011). Annual Research Review: Epigenetic mechanisms and environmental shaping of the brain during sensitive periods of development. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 52, 398–408 Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Upton I 50 Environment/Developmental psychology/Upton: Current evidence (…) supports a greater role for the environment in the development of skills [like sitting up, crawling and walking]. Modern theories of motor skill development emphasise the interaction between nature and nurture. (>Nature and nurture). An important approach here is provided by the dynamic systems theory (Thelen, 1995)(1). >Dynamic systems theory/psychological theories. 1. Thelen, E. (1995) Motor development: a new synthesis. American Psychologist, 50: 79–95. |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Environment | Gould | IV 43 Environment/adjustment/selection/Darwinism/Gould: according to the traditional point of view Darwinism is first and foremost a theory of natural selection. >Darwinism, >Selection. Gould: that is certainly true, but in reference to power and scope of selection we have become overzealous when we try to attribute every conceivable form and behaviour to their direct influence. Another often forgotten principle prevents any optimal adaptation: the strange and yet compelling paths of history! Organisms are subject to the constraints of inherited forms that slow down their evolution! They cannot be reshaped every time their environment changes. IV 44 History/Gould: a world that would be optimally adapted to its current environment would be a world without history, such a world could have been created as we find it now. >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Evidence | Darwin | Gould I 189 Evidence/Darwin/Gould: Darwin represented the view that the fossil finds were extremely incomplete. The history of most fossil species includes two characteristics that are particularly difficult to reconcile with the theory of gradual change. I 191 With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. The situation is different on the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to selection pressure because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. Question: What should fossil finds contain if the majority of evolution takes place in small marginalized groups? I 210 Evidence/Method/Gould: Events which, according to traditional wisdom, cannot "occur" are rarely recognized on the basis of collected evidence, they require a mechanism for their explanation after they can occur. The empirical evidence of that time seems plausible to us today, at that time there were not, because no acceptable force could be named, which would have been able to move ((s) e.g.) whole continents. >Method, >Evolution, >Justification, >Confirmation. Gould IV 33 Evidence/Darwin/Gould: Darwin wrote "The Descent of Man" in 1871(1), at that time there were no fossils, except for the Neanderthal man who is a race of our own kind, neither an ancestor nor a missing link. Gould IV 35 Explanation/evidence/Science/Darwin/Gould: how do we know that evolution controls the world and not any other principle? Darwin's answer was paradoxical. He was not looking for perfection, but for inconsistencies! There are structures and behaviours that endanger the meaningful form of an organism, but ultimately ensure its success. They increase productive efficiency. For example, the tail feathers of the peacocks and the antlers of the moose. They even weaken the species, but still secure the transmission of the genes. This can only be explained by Darwin: in addition to adaptation: sexual selection. IV 36 Sexual selection: competition of the males among each other or election by the females. Thus, the struggle for existence of the individuals drives evolution! It must be exceptionally effective, it is often capable of overcoming other equipment benefits and developments. 1. Ch. Darwin, The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. John Murray, London 1871. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Evolution | Deacon | I 29 Evolution/Selection/Deacon: it seems natural that smarter species prevail over more primitive ones. Is it really always like this? Is it right to order mind and mental deficits on a linear scale? In this context, the extension of consciousness, social progress and evolution are seen as mutually interchangeable terms. This is because we look at the world in terms of design and have borrowed the concept of evolution from the history of technical development. Cf. >Forms of thinking. Biological Evolution/Deacon: this is not additive in contrast to technical evolution. The human genre repertoire is similar to that of the frog or mouse. Also the body structure and even the brain is almost identical in most primates. Evolution: Evolution increased diversification and distribution. But this only occupies other niches. I 317 Evolution/Adaption/Adaptation/Deacon: there is an "evolutionary overdetermination": the apparent independence of many adapted advantages contributes to the same structural change. Since evolution is driven by patterns of tendencies, independent developments tend to strengthen each other in the long run. >Adaption. In this way, certain functions may concentrate on one half of the brain. I 322 Evolution/Baldwin's Evolution/Deacon/Baldwin's Evolution/J. M. Baldwin/Deacon: James Mark Baldwin proposed a modification of Darwinian evolution(1). Baldwin thesis: Learning and behavioural flexibility can influence natural selection through the development of certain skills that enable individuals to populate new niches. Subsequent generations are then subjected to a different type of selection pressure. >Niches, >Selection, >Learning. This does not claim that evolution becomes effective within a lifetime, but that offspring may be given better conditions for further adaptation, e.g. for colonization of colder regions. Thus Baldwin in no way contradicts the doctrine of Darwinism. >Darwinism. I 323 Thus, while no genetic change is initiated immediately, the change in the conditions will cause a change in relation to which of the existing genetic predispositions will be favoured in the future. Lactose intolerance is often cited as an example for this. 1. J. M. Baldwin, (1902): Consciousness and Evolution, Science 2, 212-223, J. M. Baldwin Development and Evolution, NY. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | Mayr | I 43 Evolution/Mayr: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or the individual. (MayrVsDawkins). >Species, >Genes, >R. Dawkins, >Genes/Dawkins, >Evolution/Dawkins. Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. >Selection. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. I 230 Evolution/Progress/Mayr: Cohesion: an expression of the fact that the system of development has become very narrow. Evolution: proceeds very slowly in large, member-rich species, and very quickly in small peripheral isolated groups. >Speciation, >punctuated equilibrium/Eldredge/Gould. A start-up population with few individuals and therefore little hidden genetic variation can more easily assume a different genotype. Macroevolution: is most strongly determined by the geographical factor (isolation). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). >Gradualism, >Saltationism. 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). >Selection. I 377 Evolution of life: a chemical process involving autocatalysis and a directing factor. Prebiotic selection. Cf. >St. Kauffman. I 237 Pasteur: proofed the impossibility of life in oxygen-rich atmosphere! In 1953, Stanley Miller grew amino acids, urea and other organic molecules in a glass flask by discharging electricity into a mixture of methane, ammonium, hydrogen, and water vapor. I 238 Proteins, nucleic acids: the organisms must form these larger molecules themselves. Amino acids, pyrimidines, puridine do not need to formed by the organisms themselves. I 239 Molecular biology: discovered that the genetic code is the same for bacteria, which do not have nuclei, as in protists, fungi, animals and plants. I 240 Missing link: Archaeopteryx: half bird half reptile. Not necessarily direct ancestor. Speciation: a) dichopatric: a previously connected area is divided by a new barrier: mountain range, inlets, interruption of vegetation. b) peripatrically: new start-up population emerges outside of the original distribution area. c) sympatric speciation: new species due to ecological specialization within the area of distribution. Darwin's theory of gradualism. >Gradualism. I 243 VsGardualism: cannot explain the emergence of completely new organs. Problem: How can a rudimentary wing be enlarged by natural selection before it is suitable for flying? I 244 Darwin: two possible solutions: a) Intensification of the function: E.g. eyes, e.g. the development of the anterior limbs of moles, whales, bats. b) Functional change: E.g. Antennae of daphia (water flea): additional function of the swimming paddle, which is enlarged and modified under selection pressure. E.g. Gould: Feathers probably first for temperature control before any animal could fly. Function/Biology: Functional differences are also related to behavioral patterns, e.g. feather cleaning. Competing theories on evolutionary change I 247 Salationism: Huxley later Bateson, de Vries, (Mendelists). The saltationist emergence of new species only occurs poyploidy and some other forms of chromosomal restructuring (very rare) during sexual reproduction. Teleological theories: assume that nature has a principle: Osbron's arsitogenesis, Chardin's omega principle. Should lead to perfection. >Teilhard de Chardin. Lamarck's Theories: Changes go back to use and non-use, environmental conditions. Until the 1930s! I 248 Def "soft inheritance" (acquired characteristics). Was refuted by genetics. Def "hard inheritance" (so-called "central dogma"): the information contained in the proteins (the phenotype) cannot be passed on to the nucleic acids (the genotype)! (Insight of molecular biology). I 256 Macroevolution: after saltationism, soft heredity and autogenesis, had been refuted with evolution, macroevolution had to be explained more and more as a phenomenon on the level of the population, i.e. as a phenomenon directly attributable to events and processes during microevolution. (Speciation: faster in isolation). (>Gould, Eldredge, 1971(1): "punctuated equilibrium", punctualism.) I 281 New: we know today that the cycles of herbivores elicit those of the predators and not vice versa! Coevolution: E.g. the Yucca moth destroys the plant's ovules by its larvae, but pollens the flowers. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Evolution | Vollmer | I 51 Evolutionary Epistemology/Vollmer: in the evolution of science, there are no "mutations" because there is no "offspring" in scientific theories. Evolutionary epistemology is only useful insofar as subjective knowledge structures are inherited. >Success, >Pragmatism, >Proofs, >Provability. I 75 The evolutionary epistemology does not have the concept of truth of pragmatism - it is not proven by success. Success/Vollmer: only proves that the hypothesis was not entirely wrong. >Hypotheses. I 217 VsEvolution theory/VsDarwinismus. Circular. VollmerVsVs: it is wrong that "Fitness" can be defined without recourse to "surviving". >Survival, >Fitness. I 260 Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more habitat, more partners, more offspring, etc. I 264 Entropy/Evolution/life/Vollmer: contrary to popular belief it is not always a measure of disorder. >Entropy. Under special conditions (low total energy and existence of lasting interactions or inclusion by external forces) the increase in entropy even includes an increase of order and structure - thus the second law does not contradict the origin of living things. >Life, >Energy, >Order. I 279 Adaptation/selection/VsEvolutionary Epistemology is no falsification - the original eye is not falsyfied by the eye of the eagle - proper mapping does not matter - transferring the selection theory on cognitive skills can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error (Simmel, 1895) - VollmerVsVs: this is not an argument VsEvolution - no matter who is adapting to whom - Co-adaption. I 298 Evolution/success/Vollmer: the accuracy of knowledge cannot be inferred from evolutionary success - otherwise naturalistic fallacy - confusion of facts with norms. >Naturalistic fallacy, >Norms, >Facts. --- II 190 Evolution/time direction/Vollmer: due to cosmic expansion there are no two moments of evolution identical - (> time arrow). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Evolutionary Psychology | Buss | Corr II 171 Evolutionary Psychology/EP/Buss/Figueredo: (…) we may envision a mass of people escaping a burning building by different exits: main exits, emergency exits, windows and service doors. Personality is similar. Just as everyone has to escape the burning building in the analogy, so there is the evolutionary imperative to reproduce before death; and just as there are many exits, one can foster successful reproduction by being gregarious and charming as with the social extravert, dogged II 172 and persevering like the exceedingly conscientious, or ingratiating and affiliative like the highly agreeable. Thus, different personality styles and strategies have evolved in competition with one another for the same goal of survival and reproduction, but with different ways and means of adaptation. II 173 [Buss] insists that evolution forges the ‘physiological, anatomical and psychological mechanisms’ that inform choice, inclination, aversion and attraction. II 175 (…) the new science of EP correctly represented emitted behaviours as the product of the interactions between evolved psychological mechanisms and specific stimulus inputs from the environment to which they were finely tuned. II 179 Survival/Reproduction: (…) Buss outlined eight exigencies of survival and reproduction in any adaptive landscape populated by concentrations of conspecifics: (1) successful intrasexual competition, (2) mate selection, (3) successful conception, (4) mate retention, (5) reciprocal dyadic alliance formation, (6) coalition-building and maintenance, (7) parental care and socialization and (8) extra-parental kin investment. There follows a continuation of Buss’s claim that EP is an able arbiter of theory in its ability to impose a biologically informed kind of Occam’s razor upon theoretical claims within personality psychology. II 180 A common misconception regarding the evolution of personality, critiqued by Buss (2011)(1), is that selection acts as a homogenizing force leading to single point of optimality in the phenotype distribution. In contrast, evolutionary theory predicts that the location of this point will vary depending upon the type of selective pressures active, in accordance to the relationship between a trait and its fitness. II 182 The alternative explanations summarized by Buss (1991)(2) for the origins of partially heritable personality characteristics and the retention of individual differences remain as possibilities, but the list of alternatives has been expanded [in a volume edited by Buss and Hawley (2011)(3)]. For example, it has been argued as possible that selective sweeps within the past several thousand years (…) are behind the large variation among humans. Gene flow due to accelerated migration of individuals among human populations is also a contender hypothesis. Balancing selection, whereby multiple phenotypes are adaptive in a complementary way, each in a specific subset of the species niches, has remained as a focus of discussion. >Evolution, >Selection, >Adaptation, >Niches, >Species, >Genes, >Heritability. 1. Buss, D. (2011). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind (4th ed.). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 2. Buss, D. M. (1991). Evolutionary personality psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 42, 459–491. 3. Buss, D. M., & Hawley, P. H. (2011). The evolution of personality and individual differences. New York: Oxford University Press. Figueredo, Aurelio J.; Fernandes, Heitor B. F.; Peñaherrera-Aguirre, Mateo and Hertler, Steven C.: “The Evolution of Personality Revisiting Buss (1991)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 171-190. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Experience | Dilthey | Gadamer I 67 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: Something becomes an experience, as long as it was not only experienced, but its being experienced had a special emphasis, which gives it lasting meaning. What is in this way one, completely wins a new state of being in the expression of art. Dilthey's famous book title "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (English: "The Experience and Poetry") brings this connection to a catchy formula. Indeed, it was Dilthey who first assigned a conceptual function to the word, which soon became a popular buzzword and was soon to rise to a term of such a plausible concept of value that many European languages have adopted it as a foreign word. Gadamer I 68 Dilthey's Goethe essay allows us (...) to look back (...) into the unconscious prehistory of the word, because this essay is available in the version of 1877(1) and in the later adaptation of "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (1905). In this essay Dilthey compares Goethe with Rousseau, and in order to describe Rousseau's novel poetry from the world of his inner experiences, he uses the expression "the experience". In the paraphrase of a Rousseau text, the phrase "the experiences of earlier days"(2) can be found. DiltheyVsRationalism: The coinage of the word obviously evokes the criticism of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which in Rousseau's late times emphasized the concept of life. It is probably Rousseau's influence on German Classicism that set the standard for "being experienced" ("Erlebtsein") and thus enabled the formation of the word experience ("Erlebnis").(3) Life/Idealism/Gadamer: The concept of life forms Gadamer I 69 also the metaphysical background that carries the speculative thinking of German idealism, and plays a fundamental role in both Fichte and Hegel, but also in Schleiermacher. In contrast to the abstraction of understanding as well as to the particularity of feeling or imagination, this concept implies the connection to totality, to infinity. Gadamer: This can be clearly heard in the tone that the word experience has had up to the present day. >Experience/Historical Development/Gadamer, >Given/Dilthey. Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The entities of meaning we encounter in the humanities may be very strange and incomprehensible to us - they can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Sensation/DiltheyVsMach/DiltheyVsCarnap/Gadamer: [It was of decisive importance (...) for Dilthey's] thinking (...) that as the last unit of consciousness not sensation or feeling is mentioned, as was taken for granted in Kantianism and still in the positivist epistemology of the 19th century up to Ernst Mach, but what Dilthey says for it. He thus limits the constructive ideal of a construction of knowledge from sensation atoms and opposes it with a sharper version of the concept of the given. >Life/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: The question is (...) how the experience of the individual and his or her insight can be elevated to historical experience. History is no longer about interrelations that are experienced as such by the individual or are relived as such by others. Dilthey develops how the individual acquires a life context and from there seeks to gain the constitutive terms that are also important for the historical context and his recognition. In contrast to the categories of the knowledge of nature, these concepts are concepts of life. For the last prerequisite for the knowledge of the historical world, in which the identity of consciousness and object, Gadamer I 227 this speculative postulate of idealism, is still a demonstrable reality and is according to Dilthey the experience. Here is immediate certainty. For what is experience is no longer differentiated into an act, such as becoming one, and a content, that which one is becoming(3). It is rather an inner being that cannot be further dissolved. Context/Dilthey: Already in his ideas "on descriptive and dissecting psychology" Dilthey had distinguished the task of deriving "the acquired context of the soul life" from the explanatory forms of the knowledge of nature(4). He had used the term structure in order to distinguish the experience of soul connections from the causal connections of the natural event. The logical characteristic of "structure" was, that here a whole of a relationship is meant, which is not based on the temporal sequence of being achieved, but on inner relationships. >Subject/Dilthey, >Interrelation/Dilthey. 1. Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, Bd. X; cf. die Anmerkung Diltheys zu »Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie« (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, p. 468 ff.). 2. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 6. Aufl., p. 219; cf. Rousseau, Les Confessions, Partie Il, Livre 9. The exact correspondence cannot be proven. Obviously it is not a translation, but a paraphrase of the description to be read in Rousseau's work. 3. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 27f.; 230. 4. VII, 13a. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Experimental Economics | Economic Theories | Parisi I 78 Experimental economics/Economic theories/Sullivan/Holt: [there is an] increasingly frequent interaction between two literatures: experimental economics and law and economics. In many ways, these literatures developed as siblings during the heady period of economic research spanning the 1960s and early 1970s. At about the same time that Ronald Coase (1960)(1), Guido Calabresi (1961)(2), and Gary Becker (1968)(3) were authoring seminal papers in the modern law-and-economics movement, acceleration of the experimental economics literature was under way with Vernon Smith’s (1962)(13) experimental challenge to the established notion that theories of efficient, perfect competition were only relevant in idealized settings with large numbers of well-informed traders. Vernon Smith: Smith’s approach to studying market equilibrium was to create a market for an artificial commodity. Adaptations of the experimental approach to other settings quickly followed, eventually bleeding into the also-expanding literature of law and economics. >Experimental economics/Vernon Smith, >Law and Economics/Sullivan/Holt. Parisi I 79 Methodology: (... )the design and implementation of controlled experiments is about as fundamental to scientific inquiry as anything could be. Parisi I 80 Another intuitive use of experiments is as part of a more open-ended search for practical solutions to a novel problem. This is often the case in experiments designed for engineering applications. Economists use experiments in much the same ways as physicists or engineers. Preconditions/hypotheses: Economic theories are typically based on strong assumptions about rationality and foresight, and evaluated on the basis of elegance, sharpness of prediction, and consistency with basic intuition. Idealization/context: features of context, interpersonal frictions, and institutional detail are frequently omitted to achieve greater tractability and generality. Experiments: The resulting theories cry out for experimental tests, where differences in individual personality traits and propensities, limitations in attention and foresight, and other details too intricate to measure or model formally can be accounted for using random assignment and other experimental controls. Example: consider the question whether a cap on damages reduces the frequency of tort suits.* Randomization: randomization or careful selection algorithms could be used to partition the members of society into two identical (or at least nearly identical) groups: one group would remain under the status quo liability rules, while the other would be subject to a cap on damages. With absolutely nothing else changed, the researcher Parisi I 81 could collect data for a few months, and then compare the rates of tort suits in the two groups to see what causal effect the cap on damages had on the outcome of interest. Comparison/control: the researcher exploits control over the experimental environment to apply some treatment to only one of two otherwise identical groups of subjects. Subjects in the experiment then interact according to their normal self-interests, but those in the treatment group act under a slightly different set of rules than those in the control group. The experimenter measures observed behavior in both the treatment and control groups, and any difference in behavior reflects the causal treatment effect of interest.** Experiments without control group: (...) economic experiments are sometimes designed simply to measure and document how subjects behave in a given market structure or incentive environment without reference to any control group. Examples include experiments that test the efficiency of an auction structure, such as an innovative proposal to allow bidding for combinations of spectrum licenses in a way that protects firms from overpaying for pieces of a fragmented network.*** Variations: (...) economic experiments can also be structured to consider a range of treatment effects. An example is an experimental study of equilibrium price formation in a homogenous-good oligopoly as the number of producers drops from five, to four, to three, to two (e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004(11); Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000(12)). In every case, the conceptual framework of the economics experiment is the same as that of experiments in any other field of science. Induced value theory: >Induced value theory/Economic theories. Experiments/methods: See >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Settlement Bargaining/Experimental conomics. * For economic experiments on the effect of damages caps on the rate of settlement, see Babcock and Pogarsky (1999)(4) and Pogarsky and Babcock (2001)(5). ** For broad surveys of various experimental designs in economics, see Davis and Holt (1993)(6), Kagel and Roth (1995)(7), and Holt (2007)(7). For a practical approach to experimental design for economists, see Friedman and Sunder (1994)(8). *** See Goeree and Holt (2010)(10) for a set of experiments used by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to design and implement a major auction for spectrum licenses for the provision of wireless communications services in a geographic network. Even this paper, however, had a control treatment without package bidding opportunities, which showed problems that could arise if bidders were not permitted to submit "all or nothing" bids for combinations of licenses. 1. Coase, R. H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 2. Calabresi, G. (1961). “Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts.” Yale Law Journal 70(4): 499–553. 3. Becker, G. S. (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76(2): 169–217. 4. Babcock, L. and G. Pogarsky (1999). “Damage Caps and Settlement: a Behavioral Approach.” Journal of Legal Studies 28(2): 341–370. 5. Pogarsky, G. and L. Babcock (2001). “Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse.” Journal of Legal Studies 30(1): 143–159. 6. Davis, D. D. and C. A. Holt (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 7. Kagel, J. H. and A. E. Roth, eds. (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Holt, C. A. (2007). Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. 9. Friedman, D. and S. Sunder (1994). Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Goeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2010). “Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior 70: 146–169. 11. Huck, S., H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (2004). “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53(4): 435–446. 12.Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy (2000). “Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental Study.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 18: 7–22. 13. Smith, V. L. (1962). “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 70(2): 111–137. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Experimental Economics | Smith | Parisi I 78 Experimental economics/Vernon Smith/Sullivan/Holt: Smith’s approach to studying market equilibrium was to create a market for an artificial commodity. Buyers in Smith’s market valued the commodity because the rules of the experiment allowed them to redeem each “unit” of the commodity they bought for cash, earning the difference between an assigned redemption value and the negotiated price of each purchase. Sellers similarly valued trade because they earned the difference between the negotiated sales price and a cost number assigned to each unit of the commodity. These induced values allowed Smith to compare observed transactions to the Walrasian price that actually equated supply and demand in his market. >Equilibrium/Walras. The experiment was notable for showing that markets with good information about bids, asks, and sales prices would converge to the equilibrium prediction, even with small numbers of traders and no public information about others’ values and costs. Adaptations of the experimental approach to other settings quickly followed, eventually bleeding into the also-expanding literature of law and economics. >Law and economics/Sullivan/Holt, >Induced value theory/Economic theories. Parisi I 89 It has long been suggested that subjects in experiments can, in some circumstances, be adequately and appropriately incentivized by personal preferences over abstract outcomes such as winning a game (Smith, 1976(1), p. 277). Sullivan/Holt: The clear concern that many people express over the demise of characters in fictional stories and television shows - mapped to the outcomes of fictional litigants in mock disputes - may not be so different from the preferences actual jurors have over the “real,” but in many ways no less hypothetical, outcomes of the cases before them. Delicacy is required, however, as motivating subjects by way of context may simultaneously tend to bias subjects’ beliefs or perceived values in ways that invalidate or at least obscure theoretical predictions. On the other hand, such biases may be of limited concern if they are uncorrelated with treatment conditions of interest. >Jurisdiction/Experimental economics, >Risk perception/Economic theories, >Strategic voting/Experimental economics. 1. Smith, V. L. (1976). “Experimental economics: Induced value theory.” American Economic Review 66(2): 274–279. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Experiments | Harlow | Slater I 11 Experiments/attachment/affectation/Harlow: In a series of studies using the surrogate preference paradigm, Harlow demonstrated that infant monkeys showed large and consistent preferences for cloth surrogates that provided contact comfort over wire surrogates that provided food. The largest sample reported in the 1962 paper(1) consisted of 56 monkeys that had been raised in conditions of “partial social isolation.” These monkeys had been housed in cages where they could see and hear other monkeys. (…+…). Slater I 13 In another set of studies (…) monkeys were exposed to a total social isolation, a condition in which they were individually housed in a cubicle with solid walls that eliminated all visual and auditory contact with other monkeys. (…) Harlow concluded that total social isolation for the first six months of life was a critical period that created irreversible effects on subsequent social adaptation. He indicated that this six-month period in the rhesus monkey was equivalent to the first two to three years of life for the human infant. (…+…). A set of studies varied the conditions and the degree of social isolation and the resulting behavior of the monkeys was described. ((s) The severity of the social restrictions corresponded to the length and severity of the isolation as well as the time of the beginning of the isolation in the life of the monkeys.) Slater I 14 Harlow’s paper had an immediate impact on the ongoing debate about the importance of the mother-infant bond in child psychiatry. During the 1950s, John Bowlby a British psychiatrist had published a monograph (1951)(2) on the effects of maternal deprivation on children’s development. In his visits to Harlow’s lab in the 1950s, Bowlby may have been responsible for pointing out to Harlow that his cage-raised monkey colony created conditions that were equivalent to partial social isolation (Suomi, Horst, & Veer, 2008)(3). Slater I 15 [Harlow’s] approach was influenced by European ethologists, particularly Robert Hinde, and by Harlow’s sensitivity to the effects of different rearing environments ranging from his lab, to the local zoo, to monkeys born and raised in the wild. Harlow’s creativity in designing laboratory environments that elicit attachment, fear, exploratory, and affiliative behavior showed a unique understanding of the importance of context in assessing how early social experience could influence subsequent development. He actively designed environments that tested the interplay between attachment, fear, and exploration. >Situation/Ainsworth. VsHarlow: The finding that rearing with age-mates could compensate for the effects of maternal deprivation on developing peer relationships was the most controversial and tentative finding in the 1962 paper(1). For criticism of Harlow, see >Behavior/Harlow. 1. Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. (1962). Social deprivation in monkeys. Scientific American, 207, 137–146. 2. Bowlby, J. (1951). Maternal care and mental health. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Suomi, S. J., Horst, F. C. P., & Veer, R. (2008). Rigorous experiments on monkey love: An account of Harry F. Harlow’s role in the history of attachment theory. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 354–369. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Explanation | Darwin | Gould IV 35 Explanation/Evidence/Science/Darwin/Gould: how do we know that evolution controls the world and not any other principle? Darwin's answer was paradoxical. He was not looking for perfection, but for inconsistencies! >Method. There are structures and behaviours that endanger the meaningful form of an organism, but ultimately ensure its success. They increase productive efficiency. For example, the tail feathers of the peacocks and the antlers of the moose. They even weaken the species, but still secure the transmission of the genes. This can only be explained by Darwin: in addition to adaptation: sexual selection. IV 36 Sexual selection: competition of the males among each other or election by the females. Thus, the struggle for existence of the individuals drives evolution! It must be exceptionally effective, it is often capable of overcoming other equipment benefits and developments. >Selection, >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Explanation | Gould | I 321 Explanation/Why-Questions/Gould: evolutionary biology is always concerned with the question "why?" (> Purposes). II 61 Explanation/tradition/Gould: is it not extremely unlikely that haplodiploidism, a prerequisite for the evolution of hymenoter societies, was probably first developed as an adaptation to an almost completely contradictory lifestyle? GouldVsTradition: but this is not unusual at all, but a basic principle that distinguishes evolutionary biology from a common stereotype about science in general. Frequent error: it is a frequent error to assume that the instantaneous usefulness of a property would allow to deduce the reasons for its origin. Origin and current usefulness, however, are two very different subjects. Complex properties are full of possibilities: their conceivable uses are not limited to their original functions. For example, the fish's fins of equilibrium became the driving elements. >Misuse. II 150 Explanation/causality/purpose/Gould: the question "What is it for?" often distracts us from the more earthly but often instructive question: "How is it built?" II 152 We tend to view each structure as if it were created for a specific purpose. II 166 Explanation/causality/causal explanation/chart of knowledge/methods/Gould: a hotly debated topic is the occurrence of transposable elements of DNA, so-called jumping genes. These sequences can repeat themselves and then move independently to other parts of the bacterial chromosome. II 167 Conventional arguments for the existence of DNA repeating itself on average follow traditional Darwinian viewpoints. Primary characteristics of organisms: about 25% of the genetic material cannot be secondary - they must exist in order to secure an advantage for the organisms in the fight for survival. Therefore, we would have to explain the advantage for the supporting body resulting from the DNA, which is repeating itself on average. Wrong answer: if you assume that all functioning genes could only exist in one copy, any possibility of alteration would be blocked. So that must be the reason! Doubling provides the material for evolution. II 168 GouldVs: this is causality in the wrong direction: it cannot move backwards in time, the resulting flexibility cannot be the reason why a doubling of genes occurs in the first place. Future usefulness can only be the beneficial effect of other direct reasons for an immediate advantage. E. g. feathers are excellent for flying, but the ancestors of the birds must have developed them for other reasons, probably to control the temperature as a few feathers on the arms of a reptile do not make it fly. II 169 Definition adaptations/Gould: adaptations are limited exclusively to those structures that have developed because of their current usefulness. Definition exaptations/Gould: we call adaptations structures that have developed for other reasons or without any reason, but are still usable. If the repeating DNA is transposable, why do we need an adaptive explanation at all for it? II 170 It can simply distribute itself from chromosome to chromosome on its own, making copies of itself while "stuck" genes cannot. Solution/Gould: these additional copies must not continue to exist because they are useful, but because the body does not notice them at all! |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Extraversion | Matthews | Corr I 420 Extraversion/Cognitive-adaptive theory/Matthews: the cognitive-adaptive theory of personality traits (Matthews 1999(1), 2000(2), 2008a(3); Matthews and Zeidner 2004(4)) proposes that traits have functional coherence, not structural coherence. Extraversion/Matthews: may be seen as an adaptation to socially demanding environments. Cognitive features of Extraversion such as efficient multitasking, verbal skills and rapid response work together to facilitate adaptation. Conversely, the various characteristics of Introversion support adaptation to solitary environments requiring self-direction. >Self-regulation/Matthews, >Personality traits. 1. Matthews, G. 1999. Personality and skill: a cognitive-adaptive framework, in P. L. Ackerman, P. C. Kyllonen and R. D. Roberts (eds.), The future of learning and individual differences research: processes, traits, and content, pp. 251–70. Washington, DC: APA 2. Matthews, G. 2000. A cognitive science critique of biological theories of personality traits, History and Philosophy of Psychology 2: 1–17 3. Matthews, G. 2008a. Personality and information processing: a cognitive-adaptive theory, in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and testing, vol. I, Personality theories and models, pp. 56–79. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 4. Matthews, G. and Zeidner, M. 2004. Traits, states and the trilogy of mind: an adaptive perspective on intellectual functioning, in D. Dai and R. J. Sternberg (eds.), Motivation, emotion, and cognition: integrative perspectives on intellectual functioning and development, pp. 143–74. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Forms | Gould | I 44 Form/nature/physics/Gould: D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1942) prophetically argued that organisms are directly formed by physical forces. (1) I 260 Form/life/organism/evolution/physics/Gould: stability is created by the fact that a living being is large enough to penetrate into an area where gravity surpasses the forces that take place on the surface. As the ratio of surface to volume decreases with growth, an increasing size is the safest way into this area. The Earth's physical environment contains numerous habitats, which are only available to organisms that are larger than single-celled organisms. The multicellularity probably originated in several places independently of each other. It has the two main features of analogue similarity: 1. It is relatively easy to reach and both highly adaptable and flexible as well as 2. the only possible route to the benefits it brings. With the exception of ostrich eggs, individual cells cannot grow very large. I 261 The multicellularity has probably arisen even within the individual kingdoms several times. Most biologists believe that it occurs in plants and fungi through amalgamation. These organisms are the descendants of protist colonies. (Protists: unicellular organisms, see Terminology/Gould). For example, some Volvox colonies with a fixed number of cells are regularly arranged. The cells may differ in size and the reproductive function may be limited to those of them located at a pole. I 264 Larger animals have such a low ratio of outer surface to volume that they need to form internal organs to increase the available surface area. I 288 Ratio of surface to volume: the ratio of surface to volume is very high in small organisms. Heat is generated by the volume of the body and radiated at its surface. Therefore warm-blooded animals have a particularly high energy requirement. Field mice, for example, must eat all the time. The ratio was so low for the large dinosaurs that they could get by without an insulation layer. I 311 Form/life/physics/size/Gould: the character of Morgan in E. L. Doctorow's "Ragtime" was wrong when he thought that large mammals were geometric copies of their smaller relatives. Elephants have relatively larger brains and thicker legs than mice. He is right in that larger animals are often similar to smaller relatives in the same group. Galileo already gave a classic example: the strength of a leg is a function of the cross-section. The weight that the legs have to carry varies with their volume. In order for the bodily functions to remain the same, animals must change their form when they become larger: this is the "scaling theory". E. g. from crab spider to tarantula, the scale of relatives reaches up to a thousand times the body weight of the smallest specimen. Here too, the scale runs regularly: the duration of the heartbeat increases only 4/10 times as fast as in relation to the body weight. I 312 Small animals move through life much faster than large ones, their heart beats faster, they breathe more frequently, their pulse is faster, their "fire of life "burns" faster: in mammals, the metabolic rate increases by only three quarters as fast as the body weight. Smaller ones tend to live shorter than large ones. I 313 However, the homo sapiens lives much longer than a comparable mammal of the same size: See Neoteny/Gould. The importance of the astronomical time is by no means to be denied; animals must measure it in order to survive. I 315 Breathing time and heartbeat increase about 0.28 times faster than body weight; the body weight can be reduced, leaving mammals of any size to breathe once at about 4 beats. For all mammals, regardless of their size, they also breathe about 200 million times during their lifetime, the heart beats about 800 million times. I 318 ff There are magnetotactic bacteria that orient themselves according to the fields and move accordingly. They thus resist the mechanism of Brownian movement. It was discovered that the magnets are distributed in the body of the bacteria in the form of about 20 small particles. Question: why is there this distribution of magnetism on particles, and why are these particles about 500 Angstrom large (1 Angstrom = 1 ten millionth of a millimetre). They form a chain in the body of the elongated bacteria. I 320 If these particles were a little smaller (about one-fifth smaller) then they would be "superparamagnetic", i. e. a magnetic reorientation of the particles could be effected at room temperature. If, on the other hand, they were twice as large, for example, the particles would form their own magnetic range within the particles, pointing in different directions. What can such a small creature do with a magnetic field? The room for movement during the few minutes of their existence is probably only a few centimetres. It does not really matter which way it goes. It can now be decisive for a bacterium to move downwards. Now gravity can be felt at least as well without a magnetic field. However, this only applies to large organisms. I 322 Insects and birds live in a world dominated by forces that affect the surface. Some of them can run on water or hang down from the ceiling because the surface tension is so strong and the gravitation is relatively weak. Gravity is hardly a problem for insects and not at all for bacteria. IV 17 Forms/biology/Gould: Darwin: thesis: form follows function. IV 19 It is the question of how a form develops continuously. IV 27 Adaptation: we should not conclude that Darwin's assumed adaptability to a local environment has unrestricted power to generate theoretically optimal designs for all situations. The natural selection can only use existing material. This is the classic dilemma of evolutionary theory. IV 151 Forms/evolution/Gould: perhaps the most difficult problem of evolution is: how can new complex forms (not just single adaptive advantageous features) be created when every single form requires thousands of individual changes and when intermediate stages do not produce viable specimens? Solution: new forms do not need to be created piece by piece, but a development program is started in a coordinated manner by activating a "main switch". IV 337 Form/organisms/evolution/Gould: surfaces grow with the square of length, volumes with the third power of length and thus much faster. Therefore, compared to their volume, small animals have a large surface area (and must eat more). 1. D' Arcy Wentworth Thompson, Onb Groth and Form, 1917, Cambridge University Press, https://openlibrary.org/books/OL6604798M/On_growth_and_form. (access date 12.01. 2018) |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Functions | Parsons | Habermas IV 363 Functions/Society/Systems/Parsons/Habermas: Because each institution (business, state administration, law, church, family) belongs to all social subsystems (economy, law, preservation of cultural patterns) in different aspects, none is suitable as a defining characteristic for each of these subsystems. Functions/Parsons: he now defines them on a relatively abstract level as adaptation, goal achievement, integration and maintenance of structural patterns (see AGIL schema/Terminology). These are production services of the economy, organisational services of state administrations, integration services of law and the normalisation services of tradition. Habermas IV 364 Problem: Parsons must explain why these four functional aspects are necessary and sufficient for the analysis of action systems. Habermas IV 367 Since the scheme of the four basic functions in Parsons is no longer based on action theory and applies to living systems in general, the analytical components of the action themselves must now be seen as solutions to system problems. IV 370 VsParsons: the division and assignment of functions in his system theory is arbitrary. J. Alexander asks, for example, why integration problems cannot be solved just as well by universalistic as by particularistic action orientations or why problems of the preservation of cultural patterns should not be solved just as well by orientation on the achievements instead of on the intrinsic qualities of a counterpart. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Gender Roles | Fraser | Mause I 201f Gender Roles/Fraser: Representatives of the theory of difference within feminist debate criticise the fact that the demand for equality demands the one-sided adaptation of women to norms and principles that are framed universally, but are actually male. Nancy Fraser: Proposal: to transfer the modern women's movement into a third phase: this is characterised by the linking of socio-economic redistribution policy with a gender-sensitive policy of recognition of cultural differences and a gender-sensitive representation policy. (1) This proposal is not yet a consensus within the women's movement. >Recogition. 1. Nancy Fraser, Mapping the feminist imagination. From redistribution to recognition to representation. Constellations 12, (3) 2005, S. 295– 307. |
PolFras I Nancy Fraser Mapping the feminist imagination. From redistribution to representation 2005 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Genetic Algorithms | Norvig | Norvig I 126 Genetic Algorithms/Norvig/Russell: A genetic algorithm (or GA) is a variant of stochastic beam search in which successor states are generated by combining two parent states rather than by modifying a single state. The analogy to natural selection is the same as in stochastic beam search, except that now we are dealing with sexual rather than asexual reproduction. Norvig I 127 Like beam searches, GAs begin with a set of k randomly generated states, called the population. Each state, or individual, is represented as a string over a finite alphabet – most commonly, a string of 0s and 1s. Norvig I 128 Like stochastic beam search, genetic algorithms combine an uphill tendency with random exploration and exchange of information among parallel search threads. The primary advantage, if any, of genetic algorithms comes from the crossover operation. Yet it can be shown mathematically that, if the positions of the genetic code are permuted initially in a random order, crossover conveys no advantage. Norvig I 155 In the 1950s, several statisticians, including Box (1957)(1) and Friedman (1959)(2), used evolutionary techniques for optimization problems, but it wasn’t until Rechenberg (1965)(3) introduced evolution strategies to solve optimization problems for airfoils that the approach gained popularity. In the 1960s and 1970s, John Holland (1975)(4) championed genetic algorithms, both as a useful tool and as a method to expand our understanding of adaptation, biological or otherwise (Holland, 1995)(5). The artificial life movement (Langton, 1995)(6) takes this idea one step further, viewing the products of genetic algorithms as organisms rather than solutions to problems. VsGenetic algorithms: Most comparisons of genetic algorithms to other approaches (especially stochastic hill climbing) have found that the genetic algorithms are slower to converge (O’Reilly and Oppacher, 1994(7); Mitchell et al., 1996(8); Juels and Wattenberg, 1996(9); Baluja, 1997)(10). VsVs: Such findings are not universally popular within the GA community, but recent attempts within that community to understand population-based search as an approximate form of Bayesian learning might help close the gap between the field and its critics (Pelikan et al., 1999)(11). >Genetic Programming/Norvig. 1. Box, G. E. P. (1957). Evolutionary operation: A method of increasing industrial productivity. Applied Statistics, 6, 81–101. 2. Friedman, G. J. (1959). Digital simulation of an evolutionary process. General Systems Yearbook, 4, 171–184. 3. Rechenberg, I. (1965). Cybernetic solution path of an experimental problem. Library translation 1122, Royal Aircraft Establishment 4. Holland, J. H. (1975). Adaption in Natural and Artificial Systems. University of Michigan Press. 5. Holland, J. H. (1995). Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Addison-Wesley. 6. Langton, C. (Ed.). (1995). Artificial Life. MIT Press. 7. O’Reilly, U.-M. and Oppacher, F. (1994). Program search with a hierarchical variable length representation: Genetic programming, simulated annealing and hill climbing. In Proc. Third Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature, pp. 397–406 8. Mitchell, M., Holland, J. H., and Forrest, S. (1996). When will a genetic algorithm outperform hill climbing? In Cowan, J., Tesauro, G., and Alspector, J. (Eds.), NIPS 6. MIT Press. 9. Juels, A. and Wattenberg, M. (1996). Stochastic hill climbing as a baseline method for evaluating genetic algorithms. In Touretzky, D. S., Mozer, M. C., and Hasselmo, M. E. (Eds.), NIPS 8, pp. 430–6. MIT Press. 10. Baluja, S. (1997). Genetic algorithms and explicit search statistics. In Mozer, M. C., Jordan, M. I., and Petsche, T. (Eds.), NIPS 9, pp. 319–325. MIT Press 11. Pelikan, M., Goldberg, D. E., and Cantu-Paz, E. (1999). BOA: The Bayesian optimization algorithm. In GECCO-99: Proc. Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, pp. 525–532. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Genetic Algorithms | Russell | Norvig I 126 Genetic Algorithms/Norvig/Russell: A genetic algorithm (or GA) is a variant of stochastic beam search in which successor states are generated by combining two parent states rather than by modifying a single state. The analogy to natural selection is the same as in stochastic beam search, except that now we are dealing with sexual rather than asexual reproduction. Norvig I 127 Like beam searches, GAs begin with a set of k randomly generated states, called the population. Each state, or individual, is represented as a string over a finite alphabet – most commonly, a string of 0s and 1s. Norvig I 128 Like stochastic beam search, genetic algorithms combine an uphill tendency with random exploration and exchange of information among parallel search threads. The primary advantage, if any, of genetic algorithms comes from the crossover operation. Yet it can be shown mathematically that, if the positions of the genetic code are permuted initially in a random order, crossover conveys no advantage. Norvig I 155 In the 1950s, several statisticians, including Box (1957)(1) and Friedman (1959)(2), used evolutionary techniques for optimization problems, but it wasn’t until Rechenberg (1965)(3) introduced evolution strategies to solve optimization problems for airfoils that the approach gained popularity. In the 1960s and 1970s, John Holland (1975)(4) championed genetic algorithms, both as a useful tool and as a method to expand our understanding of adaptation, biological or otherwise (Holland, 1995)(5). The artificial life movement (Langton, 1995)(6) takes this idea one step further, viewing the products of genetic algorithms as organisms rather than solutions to problems. VsGenetic algorithms: Most comparisons of genetic algorithms to other approaches (especially stochastic hill climbing) have found that the genetic algorithms are slower to converge (O’Reilly and Oppacher, 1994(7); Mitchell et al., 1996(8); Juels and Wattenberg, 1996(9); Baluja, 1997)(10). VsVs: Such findings are not universally popular within the GA community, but recent attempts within that community to understand population-based search as an approximate form of Bayesian learning might help close the gap between the field and its critics (Pelikan et al., 1999)(11). >Genetic Programming/Norvig. 1. Box, G. E. P. (1957). Evolutionary operation: A method of increasing industrial productivity. Applied Statistics, 6, 81–101. 2. Friedman, G. J. (1959). Digital simulation of an evolutionary process. General Systems Yearbook, 4, 171–184. 3. Rechenberg, I. (1965). Cybernetic solution path of an experimental problem. Library translation 1122, Royal Aircraft Establishment 4. Holland, J. H. (1975). Adaption in Natural and Artificial Systems. University of Michigan Press. 5. Holland, J. H. (1995). Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Addison-Wesley. 6. Langton, C. (Ed.). (1995). Artificial Life. MIT Press. 7. O’Reilly, U.-M. and Oppacher, F. (1994). Program search with a hierarchical variable length representation: Genetic programming, simulated annealing and hill climbing. In Proc. Third Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature, pp. 397–406 8. Mitchell, M., Holland, J. H., and Forrest, S. (1996). When will a genetic algorithm outperform hill climbing? In Cowan, J., Tesauro, G., and Alspector, J. (Eds.), NIPS 6. MIT Press. 9. Juels, A. and Wattenberg, M. (1996). Stochastic hill climbing as a baseline method for evaluating genetic algorithms. In Touretzky, D. S., Mozer, M. C., and Hasselmo, M. E. (Eds.), NIPS 8, pp. 430–6. MIT Press. 10. Baluja, S. (1997). Genetic algorithms and explicit search statistics. In Mozer, M. C., Jordan, M. I., and Petsche, T. (Eds.), NIPS 9, pp. 319–325. MIT Press 11. Pelikan, M., Goldberg, D. E., and Cantu-Paz, E. (1999). BOA: The Bayesian optimization algorithm. In GECCO-99: Proc. Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, pp. 525–532. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Goods | Leontief | Kurz I 18 Goods/commodity/production theory/Leontief/Kurz: Leontief (…) distinguished between ‘cost goods’ and ‘revenue goods’; the latter satisfy final demand. The concept of revenue good indicates that the economy is taken to produce a surplus over and above what is consumed productively. He suggested (Leontief 1928, p. 585)(1) that the process of production should be described in terms of three sets of ‘technical coefficients’: (i) ‘cost coefficients’, that is, the proportion in which two cost goods participate in the production of a good; (ii) ‘productivity coefficients’, that is, the total quantity produced of a good in relation to the total quantity used up of one of its inputs; and (iii) ‘distribution coefficients’, that is, the proportion of the total output of a certain good allotted to a particular group of property income receivers. Leontief stressed that because of the circular character of production ‘a complete elimination of a factor of production from the given system is in principle impossible’. He added: ‘Of course, the size of the “capital factor” can be reduced to any chosen level by referring back to even earlier periods of production’ ([p. 211] p. 622). The reference is to what became known as the method of reduction to dated quantities of labour (see Sraffa, 1960(2), chapter VI). This reduction, Leontief stressed, has nothing to do with a historical regress ([p. 192 fn] p. 596, fn. 6). >Price/Leontief. Leontief: „In the general circular flow scheme, income from ownership is of course considered alongside other cost items without the slightest direct reference to how it originates (the phenomenon of ownership). It is the task of the theory of interest to investigate these fundamental relationships.“ ([p. 196] p. 600)(1) Leontief’s argument resulted in setting up price equations that reflect not only the socio-technical conditions of production, but also the rule that fixes the distribution of the surplus product. This rule is the second key to a determination of relative prices. Only if both the system of production and the sharing out of the surplus between different claimants in terms of wages, profits Kurz I 19 (or interest) and rents is known, can relative prices be determined. Two ‘keys’ are required in order to solve the problem of value and distribution. Kurz I 27 Classical/Neo-classical economics: While Leontief conceived of his early contribution as firmly rooted in the classical tradition, he called his input–output method developed in the 1930s and 1940s ‘an adaptation of the neo-classical theory of general equilibrium to the empirical study of the quantitative interdependence between interrelated economic activities’ (Leontief, 1966, p. 134)(3). LeontiefVsWalras/LeontiefVscCassel: Scrutiny shows, however, that in his input-output analysis he preserved the classical concept of circular flow and did not, as is maintained by some interpreters, adopt the Walras–Cassel view of production. In the second edition of The Structure of American Economy, published in 1951, he even explicitly rejected the view of production as a one-way avenue that leads from the services of the ‘original’ factors of production: land, labour and capital – the ‘venerable trinity’ - to final goods (Leontief, 1951, p. 112)(4). Unlike the theories of Walras and Cassel, in Leontief there are no given initial endowments of these factors. (…) the change is more apparent than real. 1. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 2. Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 3. Leontief, W. (1966) Input–Output Economics (New York: Oxford University Press). 4. Leontief, W. (1951) The Structure of American Economy, 1919–1939: An Empirical Application of Equilibrium Analysis (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press). (Second enlarged edition of Leontief, 1941.) Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Heritability | MacDonald | Corr I 266 Heritability/personality traits/psychology/MacDonald: traits that are heritable and variable, such as the >Big Five personality traits that are heritable by a margin of .3 to .5 (MacDonald 1995)(1), cannot be the result of adaptation. See >Personality/MacDonald, >Heritability/Tooby/Cosmides. 1. MacDonald, K. B. 1995. Evolution, the five-factor model, and levels of personality, Journal of Personality 63: 525–67 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Heritability | Tooby | Corr I 266 Heritability/personality traits/psychology/Tooby/Comides: Tooby and Cosmides (1990)(1) have claimed that traits that are heritable and variable, such as the >Big Five personality traits that are heritable by a margin of .3 to .5 (MacDonald 1995)(2), cannot be the result of adaptation. Nevertheless, most evolutionary personality psychologists have generally concluded that individual differences in personality traits are adaptive in nature (see Figueredo, Sefcek, Vasquez et al. 2005(3) for a review). 1. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 2. MacDonald, K. B. 1995. Evolution, the five-factor model, and levels of personality, Journal of Personality 63: 525–67 3. Figueredo, A. J., Sefcek, J. A., Vasquez, G., Brumbach, B. H., King, J. E. and Jacobs, W. J. 2005. Evolutionary personality psychology, in D. M. Buss (ed.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology, pp. 851–77. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Hermeneutics | Gadamer | I 169 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Hermeneutics should (...) be understood so comprehensively that it would include the whole sphere of art and its questions. Like any other text to be understood, any work of art must not only I 170 understand the literary. Thus the hermeneutic consciousness acquires a comprehensive breadth that even surpasses that of the aesthetic consciousness. Aesthetics must merge into hermeneutics. Cf. >Aesthetic Consciousness. The task today could be to escape the dominating influence of Dilthey's question and the prejudices of the "history of ideas" founded by him. >Hermeneutics/Dilthey. I 171 (...) art [is] never only past (...), but [it] knows how to overcome the distance between times through its own presence of meaning. In this respect, the example of art shows an excellent case of understanding on both sides. It is not merely an object of historical consciousness, but its understanding nevertheless already includes historical mediation. How then is the task of hermeneutics determined? >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Hegel. I 177 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The art doctrine of understanding and interpretation was developed in two ways, the theological and the philological, from an analogous drive: theological hermeneutics, as Dilthey showed(1), from the self-defense of the Reformation's understanding of the Bible against the attack of the Tridentine theologians and their appeal to the indispensability of tradition to rediscover philological hermeneutics as an instrument for the humanist claim to the I 178 classical literature. Biblical Hermeneutics: its precondition is the scriptural principle of the Reformation. >Interpretation/Luther. I 280 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The fundamental discrediting of all the prejudices that the experiential pathos of the new natural science connects with the Enlightenment becomes universal and radical in the historical Enlightenment. This is precisely the point at which the attempt at philosophical hermeneutics must be critically applied. The overcoming of all prejudices, this blanket demand of the Enlightenment, will prove itself to be a prejudice, the revision of which will first clear the way for an appropriate understanding of the finite nature that dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness. Cf. >Tradition/Romanticism. Does tradition really mean in the first place: to be subject to prejudice and to be limited in one's freedom? Is not rather all human existence, even the freest, limited and conditioned in manifold ways? If this is true, then the idea of an absolute reason is no possibility of historical humanity at all. Reason is for us only as real historical reason, i.e. par excellence: It is not master of itself, but always remains dependent on the circumstances in which I 281 it is active. This applies not only in the sense that Kant, under the influence of Hume's sceptical criticism, limited the claims of rationalism to the a priori moment in the knowledge of nature - it applies much more decisively to historical consciousness and the possibility of historical knowledge. Understanding/Gadamer: The human is alien to him- or herself and his or her historical fate in still quite a different way than nature is alien to him or her, which does not know about the human. For historical understanding see also: >The Classical/Gadamer. I 295 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Understanding itself is not so much to be thought of as an act of subjectivity, but rather as moving into a process of tradition (i.e. handing down) in which past and present are constantly mediated. This is what must be brought to bear in hermeneutic theory, which is far too much dominated by the idea of a procedure, a method. I 300 [A tension] plays between the foreignness and familiarity that tradition has for us, between the historically meant, distant representationalism and belonging to a tradition. In this in-between is the true place of hermeneutics. I 313 Application of the understood: The inner fusion of understanding and interpretation led (...) to the fact that the third moment in the hermeneutical problem, the application, was completely pushed out of the context of hermeneutics. For example, the edifying application of Sacred Scripture in Christian proclamation and preaching seemed quite different from the historical and theological understanding of it. Now our reflections have led us to the insight that in understanding there is always something like an application of the text to be understood to the present >situation of the interpreter. We are thus forced to take a step beyond romantic hermeneutics, as it were, by thinking not only of understanding and interpreting, but also of applying, as part of a unified process. >Legal Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Theological Hermeneutics/Gadamer. I 334 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Insofar as the actual object of historical understanding is not events but their "meaning", such understanding is obviously not correctly described when one speaks of an object that is in itself and the approach of the subject to it. In truth, historical understanding has always been based on the fact that the tradition that comes to us speaks into the present and must be understood in this mediation - even more: as this mediation must be understood. I 391 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Just as the translator, as interpreter, makes communication in conversation possible only by participating in the matter under discussion, so too, in relation to the text, the indispensable condition for the interpreter is that he or she participates in its meaning. It is therefore quite justified to speak of a hermeneutic conversation. But then it follows from this that the hermeneutic conversation, like the real conversation, must work out a common language, and that this working-out of a common language is just as little as in conversation the preparation of a tool for the purposes of understanding, but coincides with the accomplishment of understanding and understanding itself. Between the partners in this "conversation", as between two people, communication takes place that is more than mere adaptation. The text brings up a matter, but that it does so is ultimately the achievement of the interpreter. Both are involved. I 392 In this sense, understanding is certainly not a "historical understanding" that reconstructs the correspondence of the text. Rather, one means to understand the text itself. I 446 Hermeneutics/Humboldt/Gadamer: [Humboldt's] significance for the problem of hermeneutics lies (...) [in]: proving the language view as world view. >Language/Humboldt, >Culture/Humboldt. He recognized the living execution of speech, the linguistic energeia as the essence of language and thus broke the dogmatism of the grammarists. From the concept of force, which guides all his thinking about language, he has in particular also put into perspective the question of the origin of language, which was particularly burdened by theological considerations. Origin of language/Humboldt: [Humboldt] rightly emphasizes that language is human from its very beginning(2). I 479 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Universality of hermeneutics: (...) linguistically and thus understandably is the human world relationship par excellence and by its very basis. Hermeneutics is (...) in this respect a universal aspect of philosophy and not only the methodological basis of the so-called humanities. I 480 Art/history: (...) the concepts of "art" and "history" (...) are forms of understanding that are only just separated from the universal mode of being of hermeneutic being as forms of hermeneutic experience. 1. Dilthey, Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik, Ges. Schriften vol. V, 317 338. 2. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (first printed in 1836), § 9, p. 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| History | Bubner | Bubner I 7 History/Bubner Thesis: Instead of continuity: makes breaks visible. Philosophy/History/Bubner: Thesis: one has to put aside the instilled methodological competence in favor of calling and expanding problem awareness. I 9 "Strategic alienation". Misunderstanding of possible adaptation to the scientific methodological ideal. >Method. I 10 Feyerabend/Bubner: since him (as well as Popper and Kuhn), it is no longer just as legitimate to trace back the state of knowledge reached at a given moment to the past. >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Interpretation, >Incommensurability, >K. Popper, >Th. Kuhn, >P. Feyerabend, >Historiography. I 14 History/Philosophy/Interpretation/Bubner: Philosophical history proceeds differently than other history. Neither one wants to know what an author "really" meant beyond all interpretation, nor does one assume of him what he should have said "from today's point of view". Development/History/Aristotle: already he has a principle for the development of truth through historical stages of error. >Progress. History/Philosophy/Bubner: the beginnings are due to an overweight which cannot be gained anymore by any reflection. >Reflection. I 111 History/Bubner: one should not artificially enlarge existing and estimable time intervals. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| History | Gould | IV 43 History/selection/Darwinism/Gould: according to the traditional point of view Darwinism is first and foremost a theory of natural selection. Gould: that is certainly true, but the reference to power and scope of selection has become overzealous when we try to attribute every conceivable form and behaviour to their direct influence. Another often forgotten principle prevents any optimal adaptation: the strange and yet compelling paths of history! Organisms are subject to the constraints of inherited forms that slow down their evolution! They cannot be reshaped every time their environment changes. IV 44 History/Gould: a world that would be optimally adapted to its current environment would be a world without history, such a world could have been created as we find it now. >Selection, >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| History | Nietzsche | Höffe I 375 History/Nietzsche/Höffe: Nietzsche(1) gives a basic phenomenon of the political, the striving for power, a broader, yet deeper meaning. For he subjects the entire human culture, here exemplarily the consideration of history, to the principle of the enhancement of life: As the will to power, life must constantly overcome itself and productively grow beyond itself. With the principle: "Only as far as history serves life do we want to serve it" (Preface), Nietzsche introduces three kinds of a life-serving history: the "monumental history" (2. Chap.), which provides "models, teachers, comforters" to the "active and striving"; the "antiquarian history" (3. Chap.), which allows "the preserving and revering" to look back "with faithfulness and love" to his/her origins; finally, the "critical history", which gives "the suffering and the liberation of the needy" the strength to condemn a past after an embarrassing test at the end (ibid.). In terms of the tacit motive of the will to power Höffe I 376 Nietzsche warns against oversaturation with history, since it is harmful to life in five ways: (1) Through the contrast between inside and outside it weakens the personality; (2) it nourishes the illusion, the most rare virtue, justice, possesses the present to a greater degree than any other time; (3) it disturbs "the instincts of the people, whereby both the individual and the whole are "prevented from maturing"; (4) the harmful "belief to be late and epigone" is planted; and (5) implicitly NietzscheVsHegel: an epoch gets into the glorification of the present as the completion of world history. Höffe: Nietzsche does not deal with Kant's idea of history as a legal progress open to the future. >History/Hegel, >Philosophy of history/Kant. 1. F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: «Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben» (1874) Ries II 36 History/NietzscheVs: VsHistorism VsTeleology, VsTeleological Meaning >Historism, >Teleology, >Historiography, >Philosophy of history. Ries II 38 History/NietzscheVsStrauß, Friedrich David: Strauss' "Life of Jesus" (1835) had once inspired the young Nietzsche. The first piece of outmoded consideration is directed against him. Ries II 39/40 History/outmoded considerations/Nietzsche: The second piece: "On the benefit and disadvantage of history for life": the immediacy of life is opposed "right inside" historical knowledge. That "immediacy" is guaranteed in oblivion. History/outmoded considerations/NietzscheVsHistorism: against the unreflected ideological implication of a philosophy whose scientific-theoretical postulate of a separation of theory and practice obscures adaptation to the actual. Ries II 42 It is impossible to prove a necessity of the event from history as the mere sequence of its events. The scientific claim to the recognition of a path must be abandoned. Also the thought of progress! Ries II 43 Historical construction tries to eliminate the senselessness of death. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Hopeful Monsters | Gould | I 197/198 Hopeful Monsters/Gould: as followers of Darwin, Gould defends Goldschmidt's postulate that macro evolution is not simply the accumulation of many micro-evolutions. Three questions: 1. Can a reasonable representation be drawn up for a continuous change of all macro evolutionary events? Gould: No. 2. Are theories of abrupt changes anti-Darwinian? Gould: Some are, others are not. 3. Are Goldschmidt's promising monsters anti Darwinian? Gould: No. Question: What are the possible benefits of the incomplete initial stages of useful structures? What is the use of a half jaw or wing? The answer is given by the term Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions would be fulfilled in the initial stages. E.g. Half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. Gould: the concept of preadaptation is indispensable, but it is not appropriate to demonstrate continuity in all cases>Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Individuals | Hegel | Adorno XIII 236 Individual/Hegel/Goethe/VsEpicurus/Adorno: there is no development of the I by the fact that the I cares for itself like a plant, and waters itself with water, but only by what Hegel and Goethe have described as a externalization. This does not mean, for example, that one abandons oneself in adaptation and makes onself equal to the world. Rather, one must expose that what one is oneself, the randomness of the suchness of one's own existence, the dialectic, with the non-ego. >Dialectic/Hegel. Person/Hegel/Adorno: the person is, at the same time, the one of the world that one encounters, and it is formed only in the experience of this world. >Individual/Schopenhauer, >Experience/Hegel, >Person, cf. >Epicurus. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Information | Wiener | II 83 Information/Language/Wiener: it is theoretically possible to develop the statistics of semantic and behavioural language in such a way that we obtain a good measure of the amount of information in each system. >Language, >Meaning, >Semantics, >Language behavior. In any case, we can generally show that phonetic language contains less overall information in relation to the input of data... II 84 or in any case it does not contain more than the transmission system leading to the ear and that semantic and behavioural language contains even less information. This fact is a form of the second principle of thermodynamics and is only valid if we consider the transferred information at each stage as maximum information that could be transmitted with an appropriately encrypted receiving system. >Second law of thermodynamics. II 121 The right of ownership of information suffers from the necessary disadvantage that information intended to contribute to the general state of the Community's information must say something substantially different from the community's previous general possession of information. >Innovation, >Message, >Communication. II 122 The idea that information can be stacked in a changing world without noticeably reducing its value is wrong. >Change, >Knowledge. II 123 Information is more of a dynamic matter than a stacking affair. II 124 The time factor is essential in all assessments of the information value. Brockman I 155 Information/Wiener/Kaiser: [Wiener borrowed Shannon’s insight]: if information was like entropy, then it could not be conserved – or contained. >Information/Shannon, >Entropy. Conclusion/Wiener: it was folly for military leaders to try to stockpile the “Scientific know-how of the nation in static libraries and laboratories.”(1) Brockman I 156 Since “information and entropy are not conserved,” they are “equally unsuited to being commodities.”(2) Brockman I 157 KaiserVsWiener: what Wiener had in mind, was not what Shannon meant with “information”. Wiener’s treatment of “information” sounded more like Matthew Arnold in 1869(3) than Claude Shannon in 1948—more “body and spirit” than “bit.” >Body, >Mind. Brockman I 158 [Today] [i]n many ways, Wiener has been proved right. His vision of networked feedback loops driven by machine-to-machine communication has become a mundane feature of everyday life. >Machine learning, >Human machine communication, >Robots, >Artificial intelligence. 1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. ibid. 3. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Jane Garnett (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). Kaiser, David “”Information” for Wiener, for Shannon, and for Us” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. Brockman I 179 Information/Wiener/Hillis: “Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our Brockman I 179 adjustment felt upon it.” In his words, information is what we use to “live effectively within that environment.”(1) For Wiener, information is a way for the weak to effectively cope with the strong. >Outer world, >Inner world, >Behavior, >Adaptation, >Niches. 1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 17-18. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Infrastructure | Sociology of Technology | Edwards I 42 Infrastructure/Sociology of technology/Edwards: In the 1980s and the 1990s, historians and sociologists of technology began studying the infrastructure phenomenon intensively. These researchers developed a “large technical systems” (LTS) approach to telephone, railroads, air traffic control, electric power, and many other major infrastructures.1 Around the same time, some scholars began to identify infrastructure as a key analytic category.2 The LTS school of thought generated new insights into questions of organizational, social, and historical change. Recently, investigators have applied this and related infrastructure-oriented approaches to urban development, European history, globalization, scientific “cyberinfrastructure,” and Internet studies.3 I 44 Systems/Edwards: No system or network can ever fulfill all the requirements users may have. Systems work well because of their limited scope, their relative coherence, and their centralized control. System builders try to expand by simply increasing their systems’ scale to reach more potential users, thereby excluding competitors. System builders seek to find or create well-defined niches that can be served by centrally designed and controlled systems, but users’ goals typically I 45 include functions that may be best served (for them) by linking separate systems. The fundamental dynamic of infrastructure development can thus be described as a perpetual oscillation between the desire for smooth, system-like behavior and the need to combine capabilities no single system can yet provide. For these reasons, in general infrastructures are not systems but networks or webs.4 1. 12. W. Bijker et al., The Social Construction of Technological Systems (MIT Press, 1987); W. E. Bijker and J. Law, eds., Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (MIT Press, 1992); P. Blomkvisk and A. Kaijser, eds., Den Konstruerade Världen: Tekniska System i Historiskt Perspektiv (Brutus Östlings, 1998); I. Braun and B. Joerges, Technik ohne Grenzen (Suhrkamp, 1994); O. Coutard, The Governance of Large Technical Systems (Routledge, 1999); O. Coutard et al., Sustaining Urban Networks: The Social Diffusion of Large Technical Systems (Routledge, 2004); A. Gras, Les Macro-Systèmes Techniques (Brutus Östlings, 1997); T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); T. P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (Pantheon Books, 1998); T. P. Hughes, Human-Built World: How to Think About Technology and Culture (University of Chicago Press, 2004); A. Kaijser, I Fädrens Spår: Den Svenske Infrastrukturens Historiska Utveckling och Framtida Utmaningar (Carlssons, 1994); T. R. La Porte, ed., Social Responses to Large Technical Systems: Control or Adaptation (Kluwer, 1991); R. Mayntz and T. P. Hughes, The Development of Large Technical Systems (Westview, 1988); J. Summerton, ed., Changing Large Technical Systems (Westview, 1994). 2. Star and Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure”; P. N. Edwards, “Y2K: Millennial Reflections on Computers as Infrastructure,” History and Technology 15 (1998): 7–; G. C. Bowker and S. L. Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences (MIT Press, 1999); Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity”; E. van der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal Change: A View From the Large Technical Systems Field,” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 16, no. 3 (2004): 395–. 3. Held et al., Global Transformations; S. Graham and S. Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition (Routledge, 2001); G. C. Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences (MIT Press, 2005); J. Schot et al., “Tensions of Europe: The Role of Technology in the Making of Europe,” special issue, History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005); P. N. Edwards et al., Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tensions, and Design (Deep Blue, 2007); E. van der Vleuten and A. Kaijser, eds., Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850–2000 (Science History Publications/USA, 2007). 4. Jackson, S. J., Edwards, P. N., Bowker, G. C., & Knobel, C. P. (2007). Understanding infrastructure: History, heuristics and cyberinfrastructure policy. First Monday, 12(6). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v12i6.1904 |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
| Institutions | Demsetz | Parisi I Institutions/law/legal history/Demsetz/Wangenheim: Initiated by Harold Demsetz's seminal paper (1967)(1), neo-institutional investigations of legal evolution typically look at specific changes of property rights regimes. Alchian: The basic idea is closely related to Alchian's (1950)(2) optimistic account of behavioral evolution: societies tend to have institutions that reflect, and are adapted to, the current needs of this society, given their environment and their preferences. Property rights/Demsetz: The Labrador Indians switched from open access property rights regimes to private property Parisi I 163 when fur trade made hunting beavers more valuable to each hunter, so that the natural setting could not sustain the radically increased burden resulting from consequentially increased hunting activities. Conditions/Demsetz: In his reappraising paper thirty-five years later, Demsetz (2002)(3) based his argument on a number of conditions that have to be satisfied to make environmental changes induce optimal institutional adaptations. In particular, he considered (1) the number and closeness of involved persons, (2) their productivity in solving resource allocation problems, and (3) the complexity of this problem as relevant conditions. If they change, most often due to new levels of specialization in production, observable property rights regimes will adapt to better solve the externality problems that become prevalent in effect, so Demsetz (2002)(4) argues. >Externalities. North: The idea of institutions evolving towards efficiency is also at the heart of the earlier writings of Douglas North (e.g. 1981)(4), who grounded his account of economic history on this argument. >Efficiency. WangenheimVsDemsetz: Independently of whether one wants to label this functionalist Demsetzian approach as truly evolutionary or not, the argument lacks any causal explanation for why the institutions change. There is no discussion of how rules in archaic societies are made, nor is there any hint of legislators' incentives when more complex societies are discussed (mainly in the 2002 paper). WittVsDemsetz: Many authors like Witt (1987)(5), Banner (2002)(6), Eggertson (1990(7), pp. 247—280), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)) have noted this pitfall of Demsetz's approach. The idea has been taken up by scholars like Umbeck (1977a(10), 1977b(11)), Ellickson (1991(12), 1994(13)), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)), who have argued that societies self-organize and develop property rights when law does not exist or is not enforced (prominent examples are farmer - rancher conflicts in Shasta County, mining claims during the California gold rush, Maine lobster fishing grounds, and grazing areas on the American Western frontier in the second half of the nineteenth century). Causality: (…) the authors proffer a causal complement to Demsetz's teleological hypothesis: they identify some individuals who find it privately worthwhile to design and enforce property rights against infringing group members or outsiders. VsUmbeck: Not all examples have remained undisputed. Clay and Wright (2005)(14), for example, challenge Umbeck's observations on mining district codes producing order. They argue that the mining district codes gave equal attention to the rights of claim-jumpers as to claim holders, whence chronic insecurity and litigation resulted. 1. Demsetz, H. (1967). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review, P&P 57: 347-359. 2. Alchian, A. (1950). "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy 58: 211—221. 3.Demsetz, H. (2002). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights Il: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership." Journal of Legal studies 31: S653—S672. 4. North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. 5. Witt, U. (1987). "How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 180—195. 6. Banner, S. (2002). "Transitions Between Property Regimes." Journal of Legal studies 31: S359-S371. 7. Eggertson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (1975). "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West." Journal of Law and Economics 18: 163—179. 9. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (2002). "Cowboys and Contracts." Journal of Legal studies 31: S489-S514. 10. Umbeck, J. (1977a). "The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights." Explorations in Economic History 14: 197—226. 11. Umbeck, J. (1977b). "A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush." Journal of Law and Economics 20: 421—437. 12. Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 13. Ellickson, R. (1994). "The Aim of Order without Law." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 97—100. 14. Clay, K. and G. Wright (2005). "Order without law? Property Rights during the California Gold Rush." Explorations in Economic History 42: 155—183. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Intelligence | McGinn | II 52 Intelligence/McGinn: the newer doctrine emphasizes three characteristics: plant, moldability, adaptation. We do not learn to own arms, legs and kidneys. ((s) but we learn to develop our muscles). Intelligence is always at or for something. The ability to achieve the organism goals. >Psychological theories on intelligence. II 57 Human/Evolution/mind/McGinn: it is a remarkable coincidence that we are the only species on earth that is able to drive science and philosophy. There could easily be a different species with a certain level of scientific talent, about the level of a ten year-old. Or a species that is superior in biology but inferior in physics etc. The kind of intelligence that we have, is absolutely not necessary for living beings to survive. >Mind, >Brain, >Consciousness. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Language | Dupré | Perler I 325 Language/Evolution/Dupré: three theories: 1. Pinker: thesis: language is younger, there is a difference between human and animal. 2. P. Greenfield: Language and tool use have a common basis. - There are hierarchically structured tasks of object manipulation. - There is neural basis. 3. Ethology (Evolution of behavior): Language as an adaptation to a process - it is still related to animal communication - Both are homologous (have common precursors). - Language is not a reaction to present stimuli - it also does not do information processing. - There is abig difference to humans. Dupré pro: this allows to distinguish between older and younger characteristics. >Language origins, >Language acquisition, >Animals, >Animal language, >Behavior, >Evolution. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Language Acquisition | Deacon | I 39 Language acquisition/evolution/development of language/complexity/simplicity/Deacon: there are two paradigms: a) Evolution of greater intelligence b) Evolution of a specific speech organ Both have in common that the problem is learning a very large number of complex rules and that the complexity is simply too great for species other than humans. >Learning, >Rules, >Language rules, >Grammar, cf. >Universal grammar. DeaconVs: complexity is only one problem and not the deciding factor. I 53 Language acquisition/Deacon: depends decisively on non-linguistic communication. Much of it is already innate in animals. We also use a lot of non-linguistic elements such as tone of voice, gestures, etc. in everyday speech. >Communication, >Animals, >Animal language, >Gestures. I 125 Language Learning/Deacon: that children learn language best at a certain age seems to speak for innate structures in the brain. >Innateness. A better explanation seems to me to be the immaturity of children or young chimpanzees like Kanzi. We do not need to adopt an essentialist position if we concentrate on this aspect. I 126 In this age of immaturity, children have little memory performance for details. Young Bonobo Kanzi was able to concentrate strongly on the proper use of symbols, while older chimpanzees had to learn what to focus on. I 127 If this is true, it must be a characteristic of childhood that is independent of language. GoldVsChomsky/Deacon: Gold(1) brought a logical proof that rules of a logical system with the structural complexity of a natural grammar cannot be discovered inductively without explicit error correction, even not theoretically. It is not their complexity that is decisive, but the fact that the rules are not mapped on the surface of the sentence form. Instead, they are embodied in widely distributed word relations and are used recursively (repeatedly). This multiplies the possibilities of how a rule could actually be constructed geometrically. This makes it impossible for a child or other language learners to derive the correct rules from the nature of the language. This has led many authors to adopt innate abilities. >Induction/Deacon. I 128 Language Acquisition/Newport/Deacon: Question: Why can children learn grammar more easily than other things that are much easier?(2)(3) I 129 E.g. The younger a child is, the more difficult it is for him or her to consciously process new associations. This has to do with short-term memory and attention span. Could it be that these limitations favor language acquisition? The solution seems to be to start "small and simple," "less is more." >Neural Networks/Deacon, >Complexity. I 137 Language acquisition/Elissa Newport/Deacon: Newport was one of the first to propose that language learning for children should not be perceived as a function of a particular language learning system, but vice versa; such language structures are best passed on from generation to generation, which best correspond to the child's learning biases. I 339 Language acquisition/adaptation/brain/evolution/Deacon: in addition to the constant sensomotoric conditions of language use, there are also invariances of language evolution that affect the context of language learning. There are three types of language adaptation: a) innate, b) learned, c) those that develop in the interaction between the innate and the experienced. Universality is not a sure indicator that something of the evolution has been built into our brains. 1. Gold, E. (1967), Language identification in the limit. Information and Control 16, 447-474. 2. Newport, E. (1991), Maturational consteraints on language learning, Cognitive Science 14, 11-28. 3. Newport, E. (1991), Contrasting conceptions oft he critical period for language. In: S. Carey and R. Gelma (Eds.) Epigenesis of Mind: Essys on Biology and Cognition, NJ. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language Evolution | Deacon | I 25 Language evolution/Evolution/Deacon: Language is one of the most striking behavioural adaptations of our planet. Languages have developed only in one species, only in one way, without precursors - except in a very generalized sense. The differences between language and all other forms of communication are considerable. >Language, >Communication. This is also reflected in the anatomy of the human being, especially the brain and the vocal apparatus. We can see these differences in living species. I 34 Language evolution/human/animal/Deacon: the incomparability of human and non-human communication has led to exaggerated and unacceptable interpretations of the origin of language. I 35 For example, the assertion that language is the result of a certain interconnection in the brain, which is unique, is not only the assertion that it is a unique neurological characteristic correlated with this unique behavior, but also that it is a substantial biological discontinuity. DeaconVs: this is a modern mythology, according to which we would have given a monkey a speech computer in his hand. That reminds me of the movie "Short Circuit". I 44 Language evolution/Deacon: Thesis: Speech and brain have become more complex in common evolution and have been designed as they are today. Even though we do not find any simple languages today, the beginnings were certainly easier than the languages we find today. Somewhere in this development, the threshold was crossed to an extremely difficult symbolic reference. >Symbolic reference, >Symbols/Deacon, >Reference. I 105 - 110 Language evolution/DeaconVsChomsky/Deacon: Why do children so often make the right choice when they try out grammatical rules? It is the language that develops "user-friendly". Language develops faster than brains during evolution. >Evolution. Just as dolphins can only be taught tricks that they perform on their own initiative when they are in a good mood. However, the language is not as limited in its development as the interface of a computer, which is ultimately dictated by the design of the engineers. Language has evolved in terms of reproducibility, in relation to selection pressure by human users. Language that is easier to learn prevails stronger. N.B.: you do not have to assume, as Chomsky does, that children are particularly clever. I 111 It is helpful to imagine that language is a parasitic form of life that nests in brains to reproduce itself. I 112 Deacon/Morton Christansen: Thesis: There is a co-evolutionary dynamic between language and its host, the brain. One can compare language in a way with viruses, which are not completely independent living beings themselves, but are full of information for their own reproduction. I 113 The relationship between people and language can be described as symbiotic, both need each other to reproduce. Of course, the language as a whole cannot be defined in this way. I 114 Bilingualism: in the case of bilingual people, brain regions tend to be separated for the processing of the two languages. One explanation for this is that the two languages would otherwise compete for the neuronal resources in the brain of the user. Sooner or later, there would be a mutual disturbance. I 122 Brains have evolved along with language, but most of the adaptation was on the language side. I 354 Language formation/Lieberman/Deacon: Philip Lieberman has shown in a number of influential articles that the elimination of physiological limitations of vocal formation has contributed to a rapid acceleration in the development of language(1)(2). DeaconVsLieberman: however, it would mean to over-interpret the fossil finds at hand if one wanted to ascribe the language evolution exclusively to these anatomical developments by ascribing a sudden eruption of a series of abilities to this characteristic alone. I 355 The development of the brain and the vocal system were certainly both, both effects and causes in a mutually reinforcing process of language evolution. 1. Lieberman, Ph. (1984). The Biology and Evolution of Language, Cambridge, MA. (2) Lieberman, Ph. (1991). Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought and Selfless Behavior, Cambridge, MA. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Laws | Haeckel | Gould I 255 ff Laws/Haeckel/Evolution/Gould: Ernst Haeckel: Definition "Biogenetic Basic Law": thesis: ontogenesis recapitulates phylogeny. This means that each animal passes through all stages of its own family tree during its embryonic stage. Human embryos, for example, should then have gills which they lose before birth. >Natural laws. Gould I 256 GouldVsHaeckel: At the turn of the century this theory perished, because the rediscovered Mendelian laws made it seem untenable. However, their shine had faded long before, because it was impossible to keep the fact that traces of precursors could always be distinguished from newer embryonic adaptations. Too many stages of development were lacking, too many others were confused. >Explanations, >Causal explanation, >Method, >Theories, >Science. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Learning | Deacon | I 48 Learning/Deacon: Learning always takes place in a special context, involving certain senses and motor actions. It is more than strengthening associations in memory. >Associations, >Memory, >Context. Learning requires that we find out what is relevant and how the relevant variables are related. It requires filtering and organizing what we have already learned. >Knowledge, >Prior knowledge. I 50 Language acquisition: what prevents other species from learning a language? Is symbolic reference counter-intuitive? Does it require animals to see things in a radically different way than they are capable of seeing? Animals don not know what it is all about, even when confronted with simple forms of language. >Symbolic reference, >Language acquisition, >Reference, >Animals, >Animal language. I 83 Learning/Language Acquisition/Symbolic Learning/Deacon: Learning symbols is different from learning signs. While signs are about the projection of previously learned connections between object and sign into the future, this projection into the future is much more difficult in the case of symbols. >Signs/Deacon, >Symbols/Deacon. Symbolic learning: Symbols form a complex system among themselves, which in turn must be recognized, understood and learned. A special feature is that words with a similar meaning are not used together, but alternatively. At the same time, words with very different meanings tend to appear together. >Word meaning, >Language, >Language use. Language acquisition: further problem: Sentences are seldom repeated exactly. The occurrence of a certain combination often happens only once. Index-based learning/stimulus/response: Index-based learning (from the common appearance of object and sign) is therefore extremely unsuitable in the case of symbol systems (languages). >Indexikality. I 98 Learning/Deacon: it is helpful when the number of word types increases to create a richer network of relations between symbols. This makes it easier to learn new vocabulary. Slots/Deacon: Thesis: New logical groups of words open new slots that can be filled. ((s) Slots/(s): are understood here as positions in sentences that can be filled with certain types of words.). Vocabulary: newly appearing slots must be quickly filled with new vocabulary. >Vocabulary. I 99 Animal experiments: (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978(1);1980(2) and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986(3)) showed that no new correlations (sign/object) had to be learned if the classification in semantic categories was available. I 338 Learning/adaptation/evolution/brain/Deacon: a disposition for learning specific things can be the consequence of a genetic assimilation, if constant conditions are given as well as an invariance of neuronal circuits beyond individuals. How can specific learning disposition be represented in the brain? The ability to learn is not a general function that is independent of the type of learner. It is completely different for learning signs that stand isolated for one thing than, for example, for learning symbols that are in turn founded in systems. Learning dispositions/Deacon: are both: result and cause of Baldwin's evolution (Baldwin effect). >Evolution/Deacon. 1. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978). Symbolization, language and chimpanzees: A theoretcal reevaluation based on initial language acquisition processes in four young Pan troglodytes. Brain and Language 6, 265. 2. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). Reference: The linguistic essential. Science 210. 922-925. 3. Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Animal intelligence. Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol. Columbia University Press. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Learning | Maturana | I 63 Learning/Maturana: historical transformation of an organism through experience. - It serves the basal circularity >Recursion. New behavior evolves. - For an observer, behavior by incorporating a representation seems justified that modifies behavior by memory. >Memory, >Behavior, >Observation. But the system operates in the present - advantageousness can only be determined a posteriori. >Systems. I 70 Allowes purely consensual (cultural) evolution without evolution of the nervous system. >Nervous system. I 73 Learning/Maturana: behavioral change must be accompanied by other changes. >Change. I 74 Not accumulation of representations but continuous transformation of behavior. >Representation. I 119 Learning/instinctive behavior/Maturana. initially indistinguishable, because they are determined in the concrete realization by the structures of the nervous system - Learning: acquired ontogenetically - instinct: acquired evolutionary. I 119 Learning/Maturana: does not change the structure. - Acquisition of representations: only metaphorically (it would presuppose an instructive system). - A learning system has no trivial experiences (interactions), because all interactions lead to structural changes. I 280 Learning/Maturana: described in brackets: pure epigenetic process (development of the individual) - no directed process of adaptation to a reality. >Adaption, >Reality, >Objectivity/Maturana. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Legal History | Demsetz | Parisi I Institutions/law/legal history/Demsetz/Wangenheim: Initiated by Harold Demsetz's seminal paper (1967)(1), neo-institutional investigations of legal evolution typically look at specific changes of property rights regimes. Alchian: The basic idea is closely related to Alchian's (1950)(2) optimistic account of behavioral evolution: societies tend to have institutions that reflect, and are adapted to, the current needs of this society, given their environment and their preferences. Property rights/Demsetz: The Labrador Indians switched from open access property rights regimes to private property Parisi I 163 when fur trade made hunting beavers more valuable to each hunter, so that the natural setting could not sustain the radically increased burden resulting from consequentially increased hunting activities. >Property. Conditions/Demsetz: In his reappraising paper thirty-five years later, Demsetz (2002)(3) based his argument on a number of conditions that have to be satisfied to make environmental changes induce optimal institutional adaptations. In particular, he considered (1) the number and closeness of involved persons, (2) their productivity in solving resource allocation problems, and (3) the complexity of this problem as relevant conditions. If they change, most often due to new levels of specialization in production, observable property rights regimes will adapt to better solve the externality problems that become prevalent in effect, so Demsetz (2002)(4) argues. >Externalities. North: The idea of institutions evolving towards efficiency is also at the heart of the earlier writings of Douglas North (e.g. 1981)(4), who grounded his account of economic history on this argument. >Institutions. WangenheimVsDemsetz: Independently of whether one wants to label this functionalist Demsetzian approach as truly evolutionary or not, the argument lacks any causal explanation for why the institutions change. There is no discussion of how rules in archaic societies are made, nor is there any hint of legislators' incentives when more complex societies are discussed (mainly in the 2002 paper). WittVsDemsetz: Many authors like Witt (1987)(5), Banner (2002)(6), Eggertson (1990(7), pp. 247—280), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)) have noted this pitfall of Demsetz's approach. The idea has been taken up by scholars like Umbeck (1977a(10), 1977b(11)), Ellickson (1991(12), 1994(13)), and Anderson and Hill (1975(8), 2002(9)), who have argued that societies self-organize and develop property rights when law does not exist or is not enforced (prominent examples are farmer - rancher conflicts in Shasta County, mining claims during the California gold rush, Maine lobster fishing grounds, and grazing areas on the American Western frontier in the second half of the nineteenth century). Causality: (…) the authors proffer a causal complement to Demsetz's teleological hypothesis: they identify some individuals who find it privately worthwhile to design and enforce property rights against infringing group members or outsiders. VsUmbeck: Not all examples have remained undisputed. Clay and Wright (2005)(14), for example, challenge Umbeck's observations on mining district codes producing order. They argue that the mining district codes gave equal attention to the rights of claim-jumpers as to claim holders, whence chronic insecurity and litigation resulted. 1. Demsetz, H. (1967). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review, P&P 57: 347-359. 2. Alchian, A. (1950). "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy 58: 211—221. 3.Demsetz, H. (2002). "Toward a Theory of Property Rights Il: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership." Journal of Legal studies 31: S653—S672. 4. North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. 5. Witt, U. (1987). "How Transaction Rights Are Shaped to Channel Innovativeness." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 180—195. 6. Banner, S. (2002). "Transitions Between Property Regimes." Journal of Legal studies 31: S359-S371. 7. Eggertson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (1975). "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West." Journal of Law and Economics 18: 163—179. 9. Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill (2002). "Cowboys and Contracts." Journal of Legal studies 31: S489-S514. 10. Umbeck, J. (1977a). "The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights." Explorations in Economic History 14: 197—226. 11. Umbeck, J. (1977b). "A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush." Journal of Law and Economics 20: 421—437. 12. Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 13. Ellickson, R. (1994). "The Aim of Order without Law." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 97—100. 14. Clay, K. and G. Wright (2005). "Order without law? Property Rights during the California Gold Rush." Explorations in Economic History 42: 155—183. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Life | Agassiz | Gould II 106 Life/Nature/Agassiz/Gould: AgassizVsEvolution: Agassiz (died 1873) maintained throughout his life that the history of life was a predetermined divine plan. (1) Gould II 108 At that time it was believed that the depths of the oceans were a world that was always at rest without change. Selection/GouldVsAgassiz: this one has probably not understood that the theory of natural selection does not predict global and unstoppable progress, but only adaptations to local conditions. 1. Agassiz L., |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Marginal Efficiency of Capital | Keynes | Kurz I 109 Def Marginal Efficiency of Capital/Keynes/Kurz: „I define the marginal efficiency of capital as being equal to that rate of discount which would make the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns expected from the capital-asset during its life just equal to its supply price.“ (CWK 7, p. 135)(1). Keynes goes on to argue that the various projects may be ordered according to their marginal efficiencies and then suggests to aggregate them, “so as to provide a schedule relating the rate of aggregate investment to the corresponding marginal efficiency of capital in general which that rate of investment will establish” (CWK 7, p. 136)(1). This he calls the “investment demand schedule,” which he confronts with the current rate of interest. He concludes: “the rate of investment will be pushed to the point on the investment demand-schedule where the marginal efficiency of capital in general is equal to the market rate of return” (CWK 7, pp. 136-137)(1). Problems/VsKeynes: Keynes rests his argument on the dubious partial equilibrium method: he assumes that the schedule and the money rate of interest are independent of one another. Yet, if one was to depend on the other, or if they were interdependent, the argument in its present form would break down. Several commentators, including Pasinetti (1974)(2), have emphasized that Keynes’s argument consists of an adaptation of the classical doctrine of extensive diminishing returns to the theory of investment. This doctrine (see, e.g., Kurz 1978)(3) typically assumes that the different qualities of land can be brought into an order of fertility, with the first quality exhibiting the lowest unit costs of production of, say, corn; the second quality, the second lowest unit costs; and so on. In competitive conditions, with a rise in “effectual demand” (Adam Smith), the different qualities of land will be taken into cultivation according to this order. The different qualities of land can also be ranked according to the rent they yield per acre; this ranking is known as the order of rentability. It has Kurz I 110 commonly been assumed that both orders are independent of income distribution and that they coincide. SraffaVsKeynes: In the late 1920s, Sraffa showed that this is true only in exceedingly special cases. In general, both orders depend on the rate of interest and do not coincide (see also Kurz and Salvadori 1995, chap. 10)(4). >Investments/Keynes. Kurz I 116 SraffaVsKeynes: Next Keynes brings in the marginal efficiency of capital and compares it with the rate of interest. Sraffa comments: “‘Marginal efficiency’ and ‘the’ rate of interest are obscure: the former is not defined in this context and the latter has two definitions on p. 227.”(5) It is at any rate misleading what Keynes says, because the rate of interest of an object, whose actual price exceeds cost of production, is according to the definition given on pp. 222–223(5) (relatively) high, not low. Keynes then expounds his view in terms of the three-assets example. Since in equilibrium the own rates, expressed in the same numeraire, must be equal, one gets the following result: with the own rate of money being constant, “it follows that a1 and a2 must be rising. In other words, the present money-price of every commodity other than money tends to fall relatively to its expected future price” (p. 228)(5). Sraffa comments that exactly the opposite follows: “this will lower, not raise, their rates of interest.” Sraffa/Kurz: Keynes simply got it wrong. 1. Keynes, J. M. (1971–1989). The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, D. Moggridge (ed.), London: Macmillan. 2. Pasinetti, L. L. (1974). Growth and Income Distribution. Essays in Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Kurz, H. D. (1978). “Rent Theory in a Multisectoral Model,” Oxford Economic Papers, 30, 16-37. 4. Kurz, H. D. and Salvadori, N. (1995). Theory of Production. A Long-period Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Paperback edn 1997.) 5. Sraffa, P. (1932). “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal, 42, 42-53. Kurz, Heinz D. „Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret skepticism“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
EconKeyn I John Maynard Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace New York 1920 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Markets | Spencer | Habermas IV 176 Market/Spencer/Durkheim/Habermas: Spencer thesis (according to Durkheim): social life, like life in general, can only be organized through an unconscious and spontaneous adaptation, under the simultaneous pressure of needs, and not according to a deliberate, intelligent plan. (…) Cf. >Planning, >Rationality. Habermas IV 176 The type of social relationship would be the economic relationship (...).(1) Spencer/Durkheim: the unifying mechanism is the market. Integration by the market is "spontaneous" in so far as orientations for action are coordinated not by moral rules but by functional interrelationships. Question: how can the division of labour be both a natural law of evolution and the mechanism of production for a certain form of social solidarity?(2) Solution/Spencer/Durkheim: the division of social work, controlled by the non-normative market mechanism, merely finds its normative expression in the "giant system of private contracts". >Markets, >Contracts, >Contract Theory. Habermas IV 176/177 DurkheimVsSpencer: Durkheim, on the other hand, is not about a norm-free control mechanism, for in exchange relationships there is "nothing similar to a control effect".(3) Solution/Durkheim: the socially integrative power of moral rules. "Interest is ((s) on the other hand) the least stable in the world."“(4) >E. Durkheim. 1.E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Paris 1930, German Frankfurt 1977, p. 242f 2. Ibid. p. 81. 3. Ibid. p. 243 4. Ibid. |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| McCallum Rule | McCallum | Mause I 232f McCallum Rule/McCallum: McCallum proposes (1) to facilitate monetarist monetary policy by investing money supply control more indirectly than in the case of the Taylor Rule (see Taylor Rule/Taylor). The central bank is to align the monetary base with the longer-term development path of the nominal domestic product. McCallumVsTaylor: the direct control of money supply by the Taylor rule means that monetary policy makers must make explicit statements about the price and volume components. Solution/McCallum: The very long-term orientation (more than 20 years) also ensures that the development path is independent of monetary development. (2) The averages are calculated over a rolling period of 4 years to prevent the monetary base from reacting to cyclical fluctuations in circulation speed. In contrast to the original Taylor Rule, the McCallum Rule is based exclusively on data from the previous period or on long-term average values. The problem of real-time data in identifying the need for adaptation therefore does not occur. VsMcCallum: this volume-oriented concept consciously accepts greater interest rate fluctuations. 1. McCallum, Bennett T., The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example. Review of World Economics 123, (3), 1987, S. 415– 429. 2. Ibid. |
EconMcCall I Bennett McCallum The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example 1987 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Mergers | Rothbard | Rothbard III 643 Mergers/Rothbard: Mergers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. ers have been denounced as "monopolistic," but not nearly as vehemently as have cartels. Merging firms pool their capital assets, and the owners of the individual firms now become part owners of the Single merged firm. They will agree on rules for the exchange ratios of the shares of the different companies. If the merging firms encompass the entire industry, then a merger is simply a permanent form of cartel. >Cartels/Rothbard, >Monopolies. Yet clearly the only difference between a merger and the original forming of a single corporation is that the merger pools existing capital goods assets, while the original birth of a corporation pools money assets. It is clear that, economically, there is little difference between the two. A merger is the action of individuals with a certain quantity of already produced capital goods, adjusting themselves to their present and expected future conditions by cooperative pooling of assets. The formation of a new company is an adjustment to expected future conditions (before any specific investment has been made in capital goods) by cooperative pooling of assets. The essential similarity lies in the voluntary pooling of assets in a more centralized organization for the purpose of increasing monetary income. The theorists who attack cartels and monopolies do not recognize the identity of the two actions. >Corporations/Rothbard. Rothbard III 644 Merger/cartel/Rothbard: Yet an industry-wide merger is, in effect, a permanent cartel, a permanent combination and fusion. On the other hand, a cartel that maintains by voluntary agreement the separate identity of each firm is by nature a highly transitory and ephemeral arrangement and (…) generally tends to break up on the market. In fact, in many cases, a cartel can be considered as simply a tentative step in the direction of permanent merger. And a merger and the original formation of a corporation do not (…) essentially differ. The former is an adaptation of the size and number of firms in an industry to new conditions or is the correction of a previous error in forecasting. The latter is a de novo attempt to adapt to present and future market conditions. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Modernism | Parsons | Habermas IV 303 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parson's theory of modernism is too harmonistic because it does not have the means for a plausible explanation of pathological development patterns. Habermas IV 420 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons' theory of modernity has a Janus face: A) it differs from a system functionalism that exclusively emphasizes the traits of complexity in modern societies. That's Luhmann's line. >Modernism/Luhmann. Habermas IV 421 Method/ParsonsVsLuhmann/Habermas: Parsons understands social modernization not only as systemic rationalization, but as action-related rationalization. Habermas IV 422 HabermasVsParsons: Problem: Parsons lacks a social concept designed from an action perspective. Therefore, he cannot describe the rationalization of the lifeworld and the increase in the complexity of action systems as separate, interacting, but often also contradictory processes. Therefore, he cannot grasp the corresponding dialectic and must reduce these phenomena to the degree of crisis symptoms that can be explained according to the pattern of inflation and deflation. >Revolutions/Parsons. Habermas IV 432 Modernism/Parsons/ParsonsVsWeber/Habermas: Parsons does not arrive at a different view than Weber through a divergent description of global trends, about which one could argue; rather, this view is deductively derived from his analysis of the modernization process: "When developed modern societies are characterized by a high degree of inherent complexity, and when they have this complexity only in all four dimensions of adaptation capacity. If we can simultaneously increase the differentiation of media-controlled subsystems, inclusion and value generation, then there is an analytical relationship between a) the high complexity of the system and b) universalistic forms of social integration and informal institutionalized individualism. Habermas: Parsons therefore draws a harmonized picture of modernity. >Bureaucracy/Parsons. Habermas IV 433 Modernism/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Parsons must reduce sociopathological phenomena to systemic imbalances; then the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, Habermas IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Motivation | Shoda | Corr I 478 Motivation/emotion/Shoda/Smith: Motivation and emotion are intimately connected. According to Lazarus (1991)(1), emotions are aroused when personally significant goals are attained, threatened or frustrated. Shoda/Smith: Within the CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) model, motives and values play a central role, guiding the short- and long-term goals that people seek, the ways they encode certain events, the situations and outcomes they approach or avoid, and their emotional reactions to such situations. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Individual differences in the meaning ascribed to an athletic situation depend in part on the goals and subjective values that people bring to it. Expectancies and values also interact in important ways (Brehm and Self 1989)(2). Competencies and self-regulation skills People’s cognitive, affective and behavioural capabilities are key factors in how they are influenced by, respond to, and influence their environments. The final CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) component – competencies and self-regulatory systems – receive strong emphasis in current social-cognitive theories (e.g., Bandura 1997(3); Mischel and Shoda 1995(4)). >Self-regulation, >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Brehm, J. W. and Self, E. A. 1989. The intensity of motivation, Annual Review of Psychology 40: 109–31 3. Bandura, A. 1997.Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 4. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Motivation | Smith | Corr I 478 Motivation/emotion/Shoda/Smith: Motivation and emotion are intimately connected. According to Lazarus (1991)(1), emotions are aroused when personally significant goals are attained, threatened or frustrated. Shoda/Smith: Within the CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) model, motives and values play a central role, guiding the short- and long-term goals that people seek, the ways they encode certain events, the situations and outcomes they approach or avoid, and their emotional reactions to such situations. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Individual differences in the meaning ascribed to an athletic situation depend in part on the goals and subjective values that people bring to it. Expectancies and values also interact in important ways (Brehm and Self 1989)(2). Competencies and self-regulation skills People’s cognitive, affective and behavioural capabilities are key factors in how they are influenced by, respond to, and influence their environments. The final CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) component – competencies and self-regulatory systems – receive strong emphasis in current social-cognitive theories (e.g., Bandura 1997(3); Mischel and Shoda 1995(4)). >Self-regulation, >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Brehm, J. W. and Self, E. A. 1989. The intensity of motivation, Annual Review of Psychology 40: 109–31 3. Bandura, A. 1997.Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 4. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Observation Language | Feyerabend | 87 Theory/Observation Language/Feyerabend: even the most careful examination of an observation sentence does not disturb the concepts by which it is expressed or the structure of the perception image. How can one examine something that is constantly used and presupposed in every statement? >Observation, >Theories. I 95 Observation/Observation Language/Feyerabend: there is no point in invoking the observation, if one does not know how to describe an observation! 97 Observation Concepts/Feyerabend: they are Trojan horses, to which you have to pay close attention. I 98 Observation Language/Feyerabend: the concepts hidden in the observation statements can hardly be found in the more abstract parts of language. Concepts, like perceptions, are ambiguous and dependent on the background. Moreover, the content of a concept is also determined by how it is related to perception. The only way to break out of this circle: use of an external comparison scale, new relationships between concepts and perceptions. >tower example (I 89) Tower Argument/Feyerabend: heavy bodies fall perpendicular to the earth 's surface. This is considered an irrefutable argument for the fact that the earth does not move.) I 99 Tower Example/Feyerabend: we can now turn the argument around, and use it as a search engine that helps us in discovering the natural interpretations that preclude the movement of the earth. I 100 To do so, we first assert the movement of the earth and then examine the changes that might resolve this contradiction. Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: if you have identified them, you cannot, of course, compare them to the "observation results". They do not exist anymore. Some older rationalists wanted to assign only a subordinate auxiliary function to the observation. Galileo did not go that way. I 101 Observation Language/Galileo/Feyerabend: Galileo introduces a new observation language: the senses are only responsible for relative movements! Joint movement has no effect. No matter which movement is ascribed to the earth, it must remain unnoticed. Problem: on the other hand, Galileo also says: nothing moves in a straight line naturally. I.e. horses, carriages, etc. must also move on circular paths. I 102 "Adaptation words" (expression by Austin related to Aristotle): E.g. "like", "corresponding". These words allow a comparison between different observation languages. I 103 Observation Language/Feyerabend: one needs a fair comparison: one must ensure that an observation language is not criticized because it is not yet sufficiently known and therefore less closely connected with our sense perceptions and less obvious than a more common language. We must learn to speak all the observation languages with the same fluency. Introducing purely cognitive languages should be avoided. I 360 Theory/Observation Language/Feyerabend: a contradiction between theory and observation can certainly reveal a mistake in the observation language. It is obvious to change the language of observation, to adapt it to the new theory and to see what happens. >Meaning Change. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Parent-Child Relationship | Psychological Theories | Slater I 18 Parent-Child Relationship/psychological theories: A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)(1). >M. Ainsworth. Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm at 12 and 18 months. >Situation/Ainsworth, >Strange Situation. Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)(2). The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)(3). A rodent model for studying early maternal care uses naturally occurring variations in maternal behavior over the first eight days after birth (Champagne & Meaney, 2007)(4). Direct observation of mother-pup interactions in normally-reared animals identified two forms of maternal behavior – those involving Licking/ grooming of pups (LG) and another characterized by arched-back nursing (ABN) in which a mother nurses her pups with her back conspicuously arched. Because the two types of maternal behavior tend to co-occur, mothers could be classified as either High or Low LG-ABN. The consequences for offspring of differential mothering were established by intergenerational stability of maternal behavior, with mothers who were high on LB-ABN showing similar maternal behavior to their offspring when they subsequently became mothers, and the offsprings’ increased exploratory activity and decreased startle responses as adults (Cameron, Champagne, & Parent, 2005)(5). >Animal model, >Animal studies, >Experiments, >Method. Cross-fostering of high LG mothers to rat pups served to rule out genetic transmission of intergenerational effects. Offspring of low LG mothers matched to high LG foster mothers showed high LG maternal behaviors. Early exposure to high LG mothers also has produced effects on subsequent sexual and reproductive behavior of female offspring (Cameron et al., 2005(5); Curley, Champagne, & Bateson, 2008)(6). >Environment/Developmental psychology. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press 3. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387. 4. Champagne, F., & Meaney, M. (2007). Transgenerational effects of social environment on variations in maternal care and behavioral response to novelty. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121, 1353–1363. 5. Cameron, N., Champagne, F., & Parent, C. (2005). The programming of individual differences in defensive responses and reproductive strategies in the rat through variations in maternal care. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 29, 843–865 6. Curley, J., Champagne, F., & Bateson, P. (2008). Transgenerational effects of impaired maternal care on behaviour of offspring and grand offspring. Animal Behaviour, 75, 1551–1561 Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Personality | Allport | Corr I 4 Personality/Allport: Gordon Allport (1937)(1) defined personality as ‘the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment’ (Allport 1937,p.48). I 5 McAdamsVsAllport/PalsVsAllport: A definition that gives a modern twist to this personological integration is offered by McAdams and Pals (2006)(2), who define personality as ‘an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life stories complexly and differentially situated in culture’ (McAdams and Pals 2006(2), p. 212). The emphasis on dynamics and development in these two personological definitions reminds us that some theories emphasize function and change, in contrast to the typically more static trait emphasis on description. >Environment, >Situations, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Personality traits. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, p. 48. 2. McAdams, D. P. and Pals, J. L. 2006. A new Big Five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality, American Psychologist 61: 204–17 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Corr I 43 Personality/Allport/AsendorpfVsAllport: Allport (1937) owed most of his ideas to Stern (1911)(1). >W. Stern. 1. Stern, W. 1911. Die Differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen [Methodological foundations of differential psychology]. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Corr I 380 Personality/Allport/Saucier: Allport (1937)(1): ‘personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment’ (1937, p. 48). Saucier: Allport called this a ‘biophysical’ conception. It focused on ‘what an individual is regardless of the manner in which other people perceive his qualities or evaluate them’ (1937, p. 40). Phrasings like ‘within the individual’ and ‘systems that determine’ reveal an emphasis on the underlying mechanisms behind behaviour. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Personality Traits | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 265 Personality traits/evolutionary psychology: the argument that personality differences are selectively neutral is unable to account for the fact that our closest living relative, the chimpanzee, exhibits similar versions of the >Big Five personality traits (plus Dominance) (King and Figueredo 1997)(1). >Five-Factor Model, >Causality/psychology/evolutionary theories, >Heritability/Tooby/Cosmides. Corr I 272 Personality traits/evolutionary psychology/Figueredo: we propose that sociality is the major cause of personality variation in humans. Specifically, adaptation to different micro-niches within the overall social ecology of the species is what leads to the differentiation of personality traits among individuals. Climactic and ecological fluctuations during repeated Ice Ages may have historically provided much of the initial impetus by exacerbating social competition, but the larger population densities occasioned by the Neolithic Revolution in human subsistence economies (e.g., farming, herding, industrial and now information-based) have largely taken their place in recent human history. >Ecology/evolutionary psychology, >Niches/evolutionary psychology, >Adaption/evolutionary psychology, >Selection/evolutionary psychology. 1. King, J. E. and Figueredo, A. J. 1997. The five-factor model plus dominance in chimpanzee personality, Journal of Research in Personality 31: 257–71 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Personality Traits | Matthews | Corr I 411 Personality traits/arousal/attention/bias/Matthews: Thesis: (Matthews 2000(1), 2008a(2)) traits typically relate to a multiplicity of biases in information-processing, which cannot be reduced to any general attentional (or arousal) mechanism. Corr I 419 Personality traits/Cognitive-adaptive theory/Matthews: the cognitive-adaptive theory of personality traits (Matthews 1999(3), 2000(4), 2008a(5); Matthews and Zeidner 2004(6)) proposes that traits have functional coherence, not structural coherence; that is, there is no single ‘master-process’ that mediates behavioural expressions of traits, including performance effects. Traits relate to multiple, structurally Corr I 420 independent biases in a variety of neural, computational and self-regulative processes. However, these processing biases are related in that they support common adaptive goals that are central to the trait concerned. Traits represent different modes of adaptation to the major challenges of human life. >Anxiety/cognitive-adaptive theory/Matthews, >Extraversion/cognitive-adaptive theory/Matthews. 1. Matthews, G. 2000. A cognitive science critique of biological theories of personality traits, History and Philosophy of Psychology 2: 1–17 2. Matthews, G. 2008a. Personality and information processing: a cognitive-adaptive theory, in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and testing, vol. I, Personality theories and models, pp. 56–79. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 3. Matthews, G. 1999. Personality and skill: a cognitive-adaptive framework, in P. L. Ackerman, P. C. Kyllonen and R. D. Roberts (eds.), The future of learning and individual differences research: processes, traits, and content, pp. 251–70. Washington, DC: APA 4. Matthews, G. 2000. A cognitive science critique of biological theories of personality traits, History and Philosophy of Psychology 2: 1–17 5. Matthews, G. 2008a. Personality and information processing: a cognitive-adaptive theory, in G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews and D. H. Saklofske (eds.), Handbook of personality theory and testing, vol. I, Personality theories and models, pp. 56–79. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 6. Matthews, G. and Zeidner, M. 2004. Traits, states and the trilogy of mind: an adaptive perspective on intellectual functioning, in D. Dai and R. J. Sternberg (eds.), Motivation, emotion, and cognition: integrative perspectives on intellectual functioning and development, pp. 143–74. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Production Theory | Leontief | Kurz I 18 Goods/commodity/production theory/Leontief/Kurz: Leontief (…) distinguished between ‘cost goods’ and ‘revenue goods’; the latter satisfy final demand. The concept of revenue good indicates that the economy is taken to produce a surplus over and above what is consumed productively. He suggested (Leontief 1928, p. 585)(1) that the process of production should be described in terms of three sets of ‘technical coefficients’: (i) ‘cost coefficients’, that is, the proportion in which two cost goods participate in the production of a good; (ii) ‘productivity coefficients’, that is, the total quantity produced of a good in relation to the total quantity used up of one of its inputs; and (iii) ‘distribution coefficients’, that is, the proportion of the total output of a certain good allotted to a particular group of property income receivers. Leontief stressed that because of the circular character of production ‘a complete elimination of a factor of production from the given system is in principle impossible’. He added: ‘Of course, the size of the “capital factor” can be reduced to any chosen level by referring back to even earlier periods of production’ ([p. 211] p. 622). The reference is to what became known as the method of reduction to dated quantities of labour (see Sraffa, 1960(2), chapter VI). This reduction, Leontief stressed, has nothing to do with a historical regress ([p. 192 fn] p. 596, fn. 6). >Price/Leontief. Leontief: „In the general circular flow scheme, income from ownership is of course considered alongside other cost items without the slightest direct reference to how it originates (the phenomenon of ownership). It is the task of the theory of interest to investigate these fundamental relationships.“ ([p. 196] p. 600)(1) Leontief’s argument resulted in setting up price equations that reflect not only the socio-technical conditions of production, but also the rule that fixes the distribution of the surplus product. This rule is the second key to a determination of relative prices. Only if both the system of production and the sharing out of the surplus between different claimants in terms of wages, profits Kurz I 19 (or interest) and rents is known, can relative prices be determined. Two ‘keys’ are required in order to solve the problem of value and distribution. Kurz I 27 Classical/Neo-classical economics: While Leontief conceived of his early contribution as firmly rooted in the classical tradition, he called his input–output method developed in the 1930s and 1940s ‘an adaptation of the neo-classical theory of general equilibrium to the empirical study of the quantitative interdependence between interrelated economic activities’ (Leontief, 1966, p. 134)(3). LeontiefVsWalras/LeontiefVscCassel: Scrutiny shows, however, that in his input-output analysis he preserved the classical concept of circular flow and did not, as is maintained by some interpreters, adopt the Walras–Cassel view of production. In the second edition of The Structure of American Economy, published in 1951, he even explicitly rejected the view of production as a one-way avenue that leads from the services of the ‘original’ factors of production: land, labour and capital – the ‘venerable trinity’ - to final goods (Leontief, 1951, p. 112)(4). Unlike the theories of Walras and Cassel, in Leontief there are no given initial endowments of these factors. (…) the change is more apparent than real. 1. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 2. Sraffa, P. (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 3. Leontief, W. (1966) Input–Output Economics (New York: Oxford University Press). 4. Leontief, W. (1951) The Structure of American Economy, 1919–1939: An Empirical Application of Equilibrium Analysis (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press). (Second enlarged edition of Leontief, 1941.) Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Leontief I Wassily Wassilyevich Leontief Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 1928 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Propensities | Bigelow | I 333 Functional Explanation/Forward-looking theory/function/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. Aetiological theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: I 334 For example, suppose that a pattern usually has a certain effect and is the result of natural selection. Then the aetiological theory says, that it is now a function of this pattern. >Function, >Cause, >Effect, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Functional explanation, >Functional analysis, >Selection. In the past, there must have been a relevant effect in a sufficient number of cases. >Relevance. N.B.: the corresponding situations are not randomly chosen situations, but situations where the effect was appropriate. In these situations, it contributes to survival. Propensity/Survival/Bigelow/Pargetter: although probability laws allow for a long series of coincidences, this is very unlikely. Normally, there will be a propensity towards the survival of the individual. Function/Bigelow/Pargetter: if there are only a few coincidences, we certainly do not speak of function. >Coincidence. I 335 Etiological theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: we interpret it in a way so it attributes the function for the whole time, even before it contributed to survival! At that time, it contributed to a propensity. Environment: this too must be relativized for the environment. If this suddenly changes, there may be ambiguities of adaptation. >Adaptation, >Environment, >Niches. I 336 Function/Bigelow/Pargetter: Functions can be described as components of an organism in descending hierarchy of complexity. For example, body parts, but also cells have functions. >Complexity, >Parts. Propensity theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to it, the functions are therefore relational properties. >Properties. And they are dispositional. >Dispositions. This is true even if the individual does not survive or is never in his normal environment. >Individuals, >Natural kinds. I 337 Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the functions interpreted (like that as propensities) explain survival by causal information, as a why-explanation. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Functional explanation, >Why questions. Propensity Theory/Artefacts/Bigelow/Pargetter: can it be applied to artifacts as well as to biological patterns? It can be part of an overarching theory, but with artifacts there is again the problem of looking back (see above). >Artifacts. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: we propose a theory of propensity for selection as a forward-looking theory for biological patterns and artifacts. >Selection. I 338 This means that all functions, be they biological or artifacts, have something in common. Function/fitness/causal explanation/propensity theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is possible that an organism may not survive, even though it has developed a survival function. But if it survives, it is because of this function. VsPropensity theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example, a structure does not serve any purpose at all, suppose its environment changes, and suddenly its functions serve survival. Then our theory of propensity would have to say that the structure has a function lately. For example, suppose one could say that heart tones have the function of alerting doctors. But only in this century, that seems wrong. Aetiological theory: says that heart tones have no such function because they are not designed for it. Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless the reason why we want to deny heart tones a function is not that they have no evolutionary history of the desired kind... I 339 ...but because the heart tones have an inevitable connection with the function of blood pumping. >Functional analysis. The heartbeat does nott produce any propensity for survival. This corresponds to examples of functions that existed in the past, but have now lost their function: VsPropensity Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: this assumes that the pattern has no function. Aetiological theory: assumes that it has a function, no matter what it was used for and what it was designed for. Propensity Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: generally gives better explanations. We can say that this function used to exist in the past, but unfortunately it became harmful to the individual. I 340 Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: a propensity can play an explanatory causal role, while the fact that something has a historical origin does not matter. This shows us that the propensity theory has such strong advantages that it seems to be justified to argue away counterexamples. Paul GriffithsVsPropensity Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: just because fitness is forward-looking, functions should be retrospective. And we can even give up the term "function" in favour of "fitness". BigelowVsVs: Function and fitness can play independent roles. Fitness: Property of an organism Function: functions specify the properties that together contribute to fitness. And here we can also ask why they are doing this. Information/Bigelow/Pargetter: an attribution of fitness breaks apart into the attribution of many functions. Thus, functions are more informative in one respect, and less informative in another than fitness. a) they do not tell us about the level of fitness, but b) each one tells us not only what characteristics contribute, but also why. I 341 Artifact/Fitness/Bigelow/Pargetter: artifacts are not about fitness, so function cannot be made superfluous by them. Therefore, fitness cannot be redundant in it. But instead, necessity can be redundant analogously. Propensity Theory/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a uniform concept of function that also applies to artifacts. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Properties | Dennett | I 68f Properties/Competition/Evolution/Dennett: E.g. competition in coin toss produces some kind of winner. However, this winner is not the carrier of any historical properties that would have predestined him to be the winner, like it happens in a tennis tournament. In a repetition hardly the same person would win. I 131 Coincidence/Dennett: coincidence has no memory. (E.g. competition in coin toss favors no properties of the winner). Properties/"Eve"/Human origin/Dennett: except for the fact that she had two daughters, there is nothing special about Eve! She was certainly not the first human woman and not harder working than her contemporaries. (> Competition in coin toss). I 295 She can only be identified afterwards. Properties/Evolution "why" questions/Dennett: E.g. 99 per cent of all living creatures that have ever lived have died without offspring, but non of our ancestors belonged to them. In our family tree we find ancestors with strengths and weaknesses, but none of these weaknesses led to extinction. So it might seem as though the evolution cannot explain even one property that we have inherited from our ancestors.> Explanation. I 382 Properties/Dennett: does the world of the living have many properties that are there for no reason? That depends on what you consider to be a property. Exthe fact that an elephant has more legs than eyes is not an adaptation and no adaptationist would assert that. I 607 Properties/Dennett: E.g. The Sword in the Stone that only Arthur can pull out: invisible property that only shows itself in the situation. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Proximal Theory | Proust | I 227 Proximal/Proust: primitive creatures such as the lumpfish (a species of sea snails) react to a proximal state of the receptors. I 227 Proximal/Proust: e.g. snail: a snail can only process information when there is contact with its receptors. Distal: Birds and mammals need no contact with their receptors. Therefore, they can develop completely different spatial terms. >Proximal theory/Quine, >Seeing, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Reality, >World/Thinking. I 228 Space/Animal/Thinking/Proust: intuitive, space is a kind of empty framework for possible perceptual content. >Content. The relation which is of interest to us is the occurrence at the same place, i.e. the equivalence class for all perception experience that affect the same localization in the environment. Proust: this relation is interesting because it does not presuppose either the concept of space or the concept of a concept. It is purely logical. >Concepts, >Concepts/Proust. Proust: the occurrence in the same place is also essential as a basis for the recognition of objects. >Recognition. I 229 Definition Calibration/Proust: Calibration is adaptation of an auditory pattern to a visual. ((s) Coordination of sensory impressions.) Proust: this mechanism is essential to correct the sensory inputs. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Psychological Resilience | Personality Psychology | Slater I 207 Resilience/personality psychology: Personality traits: Rutter (1987)(1) thesis: resilience is not a personality trait. (Cf. Cicchetti and Garmezy, 1993(2). Given that the same trait can function in different ways across people and situations and the life course, and given that development changes the capacity of a person to respond and adapt, the notion of a resiliency trait is untenable. >Resilience/psychological theories, >Resilience/Rutter. Slater I 211 The trait issue has resurfaced in the form of recent efforts to devise and market measures of resilience or “resiliency” (see Windle, Bennett, & Noyes, 2011(3), for a review) and also to conduct large-scale programs to promote individual resiliency. RutterVs: (Rutter, 1987(1)2006(4)) — along with other leading developmental scholars in the area — such efforts may be misguided. Resilience theory and the body of evidence on human resilience support the idea that resilience results from the interplay of many influences, the operation of multiple adaptive systems in concert, and ongoing interactions among complex systems within the person and between person and environment. It is conceivable in this dynamic systems view to promote resilience; however, this would require a very good understanding of individuals involved, the nature of the challenging situation, adaptive processes involved in meeting this kind of challenge, how to mobilize these processes, and important potential developmental and cultural influences on these various processes. Masten: (…) there is considerable risk in viewing the capacity for resilience in terms of individual traits. A child (or adult) who does not fare well is then set up for blame by others or the self. The victim is blamed for deficient “resiliency” when in fact there may have been overwhelming adversity and completely inadequate external support from family, community or the larger society to mitigate the threat, support adaptation, or promote recovery. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. 2. Cicchetti, D., & Garmezy, N. (199 3). Prospects and promises in the study of resilience. Development and Psychopathology, 5,497—502. 3. Windle, G., Bennett, K. M., & Noyes, J. (201 1). A methodological review of resilience measurement scales. Health and Quality of Life Outcomes, 9, 8. 4. Rutter, M. (2006). Implications of resilience concepts for scientific understanding. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1094, 1—12. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Psychological Resilience | Psychological Theories | Slater I 204 Resilience/Psychological theories: among others a study by Werner and Smith “Vulnerable but invincible: A study of resilient children” (Werner and Smith, 1982)(1) contributed a landmark in resilience research. See also Anthony and Koupernik, (1974)(2), Garmezy and Rutter (1983)(3). Slater I 205 According to Masten (2007)(4) there are four overlapping waves of resilience science 1) basic research to define, measure, and describe this family of phenomena 2) efforts to understand resilience processes 3) tests of resilience theory through experimental intervention studies 4) integrative, inherently multidisciplinary, research across multiple levels of analysis. Def Resilience/psychology/tradition/Masten: Resilience was often described in terms of positive function or development despite the presence of risk factors. Children who did well in adverse circumstances were identified as “invulnerable” (an unfortunate term that soon lost adherents), “stress- resistant,” or “resilient.” The goals of such studies were often to identity qualities of the child (e.g., gender, personality, or abilities) or environment (e.g., relationships or supports) that seemed to be associated with positive adaptation, competence or mental health in the context of risk. VsTradition: new approaches: Transactional models highlighted the bidirectional nature and multiplicity of effects resulting from ongoing interactions of a changing person with a changing environment. During socialization, for example, a parent would be expected to change child behavior through discipline, monitoring, or encouragement in age- and child-appropriate ways. (Eisenberg, 1977(5); Gottesman & Shields, 1972(6), 1982(7); Sameroff & Chandler, 1975(8); Sroufe, 1979(9)). >Resilience/Rutter. Slater I 207 The definition of resilience and related terms has become even more dynamic, with concepts like “resilience” or “protection” or “vulnerability” assumed to arise from complex interactions and processes across many levels of the individual and the person interacting with other people or their context (Cicchetti, 2010(10); Sapienza & Masten, 2011(11)). Concepts like protection or resilience are increasingly viewed as emergent properties of dynamic systems in interaction. In later years, many resilience scientists would refer to generally good influences (associated with desirable outcomes for all levels of risk) as “promotive” factors (Sameroff, 2000)(12) and generally bad influences as “risk factors,” while recognizing that many characteristics or experiences play varying roles along a continuum. >Distinctions/Rutter. For protection see >Resilience/Rutter, >Interaction/Rutter. For negative chain reactions see >Resilience/developmental psychology. Slater I 212 Parental care: a number of experiments corroborate the important roles of parental care for resilience (see Gest & Davidson, 2011(13)), in studies that have targeted change in quality of parenting (e.g., Borden et al., 2010(14), Patterson et al., 2010)(15) or foster care (Fisher, Van Ryzin, & Gunnar, 2011(16); Smyke, et al., 2010(17)). Neurobiology of resilience: see Curtis & Cicchetti, 2003)(18). Culture/ecology of resilience: see Luthar (2006)(19), Ungar (2008(20), 2011(21). 1. Werner, E. E., & Smith, R. S. (1982). Vulnerable but invincible: A study of resilient children. New York: McGraw-Hill 2. Anthony, E. J., & Koupernik, C. (Eds) (1974). The child in his family: Children at psychiatric risk. New York: Wiley. 3. Garmezy, N., & Rutter, M. (1983). Stress, coping and development in children. New York: McGraw-Hill. 4. Masten, A. S. (2007). Resilience in developing systems: Progress and promise as the fourth wave rises. Development and Psychopathology, 19, 921—930. 5. Eisenberg, L. (1977). Development as a unifying concept in psychiatry. British Journal of Psychiatry, 131, 225—237. 6. Gottesman, L L, & Shields, J. (1972). Schizophrenia and genetics: A twin study vantage point. New York: Academic Press. 7. Gottesman, I. I., & Shields, J. (1982). Schizophrenia: The epigenetic puzzle. New York: Cambridge University Press. 8. Sameroff, A. j., & Chandler, M. j. (1975). Reproductive risk and the continuum of caretaking casualty. In F. D. Horowitz, E. M. Hetherington, S. Scarr-Salapatek, & G. M. Siegel (Eds), Review of child development research (VoL 4, pp. 187—243). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 9. Sroufe, L. A. (1979). The coherence of individual development: Early care, attachment, and subsequent developmental issues. American Psychologist, 34, 834—841. 10. Cicchetti, D. (2010). Resilience under conditions of extreme stress: A multilevel perspective. World Psychiatry, 9, 145—154. 11. Sapienza, J. K., & Masten, A. S. (201 1). Understanding and promoting resilience in children and youth. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 24, 267—273. 12. Sameroff, A. J. (2000). Developmental systems and psychopathology. Development and Psychopathology, 12, 297—312. 13. Gest, S. D., & Davidson, A. J. (2011). A developmental perspective on risk, resilience and prevention. In M. Underwood & L. Rosen (Eds), Social development: Relationships in infancy, childhood and adolescence (pp. 427-454). New York: Guilford Press. 14. Borden, L. A., Schultz, T. R, Herman, K. C., & Brooks, C. M. (2010). The incredible years parent training program: Promoting resilience through evidence-based prevention group. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice, 14, 230—24 1. 15. Patterson, G. R., Forgatch, M. S., & DeGarmo, D. S. (2010). Cascading effects following intervention. Developmental Psychopathology, 22,941—970. 16. Fisher, P. A., Van Ryzin, M. J., & Gunnar, M. R. (2011). Mitigating HPA axis dysregula-tion associated with placement changes in foster care. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 36, 531—539. 17. Smyke, A., Fox, N., Zeanah, C., Nelson, C. A., & Guthrie, D. (2010). Placement in foster care enhances quality of attachment among young institutionalized children. Child Development, 81, 212—223. 18. Curtis, J., & Cicchetti, D. (2003). Moving resilience on resilience into the 21st century: Theoretical and methodological considerations in examining the biologica1 contributors to resilience. Development and Psychopathology, 15, 773—810. 19. Luthar, S. S. (2006). Resilience in development: A synthesis of research across five decades. In D. Cicchetti and D. J. Cohen (Eds), Developmental psychopathology. Vol. 3: Risk, disorder, and adaptation (2nd edn, pp. 739—795). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons. 20. Ungar, M. (2008). Resilience across cultures. British Journal of Social Work, 38, 18—35. 21. Ungar, M. (201 1). The social ecology of resilience: Addressing contextual and cultural ambiguity of a nascent construct. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 81, 1—17. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Psychological Resilience | Rutter | Slater I 206 Resilience/psychology/Rutter: in his 1987 review “Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms” (Rutter 1987)(1) Rutter comments on some of the commonly observed protective factors noted by earlier reviews (e.g., Garmezy, 1985)(2), such as self-esteem, harmonious families, and external support systems. Then he raises a critical question as to whether these protective factors represent something distinct from widely established risk factors (i.e., low self-esteem, discordant families, and lack of support) or the positive pole of bi-polar dimensions. In other words, has something “new” been identified or are we rediscovering the full range of key variables that relate to adaptation along a continuum from negative to positive? In a well-known passage on the utility of naming the opposite poles of the same underlying dimension. >Distinctions/order/Rutter. RutterVsTradition: Rutter focused on interactions and moderating effects. >Resilience/psychological theories. Tradition: Much confusion accompanied the early research on resilience in relation to distinguishing factors that were generally “good” or “bad” under most circumstances from factors that played a special role under particular circumstances. RutterVsTradition: In this article, Rutter emphasized that protective factors imply interactions or special roles when risk is high; in other words, these variables moderate risk in some way with differential effects that cannot be predicted simply from what may happen under low-risk conditions. There is a different or multiplicative effect under high- compared to low-risk conditions. Slater I 207 Personality traits/resilience/Rutter: thesis: resilience is not a personality trait. (Cf. Cicchetti and Garmezy, 1993(3). Given that the same trait can function in different ways across people and situations and the life course, and given that development changes the capacity of a person to respond and adapt, the notion of a resiliency trait is untenable. Protection/Rutter: a protective function is not the same thing as a pleasant or rewarding experience. Inoculations are a classic example of a protective intervention in medicine. Similarly, discipline by parents, often implicated as protective for young people in risky contexts, may not be enjoyable at the time the intervention is imposed. Slater I 208 Rutter: Four factors might lead to resilience: 1) reduction of risk; 2) reduction of negative chain reactions; 3) promotion or support of self-esteem and self-efficacy; 4) opening up of opportunities. >Resilience/developmental psychology. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. 2. Garmezy, N. (1985). Stress-resistant children: The search for protective factors. In J. E. Stevenson (Ed.), Recent research in developmental psychopathology: Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry Book Supplement 4 (pp. 213—233). Oxford: Pergamon Press. 3. Cicchetti, D., & Garmezy, N. (199 3). Prospects and promises in the study of resilience. Development and Psychopathology, 5,497—502. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Psychological Stress | Psychological Theories | Corr I 206 Psychological stress/psychological theories/ElovainioKivimäki: The research evidence of the relationships between social, psychological and physiological reactions is hard to understand without the concept of stress. One of the fundamental steps towards exploring the black box between personality and health was taken when the concept of stress was introduced as a biological phenomenon (Selye 1956)(1). The term stress was applied to psychology from engineering, where it originally meant pressure in physical structures resulting from outer loads and forces. In psychology and physiology, there remained the idea of stress as an external load or demand on a biological, physiological or psychological system. Cf. Selye 1973(2). >Psychological Stress/Selye. Generally, the term stress refers to experiencing events that are perceived as endangering one’s physical or psychological wellbeing. Stress reactions typically demonstrate stimulus-response specificity and it is apparent that there is no objective way to predict psychological stress level without taking into account individual capacity (Lazarus 1993)(3). >Psychological Stress/Lazarus. Corr I 207 Paradox of stress: The paradox of stress lies in the simultaneity of its adaptive nature and its possible role in disease etiology. The effective, orchestrated bodily responses to everyday stressors or daily hassles are crucial for our adaptation and survival, and moderate levels of stress strengthen our resources to cope with similar situations in the future. McEwen (1998(4); McEwen and Stellar 1993(5)) has described the prevailing conditions where the adaptive functioning may be impaired and the possible health debilitating effects of stress start to emerge. >Allostasis/McEwen. Corr I 208 Coping constitutes an important aspect of stress. Coping is directed at minimizing, deflecting or managing distress and sometimes defined as generalized responses to threat or demand and is thought to be selected by individuals because it is well-suited to the stressor or situation (Lazarus and Folkman 1984)(6). Application of particular kinds of coping is also affected by the resources one brings to the situation and by personality variables that influence one’s choices or predispositions to act (e.g., Scheier, Carver and Bridges 1994)(7). 1. Selye, H. 1956. What is stress?, Metabolism 5: 525 2. Selye, H. 1973. The evaluation of the stress concept, American Scientist 61: 692–9 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1993. From psychological stress to the emotions: a history of changing outlooks, Annual Review of Psychology 44: 1–21 4. McEwen, B. S. 1998. Protective and damaging effects of stress mediators, mediators, New England Journal of Medicine 338: 171–9 5. McEwen, B. S. and Stellar, E. 1993. Stress and the individual: mechanisms leading to disease, Archives of Internal Medicine 153: 2093–101 6. Lazarus, R. S. and Folkman, S. 1984. Stress, appraisal and coping. New York: Springer 7. Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S. and Bridges, M. W. 1994. Distinguishing optimism from neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): a reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test, Journal of Personal Social Psychology 67: 1063–78 Marko Elovainio and Mika Kivimäki, “Models of personality and health”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychological Stress | Selye | Corr I 207 Psychological Stress/Selye/Elovainio/Kivimäki: Selye (1973)(1) who popularized the use of the term stress, held the view that elevated levels of corticosteroids served as a bodily marker for stress. Selye’s general adaptation syndrome (GAS) underscored that any stressor, physiological or psychological, would produce in essence the same physiological stereotyped stress response. The profile of this response varies according to whether the stressor is of short duration (alarm), moderate duration (resistance), or long duration (exhaustion). (See also Selye 1956(2); >Stress/psychological theories, >Stress/Lazarus. 1. Selye, H. 1973. The evaluation of the stress concept, American Scientist 61: 692–9 2. Selye, H. 1956. What is stress?, Metabolism 5: 525 Marko Elovainio and Mika Kivimäki, “Models of personality and health”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 265 Psychology/evolutionary psychology: Although evolutionary psychologists agree that evolution is relevant to all psychological mechanisms, there has been very little research done on personality from an evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary psychologists have generally been interested solely in what Tooby and Cosmides (1992)(1) have termed the psychic unity of mankind. Therefore, they have been primarily concerned with human nature rather than individual differences. Consequently, much of evolutionary personality psychology research has focused on universally-shared psychological mechanisms that result in phenotypic plasticity due to varying environmental input without regard to genetic variability or heritable traits. >Personality/evolutionary theories. However, the vast behavioural genetics literature on personality traits indicates strong genetic components for differences in all of the >Big Five personality traits (Loehlin, McCrae, Costa and John 1998)(2). The genetic variability of such traits is dismissed or explained by some evolutionary psychologists as selectively neutral or as genetic ‘noise’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1990)(3). >Personality traits/evolutionary psychology. 1.Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1992. The psychological foundations of culture, in J. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (eds.), The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, pp. 19–136. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Loehlin, J., McCrae, R., Costa, P. and John, O. 1998. Heritabilities of common and measure-specific components of the Big Five personality factors, Journal of Research in Personality 32: 431–53 3. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: the role of genetics and adaptation, Journal of Personality 58: 17–67 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Purposes | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. >Thinking, >Animal language. Papineau: nevertheless, pro module. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". >Rationality/Papineau. I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0 - 4 apply to simple living beings. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's". I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." I 259 Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-means-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ... of our evolutionary heritage. Then the purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. I 276 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: must also use non-egocentric causal facts. (> Map, Map-Example). I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map-example. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would be no purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then plan on taking the path. This would be a combination of causal individual information. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Rationality | Rorty | I 275 f Rorty: "rationality" means the adaptation of means to purposes here. The difference to hormonal activity is that these can only be described with a meta-linguistic vocabulary. The understanding of such processes is more about tricks than about capturing universality. >Meta language, >Object language, >Generality. This has little to do with rationality. It does not allow us to understand not what it means to be a rational researcher. "Rational", just as little as "true" (or "sincere") is not a candidate for a term which would be better understood having knowledge about the functioning of the mental apparatus. III 84f Irrational/Rorty: the distinction between rational and irrational is of little use. >Thinking, >World/thinking, >Knowledge, >Mind, >Spirit, >Purposes, >Means/purpose-rationality, >Rationality/Papineau. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Regulatory Economics | Economic Theories | Mause I 377 Regulatory Economics/coordination/Economic Theories: competitive markets as a decentralised coordination mechanism have a number of social advantages: they increase welfare (equipping the economy with scarce goods) through efficient allocation (distribution of production factors among suppliers), the creation of incentives for innovation (dynamic efficiency), the promotion of consumer sovereignty (adaptation of goods production to the preferences of consumers) and adaptive efficiency (adaptability of the economy to exogenous shocks and crises). Moreover, economic freedom and competitive markets are interdependent (Röpke 1949; Eucken 1952). See also Regulatory Economics/Hayek, See Regulatory Economics/Political Theory. 1. Röpke, Wilhelm. 1949. Civitas humana – Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform, 3. ed. Erlenbach/ Zürich: Rentsch. 2. Eucken, Walter, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik. Tübingen 1952. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Representation | Papineau | I 248 Representation/Animals/Papineau: there is the danger to put more into the explanation than justified by the specific design of animals. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Behavior, >Animals, >Animal language. I 256 Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Dispositions. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Embodiment. I do not want to dispute such content attributions. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B & T, V > R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: when it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple beings can be regarded as purpose-means thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism implicitly has different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. >Adaption. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-middle-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ...of our evolutionary heritage. Then purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. >Purpose, >Function. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Resource Allocation | Climate Policy | Norgaard I 329 Burden sharing/Resource Sharing/Emissions/Climate Policy: (…) ‘burden sharing’ (like Kyoto‐style percentage reduction targets) focuses on dividing the total costs or total amount of emissions reductions, whereas ‘resource sharing’ (like equal per capita allocations) focuses on the right to make use of global carbon sinks as an economic resource, and how to share those rights. (…) resource‐sharing formulae are not necessarily more favorable to poor countries than burden‐sharing formulae; for example, a resource‐sharing formula which transitions from grandfathering to equal per capita allocations over time can be significantly less generous to many developing countries than (for example) a burden‐sharing formula like ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ (Baer et al. 2008(1), 2010(2)) (…). VsResource Sharing: [Resource‐sharing formulae] offer no good solution to the problem of funding adaptation or liability for climate damages. Under equal per capita allocations, revenue from surplus permit sales would (for at least some countries) provide a source of funds for adaptation activities, but there is no reason to think that this would be sufficient in total or appropriately distributed. (...) using these funds for adaptation would reduce the ability to use them to supply low‐carbon energy sources needed in the future when permit allocations become scarce. (…) resource‐sharing approaches do not usually address the wide variation in income levels across parties with similar levels of emissions. Since some high emitters are poor and some low emitters are rich, equal per capita allocations can be criticized as ‘treating the unequal equally’, and thus as unfair. >Burden sharing. 1. Baer, P. et al. 2008. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. 2nd edn., Heinrich Böll Stiftung, EcoEquity, Stockholm Environment Institute and Christian Aid. Available at (http://gdrights.org/wp‐content/uploads/2009/01/thegdrsframework.pdf) (Link not available as of 12/04/19) 2. Baer, P. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Selection | Gould | I 52 Selection/Darwin/Gould: I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the only means of change. I 94 Selection/GouldVsDawkins: if the selection directly affected a gene responsible for body strength when favouring a stronger body, then the theory of Dawkins could be justified. If bodies were unambiguous location maps of their genes, then the fighting parts of DNA could show itself outwards and the selection could have a direct effect on them. But bodies are not built that way. There is no gene for such unambiguous parts of morphology as the left patella or a fingernail. Hundreds of genes contribute to the structure of most body parts and their action is channelled through a kaleidoscopic series of environmental influences, through embryonic, postnatal, internal and external influences. Body parts are not simply transferred genes, and the selection is not even directed at certain body parts! It accepts or rejects whole organisms. II 19 ff Selection/Gould: if natural selection drives evolution by keeping preferred variants from a spectrum that is randomly distributed around an average value, a lack of variation will drive this process out of the way. Because natural selection does not produce anything itself. Against it: II 21 Sexual reproduction: sex creates a huge range of variations by mixing the genetic material of two individuals. Question: but why do the males have to be almost as big and complex as females? Darwin has shown that the natural selection is a battle between individuals, therefore, to pass on as many genes as possible. Since males are indispensable because of the sexual reproduction that the variation must guarantee, they become independent tools of evolution. They are not created for the benefit of their species, as independent tools they intervene in the struggle in their very own way. II 22 When fighting for females, heavyweights simply have a better chance. Combat avoidance strategies can be added to complex organisms. II 51 Selection/Gould: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, i. e. the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found on an organism results from the selection. Each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation. II 173 Selection/Gould: Gould suggests recognizing the selection (not evolution) on several levels. >Evolution, >Explanation. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Selection | Kelly | I 1772 Selection/Adaption/Kelly: the old view on the adaptation was that the internal source (the mutation) caused a change, while external factors (the environment) selected or directed the development. >Mutation, >Evolution, >Adaption. New: the new view is that external (physical or chemical) conditions produce the forms, while internal factors (self-organization) make the selection. >Self-organization, cf. >St. Kauffman. |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 |
| Selection | Mayr | I 65 Natural selection/Mayr: is no random process. (Although coincidence happens in evolution). >Mutation. I 248 Selection/Mayr: is today completely accepted. Two steps: variation and actual selection. 1. Variation: In each generation, recombination, gene flow, random factors and mutations generate a great genetic diversity. The genetic material is "hard" and not "soft", as Darwin assumed. >Randomness, >Necessity. Sexual Reproduction: the parental chromosomes are broken and reassembled. Thus uniqueness of the offspring by recombination. Composition of the genes according to no law! >Genes. I 249 2. Selection: differences in the survival and reproduction of newly formed individuals. >Individuals/Mayr, >Life/Mayr. Even in species producing millions of offspring in each generation, on average, only two of them are needed to maintain population balance. >Species, >Evolution. I 250 Coincidence/Mayr: dominates the variation. Necessity/Mayr: dominates the selection. Selection: there is no "selective force"! I 252 Selection: Bates' discovery of mimicry (1862)(1) in edible and poisonous butterflies: first proof of natural selection. >Mimicry. Benefits/Biology: what is the benefit of the emergence of a characteristic for survival: adaptionist program. Characteristics/Survival: favourable characteristics: Tolerance against adverse climate, better utilisation of food, resistance to pathogens, escape capability. (through sexual reproduction). Selection by females (peacock tail) may be more important than the ability of males to defeat rivals. >Features/Mayr. I 253 Brother and sister rivalry and parental care: affect reproductive success rather than survival. This selection is apparently more important than the concept of sexual selection suggests. I 260 Extinction: 99.9% of all evolutionary lines that once existed on Earth are extinct. Selection: Darwin: "Natural selection is on an hourly basis all over the world to detect the slightest changes".(2) I 261 Selection/MayrVsDarwin: the genetic variation needed to perfect a characteristic may not occur at all! For example, the inner/outer skeleton: vertebrates up to the dinosaur, outer skeleton: the giant crab has remained the largest creature. The difference is determined by the different paths taken by the ancestors, not by the presence of characteristics! I 262 Selection/Mayr: further restriction: interaction in development. The parts of the organism are not independent of each other. No one reacts to the selection without interacting with the other characteristics. Geoffroys, 1818(3): "Law of Balance": Organisms are compromises between competing demands. Selection/Mayr: 3rd Restriction: Ability to non-genetic modification: the more plastic the phenotype (due to flexibility in development) is, the less the force of selection pressure. Plants (and especially microorganisms) have a much greater ability to phenotypic modification (more diverse reaction standard) than animals. Ability for non-genetic adaptation is exclusively genetically controlled! Coincidence: works at every level. I 264 New: whole populations or even species could be the target of the selection. I 265 Soft/hard group selection: Soft group selection: Success through the average selection value of the individuals. This means that each individual selection is also a soft group selection. Hard group selection: the group as a whole has certain adaptive group characteristics that are not simply the sum of the contributions, the advantage of the group is greater than that of the sum of the individual members. >Adaption. Division of labor, cooperation (guardian, search for food). Here the term "group selection" is justified. I 266 Origin of the species: this controversy completely changed the status of so-called species selection: the emergence of a new species seems to contribute very often to the extinction of another species. "Species Exchange," takes place according to strict Darwinian principles. I 279 Definition r-selection: strongly fluctuating, often catastrophically exposed population size, weak intraspecific competition, very fertile. K-Selection: constant population size, strong competition, stable life expectancy. I 280 As population density increases, so too does the influence of adverse factors: competition, food shortages, lack of escape routes, predators, growth slows down. I 317 Could the human being become a superhuman? The odds are not so good here! Not enough selection pressure. Group selection was particularly a thing of the past. Selection/Human: Today, however, in mass society there is no sign of selection for superior genotypes that would allow the human being to rise above its present abilities. Many authors even claim that the human gene pool is decaying. Francis Galton was the first to suggest that one could and should improve humanity with appropriate selection. He coined the term "eugenics". 1. H.W. Bates (1862). Contributions to an Insect Fauna of the Amazon Valley. In: Trans Linn. Soc. London 23. S. 495-566. 2. Ch. Darwin (1859). On the Origin of Species. London: John Murray. 3. E. Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1818). Philosophie anatomique. Paris. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Similarity | Foucault | I 17 Order/similarity/Borges, "The analytical language of John Wilkins"(1) quotes "a certain Chinese encyclopedia": the animals are grouped as follows: (A) animals belonging to the Emperor (B) embalmed animals (C) tamed (D) milk pigs (E) sirens (F) mythical creatures (G) ownerless dogs (H) belonging to this grouping (I) which behave like mad (K) which are drawn with a very fine brush of camel hair (L) and so on (M) which have broken the water jug (N) which look like flies from afar. Borges/Foucault: not the mythical creatures are impossible, but the small distance. The monstrosity is that Borges destroys the common space of the meeting. What is impossible is not the neighborhood of things, but the place itself where they could stand side by side. The camel hair animals and the mad ones could never meet, except in the placelessness of language. The "and" of listing is ruined. If the language dries out, we already deny the possibility of a grammar in the root. I 21 Similarity/Borges/Foucault: reflected classification: For example, dog and cat resemble each other less than two windhounds, even if both are embalmed, or tamed, or have just broken a jug. Even for the most naive experience, there is no similarity that does not result from previously existing criteria. >Similarity, >Analogies, >Criteria, >Classification, >Categorization, >Categories. Four similarities I 46f Convenientia: rather neighborhood of places than similarity. Places adjoin each other, get entangled, double similarity: the place where nature has placed two things, and similarity of the peculiarities. (A) Soul and body touch twice. (B) Different beings converge into each other in the syntax of the world: plant and animal communicate, earth and sea, man and environment. Convenientia: conjunction and adaptation, is more closely related to the things themselves than to the world in which they are. Puts the world into a chain with itself at every touch point begins and ends a ring from circle to circle, the resemblance continues, it keeps the extremes at a distance. I 48 f 2. aemulatio: a kind of convenience, but free from the law of the place. Has its play immobile in the distance, as if the chain is broken, rings contactless in distance, but reproduce the resemblance. Reflex and mirror. E.g. from the distant the face is emulation of heaven, the intellect is imperfectly reflecting the wisdom of God, the eyes imperfectly the great light of the sun, the mouth is Venus, for through it kisses and love words are exchanged. Across the universe without concatenation, direct imitation. Imitating a kind of natural twinseness of things. It arises from a folding of being ( > metaphors)... I 49 ...leaves the two reflected forms not inactive, one can be weaker, and can intake influence of the other. >Recognition, >Memory. E.g. without exertion, the brightness of the grass reflects the pure form of the sky. Similar can also be the combat of one form against the other: E.g. at Paracelsus: man is like the firmament "a constellation of stars" but it is not connected with him, like "the thief with the galleys, the fish with the fisherman, the game with the hunter." The distance is not canceled in the aemulatio by its subtle metaphor. It remains visible. The rings of the aemulatio do not form a chain, but rather concentric, reflexive, rival circles. 3. Analogy (see there) I 53 f 4. Sympathy: in the play of sympathies, no way has been established before. No distance is assumed, no chaining is prescribed. Their power is so great that they are not satisfied with breaking out on a unified touch, and passing through the spaces; it evokes the movement of things in the world, and brings about the approach of the remotest things. It is the origin of the mobility: pulls the heavy to the gravity of the soil, the light weight to the weightless ether. It drifts the roots into the water and causes the sun's rays to follow from the sunflower. It has the dangerous force to assimilate, to make things identical, to mix them, to make them disappear in their individuality, to make them alien to what they were. Therefore the sympathy is compensated by its twin form, the antipathy. This keeps things in isolation upright and prevents assimilation. E.g. the Indian rat is dangerous for the Egyptian crocodile, in whose open mouth it jumps in and eats itself from the inside out again. Nature has given it as an enemy. On the other hand, the rat is watched by its enemies, because it lives in discord with the spider and often dies in the fight with the snake. E.g. the hot, dry fire has an antipathy to the water that is cold and humid. All concatenations of analogy, all echoes of aemulatio are doubled by the space of sympathy and antipathy. Through this game, the world remains the same. 1. J. L Borges. El idioma analitico de John Wilkins. Buenos Aires: Sur. 1952. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Species | Dennett | Species/Dennett: Dennett discusses several authors: I 48 Natural Kinds/Philosophy/Quine/Dennett: Quine distinguishes between good and bad scientific categories. >Categories. Art/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin doesn't mention species formation at all! But: "Descent with variation"! Adaptation/Darwin/Dennett: Natural selection inevitably leads to adaptation. Species/Darwin/Dennett: Splitting by different abilities and characteristics. Genetics/Dennett: Genetics was not yet known at Darwin's time. Mendel researched 50 years later. Species/Darwin/Dennett: is actually arbitrary! The term is applied to a number of individuals out of convenience! >Conventions. I 56 Species/Dawkins: There is nothing that wants the formation of species! Before the separation there must be a phase of "temporary separation"! I 56 Species/Dennett: question: Do individuals belong to different kinds if they cannot cross, or if they just don't do it? >Evolution, >Selection, >Darwinism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Species | Gould | I 223 Species/Gould: an average invertebrate species lived about 5 - 10 million years unchanged. It hardly changes in time and dies out without successors. At a higher level, evolution is basically a matter of the different successes of species and not a slow transformation of lineages. II 331 Species/Gould: Definition species: species are defined as populations isolated from all others in reproduction. When brought together with other species, they will not mix. Key question for the origin of a new species: how do isolation mechanisms develop? II 332 Traditional point of view: an originally unified population is separated from continents by drifting apart, by newly formed mountain ranges, the newly isolated groups would adapt to their new environment by adaptation. After a certain time, the populations become so different that they can no longer be crossed. New view: the ultimate success of a species may depend on the evolution of adaptation, but the act of species formation itself can be a coincidental event. Taxonomists have discovered that many groups of closely related species are not very different in form, behavior, and even in genetic equipment. However, there are striking differences in the number and shape of chromosomes, and these differences produce the isolation mechanisms that they receive as a separate species. The main change occurs in a single individual. Who should it breed with? IV 198 Species: biodiversity has certainly increased over time. Today's oceans contain at least twice as many species as the oceans in the Palaeozoic. Therefore, one could expect that they not only contain more species, but also more diverse species of organisms, with fundamentally different blueprints. But this is not the case! Today, twice as many species are put in much fewer groups of higher taxa. Today's seas are dominated by fewer groups: primarily by mussels, snails, crabs, fish and sea urchins. Each group includes many more species than any tribe in the Palaeozoic ever had. This steady decrease of organic construction types with a strong increase in the number of species is probably the most prominent trend of fossil documents! IV 199 Causality/coincidence/evolution: there may be one principle that can be identified: "initial experimentation and later standardization". For example, around 1900 there were few car brands and a much wider range of construction types. Today, there are hundreds of brands and much more uniform construction. Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 201 Extinction: each is inevitable forever. An extinct experiment will never be repeated. The chances are mathematically too slim. Biologists speak of the "principle of the irreversibility of evolution". Order/coincidence/Gould: coincidental processes produce a high degree of order. The fact that they result in certain patterns does not speak against their coincidence. IV 327 Species/Gould: each species is a concatenation of improbabilities. Every species, whether human, coral or squid, is the last link in a chain that stretches back to the beginning of life. If any of these species had died out or evolved in any other direction, the end results would be very different. For example, our ancestors, the fish, developed a special fin with a stable, central bony axis. Without them, they could not have developed ashore. Nevertheless, these fins did not develop in anticipation of the necessities of rural life. They developed as adaptations to a local habitat. Necessity: human brains did not develop on a direct and necessary ascending ladder, but on winding paths full of accidents. III 264 Species/Gould: in the early days of evolution, the greatest spectrum of forms was reached, and most of the early experiments were extinct. It was accidental and not by predictable causes. Today, there are only a small number of possibilities left. >Evolution, >Explanation, >Darwinism. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Symbols | Deacon | I 79 Symbols/Deacon: Tradition: assumes that symbolic association is formed by learning the connection between a sound or string with something else in the world. DeaconVsTradition: this is what we mean by index or index-like or indexing association. >Icon/Deacon. I 80 Words can also be an index: e.g."Aha!","there" etc. >Indexicality. Understanding: a sign that someone has understood a word is his ability to use that word in other sentences. However, if the word is only inserted somewhere, it would only be an index-like or iconic understanding. >Understanding, >Language use. Symbol: to use something as a symbol, you should be able to handle the referential functions (what does it refer to?). >Reference, >Symbolic reference. Def stimulus generalization: the transfer of associations from one stimulus to a similar one. Similarly, the transfer of learned patterns to a similar context. This is often confused with symbolic associations. >Association, >Stimulus, >Stimulus meaning, >Language use, >Generalization. I 81 Learning/DeaconVsTradition: such transfers are not special forms of learning, but simply iconic projections. This happens by itself, because ambiguity is always involved. Psychological models often speak of rules for this transfer. >Learning, >Rules. DeaconVs: since this is an iconic relation, there is no implicit list of criteria that is learned. ((s) Images are compared directly, not based on lists of criteria). Icon/Deacon: Words or stimuli stand for a set of things that differ more or less from each other. People and animals learn this. This learning is not done by criteria for symbols, but by iconic overlapping. This provides the basis for an indexed reference. I 83 Symbol/learning/Deacon: the difficulty of symbolic learning stems from the complex relation a symbol (e.g. a word) has to other symbols. Such complex relations do not exist between indices (simple signs with a physical connection to an object). I 92 Symbols/Deacon: Problem: Symbols cannot be learned individually as they form a system among each other. I 93 Before a single symbol-object association can be detected, the complete logical system of symbols must be learned. Problem: even with a few symbols there is a very large number of possible combinations, most of which are pointless. These must be sorted out, i.e. "forgotten". I 99 Symbols/Deacon: Symbols are not an unstructured set of tokens representing objects, but they represent each other. Symbols do not refer directly to things in the world, but they do so indirectly by referring to other symbols ((s) because they are located in a syntactic and semantic system). I 100 Limitation/Borders: Randomly uninterpreted strings of signs have no reference and therefore no limit in their set. Other symbols: their quantity is limited because of (practical, external) use and because of the use of the other symbols by which they are defined. Question: why are only some types of symbol systems implemented in human languages, but not others? I 266 Symbols/Deacon: it is wrong to assume they are located somewhere in the brain. They are rather relations between tokens, not the tokens themselves. It is also not constituted by a special association, but by the set of associations that are partially represented in each instance of the symbol. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing these combinatorial relations are located in the prefrontal cortex. I 336 Symbols/language/brain/evolution/Deacon: Thesis: it is the use of symbols that made it necessary for our human brain to develop in such a way that special emphasis could be placed on actions in the prefrontal cortex. >Adaptation/Deacon. I 339 Symbols/Evolution/Brain/DeaconVsPinker/DeaconVsChomsky: whatever we call "language instinct", symbol processing is so widely distributed in the brain that it cannot be subjected to natural selection. Thus language is cut off from what biological evolution can shape. >Thinking, >Cognition, >Information processing/psychology, cf. >Cognitive psychology. I 339/340 Universal grammar/language evolution/solution/Deacon: Co-evolution of languages with regard to the circumstances and dispositions of the brain. This can be an explanation for a developing grammatical universality. >Universal grammar, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Terminology | Parsons | Habermas IV 333 Pattern variables/Terminology/Parsons: since Parsons neglects the mechanism of communication in building his theory of action, he must, under different premises, try to find an equivalent to the lifeworld with the three components culture, society and personality. >Life world, >Culture, >Society, >Personality He introduces the "pattern variables of value orientation"(1): Cultural values serve as a pattern for a choice between alternative courses of action: they determine the orientations of an actor by defining preferences without affecting the contingency of the decision. Habermas IV 334/335 The pattern variables lie on the dimensions in which older sociology had described the transition from traditional to modern societies, i.e. the processes of social rationalization. Habermas VI 336 Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. It should be possible to test how any cultural values structure the decision-making scope of actors through one of the a priori possible combinations of basic decisions. Habermas IV 341 Def Allocation/Parsons: covers adaptation and target achievement functions, procurement, mobilisation, distribution and the effective use of scarce resources. Def social integration/Parsons: extends to functions of preservation and integration of cultural values incorporated into the system of action. It is not measured by functional imperatives, but by consistency requirements. Habermas IV 361 AGIL Schema/Parsons/Terminology/Habermas: (Since 1953): Adaptation (behavioral system) Goal attainment (personality) Latency (Cultural System) Integration (Social System). HabermasVsParsons: in doing so, he disguised the interface that had been created by the merging of the two paradigms "action" and "system". Habermas IV 366 Problem: Parsons has to analyze the coping with the problems simultaneously in the dimensions space and time. A system must secure its existence in relation to the environment and to itself (internal/external) as well as in relation to the start/end state. >Space, >Time, >Systems, >Inside/Outside. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System NY 1951, S. 78ff |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Terminology | Proust | I 229 Def Calibration/Proust: Calibration is the adaptation of an auditory pattern to a visual. ((s) Coordination of sensory impressions.) >Sensory impressions, >Perception. Proust: this mechanism is essential to correct the sensory inputs. >Correctness, >Reliability. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Thinking | James | Diaz-Bone I 32 Mental activities/James: mental activities cannot be recognized independently of their relationship to the physical environment. Reality and knowledge, environment and knowledge are not separate achievements. Action is adaptation. >World, >World/Thinking, >Environment/Gadamer, >Lifeworld. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Turing-Test | Dennett | Brockman I 46 Turing Test/DennettVsTuring/Dennett: Alan Turing himself suffered an entirely understandable failure of imagination in his formulation of the famous Turing Test. As everyone knows, it is an adaptation of his “imitation game,” in which a man, hidden from view and communicating verbally with a judge, tries to convince the judge that he is in fact a woman, while a woman, also hidden and communicating with the judge, tries to convince the judge that she is the woman. What Turing did not foresee is the power of deep-learning AI to acquire this wealth of information in an exploitable form without having to understand it. Turing imagined an astute and imaginative (and hence conscious) agent who cunningly designed his responses based on his detailed “theory” of what women are likely to do and say. Top-down intelligent design, in short. He certainly didn’t think that a man, winning the imitation game, would somehow become a woman;(…). >Machine learning, >Deep learning. Brockman I 47 DennettVsTuring: What Turing didn’t foresee is the uncanny ability of superfast computers to sift mindlessly through Big Data, of which the Internet provides an inexhaustible supply, finding probabilistic patterns in human activity that could be used to pop “authentic”-seeming responses into the output for almost any probe a judge would think to offer. Brockman I 48 (…) probably a better tactic for the judge to adopt when confronting a candidate in the Turing Test is not to search for such items but to create them anew. AI in its current manifestations is parasitic on human intelligence. It quite indiscriminately gorges on whatever has been produced by human creators and extracts the patterns to be found there—including some of our most pernicious habits.(1) >Artificial Intelligence. 1. Aylin Caliskan-Islam, Joanna J. Bryson, and Arvind Narayanan, “Semantics Derived Auto matically from Language Corpora Contain Human-Like Biases,” Science 356, no.6334 (April 14, 2017): 183—86, DOl: 1O.1126/science.aa14230. Dennett, D. “What can we do?”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Understanding | Sterelny | I 357 Animal/Thinking/Mind/Understanding/Sterelny: do primates understand something of the mind of others? What would such an understanding show? What is the simplest mind capable of doing so? When and why and how became primates "mind readers". >Theory of mind. Thesis: I move within the "hypothesis of social intelligence": selection according to social skills. I 358 Representation/method/mind reading/mind/animal/Sterelny: Actions are best pursued by the representation of the mental states that produce these actions. >Mind, >Mental states, >Representation. Imitation, too, is evidence of cognitive refinement, but it does not point to the ability to read the mind. >Imitation. I 359 Thesis: even relatively simple animals can represent meta. ((s) They represent the representations of others.) Advantage/Sterelny: to anticipate foreign actions. >Prediction. I 360 For this, the mind reading animal must know whether a novelty or rearrangement of the preferences or only of the instrumental beliefs causes. Definiton information gradient/knowledge/Dennett: the information gradient describes groups in which the members have a very different level of knowledge. >Information/Sterelny. Information/mind reading/Animal/Sterelny: there are even less refined methods of using other things than sources of information as imitation: I 361 "Stimulus increase": stimulus increase means increased attention for the interests of others. I 361 Selection/Sterelny: if there should have been a selection according to mind reading, then mind readers must behave differently than the behaviour readers, and the adaptive advantages must be found in the mind reader's behavior. >Selection, >Evolution, >Adaptation, >Behavior. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Universal Grammar | Pinker | Deacon I 38 Universal Grammar/Pinker/Deacon: Pinker is a proponent of many of Chomsky's ideas about the uniqueness of human language. >Noam Chomsky, >Grammar, >Language. Language Instinct/Pinker(1)/Deacon: Thesis: innate grammatical knowledge is not incompatible with an adaptationist interpretation of its origin. This instinct may have evolved gradually in the course of natural selection. In this way, we avoid having to assume improbable coincidences. DeaconVsPinker: on the other hand, this does not yet provide us with a formal explanation of language competence and how it arose in selection. >Selection, >Adaption. DeaconVsPinker: Pinker's theory of language instinct merely repeats a description of the problem and gives it a new name. 1.St. Pinker (1995). The Language Instinct. New York: Harper. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Utilitarianism | Parsons | Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purpose-rational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. >Procedural rationality, >Actions/Parsons. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends").(1) 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. >Purposes. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. >Autonomy/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. >Cultural values, >Institutionalization, >Internalization, >Lifeworld. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Utility | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 296 Consumption/Utility/Climate Change/Ecological Theories: It is commonly assumed that each individual's utility can be estimated on the basis of their aggregate consumption of goods and services, using a utility function that is common to all of them. The impact of climate change, and of responses to it (i.e. adaptation and mitigation), is measured as a change in this consumption. Norgaard I 300 Aggregate consumption per capita in empirical studies is simply derived from a future prediction of economic output (i.e. gross domestic product or GDP) per capita, by netting out investment. The impacts of climate change, and responses to it, are then estimated as equivalent changes in consumption, and added to this baseline flow of consumption per capita. Thus every effect of climate change, of adaptation, and of mitigation must be priced. Consumption is transformed into utility by means of a utility function. (…) the marginal utility of consumption diminishes as one becomes richer. The effect of this is to place less (more) weight on the impacts of climate change and response strategies on rich (poor) individuals. Since consumption happens to be distributed unequally across time, space, and states of nature, this is how (…) the utility function affects the social discount rate, risk and inequality aversion. Certainly any approach that takes seriously (i) the consequences of policy choices for (ii) human well‐being can be insightful (Sen 1999)(1). Vs: (…) the narrowness of the approach also gives rise to some serious concerns, which have been expressed more generally about welfare economics in numerous other settings. Perhaps the most obvious one is that the approach apparently ignores several factors that contribute to human well‐being. In particular, what role do changes in environmental, political and social circumstances play? (…) if they can be estimated as equivalent changes in consumption—monetized—then they can be included in the estimation of utility. (…) the baseline for utility is (…) essentially individual income [and it] does ignore other non‐monetary constituents. Second, it is in practice very difficult to place money values on many of the effects of climate change, and it is well known that the Norgaard I 301 IAMs [integrated assessment models] used to conduct economic evaluation omit some potentially important changes in environmental, political and social conditions (Watkiss and Downing 2008)(2). Third, the approach does not pay nearly enough attention to the distinction that is suggested to exist between the things that human beings vitally need, and the things that they merely desire (e.g. O'Neill, Holland, et al. 2008)(3). 1. Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. 2. Watkiss, P., and Downing, T. E. 2008. The social cost of carbon: Valuation estimates and their use in UK policy. Integrated Assessment 8(1): 85–105. 3. O'Neill, J., Holland, A., et al. 2008. Environmental Values. London: Routledge. Dietz, Simon: “From Efficiency to Justice: Utility as the Informational Basis for Climate Strategies, and Some Alternatives”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Variation | Vavilov | Gould II 132ff Variation/Evolution/Vavilov/Gould: Nikolai I. Vavilov was the leading Mendelian geneticist in Russia. In 1936, he served as the main target for the Soviet agronomist T. D. Lyssenko, who had a great influence under Stalin. Vavilov was attacked because of his theory, the so-called law of homologues rows in variation. Vavilov had collected barley, oats and millet from a wide variety of different breeds of wheat from various locations, and noted that within the different species of a genus, but also frequently within the species of related groups, remarkably similar series of varieties could be found. II 135 Definition homologous: similar due to inheritance of the same genes, Definition analogous: similar due to forced adaptation to the environment. Vavilov thesis: The new species emerge by developing genetic differences that exclude crossbreeding with related species. But the new species is not all genetically different from its ancestors. Most of them remain untouched. The parallel variations thus represent the "play through" of the same genetic abilities, which are inherited as blocks of one species to another. Gould: Darwin does not disagree with such a thesis, since it gives the selection an important role. While each variety can represent a predictable latent ability, its development in any climate or geographic region requires selection to maintain the adaptive variant and eliminate others. DarwinismVsVavilov: However, Vavilov's thesis comes into conflict with strict Darwinism, since it weakens the main doctrine that selection is the creating force of evolution. >Evolution, >Darwinism, >Ch. Darwin. II 136 Random and undirected variation plays a major role in Darwin because it determines the central position of selection by guaranteeing that the evolutionary variation itself cannot be attributed to variation. >Mutation. The variation is only the raw material. It arises in all directions and is at least not arranged preferably in an adaptive way. The direction is slowly being determined by natural selection, as the more adapted generations proliferate. However, if the possibilities are very limited and one species shows all of its different varieties, then this choice cannot be explained by selection alone. That's how Vavilov sets himself apart from Darwin. VavilovVsDarwin: Variation does not take place in all directions, but in classes that are analogous to those of chemistry and crystallography. GoudlVsVavilov: Vavilov underemphazised the creative role of the environment. II 139 Lysenko/Gould: Lysenko was a charlatan and undialectic (against his own assertion) by considering plants as modelling clay in the hands of the forming environment. Vavilov died in the name of an apparant Lamarckism. There was an excessively strict Darwinism in the Soviet Union, which misinterpreted Darwin. >Lamarckism. II 140 Gould: From today's perspective, Vavilov has cast a glimpse of something important. New species do not inherit their adult form from their ancestors. They will receive a complex genetic system and a number of development opportunities. This set of options narrows the variation width to a line along which the selection can select points that it cannot move. II 141 In recent experiments with recurring traits in bred mice one has not found Darwinian homologous series in the sense of Vavilov. The simplest and most common conclusion would be to consider snails with a smooth shell on all islands as related and those with a ribbed shell as members of another related group. However, we now know that the complex set of properties always arises independently. VsVavilov: he has overemphasized the internal limitations and reduced the power of selection too much. >Selection. |
Vavilov I Nikolai I. Vavilov Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants Cambridge 2009 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Vulnerability Assessment | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 208 Vulnerability Assessment/Criteria/Ecological theories: The foregoing review suggests five specific criteria that assessments should satisfy to answer the various critiques of past scholarship (Schröter et al. 2005b)(1). First, the knowledge base Norgaard I 209 engaged for analysis should be varied and flexible. This criterion goes beyond the standard call for interdisciplinary scientific research. Vulnerability researchers should also collaborate with stakeholders to learn their perspectives and concerns. This imperative may require serious engagement with indigenous, or local, knowledge—despite difficulties in testing such information within a classical scientific framework. This approach furthermore argues that it may be valuable to engage with the stakeholders as co‐equals when generating the research design (Cash et al. 2003)(2). Second, the scale at which the coupled human‐environment system is studied is generally ‘place‐based,’ meaning that local‐scale vulnerabilities are examined in the context of processes and outcomes at other scales. Most GCVAs [Global Change Vulnerability Assessments] examine the consequences of large‐scale processes (e.g. climate change) at smaller scales, and are therefore multi‐scale in scope, by definition. Yet few GCVAs have explicitly examined the roles of processes from multiple scales simultaneously, and instead have typically focused on processes and outcomes at the local scale. Third, the potential drivers of vulnerability are understood to be possibly multiple and interacting. It would be a mistake to assume that outcomes associated with climate variability and change are necessarily the only issues of concern for a given population or human‐environment system. In fact, stakeholders may rank daily matters associated with poverty, war, or health on a par or ahead of climate issues. O'Brien et al. (2004a)(3) formalize this idea with the concept of ‘Double Exposure’ (see Leichenko and O'Brien (2008)(4) for an expanded discussion), and apply it to the case of climate change and trade liberalization policies in Indian agriculture. Fourth, understanding adaptive capacity is a fundamental part of understanding vulnerability. Adaptive capacity is included as a vulnerability dimension to permit separation of human‐environment systems that are exposed and sensitive to an external stress or perturbation but cannot successfully restructure or recover, from those systems that Norgaard I 210 respond to the impacts in ways that give plausible hope for avoiding a future disaster repeat by limiting exposures, reducing sensitivities, and/or strengthening response options and adaptive capabilities. Yet vulnerability research has shown that adaptive capacity may vary within a human‐environment system, depending on demographic, social, economic, or other factors. The dimension is framed as adaptive capacity rather than ‘adaptations’ because the adaptation options of some individuals or groups may be constrained by inadequate resources (including information), or political‐institutional barriers. Moreover, in some cases it is difficult for researchers to know whether a given adaptation is good or bad; focusing on capacity, and capacity building, reframes the issue in terms of decision processes rather than outcomes. Fifth, an understanding of historical vulnerabilities should be linked to scenarios of future social and environmental conditions. The primary objective of GCVAs is ‘to inform the decision‐making of specific stakeholders about options for adapting to the effects of global change’ (Schröter et al. 2005b: 575)(1). As such, some attempt at extrapolating past vulnerabilities, or projecting new vulnerabilities associated with new trends not observed in the historical record, is necessary. >Climate change, >Environmental damage, >Environmental policy, >Climate impact assessment. 1. Schröter, D., Polsky, C. and Patt, A. 2005b. Assessing vulnerabilities to the effects of global change: An eight step approach. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 10(4): 573–95. 2. Cash, D. W., Clark, W. C., Alcock, F., Dickson, N. M., Eckley, N., Guston, D. H., Jäger, J., and Mitchell, R. B. 2003. Knowledge systems for sustainable development. Proceedings, National Academy of Sciences 100(14): 8086–91. 3. O’Brian, K., Sygna, L., and Haugen, J. E. 2004b. Vulnerable or resilient? A multi‐scale assessment of climate impacts and vulnerability in Norway. Climatic Change 64: 193–225. 4. Leichenko, R., and O'Brien, K. 2008. Environmental Change and Globalization: Double Exposures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Wages | Ricardo | Kurz I 26 Wages/Ricardo/Kurz: Ricardo’s labour-based share concept(1) was subsequently adopted by Marx in terms of a given ‘rate of surplus value’, S/V [German Mehrwert], that is, the ratio between the portion of the net (labour) value added that goes to capital owners, or surplus value, S, and the portion that goes to workers, or variable capital, V. (…) Ricardo’s argument was not meant to be limited to the case of a given economy at a given time but was designed to cover in at least one important respect also the development of the economy over time. More specifically, Ricardo’s demonstration of the inverse relationship between the rate of profits and wages was seen to encompass the case in which the productivity of labour changes. It was on the basis of the new wage concept (and on the premise that the social capital consisted only of, or could be reduced to, wages) that Ricardo had felt he could assert what may be called his ‘fundamental proposition on distribution’: that the rate of profits depends on proportional wages, and on nothing else (see Kurz, 2006)(2). SraffaVsRicardo: While Ricardo (and Marx) had consistently assumed wages to be paid ante factum, that is, at the beginning of the (uniform) production period, and thus as belonging to the capital advanced in each industry, Sraffa, after some deliberation, decided to treat wages as paid post factum, that is, at the end of the production period and thus out of the product. He admitted that this was a hard choice because of the undeniable ever-present element of subsistence in wages, but compared with the alternatives at hand it was the least unsatisfactory one.(3) >Wages/Sraffa. 1. Ricardo, D. (1951–1973) The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, 11 volumes, edited by Piero Sraffa with the collaboration of M.H. Dobb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (In the text referred to as Works, volume number.) 2. Kurz, H.D. (2006) The agents of production are the commodities themselves. On the classical theory of production, distribution and value, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 17, pp. 1–26. 2. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. Rothbard II 83 Wages/Ricardo/Rothbard: (…) Ricardo took from Mill the hard-core, or ultra-Malthusian, view that ‘wages’ – all wages – are always and everywhere pressing on the food supply to such an extent that they are always set, and determined, precisely at the level of the cost of subsistence. Labour is assumed to be homogeneous and of equal quality, so that all wages can be assumed to be at subsistence cost. While briefly and dimly acknowledging that labour can have different qualities or grades, Ricardo, like Marx after him, drastically assumed away the problem by blithely postulating that they can all be incorporated into a weighted quantity of ‘labour hours’. As a result, Ricardo could maintain that wage rates were uniform throughout the economy. In the meanwhile, as we have seen, food, or subsistence generally, was assumed to be incorporated into one commodity, ‘corn’, so that the price of corn can serve as a surrogate for subsistence cost in general. Rothbard: Given these heroic and fallacious assumptions, then, ‘the’ wage rate is determined instantly and totally by the price of corn, since the wage rate can neither rise above the subsistence level (as determined by the price of corn) nor sink below it. The price of corn, in its turn, is determined according to Ricardo's famous theory of rent. >Rent/Ricardo, >Marginal costs/Ricardo. Rothbard II 107 (…) Ricardo himself had pointed the way to abandoning his own crucial permanent subsistence theory of wages (which the German socialist Ferdinand Lassalle was later to call ‘the Iron Law of Wages’). Ricardo had adopted the subsistence wage theory, taken from the hard-core Malthusian first edition of Malthus's Essay on Population (1798)(1). But many of his statements apart from this rigid formal model were really adopted from the much weaker, indeed contradictory, second edition of the Essay (1803). These were qualifications which Marx would correctly note amounted to a desertion of the ‘iron law’. Criticism of Malthusian doctrine prevailed in the journals by the late 1820s. >Wages/Marx. Rothbard II 132 In addition to the labour theory of value, another vital cornerstone of the Ricardian system – the alleged inverse relation of wages and profits – was also riddled quickly by British economists. Even more than the explicit rejection of Malthusianism, the periodicals vehemently attacked the Ricardian view that wages and profits move inversely to each other. The British Critic denounced this thesis as early as October 1817, and two years later another writer zeroed in on the methodology of what would later be called the ‘Ricardian Vice’ with proper scorn: „taking for granted, as usual, that money never changes in value and the proportion between the supply and demand of any given commodity never alters (which is as if the astronomer were to assume as the basis of his calculations, that all the planets stand still and that they all stand still to all eternity), he assigns a specific sum to be divided between the master and the workman, as the unalterable price of the goods which they produce; from which adaptation of hypothetical conditions, it naturally follows, that, if the workmen get more, the master-manufacturer must receive less, there being only a certain sum to divide between them.“(2) 1. Malthus, Th. R. 1798. An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers. London: J. Johnson. 1st edition. 2. Barry Gordon, Barry. 1969. ‘Criticism of Ricardian Views on Value and Distribution in the British Periodicals, 1820–1850’, History of Political Economy, 1 (Autumn 1969). note 11, p. 384. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptionism | Dennett Vs Adaptionism | I 382 DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro) The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro). Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions. Münch III 375ff DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does. III 376 Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted. III 379 Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Chomsky, N. | Pinker Vs Chomsky, N. | Dennett I 545/546 Steven PinkerVsChomsky: specialization to the grammar is a conventional neo-Darwinist process. The majority of the most interesting properties of the "language organ" must have evolved through adaptation. Pinker: the objections to this position are mostly ridiculous - e.g. the structure of the cell should be "purely physical" and explained without evolution - e.g. language were not designed to communicate, etc. Pinker I 218 Design/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design: E.g. the fact that I have a positive mass prevents me from eloping into outer space, but has nothing to do with selection. Simple physical explanation. Explanation/Selection/PinkerVsChomsky: you usually do not refer to selection to explain utility, but to explain something improbable. E.g. eye. If we calculate the parts of the universe with a positive mass and those equipped with an eye, we need an explanation for this difference. Vs: one might reply: the criterion: seeing/not-seeing was only introduced in retrospect, after we knew what animals are capable of. I 219 Most clusters of matter cannot see, but most cannot "fle" either, and I define that now as the composition, size and shape of the stone, on which I'm sitting now. Def Design/Pinker: If the function cannot be described more economically than the structure, no design is present. The concept of function adds nothing new. Design/Pinker: should not serve the harmony of the ecosystem or the beauty of nature. After all, the replicator must be the beneficiary. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Millikan Vs Davidson, D. | I 209 Quotation marks/quotation/Davidson/Millikan: (Davidson, 19XX) thesis: mentioning quotation marks are indexical or "demonstrative". Their filling is semantically outside the sentence. Ex when I point to a fish and say "I've caught this fish" the fish is outside the sentence. I 210 Mentioning quotation marks/Davidson: Ex "the expression with the form shown here." MillikanVsDavidson: suppose that quotation marks alone arrange the indexing. Then the indexical relation of adaptation is a relation to a type of filling ((S) the content does not matter). But if the filling is regarded as part of the sentence, then one wonders what the criterion is for where the sentence ends and where the environment of the sentence begins. Ex "I caught this fish today" is a complete sentence with and without a fish. By contrast, "___" has five letters" is not a complete sentence. ((S) The demonstrative therefore need not be met in the sentence, but may be supplemented by ostension. But the filling of quotation marks is indispensable in the sentence.) Quotation marks/Davidson/Millikan: Thesis: quotation marks refer to the form of the expression between them (filling). MillikanVsDavidson: that is inadequate because there is no clear concept of an expressive type. Expressions are never categorized by the shape. Millikan: thesis: a strength of my approach is that linguistic units can be grouped into types. But while it's never about shape, but about lowest types or genetic families. Millikan: when we say "he first drew this ... and then ..." we need demonstratives and ostension, not quotation marks. I 211 Introduction/novelty/new/Millikan: if we introduce a completely new expression with be mentioning quotation marks, we refer to a reproductively specified family. In addition, the new symbol should be at least partly from known elements or aspects. Otherwise, the token does not fall into any scheme of the same / different - which is necessary so that one could recognize the progeny of this expression (tokens of the same type). Articulateness/articulation/quotation marks/quotation/introduction/Millikan: some characters between quotation marks are articulated, others are not: Ex "The letter "c"": here, the "c" is completely inarticulate, like a name or Ex "red" in "The German word "red"". articulated: if something is presented as a token of one type, it has to be articulated ((S) have a structure). articulated: (between the quotation marks) Ex "The syllable "red"" Ex "The term "King of France"": articulated in the sense in which a sentence is articulate, or a complex denotation. MillikanVsDavison: if the filling between the quotation marks is without significant semantic structure, it can not be a singular term. It is a denotation if you will. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dennett, D. | Nagel Vs Dennett, D. | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness. Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something. NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person. First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events. RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here. I 145/146 Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence. I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd. VI 147 NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture. VI 149 Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions. DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be! NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable. VI 150 That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel. VI 151/152 Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Evolution Theory | Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory | Vollmer I 258 VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context. The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept. I 276 VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition. VsEvolution Theory: not predictable VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory. Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations! I 277 VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.) I 278 VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world! I 279 VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer. I 279 VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance). 3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative. Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution. I 284 But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction). I 285 Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Fichte, J.G. | Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G. | Frank I 211 Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"... I 244 Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. | I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1) 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Gould, St. J. | Verschiedene Vs Gould, St. J. | Dennett I 383 Helena CroninVsGould: flaw: he asks, how exclusive the selection as a driver of change is. Do you have to look at all the properties of living organisms as adaptations? Cronin: the selection may be the only thing that really brings forth adjustments, without that it must therefore have caused all properties. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lamarck, J.-B. | Darwin Vs Lamarck, J.-B. | DarwinVsLamarck: Darwin's theory of selection is more complex than Lamarckism, since it presupposes two independent processes instead of one force. If temperatures drop and a denser coat would be useful for survival, the genetic variation towards a denser coat does not begin with increased frequency. The selection, i.e. the second step, begins with an undirected variation and changes a population by giving the favored variants a larger propagation success. The essential difference between Darwinism and Lamarckism thus lies in the fact that Lamarckism is basically a theory of directed variation. Mayr I 236 Darwin (early): adaptation change. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because there is no increase in the number of species. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Malcolm, N. | Cavell Vs Malcolm, N. | I (a) 37 Norman Malcolm: Thesis: he attempts to reject the idea of a private pain, the idea that it is impossible for two people to have the same pain. Malcolm: let us first see that "equal" here means equality of description, and not "equality of place" so we see that it is quite possible to share the same pain. CavellVsMalcolm: the argument is questionable, the sceptic can rightly assume here that our knowledge of the other is not sufficient. Knowledge then includes more than the presence of criteria. Criteria/Cavell: the skeptic is right to assume that knowing that someone is in pain involves more than just the presence of criteria. Criteria can determine whether a behavior expresses more pain than joy, but not whether it is a real pain or fake. I (a) 46 Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors are different from headaches. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical to his: namely not! However, we have the same insidious pain that Dr Ewig describes as part of the eternity syndrome! I (a) 47 Malcolm, with his adaptation of pain to colour, only shows how both are counted or identified by descriptions. Only in this respect do they behave like cars! Colours cannot be counted differently, but that does not show that pain cannot! If I was put under pressure here, I would even say that pain in this respect is more like objects than like colours. I 55 CavellVsMalcolm: we do not need this example to get into conflict: if we assume that each of us has a pain in his left hand when we hit it with a hammer, we will be pushed in the same directions as in the case of the twins. E.g. Alexandre Dumas: the Corsican Brothers (modified): when one is whipped, the other is bent in pain. I (a) 56 Cavell: Solution: the pain in the body of the second is not his pain at all. I (a) 60 Pain/Knowledge/Malcolm: the expression "I know" in connection with pain cannot fulfill any of its normal tasks. 1. reference to certainty, 2. to authority 3. to privileged access. CavellVsMalcolm: but here are three more relevant tasks: 1. "I know New York, (Sanskrit, the Garbo, myself)" 2. "I know I'm childish". 3. "I know" to agree. I (a) 61 N.B.: not because it is an expression of anger, it cannot be an expression of certainty! |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Nozick, R. | Nagel Vs Nozick, R. | I 196 Robert Nozick: Thesis: Evolution theoretical explanation of human reason. (Naturalistic epistemology). Proposes a reversal of the Kantian dependency on the facts of reason. "Reason is a dependent variable which is shaped by the facts. Reason gives information about reality, because reality shapes reason, and because it selects what appears as "obvious"." "The evolution theoretical explanation itself is something where we get by leveraging reason to support the evolution theory. I 197 Therefore, this interpretation does not belong to the initial philosophy, but to our current scientific opinion." NagelVsNozick: that is no guarantee that the thing is true at all, or necessary. There could also have been a different adaptation to evolution. Nor is it a justification of reason. I.e. the whole thing is not circular. I 199 NagelVsNozick: I must be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is consistent with the proposition that I act upon the rules of logic, because they are right and not only because I'm biologically programmed to this behavior. (Also applies to mathematics). I 200 The only form that can really assume rational thinking is to understand the validity of arguments based on what they say! I 201 This is not to deny the importance of our thinking for survival. (Although there are a lot of species that have lived on happily without this capability). VsRealism/Ethics/Nihilism: nihilism tries to portray it as a discovery that there are no objective values. Then all positive value statements must be false. Only of people in the world it could be said that it is anything of importance to them. III 64 NagelVsNihilism/Ethics: that is tempting from the objective point of view, but it is a misconception to presuppose that objective judgments can only be made from a distant point of view. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Social Darwinism | Gould Vs Social Darwinism | II 40 Another argument, radical at the time of Darwin, but common today, is that nature is simply as we find it, it does not contain any moral message. Answers cannot be passively read from nature. Nor does the factual state of the world teach us how to change or preserve it as morally as possible with our power to do good or evil. To ask why such cruelties occur in nature is completely inappropriate for us, the world is neither controlled by us nor made for us. Cruelty of nature: racist explanation: lower races suffer less (tradition). Social Darwinism needs a traditional moral image of nature. Contradiction: Social Darwinism is traditionally moral and traditionally racist. VsSocial Darwinism: if nature is not moral, evolution cannot teach any moral theory. The idea that it can has led to a long series of social evils such as "race teachings" and what is wrongly called "Social Darwinism". II 59 Haplodiloidism: Tradition: proof for "Sociality" - GouldVs. GouldVs: haplodiploid ancestors were certainly not yet completely social, this developed only as a "phylogenetic additional thought" in some independent tribes. Environment of such strains: every single female! II 242 GouldVsSociobiology: zoocentrism is the primary fallacy of sociobiology: if animals with primary mechanisms and structures emerge as products of natural selection, then human behaviour must have a similar basis! II 241 GouldVsSociobiology: but they have never existed outside a human context of meaning. Sociobiology: "low character traits" in animals justify the same in humans (genetic/homologous) - GouldVs: false similarity, false description - (other causes - same function/analog) Dennett I 367 GouldVsZoocentrism: Projection GouldVsSociobiology: was allegedly refuted by the failure of adaptationism. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Gould Vs Various Authors | I 250 GouldVsHuxley: but why should the formless be equated with the primitive? (Progressive metaphorics). Only a few organisms equate the regularity and recurrence of viruses. The simplest bacteria have precisely defined forms. II 154 Carl Sagen showed in a television show e.g. a Japanese crab wearing a portrait of a samurai warrior. He tells an incredible story of fishermen throwing back the crabs most resembling a face, and concluded on adaptation by natural selection. GouldVsSagan: the resemblance is certainly accidental. For example, fishermen can throw back starfish for millions of years without producing samurai images. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Vollmer, G. | Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. | Putnam I 196 Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical. Vollmer I 275 VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation. However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption). I 290 DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6) I 292 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule. I 293 VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. I 298 Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti) 2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus 3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized. This is a genetic fallacy. VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused! The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view! Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage. Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails. I 300 Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently. Lotze: Validity Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc. Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity. Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity. Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity. I 309 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular. I 310 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers. Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: Explication of concepts and knowledge Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems. Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements. Illumination of the conditions for cognition. Demonstration of cognitive boundaries. I 315 Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature 2. thinking category 3. this category of thinking is the result of selection. Therefore, causality generates causality via causality. a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75). b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6). I 316 VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience. I 318 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization". Vollmer I 313 Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation". Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception: I 323 Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles": |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Whorf, B. | Dennett Vs Whorf, B. | Newen/Schrenk I 147 World/Language/Reality/Structure/Newen/Schrenk: if we hold on to realism, we must say that some languages represent reality better than others which have a completely different structure. Newen/Schrenk I 148 Sapir-Whorf Thesis/Newen/Schrenk: can already be found in Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literature: 11-3a, Vol IV, p 27). Thesis: Speakers with different vocabulary and above all different grammar must think very differently about the world than others. E.g. Hopi language: only has words for "son" and "daughter". Problem: "uncle" and "grandfather" can only be characterized indirectly. It looks as if both are not distinguished with respect to their relationship. Newen/Schrenk I 149 DennettVsWhorf/Evolution TheoryVsWhorf/ChomskyVsWhorf/PinkerVsWhorf: the ability of language use is realized through specific areas of the brain that have been formed by evolution and are therefore genetically encoded and thus common to all humans. FodorVsWhorf: Language is already anchored in the brain. Newen/Schrenk: Problem: It may still be that we read structure into the world (idealism) instead of discovering it. But then it is unlikely that people of different cultures do it in very different ways, since the relevant biological equipment is common to all if them. Language/Reality/World/Newen/Schrenk: if the language capacity in the brain has evolved through adaptation to an environment, it is also possible that the structure of the world has left its footprints in the language. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Emotions | Pinker, St. | I 457 Feelings / Pinker: Thesis: emotions are adaptations, software modules - with their help should be reproduced copies of the genes that they have caused. |
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| Music | Pinker, St. | I 656 Music/Pinker: E.g. Even such a simple story such as "boy meets girl" can not be traced back to a sound sequence. Therefore music is quite different from language, it is not an adaptation but a technique. Nevertheless, there are certain parallels. Bernstein s "music - the open question": an attempt to apply Chomsky on the music. |
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| Evolut. Epistemology | Vollmer, G. | I 37 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: Thesis: our epistemological apparatus is a result of biological evolution. The agreement with real structures ("finished world"?) enables survival. However, the adaptation of an organism is never ideal, nor does it have to be. I 271 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: does not say anything new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of the Kant interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical-psychic organization". |
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