Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 28 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Bennett | I 194 Conviction/opinion/belief/Bennett: one cannot decide to have a conviction. >Beliefs, >Meaning/intending, >Will, >Freedom of will, >Intentions, >Intentionality. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Conventions | Bennett | I 155 Convention/Lewis: convention is more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement. 170 Conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity. >Regularity, >Intersubjectivity, >Community, >Language community, >Actions. I 167f Convention/Lewis: conventions are mutual knowledge. Cargile: this is useful only up to fourth reflection. David Lewis: only actions are coordinated. BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning I 189 Searle: there is no "conventional meaning"; instead: rules that apply for an expression. >Rules, >Language Rules, >Utterances, >Utterances/Searle, >Meaning/Searle. I 191 Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning. >Lemons example, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold". >Meaning/intending, >Meaning/intending/Wittgenstein. SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention. Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance. >Circumstances. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Description Levels | Flusser | I 86 Steps/Image/Flusser: 1. pictograms 2. ideograms 3. hieroglyphics 4. letters. (1 3 precursor of the alphabet: all linear codes) I 86 Pictogram: an agreed image of an object it means (convention). >Conventions, >Meaning, >Meaning/Intending, >Images, >Code, >Sign, >Symbol. I 87 Ideogram: can be the same image as a pictogram, but it no longer means the object but a general situation, an "idea" in which the object participates. For example, a watery eye can mean "grief". >Icons. I 88 Linear codes: e. g. picture box with stick figures, the sun is at the top, in the middle a dog. Next to it the same again without frame, linear order: sun, male, dog, male. (> Scene) Meaning: The "text" to the right (without frame) means the image, which means the scene. >Levels. I 89 Scene: framed picture with stick figures about 2 people walking a dog around noon. If the frame is omitted, it becomes a > linear code. I 89ff Alphabet/Flusser: the usual historical explanation of the alphabet is wrong, which was formed through the initial letters of the objects. Semitic alphabets do not know any consonants. "Genetic" explanation has little to do with the function of the letters in the alphabet. Meaning/Alphabet: The question: "What is the meaning of the 'C'" in the Latin alphabet? is not related to the camel, which originally depicted it. The alphabet is a unique invention that was made only once, about 1500 B.C. in the eastern Mediterranean: clay tablets on Crete and Syria: proto-Hebrew: "linear A" proto-Greek: "linear B". Ulysses and Abraham, for example, were originally the same figure. The alphabet is a code invented by merchants for merchants By alphabet: Technical pictures I 103 Scheme: "World" < Image < Text < technical images. >Terminology/Flusser, >Techno-image. The photographer stands behind the writer, who stands behind the draftsman who stands behind the world. To draw, one has to distance oneself from the world. >World, >Image, >Text. Techno-Image/Flusser: are to be regarded genetically as a step back from the texts (especially optics and chemistry) and they are consequences of scientific progress. >Science, >Measurements, >Observation language, >Progress. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Epistemology | Kutschera | Vollmer I 296 Recognition/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge. Cf. >Learning, >Cognition, >Recognition, >Knowledge, >Beliefs. Knowledge/Kutschera: knowledge is only toi explicate as a true conviction - neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. >Meaning/Intending, >Truth, >Definition, >Definability, >Explanations, >Subjectivity. |
Kut I F. von Kutschera Einfuehrung in Die Intensionale Semantik (Grundlagen Der Kommunikation) 1976 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Grice | Schiffer | Avramides I 114 Grice/Schiffer: (= intention-based approach) Grice is obliged to deny logical functions of meanings. - Instead: dependence on a (causal) fact (which is non-semantically specified). >Intention-based semantics, >Facts, >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. --- Schiffer I 13 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: the meaning must not determine the content. - Because semantic vocabulary must be avoided - therefore VsRelation Theory. The belief objects would have to be language independent. >Relation theory, >Objects of belief. I 241 Intention-based approach/Grice/Schiffer: works without Relation Theory and without compositional semantics. - Extrinsic explanation is about non-semantically describable facts of use. SchifferVsGrice: his theory has not enough to say about the semantic properties of linguistic units. I 242 Grice/Schiffer: (Grice 1957)(1): attempts to define semantic concepts of public language in terms of propositional attitudes (belief, wishing, wanting). With that nothing is assumed about the meaning itself. Def speaker-meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) Is non-circular definable as a kind of behavior with the intention to trigger a belief or an action in someone else. Def expression meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) that means the semantic features of expressions of natural language. - Is non-circular definable as certain types of correlations between characters and types of exercise of speaker-meaning. - Statement/extended: every act, that means something. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. Schiffer: thus questions of meaning are reduced to questions about propositional attitudes. I 243 A character string has to have a particular feature, so that the intention is detected. >Intentions. I 245 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: Falsifying evidence is not a meaning-problem. Common knowledge is necessary, but always to refute by counter-examples. >Language community. Solution: to define common knowledge by counterfactual conditions. >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: not even two people have common knowledge. SchifferVsGrice: no one has set up a lot of reasonable conditions for speaker-meaning. Problem: a person can satisfy the conditions of (S) when he merely says that A intended to cause it, that A believes that p ((S) = lies). SchifferVsGrice: this approach is hyper-intellectual, presupposes too much intentions and expectations, that will never be divided. - The normal speaker knows too little to understand the expression-meaning by Grice. >Utterance meaning. I 247 E.g. I hope you believe me, but not on the basis of my intention. - A necessary condition to tell something is not a necessary condition to mean it as well. >Meaning/Intending. 1. H. Paul Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388 |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Interpretation | Skinner | Gaus I 410 Interpretation/Quentin Skinner/Weinstein: By the 1970s, the Cambridge school of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn and Richard Tuck, began challenging such interpretive strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them (...). >J.G.A. Pocock. Skinner: According to Skinner, we should first ascertain the range of possible meanings available to an author Gaus I 411 when writing a piece of text, and next deploy 'this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer' (1969(1): 49). >Meaning/Intending, >Intention/Quentin Skinner, >Theory change, >Meaning change. Pocock: For his part, Pocock (1985)(2) insists that proper interpretation depends more on discovering the discourse paradigms that inform political philosophical texts than on trying to discover their authors' intentions. >Interpretation/Pocock. 1. Skinner, Quentin (1969) 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas'. History and Theory, V Il: 3-53. 2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
SkinnerBF I B. F. Skinner Science And Human Behavior 1965 SkinnerQ I Qu. Skinner The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences Cambridge 2008 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Schiffer | I 174 Belief/Meaning/Fact/Nonfactualism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: there is simply no property that is equivalent to the meaningful predicate "believes that Harvard lies not in Miami", and there is not a fact, that corresponds to the closed sentence that contains the predicate. Quaddition: for the past, there was not a fact, and a fortiori not for the present. Problem: it is not true that he meant addition instead of quaddition. Solution: "fact" is ambiguous: pleonastic and non-pleonastic. I 176 Nonfactualism/Solution: there is no (non-pleonastic) property which is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. Direct solution: physicalist reduction - this is impossible when it is about meaning (intending). >Private Language, >Rule Following, >Nonfactualism, >Meaning/Intending. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 15 Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common language use and rule following instead of "facts" and truth conditions. >Language use, >Language community, >Rule following, >Facts, >Truth conditions. IV 19f "Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past. - Therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition". - So far only finitely many cases have been followed. An extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future. N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Beliefs. IV 23 Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation". 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem. IV 27 N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all! IV 35ff Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past. >Dispositions. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all. a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another. IV 37 b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions! IV 47 Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive. IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist. IV 63 Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus". Experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience. >Content. IV 65 Example experience: the beginner has another experience than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud. - But: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading. IV 72 Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet there is a problem of access to these entities: it is not clear whether I grasp the right sense. >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Language | Peacocke | II 166 Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. >Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary. ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation. Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism. II 168 Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme T(s) ↔ p plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences. >Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction. II 171 Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. >Prima facie, >Evidence. II 168 Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention, >Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer. Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker. II 175 Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond. >Truth conditions, >Conjunction. Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p. >Conventions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Lemons Example | Bennett | I 190 Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional (intend p) > (mean p) SearleVsGrice: it is possible to (intend p) and ~(mean p). BennettVsSearle: Searle has not refuted Grice. - The antecedent is not satisfied. - S does not literally mean what he/she says. >Meaning, >Literal meaning, >Meaning/intending, >Reference, >Sense, >Utterances, >Speech acts, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 Meaning/intending/SchifferVsDavidson: if there is neither a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, the possibility of the conception of a judgment as a relation collapses. >Meaning theory, >Sentences, >Propositions, >Judgments. Graeser: so that we lose the ground under our feet. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Meaning Change | Cavell | II 215 Meaning/meaning change/concept change/to mean/Cavell: the opponents of Socrates did not have to repeal their definitions because they did not know what their words meant, but because they knew what they meant, and therefore they knew that Socrates had entangled them into Paradoxes. How could I be involved in paradoxes if I could mean what I want with my words? Socrates' conversation partners, however, were not clear what they were saying or what they really said, and therefore they did not know what they meant! >Words, >Word meaning, > >Meaning, >Meaning/Intending, >Paradox, >Humpty-Dumpty. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Meaning Change | Rorty | I 293f Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? >Reference. Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Context dependence. In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to. Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules. >Theory change. I 301 Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. >Truth values, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning/Intending, >Assertibility. Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts. I 315 ff Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." I 318 Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. I 321 RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. >Skepticism. --- III 103 Meaning change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. --- IV 131 Term/Meaning change/Conceptual change/Change of theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia Descartes: res Hume: impression. Wittgenstein: game Einstein: simultaneity. Bohr: Atom. >Theory Change, >Incommensurability. --- VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Necessity | Cavell | II 177 Language/Necessity/Cavell: Question: are there logical requirements or only empirical findings? (Cavell thesis: (according to Fodor): logical necessities do consist in language philosophy). Cavell: logical necessities do not exist between language and world but only between sentences. The opportunity in which we express a sentence (circumstances) cannot be regarded as part of meaning or logic. >Cicrumstances, >Language use, >Meaning, >Sentence meaning. II 178 To mean/Must/Necessity/Language/Cavell: e.g. "He would not say that unless he meant ..." >Meaning/Intending/Cavell, >Convention, >Implicature. If we assume that the speaker and we already understand the meaning and use of an expression, one could conclude: II 170 1. the pragmatic implications are unrestricted and therefore any deviation is possible. 2. there are restrictions of use, then a) since all necessity is logical, the "pragmatic implications" are "quasi-logical implications", b) then there must be a "third kind of logic", since the pragmatic implications cannot be deductively constructed. c) there is also a non-logical necessity. II 180 Necessity/Language/Cavell: it must now be argued that from the fact that an expression is used in its usual way, something follows: it entitles one to draw certain conclusions. Learning what these implications are is a part of learning the language itself. Full understanding is implicit understanding. >Learning, >Language acquisition. II 200 Must/Cavell: when I say "You must ..." and if that is correct and appropriate, then nothing you can do proves that I am wrong. >Imperative/Cavell. II 201 Should/Cavell: when I say that you should return the borrowed money, it only makes sense if there could be a reason to suppose that the money was perhaps a present. >Sense. This is an analogy to the distinction between a mere execution of an action and a good execution. cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Nonfactualism | Cavell | I (c) 234 Fact/Nonfactualism/Meaning/Rule/Wittgenstein/Cavell: there is no fact concerning me that can justify what I say and do beyond what the other, perhaps a child, says and does. >Facts, >Meaning/Intending, >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Intending/Cavell. But I do not wish to draw a skeptical conclusion from this. I (c) 239 Fact/Nonfactualism/CavellVsKripke: if I said (in the early writings) "there is no reason to share these things with each other (e.g., sense of humor, morality), then that is different than when Kripke says there is "no fact". Cavell: otherwise it would look too much like cognitive deficiency. I (c) 240 In addition, there is no room for the idea of reasons that "run out". |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Norms | Cavell | II 192 Norms/Normative/Normativity/Cavell: Normativity is not in the assertions of the philosopher of the everyday language. >Everyday language, >Meaning/Intending/Cavell. II 193 Traditional problems with the concept of normativity stem from the following confusions: 1. the (wrong) idea, descriptive utterances are the opposite of normative utterances. 2. prescriptive utterances are typical examples of normative utterances. >Descriptive/prescriptive. Ad 1. typical of actions is that they can go wrong. But then descriptive statements do not represent the opposite of normative statements, but rather presuppose them. We could not do what we call describing, if the language did not comprehend us with consummation forms that are normative for describing. Ad. 2. If normative expressions are used to institutionalize rules, then prescriptive utterances are not examples of normative utterances. II 194 Formulating a norm does not mean to indicate how we should perform an action, but how the action is done! Specifying what we should do is not to institutionalize a norm, but rather presupposes the existence of a norm! Language/Norms/Cavell: We sometimes invoke standards which our interlocutor does not accept, but we do not try to institutionalize our own norms, nor to express our subjective views. >Convention. II 195 There are always different normative possibilities to fulfill the particular normative tasks. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Perlocutionary Acts | Habermas | III 394 Perlocutionary Acts/Habermas: perlocutionary effects can be described as states in the world brought about by intervention. Illocutionary success, on the other hand, is achieved at the level of interpersonal relations at which communication participants communicate with each other about something in the world. In this sense, they are nothing inner-worldly, but extramundane. >Speech acts/Strawson, >P.F. Strawson. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 395 Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his illocutionary goal that the listener understands what he/she is saying without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. Cf. >Meaning/intending/Grice, >P. Grice. Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Picture (Image) | Flusser | Blask I 26 Picture/Flusser: Thesis: The human forgets that he was the one who created the pictures. Imagination turned into hallucination. >Imagination, >Hallucination. --- Flusser I 111 ff Picture/Flusser: Specific definition: (sur)face covered with symbols. Definition Picture: A picture is a reduction of the "concrete" four-dimensional relations to two dimensions. Cave paintings in Lascaux, for example, can be regarded as "prospective projections": their intention was probably not to depict "concrete situations" (such as anatomy lessons) but to create desired situations: to serve a hunting magic. They do not want to show what ponies are like, but what you have to do to hunt them. On the other hand, for example, there is little magic on a street map: it does not show how roads should be, but how they really are. And yet it has a "value", showing the driver what to do to get into town. Then they're good pictures. I 112 For example, Lascaux: they are "good pictures" if they help to a successful hunt, and they do so if they reproduce the anatomy of the ponies correctly. Many pictures are pleasingly designed surfaces, neither streets nor ponies, and these are commonly referred to as pictures. I 135 Picture/Flusser: Technical images/techno-images: Pictures that do not mean scenes, but texts: For example, equations that lead to atomic bombs consist of unimaginable symbols. Therefore, the text that these equations cannot be regarded as meaningless. But the atomic bomb itself is unimaginable in a strange sense. And the same applies to the TV, the car, in short, to most of our technical products. If such texts work, they lead to even more insane codes. I 137 ff Technical Images/techno-images: We believe we criticize films, we think we understand TV programs: this is a dangerous mistake. Decryption is much more difficult. Traditional Picture: Scene picture < human Techno-images: Scene > Picture > human Traditional pictures are made by people, technical pictures are made by devices. I 138 In the traditional picture, the causal chain between scene and picture is interrupted by the human being. The technical images' causal chain is not interrupted, the technical image is a direct consequence of the scene, but there is no causal chain between reality and picture. The naïve belief that one does not have to learn to decipher cinema posters or advertisements contributes to the alienation that these pictures cause. Technical Text ↔ Apparatus Operator ↔ techno-image >Alienation, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Interpretation("Deutung"). I 139 Def techno-images/Flusser: technical images are (sur)faces covered with symbols, which mean symbols of linear texts. For example, an X-ray of the broken arm is for the doctor both a map and a model of how the arm is to be treated, i.e. "prospective" and it is "beautiful" insofar as it is true and good. >Symbols, >Text. The specificity of the technical images is not to be found in the method of production (by apparatus) nor in the material (cathode tubes). Technical images are like all images symbols, but they do not mean scenes like traditional images, they mean concepts. Def techno-images: means terms, means texts. >Concepts. In this respect, traditionally created pictures are also technical images insofar they mean concepts: blueprints, diagrams, curves in statistics, etc. Strange kinship of technical images with ideograms: both are images that mean concepts. However, "concept" does not have the same meaning in both cases. >Meaning, >Meaning/intending. For example, one "feels" that the number "2", i.e. an ideogram, is a completely different kind of symbol than e.g. the photography of a bra in advertising, i.e. a technical image, although both terms mean. The essentially important of the technical codes always melts between the fingers. Ideogram translation into alphabetical code. "Two and two is four" and 2+2=4: the first seems to be the description of the second. We have the tendency to see to see pictorial scriptures in ideogrammatic codes, although they are linear. "2+2=4" is not the picture of a linear situation, however! It is the description of a scene! >Numbers, >Numerals. I 141 Ideograms: are not images but symbols of the type "letter". Def Scene: non-linear. Def Text: linear. Def ideograms: concepts which mean pictures. I 142 Ideograms are like technical picture above language. For example, you can also be translated with "Two and two makes four" and "Buy a bra!". Traditional pictures are "under language". They're being discussed. Although people can communicate with images, the belief that they are "generally understandable"is wrong. I 143 techno-images: the translation of technical images lies in a completely different direction beyond the spoken language than the translation of H20 into "water". "P", for example, means "Parking permitted" at first glance, but this new type of code has to destroy the alphabet over time. >Translation. Even if the "P" is replaced by the pictogram of a car. It could also be replaced by a reproduction of the Mona Lisa. >Convention. The way we learn to follow them is a different way than the way we learn mathematical formulas or alphabetical texts. >Learning. I 146 Technical pictures mean texts. For example, photography in the electron microscope depicts physical texts, the film depicts relationships from a film script, the statistical curve depicts relationships that set up economic texts with regard to an economic tendency. Technical codes a) Posters: directly understandable b) X-ray image: must be decoded. For example, when we hit the brake at a red traffic light, we do not pretend to read a text, but to see a picture where a foot hits a brake pedal. (See also Code/Flusser and Technology/Flusser). I 162 Techno-images/Flusser: only archeologists or biologists, astronomers or physicists use technical images "correctly", namely as symbols of concepts. Picture/Flusser: Video art does not provide technical images. Because they are not images there for concepts. I 163 Misbelief: technical images are codes of the mass media. Society is only interested in technical images that are broadcast amphitheatrically, and is left completely cold by the art discussion. >Society, >Art, >Aesthetics. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Principle of Charity | Putnam | I (b) 56 Principle of Charity/N. L. Wilson: e.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles, according to Wilson, would then be the electrons! >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. I (b) 57 Principle of Charity/Wilson: e.g. someone who is erroneously using a name wrong, still refers to the one, he/she really meant. >Meaning/Intending), >Reference, >referential/attributive. PutnamVsWilson: the principle should only apply to real situations. Also beliefs should be distinguished by relevance. >Relevance. I (b) 58 Phenomena have priority during the reference, that means, if there were Bohr electrons in the other half of the universe, Bohr would nevertheless refer to our electrons. Contribution of the environment: it follows that XYZ (on twin earth) just looks like water, but it is not water. I (b) 58 Principle of Charity/PutnamVsWilson: the principle of charity is too numeric! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. You cannot count beliefs! Reference/possible world/Putnam: e.g. electron, Bohr: suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely assumed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons" but to our electrons. Reason: the primacy of phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and these are also our phenomena. Principle of trust advance/meaning/knowledge/imagination/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without even having a clear idea! The principle of trust forbids us to assume that baptizing must be experts. It also forbids accepting omniscience. >Omniscience, >PutnamVsWilson. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Prior | I 88 Propositional attitudes/Prior: no distinction between what is said and what is meant: the object of fear is the object of fear and not a "next-intentioned" object. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Thought Objects, >Belief Objects, >Meaning/intending, >Sense. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Rationality | Bennett | Millikan I 66 Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that a rational person should not take "shortcuts". I.e., he must consider not only positive evidence, but also negative evidence. >Evidence, >Knowledge, >Meaning/intending, >Beliefs. General/formal: Suppose John believes. "usually: if A then B" and furthermore: "non-(usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)" rational: would it then follow that John must believe a) "usually: if A then C" and b) if A-and-C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. the only evidence for C comes from the fact that John knows that usually if A then C. Then he should simply move from A to B. 2. John has independent ways of believing C based on evidence. And he comes across A while he already has evidence for non-C. I 67 Then he should rationally also believe that non-C and not infer B from A. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand whether C. Question: then, to be rational, does he have to check C beforehand? Millikan: let us assume that he must. Problem: if that now again depends solely on his believing: "usually, if D, then C", etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more he has to exert himself to be rational at all. Wouldn't it be better if he refrained from all the checking? >Review, >Contradictions, >Consistency. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Self | Anscombe | Frank I 91 Self/Anscombe: the self is no Cartesian idea, but it can be combined with a Cartesian ego theory. >cogito. But this is again derived from a missed reflexive pronoun. >Pronouns/Anscombe. If someone said that the self is connected to a person, then that would be contingent, a happy coincidence! >Contingency. Another fortunate coincidence would be necessary so that it has something to do with it! I 96 Self/Anscombe: it may be very nice to describe what selves are. But if I do not know that I am a self, I cannot mean a self with "I". >Meaning/intending, >Intention, >Intentionality, >Self-consciousness. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Flusser | I 209 ff Sense/Flusser: Thesis: The codified world, which is supposed to connect with the "real world", gives this "real world" a sense by meaning it. >Meaning, >Meaning/intending, >Signs, >Symbols, >Code/Flusser. This sense is an agreement. The human is lonely in his knowledge of death. >Death. But by giving meaning to the world and life and negating death, he/she communicates with others. Thus, the codified world becomes a world of being with others and he/she him-/herself becomes "immortal". >Community. I 210 Consequences: Symbols not only show meaning, but conceal meaning, they are not only meaningful but are also giving insanity. Hell arises when people forget that in the codified world they are not only staggering around like in a dungeon, but that the codified world has been agreed to allow this oblivion of death. |
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| Skepticism | Anscombe | Frank I 79 I/Descartes/Anscombe: pro: the conception of "I" cannot be a "self" and it must guarantee that the speaker is necessarily present. This shows how powerful the approach of Descartes is. The conception is the "thinking of thoughts". >I, >cogito, >R. Descartes. I/Anscombe: Error immunity: 1. The speaker must exist, 2. The referent must exist, 3. The referent exists as the one who is meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Reference. I/Body/AnscomeVsDescartes: E.g. I am tied up in a large water tank and cannot move. I think, "I will not let this happen to me again." Thus it becomes clear that a body cannot be a referent of "I", but a Cartesian res cogitans. >Body, >res cogitans. Problem: the Cartesian ego fulfills the criteria of the guaranteed reference,... Frank I 80 ...but does not solve the problem of Locke: who guarantees that the referential object is in different "I" thoughts the same? >I, Ego, Self, >Person/Locke. AnscombeVsDescartes: he cannot even be sure that "I" does not refer to several thinkers at the same time! I/Skepticism/Anscombe: Solution: "I" refers to nothing! So it is error immune. This follows from the failure of logic in determining the meaning and the failure of Descartes' in determining the referent. Question: Why did not someone come up with this solution earlier? Because of the "grammatical illusion of a subject". The questions about meaning and referent of the "I" are meaningless, however! >Meaning, >Grammar. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Time | Flusser | I 119 Time in the image/Flusser: can be turned into circles: the time in the image is a stream that flows on the surface to hold its elements together. E. g. H O H (in a frame) means a scene in which the orbiting time arranges the elements spatially. I 120 You can roll them spatially apart on two sides:"H2O": then hydrogen and oxygen are causes, 2. 2H + O, then they are consequences of water. In the first explanation, the scene meant by the picture is the end point of a synthetic process, in the second, of an analytical process. Both explanations order the elements in chronological order. >Analyticity/Syntheticity, >Meaning/Intending. I 121 However, the information originally contained in the picture is lost, which affects the spatial and especially not procedural relation. The two explanations are in a sense profanations of the original saint. >Space, >Processes. The order of the picture is not an explanatory order like that of the text, but a total order. >Explanation, >Order, >Images/Flusser. I 132 Time/Flusser: whatever the time experienced may be, it cannot be linear: it comes from all sides. It cannot flow from the past to the future, because it is the future and not the past that arrives. The present cannot be a point on a ray, for it is the place where all time gathers, i.e. becomes present. >Past, >Present, >Future, On the other hand, the historical time cannot be more abstract than the magical time, because it can pre-program our concrete experience just as well as the magical time. >Magical thinking. You can believe in them as well as in the magical one. Recipients of a textual message (linear) live in a completely different world than that of the magical mood. >Texts/Flusser. They no longer experience the world as "scenes" but as "events" and that means: they experience time as irrevocable. >Events. I 214 ff Time/Flusser: Time experience in linear consciousness experiences time as a stream flowing from the past into the future, historical past is irrevocably past. For techno-imaginary consciousness this is pure madness. a) as soon as you get an impression of the concept of historical time, it becomes apparent that it flows in the opposite direction: from the future to the past: what arrives is not yesterday, but tomorrow. b) Presence becomes visible as the center of time. Time is recognizable as a tendency to visualization. For historical consciousness, the present is a point on a line, so the present is unreal once it is, it is no longer. >Historiography, >History. I 215 For historical consciousness, only becoming is true. For techno-imagination (TI), such an ontology is a typical example of madness. >Terminology/Flusser. 1st consequence: For them, only the present is real, because it is the place where the only possible (the future) arrives to be realized, (meaning at the present). 2nd consequence: The past is a hole in the present. However, the past does not appear as a "third time form" (besides the present and the future) but as an aspect of the present - as a "memory." I 216 3rd Consequence: "politicization" of time: I am constant, the world is variable. Trying to expand the present so that others can be with me in it. 4th Consequence: historical causal chains become senseless: the future arrives, it does not "follow" from something. Birds, for example, do not build nests "because" they are programmed by genetic information, but during nest building it turns out that birds have genetic information. For example, the French Revolution does not lead to the Russian Revolution, but the Russian Revolution shows that the French Revolution had an internal contradiction. Although we have this new experience of time, we will not have the consciousness of having it. I 217 A new, inprogressive future is on the horizon. Progress has been "suspended" in the past. >Progress. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Truth | Ramsey | III 67 Truth/Ramsey: we cannot distinguish truth from falsehood if we only know what the word "true" means - true: we use the word a) for mental states b) for statements c) for "propositions" (as objects of belief). >Propositions, >Belief objects, >Thought objects. III 68 Truth/Ramsey/(s): Truth is not a property of sentences, but of meanings of sentences - (ultimately states of consciousness). >Sentences, >Utterances, >Meaning/Intending, >Speaker Intention, >Speaker Meaning, >Mental States, >Beliefs, >Beliefs. III 70 Truth/Ramsey: does not have to be well-founded or comprehensive. For example, true belief: the name of the Prime Minister starts with B - that is correct, even if false belief that Lord Birkenhead is the Prime Minister. Problem: the propositional reference of beliefs can be arbitrarily complex. We must avoid a list of truth definition for all individually - Solution: formalization: "p": a variable sentence - "A", "B": variable words (terms). Def true/Ramsey/logical form/Russell: B is true ⇔ (Ep)(B is a belief that p & p). Vs: Problem: "p" does not seem to contain a verb, but it should - Wrong solution: "is true" to add: circular. III 71 Solution/Ramsey. In reality, "p" contains a verb: e.g. "A is B". III 73 Truth/Ramsey. Example 1. the earth is round. 2. it is true that the earth is round, are equivalent, but 1 does not involve the idea of truth. Cf. >Redundancy theory. III 74 Truth without reference/Ramsey: Example "Belief at 10 o'clock": such a belief cannot yet be called true or false. >Sentences, >Statements. III 75 Truth/Ramsey: truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Reference, >Truth definition. III 77 There cannot be any other kind of reference for true or false beliefs. Otherwise the future would be readable, from example "False reference" on tomorrow's rain. Therefore reference is simple, even if not unanalysable. Truth and reference are not independent expressions. >Simplicity, >Analysis, >Basic concepts. Truth must be defined by reference, not vice versa. >Dependence. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Writing | Ricoeur | II 25 Speaking/Writing/Ricoeur: (...) the transition from speaking tow writing has ist conditions in the theory of >discourse (...), especially in the dialectic of event and meaning (...) >Discourse/Ricoeur, >Dialogue/Ricoeur. Writing/Plato/Ricoeur: [Plato criticized] writing as a kind of alienation (...). Writing/Ricoeur: What happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse (...). The semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by the dialectic of event and meaning. Moreover, it may be said that this dialectic is made obvious and explicit by writing. Writing/text/Ricoeur: What happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse (...). The semantic autonomy of the text which now appears is still governed by the dialectic of event and meaning. Moreover, it may be said that this dialectic is made obvious and explicit by writing. II 26 Writing/Derrida: To hold - as Jacques Derrida(1) does - that writing has a root distinct from speech and that this foundation has been misunderstood due to our having paid excessive attention to speech, its voice, and its logos, is to overlook the grounding of both modes of the actualization of discourse in the dialectical constitution of discourse. RicoeurVsDerrida: I propose instead that we begin from the schema of communication described by Roman Jakobson in his famous artcle, "Linguistics and Poetics."(2) Jakobson: To the six main "factors" of communicative discourse — the speaker, hearer, medium or channel, code, situation, and message—he relates six correlative "functions": the emotive, conative, phatic, meta-linguistic, referential, and poetic functions. Ricoeur: Taking this schema as a starting point, we may inquire into what alterations, transformations, or deformations affect the interplay of facts and functions when discourse is inscribed in writing. >Media/Ricoeur. II 28 (...) does the problematics ot fixation and inscription exhaust the problem of writing? In other words, is writing only a question of a change of medium, where the human voice, face, and gesture are replaced by material marks other than the speaker's own body? When we consider the range of social and political changes which can be related to the invention of writing, we may surmise that writing is much more than mere material fixation. [The] political implication of writing is just one of its consequences. To the fixation of rules for reckoning may be referred the birth of market relationships, therefore. the birth of economics. To the constitution of archives, history. To the fixation of law as a standard of decisions, independent from the opinion of the concrete judge, the birth of the justice and juridical codes, etc. Such an immense range of effects suggests that human discourse is not merely preserved from destruction by being fixed in writing, but that it is deeply affected in its communicative function. Literature: [When] is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary'stage of spoken language[,] [t]hen writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. II 29 The best way to measure the extent of this substitution is to look at the range of changes which occur among the other components of the communication process. The relation writing-reading is no longer a particular case of the relation speaking-hearing. With written discourse, (...) the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text and the mental intention of the author gives to the concept of inscription its decisive significance, beyond the mere fixation of previous oral discourse. II 30 Meaning/intending: What the text means now matters more than what the author meant when he wrote it. >Intentional Fallacy/Wimsatt, >Literature/Ricoeur. 1. Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénoméne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967); L'écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967); De la grammatologie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967); „La Mythologie blanche," Rhétorique et philosophie, Poétique, 5 (1955); reprinted in Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972), pp. 247-324. 2. R. Jakobson, „Linguistics and Poetics“. In: T. A. Sebeok (ed.), Style in Language (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1960), pp. 350-377. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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