Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 42 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actualism | Stalnaker | I 12 Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualism does not take possible worlds literally as worlds but as ways of how the world might have been. N.B.: contingent identity is not allowed but probably contingent dissimilarity. ((s) According to Kripke, identity is always necessary identity insofar as descriptions are not involved, but names are). >Identity/Kripke, >Rigidity, >Descriptions. I 120 Actualism/Stalnaker: actualism is not a restrictive metaphysical theory as materialism or nominalism - it is just a trivial consequence of the meaning of "actual". >Materialism, >Nominalism. I 128 Presentism/Stalnaker: presentism is analogous to actualism regarding worlds: thesis: we are extended in time just as we are spread over possible worlds. >Presentism. Then we can have real temporal identity. (Stalnaker pro). Fusion/fission/personal identity: cases of fusion and fission are then cases where persons who were separated earlier become identical or a person is divided into two. >Personal identity, >Fusion, >Split. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Collectives | Habermas | IV 166 Collectives/Habermas: whether the life form of a collective is more or less "successful" (...), (...) resembles the clinical question of the assessment of a patient's mental and spiritual condition as the moral question of the recognition worthiness of a norm or an institutional system. Moral judgment presupposes a hypothetical attitude, i.e. the possibility of considering norms as something to which we can give or address social validity. However, the analogous prerequisite that we could choose life forms in the same way is pointless. No one can agree with the way of life in which he/she has been socialized in the same reflected manner as with a norm of whose validity he/she is convinced of.(1) >Norms, >Rules, >Community, >Principles. IV 167 In this respect, there is a parallel between the life form of a collective and the life story of an individual. Adults have acquired the generalized ability to realize themselves autonomously. IV 206 Collectives/Habermas: Collectives only maintain their identity to the extent that the ideas that the relatives have of their environment sufficiently overlap and condense into unproblematic background beliefs. Relatives can only develop a personal identity if they recognize that the sequence of their own actions constitutes a narratively depictable life story and a social identity only if they recognize that by participating in interactions they maintain their belonging to social groups and are thereby entangled in the narratively depictable story of collectives. For the analysis of narrative statements in this sense: see A. C. Danto.(2) 1 For Hegelian distinction between morality and decency, see: A. Wellmer, Praktische Philosophie und Theorie der Gesellschaft. Zum Problem der normativen Grundlagen einer kritischen Sozialwissenschaft, Konstanz 1979. 2. A.C. Danto, Analytische Philosophie der Geschichte, Frankfurt 1974. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Continuants | Lewis | IV 41 Modal continuants/Lewis/(s): if individuals can consist of the mereological sum of all their counterparts, they could also be modal continuants. LewisVs: Problem: If I am part of countless different modal continuants, which am I then myself? Solution/Lewis: (see e.g. Methuselah): Instead of identity we take the common sharing of states. Then there is only one individual. Modal continuants/Problem: everything that could have happened does happen. E.g. Humphrey/Kripke: Humphrey thinks: "I could have won" - i.e.: - I am an modal continuant with a world state that wins - i.e. the mC of which a world state is thinking these thoughts has a (different) world state that wins. LewisVs: Humphrey thinks only of himself, so it is pointless to assume that he was "part of the same mereological sum as the winner". >Mereological sum. IV 42 Counterpart theory/Lewis: according to it, Humphrey himself has properties such that he has potential winners as counterparts. >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Counterpart/Lewis. ersatz world: are those in which the same Humphrey just lived a different story. >ersatz world/Lewis. IV 76 Person state/continuant/Lewis: a state is not a permanent person - e.g. a person with a desire is a state - (person state, person-state). >Personal identity. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Continuants | Simons | I 117 Continuant/Broad: a continuant has no temporal parts, only spatial parts. Contrast: event: an event has spatial and temporal parts. Continuant: e.g. human. N.B.: that is why he is able to change. ((s) Otherwise there is the question of whether he remains the same.) >Temporal identity, >Personal identity. Contrast: occurrence/Broad: an event cannot change. ((s) A human (continuant) can grow old - an event cannot grow old.) >Humans, >Events, >Persons. I 127 Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants and they are used in the argument of the Relativity Theory that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light. >Four-dimensionalism, >Relativity Theory. I 173 Continuants/Locke: continuants are constant clusters of matter. They cannot lose or gain any parts (SimonsVsLocke). >J. Locke. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll other authors: thesis: even continuants can have temporal parts, i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable. Simons: thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence. >Existence. I 176 Continuants/Simons: not all continuants have to be material things, e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things. I 180 Def coincidence/continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate: CTD5 a ‹ ›t b ≡ a ‹t ∧ b ‹t a For a similarity of parts in terms of the mutual inclusion see Identity/Simons. I 187 Continuant/ChisholmVsAll other authors: thesis: a continuant is mereologically constant. Mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants. Organisms are only constructions. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event: here, a formula like "a‹b" is complete. Continuants: we need an additional time index here: ((s) with quantification) "(∃t)[a‹t b]". I 350 Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (or life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected. Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant. I 351 Continuant/temporal relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but its life story. HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: continuants bring about a reduction to events, they are mere clotheslines. Whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it. I 353 Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Encoding | Shoda | Corr I 476 Encoding/Cognitive-affective processing system/CAPS/ Shoda/Smith: One important set of CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) units are the mental categories, or personal constructs, used to encode, or mentally represent, the self, other people and events. People differ in how they customarily encode both internal and external stimuli (Higgins 1990)(1). >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. For example, performers differ in how they construe physiological arousal during performance situations (Jones and Swain 1992(2)). Some interpret the arousal cues as something that will aid their performance, whereas for others, arousal is an indication that they are ‘choking’. In the course of their social learning history, people also develop relational schemas (Baldwin 1999)(3), cognitive representations of how social relationships are expected to play out, or ‘work’. These schemas influence how they encode and respond to social interactions. Among the most significant encodings are the personal constructs used to represent one’s own characteristics (i.e., the self-schema). For example, research has shown that athletes differ in the extent to which their personal identity revolves around the role of ‘athlete’ (Brewer, Van Raalte and Linder 1993)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Higgins, E. T. 1990. Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: stand-ards and knowledge activation as a common language, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 301–38. New York: Guilford Press 2. Jones, G. and Swain, A. B. J. 1992. Intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety and relationships with competitiveness, Perceptual and Motor Skills 74: 467–72 3. Baldwin, M. W. 1999. Relational schemas: research into social-cognitive aspects of inter-personal experience, in D. Cervone and Y. Shoda (eds.), The coherence of personality: social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization, pp. 127–54. New York: Guilford Press 4. Brewer, B. W, Van Raalte, J. L and Linder, D. E. 1993. Athletic identity: Hercules’ muscles or Achilles heel?, International Journal of Sport Psychology 24: 237–54 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Encoding | Smith | Corr I 476 Encoding/Cognitive-affective processing system/CAPS/ Shoda/Smith: One important set of CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) units are the mental categories, or personal constructs, used to encode, or mentally represent, the self, other people and events. People differ in how they customarily encode both internal and external stimuli (Higgins 1990)(1). >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. For example, performers differ in how they construe physiological arousal during performance situations (Jones and Swain 1992(2)). Some interpret the arousal cues as something that will aid their performance, whereas for others, arousal is an indication that they are ‘choking’. In the course of their social learning history, people also develop relational schemas (Baldwin 1999)(3), cognitive representations of how social relationships are expected to play out, or ‘work’. These schemas influence how they encode and respond to social interactions. Among the most significant encodings are the personal constructs used to represent one’s own characteristics (i.e., the self-schema). For example, research has shown that athletes differ in the extent to which their personal identity revolves around the role of ‘athlete’ (Brewer, Van Raalte and Linder 1993)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Higgins, E. T. 1990. Personality, social psychology, and person-situation relations: stand-ards and knowledge activation as a common language, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 301–38. New York: Guilford Press 2. Jones, G. and Swain, A. B. J. 1992. Intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety and relationships with competitiveness, Perceptual and Motor Skills 74: 467–72 3. Baldwin, M. W. 1999. Relational schemas: research into social-cognitive aspects of inter-personal experience, in D. Cervone and Y. Shoda (eds.), The coherence of personality: social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization, pp. 127–54. New York: Guilford Press 4. Brewer, B. W, Van Raalte, J. L and Linder, D. E. 1993. Athletic identity: Hercules’ muscles or Achilles heel?, International Journal of Sport Psychology 24: 237–54 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Ethics | Nozick | II 17 Ethics/Nozick: there is no argument, which Hitler had to bow to. - This means that we cannot regard ethics as absolute, but: E.g. Heimson: does not bring our belief system about personal identity in the same way at risk. >Heimson case/Perry. We have more of a "How's that possible?" Question about ethics than about personal identity. >Identity, >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Identification, >Individuation, >Individual, >Person. II 118 Categorical imperative/Kant/Nozick: when the content could be extracted from the form, it would not be a "hard fact" (brute fact) anymore. - It would arise necessarily from the form. >Bare fact, >Categorical imperative, >Ethics/Kant, >Morality/Kant. II 570 Ethics/Nozick: how important is it, anyway? - As long as the meaning of our lives is not shown, ethics and values appear to be meaningless. >Life. II 631 Ethics/moral/reduction/Reductionism/Nozick: VsReductionism: infringes the principle that everything has a value in itself. NozickVsVs: this is not only theoretically wrong but also morally wrong. >Reductionism, >Reduction, >Values. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Honesty | Cultural Psychology | Slater I 169 Honesty/cultural psychology: the cultural specificity of children’s reasoning about lying and truth telling, with a focus on differences between Western and East Asian cultures has been in focus of recent research. This contrast is of particular interest in light of arguments by cultural theorists that there are important qualitative differences between Western and East Asian cultures, with individualism versus collectivism being the most widely studied dimension (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002(1) for a meta-analysis). Individualism involves a focus on individual rights and interests, with personal identity being based upon individual accomplishments. Collectivism focuses on the interests of a collective, with personal identity being based upon harmony within the group and participation in community-oriented activities. These differences point to different goals for interpersonal communication, with Western cultures placing greater emphasis on freedom of choice, self-esteem, and well-being, and East Asian cultures placing greater emphasis on collective goals and group cohesiveness. These differences call into question whether a model such as Kohlberg’s (>Morality/Kohlberg, >Honesty/Kohlberg) can be generalized across cultures, and raise the possibility of substantial cross-cultural differences in beliefs about what it means to be moral. Although lying in politeness situations tends to be evaluated similarly by children in East Asia and in the West (Xu, Bao, Fu, Taiwar, & Lee, 2010)(2), there are cross-cultural differences in how the lies are justified. In Western cultures, the focus is on the recipient’s emotional wellbeing, whereas in East Asian cultures the focus is on the social implications for the recipient (i.e., his or her “face” or public persona; Bond & Hwang, 1986)(3), which is consistent with evidence that individuals in East Asian cultures tend to place a high value on the ability to adapt one’s behavior across a range of social situations (Gao, 1998(4); Heine, 2001(5); Markus & Kitayama, 1991)(6). Slater I 170 Heyman, Itakura, and Lee (2011)(7) found that Japanese children aged 7 to 11 judged the truthful acknowledgment of a good deed more negatively when it was made to an audience of classmates rather than in private. In contrast, there were no such effects of setting within a comparison group of children from the US. 1. Oyserman, D., Coon, H., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 3—73. 2. Xu, F., Bao, X., Fu, G., Taiwar, V, & Lee, K. (2010). Lying and truth-telling in children: From concept to action. Child Development, 81, 581—596. 3. Bond, M. H., & Hwang, K. K. (1986). The social psychology of Chinese people. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The psychology of the Chinese people (pp. 213—266). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Gao, G. (1998). “Don’t take my word for it.” — understanding Chinese speaking practices. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 22, 163—186. 5. Heine, S. J. (2001). Self as cultural product: An examination of East Asian and North American selves. Journal of Personality, 69, 881—906. 6. Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224—253. 7. Heyman, G. D., Itakura, S., & Lee, K. (201 1). Japanese and American chi1drens reasoning about accepting credit for prosocial behavior. Social Development, 20, 171—184. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| I, Ego, Self | Blackmore | Pauen I 244 I/Ego/Blackmore/Pauen: Blackmore thesis: Beliefs are only accumulations of memes that change constantly. VsMinsky, VsDennett: The self also has no pragmatic value. >Memes. Unencumbered by it, we can have an unbiased access to the present. (Th. NagelVs.) I 245 I: the I is not the origin of our desires, but the function of bundling. PauenVsBlackmore: how should continuity be preserved at all? >Personal identity. Vs: Individuals can behave very differently to desires, even if they belong to the same social group. |
Blckmo I S. Blackmore Consciousness London 2010 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Chalmers | I 87 I/Chalmers: after I have determined that the world is much bigger than I initially thought, I sort the original experiences as my own. Cf. >apprehension, >personal identity, cf. >I/Kant. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| I, Ego, Self | Dennett | Rorty IV 7 "I"/Dennett/Rorty: Dennett makes the proposal to introduce the human ego as a "narrative center of gravity". (Charles Taylor ditto): the I changes as soon as it tells a different story about who it even is. >Personal Identity. Rorty VI 154 I/Dennett/Rorty: "narrative center of gravity". Cf. >perspective/Nagel. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| I, Ego, Self | Descartes | Frank I 76 Ego/Descartes/Anscombe: Descartes has asserted the non-identity of his self with a body. This argument only works in the first person! Everyone has to proclaim it in the form of "I'm not a body". >First Person. More precisely, Descartes should have said, "I am not Descartes." For the proper name Descartes denominates nothing but a person. Frank I 84 Ego/Descartes/Anscombe: The Ego is not a kind of body. I might assume that I have no body. >Body, >person, >personal identity. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | James | Diaz-Bone I 40 Self-awareness/James: A) Knowledge of oneself ("me", "myself") B) Recognizing awareness: "I". > Consciousness/James. "Me": Refers to external things. It is variable, social, mental, material. "I": that which always remains the same, although the state of consciousness constantly changes. >Personal Identity. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Identity | Anscombe | Frank I 78 Identity/I/Time/Memory/Locke: Question: How can it be guaranteed that the self who did something some time ago is identical with the self that remembers this act? >Personal identity. Anscombe/Schaede: Anscombe unthinkingly shares the traditional view that the time fell apart into discrete moments, which must first and foremost be related to one another. Then the corresponding successive consciousness moments would have to be synthesized. >Time, >Temporal identity, cf. >Zeno. But only if this theory is shared, problems arise with the temporal identity of "I". Frank I 93 I/Self/Memory/Identity/Anscombe: a repeated thought of "I" in conjunction with the same self would have to include a re-identification. But that is not at all part of the role of "I". On the other hand, it was part of the role of "A". >Logic/Anscombe. Frank I 104 I/Identity/Anscombe: when I ask: what carries out my actions? Then the answer is "this object here", "this thing here" but that is not an assertion of identity. The sentences about my actions are verified by my body. But observation does not show me which body is precisely this one. >Self-identification, >Observation, >Actions. G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Baudrillard | Blask I 82 Identity/Baudrillard: Baudrillard recommends the search for the other in order to escape the obligation to be oneself, the necessity of one's own search for identity. "Never to be oneself, but never to be alienated: to enter from the outside into the form of the other." The highest pleasure lies in metamorphosis. >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Person, >Subject, >Human, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Change. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Identity | Locke | McDowell I 126/7 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: important for him (paralogism-chapter) is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. >Apperception. Euchner I 53f Identity/person/personal identity/Locke: thesis: There is a difference between an arbitrary mass and a structured matter that makes life. We have to distinguish between substance and person, because these are different ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Substance/Locke, >Person/Locke. Def life/Locke: the substance of this trias. Def person/Locke: thinking, intelligent beings with reason, who may consider themselves e - (at different times). >Personal identity. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Identity | Parfit | Lewis IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Parfit: when it comes to survival, both answers (continuity and identity) cannot be correct, so we must choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) Continuity: (and connection) (e. g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one and gradual. >Continuity. Parfit: therefore, it is the continuity and connection that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival). >Temporal identity, >Personal identity, >Person. c) what is important for survival is not identity therefore! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problematic cases do not occur. >Relations, >Identity/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Individuation/Lewis. LewisVsParfit: someone else might just as well represent the argument in the other direction, and put identity as relevant. And of course, identity is that what counts in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connection are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity. Borderline case/Parfit: Problem: borderline cases have to be decided arbitrarily. Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it is definitely about identity. Namely, literally identity! IV 58 Definition R-relation/identity/continuity/person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? IV 59 I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: the two are identical because they are coextensive! >Coextension. IV 61 Identity/Fusion/Split/Person/State/Lewis: is one to one, in the sense that a thing is never identical with several things. However, this does not apply to the I and R relations. Many of their other states are states of the same person and related to this and also to each other. But that is not what Parfit means when he says that R relations are one to many. Parfit: means that there can be several states to which a state is related, but which are not related to each other. (fusion and splitting of the person). That means the R relation would not be transitive. Split: the forward-related R relation is one many, backward: many one, simpliciter: transitive. IV 65 Methuselah example/Person/Identity/Lewis: (Original passage): Connectivity/mental states/Parfit: thesis: the connection of mental states disappears with time. IV 67 Person/Fusion/Parfit: For example, if you merge with someone very different, the question is of who survives. But there is no specific, hidden answer. Rather, the important point is that the R-relationship is only available to a very small degree. IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: one should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. IV 74 Lewis: I had written, what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually Ir to states in the distant future such as S2, namely over the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But is that not the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants to survive (C1), then this wish is not fulfilled. LewisVsParfit: but I do not think he can have that wish at all! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought he has must be shared. He cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. On the other hand, if C1 and C2 are supposed to share something every day, then it must be a "plural" wish, "Let's survive". IV 75 Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both of us knew before the split that there would be a split. Now: Variant: both do not know about the coming split. Question: cannot we share the wish: "Let me survive!"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the same desire is due to the wrong presupposition that they are one person. Meaning the "me" is a false description. It cannot refer to C1 in C1's thoughts and not to C2 in its thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least the one of C2 and the one of C1 is not differentiated. Then their wish cannot consist only in the unfulfillable singular wish. They both must also have the weak plural desire, even if they do not know the split beforehand. |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Identity | Postmodernism | Gaus I 47 Identity/Postmodernism/Bennett: Much genealogical work, (...) insists upon the material recalcitrance of cultural products. Gender, sexuality, race, and personal identity are viewed as congealed responses to contingent sets of historical circumstances, and yet the mere fact that they are human artifacts does not mean that they yield readily to human understanding or control (Gatens, 1996)(1). >Identity politics, >Gender, >Sexuality. A personal identity, for example, is a construction, but one sedimented into bodily movements, instinctive tendencies, linguistic routines, and institutional forms that resist human attempts to redirect or revise them. Cf. >S. de Beauvoir. Everything is acculturated, but cultural forms are themselves material assemblages of natural bodies. >Culture, >Cultural tradition, >Cultural values, >Cultural relativism. Postmodern theory acknowledges the artifice of the natural and the materiality of the cultural. >Postmodernism. Difference/Specifity: There always exists – in words, things, bodies, thoughts, artifacts, ways of life – that which is persistently resistant to theoretical capture, or, for that matter, to any fixed form. This indeterminate and never fully determinable dimension of things has been described as difference or différance (Jacques Derrida), the virtual (Gilles Deleuze), non-identity (Theodor Adorno), the invisible (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), the immanent (William Connolly), the semiotic (Julia Kristeva), sexual difference (Luce Irigaray), the real (Jacques Lacan), life (Friedrich Nietzsche), or negativity (Diana Coole). >Theodor W. Adorno, >F. Nietzsche, >J. Lacan, >M. Merleau-Ponty, >G. Deleuze, >J. Derrida, >W. Connolly. Jean-François Lyotard calls it ‘that which exceeds every putting into form or object without being anywhere else but within them’ (1997(2): 29). Postmodern political theory tries to acknowledge this resistance and to resist the urge to expel this disruptive force from politics (Honig, 1993)(3). >J.-F. Lyotard. 1. Gatens, Moira (1996) Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. New York: Routledge. 2. Lyotard, Jean-François (1997) Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges van den Abbeele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 3. Honig, Bonnie (1993) Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Illusion | Baudrillard | Blask I 104 Illusion/Baudrillard: Baudrillard does not want to go back to the real, he wants to go beyond this, to reinstate the great games of seduction and illusion. >Simulation, >Simulacra, >Deception, >Reality, >World/thinking. Blask I 106 Illusion/Belief/Baudrillard: no longer believing oneself, but believing in the one who believes. >Identity/Baudrillard, >Person, >Subject, >Personal identity. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Imitation | Girard | Krastev I 11 Imitation/Girard/Krastev: (...) Girard argued (...) that imitation’s centrality to the human condition has been misleadingly and dangerously neglected by historians and social scientists. >Historiography, >History, >Psychology. He devoted his career to studying how imitation can breed psychological trauma and social conflict. This happens, he claimed, when the model imitated becomes an obstacle to the self-esteem and self-realization of the imitator.(1) Cf. >Imitation/Psychology. The form of imitation most likely to generate resentment and conflict, according to Girard, is the imitation of desires. We imitate not just means but also ends, not just technical instruments but also targets, objectives, goals and ways of life. This, in our opinion, is the inherently stressful and contentious form of emulation that has helped trigger the current sweeping anti-liberal revolt. According to Girard, human beings want something not because it is inherently appealing or desirable, but only because somebody else wants it, an observation that makes the ideal of human autonomy seem illusory. >Autonomy. Imitating the goals of others is also associated, Girard argues, with rivalry, resentment, and threats to personal identity. >Goals, >Resentment. Politics/post-communist world/Krastev: Girard’s insight into the persistent tendency of imitation to breed resentment, while based almost exclusively on the analysis of literary texts, is nevertheless highly pertinent to understanding why a contagious uprising against liberal democracy began in the post-communist world. Cf. >Dostoevsky/Girard. 1. René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre (Michigan State University Press, 2009). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Individuals | Durkheim | Habermas IV 91 Individual/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim thesis: The individual breaks down into two parts: a) a non-socialized part subject to self-interest and self-preservation imperatives and b) a moral part shaped by the group identity. (1) The division of the social universe into areas of the profane and the sacred is repeated psychologically in the contrast of body and soul or body and mind, in the antagonism of inclination and duty, sensuality and reason. HabermasVsDurkheim: here it becomes clearer than anywhere else how strongly Durkheim remains attached to the traditional philosophy of consciousness. He distinguishes between states of individual and collective consciousness, but both are considered states of consciousness of the individual. (2) Individual/Durkheim: owes its identity as a person exclusively to Habermas VI 92 the identification with or internalisation of characteristics of collective identity; personal identity is a reflection of collective identity. Durkheim: "So it is not true if we believe that the more individualistic we are, the more personal we are." (3) Habermas IV 93 MeadVsDurkheim: unlike Durkheim, Mead assumes that identity formation takes place via the medium of language communication. And since the subjectivity of one's own intentions escapes by no means from the desires and feelings, the instances of I and superego (in Mead "I" and "Me") must emerge from the same process of socialization. >Identity/Mead, I/Self/Mead, Individuation/Mead. 1. E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, p. 37. 2. E. Durkheim, Le dualisme de la nature humaine et ses conditions sociales, in: ders.La science sociale et l’action, (Ed) J. C. Filloux, Paris 1970, p. 330. 3. Durkheim (1981). p. 369. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Inverted Spectra | Shoemaker | Stalnaker I 19 Qualia/exchanged spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: Shoemaker tried to reconcile the visibility of reversed spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. >Functionalism, >Materialism. StalnakerVsShoemaker : per old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative character of experience are possible. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. Stalnaker I 233f Inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Paradox/Stalnaker: E.g., four people, partly differently wired/without backup system. Paradox: it follows that in a person two qualia would be the same and different at the same time. >Qualia. Solution/Stalnaker:we need two different identity criteria. >Criteria, >Identity, >Identity criterion, >Identity conditions. Functional Theory: provides intrapersonal criteria. >Personal identity. Identity of the physical realization: provides criteria for interpersonal identity. Problem : the two equivalence relations can not go together. I 236 The addition of the back-up system changes the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms. >Memory. Problem: subsequent changes in the system, but also unrealized possibilities change the qualitative character. >Qualities. I 237/8 The paradox can be solved by the asymmetry. - But only if we allow that intentionality plays a role in the individuation of qualia. >Intentionality, >Individuation. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Memory | Nietzsche | Ries II 81 Memory/On the genealogy of Morality(1)/Nietzsche: it never worked out without blood, torture, sacrifice, if the human considered it necessary to make a memory. 1. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. --- Danto III 212 Memory/Nietzsche/Danto: He characterizes the human as the animal that makes promise and thus has a "memory of the will".(1) Danto III 213 Forget/Nietzsche/Danto: Forgetting is not something that happens to us. It is something we do. The human is the necessary forgetful animal. In this sense, remembering is only a matter of not-forgetting. Problem: How can we then comprehend ourselves as an identical person in time, who is still bound to the same promise?(2) >Personal identity, >Temporal identity. According to Nietzsche, the technique of inflicting pain makes the human calculable. Cf. >Violence. 1. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 308. 2. Ibid. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Method | Levinson | Upton I 147 Method/Levinson/Upton: Levinson based his theory of adult development on a series of in-depth interviews with 40 adult males between 35 and 45 years of age at the time the interviews were carried out during the late 1960s (Levinson, 1986)(1). He was motivated to carry out this study because he wanted to try to make sense of his own midlife transition. A clinical psychologist trained in psychoanalysis, Levinson called the interviews ‘biographical’, explaining to participants that the primary task was to construct the story of a man’s life. The aim was to cover the entire life sequence from childhood to the present time in each person’s life. (Levinson (1986(1), 1996(2)). The men that Levinson interviewed worked either as biology professors, novelists, business executives or industrial labourers. The biographical interviews lasted one or two hours and from six to ten interviews were carried out with each participant. The questions asked focused on the individuals’ accounts of their own experiences in their post-adolescent years, focusing on topics such as the men’s background (education, income etc.) and beliefs about issues such as religion and politics. The men were also asked about major events or turning points in their lives. Over half of the men Levinson spoke to described midlife as the last chance to reach their personal goals. These goals were linked to key events such as reaching a particular level of income, or to career points such as being a supervisor or full professor. The remaining men felt negatively about their lives because they were in dead-end or pointless jobs. In the 1980s, Levinson interviewed 45 women of the same age (Levinson, 1996)(2). The sample comprised equal numbers of women who were either homemakers, college instructors or businesswomen. He found that, in general, women go through the same type of life cycles that men do. However, they were less likely to enter adulthood with specific goals and, as a result, were less likely to define success in terms of key career events. Rather than focusing on external events, women usually sought changes in personal identity in midlife. Upton I 148 VsLevinson/Upton: While it is good that Levinson acknowledged this personal interest, [one] might wonder whether this influenced his interpretation of the findings. [One] might also argue that the biographical interview is not very objective and that Levinson’s sample is not very representative. (…) men who were interviewed for Levinson’s studies would have been born between 1924 and 1934. They were therefore raised in the 1930s and i 940s. Women and men who grew up during this time were gender-typed to a much greater extent than males and females are today. Other problems with the studies: Life experiences: Men who have grown up in the last few decades may well have had to deal with less stable families due to high divorce rates, as well as having to deal with a different kind of economy. Women: the upbringing, aims and expectations of women today are very different from those at the time of Levinson’s work. >Method, >Experiments. 1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf. 2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Midlife Crisis | Levinson | Upton I 145 Midlife Crisis/Levinson/Upton: the transition from ages 40—45 is an especially significant time of life - a time of midlife crisis when a person questions his or her entire life structure, raising unsettling questions about where they have been and where they are heading. Levinson based his theory on a series of in-depth interviews and characterized 80 per cent of the men he studied as experiencing intense inner struggles and disturbing realizations in their early forties. Women: women, however, experience significant crisis during the transition at age 30, as well as in the transition to middle age. Levinson (1986(1), 1996(2)). >Stages of Development/Levinson, >Method/Levinson. VsLevinson see >Midlife Crisis/Psychological theories. Upton I 147 Women: In the 1980s, Levinson interviewed 45 women of the same age (Levinson, 1996)(2). The sample comprised equal numbers of women who were either homemakers, college instructors or businesswomen. He found that, in general, women go through the same type of life cycles that men do. However, they were less likely to enter adulthood with specific goals and, as a result, were less likely to define success in terms of key career events. Rather than focusing on external events, women usually sought changes in personal identity in midlife. 1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf. 2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Lewis | V XIII Thing/time/particular/permanent/Lewis: permanent individual things consist of temporal parts, which are combined by various types of continuity - ((s) continuants are not mentioned here). Cf. >continuants, >temporal identity, >personal identity, >change. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Parts | Nozick | II 99 Part/whole/Nozick: a whole is not equal to the sum: different parts always form another sum, but that may be an equal whole. >Mereology, >Wholes, >Part-of relation, >Mereological sum, >Totality. A body can lose the appendix or get dentures. - Body remains a whole during the time (identical). - The sum is not identical when parts are replaced. >Body, >Identity, >Temporal identity, >Person, >Personal identity, >Continuants. The self (whole) may even lose memories and change goals and dispositions. >Memory, >Actions, >Goals, >Dispositions. Identity of the parts is not sufficient for continuity of the whole: the relations of the parts could be changed. >Relations. The whole is not equal to sum: scheme of the next successor: the n.c. of the sum is the sum ofthe n.c. of the parts. >Next Successor/Nozick. But the next successor of the whole is not the sum of the next successor of the parts (similar for numbers). Later successor: body, but not the sum of the parts. Self: is therefore a whole, not a sum. Whole/criterion: it could also exist if it were made of other parts. II 102 The whole thing must not be a conglomerate. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Person | Durkheim | Habermas IV 85 Person/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim: "What makes a human a person is what he/she has in common with other people, what makes him/her a human in himself/herself and not a certain person. Kant sees the senses, the body, everything that individualizes as antagonistic for the personality. This is because individuation is by no means the essential characteristic of the person."(1) >Person/Kant. Habermas: the identity of the person is initially only a reflection of the collective Habermas IV 86 identity; this secures social solidarity in a quasi "mechanical" form. >Identity/Henrich, >Personal Identity. 1.E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981 S. p. 367f. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Person | Geach | I 246f Person/personal identity/Locke/Geach: Locke's problem can be reformulated as such: even if every human is a person and every person a human, we cannot conclude that the predicate "___ is the same person as ___" and "___ is the same human as___" fall together in use. >Person/Locke, >Personal identity. Locke: "Every human is a person" is equal to: "Every human is the same person as the one thing or the other"! - according to "every person is a human being". Geach: Human and person could, according to Locke, simply diverge as different ways to count them. E.g., Human/identity/Locke/Geach: to make sure, Locke assumed (erroneously) that there is no special way that an individual with a proper name had to be identical with itself. - This must be wrong, if the above is correct. - Because with a name, we are constantly referring to the same thing. >Names, >Identification, >Individuation, >Reference. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Person | Habermas | IV 158 Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. >Identification, >Individuation, >Individuals, cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Person/Strawson, cf. >Continuants, >Personal identity. IV 159 While entities are generally determined by the fact that a speaker can make a statement of them, persons belong to the class of entities who can take on the role of a speaker themselves. For categorization as a person, it is not enough that a person can say "I", but how they do it. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Subjects. The expression "I" not only has the deictic meaning of the reference to an object, it also indicates the pragmatic attitude or perspective from which the speaker expresses himself/herself. >Reference, >Perspective. In the communicative role of the speaker, someone addresses at least one listener. >Speaking, >Communication. IV 160 The peculiarity of the person is explained by the fact that persons do not have to acquire the identity conditions first and even the criteria by which they can be identified under these conditions (...) until they can be identified at all as a person and, if necessary, as this particular person. >Person/Locke, >Person/Kant, >Person/Strawson. IV 161 Identity/Person/Habermas: since persons acquire their identity through linguistically mediated interaction, they fulfil the identity conditions for persons and the basic identity criteria for a certain person not only for others but also for themselves. They see themselves as people who have learned to participate in social interactions. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. The person can answer the question of what kind of person he/she is, not just one of all. Identity criteria/conditions of identity/Habermas: are only fulfilled by the person when he/she is able to attribute the corresponding predicates to himself/herself. >Identity criteria, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Person | Kant | Strawson V 142 Person/personal identity/Descartes: (not physical!) - Our ordinary concept brings very well empirically applicable criteria for numerical identity of a subject with itself (concept!). But not by self-ascription - "I" is simply used without criteria. >Criteria/Kant. KantVsDescartes: the only criteria would be: "the same person", "the same soul" - that would be circular. >Circular reasoning, >Temporal identity. V 146 Kant: there is no inner intuition of the subject. >Subject/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Person | Locke | Graeser I 224 Person/Locke: by identity of consciousness, not the numerical identity of the substance. Euchner I 55f Person/Locke: awake/sleeping: not the same person (probably the same human being). Person: someone who attributes past actions to himself. Man/humanLocke: bound to shape. VsDescartes: when separated from the mental it is possible that a contemporary man was the person Nestor, but not the man Socrates. >Personal identity. Ethics: a drunk person is not liable if without consciousness. >Ethics, >Morals/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Person | McGinn | I 98 Person/McGinn: subject to a kind of physically-related sequence ratio: two physically identical bodies, must be both persons, if one of them is a person. - because for personality, there will be no difference, which is not based on physical difference. >Personal identity, >Subject. >Subjectivity. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Person | Nagel | III 105 Identity/person/personal identity/temporal/objectivity/subjectivity/Nagel: underlying problem: even if any set of conditions is met, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject. >Personal identity, >Identity/Henrich, >Subject. Even a metaphysical ego raises the question again - when temporal identity is only to be guaranteed by my metaphysical ego, this cannot not be the individual that guarantees my personal identity. >Temporal identity, >Individual, >Metaphysical I, cf. >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Person | Singer | I 74 Person/P. Singer: The term originates from the theatre, where different roles could be taken through masks. The person later corresponded to the role someone plays in life. >Roles/Goffman. Definition Person/Locke, John: a thinking, intelligent being who possesses reason and reflection and can see itself as itself, as the same thinking thing at different times and in different places. (J. Locke(1)). >Person/Locke, cf. >Person/Kant, >Personal Identity. P. Singer: that is close to Fletcher's concept of the human being. I 75 Definition Person/P. Singer: I suggest to understand them as rational and self-confident beings. Self-Consciousness/Terminology/P. Singer: I equate self-consciousness and self-awareness. >Rationality, >Self-consciousness, >Awareness. 1. J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (1690), bk. II, chap. 27, par.9. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Person | Williams | Nozick II 29f Self/Person/Self-identity/Identity/B. Williams: e.g. two stories together that put us to a mystery: 1st case: one person enters a new body, actually two people exchange their bodies. A-body-person: (now connected with the A-body): has all the memories, knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (earlier, complete) person B - if A could choose which pain should be inflicted after the change, he would choose the A-body for it - because he assumes that he lives in B. 2nd case: someone tells them to endure pain. after that, you will learn that you will undergo a change in your psychological condition - so that you will possess the character of someone else - which frightens you, you don't want to lose your identity and then endure pain. Question: Why did the A-person not have the same fears in the first case? Why is case 1: Transfer of a person to another body and case 2: something that happens to a permanent person? Why does memory play a role in case 1? II 31 Difference 1/2: in 2, B does not acquire the memories of A. Nozick II 29f Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: e.g. Symmetric case: Outside view: two people swap bodies, A is now in the B-body and decides that B (now in his old A-body) pain should be inflicted instead of him in the new body - inside view (symmetric): You are supposed to get pain inflicted which frightens you, before you should get another character which frightens you even more - you choose the pain for yourself to ward off the loss of the person - other decision, symmetric case. Problem: nothing outside influences A's task and acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can then two tasks and acquisitions lead to an exchange of bodies? Williams: Thesis: physical identity is a necessary condition for personal identity. II 31 Problem: what happens elsewhere can have no effect on whether A continues to live in the A-body. Williams: Thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Nozick II 32 Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: Principle 1: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of any kind. Principle 2: if it is possible that there is another thing that prevents identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist. NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. E. g. The Vienna Circle dissolves - several successor groups emerge - then the identity depends on something that happens elsewhere ((s) whether there are several groups). >"closest continuer, . Nozick II 33 Identity/time/next successor/NozikVsWilliams: but dependence on the existence of other things: whether a group can call itself a Vienna circle depends on whether there are other groups in exile - if two things are equally close to the original, there is no next successor (closest continuer). Identity in time: necessary condition: to be next successor. II 35 If God provided causally for identity in time, he would also have to decide how the factors should be weighted. >Ship of Theseus. II 40 It may be that the next successor is not close enough. II 41 Randomly created copy is not a next successor (because of missing causality) - we could have the second one without the first one. II 45 Identity in time/problem: overlapping. >Overlapping, >Identity, >Personal identity, >Continuity, >Change, >Temporal identity. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Political Theory | Postmodernism | Gaus I 47 Political Theory/Postmodernism/Bennett: Postmodern theory often takes the form of genealogical studies which reveal how discursive practices and conceptual schemata are embedded with power relations, and how these cultural forms constitute what is experienced as natural or real (Butler, 1993(1) ; Brown, 1995(2); Ferguson, 1991(3)). >J. Butler. One of the political insights of postmodern theory is that ‘the stakes of a democratic politics … are as much about the modern crisis of representation as they are about the distribution of other goods’ (Dumm, 1999(4): 60). Much genealogical work, however, also insists upon the material recalcitrance of cultural products. Gender, sexuality, race, and personal identity are viewed as congealed responses to contingent sets of historical circumstances, and yet the mere fact that they are human artifacts does not mean that they yield readily to human understanding or control (Gatens, 1996)(5). >Identity/Postmodernism, >Gender, >Sex Differences, >Identity Politics. 1. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. New York: Routledge. 2. Brown, Wendy (1995) States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Ferguson, Kathy E. (1991) The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 4. Dumm, Thomas (1999) ‘The problem of the We’. boundary 2, 26 (3): 55–61. 5. Gatens, Moira (1996) Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. New York: Routledge. Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rationality | Rawls | I 143 Rationality/Rawls: our view here is broadly in line with the standard model in social theory.(1)(2) The rational person/Rawls: be a person with a coherent set of preferences between options open to him/her. The person assesses the options with a view to his/her purposes. The person follows the plan that fulfils most of his/her wishes and has the better chances of success. >Goals, >Purposes, >Purpose/means rationality. Rawls: in addition, I rule out resentment. I 145 Initial state of a society to be established/Rawls: here we must assume that the persons involved have a sense of justice and the compliance of their principles and can expect this from others. They will know that agreements are not in vain. >Society/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance. I 418 Rationality/Rawls: the duration of a rational consideration must be taken into account, so that it becomes irrational at some point to look for the best plan. >Planning/Rawls. It is rational to follow a satisfactory plan if the expected results of further consideration do not compensate for the disadvantages of the loss of time. This assumes that a person has a certain decision-making competence with regard to his or her own situation when making rational decisions. I 422 The guiding principle for a rational individual in the pursuit of his or her plans should be that he or she will never have to blame himself or herself for the way in which these plans are ultimately realized. As an identical individual in time, it must be able to say that it has done in every moment what requires or at least allowed a weighing of the reasons.(3)(4) >Personal identity, >Responsibility. 1. Cf. Amartya Sen, Cellective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970. 2. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963. 3. See Charles Fried, Anatomy of Values, (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 158-169. 4. Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1970), esp. ch. VIII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Self- Reference | Proust | I 243 Self-reference/animal/representation/Proust: large primates can refer to themselves when they have been teached the use of symbols, chimpanzees and orang utans - but not gorillas - can also recognize themselves in the mirror. But it does not follow that they have a sense of personal identity. >Identity, >Personal identity, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self, >Person, >Personality. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Similarity | Baudrillard | Blask I 106 Similarity/Baudrillard: "...this disgusting promiscuity with itself, which calls itself similarity." Blask I 82 Identity/Baudrillard: Baudrillard recommends the search for the other in order to escape the obligation to be oneself, the necessity of one's own search for identity. "Never to be oneself, but never to be alienated: to enter from the outside into the form of the other." The highest pleasure lies in metamorphosis. >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Person, >Subject, >Human, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Change. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Society | Sen | Brocker I 892 Society/Sen: Not individual private law subjects existing for themselves constitute society by negotiating a social contract that promotes their respective interests separately from each other. The opposite is true: subjects find their personal identity through - always controversial - social roles as well as a political deliberation that adjusts the same in each case; only in the course of this, i.e. only in and through society, do they determine their private interests. In public space and in the debate about the political generality Brocker I 893 the private-individual is constituted.(1) In short: "Individual freedom is essentially a social creation".(2) >Freedom/Sen, cf. >Individuals, >Roles, >Democracy, >Deliberative Democracy, >Interests. 1. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, p. 44 2. Ibid. Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Time Travel | Lewis | V 67 Time Travel/Lewis: thesis: it is possible. - The paradoxes are merely curiosities. - They involve a discrepancy between time and time. Problem: how can the same event (departure and arrival) be separated by two time distances with different length. Wrong: to postulate several time dimensions. For the time traveler would not be able to find his comrades on a surface. V 69 Solution: separation of external time and personal time of the traveler, as measured by his clock. - No matter what happens to the clock - we do not want to define time operationally, but functionally. - I.e. the clock is infallible by definition. V 70 Functional role in the event pattern of time traveler. - E.g. his hair is growing, but that is not time, but only the same role as in normal life. - It is the personal time of the traveler - this is sufficient to transfer the temporal vocabulary. >Functional role/Lewis. V 71 Time travel: the life of the traveler is like a railway track: e.g. a place 2 miles east might as well be a place 9 miles west. E.g. loop: the track crosses an earlier section of itself once - external time: unique encounter - personal time: repeated - Event: separated in the personal time, united in the external time. Time Traveler: is not there twice in full person, but in two full states. - (> Person state). Problem: What unites these states? Different problem: if the time travel is instantaneous, there is a break in the time line. - Then there are two people and none of them is the time traveler. V 73 Time travel/Causality: 1) the time travel requires personal identity and thus causal continuity. - Thus reverse direction. >Personal identity. The direction of counterfactual dependence and causation is controlled by the direction of other asymmetries of time, so reverse causality and thus causal loops cannot be excluded. That does not mean that the loop as a whole is the cause or can be explained. >Counterfactual dependence. Problem: information transfer. - E.g. if the information must be transmitted first to build the time machine, there is no solution. The person and person-states of the time travel have to be defined simultaneously. - Otherwise, they will be assumed to be mutually circular. V 74f For the journey we only need three-dimensional space without time as a fourth dimension. V 75f Time travel/Grandfather paradox: the past cannot be changed, because moments cannot be split into temporal parts which could be reversed. Murdering of the grandfather is either contained timelessly in the past or it is timelessly not contained. Wrong: Original and new past: instead: one and the same thing is localized twice (like railroad crossing in eight-shaped railway track). So a killing during time travel is a contradiction: both killing and not killing. But past is no particular character. - Also present and future are unchangeable, because their moments have no temporal parts. "Can"/capability: is ambiguous: a monkey cannot speak Finnish, because of its anatomy, I can’t speak it, but I have not learned it. Narrower and broader set of facts. Murdering of the grandfather is possible because of narrow set: everything you need for murder. - But no more set: father-son relation, the end of life of the grandfather, etc. Branched time: (branching after the murder of the grandfather) no solution, because the past is not changed. It is consistent that the grandfather is alive and dead, but in different branches, but there are not two events. >Event/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Mereology | Verschiedene Vs Mereology | Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel Vs Metaphysics | I 126 Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this. III 105 Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered. Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions! (s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.). Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?" III 106 Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal identity. Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described! Subjective Perspective: here, the question of identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description. III 107 You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one. III 124 NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted. This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena. NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it. Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Perry, J. | Lewis Vs Perry, J. | Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Utilitarianism | Mackie Vs Utilitarianism | Stegmüller IV 311 Intention/Mackie: "straight rule": acoording to that one is responsible for all of one's own deliberate acts. IV 312 Ex. I continue despite lack of experience - one can taunt me of having taken the consequences into account. Punishment/praise/criticism/VsUtilitarianism/Mackie: Vs utilitarian justification: here, the only justification of punishment is deterrence. Since one can only be deterred of deliberate acts, only those should be linked to sanctions. This is a mistake: IV 313 Ex. it's quite possible that a potential murderer is deterred more effectively if everyone who kills someone (even unintentionally) is punished in the same manner as if only those are punished who did it on purpose. Intention/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: one can say that a moral system certainly has an influence on the intentions of an actor! The awareness of one's own moral duplicity is somewhat like a punishment in itself. "Straight rule:" according to that one is responsible for all one's own deliberate acts. Thereby it becomes comprehensible that we want to apply this moral principle also to our legal penalties. IV 314 Punishment/Mackie: is appropriate if it appears to be justified in moral categories. Ex. negligence: moral and legal considerations do not need to coincide. Ex. the same action may have less harmful effects occur in a specific case. From a moral perspective, it seems unfair that then punishment were less severe. Ex. sale of contaminated food due to contingency (despite due diligence) is just as severely punished as in case of intent: here the utility argument of the welfare of the community has to be taken into account. IV 315 Deviations can be explained by three schemes: a) spontaneous, impulsive actions, rage b) Temporary confusion, disorders of personal identity. c) "Irresistible psychological coercion." |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Physicalism | Lewis, D. | Schw I 112 Physicalism / Humean supervenience / Lewis / Schwarz: for Lewis it comes to a tightening of physicalism. He wants to do without additional facts such as natural laws or causality in addition to the distribution of fundamental properties (f.p.). Emergence / Lewis: there may be only in the Quantum Mechanics, but not in biology, sociology or psychology. Schwarz: Lewis has a lot of counter-examples to be explained away (so Personal Identity, chap 2). Schw I 155 Knowledge of the physical truths (including the truths about ourselves) are in principle sufficient to derive all mental truths from it. |
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| Personal Identity | Lewis, D. | IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a specific relation and attachment among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: which of the permanent persons are identical with the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! (see below I-relations also exist between several things (other than identity). Thesis: every state (of a person) is I-relative and R-relative to exactly the same states. And also for all possible problem cases. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: both are identical because they are coextensive! |
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| Personal Identity | Locke, J. | I 53 Identity/Human/Person/Personal Identity/Locke: (27.Chapter II. Book of the essay: "On Identity and Diversity"). Thesis: There is a difference between any mass of matter and a structured matter that makes life possible. As far as this basis is concerned, there is no difference between plants, animals and humans. Another conception of mental identity anchors it only in the immaterial soul (Descartes) and abstracts it completely from body and form. This position can be reconciled with the idea of transmigration, for which Locke obviously did not have much sympathy. I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary man is indeed the person Nestor. But he was not Nestor, precisely because the idea of man could not be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (>Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that the nature of the substance is not important for consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he gives the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. |
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| personal Identity | Perry, J. | Lewis IV 71 PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the R-relation (> Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states) is not the same as the I-relation (between states of an individual) in this case (split). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are I-r, but because of the split not R-r. Perry thesis: every person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable to that time. It should be noted that persons can share stages: Splitting: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity-to-t is somewhat counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Qualia | Shoemaker, S. | Staln I 220 Qualia/common sense/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, local but also comparable. Against: Frege/Schlick view. Qualia/Frege/Schlick-View/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are not comparable, because it is pointless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent something communicable at all. Interpersonal comparisons of phenomenal experiences are pointless. Staln I 229 Qualia/Secondary Qualities/Shoemaker: Thesis: we need Qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities. StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach can do that too. RelationismVsQualia. I 233 Interpersonal Identity/Qualia/Functionalism/Shoemaker: thesis: functionalism alone is not sufficient for interpersonal comparisons. Solution/Shoemaker: to explain identity in terms of the identity of the physical properties that realize the Qualia. ((s) So not only the causal role? ("whatever...-"). >Shoemakers Paradox. I 236 Shoemaker: Thesis: the addition of the backup system influences the qualitative character, because it changes the memory mechanisms that are constitutive for the identity conditions for Qualia. Then Alices and Bertha's qualitative experiences differ (see above). Stalnaker: corresponds to I 239 Dualism/Stalnaker: Thesis: it is part of the physical character of things that they have non-physical effects. If they didn't, they would be physically different. If that is true, the possibility of possible worlds with zombies would be ruled out from the beginning. |
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| Presentism | Stalnaker, R. | I 128 Presentism / Stalnaker: (see above) analogous to actualism in relation to possible worlds: we are extended in time as we are extending over worlds. Then we can have real time identity. (Stalnaker pro). Fusion / fission / personal identity / Stalnaker: are then cases where separate persons were earlier identical or a person is divided into two. |
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| Personal Identity | Willams, B. | Nozick II 29 Williams: These körperliche Identität ist notwendige Bedingung für personale Identität - II 31 Problem: was irgendwo anders geschieht, kann keine Auswirkung darauf haben, ob A weiterhin im A-Körper lebt. Williams: 1. Prinzip: Identität von etwas kann nicht davon abhängen, ob es ein anderes Ding irgendeiner Art gibt. 2. Prinzip: wenn es möglich ist, dass es ein anderes Ding gäbe, das die Identität verhinderte, dann gibt es gar keine Identität, selbst wenn dieses andere Ding nicht existierte! NozickVsWilliams: beide Prinzipien sind falsch. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal Identity | Swinburne, R. | Frank I 60 Ich/persönliche Identität/Swinburne: These: völlig irreduzibel auf irgendwelche Beobachtungsgegebenheiten. Identität der Person kann gar nicht analysiert werden, es sei denn allenfalls als Sich-selbst-Gleichheit der "Seele". |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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