Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Folk Psychology | Burge | Shiffer I 37 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/Intention-Based Semantics//IBS/BurgeVsIBS/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: Burge's counter-examples are more interesting. They differ from the twin-earth examples in two points: (I) at first sight they also make a strong objection VsIBS by seemingly demonstrating that the content of belief is sometimes a function of the meaning of the word in the linguistic community. >Intentions. I 38 (II) Def "Environment-Dependent"/Role/Terminology/Burge/Schiffer/: let's say: a functional role is dependent on the environment if we cannot know whether a system is in a state that has the role F without knowing what the environment looks like. >Circumstances, >Environment. Dependent on the Environment: e.g. "every token of x is caused in y when he sees a cat": this is environment-dependent. ((s)> Putnam: "cat-single-sign-trigger"). CSF: common-sense functionalism Twin EarthVsCSF/Schiffer: the arguments work there, because they are environment-independent. This may spur a hope for a scientific functionalism, for a theory with T-correlated functional roles that are environment-dependent. BurgeVsFunctionalism: (Burge 1979(3), example turned classic, also Burge 1982a(1), 1982b(2)): E.g. Alfred's use of "arthritis" involves more than the correct use limited to inflammation of the joints. He thinks it is similar to rheumatism and says "I have arthritis in the thigh". Burge: Alfred has a wrong belief. Shiffer dito. w: World where Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh. In w, Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh w' is a possible world that is different from the other only in that Alfred's use of "arthritis" is correct there. It is accepted by the language community. (s) The language community mistakenly believes that it is possible to have arthritis in the thigh. The community as a whole is wrong (except for the doctors)). Then, Alfred's belief there is also true. Important Point/Burge: In w', Alfred does not have the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh. For this belief is false (because arthritis is only an inflammation of the joints. But the belief he has is true on its own!) ((s) He has the belief that he has a disease of which it is generally believed that he could have in the thigh. His word "arthritis" then has a different content than in w). BurgeVsCSF: in w , Alfred is in exactly the same T* -correlated states as we are in w. Therefore, if CSF were correct, he would express the same belief in both. But he does not. Therefore, CSF must be incorrect. ((s) Alfred does not assert in w' to believe this (and does not believe it), but then there are two differences between w and w'?). >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. 1. Tyler Burge: 1982a. “Two Thought Experiments Reviewed.” In: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23.2 : 284–293. 2. Tyler Burge: 1982b. "Other Bodies" In: Andrew Woodfield (Hg.): Thought and Object. New York: Oxford. 3. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Justification | Esfeld | I 146 ~ Justification/McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: the space of reasons (justifications) is further than that of the conceptual. >Space of reasons, >Concepts, >Conceptual role, >Language dependence. I 161 ~ I-you-relations/Brandom/Esfeld: I-you-relations show in contrast to relativistic I-we-relationships that the community as a whole can be wrong. I-we: I-we is the myth of the given. I-you: I-you replaces representationalism by inferentialism. I- you-relationship. There is no enforcement of consensus, the community has no privileged status. >Myth of the given. I 191ff Justification/belief/Esfeld: justification is only possible by other beliefs because these have statement form - but circumstances are not sufficient, however inferential practices are. Ultimately, we need the coherence theory. Social holism: only beliefs are isolated from the world, nothing in the world is conceptual (VsMcDowell). >Beliefs/McDowell, >Holism, >Beliefs. But beliefs are bound to the world by not being epistemically self-sufficient. (Epistemically self-contained: the content of belief state is ontological dependent on physical texture.) >Belief state, >Content. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Mentalese | Schiffer | I 73 Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts). Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening. Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value. Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language. Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure. >Mental representation. Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought). Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought). Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content. SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled. I 76 Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? >Relation theory. Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular). Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states). >Mental states. I 282 Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language. >Convention, >Intention, >Everyday language. Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese. >Conceptual role. Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken. Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here. E.g. "state with the same content". Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought. Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief. >Objects of belief, >Content. I 78 Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g. "flounders snore". Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language. I 79 Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain. >Relation theory. Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions. >Propositions, >Quantification. Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C. Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case). Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog. Problem: only under optimal conditions. SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible. I 87 Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions. I 83-90 Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass. I 189 SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree with that. 2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula. Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification. E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy. Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional. N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano). E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + + >Knowing-how, >Nonfactualism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Natural Kinds | Schiffer | I 37 Description theory/natural kind/twin earth/Schiffer: no solution: "the beings that are co-specific with such and such looking beings which I met". >Twin earth, >Description theory, >Identification, >Reference. Then "cat" refers to both. - That does not work (see below). Belief/Schiffer: belief must not be single digit, then it would not be indexed to the person. - (Twin earth: then both had the same belief anyway). >Beliefs. I 41 Natural kind/belief/Schiffer: Problem: the theories of Kripke/Putnam for natural kinds are unsuitable for belief predicates. Kripke: original term "dog": "this kind of thing" - (paradigmatic instances). >Natural kinds/Kripke, >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Belief properties. I 54 Natural kind/proposition/belief/Schiffer: E.g. Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog. Problem: the proposition cannot be the content of belief, because there is no representation of the role that represents the natural kind term "dog" here. >Proposition, >Belief content. 1. possibility: that-sentence with predicate, "that" refers to property (dog) - (Classic: they are introduced directly into the proposition). 2. Frege: the proposition does not contain the dog property, but a way of givenness, which is how Tanya imagines dog property (belief de re). >Way of givenness. Problem: then the that-sentence does not refer to the complete content of belief, but e.g. (∃m) (m is a manner of presentation of dog property & B (Tanya)). Then (3) cannot be the content of belief: (3) ‹Gustav, the property of being a dog› >That-clause. Natural kind: it may be that there is no non-pleonastic language-independent characteristic of being a dog. I 55 Natural kind/Wittgenstein/Putnam/Kripke: natural kinds are not to define by obsertion terms (or observable properties). Because we lack appropriate expressions for dog-like appearance and behavior. Correct: properties of acquaintance/Russell. >Acquaintance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Opacity | Quine | I 263 Opacity: not "belief" is opaque, but the "that"! (Kronecker-Example) - ((s) CresswellVs?). I 268 Opaque context: has no significant function - Frege: "Name of a thought", "name of a property", "name of individual concepts" - Russell: "propositional attitude". >Propositional Attitudes/Quine. I 270 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation and is not appointed to a Lion - Relative Term: the police chases a man. XI 175 Quantification in opaque contexts/FollesdalVsQuine: we would then have to make opaque contexts referentially transparent (what is true, is true of the object regardless of the givenness) - and at the same time makes extensionally opaque (some properties are necessary, other accidental) - this is the essentialism. >Quantification/Quine. Perler / Wild I 103 Referentially Opaque/Quine/Armstrong: basic: shows actual content of beliefs, not coreferentially replaceable expressions - transparent: substitutability by coreferential expressions: is suitable for the attribution of attitudes to animals. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Psychology | Chalmers | I 12 Psychology/Mind/Descartes/Chalmers: he at least assumed that everything psychological that is worthy of being dale mental has a conscious aspect. >Mind/Descartes, >Thinking/Descartes, >R. Descartes, >Aspects, >Dualism. I 359 Interestingly, Descartes often excluded sensations form the category of the mental, instead assimilating them to the bodily, so not every phenomenal state (at least as I am understanding the notion) would count as mental, either. >Sensory Impressions/Descartes. I 13 Psychology/Wilhelm Wundt/Chalmers: Wilhelm Wundt and William James had in a Cartesian way developed psychological theories using introspection to explain behaviour, making phenomenology the arbiter of psychology. They thereby denied psychology as an autonomous domain. >W. Wundt, >W. James. I 16 Psychology/Chalmers: I had assigned them to the functional side of the explanation of consciousness. This is where functionalism comes into play. >Third-person aspects, > Behavior, >Functionalism. Phenomenology: On the other hand, there is the phenomenology that deals with the qualities (Qualia): how does consciousness feel, and why is there a way in which consciousness (not self-consciousness) feels. >First person, >Phenomenology, >Qualia, >Experience, >Knowledge how. Both sides cannot simply be equated by stipulation. I 21 Psychology/Explanation/Mind/Qualia/Chalmers: there are no superordinate terms above the separation of the aspects of psychology and phenomenology (behavior and qualia). There seems to be nothing mental, which could be varied independently, if psychological, phenomenal and relational properties are fixed. (Chalmers I 360 Kripke: (1982)(1) Thesis: the content of beliefs is not determined by psychological and phenomenal properties. ChalmersVs: that is controversial, but that does not mean that the content is something irreducible). I 22 Psychological/phenomenal: both aspects seem to always appear together. I 220 Psychology/Consciousness/Chalmers: we had called the psychological side of consciousness awareness. There is a strong coherence between consciousness and awareness. >Awareness/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 221 Problem: there may be some kinds of awarenesses (psychological) which are not based on corresponding experiences (phenomenal). E.g. I am aware of who is President without connecting an experience with it. Cf. >Knowledge. 1. S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rule-Following and Private Language, Cambridge 1982 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Rabbit-Duck-Head | Lewis | V 274 Perception/view/match/Lewis: does not mean that in your mind or the soul the same is going on as is goning on before the eyes - rather it is about a informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical >causal role. - The >content is the content of belief, which tends to be caused by it. - Problem: the same visual experience can produce very different beliefs - but not the entire content can be characterized by belief. - Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then it results in the belief that there are ink and paper. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Reference | Ramsey | III 68 Propositional Reference/Ramsey: Characteristics of a religious attitude - e.g. of "the earth is flat": the aspect that the earth is flat. >Aspects. Regardless of time and opportunity. >Situation, >Truth, >Content of belief, cf. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Representation | Esfeld | I 136 ~ Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. EsfeldVsDescartes: representation is intentional, not preconceptive. >Intentionality, >Representations/Descartes. Representation/Descartes: 1st A belief represents things. 2nd Access is only guaranteed by representation. 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism). >Beliefs, >Realism. Fodor: Fodor is pro Descartes, the content of belief states is derived from original representative content. Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? This does not allow conclusions. >Jerry Fodor. I 144ff Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity is not an explanation. But which one is the correct causal relation? >Similarity, >Explanation, >Semantics. VsRepresentation: a causal relation is not fixable. A representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning is therefore not in the head. >Reference, >Causal relation, >Meanings are not in the head. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Representation | Searle | Brandom I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Contents, >Intentional Contents, >Use, >Use theory. Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth and characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic but derived from the intentionality of the mind. The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves. >Intentionality, >Signs. Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he/she does not use his/her ideas and beliefs and desires: he/she simply has them. Belief: belief is a representation. It consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> More autors on representation). Representation needs background of non-representational skills. The compositionality principle without background is not sufficient. >Compositionality. Searle I 271 Pattern: patterns play in functional terms a causal role, but do not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality). II 28 f Representation: speech acts and intentional states have this in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. Key to understanding: are the fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology. Recognition needs not to contain representation. >Speech acts, >Ontology. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. III 197f Representations are private, language is public. >Language. I 195 Existence: is a truth condition. Possible existence: comprehensibility condition. >Existence/Searle. Graesser I125 Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | Searle Vs Davidson, D. | Brandom I 923 SearleVsDavidson/representation: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use occurs. According to this model, the content can not be transferred during use. >Representation, >intrinsic, >content. Davidson II 112 Only the following criterion is possible: (K2) x action is intentional under the description d only if -the actor has d a primary reason g for x to the description d and - g caused x in the right way. SearleVsDavidson: proposes two types of intentions can be distinguished: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action" Intentional act only when the first caused the second. Other condition: "predictable regulatrity" predictability depends on the rest of the convictions, and is therefore never fully explicable. To explain how it apparently despite the omnipresent possibility of differing causal chains manage to rationalize actions by specifying the strongest reason, Davidson is forced to a revision of the simple syllogistic reading of the explanation relation. Searle I 28/29 SearleVsDavidson: From the zeal to stick to the traditional categories, grows some strange terminology: >"anomalous monism" >"token identity" etc. ((s) Quotation marks by Searle.) Searle I 147 Once you realize that there are forms of causation running from bottom to top, there is nothing more to do for the notion of >supervenience in the philosophy of mind. And the analogy to ethics is just a source of confusion. (SearleVsDavidson). I 148 As Wittgenstein says: If you only wrap enough paper to various pieces of furniture, you can make them all look as if they have the same shape. Searle II 238 paratactic analysis/Davidson: E.g. Galileo said that the earth moves. Be equivalent to: The earth moves. Galilei said this. Searle: the subordinate clause of the first and the second proposition are entirely extensional. After Davidson Galilei and I become by my consent "Equal Sayer". SearleVsDavidson: we are not equal sayer, because I'm just saying that Galileo has said it. In addition, the subordinate clause is intensional. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Verschiedene Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 114 SchulteVsDavidson: the downside of the "literal" concept of meaning, which he considered to be solely accessible to theory, is that many interesting phenomena are thrown to rubbish, at least as theoretically not comprehensible. II 70 VsDavidson: (Rüdiger Bittner): From the fact that beliefs can be determined only in patterns does not follow a reasonableness of meaners (to mean). It follows only that pollsters must proceed in this way. GlüerVsBittner: to accuse Davidson of "unfathomable verificationism" seems unthinkable: the most fundamental assumption is the publicity of the meaning and the content of belief. VsEvent Ontology: various authors: events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "Modifier Theory": no events, not limited to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus. Davidson II 97 Jaegwon Kim: Identifying events not as individual individuals, but with the help of properties. Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Differentiation between event tokens and description. II 141/142 HaugelandVsDavidson:It is not immediately clear that the term "event" in (NK) and (AI) is used in the same way. (macro/micro). The identity relations between macro- and micro-level are not trivial. Davidson's argument is not conclusive without additions that allow an unambiguous assignment. Another question: Scope of the argument: Davidson leaves open whether there can be mental events that are outside of any causal interaction with physical events. An event that does not interact with physical events would therefore be causally impotent and difficult to identify as such. (Other AuthorsVs: Assumption is pointless!). 1.Vs: Jaegwon Kim: the supervenience principle contradicts the anomalism thesis. If every mental token could be described physically unambiguous, would it not then be possible to form an extension-equivalent physical predicate P? ..+.. II 145 f II 147 II 150 2.Vs Isn't the mental causally irrelevant? (Fodor: "epiphobia": fear of epiphenomenalism). 3. HaugelandVsDavidson: Criticism against the ontological prerequisites of the token identity thesis. The concept of the event contains, as we have seen, ambiguities (micro/macro). Lanz I 281 Are micro-events identical to everyday events? Haugeland: For example, wave movements can hardly be described physically. + Doesn't that mean: what is considered a single token depends on the description? Wouldn't it be more plausible to assume that different discourses not only sorted differently, but also constituted different individuals? Haugeland: The world is given to us just as little in the form of prefabricated individuals as they are already categorized independently of our means of description. This would have had fatal consequences for the token identity thesis if it had been transferred to mental entities, because Davidson has no independent argument for their identification with events. LanzVsDavidson: if representation is only determined by causality, no error is possible. EMD II 220 James CargileVsDavidson: 1. You might think "Shem beat Shaun" would consist of two names and a two-digit relation but that is wrong. 2. The sentence is actually a three-digit relational form with two names and an existence quantifier. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Representation | Pro | Esfeld I 137 Content of belief states / Fodor: thesis: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental Representation originally). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reduction | Block, Ned | Schiffer I XIV Reductionism / Block: Problem: does not matter if you have nothing to say in the end about what HAS BEEN Reduced, in this case the content of belief. (1986). |
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| Representation | Fodor, J. | Esfeld I 137 Content of belief states / Fodor: is derived from the original representational content. (Mental representation is the origin). (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). F / L IV 127 Representation / Fodor / Lepore: their semantics is atomistic. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Relation Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 49 Thesis: the "propositional" theory of belief as relation to propositions needs natural art concepts. (see below). I 54 Classical Propositional Position/Schiffer: Thesis: predicates in that-sentences simply refer to the properties and relations they express and introduce directly into the propositions. I 55 2. Possible position: Frege's view: Thesis: the proposition provides the whole content of belief, but does not contain dog-ness but a way of being given dog-ness that is not explicit in (2). But that is how Tanya imagines dog-ness. (Frege is concerned with belief de re of normal physical objects.) A representative of this view would deny that the that-sentence in (2) refers to the full content. According to him, (2) is best represented in this way: (Em)(m is a way of givenness of dog-ness & B (Tanya, )). I 93 Relation Theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: new thesis: a sentence S has its truth condition 1. by the bR of some of its parts and properties - 2. by certain causal relations to things (for the explanation of reference and denotation) - thus ultimately reliability determining for the truth conditions, because the combination of bR/causality plays a role in the maximization of reliability - this also explains the nature of reliability. |
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