Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Searle | I 57 LewisVsBehaviorism: behaviorismus consideres non-causal relationships. I 77 Beliefs and desires/Searle: beliefs and desires do not need to be postulated, they will be experienced consciously and not be in question. >Belief, >Wishes. I 48 ff Methodological behaviorism: psychology: encompases stimulus/response. >Stimulus/Reaction. Logical Behaviorism (Ryle, Hempel): only encompasses behavior. >Behavior/Ryle, >Behavior, >Hempel. SearleVsBehaviorism: the disposition is unclear. Circles: belief is only explainable by wishes and vice versa. Super SpartansVsBehaviorism. >SearleVsBehaviorism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Searle Vs Behaviorism | I 30 Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism). I 49 SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition". Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957)(1). I 50 LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966)(2). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being. I 57 Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input, 2. To the various other "mental" states and 3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output. Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions. VIII 428 Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma: a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting! 1. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 2. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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