Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pragmatism | Ayer | I 293 Truth/pragmatism/Ayer: one can not distinguish between what is true and what one thinks is true. >Truth, >Content, >Belief, >Belief content, >Reality, >World. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Pragmatism | Rorty | VI 105 Pragmatism/Reality/Rorty: pragmatism thinks it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos really are entities or are merely useful heuristic fictions. >Fiction, >Theoretical entities. VI 111 Difference/Pragmatism: every difference must make a difference in terms of practice. >Distinction without a difference, >Practise. VI 112 G.K. ChestertonVsPragmatism: "Pragmatism is about human needs, and one of the most important human needs is to be more than a pragmatist." Vi 186 Language/Sellars: cannot be verified at all on the base of non-linguistic things! Rorty: Therefore, only utility is interesting for pragmatism. >Benefit. There is nothing non-human, to which we are committed! VI 286f Preference for small compromises rather than large theoretical syntheses. VI 290 VI 425 Truth/pragmatism/benefits/James/Rorty: contrary to some problematic formulations by James the truth is timeless, so it cannot be mixed up with benefits. (RortyVsJames, W.). >William James, >John Dewey, >Charles Sanders Peirce. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | James | Diaz-Bone I 81 Truth/Pragmatism/Diaz-Bone: It is a misinterpretation of pragmatism: True is, what is useful as seeing it true. I 85 Definition truth/James: true representations are those that we can appropriate, hear, verify, and make effective. False ideas are those in which we cannot do these things. I 86 Being true is an event! However, it remains unclear what James means exactly with "accordance"! Truth leads our actions to reality. I 88 Truth/James: Analogy to Money: Credit: belief, can later turn out to be wrong. --- Horwich I 17 Truth/Pragmatism/James: he naturally accepts the lexicon meaning: truth is a property of some of our ideas. Problem: what is accordance, what is reality. Horwich I 18 Thesis: we must ask what difference does the truth of a sentence make for our life? How is it recognized? How does it pay off in experience concepts? True ideas are those that we can evaluate, reaffirm, and verify. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, through events. Verification: verification is a process as well as validity: namely validation. Horwich I 19 The possession of true thoughts is the possession of instruments of action. One can say they are useful because they are true or true because they are useful. Truth is the name for what starts the verification process and what it accomplishes. True ideas would never be selected if they were not useful. Horwich I 20 Reality/Object/James: either "things" or also relations in the everyday sense like data, places, distances, types, actions. Truth/Mathematics/James: it is either a principle or a definition that makes true, for example, 1 and 2 = 3, etc. Or, for example, that more differs from black than from gray. Effect/James: the effect begins as soon as the cause begins. These are all mental objects. No sense experience is required. Logical truth/James: the only risk is to encounter these truths at all. You have to name them correctly because you cannot help it. (1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Peirce | Wright I 66 Definiton Truth/Peirce: that what is justified on an ideal border of recognition when all empirical information is obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one cannot simply know when one has all the information. Wright dito. Cf. >Lists, >Knowledge, >Completeness. --- Horwich I 448 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: Peirce: For Peirce truth is the ideal final stage. >Pragmatism, >Truth/Pragmatism. JamesVsPeirce: neglects the mind. "True of" is no analyzable relation - (at least not between inhomogeneous entities). Rorty: thus James omits correspondence. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >True-of. Dewey: completes the way: only the try to interpose "language" or "ghost", can let intentionality appear interesting.(1) >Intentionality, >Language, >Mind. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey | Peirce Vs Dewey | Dewey I 179 PeirceVsDewey: VsPragmatic concept of truth. >Pragmatism, >Truth/Pragmatism. |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 |
| Pragmatism | Brandom Vs Pragmatism | I 196 BrandomVsPragmatism: you can know what follows from an assertion, for example, that an act is immoral without having understood the claim. ((s) Overemphasis on the consequences). Horwich I 444 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory (endorsing) use b) warning use: E.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true," I 445 c) disquotationale use: designed to meta-linguistically express "S is true iff. __ ". JamesVs b) and c). Relativism/Rorty: that is why pragmatism was equaled with relativism. Truth/Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson accepts all three, without the idea that usefulness of beliefs could be explained by truth. BrandomVsPrimitive pragmatism/Rorty: (truth = assertibility): is refuted by the use of "true" in the antecedent of conditionals. Brandom: an evolution of Frege and CGB (pro-sentence theory, Camp, Grover, Belnap) receives Dewey’s intentions. Pro-sentence theory/Brandom: receives the anti-descriptive approach of pragmatism ((s) truth not a property). Brandom/Rorty: shows how the pro-sentence theory can be reconciled with Davidson’s disquotationalism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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