Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Animals Dupré I 315
Animal/Speech/Thinking/Dupré: it is not quite correct to speak of "pets", it is rather a coevolution of humans and other species that live for a long time in a symbiotic relationship. "Domestication" and "socialization" is something quite different. >Animals, >Animal language, >Evolution.
I 316
Animal/Communication/Intention/Dupré: an important criterion for intended communication is the possibility of deception. >Communication, >Delusion.
I 318
Animal/Thinking/Language/Descartes/Dupré: even those who defend the cognitive abilities of the animals most, often accept the Cartesian assumption that it is in principle impossible to prove the thinking or even the consciousness of animals because this would be conceptually dependent on behavior. >Behavior, >Language, >Thinking without language, >Language and thinking, >Gestures,
>Understanding.
I 319
DupréVsDavidson: if Davidson were right, the question at stake would not only be whether or not one can teach monkeys, but whether to teach them to think. >Animals/Davidson, >Language/Davidson, >Thinking/Davidson.
I 320
Animal ethics/Dupré: animal ethics does not depend in any way on the success of the project, to teach animals to speak. >Ethics.
I 321
Language/Thinking/Dupré: there are many forms of non-verbal behavior that allow communication, and many non-verbal manifestations of thinking. Animal/Dupré: the research of the language with monkeys can tell us much about monkeys and ourselves, which we cannot learn in a different way.


John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge

Dupré I
John Dupré
"Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Epistemology Vollmer I XX
EE/evolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: Lorenz is the father of the evolutionary epistemology. Precursor: Donald Campbell, Popper, Lorenz. >K. Popper, >K. Lorenz
Two meanings: Popper: scientific theoretical: evolution of knowledge (interactionist, VsIdentity theory).
Lorenz: Evolution of cognition. (Identity theory).
>Identity theory.
I 16
Knowledge/history/quality/primary/secondary/Vollmer: with increasing progress more and more properties were recognized as subjective. - With Locke impenetrability was still a primary quality - today even expansion is not regarded anymore as a primary quality. >Qualities, >Primary qualities, >Secondary qualities, >Properties, >J. Locke.
I 59
Epistemology: is not "reflection" of the outside world - but also not purely algorithmically. In contrast Information/Lorenz embodied : E.g. hoof: "image" of the steppe soil - E.g. fin - "image" of the water.
VollmerVsLorenz: this is a misleading terminology.
>Comparisons, >Comparability, >Analogies.
Solution : texture of the hoof indicates texture of the soil.
>Evolution, cf. >Coevolution.
I 73
Knowledge/Vollmer: its third level, scientific knowledge is not genetically determined - there are no "biological roots" of the space-time - we are only obliged to consistency - otherwise we are free in forming hypotheses.
I 173
Epistemology/tradition/VollmerVsKant: why do we have just these forms of intuition and categories? - How are they formed? - Why are we bound to these a priori judgments and not to others? >Objectivity, >Categorization, >Classification, >a priori, >Judgements, >Consistency.
I 294
Definition recognition: (1983(1),30): an adequate reconstruction and identification of external structures in the subject a) construct an internal image,
b) compare the model with the stored engrams,
c) determine in how far object corresponds to already known - for that memory is required - reconstruction is therefore not a reflection.
Our concept of knowledge is narrower than any concept of information.
Stegmüller: three-digit relation: the subject recognizes the object as image.
I 296
Recognize/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge. Knowledge/Kutschera: only to explicate as true belief. - Neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable.
>Truth, >Subjectivity, >Knowledge.
I 310
Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: - explication of terms - investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparing different cognitive systems - distinction of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements - clarification of the conditions for recognition - demonstration of limits of knowledge.
1.Gerhard Vollmer: Mesokosmos und objektive Erkenntnis. In: Konrad Lorenz, Franz M. Wuketis (Hrsg.): Die Evolution des Denkens. München 1983, S. 29–91.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Evolution Mayr I 43
Evolution/Mayr: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or the individual. (MayrVsDawkins). >Species, >Genes, >R. Dawkins, >Genes/Dawkins, >Evolution/Dawkins.
Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual.
>Selection.
I 183
Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution.
I 230
Evolution/Progress/Mayr: Cohesion: an expression of the fact that the system of development has become very narrow.
Evolution: proceeds very slowly in large, member-rich species, and very quickly in small peripheral isolated groups.
>Speciation, >punctuated equilibrium/Eldredge/Gould.
A start-up population with few individuals and therefore little hidden genetic variation can more easily assume a different genotype.
Macroevolution: is most strongly determined by the geographical factor (isolation).
I 234
Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories.
2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin.
I 235
3) Variation Evolution (Darwin)
I 235
Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species.
I 236
Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such).
2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor.
3) Species multiply over time (speciation)
4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism).
>Gradualism, >Saltationism.
5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection).
I 234
Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories.
2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin.
I 235
3) Variation Evolution (Darwin)
I 235
Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species.
I 236
Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such).
2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor.
3) Species multiply over time (speciation)
4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism).
5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection).
>Selection.
I 377
Evolution of life: a chemical process involving autocatalysis and a directing factor. Prebiotic selection. Cf. >St. Kauffman.
I 237
Pasteur: proofed the impossibility of life in oxygen-rich atmosphere! In 1953, Stanley Miller grew amino acids, urea and other organic molecules in a glass flask by discharging electricity into a mixture of methane, ammonium, hydrogen, and water vapor.
I 238
Proteins, nucleic acids: the organisms must form these larger molecules themselves. Amino acids, pyrimidines, puridine do not need to formed by the organisms themselves.
I 239
Molecular biology: discovered that the genetic code is the same for bacteria, which do not have nuclei, as in protists, fungi, animals and plants.
I 240
Missing link: Archaeopteryx: half bird half reptile. Not necessarily direct ancestor. Speciation: a) dichopatric: a previously connected area is divided by a new barrier: mountain range, inlets, interruption of vegetation.
b) peripatrically: new start-up population emerges outside of the original distribution area.
c) sympatric speciation: new species due to ecological specialization within the area of ​​distribution.
Darwin's theory of gradualism.
>Gradualism.
I 243
VsGardualism: cannot explain the emergence of completely new organs. Problem: How can a rudimentary wing be enlarged by natural selection before it is suitable for flying?
I 244
Darwin: two possible solutions: a) Intensification of the function: E.g. eyes, e.g. the development of the anterior limbs of moles, whales, bats.
b) Functional change: E.g. Antennae of daphia (water flea): additional function of the swimming paddle, which is enlarged and modified under selection pressure.
E.g. Gould: Feathers probably first for temperature control before any animal could fly.
Function/Biology: Functional differences are also related to behavioral patterns, e.g. feather cleaning.
Competing theories on evolutionary change
I 247
Salationism: Huxley later Bateson, de Vries, (Mendelists). The saltationist emergence of new species only occurs poyploidy and some other forms of chromosomal restructuring (very rare) during sexual reproduction. Teleological theories: assume that nature has a principle: Osbron's arsitogenesis, Chardin's omega principle. Should lead to perfection.
>Teilhard de Chardin.
Lamarck's Theories: Changes go back to use and non-use, environmental conditions. Until the 1930s!
I 248
Def "soft inheritance" (acquired characteristics). Was refuted by genetics. Def "hard inheritance" (so-called "central dogma"): the information contained in the proteins (the phenotype) cannot be passed on to the nucleic acids (the genotype)! (Insight of molecular biology).
I 256
Macroevolution: after saltationism, soft heredity and autogenesis, had been refuted with evolution, macroevolution had to be explained more and more as a phenomenon on the level of the population, i.e. as a phenomenon directly attributable to events and processes during microevolution. (Speciation: faster in isolation). (>Gould, Eldredge, 1971(1): "punctuated equilibrium", punctualism.)
I 281
New: we know today that the cycles of herbivores elicit those of the predators and not vice versa! Coevolution: E.g. the Yucca moth destroys the plant's ovules by its larvae, but pollens the flowers.

1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972).

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Meaning Change Gärdenfors I 72
Meaning change/language/language development/historical/Gärdenfors: historical language development is difficult to explain: changes of meaning often occur fast and cannot be predicted. Still, we are trying to establish laws for meaning change, according to which some changes are more probable than others. If my thesis is true that pragmatics is to be put evolutionary before the semantics, certain cognitive functions have been defined before the formation of the language and are a condition for this. Language is then used to represent foreign beliefs and future goals. (See Gärdenfors 2003, 2004c; Gärdenfors et al. 2012).(1)(2)(3)

Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991).(4)
Terms/Dennett: Thesis: many terms can only be formed when language is already present to some extent, such as B inflation, month, heritage.
Terms/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our terms have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression.


1. Gärdenfors, P. (2003). How Homo became Sapiens: On the evolution of thinking. Oxford.
2. Gärdenfors, P. (2004c). Cooperation and the evolution of symbolic communication. In K. Oller & U. Griebel (Eds.) The evolution of communication systems (pp. 237-256).
3. Gärdenfors et al. (2012). Gärdenfors, P. Brinck, L. & Osvath, M. (2012) Coevolution of cooperation, cognition and communication. In F. Stjernfelt, T. Deacon & T. Schilhab (Eds.) New perspectives of the symbolic species (pp. 193-222) Berlin.
4. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Symbolic Reference Deacon I 43
Symbolic Reference/Deacon: Thesis: Symbolic reference is reserved for the human species only, while many animals have complex non-symbolic reference. >Reference, >Symbols/Deacon, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning.
Grammar: Grammatical rules and categories are symbolic rules and categories.
Syntax: syntactical structures are only physical regularities if they are not regarded as symbolic operations that need to be decoded.
>Syntax.
Language theories must therefore first explain symbolic references.
>Regularities.
I 44
The fact that linguists have not paid much attention to the symbolic reference is explained by the fact that grammar and syntax can be explained by comparing languages. The correlations of speech processes and brain functions can also be explained without a symbolic reference. Language acquisition: can be explained largely without relation to symbolic reference.
>Language Acquisition.
Animal/human/language/Deacon: but theories that explain the differences between human and non-human communication cannot do without relation to symbolic references. This also applies to theories that compare human and animal minds.
>Animals, >Animal language.
I 82
Symbolic reference/Deacon: remains intact even if one stimulus is erased by another, e. g. if the coupling between a signal and a subsequent event is interrupted. An index-like association would not survive this correction. Learning symbols/animals: if one of several learned characters is erased, this has virtually no effect on the association with other characters. This is quite different in the case of words.
>Learning, >Language Acquisition.
Words: unlike symbols, words are related to all other words of a language.
>Words, >Word meaning.
I 83
Symbolic reference/Deacon: arises from combinatorial possibilities and impossibilities. This is the difference to the simple correlation of signals with stimuli. Cf. >Signals/Deacon, >Signal Language.
I 88
Symbolic reference/Deacon: no single symbol defines its reference. >Reference.
Reference arises from the hierarchical relationship between the two levels of the sign-like (index-like) reference:
a) no interaction or correlation between the elements, neither at the level of the objects nor at the level of the signs, merely association of sign and object.
b) no interaction (correlation) on the level of the objects - but on that of the signs (meaningful patterns)
>Meaning, >Meaningless, >Sense.
Symbol: It is only at the third level that symbolic representation takes place: here there is interaction (or the distinction of meaningful and pointless patterns) on both levels: that of the objects and that of the signs.
>Symbolic Representation.
New: this makes logical and categorical generalization possible, which is not possible with the generalization of stimuli (stimulus generalization).
Animal experiments: (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978; 1980 and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986): showed with monkeys that new symbols were classified relatively quickly in an already established scheme with different categories of meaning. In this context, an understanding of the functions of the relations between the signs obviously played a role. The attention of the animals was not only focused on the objects, but also on the signs and their relationship to each other.
Categories: the ability to categorize and recognize logical relationships is an essential part of learning symbolic reference.
>Categorization, >Classification.
I 89
Symbolic learning: after learning the difference between symbols for edible and non-edible objects, the animals learned to sort the objects into different containers. Later on, they learned something new: they learned how to assign symbols for the respective objects to symbols for the respective containers. In doing so, they showed that they were able to make a symbolic generalization. >Understanding, >Animal/Deacon.
I 322
Symbolic Reference/Brain/Deacon: Thesis: The emergence of the symbolic reference in our distant ancestors fundamentally changed the way natural selection processes changed the human brain since then. Ultimately, the use of language changed something that was reflected in the anatomy and structure of our brain. One could say, "The Word became flesh". >coevolution of language and brain.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013



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