Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Endurantism	Lewis	Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). >Universals. LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory). Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd. Schwarz I 32 Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]). Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times. Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away. Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change. Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change. Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 — [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–359 2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge 3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001]	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Humean World		Humean World: a world without causality - phenomenally like our world. See also David K. Lewis, Humean supervenience, Humean mosaic.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Humean World	Esfeld	I 297f Humean supervenience/Lewis: the world is a mosaic of local states of particulars (single facts). It is a simple system of external relations of space-time intervals. There is no difference without a distinction in the arrangement of properties - all supervenes on everything - point properties are always intrinsic. >Supervenience, cf. >"Mosaic", >Intrinsic, >Causality, >Causality/Hume, >Causality/Lewis, >Explanation, >Reality, >World/Thinking.	Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Humean World	Jackson	Lewis V 125 Definition Humean World/Hume World/Causality/Jackson/Lewis: (Jackson 1977)⁽¹⁾: a Humean World is a possible world in which all single facts are exactly the same as in ours, only that there are no causes. Every regular conjunction is random. Lewis: I'm not sure if there's any coincidence in Jackson's world. If so, then the false laws are like our false laws about the lifetime (of atoms or humans). >Causality, >Causation, >Regularity. Schwarz I 111 Humean Supervenience/Schwarz: a minimal version, but too weak for Lewis, would be: whenever a world without alien properties agrees in the distribution of exactly, it also agrees with ours in every other (qualitative) respect. (cf. the analog def physicalism (Jackson 1994a⁽²⁾,§2 und Chalmers 1996a⁽³⁾,38 41). >Supervenience. 1. Frank Jackson [1977]: “Statements about Universals”. Mind, 86: 427–429 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42 3.David J. Chalmers [1996a]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press	Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Humean World	Lewis	V IX Humean supervenience/HS/Lewis: Thesis: everything in the world is a large mosaic of local facts - there is a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points - at the points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties - everything is an arrangement of qualities (AoQ). Everything supervenes on it. Important argument: there is no distinction without difference. - That does not mean that two possible worlds could not be different without having a difference in the AoQ. Cf. >Causality/Hume. Example 1) possible worlds with Humean supervenience, 2) possible worlds without! - ((s) i.e. Humean supervenience is contingent). Lewis: for our inner sphere of possibilities there is no such distinction. V VII Arrow of time: only in one direction - the Humean supervenience has to consider this asymmetry. - Humean supervenience/(s): does not mean here that causality is denied. --- V X Materialism/Humean supervenience/Lewis: materialism is a metaphysics that is to confirm the truth of known physics. Humean supervenience: it may be that the Humean supervenience is true and all our physics wrong. V 111 Humean supervenience/Coincidence/Lewis: If the Humean supervenience is wrong, there is a fatal counter e.g., which is made by coincidences - then coincidences and coincidence theories do not supervene on facts. Problem: a theory of coincidence is not something that itself may only have a certain chance - (which also says the Principal Principle PP) - an equally likely deviant pattern would lead to an entirely different coincidence theory. Right: chances are contingent because they depend on contingent facts, but not because they depended on a theory of coincidence - then the Humean supervenience is maintained. --- Schwarz I 112 Humean supervenience/Lewis/Schwarz: From description which property exists at point X and which at point y we learn which properties these are, thus in which the laws of nature apply.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Humean World	Stalnaker	I 103 Humean supervenience/materialism/Stalnaker: thesis: laws and causal powers supervene on regularities. >Supervenience, >Regularities, >Causality, Humean supervenience: Humean supervenience needs criteria for cross world identity. >Possible worlds, >Identity, >Cross world identity.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Laws	Lewis	V 126 Coincidence/Law/Lewis: a random truth is one that never had a chance to be true - it does not enter the law system, because it does not contribute enough to the simplicity and strictness. >Simplicity, >natural laws. --- V 131 Law/Laws of Nature/Explanation/Humean supervenience/Lewis: I want to save Humean supervenience with the theory of the best system (as an explanation of laws). >Supervenience, >Humean supervenience. Solution: The prehistory-chance conditionals must supervene trivially by being non-contingent. Problem: this creates strong restrictions for reasonable belief.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Modal Realism	Bigelow	I 165 Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should accept a correspondence theory for modal language. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Possible worlds exist. But we have not yet said anything about what they are made of and what they are. Different kinds of realisms will assume different kinds of possible worlds. >Possible worlds. Truthmaker/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have not said anything yet about how modal sentences are made true. >Truthmakers. Realism/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: all realisms will say that it is possible that there is a world that represents the actual world as being represented as being in a certain way. ((s) >Stalnaker). Of course, all but one of them represent it wrong. >Realism. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore representations of the actual world. "Representation" is only a technical term,... I 166 ... and not exploratory. >Representation. Possible worlds: represent not only the actual world, but also other possible worlds! >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: in this way of speaking, we can then differentiate between what they see as possible worlds. Modal Realism/Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: three varieties: 1. book theories = maximally consistent sets of truthmakers - "books". 2. replica theories = thesis: worlds are not carriers of truth but replicas ((s) i.e. objects). Substitutes: David Lewis. >David Lewis. 3. property theories: = thesis: worlds cannot be understood as books, they are a multitude of books. This means that there is a multitude of truths ((s) within a possible world. There are three sets of truthmakers here: (a) set of sentences (b) set of propositions (c) sets of beliefs. Cf. >Ersatz worlds. I 173 Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must be able to explain possible worlds without using any modal basic concepts. And that is harder than it looks at first glance. There is a thesis that this is not possible at all: modalism. Definition Modalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the thesis that it is not possible to define modal terms in a non-modal way. Representatives: Lycan 1979⁽¹⁾, Plantinga 1974⁽²⁾, 1976⁽³⁾, 1987⁽⁴⁾, van Inwagen (1984⁽⁵⁾: some modalities do not need to be defined in more fundamental terms.) BigelowVsModalism. Modalism: according to Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy (avant la lettre) one could express it with the slogan thesis "No must from the is". That is to say, moral desires cannot be deduced logically and entirely from outer-moral facts. Bigelow/Pargetter: from this we can gain two attitudes: a) there are no moral truths, (moral nihilism) or b) some moral truths we must take as undefined basic facts. Modal logic/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problems with the moral "must" are reflected in the metaphysical "must". >Modal logic. Correspondence theory: is the theory which brings the problems, because without it modal basic concepts would be no problem. But since we want to keep the correspondence theory, we need better access to possible worlds. >Correspondence theory. I 174 Possible solution: cannot we just say that some things cannot be described without modal terms? Analogue: For example, name: a fantasy name like "Gough" could refer to something non-linguistic that is not a carrier of truth. In any case, we have to assume an individual. We are assuming correspondence with this. If we tried a description instead, it would reintroduce a name again. >Descriptions, >Names. Therefore, we would have to accept some names as undefined basic terms. But that would not yet be a threat to the correspondence theory. (Question/s): many basic terms would make a correspondence relationship superfluous, because something undefined does not have to be shown?) Modal Basic Term/Correspondence/Bigelow/Pargetter: analogously, we can assume that modal basic terms are not a threat to correspondence: e.g. Conchita can play guitar is true by correspondence between this statement and things in the world. >Basic concepts. The property of being able to play the guitar is assumed. (Bigelow/Pargetter pro). Modal terms/Bigelow/Pargetter: their threat comes not only from the correspondence theory, but also from their supervenience of non-modal properties. >Supervenience, >Humean Supervenience/Lewis. I 175 Supervenience/Definability/Definition/Bigelow/Pargetter: a supervenience would guarantee the definition of modal properties in non-modal terms! >Definition, >Definability. Problem: to do so, we would have to allow an infinite number of complex definitions. This would at least allow a characterization of modal terms. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the following we will consider attempts to characterize possible worlds in non-modal terms. Characterization/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): less than a definition, from many individual cases. Method/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: whenever a theory leads to modal basic concepts, we will put this theory aside. This is because it cannot then play an explanatory role within the Humean Supervenience. Not because the corresponding possible worlds did not exist. >Humean supervenience. I 187 Modal Realism/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his extremely concrete modal realism has the advantage that it would explain many things if it were true. And most people agree on that. Then why has the unbelieving gaze not disappeared? His theory has nothing irrational either. >D. Lewis, >Counterpart theory. VsLewis: to disprove him, you would have to adopt one of two strategies: 1. the initial probability is 0 (instead of something above) 2. even if the probability increases in the course of time, the increase would be infinitesimal. Ad 1.: the probability cannot increase from zero. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a probability of 0. Especially not Lewis' theory. LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma: (1) the opponents might realize that a greater intelligence has thought longer about it than they did and therefore the probability is > 0 and that he means what he says. (2) they could assume that he does not mean what he says (3) they could say that sometimes it is rational,... I 188 ... to assign a chance of zero to something, which a serious and intelligent authority has said. Rationality/Bigelow/Pargetter: from Lewis' Trilemma there would only be (3) left, and thus the question of rationality. Rationality should not lead us to the acceptance of (3). But it also remains, however, even if Lewis's position is only considered to be very unlikely. >Rationality. Problem: to deny someone rationality in an area to which, in principle, one has no better epistemic access than the critizised. Ad 2. (the probability remains infinitesimal): i.e. it does not matter how much evidence we teach. BayesVs: this could only happen after the Bayes-theorem,... I 189 ...if the required probability for each future document should be practically 1. And that is unacceptable. >Bayes-Theorem, >Bayesianism. 1. Lycan, W.G. (1979). The trouble with possible worlds. In: The possible and the actual. (ed. M.J. Loux), pp. 274-316. Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press. 2. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Plantinga, A. (1976). Actualism and possible worlds. Theoria 42, pp. 139-60. 4. Plantinga, A. (1987). Two concepts of modality. Modal realism and modal reductionism. Philosophical Perspectives Vol I: Metaphysics (ed. J. E. Tomberlin). pp.189-231. Atascadero, Calif., Ridgeview. 5. van Inwagen, P. (1985). Two concepts of possible worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp.185-92.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Parts	Inwagen	Schwarz I 34 Endurantism/Van Inwagen/Schwarz: e.g. caterpillar/butterfly: thesis: there is no insect, nothing that exists beyond the pupation. Recombination/mereology/Schwarz: the existence of temporal parts follows directly from the mereological universalism together with the rejection of the presentism. Then there are also e.g. aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower (mereological sum). Socrates is a temporal part of it which at some point ceases to exist, just as e.g. a dried-out lake that fills up again during the rain season. Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (van Inwagen 1981)⁽⁷⁾: van Inwagen basically rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsvan Inwagen: then he must radically limit the mereological universalism or be a presentist. Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis pleads for its contingency. Question/Schwarz: what should be contingent? Should there be possible worlds where the ordinary things have no temporal parts? Or should specific things be atomic in time and never change their form? Lewis seems to allow only the latter. Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/mereology/Schwarz: but if one accepts aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, one could still deny that Socrates himself has temporal parts. Lewis: Lewis also does not assert that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f⁽¹⁾,x,1986e⁽²⁾,205,1994⁽³⁾ §1) VsStowe: temporal parts are not intended to provide an analysis of the enduring existence. Lewis: (1083d⁽⁴⁾, 76, similar Armstrong 1980⁽⁵⁾, 76): e.g. a child, Frieda₁ suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda₂, suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schwarz I 35 Perhaps no one notices anything. And there is nothing to notice. Vs: this is not convincing. EndurantismVs: endurantism cannot accept the premises. Van InwagenVs: Frieda₁ and Frieda₂ cannot exist strung together, and yet remain different (2000⁽⁶⁾, 398). >Mereology, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum, >Ontology. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel. 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. Peter van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. In [van Inwagen 2001].	Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Physicalism	Chalmers	Schwarz I 111 Humean Supervenience/Schwarz: A minimal version that Lewis would find too weak would be: whenever a world with alien properties in the distribution exactly matches, it also agrees with our in every other (qualitative) aspect. (See the analogous Definition Physicalism (Jackson 1994a, §2 ⁽¹⁾ and Chalmers 1996a⁽²⁾, 38 41). >Physicalism/Jackson, >Humean World/Jackson, >Supervenience/Jackson, >Supervenience/Lewis, >Humean World/Lewis, >D. Lewis. 1. F. Jackson [1996]. Finding the mind in the natural world. In: R. Casati, B. Smith and G. White (Eds), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Vienna 2. David J. Chalmers [1996a]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Regularities	Lewis	II 198 Regularity: there is always an alternative regularity that could have fulfilled the same function if the whole process had only started differently. II 224 Regularity/Lewis: rules of syntax and semantics are not even regularities. II 234 Communication depends not only on truthfulness, but also on principles of usefulness and relevance. However, these regularities are not independent language conventions. They are by-products. >Convention/Lewis. V XI Natural Laws/Lewis: at least they are regularities without exception. Not all regularities are laws, of course. Def Natural Laws/Ramsey: Laws are those that enter into the truth systems (buy into) that are unsurpassed in severity and simplicity. This is enough for the Humean Supervenience. >Humean supervenience. Simplicity/Lewis: what is simple is certainly not contingent. And the regularities (or candidates for truth systems) are supervised on the arrangement of qualities. V XIII Probability/Lewis: Probabilities are in play from the beginning. If Ramsey says that laws are regularities that enter into the best systems, the question is: what kind of systems? >Probability/Lewis. V 70 Zeit/Lewis: in the life of ordinary people there is a regularity: For example, hair grows, relative to the external time. Time traveller: no regularity at external time, but there is a way of assigning coordinates to his or her travel stages and only one, so that the regularities, as they correspond to his or her attribution, match with those normally assumed in relation to external time: This is the personal time of the time traveler: for example his hair grows, etc. but it is not really time, it only plays the same role in his life as the role it plays in the life of a normal person. (functional, not operational). >Time traveller/Lewis. V 122 Law/natural law/Lewis: this is a kind of regularity theory of lawfulness, but a collective and selective one at the same time: collective: because regularities do not acquire their status as a law from themselves, but through a system within which they are either axioms or theorems, selective: because not every regularity is worthy of being called a law. Laws should have at least the following characteristics (based on chance). V 123 (1) Simplicity, rigour and their balance can only be determined in the light of competing hypotheses. But I don't want to make lawfulness dependent on the kind of access. Nevertheless, our laws would be different if our approach were different, at least in the sense that we can keep our standards fixed and ask what the laws would be like in counterfactual situations. >Simplicity. (2) With this approach, it is not possible to say whether certain generalisations are lawful, whether they are true or false, and whether the laws are the true lawful ones. Three possibilities: something can be wrong, randomly true, or lawfully true. (3) I do not say that the competing systems of truths must consist entirely of regularities. Nevertheless, the regularities in the best systems should be laws. >Best explanation. Laws: should not mention indiviuals, not even the Big Bang, but such laws should not be excluded a priori. (4) Simplicity: in order to be able to compare them, we must not allow our theories to be simply formulated with particularly trivial terms. V 124 This means that the theory must not make all properties the same! Really simple systems may only be called those that integrate real natural characteristics as simply as possible. But then it is also useless to say that natural properties are those which occur in laws ((s) that would be circular). (5) What about a regularity that occurs in some but not all systems? Three options: 1. it is not a law, (you can take the average) 2. it is a law (association), 3. It is uncertain whether it is a law. Lewis pro 1, but I hope that nature is kind enough to show us the right system in the end. I also hope that some systems are completely out of the question. Then it will not matter whether the standards themselves are unfounded.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Supervenience	Lewis	V XIII Supervenience/Lewis: E.g. successive events - so the Humean supervenience can explain mental states (as owner of >causal roles) - only problem: probability that the >arrangement of qualities will continue in one way or another. >Humean supervenience.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Supervenience	Stalnaker	I 10 Supervenience/Stalnaker: supervenience is a conceptual tool for the separation of the purely metaphysical part of a reductionist thesis. A set of facts or properties supervenes on another if possible worlds or possible individuals who are identical in relation to one property, are also necessarily identical in another property. >Equality. I 11 Supervenience is supposed to disconnect semantic from metaphysical questions. >Semantics, >Metaphysics. I 87 Supervenience: supervenience can be a) reductionist and b) non-reductionist. ((s) But in any case semantics is not a variant of reductionism.) I 98f Supervenience: ethics: in ethics supervenience is a relation of natural and judgmental properties. >Ethics. Moore: pro this distinction. Stalnaker: if supervenience distinguishes natural and judgmental properties, it is not a reduction because it does not isolate the metaphysical component of a theory. I 90 Supervenience is sometimes used instead of emergence. I 91 Def weak supervenience: supervenience is weak within a possible world. Def strong supervenience: supervenience is strong within one or in different possible worlds. Global supervenience: supervenience is global if any two possible worlds, which are B-indistinguishable, are also A-indistinguishable. Global supervenience must be improved - like this, it is not even sufficient for weak supervenience. I 93 Supervenience is indistinguishable in terms of a mapping function from one possible world to another. >Possible worlds. I 99 Supervenience: supervenience is contingent. E.g. Lewis: print image of black dots. If we add a few colored dots, two pictures can differ in the global properties without differing in the distribution of the (black) dots. Global property: e.g. symmetry: more general: the same global properties that supervene on the monochrome image on the distribution of dots (e.g. symmetry) are also applied to things other than monochrome print images, and because of this broader applicability, they can not be defined as a global property (e.g. symmetry) through the print image. Supervenience: the properties that we call supervenient are the abstract ones. I 101 SchifferVsSupervenience: as a metaphysical thesis supervenience is mysterious. >Supervenience/Schiffer. I 103 Humean Supervenience/HS/materialism: thesis: laws and causal powers supervene on regularities. Humean Supervenience: Humean supervenience needs criteria for cross world identity. >Cross world identity, >Humean World. I 104 Supervenience: thesis: all facts are facts about current states. The rest is a matter of speech. I 105 Infinite/language/stronger/weaker/supervenience/Stalnaker: an assumed infinite language provides a supervenience that is too weak, because then you can define arbitrary properties.	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Antireductionism	Lewis Vs Antireductionism	Schwarz I 216 Possible Worlds/poss.w./meaning/conditional theory/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. objects can only be a possible world if there is a corresponding object for each mode a world could be. This is why possible worlds cannot be sets of common sentences since there is not enough of them. ((s) >Language has not enough sentences to express all the possibilities.) >Ersatz Worlds as sets of sentences. Possible World/LewisVsAnti-Reductionism/Schwarz: interestingly, he is also using the same argument against anti-reductionist theories for which possible worlds are basic metaphysical facts. The name "possible world in which donkeys are able to talk" can only be given to an object if it somehow represents talking donkeys. Schwarz I 217 Possible World/representation/Lewis/Schwarz: for Lewis, possible worlds are nothing else than 1:1 models. How can this work for irreducible abstract entities? This is why it remains open whether proposed candidates actually could be possible worlds (1986e, 184)⁽¹⁾. Problem: some basic entities do not fulfill those conditions (if reduction failed). Not even in Laws of Nature (LoN) and objective probabilities. Objective probability is characterized by the Principal Principle and therefore implies subjective probability. But why should I assume that an event is going to happen only because I learn that an irreducible element, which is logically independent from the event happening, possesses the value 0.9 (1994a,239)⁽²⁾?. This is why something should not be called "chance". Reference/Lewis: reference therefore represents a sort of theory of definite description of the reference. Thesis: terms such as "possible world", "meaning", "pain", "objective probability" are associated with roles which describe what they refer to. How those roles are defined is explained by Lewis in "How to define theoretical terms" (1970c)⁽³⁾. >Theoretical Terms. 1. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 2. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 3. D. Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Armstrong, D.	Lewis Vs Armstrong, D.	V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)⁽¹⁾: Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986⁽²⁾, §7). LewisVs: 1986a⁽³⁾, 86, HellerVs (1998)⁽⁴⁾: it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e⁽⁵⁾, 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b⁽⁶⁾, Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a⁽⁸⁾, 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980⁽⁹⁾, §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a⁽⁸⁾, 204, 2001b⁽¹⁰⁾, 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997⁽¹¹⁾, 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)⁽¹²⁾?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b⁽¹²⁾, 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a⁽⁸⁾, 207, 1994a⁽¹³⁾, 225, Bigelow 1988⁽¹⁴⁾, §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a⁽⁸⁾, 206, 2001b⁽¹⁰⁾, §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e⁽⁵⁾, 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a⁽⁸⁾, 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.	LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Humean Supervenience	Verschiedene Vs Humean Supervenience	Schwarz I 114 Vs Humean Supervenienz/HS/VsLewis/Schwarz: more serious: considerations to show that nomological and counterfactual truths do not supervene on the distribution of local properties. Suppose there is a basic law of nature, according to which when X and Y particles meet, there is always a Z particle. Purely by chance, however, X and Y particles never meet. The world w1, in which this law of nature exists, would then look exactly like the world w2, in which it does not exist. Both worlds agree in the distribution of local properties. But they differ in their laws of nature and above all in their counterfactual truths. (In w1 a collision would produce a particle). (Tooley 1977⁽¹⁾, 669 671, 2003,§4,Armstrong⁽²⁾ 1983, §5.4, Carroll⁽³⁾ 1994,§3.1) 1. Michael Tooley [1977]: “The Nature of Laws”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 667–698 2. David. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 3. John Carroll [1994]: Laws of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Mereology	Verschiedene Vs Mereology	Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f⁽¹⁾,x,1986e⁽²⁾,205,1994⁽³⁾ §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d⁽⁴⁾,76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda₁ suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda₂ suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda₁ and Frieda₂ cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000⁽⁶⁾,398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b⁽⁷⁾, 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72	Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Reductionism	Lewis Vs Reductionism	IV 76 Def Person State/p.s./State/Lewis: is a physical object, just like the person! (If persons had ghostly parts, their conditions would also have some). The state does many of the things a person does: it walks, talks, thinks, has a belief and desires, size and spatial location. The only difference: the state begins and ends abruptly. So it can't do everything a person does, namely things that take more time. 1. it is possible that a person state exists 2. it is possible that two person states follow each other directly, but do not overlap. The properties and location of the second can be exactly the same as those of the first. IV 77 Patchwork principle of possibility: if it is possible for X to occur intrinsically in a space-time region and Y in the same way, then it is also possible for X and Y to occur in two separate but subsequent regions. There are no necessary exclusions. Everything can follow everything. 3. there may be a possible world that is exactly like ours in terms of distribution of intrinsic local qualities in time and space. ((s) > Humean Supervenience; > Humean World). 4. such a possible world could be exactly like ours in terms of causal relations, for causality is determined by nothing but the distribution of local qualities. (But maybe this is too strong). 5. such a world of states would be just like our simpliciter. There are no properties of our real world, except those supervening on the distribution of local qualities. 6. then our actual world is a world of states. In particular, there are person states. 7. but persons also exist and persons are (mostly) not person states. They take too long! Nevertheless, persons and person states, such as tables and table legs, are not present twice in regions. That can only be because they are indistinguishable! They are partly identical. Person states are parts of persons. LewisVsReductionism: my definition of person as maximum R correlated aggregates of person states is no reduction! This saves me from circularity when I say that these in turn consist of even shorter ones. Part/Lewis: by this I simply mean a subdivision, not a well-defined unit that could occur in a causal explanation.	LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Humean Superven.	Esfeld, M.	I 296 Humean Supervenience/Lewis: Thesis: that everything that exists in the world is a large mosaic of local states of single things (single facts), simply a single thing and then another...Geometry exists: simply a system of external relations of space-time distances between single things. Maybe also space-time itself. At the points we have local properties, perfect intrinsic properties, which do not need more than one point to instantiate themselves. In short: an arrangement of properties. That is all. There is no difference without a distinction in the arrangement of properties. Everything else supervenes on it. I 297 Esfeld: this is a rich basis for supervenience. Esfeld: the intrinsic properties are the non-supervenient ones. ((s) non-dependent). There are spatiotemporal relations between the points. These supervene on the distribution of non-relational properties ((s) e.g. mass, size, form).	Link to abbreviations/authors
Physicalism	Lewis, D.	Schw I 112 Physicalism / Humean supervenience / Lewis / Schwarz: for Lewis it comes to a tightening of physicalism. He wants to do without additional facts such as natural laws or causality in addition to the distribution of fundamental properties (f.p.). Emergence / Lewis: there may be only in the Quantum Mechanics, but not in biology, sociology or psychology. Schwarz: Lewis has a lot of counter-examples to be explained away (so Personal Identity, chap 2). Schw I 155 Knowledge of the physical truths (including the truths about ourselves) are in principle sufficient to derive all mental truths from it.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Humean Superven.	Lewis, D.	V Main Thesis pro Humean Supervenience (HS) (Is already prepared in part 1, as it turns out now). Original passage: "Guide for subjectivists to objective probability". V IX Def Humean Supervenience/Lewis: (in honor of the great denier of necessary connections). Thesis: everything in the world is a great mosaic of local facts, always a small thing and then another. (But it is not part of the thesis that these local facts are mental ones). V 111 Probability/Hume/Lewis: Thesis: a broad Humean approach (doctrine) (which I think is correct), assumes that all facts that exist about the world are certain ("single") facts, or combinations thereof. V 131 ... Solution: if there is a possibility for a Humean Supervenience for chances, as I defended it in this paper, then the solution lies in the other direction: thesis the pre-history chance conditionals (VCK) must trivially supervene by not being contingent at all! V 324 Hume/Lewis: Thesis (neo-Humean thesis): any contingent truth about a world - law, dependency hypothesis, etc. - is somehow valid by virtue of the total history of manifest patterns of facts. Same history, same everything! Problem: this does not yet imply that the dependency hypothesis (DH) applies by virtue of causal factors. V 312 Def Dependency Hypothesis/DH/Lewis: the type of propositions that an actor knows, who knows what depends on him or does not depend on him. They are maximum specified, therefore they cannot differ without conflict, they form a partition ((s) i.e. they do not overlap). 1. The dependency hypothesis is causal in content: the classified worlds together on the basis of their similarity in relation to causal dependence. 2. But also the dependency hypotheses themselves are causally independent of the actions of the actor. Sv I 32 Mosaic/Lewis: thesis: all truths about our world also about the temporal extension of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Time	Lewis, D.	V XIII Duration / time / identity / constance / persistence / Lewis: nothing remains the same through time. (Except universals, if there are any). Their loci would coincide with relations of the coincidence of qualities, that would be no violation of the Humean supervenience).	Link to abbreviations/authors
Humean Superven.	Stalnaker, R.	I 103 Humean supervenience / materialism / Stalnaker: Thesis: laws and causal powers supervene on regularities.	Link to abbreviations/authors