Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquaintance | Schiffer | I 68 Def acquaintance/belief content/Russell/Schiffer: one is known with an aptitude Q when Q occurs unaccompanied by a way of givenness in a proposition, which is the full content of a belief. >Belief content, >Way of givenness, >Proposition. E.g. redness, e.g. squareness. Problem this is not true for "dog": this is composed of a natural kind, expertise, denoting, genotype, etc. - some of them we do not know from acquaintance. >Natural kinds, >Stereotypes, >Knowledge, >Denotation. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Beliefs | Boer | I 20 Believe/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existening-distinction. Thought content: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: If we assume that ideas can be equated with propositions, states, or properties, and that they would be accepted as platonic in existence, without having to participate in the world, we would not have to assume the believe relation as existence-independent. But we need a proper theory of the nature of belief contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5): it would be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q to z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Belief/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representation-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Brain/Brain State | Davidson | I (b) 29f Brain state/Twin Earth/Davidson: The belief content is not known to the subject. A distinction between brain states on our earth and on the twin earth is not necessary and not possible. - The subject is not aware of any difference. Subjective states are not a consequence of brain states. >Twin earth/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Content | Peacocke | I 144 Content/Peacocke: evidence-based approach: about constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states" = I. >Belief content, >Thought, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Constitutive role, >Roles, >Conceptual role, >Empirical content, >I, Ego, Self, >I think, >cogito, >Thinking, >Person. I 187 Description/Thought Content/Peacocke: Triple from way of givenness, object, point in time: no solution: a thought component could remain the same, while the object changes. >Descriptions, >Localization, >Identification, >Individuation, >Way of givenness. As with descriptive thoughts: it is possible that the content remains the same, while the "reference" changes. >Reference, cf. >Demonstratives, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Demonstratives | Peacocke | I 126 Place/location/Self/Peacocke: the demonstrative [this T place] does not reflect the sense of "here" in English. >Sense, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Here, >Now. E.g. you can ask "What’s going on here" without perceiving something in a certain place. >Spatial localization, >Reference, >Thinking, >Object of thought, >Belief content. That is not analog with [self]: - E.g. it may well make sense to say: "[this T place] is not here". - E.g. Dennett is in Oklahoma, while his brain is in Houston. >Self, >Self identification, >He/he himself. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Fido-Fido-Principle | Schiffer | I 278f "Fido"-Fido principle/Nathan Salmon: E.g. Floyd believes that a) Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent can fly - and b) Lois does not know that Superman can fly refers to the same proposition. >Proposition, >Intension, >Belief content. Because Floyd knows the story and for him the two modes of presentation refer to the same person. - For him it is the same way of givenness. >Way of givenness. For Floyd, there is no English word for a three-digit belief relation B (x, p) iff. (Em) BEL (x, p, m) (m = way of givenness). Floyd therefore cannot express what he wants to say. - Floyd himself must believe that Lois recognizes the identity. Schiffer: Salmon himself gives no representation of the way of givenness and thus the three-digit ratio - (which he himself admits). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Inferentialism | Esfeld | I 143/4 Inferential Semantics/Esfeld: the content of a belief state is its relations with other belief states - therefore there is no room for a distinction between representation and object, i.e. a belief state is directly related to objects. >Content, >Relation, >Belief state, >Mental state, >Belief content, >Beliefs, >Inferences, >Inferential role. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Intentionality | Churchland | Fodor IV 14 Intentionality/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: For example: "if someone asks you for a color, you will first think of red." Such generalizations work because there are thoughts about colors and thoughts about red. (De dicto!). Problem: if the intentionality holism is true and, of course, we have many different belief contents because of our different biographies, then it might turn out that none of your thoughts has the property T* with respect to mine. It would follow that only one of us could have thoughts about colors or thoughts about red. --- IV 15 Another problem: change of opinion and change of belief attitudes could not be explained. If the property T* is holistic, then there can be no robust intentional generalizations that can be shared by more than one individual at a time. Many philosophers also believe this: Consequence: there are no intentional laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, the Churchlands, Stich. --- Fodor IV 16 Intentality/Science/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: if the meaning holism is true, it looks bad at first sight for psychology, cognitive sciences, economics, linguistics, etc. But you can read the matter differently: If the "constitutive principles" of the intentional theory are holistic (perhaps normative or holistic because normative) in a manner in which, for example, bio-sciences, or physics are not, then perhaps intentional explanations are immune to any reductionism that threatens them through physics and biology. If one tries to defend the everyday psychology of belief that it articulates less, but not fundamentally different from unproblematic empirical sciences such as meteorology or geology, it might turn out that they are empirically completely false. It may be that our belief psychology is empirically completely false and is not compatible with the rest of our sciences. (Quine and the Churchlands think that something like this is practically in progress). |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Mental States | Field | II 84 Mental states/intentionality/Stalnaker: per pragmatic image: belief contents are coarse grained - understandable in terms of the role in the characterization of actions. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. Field: per linguistic image. >Linguistic view/Field. II 88 Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: we should manage without intrinsically representative mental states. >Mental states, >Representations/Stalnaker. Non-intrinsical representational states: also have content, can be synonymous. - On the other hand intrinsically representative: E.g. object of believe as an ordered triple from Caesar, Rubicon, Cross. II 89 Possible world/sets of worlds/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is that they form a Boolean algebra. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Field. II 100 Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that satisfies a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mental states. (Via sets of possible worlds). >Intentionality. Instead: we need a systematic of the connection of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds. Cf. >Hyperintensionality. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Natural Kinds | Schiffer | I 37 Description theory/natural kind/twin earth/Schiffer: no solution: "the beings that are co-specific with such and such looking beings which I met". >Twin earth, >Description theory, >Identification, >Reference. Then "cat" refers to both. - That does not work (see below). Belief/Schiffer: belief must not be single digit, then it would not be indexed to the person. - (Twin earth: then both had the same belief anyway). >Beliefs. I 41 Natural kind/belief/Schiffer: Problem: the theories of Kripke/Putnam for natural kinds are unsuitable for belief predicates. Kripke: original term "dog": "this kind of thing" - (paradigmatic instances). >Natural kinds/Kripke, >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Belief properties. I 54 Natural kind/proposition/belief/Schiffer: E.g. Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog. Problem: the proposition cannot be the content of belief, because there is no representation of the role that represents the natural kind term "dog" here. >Proposition, >Belief content. 1. possibility: that-sentence with predicate, "that" refers to property (dog) - (Classic: they are introduced directly into the proposition). 2. Frege: the proposition does not contain the dog property, but a way of givenness, which is how Tanya imagines dog property (belief de re). >Way of givenness. Problem: then the that-sentence does not refer to the complete content of belief, but e.g. (∃m) (m is a manner of presentation of dog property & B (Tanya)). Then (3) cannot be the content of belief: (3) ‹Gustav, the property of being a dog› >That-clause. Natural kind: it may be that there is no non-pleonastic language-independent characteristic of being a dog. I 55 Natural kind/Wittgenstein/Putnam/Kripke: natural kinds are not to define by obsertion terms (or observable properties). Because we lack appropriate expressions for dog-like appearance and behavior. Correct: properties of acquaintance/Russell. >Acquaintance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Schiffer | I 122ff Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: paratactic analysis cannot be extended to doctrines - The relation exists through the meaning of the content sentence "The earth moves." N.B.: thus it is also expandable to Italian. >Translation, >Generalization. I 127 Paratactic Analysis/belief relation/SchifferVsDavidson: the paratactic analysis is not suitable for beliefs: it cannot be a relation to actual utterances. - Then there is also no proper two-digit relation. Identical content/sameness/content/SchifferVsDavidson: Davidson has no concept of identical content of utterances. - This is only circularly expressible within the paratactic analysis. - ((s) This is no problem for Davidson) >Content, >Belief content. I 130 Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/Schiffer. For belief: False solution: utterance type. Problem: you have to say of what sort the kind is. False solution: "... of the same content" - that would be an artificial term - we do not know yet what concept of content is intended here. DavidsonVsVs: we cannot trivialize the role of "content" here (for a belief theory). I 133 Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/propositional attitude/Schiffer: Problem: a) Sam's propositional attitude that flounders snore (here one must know the content to determine the claim and the truth value b) Sam's propositional attitude that flounders snore..: here one knows the expression, without needing to know the content of the propositional attitude. E.g. Pierre: "La neige est blanche" Donald: Tarski said that. According to Davidson, you can know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres utterance. (Without knowing the content). Solution: one knows that any utterance of Tarski has the same content as ... - only assertion is the fact that Sam said something. (Or has a propositional attitude). SchifferVsDavidson: if his theory were correct, (ii) Sam believes something that is true iff flounders snore is not included by (i) Sam believes that flounders snore. Test solution: "utterance type, that has the same content like this" again says nothing about the content. False solution: a feature F (content determining proposition for propositional attitude) this should be known by all people. - (All these are objections VsExtensional theory). >Extensionality. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Pragmatism | Ayer | I 293 Truth/pragmatism/Ayer: one can not distinguish between what is true and what one thinks is true. >Truth, >Content, >Belief, >Belief content, >Reality, >World. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Radical Interpretation | Davidson | I (d) 70f Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson: first, to find out the topic independently, then ask whether true - because the situation, which usually gives rise to belief, also determines the truth conditions. I (e) 112 Radical Interpretation/Davidson: it is not about a creation of a relationship formulated in meta-language between utterances of two languages, but about a structurally revealing theory of the interpretation of an object language - the reference to the known language is omitted. >Object language, >Metalanguage. Glüer II 40 Translation/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: Translation knowledge is not interpretive knowledge - E.g. Nabokov "My sister, do you remember the mountain and the tall oak, and the Ladore?" - translation of the Russian sentence "..." - from the fact that this is correct, it does not follow that I only understand one of the two sentences. >Understanding, >Translation. Glüer II 40 Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: mutual dependence on belief and meaning - not one without the other can be opened up - starting point: minimal belief: that a sentence is true at a certain time (occasion) - a) opportunity sentences: allows construction of hypothetical truth-equivalences. >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 66 Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsQuine: there is a general truth subordination -> Externalism: the belief contents are not independent from the world. Frank I 626ff Radical Interpretation/Davidson: the content of mental states is not to be determined independently from the linguistic behavior - the truth of the believed sentences is presupposed - otherwise no evidence can be derived from the environment and behavior would be meaningless. - The knowledge of the truth conditions is presupposed by the speaker, otherwise behavior cannot be interpreted. See other autors on externalism. Frank I 634 + Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Truth Definition | Davidson | Glüer II 29 Truth Definition/Tarski-Schema/Contents/Interpreting/Translation/Tarski/Davidson/Glüer: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green. - Such a theory would not be interpretive. The right hand side truth conditions have nothing to do with the truth conditions from the left. Problem: the equivalence is purely formal because the truth value is always the same. >Equivalence. solution: menaing holism: a sentence has only meaning in the context. Solution/Davidson: truth predicate three-digit: for sentence, speaker, point of time. >Meaning holism, >Semantic holism. Glüer II 37f DavidsonVsTarski: should be empirical instead of formal - empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) ("faked theory"). The convention truth is not sufficiently empirical - ((e) because it's only providing equivalences.) Glüer II 65 Truth-equivalences/Davidson/Glüer: equate belief content with belief cause. Glüer II 40/41 E.g. (TR") for all speakers x, for all t: "It is raining" expressed by x to t is true iff it is raining at t in the surrounding of x. - ((s) That specifies the truth conditions). Glüer II 67 Truth/Davidson: intuitive - meaning: non-intuitive - truth: unanalysable basic concept. >Basic concepts. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Twin Earth | Davidson | Twin earth: brain state identical, mental state different. >Mental state, >Brain state. Davidson I (b) 29 Twin Earth/Davidson: before the difference comes out, he believes to have water in front of him, the other twin earth water, but no one knows what he believes because he cannot claim to believe anything else than the other - no psychological difference. Putnam: therefore, external-subjective factors are responsible for the "object of thought" - DavidsonVsPutnam: he does not know what he believes, but he still knows what he thinks: that would only follow if the object what is used to identify my thoughts would be something for which I should be able to do a differentiation. I do not run the risk of holding water for twin earth water because I do not know what that is. - I also do not think to see water, and I am right because it is possibly not water, but twin earth water. I know that I think that because I know that I believe that the substance has the same structure as the one I have learned the word of - even if the twins are interchanged in sleep, no one is mistaken about what he thinks himself Conclusion: subjective states do not arise from brain states - but from external differences (water/twin earth water). >Externalism. I (b) 30 Twin earth: Belief content is not known to the subject - distinction is not necessary, not possible at all. - No opposite is conscious - subjective states have no consequence of brain states. Fallacy/Deception: The possibility of an error is only then intelligible if a special psychological relation to the object of the "thought-content" is assumed, which should serve for identification. >Deceptions, >Identification, >Objects of belief. I (b) 31 Belief/knowledge/thinking/twin earth/Davidson: Conclusion: propositional attitudes are truly psychological states - you always know what you think. There is always an advantage in favor of the thinker himself in the question of what is going on in consciousness. >Content. I (b) 32 Belief/thinking/knowledge/propositional attitudes/content/twin earth/Davidson: Object, not of thinking, (twin earth water), but the object, which regularly indicates the state of consciousness (from learning history). Frank I 658 Twin Earth/Davidson: Everyone says the truth because the words mean different things - narrow (inner) states are equal - but they believe different things: A believes that water is in front of him, B, twin earth water (but calls it water) - Putnam (among others): no one knows what he thinks - DavidsonVs: the speaker is certainly right, because he has learned the word in his environment. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lewis, D. | Perry Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 170 Mental Content/Content/View/PerryVsLewis/Schwarz: some authors want to keep perspective out of the content (Perry 1977)(1): Thesis: locate perspective differences in the way of givenness: E.g. Fred in Kuala Lumpur, I in Berlin: our content is the same: that it rains on 12 August 2005 in Berlin, but the content is given differently which explains the different behavioral consequences. Def Givenness/Perry/Black: is the function that assigns to every situation the class of worlds in which it is rains at the place and time of the situation. LewisVsPerry: it makes no difference (1989b(2), 74, Fn 9). Content is simply the class of situations to which a true proposition is assigned. Perspective/Lewis: on the other hand, it is not possible to reconstruct the perspective proposition from Lewis' content. Perry: thus has an additional content component. Lewis: which is not needed with him. Perspective/Uncentered World/Perry/Schwarz: Perry has other tasks in mind: the uncentered content component should help with the semantics of beliefs and explain why Fred and I intuitively believe the same thing. LewisVsPerry: doubts that this is possible: semantics: when it comes to our intuitions about "meaning the same thing", they are more vague and complicated. E.g. there is a good sense in which Fred and I mean the same thing, if he believes that it rains where he is! E.g. "I wish it would rain" - "I wish the same thing." For this classes of possible situations are sufficient. 1. John Perry [1977]: “Frege on Demonstratives”. Philosophical Review, 86: 474–497 2. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. Stalnaker I 255 Def Belief/Conviction/Self//Stalnaker: having a conviction with a given property means to attribute this property to yourself. Belief/Lewis: (not based on the self): believe that φ (φ being a proposition) = attributing the property of living in a possible world φ to yourself. Self/Semantic Diagnostic/PerryVsLewis/Stalnaker: provides no content of a self-attribution, but distinguishes belief content from belief state. Relativized Proposition/Perry: classify believers: we have the same belief state in common if we both have the belief, e.g. "I am a philosopher." That corresponds set-centered possible worlds. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Nagel, Th. | Stalnaker Vs Nagel, Th. | I 20 Objective Self/Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel begins with the expression of a general sense of confusion about one's place in an impersonal world. I: if somebody says "I am RS" it seems that the person expresses a fact. I 21 Important argument: it is an objective fact whether such a statement is true or false, regardless of what the speaker thinks. Problem: our concept of the objective world seems to leave no place for such a fact! A full representation of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me. (single out). It will not tell me who I am. Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization as a solution. NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: that does not get to the heart of the matter. StalnakerVsNagel: a particular variant can solve our particular problem here but many others remain with regard to the relation between a person and the world they inhabited, namely what exactly the subjective facts about the experience tell us how the world in itself is Self-identification/Self-localisation/belief/Stalnaker: nothing could be easier: if EA says on June 5, 1953 "I am a philosopher" then that is true iff EA is a philosopher on June 5, 1953. Problem: what is the content of the statement? Content/truth conditions/tr.cond./Self-identification/I/Stalnaker: the content, the information is not recognized through tr.cond. if the tr.cond. are made timeless and impersonal. ((s) The truth conditions for self-identification or self-localization are not homophonic! That means they are not the repetition of "I'm sick" but they need to be complemented by place, date and information about the person so that they are timeless and capable of truth. Problem/Stalnaker: the speaker could have believed what he said, without even knowing the date and place at all or his audience could understand the statement without knowing the date, etc.. Solution: semantic diagnosis needs a representation of subjective or contextual content. Nagel: is in any case certain that he rejects the reverse solution: an ontological perspective that objectifies the self-.properties. Stalnaker: that would be something like the assertion that each of us has a certain irreducible self-property with which he is known. ((s) >bug example, Wittgenstein dito), tentatively I suppose that that could be exemplified in the objectification of the phenomenal character of experience. I 253 Self/Thomas Nagel/Stalnaker: Nagel finds it surprising that he of all people must be from all Thomas Nagel. Self/subjective/objective/Stalnaker: general problem: to accommodate the position of a person in a non-centered idea of an objective world. It is not clear how to represent this relation. Self/I/Nagel/Stalnaker: e.g. "I am TN". Problem: it is not clear why our world has space for such facts. Dilemma: a) such facts must exist because otherwise things would be incomplete b) they cannot exist because the way things are they do not contain such facts. (Nagel 1986, 57). Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: NagelVsOntological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in a wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: There is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: this is difficult to grasp and neither necessary nor helpful. I 254 Semantic diagnosis/StalnakerVsNagel: has more potential than Nagel assumes. My plan is: 1. semantic diagnosis 2. sketch of a metaphysical solution 3. objective self is a mistake 4. general problem of subjective viewpoints 5. context-dependent or subjective information - simple solution for qualitative experiences. Self/subjective/objective/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: (in Stalnaker's version): This does not include that "I am TN" is supposedly without content. StalnakerVsNagel: the identity of the first person is not "automatically and therefore uninteresting". semantic diagnosis: starts with the tr.cond. WB: "I am F" expressed by XY is true iff XY is F. What information is transmitted with it? I 255 Content/information/self/identity/Stalnaker: a solution: if the following is true: Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of non-centered poss.w. Content/self-ascription/Stalnaker: is then a set of centered poss.w. E.g. I am TN is true iff it is expressed by TN, Content: is represented by the set of centered poss.w. that have TN as their marked object. Content/conviction/Lewis/Stalnaker: with Lewis belief contents can also be regarded as properties. (Lewis 1979). I 257 Semantic diagnosis/NagelVsSemantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: "It does not make the problem go away". Stalnaker: What is the problem then? Problem/Nagel: an appropriate solution would have to bring the subjective and objective concepts into harmony. I 258 StalnakerVsNagel: for that you would have to better articulate the problem's sources than Nagel does. Analogy. E.g. suppose a far too simple skeptic says: "Knowledge implies truth so you can only know necessary truths". Vs: which is a confusion of different ranges of modality. VsVs: the skeptic might then reply "This diagnosis is not satisfactory because it does not make the problem go away". Problem/Stalnaker: general: a problem may turn out to be more sophisticated, but even then it can only be a linguistic trick. Illusion/explanation/problem/Stalnaker: it is not enough to realize that an illusion is at the root of the problem. Some illusions are persistent, we feel their existence even after they are explained. But that again does not imply that it is a problem. I 259 Why-questions/Stalnaker: e.g. "Why should it be possible that..." (e.g. that physical brain states cause qualia). Such questions only make sense if it is more likely that the underlying is not possible. I 260 Self-deception/memory loss/self/error/Stalnaker: e.g. suppose TN is mistaken about who he is, then he does not know that TN itself has the property to be TN even though he knows that TN has the self-property of TN! (He does not know that he himself is TN.) He does not know that he has the property which he calls "to be me". ((s) "to be me" is to refer here only to TN not to any speaker). objective/non-centered world/self/Stalnaker: this is a fact about the objective, non-centered world and if he knows it he knows who he is. Thus the representative of the ontological perspective says. Ontological perspective/StalnakerVsNagel/StalnakerVsVs: the strategy is interesting: first, the self is objectified - by transforming self-localizing properties into characteristics of the non-centered world. Then you try to keep the essential subjective character by the subjective ability of detecting. I 263 Nagel: thesis: because the objective representation has a subject there is also its possible presence in the world and that allows me to bring together the subjective and objective view. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not see how that is concluded from it. Why should from the fact that I can think of a possible situation be concluded that I could be in it? Fiction: here there are both, participating narrator and the narrator from outside, omniscient or not. I 264 Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: may be sufficient for normal self-localization. But Nagel wants more: a philosophical thought. StalnakerVsNagel: I do not think there is more to a philosophical thought here than to the normal. Perhaps there is a different attitude (approach) but that requires no difference in the content! Subjective content/Stalnaker: (as it is identified by the semantic diagnosis) seems to be a plausible candidate to me. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Propositions | Schiffer Vs Propositions | I XVII SchifferVsPropositions: (For reasons that have nothing to do with the mind-body-problem): Belief/Schiffer: (late): cannot be a relation to propositions: E.g. Tanya's belief that Gustav is a dog: Proposition: if the propositional theory is correct, the proposition has to, in order to present the full content, so to speak contain doghood or a manner of the representation of doghood. I 43 SchifferVsPropositions: if a functional theory can also be set up with sentences or even uninterpreted formulas, propositions are surely completely superfluous. I 44 Why should an arbitrary formulation that uses propositions to index functional roles, be considered as determination of the extension of the colloquial "believes"?. I 51 Proposition/Schiffer: There are several things that can be taken as propositions: rough-grained: propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values. These have no structure as functions. fine-grained: Complex that contain individuals (as components) and properties as structure. (E.g. situation semantics, Barweise/Perry 1983, Bealer 1982, Adams 1974, Lewis 1970a, Loar 1981, Plantinga 1974). SchifferVsPropositions: no matter whether to accept propositions as fine-grained or rough-grained, there are problems: E.g. Suppose (a) Ralph believes that snow is white and all theoreticians agree that one can analyze it like this: (b) B (Ralph, the proposition that snow is white). FN I 277 But they are all not obliged to (b). I 51 But they will agree that the expression "that snow is white" in A functions as a complex singular term that refers to this proposition and that the reference of this singular term is defined by the references of its components. ((s)> compositionality of reference). I 52 Then the proposition is necessarily true if snow is white. Schiffer: the two theorists may differ in whether the propositions contain their speakers as components. Function/Structure/Schiffer: if propositions are functions of possible worlds in truth value, they contain their references not as components. They do not include the entities they determine. I 70 SchifferVsPropositions/As belief content/SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsPropositional Theory/Conclusion: if the theory were true, the proposition would contain as belief content either doghood itself or a BT of it But if there were a truly language-independent property of doghood, they would belong to the biologically determined natural type and E.g. show "shmog" I 71 That doghood itself cannot be the component of propositions that we seek. That the content of natural-type-concepts should include BT, is only credible if there was a specific approach for what those BT should be at all. And we have not found such an approach. So the propositional theory (propositionalism) is wrong. Another reason against propositions as belief content: Property/Doghood/Schiffer: if there should be a non-pleonastic, voice-independent 1. property of being a dog that it would have to be the only one. But there is not. If it existed, it might not be irreducible. 2. if there were a reducible such property, there would be a property that is specifiable in phenotypic and/or genetic etc. terms that would be this property of being a dog, 3. but there is not such a property: none of Gustav's properties, however complex. But that is not so important. It only later plays a role for the existence of language-independent belief properties. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Putnam, H. | Stalnaker Vs Putnam, H. | II 23 Belief ascription/belief attribution/externalism/anti-individualism/wide content/Burge/Stalnaker: thesis: the ascription of wide content is generally only an indirect and vague way to describe underlying facts described more directly by the narrow content. Narrow content/StalnakerVsNarrow content/StalnakerVsPutnam/Stalnaker: n.c. is obscure and confused. E.g. twin earth: it are the properties of the convictions that are "wide" not the content itself. II 24 Def "organismic contribution"/Dennett: (Dennett 1982): contribution to the belief content: an intrinsic component e.g. of water. Analogy e.g. mass as it contributes to weight. Thesis: one might view intentional properties as intrinsic components of convictions. StalnakerVs: yet it is not clear whether one should establish the distinction narrow / wide in the content. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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