Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liability | Calabresi | Parisi I 19 Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)(1) addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred. Parisi I 20 They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ... Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange. Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade. Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers. Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli. Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs. Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains. Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few. * Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts. 1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Liability | Melamed | Parisi I 19 Liability rules/property rules/Calabresi/Melamid/Miceli: The classic paper by Calabresi and Melamed (1972)(1) addresses the manner in which rights or entitlements, once assigned, are legally protected and transferred. Parisi I 20 They distinguished between ... Property rules: ... under which an entitlement can only be transferred if the holder of the entitlement consents; and ... Liability rules: ..., under which a party seeking to acquire an entitlement can do so without the holder’s consent provided that he or she is willing to pay compensation for the holder’s loss.* Property rules: Property rules therefore form the basis for market (voluntary) exchange, while... Liability rules: ... liability rules form the basis for legal (forced) exchange. Markets: Because market exchange is consensual, it ensures a mutual benefit, or the realization of gains from trade. Law/property rules: : The role of the law in such transactions is limited to the enforcement of property rights and contractual exchange of entitlements. In other words, law is complementary to markets in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Law/liability rules: In the case of liability rules, on the other hand, the law takes the primary role of forcing an exchange of the entitlement on terms dictated by the court. Here, the law is a substitute for market exchange in organizing the transfer of entitlements because bargaining costs preclude voluntary transfers. Externalities/liability: The choice between market and legal exchange depends on the trade-off between the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the price, and errors by the court in setting the price. >Coase Theorem/Miceli. Property rule/Miceli: (...) suppose that farmers situated along a railroad track have the legal right to be free from crop damages caused by sparks, and that right is protected by a property rule. The railroad would then have to secure the agreement of all farmers in order to run trains along a given route, a prospect that would likely prevent any trains from ever running due to high bargaining costs. Liability rule: If the farmers’ rights were instead protected by a liability rule that only required the railroad to compensate farmers for any damages but did not allow the farmers to prevent trains from running, the railroad would internalize the harm through the assessment of liability for damages, and it would run the efficient number of trains. Legal problem: This arrangement, however, places a heavy burden on the court to measure the damages suffered by victims accurately. If it underestimates the damages, the railroad will run too many trains, and if it overestimates damages, the railroad will run too few. * Calabresi and Melamed also discuss a third rule, called an inalienability rule, which prohibits the exchange of an entitlement under any circumstances, including consensual exchange. Examples include constitutional protections of certain fundamental rights, like speech and religion, as well as laws prohibiting the sale of organs, children, and cultural artifacts. 1. Calabresi, Guido and A. Douglas Melamed (1972). “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–1128. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Liability | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 109 Liability/tort damages/tort law/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Assigning punishment and compensation often requires the observer or the judge to draw inferences about the subjective experience of the wrongdoer (e.g., her level of intentionality) and/or the subjective experience of the victim (e.g., the nature of her suffering). Each of these judgments is vulnerable to manipulation or error. From a psychological point of view, it comes as no surprise that damages awards are particularly susceptible to manipulation by a variety of normatively irrelevant factors. In order to figure out how bad something is, people inevitably, if implicitly, ask themselves, “Compared to what?” (Kahneman and Miller, 1986)(1). Research from moral psychology and law demonstrates widespread agreement around how harms compare to each other. That is, given a list of crimes or acts or harms, we can expect correspondence among a wide array of individuals asked to place them ordinally on a scale of punishment (e.g., Robinson and Darley, 1995)(2). Problem: The difficulty in the context of tort damages, and even perhaps in lawmaking more generally, is that we are generally not given a long list of wrongful acts and asked to think about how to punish lots of different harms. Rather, juries are presented with a particular harm and asked how to punish that wrongdoer. >Comparisons/Behavioral economics. 1. Kahneman, Daniel and Dale T. Miller (1986). “Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to its Alternatives.” Psychological Review 93: 136–153. 2. Robinson, Paul H. and John M. Darley (1995). Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Liability | Wittman | Parisi I 432 Liablity/last clear chance/law/liability/Wittman: (…) Other drivers may swerve out of the way to avoid an accident (and the legal system should encourage them to do so). To the extent that these other drivers are successful, reckless drivers will not pay for their behavior if liability depends only on actual damage. Reckless drivers are not sufficiently deterred if the costs of protection are shifted onto other drivers. In other words, if liability were only based on damages, reckless drivers would not pay for some of the negative externalities that they create. Therefore, we have fines to make these reckless drivers liable for the cost of damage prevention they shift onto others. Time: (…) when there is a sequence of events, marginal cost liability should be applied regardless of whether there is damage or who is actually damaged. The law, in fact, reflects the symmetry of this analysis. A person is fined for illegal parking regardless of whether an accident occurred. Depending on which party had the last clear chance, the doctrine can be used against the defendant in favor of the plaintiff or against the plaintiff in favor of the defendant. Parisi I 433 Damages/time/liabilityWittman: In nuisance law, when “damages” are awarded, they are typically for the costs of reasonable preventive behavior by the plaintiff and any damage occurring (or that would have occurred) after preventive action had been taken. In other words, there is marginal cost liability. >Marginal costs/Wittman. Donald Wittman. “Ex ante vs. ex post”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Antirealism | Boyd Vs Antirealism | Fractions I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is necessary for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. To explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. --- I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is written down like this, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a quite different definition of empirical equivalence than he does. 2. Principle: (accepted by all philosophers according to Boyd): Suppose, a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of knowledge theory (epistemology) to explain the reliability of this principle. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree to that. It is itself a principle of principles. Boyd/Fraassen: has a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it will most likely fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is written down like this. --- 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he understands "knowledge" here "light", i. e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms, which are based on previously accepted theories. Boyd: E.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of the bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, dosage of A and time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L to be tested, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. For example, one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that allows the cell walls to mutate. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 |
| Benacerraf, P. | Field Vs Benacerraf, P. | I 24 VsBenacerraf/Field: another argument could be brought forward: the problem of consistent arbitrariness of identifications is a phenomenon not only in mathematics, but also in other areas: E.g. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: E.g. some say it is arbitrary whether a point is a convergent number of ever smaller regions, all of which are non-zero. Anti-PlatonismVs: If no sets are assumed, the problem takes care of itself. I 25 Arbitrariness/Field: Thesis: In the realm of physical objects, we do not have the same consistent arbitrariness as in mathematics. VsPlatonism/Mathematics/Field: 1) The most-discussed challenge to him is the epistemological position. Locus classicus: BenacerrafVsPlatonism: (1973): FieldVsBenacerraf: Problem: it relies on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. BenacerrafVsPlatonism: if there were language and mind-independent mathematical entities without spatiotemporal localization which cannot enter any physical interactions, then we cannot know if they exist nor know anything else about them. The Platonist had to postulate mysterious forces. VsBenacerraf: here we could respond with the indispensability argument: Mathematical entities (ME) are indispensable in our different theories about physical objects. FieldVsVs: but this assumes that they are indispensable, and I don’t believe they are. Benacerraf/Field: However, we can formulate his argument more sharply. Cannot be explained as a problem of our ability to justify belief in mathematical entities, but rather the reliability of our belief. In that, we assume that there are positive reasons to believe in such mathematical entities. I 26 Benacerraf’s challenge is that we need to provide access to the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about such remote entities reproduces facts about them so well. Important argument: if you cannot explain that in principle, the belief in the mathematical entities wanes. Benacerraf shows that the cost of an assumption of ME is high. Perhaps they are not indispensable after all? (At least this is how I I understand Benacerraf). I 27 VsBenacerraf/Field: 2) sometimes it is objected to his position (as I have explained) that a declaration of reliability is required if these facts are contingent, which would be dropped in the case of necessary facts. (FieldVs: see below, Essay 7). I 29 Indispensability Argument/Field: could even be explained with evolutionary theory: that the evolutionary pressure led us to finally find the empirically indispensable mathematical assumptions plausible. FieldVsVsBenacerraf: Problem: the level of mathematics which applied in empirical science is relatively small! That means only this small part could be confirmed as reliable by this empiricism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Benacerraf, P. | Lewis Vs Benacerraf, P. | Field I 231 Example (2) if most mathematicians accept "p" as an axiom, then p. I 232 VsPlatonism: he has a problem if he cannot explain (2). This is a reformulation of the famous problem of Benacerraf in "Mathematical truth". (see above). (>Benacerraf here departs from a causal theory of truth). Field: our current approach does not depend on that, though. I 233 Knowledge/Mathematics/Field: our approach does not depend on the givenness of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Instead: Reliability Theory/Knowledge/Field: the view that we should be skeptical if the reliability of our knowledge is not explainable in principle. Mathematics/LewisVsBenacerraf: (Lewis, 1986, p.111 12): Benacerraf's case is not a problem for mathematics because most mathematical facts necessarily apply. Reliability Theory/Lewis: then we also need an explanation of the reliable relationship, e.g., between facts about electrons and our "electron" belief states and we even have them! In this case, it is the causal approach, according to which the "electron" beliefs counterfactually (>counterfactual conditionals) depend on the existence and nature of electrons. Explanation/Lewis: now it's precisely the contingent existence and nature of electrons, which makes the question of their existence and nature meaningful. Lewis: nothing can counterfactually depend on non-contingent things. E.g. nothing can counterfactually depend on which mathematical entities there are. Nothing meaningful can be said about which of our opinions would be different if the number 17 did not exist. Stalnaker I 41 Mathematics/Benacerraf/Stalnaker: for mathematics we should expect a semantics that is a continuation of general semantics. We should interpret existence statements about numbers, functions and sets with the same truth-conditional semantics as propositions about tables, quarks, etc. I 42 Knowledge/Mathematics/Reality/Stalnaker: On the other hand, we should also expect that the access to our mathematical knowledge is continuous to the to everyday knowledge. The procedures by which we evaluate and justify mathematical statements should be explained by a general approach to knowledge, together with a representation of mathematical knowledge. Platonism/Mathematics/Benacerraf: Thesis: he gives natural semantics, but does not allow plausible epistemology. ((s) that does not explain how we come to knowledge). Combinatorial Approach/Combinatorial/Terminology/Benacerraf: Example conventionalism, example formalism: they show mathematical procedures, but do not tell us what the corresponding confirmed mathematical statements tell us. Benacerraf/Stalnaker: he himself does not offer any solution. Reference/Benacerraf: Thesis: true reference needs a causal link. Knowledge/Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Solution/LewisVsBenacerraf: pro Platonism but Vs causal link for reference. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Boyd, R. | Rorty Vs Boyd, R. | I 310 Def convergence/Boyd/Putnam/Rorty: reliability of a principle such as the following: one should examine in the light of the theoretical knowledge available, under which circumstances the causal assertions of the theory can plausibly go wrong, either because other causal mechanisms seem plausible, or because kinds of causal mechanisms already known come into conflict with the theory, namely in ways that theory can not foresee. Cf. >Reliability. Rorty: no one will have anything against that as long as Boyd does not claim we could explain why this principle leads to useful results only on the basis of a "realistic understanding of the relevant adjoining theories": I 311 Boyd: Suppose, we advise each time which theories are particularly likely to fail experimentally. And suppose further, our conjectures apply exactly where the realist would expect it. What other explanation than realism is then still possible? It certainly is not the mere effect of conventionally or arbitraryly acquired scientific traditions. If the world is not shaped by our conventions, which no empiricist would accept, then the reliability of this principle can by no means be merely a matter of convention. RortyVsBoyd: he confuses two meanings of "reliability of a method": a) the meaning, that a process is reliable in relation to an independent test (thermometer) with b) the meaning that a process is reliable, because one can not imagine an alternative to it. The examination of a new theory by old ones is not an optional procedure. How else could we verify it? Theory/Rorty: but a new theory is nothing more than a relatively minor change of a comprehensive network of convictions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Causal Theory | Goldman Vs Causal Theory | Brandom I 310 Causal Theory of Knowledge: an observation is considered knowledge if it is caused by the very thing it is about in the right way. GoldmanVs: the claim of an inhabitant of the Real Barns Province expresses true knowledge, the claim of an inhabitant of the Barns Facade Province does not express knowledge. Here it is mere chance if he actually looks at a real barn. I 311 1. One must go beyond the causal prehistory of a belief. 2. The difference between the circumstances influences the assessment of the authorization (even if they are causally irrelevant!) This can be explained by terms of reliability based on circumstances. (probability, quantity). |
Gold I Alvin I. Goldman Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Cavell, St. | Stroud Vs Cavell, St. | I 260 Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: he shows a solution in the right generality. I 261 CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: no statement that the traditional epistemologist can produce is representative of our epistemic situation towards the world in general that he aspires to. The judgment of the epistemologist or the skeptic is always particulate. It cannot be generalized. Stroud: Cavell must show that the philosopher (skeptic, epistemologist) must construct the meaning of each particular assertion wrongly in order to pretend his generalization. StroudVsCavell: is it true that e.g. Descartes does not make a "concrete" assertion at all? The very general fact that the various linguistic actions (speech acts?) such as assertions, questions, etc. all have their own conditions of expression is not sufficient to justify Cavell's point. We need to know what the conditions are to claim something to show that they are not fulfilled in the cases the philosopher is considering. And it is also not enough just for assertions, it must be shown that the conditions for not saying or thinking anything in any way that could fulfill the philosopher's purposes, I 262 could be fulfilled here. Problem: but what are "all" possible ways to say something? It seems that there would have to be only one specific (single, particular) instance of knowledge that we would all regard as knowledge. For example, he imagines (or finds himself in the situation) sitting by the fireplace. He wonders if he knows and how he knows that he is sitting there. Even if he makes no assertion here, it looks as if he (StroudVsCavell) could still ask if he knows if he is sitting there at that moment and discovers a basis for any such knowledge, and can then assess the reliability of that basis. StroudVsCavell: he could then come to the conclusion that he does not know, although he even has made no (knowledge) assertion! If that is true, he does not seem to need a concrete assertion (context) to evaluate his position in this situation. Stroud: This is how I describe Descartes' project as an attempt to test his knowledge. Stroud: with this he wants to check the reliability of everything he has claimed since his youth. It then does not seem essential that he makes or has made a certain assertion at a certain point in time. I can still ask how I would know if I knew. I 263 StroudVsCavell: I, for example, read a detective novel and find that - without making an assertion - I assumed that something particular would be impossible. And that I have no reliable basis for this assumption, that it might be possible, although I never explicitly said that. I can then subsequently assess the position I was in and find it inadequate. ((s) According to Cavell this would not be possible, because he demands an explicit assertion beforehand, which clearly defines the context.) Still: Stroud pro Cavell: I think he's right that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case that makes a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you do not have to show that no statement has been made. StroudVsSkepticism: if it looks like he can estimate his position, even without making a certain assertion, the diagnosis should concentrate on showing that any assessment of his position that the philosopher makes cannot have the meaning that he thinks it has. That is the crucial point. I 264 Generality: what general conclusion does the skeptical philosopher seek and why can it not be given? StroudVsCavell: it is not sufficient to say that he is seeking a general conclusion, because it is not true that the investigation of an individual case does not allow a general conclusion about human knowledge: for example, I learn that historians know something about apples in Sicily in the 4th century BC. This shows that someone has knowledge about Sicily and this is a general statement about human knowledge. For example, that no one knows the causes of cancer is also such a general statement about knowledge. VsMoore: if he does not make a general statement about human knowledge, as the traditional epistemologist seeks, it is not due to a lack of generality! It is expressed in exactly the same general terms as the philosopher would use. Solution/Stroud: we must introduce a distinction between two uses of the same words. >Thompson Clarke: "Representativeness" (Skepticism/Clarke) (...+...) |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Coherence Theory | Field Vs Coherence Theory | II 365 Justification/Coherence Theory/Field: It is not certain that without circular justification there would be no rationality. This view is a variant of the coherence theory. Coherence Theory/Field: Thesis: simple deductive, inductive or perception rules do not count as "reasonably applicable" II 366 before the users have shown by a combination of deduction, induction and perception where this combination varies from case to case, that these rules are reliable. But once these rules are used to support themselves, it becomes reasonable to apply them. Justification/Compass/FieldVsCoherence Theory: this shall avoid unjustified rationality (Field pro unjustified rationality (reasonableness without justification, justification-less rationality)), but in the case of some induction rules this has no substance. Not any amount of self-supporting procedures counts as reasonable: E.g. various types of contra-deductive and contra-inductive methods. What then distinguishes those that are reasonable from those that are not? Proto-rationality/Field: the solution is that some methods must be proto-rational regardless of empiricism. They could depend on maintaining the truth or on reliability. Or on the fact that we find them reasonable! Solution: The moment when we realize that the method is reliable, the proto-rationality turns into normal rationality. Important Argument: contra-inductive and contra-deductive methods have no initial proto-rationality, so they do not support themselves! (Circle: cannot begin if no initial assumption is made). Coherence Theory/Justification/Compass/Field: this is the most direct way in which the coherence theory should distinguish reasonable from unreasonable self-supporting methods. Field: But then it is clear that this view is basically a notational variant of the view that there is justification-less rationality. It simply calls it "proto-rationality": PR: of course implies rationality Proto-rationality: does not imply it. Its representatives attribute a positive value to it. Field: but that merely means that they set a higher threshold for reasonableness. This corresponds to the coherence theory. Coherence Theory/Rationality/Field: higher threshold for reasonableness. Lower threshold: for rationality: Non-coherentist theories. Pro Lower Threshold/Rationality/VsCoherence Theory: 1) there are not so many problems with deductive justification of deduction and inductive justification of induction ("less than meets the eye to ...") 2)At least with induction it is impossible even to use the rules to argue for the reliability of the rules. Threshold: that means that it is difficult to justify a higher (coherentist) threshold without choosing such a high one that it becomes unreachable. Footnote: E.g. Assuming theory T and T* T* is valid until 2000, from then on theory U applies. II 367 Now it could be that in the last few millennia physical theory has changed every hundred years so that it seems likely that it will change again in 2000... ((s)> glue). Rationality/FieldVsCoherence Theory: Thesis: I prefer the lower threshold, according to which good induction and perception rules count as weakly a priori. Full Aprioricity/Field: the question for it is reduced to the question of empirical irrefutability. We will see below that this also has a quasi-terminological component. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Coherence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory | Horwich I 488 Coherence Theory/M. Williams: has to do with skepticism. The coherence theory says that the analysis of truth in non-epistemic terms makes it inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, disquotationalism, but also the richer correspondence theory, would be excluded. I 489 Truth/justification/acceptability/Arthur Fine: when one sees that the realistic T-concept creates a gap that keeps the epistemic approach ((s) justification) always out of reach, one might be tempted to redefine truth in epistemic terms to literally make it accessible. M. WilliamsVs: as an epistemic thesis, skepticism can only be derived under skeptical premises! Truth/Skepticism/M. Williams: no concept of truth makes it inaccessible by itself: one always needs epistemic premises! Gap/M. Williams: the gap Fine means is probable: even the best justified belief can be wrong. M. WilliamsVs: nevertheless, why should this lead to radical skepticism? ((s) Everyone can be wrong, but not all can be wrong). Correspondence Theory/Skepticism/M. Williams: combined with a Cartesian dualism it leads to skepticism. But if representations can only be compared with other representations, this leads to the coherence theory ((s) Berkeley> Coherence Theory). Correspondence Theory/M. Williams: modern form: tends towards naturalism and physicalism by identifying reference with a causal relation. (Causal Theory of Reference). I 490 Correspondence Theory: argues with the impossibility of an alternative. Coherence theory does the same! M. Williams: both do not answer the question: why not be satisfied with deflationism? Deflationism/M. Williams: can share many of the criticisms of Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory and vice versa. Because he neither shapes the idea of truth as correspondence nor shows that truth is an epistemic property. I 495 Correspondence Theory/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: because the truth of our beliefs explains success, a correspondence theory can explain, I 496 what is the contribution of language behaviour to the success of overall behaviour. Truth/Explanation: this is how success explains it: (i) if we have true beliefs about our goals, we will generally achieve them. (ii) We have true beliefs about how we achieve our goals. (iii) We generally achieve our goals. Horwich: admits that truth actually has an explanatory role here. Putnam would be right if there were no alternative explanation. VsPutnam/VsCorrespondence Theory: yet there is no obvious connection between his argument and a physicalistic correspondence theory: Truth/Law/M. Williams: you can save Putnam's argument by assuming that (i) involves a generalization that may even be lawful. BoydVsPutnam: does not want truth to appear in any laws. ((s) The theory explains success as well as the truth of the theory. Instead, the theories could simply be listed. - Vs: that would only work without generalization.) M. Williams: I do not believe that (i) is a law. That is because it is not really an empirical position. Belief/Content/Truth/Davidson: determining their content is not independent of giving meaning to our general behaviour and therefore most must be true. Ad (i): is then not an empirical law but a reflection of a condition of interpretation. I 497 Correspondence Theory/Putnam: it is not the explanation of our success that motivates the correspondence theory itself, but the consideration of Premise (ii): that most beliefs are true. Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give (ii) meaning if we explain the reliability of learning and only realism can do that. Causal Theory/Correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would present us as reliable signal generators. What would the truth theory contribute? It communicates that the proposition is true iff the state exists. This is the correspondence involved in causal theory, it is exactly the correspondence established by the T-Def. Deflationism/Correspondence/M. Williams: to him this minimal correspondence is also available. I.e. Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or any other substantial theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Burge Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 699 Reliability theoryVsSkepticism/Burge: some want to block the skepticism by denying seclusion principles. BurgeVsDescartes: I think we can be sure that we are not being deceived by any deus malignus. We derive this knowledge from our perception knowledge. This is not transcendental, as some authors believe. BurgeVsDescartes: the second stage judgment (reflective) simply inherits the content of the first-stage thought. E.g. "Water is a liquid": 1) you need the ability to think the empirical thought of the first stage, and 2) to attribute it to yourself at the same time. The knowledge of the content of the thoughts does not require an upstream separate examination of the conditions, just like the knowledge of the contents of perception does not require this. Fra I 700 One simply knows the thought by thinking it. We have no criterion, no phenomenon and no empiricism. I 705 BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive one’s own thoughts as objects and to attribute a special faculty of infallibility to oneself. Either you introduce the new entity of an ability or special objects as new entities. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought if they have been fully understood, or ideas whose esse is their percipi. That would be objects about which no mistakes could be made, like items that could be seen at once from all sides. I 708 BurgeVsDescartes: main error: the difference between a-priori knowledge and authoritative self blurring knowledge of the first person. One has clearly no authority to know whether one of one’s own thoughts can be individuated or to explicated in a certain way. But one does not need this authority to know that one is thinking them. E.g. I can know that I have arthritis, and know that I think that without having clear criteria for arthritis. It is a truism that you have to understand what you think well enough to think of it. But this does not mean that such an understanding brings an ability to explication or substitution with it, nor that such an understanding is immune to errors. So you can know what your own thoughts are, even if you only understand them partially. DavidsonVs: that undermines the authority of the first person. BurgeVsDavidson: that is not necessary if a distinction is made between understanding and the ability to explicate. I 709 Explication: requires a higher degree of objectification: a conceptual mastery of the conditions that are the basis of your own thoughts and a conceptual mastery of the rules that you follow. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dretske, F. | Lehrer Vs Dretske, F. | Brendel I 218 Knowledge/Externalism/Internalism/Lehrer/Brendel: (Lehrer 1990b. 252) Thesis: LehrerVsInternalism, LehrerVsExternalism: Both answers to the question of what needs to be added to true conviction in order to obtain knowledge are wrong. (Lager) Solution/Lehrer: Thesis: Connection of internalism and externalism: Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Is a rational connection of subjective states and truth, of mind and world. [ist eine rationale Verbindung subjektiven Zuständen und Wahrheit, zwischen Geist und Welt.] Three conditions: 1. Knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true conviction 2. It must be "articulable" in principle 3. The epistemic subject must know and must be able to recognize the difference between information and misinformation. Metaknowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: The third condition makes it necessary to have the term "metaknowledge". LehrerVsExternalism: Cannot represent metaknowledge (to recognize misinformation in light of my knowledge of information). LehrerVsDretske: Creating information is not a sufficient condition for knowledge; It also needs to know that the information is correct, e.g. defective measuring instruments do not lead to knowledge. I 219 Important argument: the temperature can coincidentally match the one indicated on the display of the defective measuring instrument. Solution/Lehrer: We need background information (e.g. barn facades) LehrerVsReliability theory: There would not be knowledge there as well. Reliability theoryVsVs: this is only valid for causal theories, die die r.th. selber ablehnt. Causal Theory/c.th.Lehrer/Brendel: It exceeds c.th. if Lehrer demands that the subject can recognize wrong information. LehrerVsExternalism/Brendel: By recognizing misinformation any variety of externalism must be rejected as well. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Fodor, J. | Schiffer Vs Fodor, J. | I 80 SchifferVsFodor: his theory implies that everyone is omniscient and infallible under optimal conditions. omniscient: because if any situation exists (and yourself are working perfectly) you believe it and probably know it. infallible: because under ideal conditions nobody believes anything wrong. Optimality condition/Optimum/Schiffer: whatever Fodor's optimality condition is, it is clear 1. that they will never be fulfilled 2. that we have no idea what they should be 3. if they are to serve the strong thesis of the language of thought, it must be shown without reference to semantic or intentional vocabulary 4. it is compliable, even though it will never be fulfilled. Otherwise (a) would incoherent. (…+…) I 81 SchifferVsFodor: 1. his performance is not the best solution for finding naturalistic truth conditions for Mentalese. 2. Problem: reliability theory: each reliability theory for mental content must take into account that we ourselves are only reliable indicators in terms of some of our beliefs. E.g. Ralph sees a dog: Then the chances are good that he believes it is a dog. But: E.g. when Ralph Jesus sees how high are the chances that he thinks he's divine! E.g. I have exactly 11 dollars in my pocket: what are the chances that Ralph believes that?. Truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: So we must not individually proceed belief for belief!. I 82 Reliability/truth conditions/Mentalese/SchifferVsFodor: the reliability considerations extend transversely through the systematic links that exist between the expressions in Mentalese. And again we should better look from the standpoint of thought language as a whole and not, as Fodor, for each mental representation individually. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Galilei, G. | Feyerabend Vs Galilei, G. | I 128 Perception/Natural Interpretation/Galilei/Feyerabend: apart from natural interpretations Galilei also changes perceptions that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits the existence of such perceptions, praises Copernicus for ignoring them, and claims to have removed them with the help of the telescope. But he gives no theoretical reasons for the unreliability of the telescope in celestial observations. Conclusion//Feyerabend: an argument is construed that Copernicus disproved due to the observation. The argument is reversed in order to discover the natural interpretations which are responsible for the contradiction. The offensive interpretations are replaced by others (through propaganda). The new natural interpretations are formulated as auxiliary hypotheses. They are partly established because of the help they give Copernicus, partly due to plausibility considerations and ad hoc hypotheses. This gives rise to a completely new ’experience’. Independent data are still missing completely, but this is not a disadvantage. They will only come about after a long time. What we need now is a theory of aerodynamics and of solid objects. They have been left out completely. But their task is now determined. This points the way for further research. I 129 Movement/Aristotle/Feyerabend: Question: how is it possible that something is moving, and yet occupies a certain place. Answer: it is not possible. This response by Aristotle agrees with quantum mechanics. A well-defined movement with a well-defined momentum has no place in it. Movement/Galilei/FeyerabendVsGalilei: all that is lost in the revolution of Galilei. He is looks at idealized movements that exist nowhere in the world. Difference Newton/Galilei/Feyerabend: Newton could never push all the rich reality aside like this. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Gettier, E. | Brandom Vs Gettier, E. | Knowledge / reliability / Brandom: the theory of reliability is one of the most important developments of recent years. II 127 VsGettier: it is not the question of whether the three conditions of the justified true belief taken together are sufficient but whether they are necessary when considered individually. "founding insight": there are at least some cases of knowledge without justification. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Goldman, A. | Brandom Vs Goldman, A. | II 151-155 BrandomVsGoldman: his theory paved the way for theories of reliability, but it is a double-edged sword in terms of naturalized epistemology. For his example it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. E.g. barn facades / Brandom: you can think of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded it in a continent with real ... But e.g. Twin Earth: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" be the same. All they have in common is that the subject can not tell them apart. McDowell: this fact has not to be considered as sufficient for the identification of their contents! Goldman / Brandom: it shows that the presence of barn facades in the area is causally irrelevant. BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman s insight,"does not support the naturalized epistemology, because the knowledge is totally dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument position therefore remains blank. It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as an inhabitant of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistic formulable facts. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Heidegger, M. | Derrida Vs Heidegger, M. | I 29 DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeidegger's Van Gogh interpretation. Heidegger: sees reliability in the strength and robustness of build shoes. Derrida wants to go further: he sees a cipher for the reliability of being. But he can only do this by thinking about the reliability of the farmer's wife at the same time. I 43 DerridaVsHeidegger: is not consistent on his way to leave metaphysics. He remains arrested because he demands of thinking to be cruel to the "voice of being". This seems to presuppose an instance that speaks. The Christian God is associated. On the other hand, for Heidegger the "voice of being" is naturally silent, silent and wordless. I 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: does not pay enough attention to the difference between man and animal. Heidegger emphasizes the hand as the organ of showing as the property of humans. Heidegger: "what is world ?": "1. the stone is worldless 2. the animal is world poor 3. the human is world forming". Rorty III 202 Language/Primordial Words/DerridaVsHeidegger: his litany is only his own, by no means that of Europe. There is also no "universal name". III 203 Vs Myth of a "hidden language". (Vs superpersonal power, the gives certain words power) III 207 DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: one can escape Heidegger's "we" and the trap into which he ran - when he wanted to lean on something greater than himself through affiliation - through avoiding by what Gasché (his biographer) calls "wild private thought games". III 208 Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: degrades language to a language game, degrades wave to sign, thinking to metaphysics. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: the problem is not to touch the essence of language without hurting it, but how to create one's own style that makes it impossible to compare oneself with one's predecessors. Language/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: has as little a "nature" as a "human" or "being". III 213 Primordial Language/DerridaVsHeidegger: the day on which a most elementary word would be found, through which there would be only one possible reading of the "Map of Oxford", would be a tragedy! The end of the story! Rorty IV 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: "There will be no unique name, even that of being". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a group of metaphors that he and Husserl have in common. These metaphors indicate that we all have the "truth of being" deep within us! Calling and listening do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. IV 137 Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: being has always had only "meaning"; it is always thought only as hidden in being. The "differance" is in a certain and extremely strange way "older" than the ontological difference or as the truth of being. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Idealism | Field Vs Idealism | I 27 "Mathematical Idealism"/Field: mathematical entities as "mental constructions". FieldVs: that is obscure. Idealists: the representatives would argue that it is not difficult to explain the reliability of our belief in entities that we ourselves have constructed! FieldVsIdealism: 1) can extract no sense at all from classical mathematics, if it assumes constructions. (Brouwer and Heyting reacted to this with intuitionism). 2) those who designate the ME as mental constructions make no corresponding statements about physical entities, which makes applicability a mystery. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Internalism | Brandom Vs Internalism | Brandom II 151 E.g. Barn facades: you can picture this facades province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real barns, that on a planet with facades which is in turn embedded in a planetary system with real barns etc. Whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge would then entirely dependent on the choice of the reference class! Maximum reliability is given with the narrowest reference class. VsInternalism: Many things speak agains real knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of the classical justification-based internalism. But E.g. twin earth: a modern internalist could assert that the "internal states" are equal. All they have in common is that the subject cannot distinguish. McDowellVsInternalism: But this fact does not have to be regarded as sufficient to identify its contents!. Goldman/Brandom: all in all, it turns out that the presence of barn facades is causally irrelevant in the surroundings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Lewis, D. | Field Vs Lewis, D. | I 233 Knowledge/Belief/Explanation/Mathematics/Lewis: consequently, since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem. FieldVsLewis: at least 4 points, why this does not exclude the epistemic concerns: 1) not all the facts about the realm of mathematical antities apply necessarily. But suppose it were so, then there are still facts about the mathematical and non-mathematical realm together! E.g. (A) 2 = the number of planets closer to the Sun than the Earth. (B) for a natural number n there is a function that depicts the natural numbers smaller than n on the set of all particles in the universe ((s) = there is a finite number of particles). (C) beyond all sp.t. points there is an open region, for which there is a 1: 1 differentiable representation. I 234 of this region on an open subset of R4 (space, quadruples of real numbers). (D) there is a differentiable function y of spatial points on real numbers, so that the gradient of y indicates the gravitational force on each object, as measured by the unit mass of that object. Field: these facts are all contingent. But they are partly about the mathematical realm (mathematical entities). Explanation/FieldVsLewis: There remains the problem of the explanation of such "mixed" statements. (Or the correlation of these with our beliefs). Solution: You can divide these statements: an a) purely mathematical component (without reference to physical theories, but rather on non-mathematical entities, E.g. quantities with basic elements, otherwise the condition would be too strong). Important argument: this component can then be regarded as "necessarily true". b) purely non-mathematical component (without reference to mathematics). I 235 2) FieldVsLewis: even with regard to purely mathematical facts, Lewis’ answer is too simple. Necessary Facts/Mathematics: to what extent should they be necessary in the realm of mathematics? They are not logically necessary! And they cannot be reduced to logical truths by definition. Of course they are mathematically necessary in the sense that they follow from the laws of mathematics. E.g. Similarly, the existence of electrons is physically necessary, because it follows from the laws of physics. FieldVsLewis: but in this physical case, Lewis would not speak of a pseudo-problem! But why should the fact that numbers exist mathematically necessary be a pseudo-problem?. Mathematical Necessity/Field: false solution: you could try to object that mathematical necessity is absolute necessity, while physical necessity is only a limited necessity. Metaphysical Necessity/Field: or you could say that mathematical statements. I 236 Are metaphysically necessary, but physical statements are not. FieldVs: It is impossible to give content to that. I 237 3) FieldVsLewis: he assumes a controversial relation between Counterfactual Conditional and necessity. It is certainly true that nothing meaningful can be said about E.g. what would be different if the number 17 did not exist. And that is so precisely because the antecedent gives us no indication of what alternative mathematics should be considered to be true in this case. I 238 4) FieldVsLewis: there is no reason to formulate the problem of the explanation of the reliability of our mathematical belief in modal or counterfactual expressions. II 197 Theoretical Terms/TT/Introduction/Field: TT are normally not introduced individually, but in a whole package. But that is no problem as long as the correlative indeterminacy is taken into account. One can say that the TT are introduced together as one "atom". E.g. "belief" and "desire" are introduced together. Assuming both are realized multiply in an organism: Belief: because of the relations B1 and B2 (between the organism and internal representations). Desired: because of D1 and D2. Now, while the pairs (B1, D1) and (B2, D2) have to realize the (term-introductory) theory. II 198 The pairs (B1, D2) and (B2, D1) do not have to do that. ((s) exchange of belief and desire: the subject believes that something else will fulfill its desire). FieldVsLewis: for this reason we cannot accept its solution. Partial Denotation/Solution/Field: we take the TT together as the "atom" which denotes partially as a whole. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Naturalism | Brandom Vs Naturalism | II 147 Naturalized epistemology/Brandom: allows us to prove knowledge states as products of natural processes which are completely understandable in more or less physical terms. II 148 If the concept of conviction can be naturalized, then the concept of knowledge can also be naturalized. InternalismVs: knowledge is about having a reason. VsVs: Reliability theories are about objective probabilities. BrandomVs: that falls short of providing a completely naturalistic analysis of knowledge. (> Barn facades). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Platonism | Benacerraf Vs Platonism | Field II 324 BenacerrafVsPlatonism/Field: standard argument: if there are objects as Platonism accepts them, how should we have an epistemic access to them? (Benacerraf 1973). Benacerraf/Field: used an argument against the causal theory of knowledge at the time. PlatonismVsBenacerraf: therefore attacked causal theory. Field: but Benacerraf's objection goes much deeper and is independent of causal theory. Benacerraf: Thesis: a theory can be rejected if it is dependent on the assumption of a massive chance. For example the two statements:´ II 325 (1) John and Judy met every Sunday afternoon last year at different places by chance, (2) they have no interest in each other and would never plan to meet, nor is there any other hypothesis for explanation. ad (2): should make an explanation by some "correlation" impossible. Even if (1) and (2) do not contradict each other directly, they are in strong tension with each other. A belief system that represents both would be highly suspicious. N.B.: but then Platonism is also highly suspicious! Because it postulates an explanation for the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and mathematical facts. (>Access, > Accessibility) For example, why do we only tend to believe that p, if p (for a mathematical p). And for this we must in turn postulate a mysterious causal relationship between belief and mathematical objects. PlatonismVsVs/Field: can claim that there are strong logical connections between our mathematical beliefs. And in fact, in modern times, we can say that we a) tend to conclude reliably and that the existence of mathematical objects serves that purpose; or b) that we accept p as an axiom only if p. FieldVsPlatonism: but this explains reliability again only by some non-natural mental forces. VsBenacerraf/Field: 1. he "proves too much": if his argument were valid, it would undermine all a priori knowledge (VsKant). And in particular undermine logical knowledge. ("Proves too much"). BenacerrafVsVs/FieldVsVs: Solution: there is a fundamental separation between logical and mathematical cases. Moreover, "metaphysical necessity" of mathematics cannot be used to block Benacerraf's argument. FieldVsBenacerraf: although his argument is convincing VsPlatonism, it does not seem to be convincing VsBalaguer. II 326 BenacerrafVsPlatonismus/Field: (Benacerraf 1965): other approach, (influential argument): 1. For example, there are several ways to reduce the natural numbers to sets: Def natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and each natural number >0 is the set that contains the set that is n-1 as the only element. Def natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: every natural number n is the set that has as elements the sets that are the predecessors of n. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelo's or Neumann's approach "presents things correctly". There is no fact that determines whether numbers are sets. That is what I call the Def Structuralist Insight/Terminology/Field: Thesis: it makes no difference what the objects of a given mathematical theory are, as long as they are in the right relations to each other. I.e. there is no reasonable choice between isomorphic models of a mathematical theory. …+… |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 183 Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions. Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology. I 184 The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense. I 223 Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience. Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli). StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory! Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two? Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope. Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information. Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain, I 224 how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically. Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal. StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that. "Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem. Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness. Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection. QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science. I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies. Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms. Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge. I 230 Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense. Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously. Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that. StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here. I 231 Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow. I 233 Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630! I 234 Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input. I 240 Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief. I 245 Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Regularism | Brandom Vs Regularism | I 308 Regularity theories: attempts to define boundaries of terms, difference between correct and incorrect use - Assessment of truth based on the application of concepts. I 309 Problem: gerrymandering: there is an infinite number of patterns to describe a regularity Regularity: can only achieve something if some regularities are privileged over others. I 313 The terms of regularity and reliability cannot do the work alone: The concept of regularity cannot distinguish regularities. And the concept of regularity with respect to the reference classes cannot distinguish reference classes. I 823 Regularism: (BrandomVs): Conceives implicit standards as mere regularities in practice. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reliability Theory | Brandom Vs Reliability Theory | Reliability theories: already presuppose a concept of correct asserting or applying. An assessment of the probability of correctness. Authorization is a derivative type of accuracy of asserting. I 309 Problem: gerrymandering: there are infinitely many patterns to describe a regularity. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reliability Theory | Field Vs Reliability Theory | II 381 FieldVsReliability Theory: I prefer an alternative to it that is more compatible with non-factualism: Thesis: rationality is not a "de facto property". Solution: We value those rules higher that lead to the truth in the circumstances in which we apply them. ((s) "value rather than fact"). II 382 Accordingly, we value a rule higher of which we believe that it is reliable. Belief/Necessity/Field: we must inevitably believe that our most basic rules are reliable. Equally inevitably, we assign a high value to them. Externalism/Field: Is this an externalist point of view? (The term was coined by Goldman 1980). FieldVsGoldman: the distinction externalism/internalism is based on a false premise: that epistemic properties like rationality are factual. If this is so, then it makes sense to ask whether the factual property contains external elements. EvaluationismVsGoldman: when measured by the evaluation of rules rather than facts about rules, the distinction externalism/internalism is obsolete. What is internalistic about our point of view is that we simply value our own rules more highly. Problem: this might lead to extreme relativism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Reliability Theory | Goodman Vs Reliability Theory | IV 184 The reliability theory concludes - correctly, as it seems - that Watson knows nothing: because he would believe that he drinks Bordeaux, even if he were drinking Muscatel. The problem is that Holmes is apparently not improving. IV 185 But the class of relevant alternatives could be even more narrow. It could be limited it to those wines which Holmes is most likely to encounter. The requirements of the reliability theoretician are variable with the range defined as relevant classes. GoodmanVsReliability Theory: apparently any true belief can be constituted as knowledge by reducing the alternatives. The epistemic status of a true conviction therefore depends on the selection of such a range. In this situation, the smarter man has at least an epistemic advantage, because he requires less stringent constraints. IV 187 Problem: the more distinctions a category system allows, the less difference is there between adjacent categories. With the refinement of our conceptual schemes we also increase our chances of being mistaken. Causal theories seem to work better here, because they are indifferent to the unreal conditional sentences which refute the reliability theoretician. The problem is that Holmes is not a dummy! He is fully aware of the circumstances that may mislead him. Because, even though he strongly suspects that he is drinking a Margaux, he doesn’t succeed in being completely convinced of it. And without belief there is no knowledge! |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Reliability Theory | Rorty Vs Reliability Theory | VI 236 Reliability Theory/RortyVsReliability Theory: risk to be limited to occasional investigations! So far, it's not been possible to scrap a justification method by which it becomes possible to compare good and bad scientists. The only question that arises in this area is how and why justification patterns change. This is not to the promotion of truth by justification processes. >Justification/Rorty. VI 237 One should regard "true" as an adjective of approval according to Sellars and Brandom, and not of description. ((s) Contradiction to Rorty's thesis: "Truth" = property). >Reliability Theories. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reliability Theory | Sellars Vs Reliability Theory | Brandom I 324 Reliability theory: the view that it’s perfectly fine, to call Monique a reliable reporter in the field of hornbreams when someone comes to the conviction that there are hornbeams because of her report and takes her report as a witness. Who takes her seriously in this way will say she possess knowledge, although she denies that knowledge. So the knowledge status would be external. (SellarsVs, Brandom per). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Sellars, W. | Brandom Vs Sellars, W. | I 322 BrandomVsSellars: Two problems: 1) Sellars assumes that the reporter has to justify his assertions. This implies that general facts of the form to "X is a reliable symptom of Y" are known. I 323 But invoking something contains an implicit assertion of reliability (to avoid regress?) 2) Error: construe the authority of non-inferential reports as the act of invoking a piece of evidence. (Regress: On what is the authority of the evidence based, etc.). The authority of inferential reports is rather sui generis. "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 242 BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of so understood semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as the alternative language game theory does. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sense Data | Sellars Vs Sense Data | I 9 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: mistake: as with the naturalistic fallacy: to consider the reality as a fact that requires no learning! It looks indeed strange that one would have to learn a sensation of pain or sensation of color. But if the sensation is not learned, then the theorists cannot perform any analysis that assumes the acquired skills. But a classificatory distinction does not work without learning and without conceptualization, or even without the use of symbols. I 10 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: three assumptions are contrary to each other: A. The proposition X perceives a red sense content s stating that X in a non-inferential way knows that s is red. B. The ability to feel the meaning content is not learned. C. The ability to know facts of the form x is φ is learned. A and B together contain non-C; B and C contain non-A; A and C contain non-B. ((s) ratio of three propositions that in pairs respectively exclude the third.). Three possibilities: (1) you can drop A. Then the sensation becomes a noncognitive fact. This can, of course, build a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition for a non-inferential knowledge. I 11 (2) One can drop B. Thus the concept of the sense data is detached from our everyday speech on sensations, feelings, itching. (3) to drop C would, however, be contrary to the nominalistic trends that were prevalent within the empiricist tradition. Sense data/Sellars: the concept of the sense data seems to be a hybrid of two ideas: 1. the idea that there are certain inner episodes as red sensations, without a process of learning or conceptualization would have preceded. Without these inner episodes one could in some way not see! 2. the idea that there are certain inner episodes that are non-inferential content of knowledge. These episodes are necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as evidence base ("evidence") for all other empirical claims. I 12 Right now, it does not follow that the sensation of a red triangle is a cognitive or epistemic fact. You are of course tempted to equate "To have the sensation of a red triangle" with the "Thinking of a heavenly city", then the former is epistemic and intentional, the latter only intentional. But this temptation can be resisted. Because you can claim that the sensation is a fact sui generis that is neither epistemic nor physically and that has its own logical grammar! Unfortunately, that was often associated with a false reasoning: False: we might describe "seeing that a facing side of a physical object is red and is triangular," as "apparent act of seeing" of which some are not reliable. From a subjective perspective there is no indicator which ensures that any such information is reliable! By more precise information on the circumstances a class some more reliable observations can be created. But no complete reliability. I 13 Sellars: that confuses a lot: we remember that the sensations of red triangles have exactly those advantages that they are missing the apparent acts of seeing physical surfaces. From the analogy of sensations with the "thinking of a heavenly city", one might think that sensations were in the same category as thoughts. So that both are cognitive facts. Then you will find that sensations are much closer to mental processes than external physical objects. Mistake: to overlook the fact that one can only describe an experience as reliable when it is also useful to refer to it as unreliable. I 24 To appear/to seem/theory of the appearance/Sellars: VsSense data theory: assume that the facts of the form "x seems to be φ for S" are atomically and irreducible and that you need sense data neither for its analysis nor for an explanation of these facts. (Sellars pro). The proposition that something seems to be red for someone who has the idea that he is in any relationship with something that is red, not as part of its meaning! Sellars: to seem prima facie = to be. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Skepticism | Austin Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about the strong thesis of Descartes that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without them, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin major thesis Method/everyday language/AustinVsDescartes: Can it be shown ((s) > manifestation) that Descartes violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge with his strong thesis? Stroud: we have already seen it that it seems like this. (In terms of our everyday life and science). --- I 49 For example, no one asks whether the other is not dreaming when he points to a goldfinch, or e.g. in court, if the witness does not dream. But even in very important cases the dream possibility is not allowed in the discussion as a relevant alternative. --- I 50 Knowledge/Austin: is only questioned in special cases. --- I 51 Only then certain alternatives are relevant. Austin: typical e.g. external psychological. And again, there are (more or less) established procedures. Error/Deception/Austin: Thesis: "You cannot always deceive all people". Austin/Stroud: his demand for specific reasons for doubt related to e.g. suspected deception are not the same as the above requirement that there must always be a "special basis" for the question, e.g. "is it really a goldfinch?". E.g. Goldfinch: this is all about the question of whether there are certain reasons to assume something else. This can also be the case, for example, when we quote authorities. Reliability/everyday language/Austin: it is fundamental for our speech that we are entitled to trust others, unless there is a concrete reason against it. Knowledge/Stroud: excludes error or mistake. Austin: dito: "If you know something, you cannot be wrong": this is perfectly fine. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Stich, St. | Field Vs Stich, St. | II 79 Truth Conditions/TC/Attribution/Behavior/Truth/Field: we use attributions of truth conditions to others to find out something about the world. E.g. (see above) a child behaves guiltily. >Reliability Theory. StichVsReliability Theory/Field: (Stich, 1983,200-4): Problem: we would need as many different reliability theories as there are people, because we it is precisely the idiosyncrasies of these people which we use in the explanation. II 80 Truth/Stich: Thesis: it is not true that we learn the use of the term truth from others. Learning/FieldVsStich: I cannot imagine any alternative theory without the concept of truth. Reliability/Learning/Explanation/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer 1981) Thesis: the reliability assumptions that we use while learning from others play a role in explanations. Computational Explanation/Computation/TC/Schiffer/Field: if we could give such an explanation for the behavior of others, we would not need truth conditions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tradition | Nozick Vs Tradition | II 113 Properties/Tradition/Nozick: philosophers tend to regard properties as something eternal and immutable. NozickVsTradition: it is natural to regard properties as something that amerges: E.g. did the property of being president of the United States exist before Washington became the first president? Certainly: the position was provided by the Constitution before the election. But I would not be able to say when exactly the property came about. ((s) E.g. "The thickest Neanderthal man has the property of being president of the United States": this sentence can be formed and then it can be found out that it is false. This would not be possible if the property had not yet formed.) E.g. the property of being a human being: from fertilization? E.g. the property of being me: does it not change in the course of life with the acquisition of experience? I/Property/Nozick: here the question whether is we want to apply the scheme of nN: e.g. being the nN of the bearer of this exact reflexive self-referring acts may walk on too winding a path. ((s) >Castaneda, "volatile egos") I could simply assume a permanent, underlying self. Nozick: this amounts to the question of whether I prefer to assume less intrinsic unity or fewer boundaries. II 264 Def Reliability Theories/Reliability/Knowledge/Document/Talbott/Hanson/Nozick: Question: is the method by which the subject comes to a belief reliable? (FN 94). Nozick: Problem: how do you determine this statistical fact about the method used or find the reference class. Reference Class Problem/Nozick: the reference class of beliefs cannot consist in the beliefs acquired so far, because it may have been a coincidence that the method was reliable. Like the class of all possible acquisitions of beliefs, because the method is not influenced by II 265 the possibility that it fails in situations that never occur! It is about possible situations in the actual world. How do you represent it? Def Strong Reliability/Nozick: should provide knowledge rather than belief. Would be worth investigating. Reliability Theory/Nozick: externalizes justification. (Just as we have already externalized knowledge and evidence (VsTradition). Reliability/Nozick: should be right in more than 50% of cases. It would also be possible that a method delivers less than 50% correct answers, but more correct ones than any other method (see above >closest continuer). In addition, a method may be suitable (reliable) to acquire very specific (narrow) beliefs. E.g. I know from experience that every piece of news in the paper contains errors, but still I believe every statement and its conjunction. I do not know what the mistakes are! II 266 Reliability/Nozick: is a relation between belief (by method) and truth. Direction: from belief to truth. Vice versa: Conditions/Connection: (tracking) (3), (4) (see above): from truth to belief. Difference (like between error type I and II): a) the probability that a particular method leads to the belief that p is false. This relates to the adequacy of the method. (Real connection?). b) the probability that p is false, given this particular method has convinced you that p is false. That is the question of reliability. (sic). (Symmetry/Asymmetry). Evidence/Knowledge/Justification/Nozick: what are the relationships? Can we know without evidence? We can believe without having made any conclusions. A counterfactual conditional or conditional may apply without us understanding the mechanisms. Knowledge: but if a person knows something, then there is a fact available for him that p. II 267 Knowledge/NozickVsTradition: believing something is true without (perhaps weak) evidence does not imply knowledge, but it is evidence of knowledge. JTB: justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Nevertheless, it seems to be evidence of knowledge. Connection: to facts: involves a kind of universality. It seems plausible that in the case of knowledge there is a reliable submethod. II 268 Belief: in evidence: is this a reliable method for justified belief? ((s) that's not a method, at most it is circular.) Nozick: the question is whether it is the most reliable one. II 291 Free Will/Nozick: Tradition/Nozick: often presents the problem as one of punishment and responsibility. How can we punish someone if the action was causally determined? NozickVsTradition: my interest is not how we can legitimately punish others, or can consider ourselves responsible. Without free will we seem reduced, our value and our human dignity seems to be cut short. II 292 Determinism/Nozick: if our actions, as opposed to determinism were purely coincidental, our human dignity would be equally questioned. Indeterminism: hence the opponent of determinism needs a positive concept of free acts. Free Will/Nozick: a free action is then an undetermined act with a little extra. What is this little extra? This should in turn be compatible with determinism and also with the notions of human value. In this case this little extra would be the whole access to free will. Procedure: the division must look like this: a) causal determinedness and coincidence on the one hand, b) assessable actions and agents on the other. Free Will/Nozick: different approaches are possible, for example, there is an analogy to our study of knowledge (see above). We want our beliefs to relate to the facts (co-vary with them). Could the causation of actions not be related in the same way with the facts? |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Skepticism | Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. (RR 2). "Enlightenment"/"liberated" Epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that thesis that skepticism arises from science itself. Thesis: in order to combat this, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. These doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. I 231 QuineVsSkepticism: thesis: is an overreaction to the uncertainty of individual possibilities of deception. But skepticism is not incoherent in itself. |
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| Circularity | Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud I 223 Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" Epistemology/Quine: insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to combat it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Relation Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 49 Thesis: the "propositional" theory of belief as relation to propositions needs natural art concepts. (see below). I 54 Classical Propositional Position/Schiffer: Thesis: predicates in that-sentences simply refer to the properties and relations they express and introduce directly into the propositions. I 55 2. Possible position: Frege's view: Thesis: the proposition provides the whole content of belief, but does not contain dog-ness but a way of being given dog-ness that is not explicit in (2). But that is how Tanya imagines dog-ness. (Frege is concerned with belief de re of normal physical objects.) A representative of this view would deny that the that-sentence in (2) refers to the full content. According to him, (2) is best represented in this way: (Em)(m is a way of givenness of dog-ness & B (Tanya, )). I 93 Relation Theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: new thesis: a sentence S has its truth condition 1. by the bR of some of its parts and properties - 2. by certain causal relations to things (for the explanation of reference and denotation) - thus ultimately reliability determining for the truth conditions, because the combination of bR/causality plays a role in the maximization of reliability - this also explains the nature of reliability. |
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| Reliability | Schiffer, St. | II 80 Reliability / learning / explanation / Schiffer / Field: (Schiffer 1981) the presumptions of reliability, which we use in learning from others, play a role in explanations. |
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