Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogies | Genz | II 209 Machine/addition/calculator/Genz: the functioning of a machine that adds only positive integers cannot be described by the calculation rules, but is ultimately based on the behavior of particles inside that behave quantum-mechanically. Their behaviour cannot be recorded by the calculation rules. >Quantum mechanics, cf. >Rules, >Rule following, >Facts. Quantum mechanics/calculation/Genz: quantum electrodynamics stands for the calculation possibilities that the universe must have in order to enable simple computation. >Natural laws. Analogy/Genz: it could be that highly complicated laws of nature have a surface that corresponds to the keys of the simple calculator. Then it would be impossible to formulate their underlying mathematics. Analogy/Genz: the mathematics of the real laws of nature is also not already identical to the mathematics accessible to us for logical reasons. Natural Laws/Genz: it is therefore possible that the laws of nature may have a greater effect than is accessible to us. Logic/Genz: logic is among other things also a consequence of the laws of nature. It is limited by physics. >Logic, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Criteria | Hempel | II 104 Verifiability Criterion/Hempel: the domain of cognitively significant language is that of potential knowledge, i.e. the verifiable domain. >Significance. II 106ff Empiricist Criterion of Meaning/Hempel: we need verifiability, not actual, but in principle, otherwise the statement "Planet Neptune did not exist prior to his discovery" is possible. It is enough that the impossibility of the verifiability is "merely empirical" - "empirically impossible"/metaphysically impossible? >Metaphysical possibility. II 114 Empiricist Criterion of Meaning/Carnap/Hempel: solution: the translatability into empiricist (artificial, ideal) language offers a solution here. II 121 Translations are indirectly a partial interpretation of the hypothesis and the constructions through which they are formulated. >Translation, >Interpretation, >Hypotheses. II 125 Empiricist Criterion of Meaning: the empiricist criterion of meaning is a linguistic design, neither true nor false. 1) The explication should provide a nearly complete analysis of the generally accepted sense of the explicandum. 2) It is supposed to carry out a rational reconstruction of the explicandum. >Rational reconstruction/Hempel, >Rational reconstruction/Quine. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Descriptions | Chaitin | Rucker I 350 Name / designation: "impossible object": "Name of the impossible object": >Chaitins sentence: e.g. "the first number, which I can not name with eleven words" - inconsistency. >Contradictions, >Consistency, >Names, >Possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Logical possibility. |
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| Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Materialism. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers, cf. >R. Descartes. I 134 Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. >Zombies/Chalmers. I 135 This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). >"dthat", >Rigidity, >Operators, >Properties. N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has. N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument. >Metaphysical possibility, >Metaphysics. ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative. 2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts. I 136 For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. >Change in meaning, >Change in theory. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains. I 154 Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers, >Causality, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Knowing how. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. >Causation. I 155 Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. >Essentialism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. >Monism, >Extrinsic, >Intrinsic, cf. >Exemplification. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type. >G. Berkeley, >Idealism. It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism: I 155 Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. >Experience. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses. ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant. I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal role, >Causality, >Causation. I 162 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". >Supervenience. I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. I 171 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Effect | Hegel | Gadamer I 209 Forces/Effect/History/Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel was absolutely right when he dialectically developed the inner affiliation of force and utterance. On the other hand, however, it is precisely in this dialectic that the force is more than its utterance. It belongs to the possibility of effect par excellence, that is, it is not only the cause of a certain effect, but the ability to evoke such an effect wherever it is triggered. So its way of being is different from that of effect. >Dialectic/Hegel, Cf. >Cause, >Causality, >Possibility, >Metaphysical Possibility. It has the mode of "queuing" - a word that comes up because it apparently expresses precisely the force's "being by itself" against the indeterminacy of what it may express itself in. From this it follows that force is not recognizable or measurable from the utterances, but can only be experienced in the manner of an inner being. Effect: Observation of an effect always makes only the cause, not the force, accessible, if otherwise force is an inner surplus over the cause belonging to the effect. This surplus of which one is aware in the causer can certainly also be experienced in terms of its effect, in the resistance, insofar as the resistance is itself an expression of force. But even then it is an inner being in which force is experienced. Being within is the way of experiencing force, because force by its very nature refers to itself. In his "Phenomenology of the Spirit" Hegel convincingly demonstrated the dialectical suspension of the idea of force into the infinity of life, which refers to itself and is inherent in it.(1) >Forces/Ranke, >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >World Spirit/Hegel. Gadamer I 210 Hegel/Gadamer: Here (...) the truth of the dialectic of forces revealed by Hegel is shown(2). The resistance that the free force finds is itself out of freedom. The necessity at issue here is the power of the traditional and the counteracting others, which is given to every use of free activity. By excluding many things as impossible, it limits action to what is possible, i.e. which is open. Necessity is itself out of freedom and is itself conditioned by the freedom that relies on it. Logically, it is a matter of hypothetical necessity (the ex hypotheseös anagkaion), in terms of content a mode of being not of nature but of historical being. What has become is not easy to overturn. Cf. >Necessity, >Change. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, S. 120ff. (Hoffmeister). 2. Hegel, Enzyklopädie S 136f., ebenso Phänomenologie (Hoffmeister) S. 105ff.; Logik (Lasson) S. 144ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Existence | Lewis | Schwarz I 30 Existence Definition/Lewis : is simply to be one of the things that are there. >"there are"/existence. Lewis IV 24 Actual/actuality/ontology/existence/"there is"//Lewis: Thesis: There are many things that are not actual - e.g. overcountable many people, spread over many possible worlds. - LewisVsCommon sense: not everything is actual. - >Difference between "exist"/"there is". >Actuality/Lewis. IV 40 Existence/Ontology/Possible Worlds/Lewis: let's say an individual exists from the point of view of a world when, and only when, it is the least restricted area normally capable of determining the WW in the world. (This is not about modal metaphysics). Cf. >Modal realism, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. This area will include all individuals in the world, not others. And some, but not all, sets (e.g. numbers). Schwarz I 20 Quantification/range/Schwarz: Unlimited quantifiers are rare and belong to metaphysics. Example "There is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: then there are different "modes of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/existence: statements about what exists ignore past and future from his point of view. Cf. >Four dimensionalism. Schwarz I 30 Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Chapter 19) Thesis: Some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(2),80f,1986e(3),212f): if you have already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if you say "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: simply means to be one of the things that exist. Schwarz I 42 Def Coexistence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is also no causality between them. >counterparts, >counterpart relation, >counterpart theory. Schwarz I 232 Object/existence/ontology/Lewis/Schwarz: the question whether a thing exists in a world is itself completely determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and relations. Then the condition "what things exist there" is superfluous. With this we are with Lewis' "a priori reductionism of everything". (1994b(4),291). Truthmaker/Lewis: Pattern of the instantiation of fundamental properties and relations. >Truth maker/Lewis. 1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Imagination | Pauen | Pauen I 163 Conceivability/NagelVsKripke: it is unclear whether possibility can already be derived from conceivability. >Conceivability, >Possibility, >Th. Nagel. Imagination of mental and neural processes uses different modes of imagination. - Conceivability also does not guarantee the non-identity that it is a psychological fact. >Identity theory. Intuitions are bad witnesses for what is possible in principle. >Logical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Impossible World | Hintikka | II 12 Impossible World/Hintikka: I believe that we must allow the impossible world to fight the problem of another kind of omniscience, the logical omniscience. >Logical omniscience. II 63 Impossible Worlds/logical omniscience/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: the problem of omniscience does not occur here at all! E.g.: (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a world W iff. P is true in all a-alternatives. That is, in all worlds, which are compatible with the knowledge of a. The failure of the logical omniscience can be formulated like this: (2) There is a, p and q such that a knows that p, p implies logically q, but a does not know that q. The logical truth is then analyzed model-theoretically: (3) A sentence is logically true, iff. it is true in every logically possible world. Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not yet incompatible in the form given above, but only with the additional assumption: (4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible. II 64 Problem: now it can be that in an epistemic a-alternative W'q is wrong! Problem: according to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible. However, according to the logical truth of (p > q) ((s) in this example), q must be true in any logically possible world. This results in the contradiction. Solution: different authors have responded differently: Positivism: positivism takes refuge in the noninformative (tautological) logical truth. HintikkaVs: instead: semantics of possible worlds. (4) already presupposes omniscience! It assumes that a can only eliminate seeming possibilities. This is circular. Solution: there may be possibilities that appear only possible but contain hidden contradictions. II 65 Problem: the problem here is (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow worlds that are logically impossible, but still epistemically possible ((s) unlike the impossible worlds discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell.) Then (1) - (3) can be true together. That is, in an epistemic world (p > q) can fail. Impossible World/Hintikka: how we can allow a possible world? Impossible World/Cresswell/Hintikka: Cresswell proposes a reinterpretation of the logical constants (model-theoretical). HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge. And this takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: bypasses the problem. You could say it destroys the problem instead of solving it. II 65 Impossible World/logical omniscience/solution/Veikko RantalaVsHintikka: Hintikka has solved some problems of this approach. II 66 Nonclassical models: nonclassical models are for first level sentences. Impossible World/Rantala: impossible worlds are not "impossible" according to Rantala, but they differ from normal possible worlds, in the way that they are "changing worlds" by allowing new individuals. However, they differ in such a subtle way that they normally cannot be distinguished from invariant worlds (with always the same individuals). It is about: Urn Model/statistics/omniscience/Hintikka: in the urn model, variant worlds are such worlds with which moves from the urn possibly get new individuals into the game. But only so few that you may not notice it. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Possible worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Impossible World | Lewis | IV 21 Impossible world/Impo.wo./LewisVs: does not exist. - Problem: describe the impossible things in it. - 1) consistent truths about them. 2) false contradictions about them. a) truth about pigs that can fly and cannot b) contradictory falsehood that they can fly there, although it is not so that they can fly there. >Actuality/Lewis, >Conterfactuals/Lewis. Lewis: such a distinction cannot be made. VsLewis: at best one could argue with something like "truth in fiction". LewisVs: but that does not help. >Possible world/Lewis, >Possibility/Lewis, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. --- V 15 Impossible world/Lewis: If we cannot find a most similar possible world among the similar possible worlds - (e.g. 7 foot + e for shrinking e finds no limit) - then we can still assume impossible worlds - S be any maximum number of sentences, so that for every finite conjunction of C sentences in S wA>>wC is applicable in i - S is then a complete description of a. Possible or impossible - way of how the facts could be if A was the case (seen from the position of i). - Then we must postulate an impossible world where all sentences from S apply - it should be accessible from i alone (!). >Accessibility. It should be closer to i than every possible world. Important argument: but not closer to i than any possible world which in turn is closer than all possible A-worlds. Impossible worlds here accessibility and comparable similarity are undefined. The limiting assumption is obviously fulfilled. - The sentences in an impossible world may be incompatible. - But you cannot derive any contradiction from them - because there may be consistency subsets. E.g. I am more than 7 feet tall - our borderline worlds will be impossible worlds where A is true, but where ..7.1 foot .. ..7.01, .. 7.001, etc. is wrong. Important argument: this is not the same as the possible world where I am infinitesimally more than 7 feet tall: because there are such worlds, where physical quantities can take non-standard values, which in turn differ infinitesimally from their natural numbers. Numbers/Measuring/Physics: e.g. physical quantities are never non-standard values. >Measuring. V 16 That is false in any possible world where I am infinitessimally larger than 7 feet, but true in the impossible closest A worlds. >Impossible world. LewisVs: it is bad to assume such a thing, but it can be reduced to less problematic sets of propositions or sentences. V 18 Impossible frontier worlds: here, impossible, but consistent endless combinations of possible true propositions become true. V 15 Impossible world/Lewis: is assumed if infinitesimal approach does not deliver a definitely last most similar possible worlds. >Similarity metrice/Lewis. Vs: we should assume sets of propositions or sentences instead of impossible worlds. >ersatz world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Information | Bigelow | I 68 Information/Movement/Causality/Speed of Light/Bigelow/Pargetter: an image can be transmitted faster than light: e.g. a laser cannon on earth can swing on the surface of the Jupiter moon Callisto and move an image from one point to another through the angular speed, which is faster than the speed of light. I 69 This is possible because there is no causal process under way here. The point at a time is not the same thing as the point at another time, the point is not an object. >Causality, >Causation. N.B.: then in the case of this point there is only one Ockhamistic speed, no vector. Saying "it" moved was misleading. It also has no identity in time. >Temporal identity. Cause: is the movement of the laser cannon on Earth. >Causes. N.B.: therefore, the existence of a pattern of 2nd level of positions does not imply the existence of a property of the 1st level of the instantaneous velocity. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Newton: shows again that instantaneous velocity (property of the 1st level) does not imply properties of the 2nd level (sequence of positions). Flux theory: this is what it needs, the logical independence of properties 1st and 2nd level. Nevertheless, it must accept an intimate connection between the two. >Flux/Bigelow. False solution: to say that the point of light receives its identity from the numerical identity. That would be a dubious combination of first and second level properties. I 70 Vs: if, for example, a world of Malebranche - God creates the moving objects at any time in any place - is a logical possibility, then there is no implication (entailment) between Ockhamistic speed and velocity according to the flux theory (2nd and 1st level of properties). >Malebranche, >Entailment, >Implication, >William of Ockham. Bigelow/Pargetter: That is why we say that the connection between Ockham speed and flux speed is not guaranteed by a metaphysically necessary connection, but by a contingent natural law. >Laws of nature, >Contingency. Motion/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Ockham's change of location is often explained by instantaneous speed. The reason is that there is no other possibility according to the laws of nature. >Motion, >Change. Moment/Bigelow/Pargetter: this vector understands velocity among itself. Moment is not an intrinsic property (or "invariant"), but is relativized to a frame of reference. >Reference systems. Vector/Natural Laws/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Vectors play an important role in natural laws. It is they who give the natural laws their explanatory power. Intrinsic property/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: each vector constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of an object at a time. ((s) No contradiction to above, if related to point of time). Velocity/acceleration/Bigelow/Pargetter: their connection is mediated by their role in natural laws. Gravitational Acceleration/Galilei/Bigelow/Pargetter: is actually not quite constant, because gravitation becomes stronger when approaching the center of gravity. And it is increasingly accelerating. Galilei, however, assumes constancy. I 71 Explanation/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all quantities play an explanatory role such as acceleration and velocity. For example, the change in acceleration (see above gravitational acceleration) does not play an explanatory role. That is why we do not assume a vector for them. All we need here is "Ockham's" pattern of acceleration. No flux. However, we do need the flux for the underlying vectors of velocity and acceleration. >Intrinsic. Vector/Physics/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is no reason to assume vectors above the level of acceleration, neither flux vectors nor Ockhamist vectors. >Vectors. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows an explanatory link between flux vectors and patterns in time. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. This connection is not a close logical or metaphysical one, but a looser, a nomological one. >Metaphysics, >Metaphysical possibility, >Nomothetic/idiographic. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Kripke Semantics | Hintikka | II XIII Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke semantics is not a viable model for the theory of logical modalities (logical necessity and logical possibility). Problem: the right logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: to interpret Kripke semantics as a non-standard semantics,... II XIV ...in the sense of Henkin's non-standard interpretation of the logic of higher levels, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. >Logical possibility, >Logical necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. --- II 1 Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: Kripke semantics is a modern model-theoretic approach that is misleadingly called Kripke semantics. E.g.: F: is a framework consisting of SF: a set of models or possible worlds and R: a two-digit relation, a kind of alternative relation. Possible Worlds: w1 is supposed to be an alternative, which could legitimately be realized instead of w0 (the actual world). R: the only limitation we impose on it is reflexivity. Truth Conditions/modal logic/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: the truth conditions for modal sentences are then: II 2 (TN) Given a frame F, Np is true in w0 ε SF iff. P is true in every alternative wi ∈ SF to w0. (T.M) Given a frame F, Mp is true in w0 ε SF iff. P is true in at least one alternative wi ∈ SF to w0. Model Theory/modal logic/Hintikka: Kanger, Guillaume and later Kripke have seen that when we add reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry, we get a model theory for axiom systems of the Lewis type for modal propositional logic. Kripke Semantics/modal logic/logical possibility/logical necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke semantics: problem: if we interpret the operators N, P as expressing logical modalities, they are inadequate: we need more than one arbitrary selection for logical possibility and necessity of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But in the Kripke semantics it is not necessary that all such logically possible worlds are contained in the set of alternatives ((s) that is, there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (See below the logical possibility forms the largest class of possibilities). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes, concentrating on pure modalities. >Epistemic logic. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: Kripke has not even shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Lawlikeness | Schurz | I 237 Laws of nature/natural laws/Schurz: Laws of nature do not refer to specific physical systems but express what is valid for any systems in all physically possible universes. E.g. Newton's nuclear axioms (E.g. total force = mass times acceleration, E.g. force = counterforce, E.g. gravitational force is proportional to the product of masses). Only if they are used system conditions, which explicitly list the present forces, we get a concretely solvable differential equation. There are only a few fundamental ones and they are found only in physics. However, most of the laws of physics are: Def system laws/Schurz: involve concrete contingent system conditions. Therefore they are not physically necessary but contingent. Example law of fall, example law of pendulum, example law of planets etc. Law-likeness/law-like/Schurz: a) in the broad sense: the law-like character of spatiotemporally limited general propositions is gradual. In this sense not only the laws of nature but also all system laws are law-like. Counterfactual conditionals: if we would agree to them are an indication of law-likeness. Problem: the counterfactual conditional also characterizes spatiotemporally bounded laws Ex "All ravens are black". Counterfactual conditionals/Schurz: on the other hand: we would not say Ex "If this apple had not been in the basket, it would not be green." >Counterfactual conditionals, >Laws of nature, >Laws. I 237 Similarity-metris/Possible Worlds/Counterfactual Conditional/RescherVsLewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973b(1)): for philosophy of science, Lewis' logical semantics for counterfactual conditionals yields little, because the substantive interpretation of the similarity metric between Possible Worlds presupposes that we already know a distinction between laws and contingent facts. (Stegmüller 1969(2), 320-334). I 238 Law-like/law-like/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness resp. graduality of the broad term). Problem: Not all spatiotemporally unrestricted laws are law-like in the narrow sense. Universal but not physically necessary: Ex "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometer". Universality: is not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for law-likeness. E.g. the universal proposition "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if one replaces it by its contraposition: Ex "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965(3), 341). Strong Hume-thesis/Hume/Schurz: universality is a sufficient condition for law-likeness. SchurzVs: this is wrong Weak-Hume thesis/Schurz: universality is a necessary condition for law-likeness. >Causality/Hume. Stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than that it is necessary. BhaskarVWeak Hume-thesis. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell conditional/law-like: laws of nature or nomological predicates must not contain an analytic reference to particular individuals or spacetime points (spacetime points). This is much stronger than the universality condition. >Stronger/weaker. Ex "All emeralds are grue": is spatiotemporally universal, but does not satisfy Maxwell's condition. >Grueness. I 239 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Thesis: Laws of nature are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. >Laws of nature/Armstrong, >Causality/Armstrong. Maxwell-Conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): represent a physical symmetry principle: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry principles/principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! >Symmetries/Feynman, >Symmetries/Kanitscheider. Maxwell-condition/Schurz: is too weak for law-like character: e.g. "no lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km" also this universal theorem fulfills it. Law-likeness/Mill/Ramsey/Lewis/Schurz: proposal: all those general propositions which follow from those theories which produce the best unification of the set of all true propositions. (Lewis 1973b(1), 73). Vs: problem: it remains unclear why one should not add the proposition Bsp "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km". Because many true singular propositions also follow from it. Solution/Schurz: we need a clear notion of physical possibility. Problem: we have no consistent demarcation of natural laws and system laws. 1. Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 3. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Logical Possibility | Dennett | I 141 Logical possibility/Dennett: e.g. Superman flies faster than light,this is logically possible - Dupermann who does not move while he flies faster than light, is not logically possible. Problem: how to distinguish logical and physical possibility: e.g. >time travel. Possibility/graduation/degree/Dennett: at least 4 degrees: 1 logical possibility 2 physical 3 biological 4.historical. (Nested in that order.) The weakest is the purely logical possibility. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Metaphysical Possibility | |||
| Metaphysical Possibility | Field | I 86 Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. FieldVsKripke: that is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be seen as "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". >Possibility. I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong. >Meaning postulates. FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. >Predicates, >Predication. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) should not only be true, but logically true. ((s) Even without meaning postulates.) (Meaning postulate/(s): this is about the scope of logic.) |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphysical Possibility | Lewis | Schwarz I 184 Metaphysically possible/Lewis/Schwarz. E.g. traveling faster than light - but: if I said yesterday that it was impossible, I said something true - (> context dependency). --- Schwarz I 227f Strong need/Chalmers/Schwarz: thesis: there are substantial modal truths - E.g. Kripke is essentially human - E.g. pain is essentially the same as XY - Important argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to identify these modal facts - LewisVs: Something that is a possibility is not contingent. >Metaphysically possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Metaphysical Possibility | Peacocke | I 19 Name/Identification/Necessary/Metaphysically possible /Epistemic/Kripke/Peacocke: E.g. assumed one could fix the reference of the name Bright by the fact that it intended to refer to the man who invented the wheel. Kripke: then still the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright has never invented the wheel". Cf. >Julius example, >Reference, >Possibility, >Necessity, >Indeterminacy, >Names. I 188/189 Possible world/Description/Peacocke: there is no specific individual relation between the use of the expression "the F" and the thing which is F. >Possible worlds, >Descriptions, >Predication. ((s) Otherwise certain aspects would be a priori). Identity between worlds/Peacocke: even in quite similar worlds identity is a relation for itself. >Cross world identity, >Identity. Identity between relations to the perceiving subject in various worlds: pointless to claim. >Unabmiguity, >Identification, >Perception. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Metaphysical Possibility | Stalnaker | I 64 Metaphysically necessary/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Stalnaker: that means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then the quantifiers. >Quantifiers, >Domains, >Quantification. Error: one can also be mistaken, but only about how one should understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Conditions, >Verificationism. I 102 Def metaphysically possible world/metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: metaphysically possible are all possible worlds. ((s) They are not a particular subset of all possible worlds, metaphysical is not something "special".) Stalnaker: If a world is not metaphysically possible, it is impossible. If there are metaphysical laws, then they are contingent. >Impossible world, >Contingency. I 102 Metaphysically possible/metaphysical possibility/epistemic/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke: there are epistemic possibilities that are metaphysically impossible, e.g. that water is not H2O, e.g. that Charles is not the son of Elizabeth II. Kripke: but these are metaphysical possibilities in other descriptions. I 167 Metaphysically possible/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Shakespeare did not have to write any of his works - but he could not have been anything other than a human being. He could not have had other parents than the ones he had (essentialism). >Essentialism. I 168 Some VsKripke: Shakespeare could have had some properties counterfactually, but not all. >Properties, >Counterfactuals. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Metaphysics: is a theory that has the claim to ask questions and provide answers beyond our available knowledge. It is objected that even for asking questions, a knowledge of the meanings of the words used is required. This knowledge is not given when experiences or at least theories using these terms are not available. See also essentialism, metaphysical possibility. |
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| Metaphysics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 201 Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989(1), Jackson 1998(2), Chalmers 1996(3)) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,... I 202 ...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. >Necessity, >Necessity de re. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. >Necessity a posteriori, >Two-dimensional semantics. I 203 Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998(2), 67-84, Chalmers 1996(3), 136-8). I 204 Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts. >Facts. 1. Alan Sidelle. [1989] Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press 2. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. David J. Chalmers [1996]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Stalnaker | I 1 Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics asks how the world is, not how we think about it. I 2 CarnapVsMetaphysics: in metaphysics there is a confusion of discovery and stipulation. I 15 Def understanding/Stalnaker: thesis: we understand the informational or propositional content in terms of distinguishing between options. Def metaphysics: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that need to be made between options. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Def semantics: semantics affects our ability to represent options and to distinguish between them. >Semantics, >Intentionality, >Meaning (Intending). Representation: we can only judge representation if we know how our logical space is structured. >Representation. Descriptive semantics: descriptive semantics asks what the semantic value of expressions is. Basic semantics: basic semantics asks, due to which facts they have this value. Metaphysical: metaphysical is inconceivable. I 181 Metaphysics/Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: thesis: the only role of theory in Kripke is that it serves to reject false arguments based on the confusion of two different questions (metaphysical and semantic questions). >Essence/Kripke, >Metaphysics/Kripke, >Essentialism/Kripke, >Essentialism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Logic Texts | Read III 67 Necessity: the classical criterion of logical concluding does not mention necessity! >Conclusion. III 140 Necessity a posteriori (empirical): Kripke: believes in the necessity of the origin. - E.g., Margret Thatcher could not have been Stalin's daughter. Naturally the KGB could reveal a gigantic conspiracy that the baby had been foisted at the time. - But this is an epistemic possibility - metaphysical, there is no possibility. >Possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Necessity a posteriori. III 141 Necessary/a priori/Kripke/Read: the separation between the necessary and the apriori: surprising consequence: every statement a priori is equivalent to a contingent statement. >Contingency. Distinction with a rigid designator for the truth value: not "the truth value of A" but "the actual truth value of A"- truth is not a property. >Truth, >Rigidity. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. Necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. Necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Wittgenstein | I 73 ff Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity! >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Possible worlds. I 157 Necessity/Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to Wittgenstein, such logical necessities can always be recognized by the logical form of the sentences concerned. This is represented by purely notation-bound characteristics. "It is the special characteristic of the logical propositions that one can recognize only by their form that they are true." All necessary connections are ultimately tautologies. This sheds a new light on "image theory". I 165/166 Color/Colour Word/Necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colour incompatibility means a violation of Wittgenstein's idea that purely logical needs are the only necessities is now being put in a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of the color terms (or the correct notation). Is a) each individual color represented by a single-digit predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical kind. b) Dots in a color space: then the incompatibilities of the different colors do not cause any non-logical necessities. (Wittgenstein is certainly not familiar with this alternative from Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of colour space. However, one cannot live up to this concept if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates . II 79 Necessity/necessary/Wittgenstein: a necessity in the world corresponds to an arbitrary rule in language. II 134 Necessary/Necessity/Physics/Logic/Wittgenstein: we use the expression both in logic and in physics, because there is a certain analogy between them. II 168 The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". VI 124 WittgensteinVsNecessity/Schulte: the necessity of the logical "must" is only agreement. VI 169 Necessity/Wittgenstein: not for objects, only for terms - not for colours (that there is necessarily still a level between them) but for the representation system (agreement). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Possibility | Dennett | I 140 Possible objects/Unrealized possibilities/Individuation/Identification/Quine/Dennett: Quine asks: The possible fat man in the entrance and the possible bald man in the entrance: are they the same possible man, or there are two different possible men? Would their similarity make them into one? Are no two possible things equal? >Possibilia. I 141 Possibility/Dennett: Degrees: from weak to strong: 1) logical , 2) physical, 3) biological, 4) historical - (>stronger/weaker: >strength of theories). - Problem: E.g. >time travel: how to distinguish logical and physical possibility? I 162 Possibility/Dennett: Lewis: pro graded possibility (Dennett dito). Problem: not the same as accessibility within the >Library of Babel (or Mendel ) - this is greater than the universe. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Possibility | Field | I 86 Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". >Logical truth, >Metaphysical possibility. --- I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is bachelor and married": is logically wrong. >Meaning postulates. FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not count to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) Also without meaning postulates.) ((s) Meaning postulate/(s): here it is about the extent of the logic.) --- I 203 Geometric Possibility/Field: instead of logical possibility: there are different geometries. >Geometry. Precondition: there are empirical axioms which differentiate the possibility from impossibility. However, the existential quantifier must be within the range of the modal operator. >Existential quantification, >Modal operator, >Scope. --- I 218 Problem of Quantities/mathematical entities/me/Field: For example, it is possible that the distance between x and y is twice as long as the one between x and w, even if the actual distance is more than twice as long. Problem: extensional adequacy does not guarantee that the defined expression is true in every non-actual situation - that is, that we must either presuppose the substantivalism or the heavy duty Platonism. That is what we do in practice. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Possibility | Genz | II 268 Impossibility/physical/Genz: unlike mathematical impossibility: is the highest improbability. For example, it is impossible to set an initial state that would cause all molecules to assemble on the left side of the box because it is undetectably isolated in a continuum of states that have no such consequence. Cf. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Possibility | Wittgenstein | II 31 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence. II 139 Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists. >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Sense. II 167/168 Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. >Experience, >Necessity. The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". II 228 Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture. >Picture. II 229 For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another. II 235 Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense. II 359 Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness. >Logical possibility. II 362 Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment. IV 19 Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible. 3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like. >Conceivability/Chalmers. IV 20 3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space. IV 20 Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected. IV 21 So the possibility of the projected, not this itself. The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it. IV 81 Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. >Contradictions. VI 113 Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate. Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense? Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate. >Use, >Convention. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Possible Worlds | Dennett | I 141 Possible World/logical possibility / Dennett: e.g. in world, in which Superman flies faster than light,this is logically possible - a world with Dupermann who does not move while he flies faster than light, is not logically possible. Problem: how to distinguish logical and physical possibility: e.g. time travel. Possibility/graduation/degree/Dennett: at least 4 degrees: 1 logical possibility 2 physical 3 biological 4.historical. (Nested in that order.) The weakest is the purely logical possibility. >Accessibility. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Fraassen | I 158 Possible world/Lewis/Fraassen: (accdording to Fraassen): distinguishes between real and logically possible: real worlds are those where the natural laws apply - or natural laws as statements about real worlds. >Natural laws. Unreal possible worlds: those that are only logically conceivable. >Conceivability, >Impossible world, >Metaphysical possibility. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Qualia | Chalmers | I 251 Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does! We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either! >Analogies, >Thought experiments, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 252 Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. >Functions, >Experience. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines. BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example). I 253 Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. I 254 ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. I 256 A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... I 257 ...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible. >Logical possibility, cf. >Metaphysical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Possibility. I 261 ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. I 262 Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! >Invariance, >Behavior. VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981)(5). So something must be wrong with the argument. ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented. 2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips. I 263 A system like this would be rational in any case. I 266f Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... I 267 1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences. Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers). Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time. I 268 After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference! I 269 A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes! I 270 The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle: Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism. >Skepticism. I 271 VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... I 272 ...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... I 273 ...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument. Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible. Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded. >Functionalism, >Functionalism/Chalmers. 1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980. 2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44 3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43 4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27. 5. N. Block Psychologism and behaviorism Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43 (1981). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Understanding | Lewis | IV 12 Understanding/understandability/Lewis: it is about understandability in our world, not in a conceivable world - someone may say that e.g. a >round square is an understandable thing that does not exist in any possible world. >Possible world/Lewis, >Conceivability, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Zombies | Chalmers | I 94 Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. >Robots, >Experience, >Qualia, >Phenomena, cf. >Artificial Consciousness, >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong AI. I 95 Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do. 2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior. Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences. I 96 Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. >Analyticity. I 97 Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 131 Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. >Necessity a posteriori, >Metaphysical possibility. Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O. VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism. ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself). I 132 ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. I 180 Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ersatz World | Lewis Vs Ersatz World | Schwarz I 69 Linguistic Ersatzism/Schwarz: LewisVs: If possible worlds (poss.w.)are a set of propositions, why is the actual world not a set of propositions? (1973b(1),16,90) Schwarz I 70 VsVs: Because it is ersatzism which actually denies that things of the same form are like the actual world.(> ersatz worlds/Lewis). LewisVs Ersatzism: natural languages do not have enough sentences at their disposal in order to build a poss.w. for each mode how a world could be: Language/Infinity/Lewis: If propositions are finite chains of signs from a finite alphabet,there are at the utmost Aleph 1 of a set of propositions, as many as real numbers. But there are many more modes how a world could have been. (see above paragraph 3.2), at the least Aleph2.(1973b(1),90,1986e(2), 143) Schwarz I 71 Possibilia/LewisVsErsatzism/Schwarz: 4. (Inhabitants of poss.w.): persistent problem: singular statements about them are something akin to descriptions or open sentences in linguistic ersatzism. Problem: as such, things, which are described in exactly the same way, cannot be differentiated. ((s) e.g. A particles, which is different than above: we were talking about identical characteristics, not identical things.) e.g. two dragons may live in a symmetrical world which can be described in an identical way (as long as there are no haecceities). Then, descriptions are identical, but not the dragons. (1986e(2),157f). VsErsatzism/linguistic/Lewis/Schwarz: 5. Not every set of propositions corresponds to a possibility, e.g. if Kripke necessarily is a human, and cannot be totally red and totally green at the same time, sets of propositions which state the contrary need to be excluded as well as sets in which the elements are incompatible. E.g. particular propositions regarding the distribution of microphysical structures are incompatible with the statement that there is a donkey. Problem: How can this be determined without using modal terms, e.g. purely syntactical. 1. D. Lewis [1973b]: Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell Stalnaker I 28 Ersatz World/LewisVsErsatzism/LewisVsModerate modal realism: This is why every moderate theory stumbles: it sees possible worlds as ways which represent the actualized [ersatz] world as a special one. This world shall be special because it is the only one to represent the concrete one. And as such it is shall not only be special from the own point of view, but from each and every one. So, not contingent special (extraordinary). ((s) Ersatz world/((s): an ersatz world is a set of propositions.) ((s) As such, it is necessary that the world has exactly the elements it has in the set, because if not, it would be a different set. It is not contingent that the set {0,1} (as an example)has the elements which it has. But it is contingent that the poss.w. has some of its objects.) StalnakerVsLewis: The cursive sentence ("...from each and every [point of view]) is wrong. But this is a special fact about the actual world: it alone corresponds to the only concrete world. But this is a contingent fact, i.e. it is not even a fact from the point of view of other possible worlds. Problem: Does it not mean that only from an objective point of view possible persons and their surroundings are as real as we are? Only if the objective or absolute point of view is identified with a neutral point of view outside of all possible worlds. Such a point of view does not exist. I 29 Objectivity/absolute/Stalnaker: the absolute, objective point of view is the view from our actual world. Fiction: We concede that fictional characters have, from their point of view, exactly the same right to determine their reality, as we do. But their point of view is fictional. Semantic thesis: Is the thesis that the deictic analysis of "actual" is the correct one. Metaphysical thesis: defines that the actual world's actuality is nothing more than the relation between the actual world and the things that exist in it. The semantic thesis can therefore be accepted, and exclude any universes from the ontology. I 63 …naturally, there are inconsistent sets of propositions. Metaphysics: Metaphysics cannot be obtained by calling such sets of propositions poss.w. ((s) > LewisVsErsatz Worlds). Possible worlds/Louis: Our main contentious point is about the role of poss.w. in the explanations of possibility, and more generally, in the explanation of propositions and relations Question: Should we analyze possible worlds with the terms of propositions or analyze them the other way round? VsErsatz worlds/Lewis/Louis: We should not identify poss.w. with sets propositions, since I believe, that propositions are sets of possible worlds. I 64 Content: It deals with a term of content which is not tied to modal realism. The starting point is the familiar idea that the intentional content of a sentence or a thought are the truth conditions (tr.cond.). It is about a concept of content that is not at all bound to modal realism. The starting point is the familiar thought that the intentional content of a sentence or thought is the truth conditions. tr. cond.: are the ways how the world should be in order for the sentence to be true. It is known what the sentence means if it is known which poss.w. makes it true and which one does not. Possible/Possibility/Louis: If one has a term of a possible world which, if realized, would render the proposition true, then it will be shown that the proposition is possible. Then the following will be true,regardless which metaphysics one follows: Modal operator/Quantification/Louis: If there is one domain of all poss.w., all the modal operators can be interpreted in terms of unrestricted quantification in this domain. Necessity is truth in all poss.w., possibility in at least one. metaphysical necessary/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: this is what I mean when I say "metaphysical possible". (Quantification of the set of all possiible worlds). This is also possible with unrestricted quantification without ruining the terms "possible", "could", etc. Restriction: It should be known what the basis of the restriction should be. Impossible world/imposs.w./LouisVsImpossible world: In any case the conclusion will inevitable come that at least some impossible statements are impossible because they are not true in any possible world. And this because of compositionality, which you will surely agree to as well. This is why there are propositions that are neither true in all the possible worlds nor in all the impossible worlds. Possibility/Error/Not knowing[Unwissen]/Louis: Naturally,one can be wrong what is possible in this unrestricted sense. One can also be wrong whether a possibility has been rightly conceived. Solution: Statements complexly represent possibilities. I 65 As such, it is possible to discover that a proposition is impossible. It would be wrong to state that a term creates a situation that renders a statement true, and then judge afterwards that this sort of situation does not fulfill a metaphysical condition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Frege, G. | Stalnaker Vs Frege, G. | I 260 I/self/Frege: "Everyone is itself placed in a special and easy way. ... ~ Only the subject itself can detect such thoughts." StalnakerVsFrege: this is just an unfortunate slip. Metaphysics/self/Stalnaker: I do not think that metaphysics can be so easily avoided. If the thought "I am TN" is adjustable wrong (even if a logical omniscient TN could capture it without knowing that it is true) why is its falsity not a metaphysical possibility? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Wright Vs Kripke, S. A. | Esfeld I 122 Inferentialism/I-You-Relationships/Brandom/Esfeld: Problem: even a community could be arbitrary. The fact of consent could be confused with the right of consent. This is sometimes put VsKripke. WrightVsKripke: formerly: the community itself is no authority. (No longer represented today). McDowellVsWright: whatever seems right to us is right! But that only means that we cannot talk about "right" here! Solution/Esfeld: I-You-Relationships: are symmetrical: I 123 this leaves room for the possibility that the community as a whole can err. Social Holism/Pettit: the human is dependent on the existence of other people in terms of thinking and rules. (And it is always about relationships of individual people to each other). VsCollectivism: which assumes that the community as a whole exerts an influence on its members. (>Method/Wright). I 124 Pettit: social holism is a contingent thesis about the actual practices of us humans. Esfeld: our reconstruction should apply to all possible worlds. Private following of rules/Pettit: has been left open by him! One can also continue to be a member of a community in isolation. Social Holism/Esfeld: does not imply that a person who becomes isolated no longer has any beliefs! I 125 Nevertheless, the concept of "correct" following is then no longer applicable. N.B.: once the customs of the community are internalized, one can argue that real feedback is no longer indispensable! I.e. there is a metaphysical possibility that the constituents of a holistic system are no longer ontologically dependent on other individuals! For example radical Robinson who spends his whole life in isolation: Kripke: is liberal about such a case. We could take it into our community and apply our criteria to it as well. (s) But also vice versa? I 126 EsfeldVsKripke: we cannot be so liberal here. It is also questionable whether the assertiveness conditions for rule sequences are really fulfilled. One can argue that Kripke's position includes direct or indirect interaction. Private Rule Following/Esfeld: neither the truth conditions nor the assertiveness conditions are fulfilled. Wright I 264 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Rule Following/Kripke: in Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": destroys any possibility that rules and meanings include real limitations. Wright: in the end there is the attempt to stay afloat with the Charybdis. (Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. So no "general real objectivity".) I 265 Quietism/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: is in any case committed to quietism: for unrealism (that there are no facts concerning any rules) must inflate to a comprehensive unrealism. I 266 Then there are no relevant facts in the matter anywhere. If there are no substantive facts about what sentences say, then there are also no facts about whether they are true or not. An unrealism of meaning must therefore entail an unrealism of truth. WrightVsKripke: that is however attackable: however, it is not an error of sublimation (raising to a higher level) of the rules. If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then it is a humanized platonism no less than the superobjectified version. McDowell's Skylla does not belong to the scene of Kripke's dialectic. It could only appear if the opponent is denied a point of view. Thus, the assertions in the first person would be presented as inferential but the fact is that the knowledge of earlier meanings is for the most part not inferential and has no clearly recognizable epistemology. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A. | II XIII Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1). Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics, II XIV in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant. I call them "epistemology of logic". II XVI Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats. World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds. Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted. 2) world lines can be drawn in two ways: a) object-centered b) agent-centered. (Essay 8). Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11) II 2 Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed. HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house. Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF. II 3 KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0). Hintikka: technically it is of course possible. "Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics. new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0. Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world). Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D. II 4 HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another. Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line. World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located. Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w. Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said: Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic). Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds. This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy: Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic. Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense. Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. II 77 Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers. II 84 KIripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines. HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict. World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations. II 86 HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section). II 116 Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual. HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions. Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?". Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective II 117 Kripke: on public identification. II 195 Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable. HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular: Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things: a) transitivity within a possible world. b) between possible worlds. The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter. To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument. II 196 Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience. And then fission cannot be ruled out. II 209 Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same. Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works. Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects. HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic. But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Field Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g. (DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history. (DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Materialism | Verschiedene Vs Materialism | Lanz I 285 VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory: three objections: 1. In contrast to the usual theoretical entities (genes, electrons), we have direct, introspective access to our own mental states. The assumption of their existence does not seem to depend on their explanatory role. Lanz I 283 2. Sensations have qualitative characteristics that cannot be captured by causal analysis. For example, sweet/sour taste: clear qualitative difference, regardless of what their causal roles may be. (> Qualia problem). 3. (VsMaterialism/VsIdentity Theory): a purely causal analysis cannot explain the characteristic of intentionality. (Propositional Attitutede). Materialism uses representation theory (VsSpeech Act Theory). Stalnaker I 19 Zombie/Awareness/Stalnaker: one cannot say that there are possible worlds (poss.w.) with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. Problem: all materialists agree that there are possible worlds that the dualist calls "zombie worlds", they are even metaphysically possible! Stalnaker: but the conclusion from conceivability to metaphysical possibility only works if one assumes that materialism is wrong. And therefore the thinkability of zombies does not provide an argument VsMaterialism. The general picture goes like this: "Consciousness": refers to a quality that we find within ourselves and that we may know because we have it. But the fact that we are conscious does not provide any particular access to the nature of that property. Stalnaker I 239 VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: simple argument against him: that it is imaginable or conceptually possible that zombies exist. Some conclude that zombies are metaphysically possible. Problem: if there are possible worlds that are physically exactly like the actual world, I 240 only that there is no consciousness, then it follows that consciousness does not supervene on the physical! VsMaterialism: if consciousness does not supervene on the physical world, materialism is wrong. I 242 Zombie/Materialism/Stalnaker: any materialist who believes that we are conscious beings must believe that the real world is the z-world, but deny that the z-world is a zombie world. This is the reason for A and B materialists to claim that the zombie world is metaphysically impossible: that some of the possible worlds that come into consideration as a candidate for a zombie world (the z-world) are not a zombie world. Metaphysics/Imaginability/Lücke/VsMaterialism: if this is correct, materialism can no longer defend itself against the zombie argument that tries to drive a gap between imaginability and possibility. Namely that there are possible worlds that are imaginable, but not metaphysically possible. I 243 MaterialismVsVs: each materialist will agree with all three philosophers that the z-world is not only imaginable, but also metaphysically possible. Metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: the question is not whether a situation is metaphysically possible, but whether, if it is, it is correctly described. VsMaterialism/Stalnaker: the argument against it depends decisively on whether the z-world is a zombie-world. This cannot depend on innocent talk (semantics). It is about what world we live in. Solution: we need more details about the z-world. z-World/Stalnaker: we have defined it in terms of the actual world. And since we are not omniscient, we may argue about how the actual world should exactly and physically be (and so is the z-world). But these remain empirical questions. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Putnam, H. | Brendel Vs Putnam, H. | I 70 Truth-Definition/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is contraintuitive from the start: this also applies to the model-theoretical variants. They do not do justice to our intuitive concept of "true". I 71 His truth concept is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" is itself quite unclear. I 105 Disquotation Theory/Disquotation Theory/Disquotationalism/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: is only a variant of redundancy theory. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: this is an error: because redundancy theory assumes an operator and a concept of truth based on disquotation theory cannot be a propositional operator and thus not a redundancy theory. I 278 Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: the statement that we are brains in a vat cannot turn out to be true because representations have no intrinsic connection to their representatives ("magic reference") - is independent of causation. I 279 SkepticismVsPutnam/Brendel: Skepticism does not have to be impressed. It can classify Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument: it refers to the premises of the possibility of formulating the sentence "We are brains in a vat". StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: such transcendental arguments already presuppose certain verificationist assumptions. I 280 Problem: one cannot yet conclude from this that the world actually exists. One would also have to assume that principles constituting knowledge necessarily describe the world as it actually is. StroudVsTranscendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii. I 281 BrendelVsStroud: Solution: Semantic Truth/Brendel: the skeptical hypothesis is not a meaningful truthful statement in the sense of semantic truth. Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam himself admits that brains in a vat is physically possible. But what does that mean, except that there is such a possible description? I 282 BrendelVsPutnam: no physical possibility is shown at all, only a black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). He should show the possibility or impossibility of thinking. ((s) Because he himself ultimately proceeds from an argument of the impossibility of thinking (impossibility of reference). Thought experiment/Brendel: that something is physically possible is not yet an argument for the legitimacy of thougt experiment either. I 283 Conceptual Analysis/Brendel: can only be confirmed or refuted by conceptual possibilities. I 284 BrendelVsPutnam: the world of brains in a vat is not so closed to us, we have an idea of what it would be like. I 285 Understanding/Skepticism/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: therefore the skeptical hypothesis is not incomprehensible to us at all. And then also truthful. "Everything different"/Brendel: but this is where the limits of our imagination come in. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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