Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3164 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Fodor | Rorty I 269 ff RortyVsFodor: a priori: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we may at any time be wrong about it, so that we may be wrong about something that is a priori. (>a priori/Kripke). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| A priori | McGinn | I 151 a Priori/McGinn: We have a number of cognitive abilities, which are based on innate foundations. - How is that possible? It's a miracle that we know so much, much more surprising than e.g. our abilities to walk and lift. Of course, there are also scientifically unresolved issues here, but that does not threaten their ontological status. I 165 A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn:We resemble three-dimensional beings that are equipped only with two-dimensional concepts. In the case of empirical knowledge, we understand, after all, with what kind of things we are dealing. I 166 a Priori/CAlM/Combinatorial Atomism with Lawlike Mappings/McGinn: Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mapping deserts us with a priori: we cannot even formulate the kind of relationship that could be regulated by this scheme. We cannot even settle the corresponding facts in the realm of reality. a Priori/Transcendental Naturalism: Transcendental Naturalism asserts that the relationship between consciousness and the brain did exist, but did not correspond to our thinking in form. McGinn: unlike the topics discussed so far, the chances of the Transcendental Naturalism to apply to a priori seem rather low. For it is not able to transform something profoundly incoherent in one good piece of our world inventory. I 170 A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism: due to the conceptual limits embedded in us, we will not succeed in establishing a unified theory about the a priori. It does not follow that we must correct any standard ideas. Reason cannot establish a complete theory of itself. >Circular reasoning, >Reason, >Totality, >Self-reference. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| A priori | Millikan | I 325 A priori/Intension/Sense/Knowledge/Meaning/Wittgenstein/Quine/Millikan: the two can be understood in such a way that the knowledge that an expression or a proposition has meaning is knowledge a priori. That's what I call the Def "Meaning-rationalism"/Millikan: Thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge about judgments, this is empirical. ((s) Because it is about the meaning of our own expressions and our own use.) MillikanVsMeaning rationalism. Main representative: Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Quine, Putnam. >Rationalism, >Descartes, >Hume, >Husserl, >Quine, >Putnam, >Wittgenstein. I 326 Synonymy/Putnam: thesis: the knowledge of synonymy is also a priori. Millikan: that is, that should all be armchair contemplation. >Synonymy. I 327 Criterion/Millikan: Problem: if all this should be so secure, there can always be only one criterion for one concept, not several. And all terms may have only one intension, never several, except, these are "logically equivalent". >Criteria, >Equivalence. "Necessary and sufficient" conditions/Millikan: these conditions supposedly do not only distinguish between actual things that fall under one concept and those that do not fall under it but also between all "logically possible" things. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: thesis: between meaningful and meaningless must be distinguished a priori. I 328 Error/Millikan: an error can only be there after judgments. >Judgment, >Error. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: E.g. I cannot ask at all myself meaningfully whether my idea of Shakespeare is perhaps not from Shakespeare. Judgment/Millikan: but judgments cannot be made without applying concepts. Concept/Millikan: so at least some concepts must stand on their own feet. >Concepts. Tradition/Millikan: according to it these terms would be those of properties. Meaning rationalism/Millikan: thesis: all our real concepts are of things with a particular ontological status, namely things that can exist and be known, and yet have no necessary relation to the actual world. E.g. platonic forms or "reified meanings" or "reified possibilities". NominalismVs: it does not correspond to anything at all. >Nominalism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Abortion | Mill | Singer I 307 Abortion/J. St. Mill/P. Singer: Mill's "very simple principle" can be found in J. St. Mill 1957(1). Singer I 131 Principle/Mill: the only purpose for which violence against a member of a civilized community can be used against his or her will is to avert harm from others. >Violence, >Coercion, >Laws, >Law, >Society, >Community, >Ethics, >Morals. P. Singer: this is often mentioned when it comes to whether laws should be applied to "crimes without victims" (> homosexuality). Abortion/P. Singer: The discussion about it is all about whether it is a "crime without victims".(2) >Crime, >Criminal law. 1. J. St. Mill, On Liberty, 3rd edition, London, 1957, p. 24. 2. Edwin Schur, Crimes Without Victims. NJ 1965. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Abortion | Rawls | Gaus I 97 Abortion/Rawls/Waldron: Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. >Justice, >Community, >Society, >State(Polity), >Constitution, >Responsibility. Interestingly some of the discussion in Political Liberalism of the abortion example showed how difficult it is to apply this stricture in practice. In a footnote to the original edition Rawls inferred, from the fact that anti-abortion laws usually rest on controversial religious grounds, that liberty in this regard was required (1993(1): 243n). >Liberalism. WaldronVsRawls: But he quickly had to concede that that was a mistake (1996(2): lv), for three reasons. 1) (...) we are not entitled to assume liberty in such an area as the default position, any more than we are entitled to conclude that foetuses do not have souls from the fact that political liberalism is unable to countenance religious arguments to the effect that they do. 2) (...) although there might be good neutral arguments for a right to choose abortion in the first trimester, we must not assume that there are no contrary arguments or no way of opposing abortion rights that does not run foul of the strictures of political liberalism. Many opponents of abortion will insist that their arguments for protecting human foetuses are continuous with arguments (that they insist any theory of justice must acknowledge) for protecting all human life, particularly in its most vulnerable forms. 3) (...) the fact that a religious doctrine may not be appealed to in order to justify restrictions on abortion doesn’t mean that such doctrines are altogether beyond the pale. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, new edn. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Abortion | Zittrain | I 214/ 215 Abortion/Zittrain: The Christian Gallery News Service was started by antiabortion activist Neal Horsley in the mid 1990s. Part of its activities included the Nuremberg Files Web site, where the public was solicited for as much information as possible about the identities, lives, and families of physicians who performed abortions, as well as about clinic owners and workers. (1) When a provider was killed, a line would be drawn through his or her name. (The site was rarely updated with new information, and it became entangled in a larger lawsuit lodged under the U.S. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. (2) The site remains accessible.) An associated venture solicits the public to take pictures of women arriving at clinics, including the cars in which they arrive (and corresponding license plates), and posts the pictures in order to deter people from nearing clinics. (3) 1. The Nuremberg Files, http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/ (last visited June 1, 2007). 2. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005). 3. Abortion Cams: Shame Deters Abortion, http://www.abortioncams.com/ (last visited June 1, 2007). The Web site is premised on the belief that showing the images of clinic patients will either shame or scare women away from having an abortion. See How to Deter Abortion, http://www.abortioncams.com/deter.htm (last visited June 1, 2007) (“Would a preacher want to be photographed going into a whore house, would a Priest want to be photographed going into a sex chat room with grade school kids? Neither would a mother want to be photographed going in to kill her baby”). |
Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009 |
| Aboutness | Baudrillard | Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 |
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| Aboutness | Lewis | V 93 Definition about/"aboutness"/Lewis: a proposition is about an object iff it applies in either or neither of any two worlds that match perfectly in terms of this subject. >Intentionality, >Reference/Lewis >Proposition/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. The other way around: just as well: two worlds fully coincide with respect to an object iff every proposition is true in both worlds or in none about this subject. E.g. a proposition that differentiates the two, cannot be about something that is the same in both worlds. There is no non-circular test for "aboutness" that does not refer to the language used. Therefore, "about" is not a fundamental concept. Also not "match in relation to". >Basic concept, >Circular reasoning. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Aboutness | Millikan | I 13 Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something in the sense that their users are not aware of them. E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is about, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the referent is identified. >Intentionality, >Meaning, >Reference, >Thought, >Sign. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Aboutness | Prior | Prior I 21 "About"/Prior: believing-that, thinking-that never goes about propositions, but rather, what propositions are about. >Propositions, >Facts. "About" is systematically ambiguous; what it means depends on what kind of a name or quasi-names (eg numbers) follows. >Systematic ambiguity. Prior I 57f "about"/Prior: instead of propositions about propositions (identity of propos E.g. "Bachelors ... "/" unmarried ... " better: "if someone expresses .."Bachelors...". expresses the same propossition as "..unmarried ..." this is not about propositions. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Prior I 155f "about"/Unicorn example: that a sentence is really about something (existent), cannot depend on the shape, because the shape is the same when the subject is fictional. >Unicorn-example, >Non-existence, >Fictions, >Logical form. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Aboutness | Sellars | I 53 About/aboutness/sensation/Sellars: sensations are not "about". - There is no bond between words and "immediate experience". Instead: word-world connection: between "red" and red things. - But not between "red" and a class of private red things. Cf. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >World/thinking, >Language use, >Sensations, >Sensations/Sellars, >Intentionality, >Meaning, >Word meaning. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Aboutness | Stalnaker | I 62 About/aboutness/possible worlds/propositions/Stalnaker: Problem: when propositions are sets of possible worlds, it makes no sense to say that a proposition would be more about one world than about another. >Propositions, >Possible Worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Aboutness | Strawson | I 185 Object/Activity /about/represent/stand for/singular term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" can not be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. E.g. Raleigh smokes can be regarded as a sentence on smoking. It also "stands for" specifies no singular term - Both singular term and predicate term can stand for something. VsGeach: Geach is forced to say that "smoking" stands for something because for him predicative expressions stand for properties. >Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular terms, >Predicates, >Levels/order. >Properties/Geach, >Intentionality. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Absoluteness | Field | III 48 Absolute Point of Rest/Newton/Field: Newton considers absolute rest possible and necessary to define absolute acceleration (bucket experiment). Absolute Acceleration/Newton: uses the laws of mechanics for explanation - acceleration can only be explained by absolute speed. For this we need an absolute point of rest. FieldVs: that does not work, because the theory itself cannot pick out a reference system. >Reference systems. III 49 MachVsNewton: theory change, does not need a resting point. FieldVsMach/FieldVsTheory Change: better: define acceleration without numerical speed and resting point. FieldVsTensors: they are arbitrary. Solution/Field: simultaneity. Point: sameness of place over time is absolute rest. Vs: that does not work within Newton's theory! Solution: concept of space without structure (intrinsic). Solution: affine geometry - (this also for Newton). IV 419 Relativism/Absolute/Field: statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Abstract Art | Gadamer | I 97 Comment Abstract Art/Gadamer: The contemporary discussion about abstract art is, in my opinion, in the process of drifting into an abstract opposition of "representational" and "non-representational". There is in fact a polemical accent on the concept of abstractness. Polemics, however, always presupposes common ground. In this way, abstract art does not detach itself from the reference to representationalism per se, but holds it in the form of privation. It cannot go beyond this, provided that our seeing is and remains a seeing of objects. There can only be aesthetic vision in the absence of the habits of practically directed seeing - and what one refrains from, one must see, indeed, keep an eye on. The theses of Bernhard Berenson are similar: "What we generally call 'seeing', is a convenient arrangement." "The fine arts are a compromise between what we see and what we know" (Berenson, Sehen und Wissen, Die Neue Rundschau, 1959, pp. 55-77). >Form and Content/Gadamer, >Art, >Artworks, >Aesthetics, >Beauty. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Abstraction | Frege | Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 49 Definition abstraction/Frege/St: abstraction is a process to identify each other in the various elements of a region, e.g. same color, same size, same shape. New objects are gained by abstraction of the partial identity. ((s) Such objects which are only about numerical equality or color identity are individuated.) If A is such an abstraction, then there is by definition a (base) object a, so that the following is true: A is the F of a. --- Thiel I 131 Abstraction/Mathematics/Frege/Thiel: abstraction is a purely logical process, an operation with statements, the logical character of which is revealed by the change from the structure of the complicated initial statement to the structure of the new statement. Frege understood this first. Tere are statements not only about numbers, but also about sets, functions, concepts, situations, meaning and truth value of a statement, about structures. I 133 Numbers/digits/number names/names/mathematics/Thiel: the philosophical punch line of the transition from general statements via digits to arithmetic statements is that although we have introduced the speech about numbers in addition to the speech about digits, it is still a form of speech, a facon de parler, whose possibility does not depend on the fact that there are still abstract objects beyond the concrete digits, which we call "numbers". >Numerals. I 134 We also had no reason to conceive the digits as "names" of numbers, so that 4, IV, and |||| would denote the same number four, as it was assumed in the traditional philosophy of numbers. >Numbers. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Abstraction | Prior | I 64 "Extensional abstraction"/Prior: Extensional abstraction says that it is not about real entities but only surrogates. - E.g. identity of "nothing φ-es" with "everything that φ-es is not identical with itself." >Non-existence, >Identity, >Extensionality, >Extensions. I 133 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the vernacular requires a.: E.g. Cook Wilson: instead of "Jones is musically talented": what is predicted, is musicality. >Everyday language, >Predication, >Attribution. PriorVs: "-ty" or "-ness" is always just a trick. Vsuniversals; > |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Abstraction | Stalnaker | I 85 Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about essentialism are questions about how far it is useful and possible to abstract. >Essentialism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Abstractness | Prior | I 5 Abstract/Prior: objects are sometimes abstract, but what we think about them is always abstract. >Abstract objects, >Thinking, >World/thinking. I 31 Abstracts/abstract/Prior: "3 is greater than 4" even if not true. - It is not eliminable. >Elimination. Adverbs and connections can be eliminated if we introduce nominators. >Adverbs. E.g. "that" in "that P comes implies that Q stays away". - E.g. "that P is wrong"- e.g. instead of "everything moves": "Movement is universal". Problem: there are still links (abstractions) needed. These links must be meaningful because they can be true or false. >Truth, >Truth values, >Connectives, >Logical constants. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Abstractness | Rorty | VI 173f Abstracts/abstracta/Dennett: can be described by reference to physical forces and other characteristics - Reichenbach: Thesis: the existence of abstractions (Abstrakta") can be attributed to the existence of concreta. >Abstracta/Reichenbach. Reason: conclusions about abstractions are not probability conclusions, but analogies. Illata/Reichenbach: Displayable objects like electrons are no connections of concreta, but separate entities that are inferred from concreta. Ontology/RortyVsReichenbach: today ontological status no longer depends on definability. >Definition, >Definability, >Reichenbach, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Observation language. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Abstractness | Wright | I 226 f Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers. >Identification. Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. that there are no abstract objects). >Nominalism. But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! >Singular terms, >Reference, >Conceptual role, >Inferential role. Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! >Meaning, >Semantics, >Non-existence. Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. >Numbers, >Platonism. I 227f Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is evaluable in relation to truth, or not. >Truth-evaluableness, >Morals, Discourse. If the "capacity for truth" (truth evaluability) is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions. >Realism. I 223 ff It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner. Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference). >Minimalism. I 242 Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are. >Objects of thought. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Acceptability | Lyons | I 140f Def Acceptability/Grammar/Lyons: an utterance is acceptable if it was or could be used by a native speaker in a particular context and is or would be perceived by other native speakers as belonging to that language. Linguistics: one of its tasks is to explain which sentences are acceptable within the framework of a general theory of language structure. I 146 Acceptability/Level: at a lower level: here phonology is responsible for the acceptability of statements. >Phonemes. Grammar: replaces phonology at a higher level. >Grammar. I 151 Grammatical/meaningful/(sensible)/Lyons: we can now rewrite this distinction provisionally: Acceptable: e.g. 1. The dog bites the man. 2. The chimpanzee eats the banana. 3. The wind opens the door. 4. The Linguist recognizes the fact. 5. The meaning determines the structure. 6. The woman undresses the child. 7. The wind frightens the child. 8. The child drinks the milk. 9. The dog sees the meat. Tradition: would describe all as subject-predicate-structure and say that the subject is a syntagma (unit of several words consisting of articles and nouns). Def Syntagma/Linguistics: Unit of several words: Example predicate: = verb + object. I 152 Word classes: N = {dog, man, chimpanzee, fact...} V = {bites, eats, opens, recognizes… T: article Grammatical Rule: ∑1: T + N + V + T + N Notation: : stands for “sentence”. Subscript: shows that the rule only applies to one class of sentences. Grammatical rule: not only requires a lexicon that classifies all words of the language grammatically as N, V, or T, but also one or more rules for lexical substitution. First of all, we assume that such rules exist. I 153 Subclassification/Grammar/Lyons: now we can allow finer rules by dividing the classes finer ((s) to exclude "The banana bites the child"): Na = {dog, man, chimpanzee, linguist, child, wind... Nb = {banana, door, milk, meat…} Nc = [{ fact, meaning, structure… Vd = {eats, bites, frightens, undresses, sees,… Ve = { recognizes, determines, sees, eats… Vf = {determines…} 1. How we came to the decisions of the classification is irrelevant. I 154 Instead, it is about which classification allows the grammarian to set up a number of rules that cover the largest number of acceptable and the smallest number of unacceptable sentences. 2. The new subclasses can be considered as if there were no longer any relationship between them. 3. Some words are assigned to several classes. Example determines, sees. New: we then replace the original rule with several new rules (which define very different sentence types): a) ∑ 1: T + Na + Vd + T + Nas (e.g. The dog bites the man) b) ∑ 2: T + Na + Vd + T + Nb (e.g. The chimpanzee eats the banana) c) ∑ 3: T + Na + Ve + T + Nc (e.g. The linguist recognizes the fact) d) ∑ 4: T + Nc + Vf + T + Nc (e.g. The meaning determines the structure) I 155 N.B.: the new rules redefine the distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical English sentences. "The banana bites the meaning" is no longer possible, according to the simple rule T + N + V + T + N it would not have been excluded. However, there are still inadmissible statements that cannot be ruled out. Formal Grammar/Lyons: this is all about acceptability according to rules. Lexicon/Grammar/Lyons: the distinction between lexical and grammatical elements can still be neglected here. Grammaticality/Lyons: the linguist will draw the limit at an arbitrary place in his description. Two main factors: 1. law of "decreasing profitability": I 156 It should be avoided that one needs too many rules, which in the end only capture very few words. 2. Because of the unlimited number of sentences, it is not possible to decide for each sentence whether it is acceptable or not. This leads to an "indeterminacy of grammar". Problem: (see I 389 below): the design of sentences of a certain type within a certain theoretical framework can make the design of sentences of another type within the same theoretical framework very difficult. That is still unsolved today (1968). Acceptability/Grammar/Lyons: can only be determined in relation to one rule system. Different grammars assess the grammaticality of certain sentences differently. >Grammar, >Generative Grammar, >Universal Grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar, >N. Chomsky. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Acquaintance | Acquaintance: direct handling and contact with a subject matter about which statements are to be made as a basis for knowledge. Antonym to knowledge through description. |
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| Acquaintance | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 79 f Acquaintance/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: 1) you need to be familiar with the reference of "a", "R" and "b" - 2) and also with the logical form to distinguish aRb from bRa - 1) concrete objects - 2) logical form. >Logic. WittgensteinVsRussell: eliminates the logical forms, which can be expressed by general propositions - we do not need experience in logic - Tractatus: thus the logical forms get great weight. Hintikka I 315f Language/Acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: Russell has to show how his (phenomenological) language of acquaintance can be applied to physical objects. >Phenomenology. Wittgenstein: has to show, in turn, how a physical language can speak about our immediate experiences. >Experience. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Action Theory | Habermas | III 369 Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. >Sociology, >Method. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanation. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >Intentional Semantics, >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >J. Bennett. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. >Interaction, >Subjects. III 384 Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented Action Situation: social - or non-social Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others). >Interest. Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented). >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Agreement, >Success. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Actions | Davidson | Glüer II 108 Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation. Glüer II 109 f Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. Brandom I 724 Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent. Brandom I 727 She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow). I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs. Brandom I 957 Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber. I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded. I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine. I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. Glüer II 92 Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object. Glüer II 96 Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted. MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely) Glüer II 110 Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.) ((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.) >Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Actions | Frith | I 99 Action/consciousness/Daniel Wegner/Frith: Thesis: we have no direct knowledge that we are the originators of our actions. >Knowledge, >Intentionality, >Intentions. I 100 E.g. There is a second test partner, who actually works with the experimental director, and who moves the mouse in a computer test almost in unison to you, but sometimes not, or with time delay. N.B.: then you will think you are the one who moves the mouse (or cursor). This is also true vice versa. I 102 Action/Frith: for example, a person on a treadmill should perform various responses to changes in the resistance or the speed increase, e.g. maintaining the energy, the tempo, etc. N.B.: the people changed their way of walking several seconds before they had noticed the change in the resistance of the treadmill! I 202 Originator/action/movement/foreign psychological/sovereignty/Frith: something that is as private as pain is the experience that we are the originators of our actions. >Authorship, >Libet experiment. Cause/effect/Frith: cause and effect are connected here to units, as, for exampe, color, form and movement are connected to form objects. Object/thing/Frith: thesis: the object arises from a combination of form, color and movement. I 252 Action/freedom/freedom of will/Frith: why does my brain make me feel like a free acting being? Thesis: it is beneficial for us to feel like free actors. Why this is the case, I can only answer very speculatively: I 253 It has to do with altruism. Altruism/Frith: altruism is one of the most difficult problems in evolutionary biology. J. B. S. Haldane: "I would sacrifice my life for two brothers or eight cousins." Def Dictator Game/Frith: e.g. a player gets a hundred dollars and can decide how much of it he/she gives to another player, which he/she does not know and of which he/she knows that this person will never meet him/her again. Most people give about $30. Def Ultimatum Game/Frith: here the other players can influence the result: if the one rejects the offer, both will leave with empty hands. If a player gives less than 30 dollars, he is usually punished by the other players. Thesis: we have a strong sense of fairness. >Fairness, >Ultimatum game. Def altruistic punishment/Frith: sometimes we even pay to punish someone else, e.g. free riders. With them we have no compassion. Our brain rewards us for the punishment of free riders. >Free rider. Def 2n level free rider/Frith: free riders are people who rely on others carrying out the punishment and never do it themselves. Freedom/freedom of will/Frith: freedom is a consequence of the fact that we are experiencing ourselves as free actors, that we also assume this of other people. >Intersubjectivity. Child: differs between intentional and unintentional action already at the age of three years. >Stages of development. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Actions | Gärdenfors | I 15/16 Action/Meaning/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: Actions, especially exercised forces have an influence on meanings of our linguistic expressions. See Johnson (1987)(1), Clark (1997)(2), Mandler (2004, especially pp. 118-119)(3). I 91 Action/Gärdenfors: Speaking and listening are traditionally understood as autonomous actions. H. Clark (1996, p.19)(4) Thesis: one should understand both as participatory actions. Gärdenfors: It is about bringing the spirit of the participants together. >Meeting of Minds. Predecessor of this view: G. H. Mead (1934)(5). I 145 Acts/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: many of our cognitive representations affect dynamic properties (as opposed to properties denoted by most nouns and adjectives). (See van Gelder, 1995, Port & van Gelder, 1995)(6). Conceptual Space/Action/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the action space can be treated as the colour space or the shape space. Action/Gärdenfors: Thesis: Actions can be described as force patterns. >Space/Lakoff. I 146 Actions/Language/Gärdenfors: many of our everyday concepts come from acts and events, many words for artefacts - such as chairs, clocks, etc. - are categorized according to their functional properties. (See Nelson, 1996, Mandler, 2004).(7) (8) I 148 Action/Representation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: an action is represented by the force pattern, which produces it. N.B.: a consequence of this thesis is that the actors are not part of the representation. Conceptual space: the conceptual space for actions is therefore a configurational space that includes the movements e.g. of body parts. It is based on the force space. As in the case of forms, there is also a meronomic (part-whole) structure in forces. (See Westera, 2008, Robot Control).(9) I 153 Action/Categories/Function/Gärdenfors: Thesis on concepts of action: a concept of action is represented as a convex region of the space of action. Convex: one can interpret that here in the way that a linear "morph" (e.g. hiking, running, marching) between two actions within a region of a concept of action will fall under the same concept. I 198 Actions/Gärdenfors: Conclusion: 1. The models of action and the models for property changes make it possible to predict the similarities of verbs and their superordinate and subordinate hierarchies. 2. The distinction between course of action/result is directly derived from the assumption of a single area. 3. The role of intentionality in the verb meaning is underlined. Many verbs, which seem to contravene the assumption of a single space, have a dual lexical potential. Verbs: can be analyzed similarly to the pointing and similar to nouns and adjectives. Therefore, I do not divide verbs into classes. I 199 Pro verbs/Gärdenfors: Verbs like "is", "go", "make" are often placeholders for verbs of the course of action or property change. I call them "pro verbs" analog to pronouns. 1. Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Mandler, J. M. (2004). The foundations of mind: Origins of conceptual thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 4. Clark, H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Port, R. F., & van Gelder, T. (Eds.). (1995). Mind as motion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 7. Nelson, K. (1996). Language in cognitive development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Mandler, J. M. (2004). The foundations of mind: Origins of conceptual thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 9. Westera, M. (2008). Action representations and the semantics of verbs. Bachelor’s thesis. Cognitive Artificial Intelligence, Utrecht University. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Actions | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Action/Parsons/Habermas: Like Weber, Parsons proceeds from the categories of "purpose" and "means". He focuses on the most general provisions of the smallest conceivable unit of possible action. (1) Habermas IV 307 HabermasVsParsons: his concept of action is subjective ("voluntaristic"), which follows from his concept of the situation. >Situation/Parsons. Thus, his theory of action excludes objectivism from concepts of action reformulated in behavioral science. Taking normative standards into account, according to Parsons, action bridges the gap between the regions of being and should, facts and values, between the conditions of a given situation Habermas IV 308 and the orientation of the actor determined by values and norms (the ontological dimension: conditions/norms). In doing so, the "effort" that requires an action loses the empirical sense of a striving for gratification: "effort" is here rather „a name for the relating factor between the normative and conditional elements of action. It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not realize themselves automatically but only through action, so far as they are realized at all.“(2) HabermasVsParsons: the concept of action as a basic unit does not explain what it means that an actor bases its decisions on values. Habermas IV 352 Actions/System/Parsons: Action/Luhmann: "The action is a system due to its internal analytical structure".(3) Habermas: this is about the relations between values, norms, goals and resources. Action system/Parsons: is composed of subsystems that specialize in the production and maintenance of one component of action at a time: Culture: on values Society: on norms Personality: on goals Behavioral system: on means or resources.(4) >Values, >Norms, >Goals. Habermas IV 353 HabermasVsParsons: with the concept of the action system, the actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which decisions and thus effects of actions are ascribed. >Systems theory, >Action systems. Actors come into view as abstract placeholders, namely as aspects of the organism capable of learning, the motivational balance of a person, the roles and memberships of a social system and the action-determining traditions of a culture. >Cultural Tradition. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, p. 43f. 2. Ibid. p. 719. 3. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, p. 8 4. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 44 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Active/passive | Chomsky | Lyons I 258 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: although subject and object are interchanged, identity or similarity prevails between the two corresponding sentences in the deep structure. However, this is also a prerequisite for determining that subject and object can be exchanged. >Transformational grammar, >Subject, >Object, >Grammar, >Syntax. Problem: there is disagreement about whether dissimilation prevails here or not. For example, suppose that "the shooting of the hunters" is not ambiguous. Problem: then we would still require the grammar to be written in the following way that a) between "the shooting of the hunters" and the transitive sentence NP1 "shoot the hunters", and b) between "the hunters shooting" and the intransitive "the hunters shoot" relationships are established. Lyons I 261 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957) Passive (optional) Structural descriptions: NP – Aux – V NP Structural change: X1 – X2 - X3 – X4 > X4 – X2 + be + en – V – by + X1 (Notation: concatenation: sometimes „+“, sometimes “–„ (is not explained here). different: (formally more precise): NP1 – Aux – V – NP2 > Aux + be + en – V – by + NP1 T-rule: contains two parts: the description (analysis, notation: SA, SB) and the change (structural change, notation: SC, SV). By definition, T-rules are only effective in chains that can be analyzed by means of the elements indicated in their structural description. Transformation: its result is exactly what has already been described in the alternative representation of the rule: NP1 – Aux – V – NP2 > Aux + be + en – V – by + NP1 What does it mean that the chain can be analyzed using four elements (NP, Aux, V and NP)? I 262 The following chains resulted from the rules: from (1): NP + VP (2): NP + Verb + NP (3) : NP sing + Verb + NP sing (4): T + N + 0 + Verb + T + N + 0 (6): T + N + 0 + Aux+ V + T + N + 0 (7) T + N + 0 + C + M + have + en + V + T ü N + 0. Rule (3) n d(4) was applied twice (4), because NP sing f both positions were selected in the output of rule (2). Rule (5) was not applicable. Rule (7): Au has been replaced by C + M + have + en. The edition of (7) is a core chain which is underlied by the type of corresponding active and passive sentences, e.g. "The man will have read the book" and "The book will have been read by the man". Passive transformation: now we apply them to the chain: where none of the elements specified in the structural description with respect to the passive transformation occur in the core chain. Furthermore, we did not come across the chain NP + Aux + V + Np at any stage of deriving the core chain through the PS rules. Therefore, we review the rules again to create the constituent structure of the desired core chain: By rule (1): ∑ (NP + VP) (2): ∑ (NP + VP)(Verb + NP)) (3): ∑ (NP (NP sing) + VP(Verb + NP(NP sing))) (4): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb + NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))) (6): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb (Aux + V)+ NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))) (7): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb (Aux (C + M + have + en) + V)+ NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))). This is the constituent structure of sentences that is the basis of sentences such as "The man will have read the book" and "The book will have been read by the man." (active/passive). Lyons I 262 Definition Phrase Marker/P-Marker/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: if a chain is represented with constituent parentheses and parentheses indices (labelled-bracketing), this is referred to as a formation marker or P-marker. Def parenthesis index: labelled-bracketing/terminology: Designation of a node in the tree diagram or symbol in front of a parenthesis. I 263 Def Dominate/Dominance/Chomsky/Lyons: a symbol dominates an entire parentheses expression when the parentheses in the P marker is opened immediately after this symbol. In the tree diagram: The symbol dominates everything that is derived from the node indicated by the symbol. Def (structural) analyzability/grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (is a condition for the application of T-rules): if a chain without residual elements can be broken down into subchains, each of which is dominated by a symbol given in the structural description of the T-rules, then the chain satisfies the conditions defined by the structural description (SB). Passive transformation/Chomsky/Lyons: (is optional) and looks like this: {T + N + 0} + {C + M + have + en} + {V} + {T + N + 0} NP1 - Aux - V - NP2 Transformation: due to the operation of the actual T-Rule (in the structural change), a further chain (no more core chain) results as output, which then serves with its P-marker as input for further T-Rules. >Unambiguity. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Acts of Will | Geach | I 251f Vs"Acts of Will"/Geach: attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs)-Vs: "ascription theory" ("ascriptivism", Oxford). Ascriptivism/Oxford: Thesis: saying that an action is voluntary is not a description of the action, but an attribution. "All he said"/Oxford: Thesis: this would not be about description but about "confirmation". >Everything he said is true. GeachVs: such theories can be invented by the dozen. - The actual distinction to be observed is the one between naming and predication. >Naming, >Predication. VsAscription Theory: condemning a thing by calling it "bad" must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also be done without condemnation. Neither can "done deliberately" be characterized by attribution of responsibility or "being imposed" without describing the act as such first. Cf. >Prescriptivism, cf. >"voluntarily"/Austin. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Acts of Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the mental. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, we have to combine connotations in Nietzsche concerning the usual and mental with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: Acts of Will behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of the causal nexus, how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. >Regress. NietzscheVsHume: is more radical, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted.(1) >Reality/Nietzsche, >Subject/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Actuality | Boer | 12 Actuality/Boer: (= existence) against it: being unequals existence. --- Note I 36 Question: Does acquaintance with the object and the property shifts one into another physical state? A) if intentional states are locally supervening on non-intentional facts about the person, then not. B) if they supervise globally, then yes. > "There is". --- I 14 Non-actual essences/non-updated essential properties/Boer: their possibility does not bind us to non-actual individuals whose essences they would be. Plantinga: Thesis: the former make the latter superfluous: Boer pro: that could be. E.g. there is no obligation on a round square, but the non-exemplifiable property of being a round square. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Adolescence | Elkind | Upton I 123 Egocentrism/adolescence/Elkind/Upton: [during adolescence there is a] change in cognitive skills is reflected in the growing ability of adolescents to handle increasingly complex scientific and mathematical concepts. This new way of thinking also underlies the ability of the adolescent to engage in introspection and self-reflection, which, according to some theorists, results in heightened self-consciousness (Elkind. 1978)(1). Elkind called this phenomenon adolescent egocentrism, suggesting that this governs the way in which adolescents think about social matters. According to this theory, adolescents believe that others are as interested in them as they are in themselves and in their sense of personal uniqueness. Two aspects of adolescent egocentrism have been described: - The imaginary audience: this is where adolescents believe themselves to be ‘at centre stage’. Everyone else’s attention is riveted on them. - The personal fable: this underpins the adolescent sense of personal uniqueness and invincibility. No one else can possibly understand how they really feel; furthermore, although others may be vulnerable to misfortune, they are not. >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Elkind, D (1978) Understanding the young adolescent. Adolescence, 13(49): 127-34. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Adolescence | Freud | Upton I 126 Adolescence/Anna Freud/Upton: (…) even when adolescents are physically mature enough to perform adult functions such as work and childbearing, they lack not only the psychological maturity, but also the social status and financial resources to perform those functions responsibly. This is because of the extended dependency brought about by social conventions such as the school-leaving age. Indeed, Anna Freud regarded any adolescent who did not experience emotional upheaval as ‘abnormal’ (Freud, 1958)(1). VsFreud, Anna: However, this image of the troubled or delinquent teenager was challenged as early as 1928(3) by Margaret Mead, who presented an account of the coming of age for Samoan adolescents that showed a very gradual and smooth transition from childhood to adulthood. The debate about storm and stress in adolescents is frequently mentioned in the literature (e.g., Arnett, 1999)(2); however, it seems that very few developmental psychologists still support this view. >Adolescence/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Freud, A (1958) Adolescence, in The Writings of Anna Freud, Vol. 5: Research at the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic and other papers 1956—1965, New York: Indiana University of Pennsylvania. 2. Arnett. JJ (1999) Adolescent storm and stress reconsidered. American Psychologist, 54: 317-26. 3. Mead, M (1928). Coming of Age in Samoa. A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Adolescence | Hall | Upton I 126 Adolescence/Hall/Upton: adolescence has been depicted as a tumultuous period, full of chaos and confusion caused by the ‘raging hormones’ brought about by puberty (Hall, 1904)(1). Indeed, (…) adolescence involves major physical transitions that include growth spurts, sexual maturation, hormonal changes and neurological development, in particular in the frontal lobes, an area of the brain linked to impulse control. It has also been argued that, for adolescents in Western cultures, there is a disjunction between biology and society. VsHall >Adolescence/Psychological theories. Further contributions to adolescence >Adolescence/Anna Freud, >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Hall, GS (1904) Adolescence: Its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education. New York: Appleton. |
EconHallR I Robert E. Hall The Streetcorner Strategy for Winning Local Markets: Right Sales, Right Service, Right Customers, Right Cost Austin 1999 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Adolescence | Mead | Upton I 126 Adolescence/Mead, Margaret/Upton: adolescence has been depicted as a tumultuous period, full of chaos and confusion caused by the ‘raging hormones’ brought about by puberty (Hall, 1904)(1). Cf. >Adolescence/Anna Freud. VsHall: this image of the troubled or delinquent teenager was challenged as early as 1928(2) by Margaret Mead, who presented an account of the coming of age for Samoan adolescents that showed a very gradual and smooth transition from childhood to adulthood. The debate about storm and stress in adolescents is frequently mentioned in the literature (e.g., Arnett, 1999)(3); however, it seems that very few developmental psychologists still support this view. >Adolescence/Psychological theories. Further contributions to adolescence: >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Hall, GS (1904) Adolescence: Its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education. New York: Appleton. 2. Mead, M (1928). Coming of Age in Samoa. A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization. 3. Arnett. JJ (1999) Adolescent storm and stress reconsidered. American Psychologist, 54: 317-26. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Adolescence | Psychological Theories | Upton I 126 Adolescence/Psychological theories/Upton: Traditionally, adolescence has been depicted as a tumultuous period, full of chaos and confusion caused by the ‘raging hormones’ brought about by puberty (Hall, 1904)(1). Indeed, (…) adolescence involves major physical transitions that include growth spurts, sexual maturation, hormonal changes and neurological development, in particular in the frontal lobes, an area of the brain linked to impulse control. It has also been argued that, for adolescents in Western cultures, there is a disjunction between biology and society that has the potential to create a difficult transitional period: even when adolescents are physically mature enough to perform adult functions such as work and childbearing, they lack not only the psychological maturity, but also the social status and financial resources to perform those functions responsibly. This is because of the extended dependency brought about by social conventions such as the school-leaving age. >Adolescence/Anna Freud, >Adolescence/Margaret Mead. The debate about storm and stress in adolescents is frequently mentioned in the literature (e.g., Arnett, 1999)(2); however, it seems that very few developmental psychologists still support this view. The consensus is that most of us negotiate adolescence with few serious personal or social problems. Coleman (1978)(3) proposed a focal theory of adolescence, which suggests that each of the many personal and social issues that have to be dealt with in adolescence come to the teenager’s attention at different times. However, it is important to recognize that those children who do have an emotional time in adolescence usually have some pre-existing Upton I 127 emotional problem (Graham and Rutter, 1985(4); White et al.. 1990)(5). Likewise, delinquent teenagers are likely to have had behavioural problems as children (Bates. 2003)(6). All of which perhaps points to adolescence intensifying existing predispositions, not creating new ones. >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Hall, GS (1904) Adolescence: Its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education. New York: Appleton. 2. Arnett. JJ (1999) Adolescent storm and stress reconsidered. American Psychologist, 54: 317-26. 3. Coleman. IC (1978) Current contradictions in adolescent theory. Journal of Youth and Adolescence,7: 1-11. 4. Graham, P and Rutter, M(1985) Adolescent disorders, in Rutter, M and Hersov, L (eds) Child And Adolescent Psychiatry: Modern approaches (4th edu). Oxford: Blackwell Scientific. 5. White, J, Moffit, T, Earls, F. Robins. L and Silva, P (1990) How early can we tell? Predictors of childhood conduct disorder and adolescent delinquency. Criminology, 28:507-27. 6. Bates. JE (2003) Temperamental unadaptabiity and later internalizing problems as moderated by mothers’ restrictive control. Paper presented at the meeting for the Society for Research in Child Development, Tampa, FL. Further reading: For traditional ways of adolescence: Arnett, J (1999) Adolescent storm and stress, reconsidered. American Psychologist, 54: 317-26. Available online at http://uncenglishmat.weeb1y.com/uploads/1/4/3/4/1434319/arnett.pdf. (Access date 7/17/2019). For links between neurological structures, brain function and cognitive skills: Casey, BJ, Giedd, JN and Thomas, KM (2000) Structural and functional brain development and its relation to cognitive development. Biological Psychology, 54,241—57. Available online at www.medinfo.hacettepe.edu.tr/tebad/umut_docs/interests/fmr/aging/ MAIN_structural_fonctional.pdf. (Access date 7/17/2019). |
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| Adulthood | Biological Theories | Upton I 134 Adulthood/Biological theories/Upton: greying of the hair or the hair may thin. Weight changes typically seen across the lifespan include weight gain in middle age, followed by weight loss when people reach their sixties (Whitbourne, 2005)(1). Upton I 135 Ageing involves a decline in efficiency in most bodily systems from the twenties onwards. Strength and flexibility begin to wane in both genders in middle age (Samson et aL, 2000)(2), motor performance slows (Newell et al., 2006)(3) and reaction times decrease. However, it seems likely that avoiding a sedentary lifestyle will make such deterioration less marked (Earles and Saithouse, 1995)(4). Research has found that moderate exercise and a healthy diet can protect against stroke, heart disease and late-onset dabetes (Yung et al., 2009)(5). Women also experience the menopause— the hormonal changes that result in the loss of the ability to reproduce in middle to late adulthood. An increase in the incidence of chronic disease, such as osteoarthritis, hypertension and heart disease, is also seen in older adults. Individual differences in physical functioning increase with age. Thus, measurements such as aerobic capacity, strength and reaction times vary more widely among 70 year olds than among 20 year olds. This is in part due to lifestyle choices — for example, physically active older adults are more likely to retain strength (Amara et al., 2003(6)). (…) muscles atrophy if not used and the heart functions less well if the individual leads a sedentary life style (Rosenbloom and Bahns, 2006)(7). Health problems may also contribute to differences in decline; a classic study in the 1960s showed how deterioration in physical and psychological functioning in men aged 65—91 was linked to sub-clinical disease (Birren et al., 1963)(8). Socioeconomic status is also often reported to make a difference to health and disability; studies using self-reported measures of health demonstrate greater problems among older people in disadvantaged socio-economic groups (Marmot et al., 2001)(9). This is usually believed to demonstrate the advantages of having greater material resources and opportunities to promote a healthy lifestyle. >Aging. 1. Whitboume, SK (2005) Adult Development and Aging: Biopsychological perspectives (2nd edn). New York: Wiley. 2. Samson, MM, Meeuwsen, lB, Crowe, A, Dessens, JA, Duursma, SA and Verhaar, HJ (2000) Relationships between physical performance measures, age, height and body weight in healthy adults. Age and Ageing, 29: 235-42. 3. Newell, KM, Vaillancourt, DE and Sosnoff, JJ (2006) Aging complexity and motor performance, in Birren,JE and Schaie, KW (eds) Handbook of the Psychology of Aging(6th edn). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 4. Earles, JL and Salthouse, TA (1995) Interrelations of age, health, and speed. Journal of Gerontology, 50(1): 33—41. 5. Yung, LM, Laher, I, Yao, X, Chen, ZY, Huang, Y and Leung, FP (2009) Exercise, vascular wall and cardiovascular diseases: an update (part 2). Sports Science, 3 9(1): 45-63. 6. Amara, CE, Rice, CL, Koval. ¡J, Paterson, DH, Winter. EM and Cunningham, DA (2003) Allometric scaling of strength in an independently living population age 55-86 years. American Journal of Human Biology, 15:48-60. 7. Rosenbloom, C and Bahns, M (2006) What can we learn about thet and physical activity from master athletes? Holistic Nursing Practice, 2 0(4): 161-6. 8. Birren. JE, Butler, RN and Greenhouse. SW et al. (eds)(1963) Human Aging: A biological and behavioral study. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 9. Marmot, M, Shipley, M. Brunner, E and Hemingway, H(2001) Relative contribution of early life and adult socioeconomic factors to adult morbidity in the Whitehall II Study. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 55: 301-7. |
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| Aesthetic Consciousness | Gadamer | I 91 Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer: What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on an achievement of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted in its original context of life, of all religious or profane function in which it stood and in which it had its meaning, it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". The abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness thus achieves a positive achievement for itself. It lets us see and is for itself what the pure work of art is. I call this, its achievement, the "aesthetic distinction". >Truth of Art/Gadamer, >Truth of Art/Schiller. This is intended to designate - in contrast to the distinction that a content-filled and certain taste exercises in selecting and rejecting - the abstraction that selects solely on the basis of aesthetic quality as such. It takes place in the self-consciousness of the "aesthetic experience". What the aesthetic experience is aimed at is to be the actual work - what it is not aimed at are the non-aesthetic moments inherent in it: purpose, function, meaning of content. These moments may be significant enough, as long as they integrate the work into its world and thus determine the whole range of meaning that it originally owns. But the artistic nature of the work must be distinguishable from all that. It virtually defines the aesthetic consciousness, that it carries out precisely this distinction of the aesthetically meant from all that is non-aesthetic. It abstracts from all conditions of access under which a work shows itself to us. Such a distinction is therefore itself a specifically aesthetic one. It distinguishes the aesthetic quality of a work from all content-related moments that determine our position in terms of content, morality or religion, and only means itself in its aesthetic existence. >Aesthetics, >Art, >Art works. The aesthetic consciousness therefore has the character of simultaneity, because it claims that everything that has artistic value is gathered in it. I 92 The "aesthetic distinction" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the standing theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic distinction", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his/her place in the world. I 105 Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer: [In the aesthetic experience] there is no progress and no final exhaustion of what is contained in a work of art. >Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer. The experience of art knows that about itself. Nevertheless, the aesthetic consciousness should not simply assume what it thinks of as its experience. For it perceives it, as we have seen, ultimately as the discontinuity of experience. But we have recognized this consequence as unacceptable. >Truth of Art/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Fichte | Gadamer I 63 Aesthetics/Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: Kant's justification of aesthetics on the concept of taste cannot (...) be entirely satisfactory. It is far more obvious to use the concept of genius, which Kant developed as a transcendental principle for artistic beauty, as a universal aesthetic principle. Far better than the concept of taste, it fulfils the demand to be invariant to the changes of time. The Kantian phrase "beautiful art Gadamer I 64 is art of genius" becomes (...) the transcendental principle for aesthetics in general. In the end, aesthetics is only possible as a philosophy of art. Schlegel/Fichte/Gadamer: It was German idealism that drew this conclusion. Just as Fichte and Schelling otherwise followed Kant's doctrine of the transcendental imagination, they also made a new use of this term for aesthetics. In contrast to Kant, the standpoint of art as that of unconsciously ingenious production thus became all-embracing and also encompassed nature, which is understood as a product of the mind(1). But this has shifted the foundations of aesthetics. Like the concept of taste, the concept of natural beauty is devalued or understood differently. The moral interest in the beauty of nature, which Kant had described so enthusiastically, now takes second place to the self-encounter of man in the works of art. >Beauty of nature/Hegel. Gadamer I 65 Aesthetics/Fichte/Gadamer: (...) Kant's essential concern to provide an autonomous foundation of aesthetics, freed from the criterion of the concept, and not to pose the question of truth in the field of art at all, but to base the aesthetic judgement on the subjective a priori of the attitude to life, the harmony of our capacity for "knowledge in general", which constitutes the common essence of taste and genius, [came] to meet the irrationalism and the cult of genius of the 19th century. Genius/Fichte: Kant's doctrine of the "increase of the feeling of life" in aesthetic pleasure promoted the development of the term "genius" into a comprehensive concept of life, especially after Fichte raised the standpoint of genius and ingenious production to a universal transcendental standpoint. Thus it came about that Neo-Kantianism, in that it sought to derive all representational validity from transcendental subjectivity, used the term Gadamer I 66 experience as the actual fact of consciousness.(2) >Experience/Gadamer. 1. To what extent the change that occurred between Kant and his successors, which I try to characterize by the formula "standpoint of art", has obscured the universal phenomenon of the beautiful, can be taught by the first Schlegelfragment (Friedrich Schlegel, Fragmente, From the Lyceums 1797): "One calls many artists who are actually works of art of nature". This turn of phrase echoes Kant's justification of the concept of genius in terms of the favor of nature, but it is so little appreciated that it becomes, on the contrary, an objection against an artistic nature that is too little aware of itself. 2. It is the merit of Luigi Pareyson's 1952 book, L'estetica del idealismo tedesco, to have highlighted the importance of spruce for the idealist aesthetic. Accordingly, the secret influence of Fichte and Hegel could be recognized within the whole of the Neo-Kantianism. |
Fichte I Johann Gottlieb Fichte Zur Politik, Moral und Philosophie der Geschichte Berlin 1971 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Schiller | Gadamer I 87 Aesthetics/Schiller/Gadamer: In his aesthetic writings, Schiller transformed the radical subjectivation by which Kant transcendently justified the judgement of taste and its claim to universal validity from a methodological to a content-related precondition(1). Although he was able to draw on Kant himself in this process, insofar as Kant had already recognized the importance of a transition from the enjoyment of the senses to a sense of morality,(2) but by proclaiming art as an exercise in freedom, Schiller was referring more to Fichte than to Kant. The Gadamer I 88 free play of cognitive faculties, on which Kant had based the a priori of taste and genius, was understood anthropologically from the basis of Fichte's drive theory, in that the play drive is supposed to bring about harmony between the form and material drive. >Taste, >Genius. It probably has to do with the inner shift in the ontological basis of Schiller's aesthetics that his great approach in the "Letters on Aesthetic Education" also changes in the execution. As is well known, an education through art becomes an education to art. In place of the true moral and political freedom for which art should prepare, the formation of an "aesthetic state" of an educational society interested in the arts(3) occurs. But this also forces the overcoming of the Kantian dualism of the world of the senses and the world of morals, represented by the freedom of aesthetic play and the harmony of the work of art, into a new contrast. The reconciliation of ideal and life through art is merely a particular reconciliation. Beauty and art lend only a fleeting and transfiguring glimmer to reality. Gadamer I 89 The concept of reality that Schiller contrasted with poetry is certainly no longer Kantian. For Kant, as we have seen, always starts from the beauty of nature. Cf. >Art/Phenomenology. 1. Thus one can summarize what was said in the letters "Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen", for example in the 15th letter, it is justified: "there should be a community between form drive and material drive, i.e. being a play drive". 2. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft p. 164. 3. "Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen", twenty-seventh letter. Cf. still the excellent presentation of this process in H. Kuhn, Die Vollendung der klassischen deutschen Ästhetik durch Hegel, Berlin 1931. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Vischer | Pfotenhauer IV 100 Ästhetik/Vischer/NietzscheVsVischer/Pfotenhauer: Friedrich Theodor Vischer, who at an early stage had provoked Nietzsche's disgust as a "renowned aesthete from the Hegelian school of reason"(1) had already made his mark with the relevant publication "Über das Erhabene und Komische", 1837(2). It was about how the initially unaesthetic, the ugly, could be absorbed in the medium of art. Vischer considered "the interest of the senses" as a challenge to aesthetics(2), the disharmony in the "quarrel of indignant forces", the acridness of tragic discord (ibid. p. 69), but also the isolated, the "substance-like atoms" that are present to us in their "massiveness" as an experience of nature (ibid. p. 64). The question was how these elements, which endanger the aesthetic harmony, could be overcome. Solution/Vischer: the key to the solution of the problem lies in Kant's definition of the sublime. The sublime proves "a capacity of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses." (ibid. p. 71; on Kant's criticism of the power of judgement §25ff, p. 333ff, especially p. 336). >Sublime. Sublime/Vischer: what appears to our sensual imagination to be excessive and monstrous, awakens in us the feeling of a supernatural capacity. The finite in its form, incommensurable to the senses, need not offend our aesthetic sensibility, but can awaken in us the idea of the infinite ex negativo. Ugliness becomes a mere occasion. Beauty/Vischer: beauty produces turbulences, "fermentations" (ibid. p. 69) from within itself in order to be able to lift itself to a higher level because of its own opposition. Sublime/Vischer: the sublime thus becomes a necessary and essential component of the idea of beauty. It proves its increasing ability and superiority. NietzscheVsVischer/Pfotenhauer: Nietzsche could not embrace this belief in referencing and transcending. 1. F. Nietzsche Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, 2, KGW III, 1, S. 167. 2. F. Th. Vischer, Über das Erhabene und Komische und andere Texte zur Ästhetik, (Ed.) Willi Oelmüller, Frankfurt/M. S. 71. |
Vischer I Friedrich Theodor Vischer Über das Erhabene und Komische und andere Texte zur Ästhetik Frankfurt/M. 1967 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Affect | Shoda | Corr I 477 Affects/Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith: Early information-processing models developed within cognitive psychology focused on ‘cool cognitions’, such as facts and propositions processed in a logical fashion. These models changed as it became clear that affects, or emotions, profoundly influence many aspects of behaviour, including how stimuli are encoded and the expectancies that are evoked by situational cues (Forgas 1995)(1). Cognitions about the self and one’s future are inherently affect laden, or ‘hot’ (Shoda and Mischel 1998)(2). Moreover, affective responses can influence a wide range of behaviours, including evaluative responses and social behaviour, in a pre-conscious fashion that occurs automatically and outside of awareness (Gollwitzer and Bargh 1996)(3). Shoda/Smith: Emotions also affect other CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) components. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Anxiety, for example, can significantly lower outcome expectancies in performance situations (Smith 2006)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Forgas, J. P. 1995. Mood and judgment: the affect-infusion model (AIM), Psychological Bulletin 117: 39–66 2. Shoda, Y. and Mischel, W. 1998. Personality as a stable cognitive-affective activation network: characteristic patterns of behaviour variation emerge from a stable personality structure, in S. J. Read and L. C. Miller (eds.), Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour, pp. 175–208. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Gollwitzer, P. M. and Bargh, J. A. (eds.) 1996.The psychology of action: linking motivation and cognition to behaviour. New York: Guilford Press 4. Smith, R. E. 2006. Understanding sport behavior: a cognitive-affective processing systems approach, Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 18: 1–27 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Affect | Smith | Corr I 477 Affects/Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith: Early information-processing models developed within cognitive psychology focused on ‘cool cognitions’, such as facts and propositions processed in a logical fashion. These models changed as it became clear that affects, or emotions, profoundly influence many aspects of behaviour, including how stimuli are encoded and the expectancies that are evoked by situational cues (Forgas 1995)(1). Cognitions about the self and one’s future are inherently affect laden, or ‘hot’ (Shoda and Mischel 1998)(2). Moreover, affective responses can influence a wide range of behaviours, including evaluative responses and social behaviour, in a pre-conscious fashion that occurs automatically and outside of awareness (Gollwitzer and Bargh 1996)(3). Shoda/Smith: Emotions also affect other CAPS (Cognitive-affective processing system) components. >Encoding/Shoda/Smith, >Social Cognition/Shoda/Smith. Anxiety, for example, can significantly lower outcome expectancies in performance situations (Smith 2006)(4). >Control processes/Shoda/Smith. 1. Forgas, J. P. 1995. Mood and judgment: the affect-infusion model (AIM), Psychological Bulletin 117: 39–66 2. Shoda, Y. and Mischel, W. 1998. Personality as a stable cognitive-affective activation network: characteristic patterns of behaviour variation emerge from a stable personality structure, in S. J. Read and L. C. Miller (eds.), Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour, pp. 175–208. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 3. Gollwitzer, P. M. and Bargh, J. A. (eds.) 1996.The psychology of action: linking motivation and cognition to behaviour. New York: Guilford Press 4. Smith, R. E. 2006. Understanding sport behavior: a cognitive-affective processing systems approach, Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 18: 1–27 Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| African Countries | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 53 African countries/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) the orientation of continents cannot provide an explanation for today’s world inequality. Though the Sahara Desert did present a significant barrier to the movement of goods and ideas from the north to sub-Saharan Africa, this was not insurmountable. The Portuguese, and then other Europeans, sailed around the coast and eliminated differences in knowledge at a time when gaps in incomes were very small compared with what they are today. Since then, Africa has not caught up with Europe; on the contrary, there is now a much larger income gap between most African and European countries. >Inequalities/Diamond, >Inequalities/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 58 Historically, sub-Saharan Africa was poorer than most other parts of the world, and its ancient civilizations did not develop the wheel, writing (with the exception of Ethiopia and Somalia), or the plow. Though these technologies were not widely used until the advent of formal European colonization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, African societies knew about them much earlier. Europeans began sailing around the west coast in the late fifteenth century, and Asians were continually sailing to East Africa from much earlier times. In West Africa there was rapid economic development based on the export of palm oil and ground nuts; throughout southern Africa, Africans developed exports to the rapidly expanding industrial and mining areas of the Rand in South Africa. Yet these promising economic experiments were obliterated not by African culture or the inability of ordinary Africans to act in their own self-interest, but first by European colonialism and then by postindependence African governments. Colonialism: The real reason that the Kongolese did not adopt superior technology was because they lacked any incentives to do so. They faced a high risk of all their output being expropriated and taxed by the all-powerful king, whether or not he had converted to Catholicism. Acemoglu I 463 Literature: a seminal political economy interpretation of African underdevelopment was developed by Bates (1981(1), 1983(2), 1989(3)), whose work heavily influenced ours. Seminal studies by Dalton (1965)(4) and Killick (1978)(5) emphasize the role of politics in African development and particularly how the fear of losing political power influences economic policy. 1.Bates, Robert H. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2. - (1983). Essays in the Political Economy of Rural Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. - (1989). Beyond the Miracle of the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4.Dalton, George H. (1965). “History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia.” Journal of Economic History 25: 569–91. 5. Killick, Tony (1978). Development Economics in Action. London: Heinemann. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| African Countries | Robinson | Acemoglu I 53 African countries/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) the orientation of continents cannot provide an explanation for today’s world inequality. Though the Sahara Desert did present a significant barrier to the movement of goods and ideas from the north to sub-Saharan Africa, this was not insurmountable. The Portuguese, and then other Europeans, sailed around the coast and eliminated differences in knowledge at a time when gaps in incomes were very small compared with what they are today. Since then, Africa has not caught up with Europe; on the contrary, there is now a much larger income gap between most African and European countries. >Inequalities/Diamond, >Inequalities/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 58 Historically, sub-Saharan Africa was poorer than most other parts of the world, and its ancient civilizations did not develop the wheel, writing (with the exception of Ethiopia and Somalia), or the plow. Though these technologies were not widely used until the advent of formal European colonization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, African societies knew about them much earlier. Europeans began sailing around the west coast in the late fifteenth century, and Asians were continually sailing to East Africa from much earlier times. In West Africa there was rapid economic development based on the export of palm oil and ground nuts; throughout southern Africa, Africans developed exports to the rapidly expanding industrial and mining areas of the Rand in South Africa. Yet these promising economic experiments were obliterated not by African culture or the inability of ordinary Africans to act in their own self-interest, but first by European colonialism and then by postindependence African governments. Colonialism: The real reason that the Kongolese did not adopt superior technology was because they lacked any incentives to do so. They faced a high risk of all their output being expropriated and taxed by the all-powerful king, whether or not he had converted to Catholicism. Acemoglu I 463 Literature: a seminal political economy interpretation of African underdevelopment was developed by Bates (1981(1), 1983(2), 1989(3)), whose work heavily influenced ours. Seminal studies by Dalton (1965)(4) and Killick (1978)(5) emphasize the role of politics in African development and particularly how the fear of losing political power influences economic policy. 1. Bates, Robert H. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2. Bates, Robert H. (1983). Essays in the Political Economy of Rural Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. Bates, Robert H. (1989). Beyond the Miracle of the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4. Dalton, George H. (1965). “History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia.” Journal of Economic History 25: 569–91. 5. Killick, Tony (1978). Development Economics in Action. London: Heinemann. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Aggression | Behaviorism | Slater I 176 Aggression/Behaviorism: according to behaviorism as conceptualized by Skinner (1953)(1). The main mechanism through which individuals were believed to learn aggression (or any behavior) was through operant conditioning. That is, if an individual’s behavior was reinforced by some form of reward, which could be something tangible such as money or possession of a desired object or intangible such as praise, this reinforcement would increase the likelihood that the individual would behave in that way again in the future. >Reinforcement sensivity theory. VsBehaviorism: behaviorism falls short in explaining how individuals come to behave in particular ways when they have received no previous reinforcement for that behavior. Miller/Dollard: To address that limitation, Miller and Dollard (1941)(2) introduced the idea that individuals could learn new behaviors by imitating others. However, in Miller and Dollard’s procedure for studying imitation, individuals witnessed a model being rewarded for engaging in a particular behavior, and they themselves then had the opportunity to engage in the same behavior, also receiving rewards for it. Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961)(3) made a tremendous contribution to understanding learning by demonstrating that aggressive behavior could be learned even in the absence of any rewards and solely by observing the behavior of an adult model. >Aggression/Bandura, >About Behaviorism. 1. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan. 2. Miller, N. E., & Dollard, J. (1941). Social learning and imitation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 3. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Aggression | Gender Studies | Slater I 185 Aggression/Gender Studies: Bandura et al. (1961)(1) distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(2). Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. >Social groups, >Group behavior, >Social relations, >Resentment, >Social competence, >Social behavior, >Gender. Early work suggested that girls were more likely to engage in relational aggression than boys (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(2), but more recently, there has been controversy in the literature regarding whether there are gender differences in relational aggression (Delveaux & Daniels, 2000(3); Salmivalli & Kaukiainen, 2004(4); Underwood, Galenand, & Paquette, 2001(5)). 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 3. Delveaux, K. D., & Daniels, T. (2000). Children’s social cognitions: Physically and relationally aggressive strategies and children’s goals in peer conflict situations. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 46, 672— 692. 4. Salmivalli, C., & Kaukiainen, A. (2004). “Female aggression” revisited: Variable- and person-centered approaches to studying gender differences in different types of aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 30, 15 8—163. 5. Underwood, M. K., Galenand, B. R, & Paquette, J. A. (2001). Top ten challenges for understanding gender and aggression in children: Why can’t we all just get along? Social Development, 10, 248—266. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Aggression | Psychological Theories | Slater I 178 Aggression/imitation/psychological theories: the idea that children learn through imitation is taken for granted and regarded as obvious today. [Anyway] this was by no means the case when the Bobo doll study was published in Bandura (1961)(1). >Bobo doll study/Bandura, >Aggression/Bandura. Notably, even today, several domains have generated fierce debate about whether children learn aggressive behavior through imitative processes. For example, in the case of children viewing violent television programs or playing violent video games, the entertainment industry has tried to argue that there is no evidence that exposure to violent media causes increases in children’s aggressive behavior (see Bushman & Anderson, 2001)(2). Slater I 179 While Bandura et al. did not yet have an adequate theory to describe the mechanisms underlying imitative learning, Anderson and Bushman (2001)(2) developed a General Aggression Model describes how individuals’ cognition, affect, and arousal are altered through repeated exposure to violent media, thereby contributing to aggressive behavior. According to the model, each exposure to violent media teaches individuals ways to aggress, influences beliefs and attitudes about aggression, primes aggressive perceptions and expectations, desensitizes individuals to aggression, and leads to higher levels of physiological arousal. These mediating variables then lead to more aggressive behavior. Although more aggressive children tend to seek out violent media, there is also convincing empirical evidence that even controlling for initial levels of aggression, exposure to violent media contributes to increases in aggressive behavior (Huesmann, Eron, Berkowitz, & Chafee, 1991)(3). >Aggression/Developmental psychology, >Aggression/Moffitt. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)(4). It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. Slater I 185 Forms of aggression: Some (…) advances in understanding aggression since the time of the Bobo doll studies have been in understanding different forms of aggression. Bandura et al. distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression: has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(5). Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. For differences between the sexes see >Aggression/Gender Studies. Forms of aggression: Researchers today also distinguish between proactive aggression and reactive aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Proactive aggression: is described as being unprovoked and goal-directed (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), and is predicted by having aggressive role models (Bandura, 1983)(8), friendships with other proactively aggressive children (Poulin & Boivin, 2000)(9), and physiological under arousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(10). Reactive aggression: is described as being an angry retaliatory response to perceived provocation (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Precursors of reactive aggression include a developmental history of physical abuse (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997)(11), peer rejection (Dodge et al., 1997)(11), more reactive temperament (Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002)(12), and physiologic overarousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(9). Proactive aggression is associated with evaluating aggression positively (Smithmyer et al., 2000)(13) and holding instrumental (e.g., obtaining a toy) rather than relational (e.g., becoming friends) goals in social interactions (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), whereas reactive aggression is associated with making inappropriate hostile attributions in the face of ambiguous or benign social stimuli (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological Science, 12, 353—359. 3. Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Berkowitz, L., & Chafee, S. (1991). The effects of television violence on aggression: A reply to a skeptic. In P. Suedfeld & P. Tetlock (Eds), Psychology and social policy (pp. 19 2—200). New York: Hemisphere. 4. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27— 51. 5. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 6. Dodge, K. A., & Coie, J. D. (1987). Social information processing factors in reactive and proactive aggression in children’s peer groups .Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1146—1158. 7. Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social information-processing mechanisms in reactive and proactive aggression. Chi id Development, 67, 993—1002. 8. Bandura, A. (1983). Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In R. Geen & E. Donnerstein(Eds), Aggression: Theoretical and empirical reviews, Vol. 1. Theoretical and methodological issues (pp. 1—40). New York: Academic Press. 9. Poulin, F., & Boivin, M. (2000). The role of proactive and reactive aggression in the formation and development of boys’ friendships. Developmental Psychology, 36, 233—240. 10. Scarpa, A., & Raine, A. (1997). Psychophysiology of anger and violent behavior. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 20, 3 75—394. 11. Dodge, K. A., Lochman, J. E., Harnish, J. D., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1997). Reactive and proactive aggression in school children and psychiatrically impaired chronically assaultive youth. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106,37—51. 12. Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., & Tremblay, R. E. (2002). Reactively and proactively aggressive children: Antecedent and subsequent characteristics. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43,495—505. 13. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Aging | Cognitive Psychology | Upton I 139 Aging/Cognitive psychology/Upton: (…) elderly adults have been found to perform more poorly than younger adults on Piagetian cognitive tasks (>Stages of development/Piaget), for example (Blackburn and Papalia, 1992)(1). However, there is some debate about the extent to which this decline is an inevitable part of ageing. It has been proposed, for example, that this difference is actually caused by a cohort effect, brought about because the older adults who participated in these studies generally had less formal schooling than most younger adults today. (…) other studies that have taken a longitudinal approach have found that cognitive skills either stay stable or improve over time (Salthouse. 2009)(2). This idea is also supported by studies that have shown that older adults in college perform as well as their younger classmates on cognitive tests (Blackburn. 1985)(1). However, it has also been suggested that cognitive decline actually begins in early adulthood (Salthouse, 2009)(2), although not all aspects of cognitive functioning are thought to show early age-related declines. Upton I 140 Decline of cognitive skills: ttraining studies, (…) have shown that cognitive decline in older people can be reversed in many cases (Blaskewicz Boron et al., 2007)((3). Perhaps cognitive decline is caused by a lack of use? This is what Bielak (2010)(4) calls the fuse it or lose it’ hypothesis of cognitive ageing. Def crystalized abilities: the information, knowledge and skills that are acquired through experience in a cultural environment. [They] are consistently found to increase until at least the age of 60. Def fluid abilitites: fluid abilities fluid intelligence or fluid reasoning is the ability to think logically and solve problems in novel situations, independent of acquired knowledge. It is the ability to analyse novel problems, identify patterns and relationships that underpin these problems and so find a solution using logic. One of the largest studies of age-related changes in functioning, the Seattle Longitudinal Study (e.g. Schaie, 2006(5); Willis and Schaie, 2006)(6), has suggested that there is no uniform pattern of age-related changes across all intellectual abilities. The study findings suggest that both cohort and age effects are important in determining changes in cognitive ability across the lifespan. This body of work also confirms the trend observed by Salthouse (2009)(2) that, in general, crystallized abilities tend to decline later than fluid abilities in intelligence. Upton I 141 A number of factors have also been shown to reduce the risk of cognitive decline in old age, including the absence of cardiovascular and other chronic diseases (Wendell et al., 2009)(7); higher socio-economic status (Fotenos et al., 2008)(8); and involvement in a complex and intellectually stimulating environment (Valenzuela et al., 2007)(9). It has also been suggested that the modern sedentary lifestyle may increase the ageing process; evidence from the British cohort study has shown that maintaining an active lifestyle can help to slow the process of cognitive decline linked to ageing (Richards et al.. 2003)(10). 1. Blackburn, JA and Papalia, DE (1992) The study of adult cognition from a Piagetian perspective, in Sternberg, RJ and Berg, CA (eds) Intellectual Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2. Salthouse, TA (2009) When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of Aging, 30: 507-14. 3. Blaskewicz Boron, J, Turiano, NA, Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2007) Effects of cognitive training on change in accuracy in inductive reasoning ability. Journal of Gerontology, 6 2(3): 179-86. 4. Bielak, AM (2010) How can we not ‘lose it’ if we still don’t understand how to use it’? Unanswered questions about the influence of activity participation on cognitive performance in older age: a mini-review. Gerontology, 56: 507-19. 5. Schaie. KW (2006) Inteffigence, in Schultz, R (ed.) Encyclopedia of Aging (4th edn). New York: Springer. 6. Willis, SL and Schaie, KW (2006) Cognitive functioning among the baby boomers: longitudinal and cohort effects, in Whitbourne, SK and Willis, SL (eds) The Baby Boomers. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 7. Wendell, C, Zonderman, A, Metter, J, Najjar, SS and Waldstein, SR (2009) Carotid intimal medial thickness predicts cognitive decline among adults without clinical vascular disease. Stroke,40: 3-180. 8. Fotenos, AF, Mintun, MA, Synder, AZ, Morris,JC and Buckner, RL (2008) Brain volume decline in aging: evidence for a relation between socioeconomic status, preclinical Alzheimer disease, and reserve. Neurology, 6 5(1): 113-20. 9. Valenzuela, M, Breakspear, M and Sachdev, P (2007) Complex mental activity and the aging brain: molecular, cellular and cortical network mechanisms. Brain Research Reviews, 56: 198- 213. 10. Richards, M, Hardy, R and Wadsworth, ME (2003) Does active leisure protect cognition? Evidence from a national birth cohort. Social Science and Medicine, 56:785-92. Further reading: Kitchener, KS, Lynch, CL, Fischer, KW and Wood, PK (1993) Developmental range of reflective judgment: the effect of contextual support and practice on developmental stage. Developmental Psychology, 29:893-906. Available online at https :/ /gseweb.harvard.edu/ -ddl/articles Copy! Kitchener-etal 1993 DevRangeReflectjudgem.pdf. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Agreement | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 107 Agreements/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Experimental psychology can help identify what kinds of roadblocks particularly affect dyads trying to reach an agreement over a contentious issue, insofar as bargaining over a scarce resource is a context that can be reasonably replicated in simulated or real negotiation tasks in the laboratory. Parisi I 108 Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein’s studies on self-serving biases are at the center of these studies. Their core insight was that not only do parties systematically overestimate the value of their claims, but that they also overestimate the similarity of their preferred judgment to the fair judgment (Loewenstein et al., 1993)(1). They used a hypothetical case and put subjects into pairs, with one subject playing plaintiff and one playing defendant, to negotiate the settlement of an automobile accident claim. Each subject was given the same set of case materials, and they were all told that a real judge had read the same materials and had made a decision about whether or not compensation was due to the plaintiff and if so, how much. Before the negotiation, subjects were asked to, in writing, predict the judge’s actual award and also to report what would be a fair settlement. Subjects randomly assigned to be the defendant thought a fair settlement was almost $18,000 lower than the subjects who were assigned to be plaintiffs. Roles/veil of ignorance: In an additional iteration of this study, subjects were randomly assigned to learn their role either before or after reading the case materials and offering their private assessments of the likely and fair outcomes, respectively (Babcock et al., 1995)(2). When subjects read the materials and made the predictions in full knowledge of their own roles, they showed much stronger biases. Indeed, in the eventual settlement task, more than a quarter of those negotiations did not reach settlement, but only 6% of the subjects who formed their impressions prior to knowing their own roles were unable to come to an agreement. >Fairness/Experimental psychology, >Apologies/Experimental psychology, >Dispute resolution/Experimental psychology. 1. Loewenstein, George, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer, and Linda Babcock (1993). “Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining.” Journal of Legal Studies 22: 135–159. 2. Babcock, Linda, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, and Colin Camerer (1995). “Biased Judgments Of Fairness In Bargaining.” American Economic Review 85: 1337–1343. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Agreement | Habermas | III 386 Understanding/agreement/Habermas: in the context of an action theory, understanding cannot be characterized by psychological terms. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. It is also not about empirically characterized behavioral dispositions but about the capturing of general structures of communication processes from which conditions of participation can be derived. It is not about the predicates that an observer uses when writing communication processes, but about the pre-theoretical knowledge of competent speakers who themselves can intuitively distinguish when they interact with others and when they communicate with them. The speakers also know when communication attempts fail. It is about finding standards for these distinctions. Although communication is considered to have come about through language, those involved can also feel one in a way that makes it difficult to ascribe a propositional content. Such a collective equality of opinion does not fulfil the conditions of a communicative agreement. Thanks to its linguistic structure, understanding cannot be induced solely by external influence; it must be accepted as valid by those involved. In this respect, understanding differs from mere factual agreement. III 387 An agreement achieved through communication has a rational basis. It cannot be imposed by success-calculated influence. Agreement may be objectively enforced, but what comes evidently about through external influence or violence cannot subjectively count as agreement. Agreement is based on common convictions. All those involved base their decisions on potential reasons. Without reference to language or the model of speech, communication cannot be analysed. However, language and communication do not relate to each other like means and purposes. But we can only explain the concept of communication if we state what it means to use sentences with communicative intent. >Language/Habermas, >Language use, >Intention, >Intentionality. III 394 Since acts of speech are not always teleological, it must be possible to clarify the structures of linguistic communication even without reference to structures of the purpose activity. >Purposes, >Procedural rationality. What we mean by understanding must be clarified solely on the basis of illocutionary acts - acts that are dealt with but do not always have an effect. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act ((s) This makes it possible to speak at all of attempts of communication, even if they fail.) III 412 Understanding/communicative action/Habermas: if the listener accepts an offer of a speech act, an agreement can be reached between a subject capable of speaking and a subject capable of acting. However, this is not based solely on the intersubjective recognition of a single... III 413 ...thematically highlighted claim to validity. >Intersubjectivity. Rather, agreement is achieved simultaneously at three levels: via a) an act of speaking correctly in the normative context, b) a true statement, c) a truly expressed opinion, intention, feeling or conviction. >Norms, >Truthfulness. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| al-Farabi | Höffe | Höffe I 122 Al-Farabi/Höffe: Al-FarabiVsAl-Kindi: al-Fārābī (around 870-950), strongly opposes al-Kindī. Höffe I 123 Aristotle/al-Farabi: It is not clear in which form Plato's Politeia was present to al-Fārābī ; only individual sections of Aristotle's politics were known to him. >Aristotle, >Politics/Aristotle. Religion/Philosophy/Islam: Al-Fārābī does not criticize Islam, because like al-Kindī he is convinced that philosophy and religion represent the same truth. Philosophy with its concepts and arguments has to serve the religion operating with pictures and parables. >Philosophy, >Religion. Politics/al-Farabi: here especially the writing Mabādi' ārā ahl al-madīna al-fādila [is authoritative]: The principles of the views Höffe I 124 of the inhabitants of an excellent state (942/43), in short: The Excellent State or the Model State. (Madīna may literally mean "city", but in this case the text is about a community, a state). >Politics, >State (Polity). al-FarabiVsAristotle: From a philosophical-historical point of view, [the scripture] consists of a commitment to Plato and New Platonism. In contrast to Aristotle, the excellent state has its place in a metaphysically founded overall structure of being. >Plato, >Being. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| al-Gazali | Höffe | Höffe I 132 Al-Gazali/Höffe: The probably greatest theologian of Islam, al-Gazali, raises the sharpest contradiction against Avicenna [VsAvicenna] (Algazel, 1058-1111). His main theological work The Revival of Religious Studies (Ihya' 'ulum ad-din, about 1100) deals with all questions of religious life: from worship services and social behaviour to perishable vices and saving virtues. >Avicenna. With al-Gazäli in many places a scriptural orthodoxy triumphs over an Islam enlightened by philosophy. In political terms, a counterrevolution is gaining ground: The first spiritual revolution, the Hellenization, is rejected along with subsequent revolutions, while Islamic mysticism flourishes.(al-GazaliVsHellenism). >Hellenism, >Islam. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| al-Mawardi | Höffe | Höffe I 130 Al-Mawardi/Höffe: al-Mawardi (974-1058) [writes] an exemplary book on the rules of Höffe I 131 (sultanic) rule in Islam, the fiqh: Kitāb al-ahkām al-saltā-nūya. Sultan: Sultan in Arabic means two things: the rule and the person of the ruler. As a representative of sacral legal thought, al-Mawardi does not refer to philosophy but exclusively to divine law, the Shari'a. Al-MawardiVsHellenism: In contrast to the Hellenization of Islamic culture, one could speak here of a counterrevolution in Islamic culture. Fiqh thinking, however, arises at about the same time as Hellenization, so we are dealing with two competing currents. >Hellenism, >Islam. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Algorithms | Gershenfeld | Brockman I 165 Algorithms/artificial intelligence/Gershenfeld: If you lose your keys in a room, you can search for them. If you’re not sure which room they’re in, you have to search all the rooms in a building. If you’re not sure which building they’re in, you have to search all the rooms in all the buildings in a city. This is called the curse of dimensionality. The solution to the curse of dimensionality came in using information about the problem to constrain the search. The search algorithms themselves are not new. But when applied to a deep-learning network, they adaptively build up representations of where to search. >Artificial intelligence/Gershenfeld. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Algorithms | Morozov | I 160 Algorithms/Christopher Steiner/Morozov: "Algorithms can bring us new artists, but because they build their judgment on what was popular in the past, we will probably end up with the same kind of forgettable Pop we already have. It is clear evidence of the technology that all these years mediocre music is included in the analysis."(1) >Taste, >Music. Morozov: Of course, algorithms can be configured differently - and some independent labels may choose to release music that will remain unpopular - but it is hard to expect major labels to miss the opportunity to earn more and safer money by using algorithms. ((s)VsMorozov: It is not about the fact that unpopular music or art is perhaps more interesting, but about new forms that are not found or even invented when algorithms are programmed to follow pre-drawn paths. However, in most algorithms there is a random element. This random element is also an important tool to prevent manipulation. Calculable behavior is more manipulable than unpredictable.) I 163 After online media record the behavior of their users, they use algorithms to automatically generate new and customized content. (2) >Internet, >Internet culture, >Social Media, >Social Networks. Morozov, Evgeny. To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism, and the Urge to Fix Problems that Don’t Exist (S.160). Penguin Books Ltd. 1. Christopher Steiner, Automate This: How Algorithms Came to Rule Our World (New York: Portfolio Hardcover, 2012), 88. 2. for more on this, see my Slate column: Evgeny Morozov, “A Robot Stole My Pulitzer,” Slate, March 19, 2012, http:// www.slate.com/ articles/ technology/ future_tense/ 2012/ 03/ narrative_science_robot_journalists_customized_news_and_the_danger_to_civil_discourse_. html. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Alienation | Marx | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation(voluntary/involuntary). >Alienation/Hegel. Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing oneself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. consists in a permanent struggle. Habermas IV 501 Alienation/Marx/Habermas: in Marx and in the Marxist tradition, the concept of alienation has been applied above all to the way of life of wage workers. With the transition to value theory, however, Marx has already freed himself from the educational ideal determined by Herder and Romanticism(1). Value theory only retains the concept of exchange and thus a formal aspect of distributive justice. With the concept of transforming concrete labour into abstract labour, the concept of alienation loses its certainty. He no longer refers to the deviations from the model of an exemplary practice, but to the instrumentalization of a life presented as an end in itself. >Life/Marx. 1.Ch.Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge1975, S. 5-29; deutsch Frankfurt 1977. Höffe I 364 Alienation/Marx/Höffe: (...) the Paris manuscripts(1) [expand] the critique of national economy into a philosophical anthropology about the nature of the human and his/her work. >National Economy/Marx. Anthropology/Marx: The guiding concept is the concept of alienation known from Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's phenomenology of the mind: that the human becomes alien to his/her nature. Alienation/Hegel: For Hegel, the alienation that the slave experiences in confrontation with the master, nature and him- or herself is a necessary phase in the formation of consciousness. Marx: Marx, on the other hand, plays through Hegel's complex dialectic for the "material", basic economic relationship, for the "hostile struggle between capitalist and worker". Like Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel), Marx also ascribes to the first inferior, the slave, now the worker, the greater possibility of liberating him- or herself from alienation. In a captivating analysis, he blames the main obstacle to a better society, the private ownership of the means of production, for a fourfold alienation: alienation from the product of work, from the nature of work, from oneself as a worker and from society: 1) First, the worker -and in a modified form also the owner of capital- is alienated from his/her product, since the worker does not enjoy the commodity him- or herself; moreover, nature faces the worker as a hostile world. 2) Second, the laborers alienate themselves from themselves, from their life activity, for, since he/she does not affirm labor, he/she feels " with him- or herself when he/she is apart from labor and apart from him- or herself when he/she is working; his/her work is in essence forced labor. Höffe I 365 3) (...) Thirdly, (...) the human alienates him- or herself from his/her being generic, since he/she does not find himself in the work of the genus, the worked nature. 4) (...) he/she still alienates him- or herself from his/her fellow humans, since they do not meet him/her as a human, but merely as laborers, and thus as means for his/her own individual life. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| All | Geach | I 57 FregeVs "quantifying stance" as if "all" or "most" or "no" say something about the size of a partial class (subset). - As if "no" referred to the empty set. Problem: how can "some" refer always to the same subclass? Solution: "some" never stands for a particular group. >Class, >Set, >Subset, >Empty set, >Set theory, >Somebody, >Each/every, cf. >One. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Allegory | Gadamer | I 78 Allegory/Gadamer: The allegory originates from the theological need to eliminate the offensive and to recognize valid truths behind it in religious tradition - so originally in Homer. It gains a corresponding function in rhetorical use wherever the paraphrase and indirect statement seems more appropriate. The allegory originally belongs to the sphere of speech, to the Logos, and is thus a rhetorical or hermeneutical figure. Instead of what is actually meant, something else, more tangible, is said, but in such a way that this nevertheless allows that other to be understood. The symbol, on the other hand, is not limited to the sphere of the Logos. For the symbol does not, by its meaning, refer to another meaning, but its own meaningful being has 'meaning'. I 80 The symbol is the coincidence of the sensual and the non-sensual, whereas the allegory is the meaningful reference of the sensual to the non-sensual. >Symbols/Kant, >Symbols/Goethe, >Allegory/Schelling. I 84 Allegory/Gadamer: [In the course of the discussion of the symbol at the beginning of the 19th century a] devaluation of the allegory ensued. >Symbols/Goethe, >Symbols/Solger, >Symbols/Kant, >Symbols/Schiller, >Symbols/Schelling, >Symbols/Gadamer. From the beginning, the rejection of French classicism by German aesthetics since Lessing and Herder may have played a role in this(1). After all, Solger still reserves the expression of the allegorical in a very high sense for the whole of Christian art. I 85 Friedrich Schlegel goes even further. He says: All beauty is allegory (conversation about poetry). Also Hegel's use of the term symbolic (like the one by Creuzer) is still very close to this concept of the allegorical. But this use of language by the philosophers, on which the romantic ideas about the relationship of the inexpressible to language and the discovery of the allegorical poetry is based on, is no longer held by the educational humanism of the 19th century. One invoked Weimar Classicism, and indeed, the devaluation of allegory was the dominant concern of German Classicism, which arose quite necessarily from the liberation of art from the shackles of rationalism and from the distinction of the concept of genius. The allegory is certainly not the sole preserve of genius. It is based on firm traditions and always has a certain, alleged meaning, which does not oppose the intellectual grasping of the term. On the contrary, the concept and cause of allegory is firmly connected with dogmatics (...) (...) At the moment when the essence of art broke away from all dogmatic ties and could be defined by the unconscious production of the genius, allegory had to become aesthetically questionable. Thus we see a strong influence of Goethe's art theoretical efforts to make the symbolic into a positive and the allegorical into a negative artistic concept. 1. Here, for Klopstock (X, 254ff.), even Winckelmann appears to be in a false dependence: "The two main errors of most allegorical paintings are that they are often not understood at all, or at least with great difficulty, and that they are, by their very nature, uninteresting...". . |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Allport | Lamiell | Corr I 73/74 Allport/personality traits/Lamiell: Allport (1937)(1) argued that person characterization must somehow be possible outside of the framework of common traits. After all, he reasoned, psychologists working in non-research settings, e.g., as counsellors or clinicians, face daily the challenge of characterizing their clients in ways often peculiar to each one of them individually, and hence not necessarily on the basis of considerations about how that client compares with others along some pre-specified dimension(s) presumed applicable to all (‘common traits’). Within the mainstream, Allport’s arguments along this line were widely (and sometimes harshly) dismissed, e.g. LundbergVsAllport Lundberg 1941(2), p.383. SarbinVsAllport: Sarbin 1944(3), p. 214. …“ Either they are making statistical predictions in an informal, subjective, and uncontrolled way, or else they are performing purely verbal manipulations which are unverifiable and akin to magic.” LamiellVsTradition: see >Measurement/traits/Lamiell. Corr I 79 Allport/Lamiell: Allport’s conjectures (…) might well merit the serious consideration they never received in his lifetime. The findings of several investigations carried out by the present author in collaboration with various colleagues offer substantial empirical support for this view (Lamiell and Durbeck 1987(4); Lamiell, Foss, Larsen and Hempel 1983(5); Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler and Leffel 1983(6)). 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 2. Lundberg, G. A. 1941. Case-studies vs. statistical methods: an issue based on misunderstanding, Sociometry 4: 379–83 3. Sarbin, T. R. 1944. The logic of prediction in psychology, Psychological Review 51: 210–28 4. Lamiell, J. T. and Durbeck, P. 1987. Whence cognitive prototypes in impression formation? Some empirical evidence for dialectical reasoning as a generative process, Journal of Mind and Behaviour 8: 223–44 5. Lamiell, J. T., Foss, M. A., Larsen, R. J. and Hempel, A. 1983. Studies in intuitive personology from an idiothetic point of view: implications for personality theory, Journal of Personality 51: 438–67 6. Lamiell, J. T., Foss, M. A., Trierweiler, S. J. and Leffel, G. M. 1983. Toward a further understanding of the intuitive personologist: some preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions, Journal of Personality 53: 213–35 James T. Lamiell, “The characterization of persons: some fundamental conceptual issues”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009 The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Allport | Psychological Theories | Corr I 92 Allport/personality/traits/psychological theories/Deary: John and Robbins 1993(1) p. 224): ‘The Big Five' structure was derived through purely empirical and purposely atheoretical procedures; theoretical considerations, such as questions about the existence and explanatory status of traits, were deemed unimportant.’ There are two views: A. There are those who hold to traits as merely descriptive: the summary view. B. On the other hand, there are those who hold the causal view. The causal view seems irresistible, if only to try to test it and to think how. When discussing the causal view one gets various reiterations of what this means to people: ‘unknown neuropsychiatric structures’, ‘entities that exist “in our skins” ’, ‘underlying causal mechanisms’, ‘some neurophysiological or hormonal basis for personality’, and ‘causal and dynamic principles’ (John and Robins 1993, pp. 227–8). Most of this is hand-waving. ((s) For the philosophical discussion on causal explanation see >Causal explanation.) >Personality traits, >G. Allport, >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. 1. John, O. P. and Robbins, R. W. 1993. Gordon Allport: father and critic of the five-factor model, in K. H. Craik, R. Hogan and R. N. Wolfe (eds.), Fifty years of personality psychology, pp. 215–36. New York: Plenum |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Altruism | Nagel | Rawls I 190 Altruism/Society/Justice/Benevolence/Th. Nagel/Rawls: Thomas Nagel's thought is that a benevolent person is guided by principles that someone would choose if he/she knew that he/she would divide into the many members of a society, so to speak. (See Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford, 1970, pp. 140f.) Rawls I 191 Rawls: But memories and expectations remain those of individuals. What principles would such a person choose? If the person loves the plurality of persons just as much as he/she loves himself/herself, his/her principles would be characterized through benevolence. RawlsVsNagel: 1. it would still be unclear how a person decides, 2. the two principles of justice... Rawls I 61 Principles/Justice/Rawls: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. I 191 ...are then a more plausible choice than the classical principle of utility. Benevolence/RawlsVsNagel: the situation is still unclear because love and benevolence are second order concepts. The goods are already given in the situation ((s) it is only about distribution). This shows us that benevolence does not bring a profit in the initial situation of a society to be established. >Principles/Rawls. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Altruism | Sen | Brocker I 882 Altruism/Gary S. Becker: some economists, including Gary S. Becker, reinterpret moral expenditures in such a way that they appear as sophisticated forms of self-care - eager for social recognition or transcendent salvation (Becker 1976(1); Becker 1996(2)): With the help of secret motifs unknown to the actors, ordinary altruism is reconstructed as extraordinary egoism. >Egoism, >Unconscious, >Actions, >Behavior. SenVsBecker, Gary: But Sen is against it: If such, scientifically questionable, ad-hoc assumptions are necessary in order not to simply dismiss moral action as irrational to one's own disadvantage, what does this actually say about the theory applied here?(3) Shouldn't one rather renounce the dogma of self-interest than the plausibility of one's own statements? >Rationality, >Irrationality, >Theories, >Method. 1. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago 1976 2. Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 3. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, S. 332-334. Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ambiguity | Block | II 547 Consciousness/Ambiguity/Block: there is a common conception that consciousness is ambiguous: information processing/access consciousness. Block: we all use "consciously" even in both ways. Alternative: cluster concept of consciousness. Ambiguity/Block: if there merging can occur, we have ambiguity, not a cluster concept. E.g. speed: the blurriness of a passing car is not a result of the average speed. (No implicit relativation). Consciousness/Ambiguity/Natural Kind/Block: it is a difference, however, whether one is considers consciousness to be ambiguous, or whether one denies that it is a natural kind. The former is an assertion about the concept, the latter about the object. The former may be decided reflexively, the latter only empirically. II 551 Consciousness/Ambiguity/Block: since there are mergers of P consciousness and a-consciousness in the consciousness, the term must be conceived as ambiguous, and not as a cluster concept. Terminology: Metzinger II 458 Def Z-consciousness/terminology/block: to be z-conscious of a fact means that the information is available for rational reasoning. (Functional term). P-consciousness: phenomenal consciousness. >Consciousness. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Ambiguity | Eco | Ambiguity/Eco: the work of art is regarded as a fundamentally ambiguous message: it is the majority of meanings in a single carrier of meaning. I 12 "Open work of art"/Eco: an "open work of art" is what A. Riegl called "artful" and Panofsky described it (ensuring it from idealistic suspicions) as the final and definitive sense. I 16 The model of the open work of art is independent of the actual existence as "openly" definable works of art. It is about a relationship with the recipient. I 84 Openness/Eco: the impression of openness and totality does not have its reason in the objective stimulus, which is materially determined in itself. Not even in the subject, which is on its own accord for all and no openness disposed:... I 85 ...the impression of openness lies in the cognitive relationship in which possibilities are realized that are stimulated and directed by stimuli organized according to an aesthetic intention. I 85 There is also openness when the artist does not strive for ambiguity, but rather for unambiguousness. I 89 Definition Openness/Eco: openness is an increase in information. I 105 Openness and disorder are relative concepts. Something is ordered in comparison to a previous disorder. I 138 Definition openness of the first degree: integration and knowledge mechanisms are characteristic for every process of knowledge. I 139 Definition second-degree openness: second-degree openness corresponds to grasping that constantly open process, which allows us to perceive new contours and new possibilities for a form. I 149 Openness: openness means that the recipient has freedom of choice. >Art, >Artworks. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Analogies | Gould | II 241 Analogies/science/Gould: GouldVsSociobiology: zoocentrism is the primary fallacy of sociobiology: if animals develop with primary mechanisms and structures as products of natural selection, then human behaviour must have a similar basis! Sociobiology is about the idea that a behaviour in humans must also be "natural" if it looks similar in animals. These are misleading similarities. For example, sociobioligists associate human names with the actions of other beings and speak of enslavement in the ants, rape in the wild ducks and adultery in the mountain bluethroat. Since these "character traits" exist in the "lower" animals, they can be derived as "natural" genetic and adaptive for humans. GouldVsSociobiology: but these traits never existed outside a human context of meaning. No one can claim that two behaviours are really homologous: that is, are based on the same genes! (> Behavior). If the similarity is significant, it can only be analogous, i. e. it reflects different phylogenetic (phylogenetic: concerning the phylogeny) origins, but serves the same biological function. Different origins - the same function. GouldVsZoocentrism: zoocentric systems fail mainly because they are never what they pretend to be. The "objective" animal behaviour is from the very beginning an imposition of human preferences. >Explanation, >Similarities. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Analogies | Waismann | Friedrich Waismann Suchen und Finden in der Mathematik 1938 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 77 Analogies/Science/Mathematics/Searching/Finding/Waismann: The mathematician who searches proceeds through analogies: 78 1. He thinks of his usual constructions of other regular figures. 2. A figure, whose sides are actually equal in length, is in his mind. Important: the connection with the empirical and the mathematical figure exists, but is an outer-mathematical! They are, therefore, outer-mathematical aspects which are the leading stars of mathematical research. The question in mathematics does not give the investigation an objective, but only a direction. >Discoveries. E.g. Brouwer's question whether there is in the development of the number π a place where the digits 0123456789 follow one another. The term "development of the number π" does not help me with the question. Suppose we gain the possibility to answer the question by finding a formula which indicates the digits of π. Thus, we lead the question whether this sequence exists, back to another question. 79 Then we believe that it is still the same concept. It is believed that we have sought each time in the same space, namely in the development of π. The misconception is that a strip passes us, on the other hand, the idea of the strip has led to the direction of this whole investigation. Suppose, for example, that a law on the distribution of the prime numbers is found with the help of the theory of function. Then one believes that one has discovered a new property in the previous concept of the prime number. One does not see that the term has been inserted into a new context, that is, has created a new prime number concept! The two prime number terms, however, are about in the same relation as the concept of the cardinal number to that of the positive whole real number. They do not coincide, they only correspond to each other. >Meaning change, >Theory change. E.g. After the discovery of the North Pole we have not two earths, one with and one without the North Pole, but after discovering the law of the prime number distribution we have two types of prime numbers. >Numbers. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Analysis | Moore | Avramidis I 2o Analysis/Moore: two types of analysis: 1) eliminate confusion over a concept (>Quine (1960) Word and Object(1) §53) 2) Make our thoughts clearer. Broad: per 1) - Moore per 2) WisdomVsMoore: new level of concept: asymmetry: E.g., the analysis of nations discovers something about individuals. MooreVsWisdom: we have to stay on the same level! (Symmetry). Ad 1) Avramides: understanding a concept through other concepts. ad 2) Location of a concept in the network. - These are two interpretations of the same biconditional. >Interpretation, >Levels, >Description levels, >Biconditional. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. |
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| Analytical Hypothesis | Quine | V 19 Translation Manual/Quine: a translation manual for a substantial part of the foreign language provides a structure in which the word is given a translation that would be compatible with its function in this larger context. Then one could probably answer the question about its reference. VI 61 Analytical Hypothesis/Translation Manual/Quine: this is more about a better or worse than a final right or wrong. As we now move away from the requirement of a congruent stimulus meaning (new), the peculiar "objectivity" that such sentences should have in themselves becomes blurred. The "objectivity is only guaranteed by the fluidity of communication and the efficiency of practical handling". VI 67 Translation/Uncertainty/Quine: there is not even any hope of achieving something like a codification of the relevant procedures, perhaps to define what should be considered a translation by specifying these manoeuvres. For this purpose, incommensurable values must be weighed against each other in these procedures. How grotesque may the interpreter, for example, let the beliefs of the natives turn out to be in order to avoid peculiarity on the part of their grammar or semantics through this chess move? VI 68 Thus two translators would hardly ever come up with two equivalent translation manuals. Thesis: it would be possible at any time for one manual to prescribe some solutions as valid that have been currently rejected by the other translator. Each translation manual basically represents its so-called "recursive" or "inductive" definition of a translation relation. It could always turn out that the German sentences, which are prescribed by the competing manuals as the translation of an indigenous sentence, are not interchangeable for each other in German contexts. Robert Kirk: he has seen that, in retrospect, linguistic differences can be provoked, but the status quo, and that alone is the most important, would be justified by the two manuals. VI 69 In principle, the thesis is even valid for everyone's native language! After all, we can even translate our own German into German in a perverted way at any time, as soon as we have two competing translation manuals for the jungle German, by translating it first into the jungle language after one manual and then into German again after the other. Incidentally, it is unlikely that the indeterminacy of the translation will make itself felt in practice at all! The linguist assumes, until proven otherwise, that his way of thinking is similar to that of the native. Radical Interpretation/Quine: it is a fact that the radical translator is forced to always put as much into the facts as he takes from them. VI 71 Analytical Hypothesis/translation manual/Quine: term by term will be translated. The problem however is that then meaningful sentences can arise, but they refer to something else. This is the inscrutability of reference. XII 50 Translation Manual/Gavagai/Quine: Gavagi does not eliminate the uncertainty between hare, hare part and hare stage. N.B.: instead of asking "is it the same?" in the foreign language, it could happen to us without knowing that we ask every time "do they belong together?" in the foreign language! The affirmative answer does not create certainty then. Even compensations with "Hareness" could occur. This is plausible because all means of individuation are structural and contextual in nature. Therefore, there can systematically be many different possibilities. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Chisholm | II 64 Analytical/Chisholm: early: a preposition is analytical for which there is a conjunctive property such that it and the S property include one another (inclusion) and the P property is one of its sub-properties - late: different property relations: implicy and involve - (Involve/Chisholm: that which contains one also contains the other). II 66f Analytical/Language/Meaning Postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: Problem: different intensional structure: E.g. squares have the conjunctive property of being rectangular and equilateral, or conjunctive property of being rectangular and have mutually perpendicular diagonals - same extension, different meaning, hence different properties. II 67 Carnap: the property expressions are L equivalent because of the rules of language (meaning postulates). ChisholmVsCarnap: for him it is not about the intensional structure, but about the structure of properties themselves. >Intensionality, >Meaning postulates, >Extensions. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Fodor | IV 57 Meaning/Quine: meaning does not come from speaker meaning and not from the acceptance of inferences of the speaker. The speaker meaning depends on the worldview from, and thus on an intention regarding what the words should mean. In this it is not possible to distinguish what views the speaker accepts a priori. So there are no analytic sentences. Vs a/s "true through meaning": there is no epistemic criterion for this. >Criteria, >Speaker meaning, >Meaning, >Content, >Worldview. IV 177ff Analyticity/block/Dummett/Devitt/Bilgrami: VsQuine: perhaps we can assume a "gradual A"?. Fodor/LeporeVs: we presuppose equal meaning instead of equal identity. Problem: in the end everything is "just about": sentences are just about propositions of expression, because "John" refers just about to John. Not analytical: e.g. "brown cows are dangerous". Here, there is no inference from "cows are dangerous" and "brown things are dangerous". Therefore, there is no compositionality. IV 186 Analyticity/analytical/Fodor/Lepore: if meanings are stereotypes, however none of the individual features is defining. E.g. the stereotypical brown cow can be dangerous, even though the stereotype dangerous does not match the stereotype brown or the stereotype cow. Hence the distinction analytic/synthetic fails. Important argument: even if you reject the a/s distinction, it is clear that meanings are never stereotypes! >Stereotypes. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Hare | II 133 Analytical/Hare: is the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not-p' are analytically false" supposed to be analytically true? Or perhaps empirically? It is about the (empirical) use of "and not". Plato/Solution: anamnesis: the definition of a concept is similar to remembering, i.e. not to make an empirical discovery or to decide. Plato: the only thing that is correct, is what we have learned from our teachers. >Anamnesis, >Plato. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Newen, A./Schrenk, M. | Newen I 69f Analyticity/Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 19 Def analytic: due to word meaning. - Vs: E.g. having a heart/having kidneys: despite word meaning. - 2) due to synonymy: solution for bachelor/unmarried: the corresponding sentences are from the same synonymy class. - Concept of meaning is no longer found, either. - Dictionary: already presupposes synonymy - This is an empirical hypothesis about use. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Quine | I 120 Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity. I 339 Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. V 114 QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine. --- VII (b) 21 Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative. VII (b) 23 Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried. VII (b) 28ff Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma. VII (b) 37 Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same. VII (b) 37 Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. VII (i) 161ff Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Anaphora | Geach | I 88 "It"/Geach: "it" is a non-referring term: For example, The only one who ever stole a book from Snead made a lot of money selling it. Problem: this cannot be replaced salva veritate by "Robinson", because "it" then becomes senseless. - in the original also not replaceable by "a book", because then it is also senseless. >Senseless. I 110f Fake predicate/fake token/Geach: the philosopher whose disciple (was) Plato was bald - fake: "Plato was bald" - Example: "A philosopher smoked and drank whisky": fake token: "a philosopher smoked"..."and he (or the philosopher (!)) drank... >Predicates, cf. >Pronouns, >Reference. Solution: "casus": two smoking philosophers, one of whom does not drink. The sentence does not show which one is true - but no psychologizing: ("what the speaker thought about") what he said is true, even if not all thoughts were true. Wrong question: to what the subject refers: "he" or "this philosopher" is not a subject at all. "And" (conjunction) combines here two predicates, not two sentences! Def fake predicate/Geach: we have a fake predicate if the question is irrelevant to what it is applied. Example "Everyone loves themselves" can be true, even if "every man loves ---" does not appeal to anyone. - >Anaphora, >Index words, >Indexicality. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Anaphora | Kamp | Cresswell I 184 Anaphora/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: a discourse section can be interpreted as a "long sentence". HintikkaVsKamp: that is unnatural. CresswellVsHintikka: pro Kamp. It is only about a semantic ((s) non-syntactic) point of view. On the surface we have different sentences. Hintikka: Thesis: a theory like that of Kamp/Heim cannot be applied to question-answer games. CresswellVsHintikka: that does work: E.g. (14) Here is a bee in the room. (15) Will it stab me? I 185 On a certain level one can consider (14) and (15) as a conjunction. >File change semantics, >Prosentential theory, >Conjunction. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Anarchism | Diogenes the Cynic | Gaus I 315 Anarchism/Diogenes of Sinope/Diogenes the Cynic/Keyt/Miller: [Diogenes] claimed to be without a polis (apolis) (D.L. VI.38), said that 'the only correct constitution is that in the cosmos' (D.L. VI. 72), and declared himself to be a citizen of the cosmos (kosmopolités) (D.L. VI.63). The second of these sayings entails that no constitution in a polis is correct (and hence just) whereas the first and third may be taken, consonant with this, to disavow citizenship in any polis. In the same spirit the famous anecdote of Diogenes' encounter with Alexander the Great illustrates among other things his scorn for political power. Coming upon Diogenes sunning himself, Alexander asks what he can do for him and draws the reply, 'Stand out of my light' (D.L. VI.38; see also V 1.32, 60, and 68). Diogenes had similar anarchistic ideas about slavery and marriage. 'To those who advised him to pursue his runaway slave, he said, "It would be absurd if Manes can live without Diogenes, but Diogenes cannot without Manes"' (D.L. VI.55). Diogenes implies in this saying that slavery should be a voluntary relation resting on the need of the slave for a master. 'He also said that wives should be held in common, recognizing no marriage except the joining together of him who persuades with her who is persuaded' (D.L. VI. 72). In this saying Diogenes advocates free cohabitation and disavows marriage based on coercion. Literature: (Navia, 1995(1), is an annotated bibliography of over 700 items on the Cynics. Two books on Cynicism that appeared subsequent to the bibliography are Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996(2), an extensive collection of essays, and Navia, 1996(3), an important new study.) Questions: Controversy over Diogenes' political ideas concerns the nature of his anarchism and cosmopolitanism. Is Diogenes a nihilistic or an idealistic anarchist? Is he 'the saboteur of his civilization, the nihilist of Hellenism, the parasite of his culture' or the apostle of a higher law and a higher authority (Navia, 1996(3): 102—3)? In a similar vein, is his cosmopolitanism positive or negative? When he refers to himself as a kosmopolités, a citizen of the cosmos, is he denying all bonds of citizenship or affirming a universal bond? Successor: The latter is the Stoic interpretation. Claiming to be a follower of Diogenes, the first Stoic, Zeno of Citium (335-263 BC), wrote in his Republic that 'we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law' (Plutarch, LA 329a). >Governance/Zeno of Citium. LA: Plutarch: Luck of Alexander 1. Navia, Luis E. (1996) Classical Cynicism: A Critical study. Wes CT: Greenwood. 2 Branham, Robert Bracht and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazc, eds (1996) The Cynics: The cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy for Europe. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 3. Navia, Luis E. (1996) Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Anarchism | Kropotkin | Brocker I 19 Anarchism/Kropotkin: Kropotkin's turn towards anarchism goes back to his personal experiences with the egalitarian coexistence of watchmakers on a farm in Switzerland in 1872. Brocker I 20 However, the associated basic concept of communist anarchism existed even before Kropotkin. With his essays and books, he primarily contributed to their historical and scientific foundation, since Kropotkin wanted to provide a scientific explanation for anarchism. It was about free cooperation of individuals without regulation by the institution of the state. >Cooperation. The central organisational principle should be free agreement. Kropotkin saw the prerequisite for this in the formation of small and manageable groups, which would be formed by working together, local proximity or private interests. Work should be carried out in small decentralised businesses in order to overcome the negative impact of the division of labour. In the social order he was striving for, the distribution of goods should no longer take place via the individual work performed in each case. Rather, a generally equal consumption must be possible according to the formula "Everyone according to his/her needs". KropotkinVsCounsils: instead, a decentralized federation of autonomous groups in a stateless society. >Community, >Society, >Organization. Armin Pfahl-Traughber Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt (1902) in: Brocker 2018. |
Kropot I Peter Kropotkin Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien 1975 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Animal Language | Aristotle | Gadamer I 448 Animal Language/Aristotle/Gadamer: Language is a free and variable possibility of humans in its use. It is also variable for him or her in itself, as long as it offers various possibilities of expression I 449 of the same thing. >Language/Aristotle, >Language/Ancient Philosophy. The communication possibilities between the animals do not know such variability. This means ontologically that they communicate with each other, but do not communicate about state of affairs as such, the epitome of which is the world. Aristotle already saw this with full clarity: while the call of the animals instructs their conspecifics in a certain behavior, the linguistic communication through the Logos reveals the being itself.(1) >Logos/Aristotle. 1. Arist. Polit. A 2, 1253 a 10ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Animal Language | Deacon | I 34 Animal language/Deacon: the communication of other species is never a "simpler form" of human language. It is not language at all. >Communication. Biological explanation/Deacon: is always evolutionary and tries to show continuity. However, there are no animal precursors to the emergence of human language, let alone an ascending scale of complexity. (See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 1997(1); and Dunbar 1992 a(2), b(3)). I 54 Animal language/animals/Deacon: the misconception that animal calls and gestures are like words or phrases can be traced back to misunderstandings about the concept of reference. >Reference, >Gestures. Behaviorism: some behaviorists have suggested that animal cries are just external expressions of internal states and therefore have nothing to do with reference. >Behaviorism. Cognitive behaviorists saw calls as equivalent to words. One study played a central role in this. Seyfarth/Cheney: Thesis: Warning calls of guenons are like names for predators in the distance. (See Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980(4)). I 56 In response to various calls, the monkeys left the trees (warning of eagles) or jumped on trees (leopards) or peeked into bushes (snake). Deacon: this is evolutionary easy to explain. Since the saving behaviour cannot always look the same and is even mutually exclusive, different calls have to be distinguished. (See also Hauser, 1996(5)). Animal calls/Cheney/Seyfarth/Deacon: Cheney and Seyfarth initially assumed that the animal calls were names for the predators. These were accepted instead of a complete sentence, i.e. as "holophrastic" utterances. Holophrastic utterances/Deacon: it is disputed how much syntactic potential lies in them. >Wittgenstein language game "Platte", cf. >Subsententials. Animal communication: the thesis was put forward that warning cries were different from cries of pain or grimaces by referring to something else... I 57 ...than the inner state of the animal. Reference/DeaconVsCheney/DeaconVsSeyfarth: it was implicitly assumed that pain cries, for example, could not be referring. Such assumptions give rise to the idea of a "proto-language" with calls as "vocabulary". >Vocabulary, >Words, >Signs, >Signals. Then you could imagine an animal language evolution with grammar and syntax that emerged later. This whole house of cards is falling apart however. (See also Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990(6)). Reference/Deacon: is not limited to language. Symptoms can refer to something other than themselves. For example, laughter: is congenital in humans. It does not have to be produced intentionally and can be simulated in social contexts. But laughter can also refer to things, even to absent ones. In this way alarm calls also refer. >Innateness. I 58 Language/DeaconVsSeyfarth/DeaconVsCheney: e.g. laughter differs from speech by the fact that it is contagious. In a room full of laughing people, it is hard to be serious. The idea of a room full of people repeating just one sentence is absurd. Intentionality/Intention/animal calls/Deacon: Animal calls do not fulfil the Grice criterion for messages either: "I think you believe that I believe x". Animal calls are involuntary and contagious. >Language, >P. Grice. I 59 Solution/Deacon: it is more about spreading excitement than sharing information. Reference/Deacon: therefore, reference is not the distinguishing feature between animal calls and words. Both can refer to inner states and things in the outer world. We must therefore distinguish between different types of reference rather than distinguish between referring and allegedly non-referring signals. >Reference/Deacon. I 65 Animal language/Herrnstein/Deacon: (Herrnstein 1980(7)): Experiments with pigeons who had successfully learned an arbitrary sign language and cooperation. I 66 Symbolic reference/Deacon: this simple form of reference with the characteristic learned association, randomness of characters, transmission of information between individuals are not sufficient to define symbolic reference. A symbolic reference system does not simply consist of words without syntax. >Symbolic reference, >Syntax. I 67 Animal calls: in one sense their understanding is innate, on the other hand the connection to the referent is not necessary. The reference is somewhat flexible. Some connections are built in prenatal, others are learned. I 68 Symbolic competence: is that which goes beyond parrot-like expressions. For this purpose, one has to distinguish between contextually determined causes of expression and memorized dictations. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. 1. Dunbar, R. (1997). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Dunbar, R. (1992a). Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3. Dunbar, R. (1992b). Neocortex size as a constraint on group sizes in primates. Journal of Human Evolution 20, 469-493. 4. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. 5. Hauser, M. D. (1996): The evolution of communication. The MIT Press. 6. Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990): How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. University of Chicago Press. 7. Herrnstein, R. (1980). Symbolic communication between two pigeons (Columba domestica). Science 210. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Animal Models | Behavioral Ecology | Corr I 278 Animal Models/Behavioral Ecology/Gosling: Researchers in psychology tend to use animal modes to understand the biological and environmental bases of personality (e.g., Ray, Hansen and Waters 2006(1); Willis-Owen and Flint 2007(2) and the implications of various personality traits (e.g., Capitanio, Mendoza and Baroncelli 1999(3); Pederson, King and Landau 2005(4)). Compared with human studies, animal studies afford greater experimental control of both environmental and genetic factors, as well as greater ability to manipulate independent variables and assess dependent variables (Gosling 2001(5); Mehta and Gosling 2006(6); Vazire and Gosling 2003(7)). >Animal Studies. 1. Ray, J., Hansen, S. and Waters, N. 2006. Links between temperamental dimensions and brain monoamines in the rat, Behavioural Neuroscience 120: 85–92 2. Willis-Owen, S. A. G. and Flint, J. 2007. Identifying the genetic determinants of emotionality in humans: insights from rodents, Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews 31: 115–24 3. Capitanio, J. P., Mendoza, S. P. and Baroncelli, S. 1999. The relationship of personality dimensions in adult male rhesus macaques to progression of Simian Immunodeficiency Virus disease, Brain, Behaviour, and Immunity 13: 138–54 4. Pederson, A. K., King, J. E. and Landau, V. I. 2005. Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) personality predicts behaviour, Journal of Research in Personality 39: 534–49 5. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 6. Mehta, P. H. and Gosling, S. D. 2006. How can animal studies contribute to research on the biological bases of personality?, in T. Canli (ed.), Biology of personality and individual differences, pp. 427–48. New York: Guilford 7. Vazire, S. and Gosling, S. D. 2003. Bridging psychology and biology with animal research, American Psychologist 5: 407–8 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Animals | Davidson | V 130 Animal/Thinking/Beliefs/Davidson: Thinking is possible not without language, because it must be possible to think of the same thing and to discover error, belief about belief - different living beings need to share the same concept of truth. - (Baseline of triangulation). >Triangulation. V 136 Thinking/Language/Animal/Davidson: The lack of language makes thought impossible in animals - SearleVsDavidson: we know that human children have consciousness long before they have language. >Animal language, >thinking without language. V 139 Animal/Propositional Attitude/Thinking/Davidson: E.g. the dog believes his master is at home, but not that the bank manager is at home, even though they are the same person - Searle: according to this argument, there is no intentional state without a certain fact that coresponded to its propositional content - SearleVsDavidson: we do not need language to recognize an incorrect belief. >Gavagai. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Animals | Dupré | I 315 Animal/Speech/Thinking/Dupré: it is not quite correct to speak of "pets", it is rather a coevolution of humans and other species that live for a long time in a symbiotic relationship. "Domestication" and "socialization" is something quite different. >Animals, >Animal language, >Evolution. I 316 Animal/Communication/Intention/Dupré: an important criterion for intended communication is the possibility of deception. >Communication, >Delusion. I 318 Animal/Thinking/Language/Descartes/Dupré: even those who defend the cognitive abilities of the animals most, often accept the Cartesian assumption that it is in principle impossible to prove the thinking or even the consciousness of animals because this would be conceptually dependent on behavior. >Behavior, >Language, >Thinking without language, >Language and thinking, >Gestures, >Understanding. I 319 DupréVsDavidson: if Davidson were right, the question at stake would not only be whether or not one can teach monkeys, but whether to teach them to think. >Animals/Davidson, >Language/Davidson, >Thinking/Davidson. I 320 Animal ethics/Dupré: animal ethics does not depend in any way on the success of the project, to teach animals to speak. >Ethics. I 321 Language/Thinking/Dupré: there are many forms of non-verbal behavior that allow communication, and many non-verbal manifestations of thinking. Animal/Dupré: the research of the language with monkeys can tell us much about monkeys and ourselves, which we cannot learn in a different way. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Animals | Frith | I 131 Animal/animal experiments/behavior/Frith: we know nothing about the experience of animals, we can only observe their behavior. >Behavior, cf. >Hetero-phenomenology, >Experience. I 228 Learning/imitation/animal/Frith: animals can also learn by imitation: e.g. mountain gorillas show their offspring, how nettles are folded inside, in order not to bring the hairs into contact with the lips. Animal: difference to humans: the gorillas show no interest in encouraging their offspring to learn. They also show little interest in what their offspring does at all. >Learning, >Imitation. Learning/human/child/Frith: the baby knows when its mother is interested in it. When an object is dropped and the mother says "shit!", the baby does not draw the conclusion that this is a word for the object. >Reference, >Word meaning, >Language use. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Animals | Papineau | I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": Tue V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0: 4 apply to simple creatures. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's" I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." >Generality/Papineau, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking without language, >World/thinking. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Animals | Proust | I 239 Animal/mind/consciousness/Proust: what about the ability of animals to form hypotheses that might point to a "theory of the mind"? >Theory of the mind. This is only true for primates and large marine mammals, not for dogs and cats who have acquired their relatively comprehensive communication repertoire only through domestication and interaction with us. E.g. shared attention: shared attention apparently implies a recognition of the fact that another has discovered an interesting object with its perception. From this, however, the animal does not conceive the idea that its conspecific or the other has seen an object or knows a state of affairs. I 240 Primates do not perform spontaneous pointing gestures! They can only be teached if they are promised food. >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition, >Gestures. Culture/Animal/Proust: E.g. washing potatoes: here nothing points to a pedagogic concern. The slowness of appropriation suggests that the innovation is not acquired by either targeted education nor imitation, it is about "stimulus intensification": the simple spatial proximity of a group member to the target object arouses the interest of the conspecific for this type of object and leads to the testing of different possibilities of use. Group behavior: also appeasement, etc. can be explained by simple social cooperation without mental representations. The animals do not need to know why they are doing the gestures. >Group Behavior/Psychology. Tactical deception maneuvers are often found in primates. I 242 Instead of assuming that animals "lie", it is now acknowledged that these behaviors can be explained by the learning of effective actions in a particular situation. >Learning, >Behavior. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Animals | Searle | I 137f Bat: Problem: We want to know how it feels for the bat, not how it feels for us being a bat! Properties: which properties exist? Not: what do we know about them? Epistemology/Ontology: First-person properties are unlike third-person properties. A full neurophysiological theory is not enough, there is no sensation. >Being a bat, >First Person. --- Perler I 132 Animal/Searle: Thesis: many animal species have consciousness, intentionality and thought processes. Cf. >animal language. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Animals | Sellars | Rorty VI 185 Animals/RortyVsSellars: the most common objection to Sellars psychological nominalism is "proto-consciousness": small children and dogs are aware of their pain without being able to talk about it. Sellars can give no room for sentience. >Nominalism, >Pain, >Animals, >Animal language, >Consciousness, >Language use >Everyday language, >Psychological nominalism. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Animals | Singer | I 49 Animals/P. Singer: the basis for extending the principle of equality beyond our own species is based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. The strength of this principle lies in the fact that the properties, abilities or disadvantages of others must not lead to their interests being less taken into account. >Equality, >Inequality, >Interest. I 54 Animals/Life/P. Singer: When it comes to the question of whether humans should eat animals, an Inuit who would not survive without animal flesh can argue differently than people in mid-latitudes who do not necessarily have to eat meat to survive. Interest: the principle of equal consideration of interests does not allow higher ranking interests to be infringed for the protection of lower interests (e.g. costs of animal husbandry). I 94 Animal/Person/P. Singer: Can an animal be a person? We can understand "person" here as a being that is rational and self-confident and that experiences itself as separate from other beings, with a past and a future. >Person. I 99f Future/consciousness/Animal/P. Singer: both wild and experimental animals have proven that they do indeed have a sense for future situations in which they and their conspecifics have the choice between different options for action. (cf. J. Goodall(1), F. de Waal(2). I 101 We can assume that some animals are persons in this sense. Then we can ask the question here whether it is all right to kill non-human persons. Death/killing/Animals/P. Singer: there is no objective assessment that can show that it is worse to kill members of one's own species than members of other species. Then it seems to be worse to kill a chimpanzee than a severely restricted human being who will never be able to be a person (in the above sense). However, this only applies ceteris paribus, i.e. if other factors such as the parents' attitudes are not taken into account. >ceteris paribus. I 103 Person/Animal/Gary Varner/P. Singer: (G. Varner)(3): according to Varner, a person is a being who has a biographical sense of himself, i.e. who typically can tell a story about himself. According to Varner, animals are close to humans, but have no biographical sense. Animal/Death/Person/Roger Cruton(4): Thesis: The death of a human being is more a tragedy than the death of an animal,... I 104 ...since it is likely that the human being still had plans which he/she wanted to realize, in contrast to an animal which does not have such plans. >Ethics/Nozick, >Planning, >Life, >Humans. 1. J, Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe, p. 31, 2. F. de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics, NY. 1983. 3. G. Varner, Personhood and Animals in the Two-Level Utilitarianism of R. M. Hare. 4. R. Scruton The Concscientious Carnivore in Food for Thought (Ed. St. Sapontzis (Amherst, NY, 2004) p. 81-91. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Animism | Piaget | Upton I 78 Animism/magical thinking/Piaget/Upton: Piaget (1923)(1) believed that children’s mental reasoning at this stage was limited by magical thinking and animism. Animism is the belief that objects have lifelike qualities and are therefore capable of having feelings, intentions and emotions. For example, a preoperational child may explain the rain by saying that the clouds are sad and are crying. According to Piaget, this limits children’s understanding of how the world works and so reduces their ability to think logically. It also means that they find it difficult to tell the difference between reality and fantasy. VsPiaget: Woolley (1997)(2) disagrees with the idea that children’s thinking is more magical than that of adults. Adults have been found to be just as likely as Upton I 79 children to engage in magical thinking, especially when they do not have the knowledge to explain phenomena. Adults invent speculation to fill gaps in their knowledge, much as children do. It is therefore the social context that determines whether or not adults or children engage in magical thinking. >Magical thinking/Piaget, >Psychological theories on magical thinking, >Philosophical theories on magical thinking. 1. Piaget, J. (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge. 2. Woolley, J.D. (1997) Thinking about fantasy: are children fundamentally different thinkers and believers than adults? Child Development, 68: 991–1011. |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Anomalous Monism | Quine | VI 100/101 Def Anomalous Monism/Quine: anomalous monism was baptized by Davidson, nowadays called "Token Materialism". Although there is no psychological substance, we have irreducible psychological ways of "sorting" physical states and events. Without "mental substance" there remain two problems of our mentalistic language: a syntactic and a semantic one. The syntactic distinguishing feature ((s) for propositional attitudes) was our content component, the constituent phrase "that p" - it was the phrase that thwarted extensionality: the substitutiveness of identity, the interchangeability of arbitrary terms and phrases of the same scope salva veritate. It thus obstructed classical predicate logic. >Propositional Attitudes/Quine. Solution today: spelling (preserves extensionality) and quoting de dicto. (>Semantic ascent: instead of talking about objects, talking about assertions.) VI 102 The remaining curiosity of psychological predicates de dicto (Quine pro) is then a purely semantic one: such predicates cannot be interlocked with self-sufficient concepts and causal laws. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Anonymity | Lanier | I 89 Anonymity/Lanier: thesis: ethics in the digital world is based on design. There are well-founded theories about factors that influence good or bad behaviour on the internet. I 89 How mean people behave towards each other on the internet depends on the degree of anonymity. >Social networks, >Social media. I 90 Anonymity/Lanier: certainly has its place, but it requires careful design. A substantial exchange of views requires full presence. It is therefore one of the fundamental rights of an accused person to be allowed to face his prosecutor. I 96 Before the World Wide Web, there were two types of online connections. One was Usenet, which usually required a connection to universities or the military, so that the Usenet population consisted mainly of educated adults. It would have been easy to design a non-anonymous system (for the Internet) at that time. If this had happened at that time, today's websites might not have the design aesthetics of incidental anonymity. >Terminology/Lanier, >Internet, >Internet Culture, >Internet Law, >Internet Protocol, >Internet Security, >World Wide Web. |
Lanier I Jaron Lanier You are not a Gadget. A Manifesto, New York 2010 German Edition: Gadget: Warum die Zukunft uns noch braucht Frankfurt/M. 2012 |
| Anthropic Principle | Anthropic Principle: the justification of the observability of the universe by properties that correspond to the observer. In this form, the principle is not about the existence of the universe and the observer, but about necessary properties. |
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| Anthropomorphism | Comparative Psychology | Corr I 275 Anthropomorphism/comparative psychology/animals/Gosling: many people, especially those working in sciences, have been reluctant to concede that personality exists in non-human animals. Their concerns range from philosophical arguments regarding the uniqueness of humans to methodological concerns about the perils of anthropomorphism (Gosling 2001)(1). To address concerns about the existence of personality in animals, Gosling, Lilienfeld and Marino (2003(2); see also Gosling and Vazire 2002(3)). >Animals, >Animal studies, >Animal models, >Animal language, >Personality, >Personality traits, >S.D. Gosling, >K. Sterelny, >J. Proust, >D. Radner. 1. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 2. Gosling, S. D., Lilienfeld, S. O. and Marino, L. 2003. Personality, in D. Maestripieri (ed.), Primate psychology: the mind and behaviour of human and nonhuman primates, pp. 254–88. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 3. Gosling, S. D. and Vazire, S. 2002. Are we barking up the right tree? Evaluating a comparative approach to personality, Journal of Research in Personality 36: 607–14 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Anthropomorphism | Jonas | Brocker I 618 Anthropomorphism/BirnbacherVsJonas/Jonas: When Jonas speaks of nature, he uses terms and metaphors taken from the realm of human practice: His teleology sets purposes of nature as if it wanted something or as if it ((s) acted as "wrong subject"). This is an anthropomorphism (1). >Nature, >Teleology, >Purposes, >cf. >Ecology/Peter Singer. Brocker: The methodical admissibility of this figure of thought is contested by many in contemporary philosophy. ((s) This is about attributing quasi-human traits of an acting or wanting subject to nature.) >Sense, >Life, >World, >Lifeworld, >Actions, >Politics. 1.Dieter Birnbacher, „Rezension zu Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37, 1983, S. 146. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Anti-Realism | Field | I 229 Anti-Realism/Field: many forms (which have nothing to do with our purpose) are reductionist: (E.g. reduction of the external world to human experience) or quasi-reductionist (e.g. theories that match in statements about human experiences must be cognitively equivalent, i.e. have the same understanding of "true"). >Truth definition. I 249 Truth Definition/Anti-RealismVsTarski/Anti-RealismVsKripke - Anti-RealismVsModel Theory: VsOntology of sets (Anti-Platonism dito). - ((s) Model-theoretic statements for the anti-realism are trivially true, because they have no references.) >Reference, >Models, >Model theory, >Antirealism/Dummett, >Platonism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Anti-Realism | Fraassen | I 18 Anti-Realism/VsAnti-Realism: what he believes about the world depends on what kind of world he believes to be in. >Possible worlds. Fraassen VsVs: (pro anti-realism): this would presuppose that epistemology provided the same results, regardless of the span of evidence available to us - that would presuppose skepticism. Solution/Fraassen: empirical adequacy: a theory should correctly describe phenomena ("preserve") - then observability depends on our community. >Adequacy. I 31 Anti-Realism/Science/Fraassen: for him, it is all about increase in knowledge about the observable - Fraassen pro. - Possibly another correlation is assumed between smoking and cancer: lung irritation, etc. I 219 FraassenVsAnti-Realism: cannot claim that successful theories are simply those that survive without claiming that they are true. >Theories, >Success. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Anti-Realism | Putnam | VI 393 Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data). >Sense data, >Fact. Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. >Verification. N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken ((s) in such and such circumstances). It is still not incorrigible. The sentence does not need to be bivalent. >Bivalence, >Incorrigibility. Soft Fact/Putnam: soft facts are self-affirmation of observation statements. N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. >Observation sentence, >Reference. Therefore, there is no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation. If we introduce reference à la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. >Metaphyiscal realism. Verificationism: verificationism must then also be applied in the meta language, i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). Otherwise, Wittgenstein's private language argument applies. >Meta language, >Private language. --- I (d) 124 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: anti-realism (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: this is no problem for the anti-realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. It must only renounce models of verification. With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. It can then speak about models again. I (d) 125 It can even define reference à la Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. I (e) 150 Anti-Realism/truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence which is justified assertibility. We need it not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. It is about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions. >Assertibility. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Anxiety | Corr | Corr I 362 Anxiety/fear/terminology/Corr: The avoidance of, or approach to, a dangerous stimulus is reflected in the categorical dimension of ‘defensive direction’, which further reflects a functional distinction between behaviours (a) Fear: behaviors that remove an animal from a source of danger (FFFS-mediated, fear), and (b) Anxiety: behaviors that allow it cautiously to approach a source of potential danger (BIS-mediated, anxiety). These functions are ethologically and pharmacologically distinct and, on each of these separate grounds, can be identified with fear and anxiety, respectively. FFFS: Fight–Flight–Freeze System; BIS: Behavioural Inhibition System. >Terminology/Corr. Corr I 364 Anxiety/Fear/Corr: The type of behavioural reaction to a threat is reflected in the (…) dimension of ‘defensive distance’, which reflects further the actual, or perceived, distance from threat. This dimension applies equally to fear and anxiety anxiety but operates differently in each case: anxiolytic drugs change it in the case of the BIS-anxiety (Behavioural Inhibition System; >Terminology/Corr), but not in the case of FFFS-fear (Fight–Flight–Freeze System; >Terminology/Corr). The main point is that defensive distance (i.e., how far you think you are from the threat, which closes with increasing magnitude of threat) corresponds to activation of specific neural modules (e.g., at very close defensive distance, PAG (activation and panic): the common expletive ‘Oh shit!’ is more than being merely figurative, because one of the most reliable signs of intense fear in rodents and man (e.g., soldiers in battle) is defecation (Stouffer et al. 1950)(1). >Perception/Corr, >Behavior/Corr. Corr I 366 Fear/Anxiety: important asymmetry: fear can be generated without a significant degree of anxiety (i.e., in the absence of goal-conflict), but BIS activation always leads to FFFS activation via the increase in negative valence. For this reason FFFS and BIS will often be co-activated – and, as we will see below, this is a good reason for lumping them together into a single ‘Punishment Sensitivity’ factor of personality. Corr I 367 To some extent, within the BIS scale it is possible to separate fear from anxiety (Corr and McNaughton 2008(2); putative FFFS-Fear and BIS-Anxiety in square brackets), although for some items this differentiation is blurred. (1) Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness. [FFFS] Corr I 368 (2) Criticism or scolding hurts me a lot. [FFFS/BIS] (3) I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. [FFFS/BIS] (4) If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty ‘worked up’. [FFFS/BIS] (5) I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. [BIS] (6) I have few fears compared to my friends. [FFFS] (7) I worry about making mistakes. [BIS] That the differentiation of fear and anxiety is needed in terms of personality scales is shown by Cooper, Perkins and Corr (2007)(3); and Perkins, Kemp and Corr (2007)(4)). 1. Stouffer, S. A., Guttman, L., Suchman, E. A., Lazarsfeld, P. F., Star, S. A. and Clausen, J. A. 1950. Studies in social psychology in World War II, Vol. IV, Measurement and prediction. Princeton University Press 2. Corr, P. J. and McNaughton, N. 2008. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 155–87. Cambridge University Press 3. Cooper, A. J., Perkins, A. and Corr, P. J. 2007. A confirmatory factor analytic study of anxiety, fear and Behavioural Inhibition System measures, Journal of Individual Differences 28: 179–87 4. Perkins, A. M., Kemp, S. E. and Corr, P. J. 2007. Fear and anxiety as separable emotions: an investigation of the revised reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, Emotion 7: 252–61 Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Anxiety | Eysenck | Corr II 119 Fear/Anxiety/study/reward/punishment/Arousability/Gray/Eysenck/GrayVsEysenck/McNaughton/Corr: Gray’s intellectual starting point is the biological component of Hans Eysenck’s theory of introversion–extraversion and neuroticism–stability. II 120 Eysenck saw introverts and extraverts as differing primarily in general conditionability (whether with reward or punishment as the reinforcer) resulting from arousability (…). In contrast, Gray suggested that they differ, instead, in specific conditionability (…), related to sensitivity to punishment (sometimes he said fear) but not reward. (…) for both theories, the most important consequence of introversion for psychiatry is high conditioning of fear. Both theories presumed that these introversion-/extraversion-based differences in socialization would lead to psychiatric disorder when combined with high levels of neuroticism, which acts like an amplification factor. [However,] the two theories differ in their predictions about conditioning via reward. Gray’s key modification (…) is to attribute variations in fear conditioning to differing sensitivities to punishment, whereas Eysenck attributes it to variations in general arousability (in the ascending reticular activating system, ARAS) and so, as a consequence, conditionability in general. Gray located punishment sensitivity (in the sense of susceptibility to fear; see Gray, 1970a, p. 255(1)) in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the septo-hippocampal system (SHS) (…). He connected PFC, SHS and ARAS in a feedback loop, controlled by ‘theta’ rhythm, and impaired by extraverting (anti-anxiety) drugs such as amylobarbitone. High arousal could generate punishment (with effects similar to those proposed by Eysenck). Conversely, high punishment sensitivity would generate high arousal in punishing situations (…) due to interaction of PFC + SHS with ARAS. II 123 Susceptibility to fear (although not always due to conditioning (…)) fitted well with a number of facts (p. 255)(1). We can easily see internalizing disorders (‘dysthymias’, e.g., phobia, anxiety and obsession) as excessive fear of one form or another. (…) trait-anxious people (neurotic introverts) condition better only if there is threat. At the other end of the scale, we can view externalizing disorders (e.g., psychopathy) as insufficient sensitivity to punishment. II 126 Reward/Punishment/Arousability/Sensitivity/Gray/McNaughton/Corr: According to Gray, arousability is a general concept that should apply to both reward and punishment. To explain activity in a ‘system whose chief function appears to be that of inhibiting maladaptive behaviour’ (p. 260)(1), general arousability needs explanation. For Gray, if we invert the causal order, it seems perfectly reasonable that higher susceptibility to the threats that abound in everyday life would lead to higher levels of arousal effects. For Gray, arousal, however it is produced, serves to invigorate behaviour (…), unless it is so intense it becomes punishing. This can give rise to paradoxical effects: for example, mild punishment will induce arousal and may invigorate reward-mediated reactions – so long as the punishment-inducing effects are smaller than the reward-inducing effects. II 127 Neuroticism/Anxiety: Taking an explicitly two-process learning approach, Gray first recasts the combination of neuroticism with introversion. If reward and punishment sensitivities are distinct, and we employ only two factors for our explanations, then high neuroticism/emotionality as normally measured must represent a combination of high reward and high punishment sensitivity. Gray’s initial equation of introversion with punishment sensitivity means that the neurotic introvert will be particularly sensitive to punishment. II 129 VsGray: The paper’s complexity may seem a trivial issue [but] even half a century later, readers (…) struggle with it. The biggest problem is that the theory spans multiple disciplines – with each integral to the whole. Gray’s detailed exposition also has some specific problems that we discuss here. At the theoretical level, his use of the terms ‘punishment’ and ‘fear’ were ambiguous: blurring key points when he shifted between one and the other conceptually. At the measurement level, while proposing a rotation of Eysenck’s axes, he did not tell us how to assess his proposed reward and punishment sensitivities (…). [Moreover] his paper focused on ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ in the context of conditioning. He, therefore, did not discuss the third case of escape/withdrawal in any detail. However, it is via fight/flight that he included obsessive–compulsive disorder, with its compulsive rituals and obsessive rumination, within the dysthymic disorders. >Terminology/Gray, >Fear/Eysenck. 1. Gray, J. A. (1970a). The psychophysiological basis of introversion–extraversion. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8, 249–266. McNaughton, Neil and Corr, John Philip: “Sensitivity to Punishment and Reward Revisiting Gray (1970)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 115-136. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Apologies | Experimental Psychology | Parisi I 108 Apologies/Experimental Psychology/Wilkinson-Ryan: Apologies are a particularly apt area of study for psychologists because they are crucial to how we deal with interpersonal conflicts outside of the law but are often discouraged in legal conflicts because of their admissibility in court as something like an Parisi I 109 admission of culpability. In Robbennolt (2003)(1), subjects read about a personal injury claim in which a pedestrian was injured in a collision with a bicycle (and its rider). Subjects were asked to indicate how they, in the position of the injured pedestrian, would respond to a particular settlement offer. When there was no apology, 43% reported that they would reject. When a full apology was offered, though, only 14% said they would reject, a significant difference. In follow-up work, Robbennolt (2006)(2) found that apologies affect settlement because they change how plaintiffs understand both the incident and the defendant. When plaintiffs had received an apology, they had lower reservation prices and more defendant-friendly perceptions of the fair outcome. >Settlement bargaining/Experimental Psychology. 1. Robbennolt, Jennifer K. (2003). “Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination.” Michigan Law Review 102: 460–516. 2. Robbennolt, Jennifer K. (2006). “Apologies and Settlement Levers.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 3: 333–373. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Apologies | Social Psychology | Parisi I 138 Apologies/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Some common elements include an admission of wrongdoing and/or an acknowledgment of the rule that was violated, expression of responsibility, expression of regret or remorse, a promise to forbear, and an offer to repair (Dhami, 2012(1); O'Hara and Yarn, 2002(2)). Responsibility: Empirically, taking responsibility for one's actions, offering to repair damage, and promising to forebear in the future have been shown to be essential elements (Scher and Darley, 1997)(3). Punishment/blame: Apologies that contain none of these characteristics lead to increased blame and punishment. Future behavior: A wrongdoer whose apology omits an expression of responsibility is perceived to be more likely to cause harm in the future (Robbennolt, 2003)(4). Moral character: In some circumstances, a wrongdoer who issues an apology is viewed more favorably, serving to reduce the inference of negative moral character (Gold and Weiner, 2000(5); Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie, 1989)(6). As a result of an apology, people perceive the wrongdoer as less likely to offend in the future (Etienne and Robbennolt, 2007(7);Gold and Weiner, 2000(5)). Court proceedings: In another study, judges who evaluated a hypothetical about a defendant who threatened a fellow judge imposed a lower sentence when the defendant apologized at the sentencing hearing, compared to when he did not (Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich, 2013)(8). Judges who evaluated a hypothetical robbery case imposed a lower sentence when the defendant apologized (Rachlinski et al., 2013)(8). These effects were small but reliable. Settlement: (...) there is experimental evidence that a defendant who apologizes to the plaintiff can increase the likelihood of out-of-court settlement by making the plaintiff more amenable to coming to the negotiation table, and by lowering the dollar amount that the plaintiff would be willing to accept in settlement (Robbennolt, 2006)(9). Parisi I 139 Punishment: (...) motorists who apologize to a police omcer issuing a traffc ticket might incur a lower fine (Day and Ross, 2011)(10) but motorists who apologize to an administrative law judge in court might find themselves incurring a higher fine (Rachlinski et al., 2013)(8). >Attractiveness/Social Psychology, >Punishment/Social Psychology. 1. Dhami, M. K. (2012). "Offer and Acceptance of Apology in Victim-Offender Mediation." Critical Criminology 20(1): 45-60. doi:10.1007/s10612-011-9149-5. 2. O'Hara, E. and D. Yarn (2002). "On Apology and Consilience." Washington Law Review 77: 1121. 3. Scher, S. J. andJ. M. Darley (1997). "How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization ofthe Apology Speech Act." Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 26(1): 127-140. 4. Robbennolt, J. K. (2003). "Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination." Michigan Law Review doi:10.2307/3595367. 5. Gold, G. J. and B. Weiner (2000). "Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression." Basic and Applied Social Psychology 22(4): 291-300. 6. Ohbuchi, K., M. Kameda, and N. Agarie (1989). "Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm." Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.219. 7. Etienne, M. and J. K. Robbennolt (2007). "Apologies and Plea Bargaining." Marquette Law Review 91:295. 8. Rachlinski, J. J., C. Guthrie, and A. J. Wistrich (2013). "Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?" Cornell Law Review 98(5): 13-90. 9. Robbennolt, J. K. (2006). "Apologies and Settlement Levers." Journal of Empirical Legal studies 3(2): 333-373. 10. Day, M. V. and M. Ross (2011). "The Value of Remorse: How Drivers' Responses to Police Predict Fines for Speeding." Law and Human Behavior 3 5(3): 221-234. doi:10.1007/ s10979-010-9234-4. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Appearance | Brandom | I 424 Form/appearance/BrandomVsPhenomenalism: "it looks as if" just holds back approval. I 426 Error: Understanding appearance as a cognitive act, about which one cannot be wrong - otherwise the mind would consist of infallible representations - Solution: errors and failure are not applicable here - approval that cannot be given cannot be held back - also error: attempt as an act that (as such) cannot fail. I 428 Appearance/Phenomenalism: goes beyond supervenience: > Reductionism: perceptual conditions can only be formulated in terms of the way things are - E.g. Something cannot just appear to seem to be red without really seeming to be red. E.g. you can try to lift a weight, without actually lifting it, but you cannot just attempt to try it without really trying. I 425 Form/appearance/Sellars: two uses: 1. E.g. the chicken seems to have a certain number of spots, but there is no specific number, which it seems to have - 2. Distinction between a) it looks as if there is a tree b) there is something that looks like a tree c) over there is a tree Understanding/Brandom: here, it "seems to be red" requires it "to be red" - Appearance: is not iterable (trying to do smomething: ditto). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Appearance | Chisholm | Sellars I 27 Chisholm: distinction between non-comparative and comparative sentences about the "appearance". |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Appearance | Kant | Bolz I 45 Appearance/Kant: emerges by necessary conjunctions of terms. Vaihinger I 274 Appearance/Kant/Vaihinger: "natural appearance", the term of a highest, necessary reality. "You should philosophize about nature, as if there was a necessary first reason for everything that exists, only to bring a systematic unity to your knowledge." >Unity/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant, >Nature/Kant, >Concepts/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Appraisal Theory | Attachment Theory | Corr I 239 Appraisal theory/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Adult attachment research has provided extensive evidence concerning the role of attachment working models in a person’s appraisals of the self and others. Numerous studies have shown that insecure >working models (>Terminology/Bowlby) are associated with negative appraisals of other people. Specifically, individuals scoring higher on attachment anxiety or avoidance have been found to hold a more negative view of human nature (Collins and Read 1990)(1), use more negative traits to describe relationship partners (e.g., Feeney and Noller 1991)(2), perceive these partners as less supportive and trustworthy (e.g., Collins and Read 1990(1); Davis, Morris and Kraus 1998(3)), and believe that their partners do not truly know them (Brennan and Bosson 1998(4)). Both anxiety and avoidance are also associated with negative expectations concerning a partner’s behaviour (e.g., Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian et al. 1993(5)). >About the Attachment theory. 1. Collins, N. L. and Read, S. J. 1990. Adult attachment, working models, and relationship quality in dating couples, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58: 644–63 2. Feeney, J. A. and Noller, P. 1991. Attachment style and verbal descriptions of romantic partners, Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 8: 187–215 3. Davis, M. H., Morris, M. M. and Kraus, L. A. 1998. Relationship-specific and global perceptions of social support: associations with well-being and attachment, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 468–81 4. Brennan, K. A. and Bosson, J. K. 1998. Attachment-style differences in attitudes toward and reactions to feedback from romantic partners: an exploration of the relational bases of self-esteem, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24: 699–714 5. Baldwin, M. W., Fehr, B., Keedian, E., Seidel, M. and Thompson, D. W. 1993. An exploration of the relational schemata underlying attachment styles: self-report and lexical decision approaches, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19: 746–54 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Appraisal Theory | Psychological Theories | Corr I 55 Appraisal theory/emotions/psychologcal theories/Reisenzein/Weber: The appraisal of an event determines not only whether or not this event elicits an emotion, but also which emotion it elicits. Hedonically positive (i.e., experientially pleasant) emotions occur if an event is evaluated as motive-congruent, whereas hedonically negative (experientially unpleasant) emotions occur if an event is evaluated as motive-incongruent. Emotions are distinguished by a) on the kind of evaluation made, for example, on whether an event is evaluated as just personally undesirable or as morally wrong (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988)(1). b) they depend on particular factual (non-evaluative) appraisals, including the appraisal of the event’s probability, unexpectedness, controllability, and the appraisal of one’s own or other people’s responsibility for bringing it about (see Ellsworth and Scherer 2003)(2). The relations between appraisals and specific emotions have been spelled out in several structural appraisal models (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(1); Roseman, Antoniou and Jose 1996(4); Scherer 2001(5)). Information-processing models for appraisal theories: (for overviews, see e.g., Power and Dalgleish 1997(6); Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001(7); Teasdale 1999(8)). Corr I 56 Modes of appraisal: a) non-automatic: non-automatic appraisal processes are conscious inference strategies, b) automatic appraisals are unconscious and are ‘triggered’ fairly directly by the perception of eliciting events. >Emotion. Like other mental processes, initially non-automatic, conscious appraisals can become automatized as a result of their repeated execution (e.g., Reisenzein 2001(9); Siemer and Reisenzein 2007(10)). Automatic appraisals can explain why emotions frequently follow eliciting events rapidly. They may also explain moods, that is, emotional experiences which seem to lack concrete objects (for further discussion of moods, see Schwarz and Clore 2007(11); Siemer 2005(12)). >Appraisal theory/Reisenzein. 1. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 2. Ellsworth, P. C. and Scherer, K. R. 2003. Appraisal processes in emotion, in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer and H. H. Goldsmith (eds.), Handbook of affective sciences, pp. 572–95. Oxford University Press 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A. and Jose, P. E. 1996. Appraisal determinants of emotions: constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory, Cognition and Emotion 10: 241–77 5. Scherer, K. R. 2001. Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 92–120. Oxford University Press 6.Power, M. and Dalgleish, T. 1997. Cognition and emotion: from order to disorder. Hove: Psychology Press 7. Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A. and Johnstone, T. 2001. Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press 8. Teasdale, J. D. 1999. Multi-level theories of cognition-emotion relations, in T. Dalgleish and M. Power (eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion, pp. 665–81. Chicester: Wiley 9. Reisenzein, R. 2001. Appraisal processes conceptualized from a schema-theoretic perspective: contributions to a process analysis of emotions, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 187–201. Oxford University Press 10. Siemer, M. and Reisenzein, R. 2007. The process of emotion inference, Emotion 7: 1–20 11. Schwarz, N. and Clore, G. L. 2007. Feelings and phenomenal experiences, in A. W. Kruglanski and E. T. Higgins (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, 2nd edn, pp. 385–407. New York: Guilford Press 12. Siemer, M. 2005. Moods as multiple-object directed and as objectless affective states: an examination of the dispositional theory of moods, Cognition and Emotion 19: 815–45 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Appraisal Theory | Reisenzein | Corr I 61 Appraisal theory/Reisenzein/Weber: One strength of the appraisal theory of emotion is that it can readily explain how inter-individual differences in emotional reactions to the same event arise at the psychological level (Roseman and Smith 2001)(1). (…) these differences in appraisal, in turn, are due to inter-individual differences in the cognitive and motivational structures (e.g., memory schemas) that underlie appraisal processes. At least some of these structures are sufficiently stable to be regarded as components of personality. >Personality, >Emotion, >Situations. These are, in particular, relatively stable and general desires, and relatively stable and general beliefs about the world and the self (Lazarus 1991(2); Pekrun 1988(3); Smith and Kirby 2001(4)). Viewed from an information-processing perspective, these personality determinants of appraisal concern the content of the cognitive and motivational structures that underlie the appraisal of concrete events (Reisenzein 2001)(5). >Self, >Desires, >Beliefs. The information-processing perspective suggests that the personality determinants of appraisal may comprise, in addition, inter-individual differences in the chronic accessibility of appraisal-relevant cognitive and motivational structures (e.g., memory schemas; for support see e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein and Strauman 1986)(6) as well as differences in the procedures habitually used for processing appraisal-relevant information (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty and Feinstein 1996)(7). Although clarifying the personality determinants of appraisals, and thereby those of emotions, was already declared a main task of emotion psychology by Lazarus, Averill and Opton (1970)(8), so far only limited systematic research has been devoted to this issue. Nearly all of this research has been concerned with the effects of stable, general desires and beliefs on emotional states. Corr I 62 Appraisal theory postulates that emotions arise if an event is appraised as motive-congruent or motive-incongruent, and that the intensity of the resulting emotions depends on the strength of the motive, or the subjective importance of the goal (i.e., the content of the desire) at stake. VsAppraisal theory: Motive and goal theorists commonly assume that the goals that a person has in a specific situation are derived from more fundamental goals for which the specific goals are viewed as means to ends (e.g., Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998(9); Reiss 2000)(10). At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)(10). >Goals. 1. Roseman, I. J. and Smith, C. A. 2001. Appraisal theory: overview, assumptions, varieties, controversies, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 3–19. Oxford University Press 2. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 3. Pekrun, R. 1988. Emotion, Motivation und Persönlichkeit [Emotion, motivation and personality]. Munich: Psychologie Verlags Union 4. Smith, C. A. and Kirby, L. D. 2001. Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory, in K. R. Scherer A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 121–38. New York: Oxford University Press 5. Reisenzein, R. 2001. Appraisal processes conceptualized from a schema-theoretic perspective: contributions to a process analysis of emotions, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 187–201. Oxford University Press 6. Higgins, E. T. Bond, R. N., Klein, R. and Strauman, T. 1986. Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: how magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 5–15 7. Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E. and Feinstein, J. 1996. Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation: the life and times of individuals varying in need for cognition, Psychological Bulletin 119: 197–253 8. Lazarus, R. S., Averill, J. R. and Opton, E. M. Jr. 1970. Toward a cognitive theory of emotion, in M. B. Arnold (ed.), Feelings and emotions, pp. 207–32. New York: Academic Press 9. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508 10. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Arbitrariness | Field | I 24 Identity/Identification/Field: in many areas, there is the problem of the continuous arbitrariness of identifications. - In mathematics, however, it is stronger than with physical objects. I 181 Solution: Intensity relations between pairs or triples, etc. of points. Advantage: that avoids attributing intensities to points and thus an arbitrary choice of a numerical scale for intensities. III 32 Addition/Multiplication: not possible in Hilbert's geometry. - (Only with arbitrary zero and arbitrary 1) Solution: intervals instead of points. II 310 Non-Classical Degrees of Belief/Uncertainty/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary is a good reason to not assume classical degrees of belief. - (Moderate non-classical logic: That some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded third party). III 31 Figure/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ("what line?"). - What should be zero - what is supposed to be 1? III 32 f Hilbert/Geometry/Axioms/Field: multiplication of intervals: not possible, because for that we would need an arbitrary "standard interval". Solution: Comparing products of intervals. Generalization/Field: is then possible on products of spacetime intervals with scalar intervals. ((s) E.g. temperature difference, pressure difference). Field: therefore, spacetime points must not be regarded as real numbers. III 48 FieldVsTensor: is arbitrarily chosen. Solution/Field: simultaneity. III 65 Def Equally Divided Region/Equally Split/Evenly Divided Evenly/Equidistance/Field: (all distances within the region equal: R: is a spacetime region all of whose points lie on a single line, and that for each point x of R the strict st-between (between in relation to spacetime) two points of R lies, there are points y and z of R, such that a) is exactly one point of R strictly st-between y and z, and that is x, and -b) xy P-Cong xz (Cong = congruent). ((s) This avoids any arbitrary (length) units - E.g. "fewer" points in the corresponding interval or "the same number", but not between temperature and space units. Field: But definitely in mixed products are possible.Then: "the mixed product... is smaller than the mixed product..." Equidistance in each separate region: scalar/spatio-temporal. III 79 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Scales Types/Scalar/Mass Density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which, due to its logarithmic structure, is "less arbitrary" than the scale for the gravitational potential. >Objectivity, >Logarithm. Logarithmic structures are less arbitrary. Mass density: needs more fundamental concepts than other scalar fields. Scalar field: E.g. height. >Field theory. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Archeology | Foucault | II 193ff History of ideas/Foucault: It is now possible to reverse the procedure (after examining the discourse). >Discourse/Foucault. One can walk downhill. The general theory is sketched, now we can reach the possible fields of application. It is about separating oneself from it. Instead: archeology. FoucaultVsHistory of ideas: indefinite object, ill-drawn boundaries, history of secondary positions. Rather, the history of alchemy than of chemistry. Analysis of the opinions more than knowledge, the errors more than the truth, not the thought forms, but the mentality types. Also analysis of the silent origin, the distant correspondences, the permanences. Archeology/Foucault: the attempt to write a completely different history: four differences: 1. With regard to the determination of novelty 2. Analysis of contradictions 3. The comparative descriptions 4. Finding the Transformations. Archeology: 1. Does not try to define thoughts, ideas, images, themes that are hidden or manifest in discourses. But those discourses themselves. Discourse not as a sign for something else but as a monument. No interpretative discipline, it does not seek a "different discourse." It is not "allegorical". 2. Archeology does not seek to find a continuous transition. 3. It is not ordered according to the sovereign form of the work. The authority of the creative subject as a principle of its unity is alien to it. 4. It is not looking for the restoration of what people have thought, wanted, felt, desired. It does not seek that volatile core. Archeology: creates the tribe of a discourse. E.g. the natural history: 1. As leading statements, it will set the statements concerning the definition of the observable structures and the field of possible objects. 2. Those who prescribe the forms of the description. 3. Those who make the most general characterization possibilities appear, and thus open up a whole range of terms. 4. Those who, by making a strategic choice, leave room for a very large number of later options. This is not a deduction from axioms. Nor is it a general idea or a philosophical core. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Arrow’s Theorem | D’Agostino | Gaus I 242 Arrow’s Theorem/pluralism/diversity/D’Agostino: Consider a collection of individuals, each of whom has well-behaved preferences (or judgements) over a domain of alternative social arrangements. The problem of collective choice is to specify a procedure, meeting (at least) minimal conditions of fairness, that will deliver a rating of these alternative arrangements, based on individuals' assessments, that is sufficiently determinate to warrant the selection of one of them as the collectively binding arrangement for this group. Arrow: What Arrow shows, and what much subsequent tinkering has confirmed, is that there is no formal procedure of amalgamation that can be relied on for this purpose (see Arrow, 1979(1); and, for helpful commentary, see Mueller, 1989(2), and Sen, 1970(3)). In so far as a procedure fairly recognizes the antecedent assessments of the various individuals, it will, on certain profiles of assessments, fail to achieve determinacy, and, hence, will fail to identify a collectively binding social arrangement. D’Agostino: I tried elsewhere (D' Agostino, 1996)(4) to show that this result provides a model for theorizing about ideals, such as 'public reason', that are, at least nowadays, directly associated with liberalism per se (see also Gaus, 1996(5); and D' Agostino and Gaus, 1998(6)). Democracy/diversity/procedures/Arrow/D’Agostino: the point of Arrow's Theorem is not that formal procedures never work, but rather that they don't always work. And this point is ethico-politically significant for two reasons. 2) When we apply a procedure in concrete circumstances, we typically will not be able to tell, antecedently, whether or not it will work in these circumstances. 2) Even if we can determine that it will not work in these circumstances, we have, according to Arrow's Theorem, no alternative procedure (of the same type) to use instead, except, of course, another that also will not work. Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S1: Winner S1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. (The alternative to such arbitrariness is simple indeterminacy: none of the options can be identified as the collectively binding best for the group.) Cf. >Chaos Theorem/Social Choice Theory. Elections/democracy/solutions: (...) once such diversity among individuals' assessments is 'managed', exactly the indeterminacy of such formal procedures as voting (and other modes of amalgamation) disappears. Suppose, for instance, that through some programme of socialization and education, individuals' assessments are sufficiently 'homogenized' that one of the alternative social arrangements that individuals are assessing is 'dominant' in the sense that it is best from all relevant points of view. In this case, we might have the configuration in Table II of preferences. Table II of preferences S1: A 1st – B 1st – C 1st S2: A 2nd – B 3rd – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 2nd Given this configuration, there would be no difficulty with collective choice, either statically or dynamically. There is a unique collectively best option whose identification as such is not dependent on arbitrary factors and whose selection as such cannot be destabilized (so long as individuals' assessments themselves remain constant). Value monism/pluralism//D‘Agostino: Of course, Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. (For D’Agostino’s solution see >Diversity/Liberalism.) 1. Arrow, Kenneth (1979) 'Values and collective decision making'. In Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Sen, Amartya (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. 4. D'Agostino, Fred (1996) Free Public Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. D' Agostino, Fred and Gerald Gaus, eds (1998) Public Reason. Aldershot: Dartmouth. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Arrow’s Theorem | Weale | Gaus I 243 Arrow’s theorem/Weale/D’Agostino: I [Fred D’Agostino] said that Arrow's Theorem might be considered a parable; that it might suggest something, vividly, for liberalism about the implications of diversity (and hence pluralism). ((s) For a presentation of the problems in relation to Arrow’s theorem see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino). What, to this effect, does it actually show? Weale: Albert Weale (1992)(1) provides a helpful analysis whose upshot also applies to specifically liberal modalities of collective deliberation. He notes, in particular, that the conditions which Arrow imposes on formalistic procedures for collective choice should be understood as involving two distinct requirements - 'of coherence and Gaus I 244 representativeness', which, as he says, 'come into conflict'. He continues: 'Coherence requires decision-makers to know their own mind all things considered, but representativeness pushes towards the inclusion of considerations that may make knowing one's own mind impossible' (1992(1): 213). a) Representativeness, in other words, requires, of any approach to collective decision-making, that it make adequate provision for reasonable antecedent diversity of preferences or judgements. b) Coherence, on the other hand, requires of such an approach that it make adequate provision for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. Arrow/Weale: What Arrow's Theorem itself shows is that the specifically formalistic approaches to collective decision-making that are illustrated, for instance, in systems of voting cannot, in fact, satisfy both these desider- ata reliably. D’Agostino: What, treated as a parable, Arrow's Theorem suggests is a conundrum: how can we reconcile the demand for coherence in social arrangements with the fact of evaluative diversity? 1. Weale, Albert (1992) 'Social choice'. In Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sugden and Albert Weale, eds, The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Art | Eco | I 48 Science/Art/Eco: in the open work of art you can see the resonance of some tendencies in modern science: the concept of the field comes from physics: it is a new understanding of the relationship between cause and effect: it has a more complex interaction of forces. There is a departure from a static and syllogistic view of order. It has an indefinite relation and is complementarity. I 55 Reception/Eco: the work of art offers the interpreter a work to be completed. I 105 Openness and disorder are relative terms. Something is more in order in comparison to a previous disorder. I 138 Definition openness of the first degree: integration and knowledge mechanisms are characteristic for every process of knowledge. I 139 Definition second-degree openness: second-degree openness corresponds to the grasping that constantly open process, it allows us to perceive new contours and new possibilities for a form. I 149 Openness: openness means that the recipient has freedom of choice. I 160 Art/Science/Eco: certain structures in art appear as epistemological metaphors, as structural decisions of a diffuse theoretical consciousness (not of a particular theory, but cultural belief). Art and science are mirroring certain achievements of modern scientific methodology in categories of uncertainty and statistical distribution. Bivalent logic, causality and the principle of the excluded middle are called into question. I 163 Art/Science/Cubism: art exhibits parallels to non-Euclidean geometry. There is a parallel between Hilbert's attempts to axiomatize geometry and neoplasticism and constructivism. I 165 Eco thesis: in a world where the discontinuity of phenomena has called into question the possibility of a unified and definitive view of the world, open art shows us a way of seeing and recognizing this world and of integrating our sensitivity. This discontinuity is not narrated but it is art. ((s)VsEco: Eco shows a strongly affirmative attitude: that it is about recognizing the world.) I 260 Alienation/Art/Eco: Epigones have become alienated from a habit that now fixes them without allowing them to move in an original and free way. >Artworks, >Alienation. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Art | Flusser | Rötzer I 58 Art/Flusser: Art making is about making something that has never been there before and therefore cannot be foreseen by any given program. Rötzer I 59 Rome is the seed that was planted by auctor Romulus in a wide field, Latium. The man (vir) dug a hole in the camp with his cane (aratrum). His masculine act (actio), i. e. the rape of the field leads to the possibility (virtualitas) of semen (semen) to develop into the reality of Rome (augere)... etc. The transfer of this myth to art brought a lot of things like genius, inspiration and uniqueness. Artists as all kinds of Romulusses. >Artists, >Genius, >Creativity. Rötzer I 64 Art/Flusser: Ghettos: Museums, Academies. The more untheoretical, empirical and more on good luck these people proceed, the better they are. At present, the craftsmen's revolution has come to an end. Division into capitalists and workers resigns. The meaning of life is no longer work but consumption. In contrast to the Middle Ages, leisure no longer serves to acquire wisdom; it is pointless, and therefore the whole of life is absurd. We expect art (which we understand as a creator of experience models) to give meaning to our leisure, but this task cannot be accomplished by theory-less authors. Rötzer I 65 As long as art could not be taken seriously, the authors could not only be tolerated, but their nonsense also came in handy. But now, when art has to be taken seriously, as in television, and because leisure is more and more recognized as a goal and the main component of life, the authors become dangerous to the public. --- Flusser I 11 Art/Flusser: for a Christian, everything is art (namely God's work). >Christianity, >Artifacts. For an enlightened philosopher of the 18th century, everything is nature (namely, in principle, explainable). >Enlightenment, >Explanation. I 11ff Art/Flusser: Separation of art and technology is the result of printing. Pictures become works of art as soon as they cease to be the dominant code. They only become "beautiful" because they can no longer be "good", "true". >Beauty, >Truth, >Images. This makes them opaque. Even if they hang on walls, they are also more than just "beautiful" they are models of different ways to experience the world. You do not have to accept the romantic ideology of art as a "revelation of reality" to see that when you look at a Goya, you get a different view of the world than when you look at Matisse. They are different ways of living. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Rötz I F. Rötzer Kunst machen? München 1991 |
| Art | Gadamer | I 57 Art/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: [Kant's] preference of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only the other side of the lack of natural beauty in a certain statement. >Beauty/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Conversely, the advantage of art over natural beauty can be seen in the fact that the language of art is a demanding language that is not free and indeterminate in its atmospheric interpretation but addresses us in a meaningful and definite way. And it is the wonderful and mysterious thing about art that this particular demand is not a shackle for our mind, but rather opens up the scope of freedom in the play of our powers of cognition. KantVsVs/Gadamer: Kant certainly does justice to this when he says(1) that art must be "seen as nature", i.e. it must please, without betraying the compulsion of rules. I 121 Art/Gadamer: The thesis is (...) that the being of art cannot be determined as the object of an aesthetic consciousness, because conversely the I 122 aesthetic behaviour is more than it knows about itself. It is a part of the process of being of representation and belongs to the game as a game in its essence. >Representation/Gadamer, >Play/Gadamer, >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer. 1. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1799, S. 179ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Art | Weber | Habermas III 229 Art/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber counts not only science, but also autonomous art among the manifestations of cultural rationalization. >Rationalization. The artistically stylized patterns of expression became independent with the conditions of art production, initially courtly patronage and later bourgeois-capitalist: "Art now constitutes itself as a cosmos of always consciously grasped independent intrinsic values."(1) >Artworks, >Artists, >Autonomy, >Value spheres. Habermas: Weber does not concentrate primarily on the art business and art critique, but on III 230 the effects of consciously capturing aesthetic intrinsic values for the techniques of art production. >Aesthetics, >Society. III 231 For Weber, however, the development of art plays as little of a role in the sociological explanation of social rationalization as the history of science. Art cannot even accelerate these processes like a science that has become productive. III 251 Progress/Art/Weber/Habermas: Weber emphasizes that "the use of a certain technique, however 'advanced', does not mean the least about the aesthetic value of the work of art.(2) >Technology, >Progress. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, S. 555. 2. M. Weber Methodologische Schriften, Hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Frankfurt 1968 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Articles | Kamp | Cresswell I 175 Definite descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only spoken about undefined descriptions! Undefined descriptions/Russell. Thesis: a man means "at least a man". Certain descriptions/Russell. Thesis: the man means "this particular man". Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: the tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions. Article/Cresswell: recent attempts to integrate the old linguistic idea into the traditional logic that the indefinite article introduces new objects in the speech while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to: Article/Kempson: (1975, 111)(1): thesis: definite/indefinite article should be distinguished not semantically but only pragmatically. Article/old/new/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article is also found in Heim (1983). I 176 There it leads to the file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore "files". (Files, "new in the files"). Definiton file/Heim/Cresswell: a file represents facts about objects for the speaker. >File change semantics, (1) Ruth M. Kempson (1975): Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics, 15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Articles | Russell | Cresswell I 179 Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ. >Scope, >Narrow scope, >Wide Scope. Russell I X Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names. >Proxy, >Names, >Logical proper names, >Axioms, Typographical abbreviation: >"blackening of the paper", >Formalism. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Artificial Consciousness | Deacon | I 455 Artificial Awareness/Symbolic Communication/Symbolic Reference/Deacon: will we one day build devices with a symbolic understanding? Yes, I believe so, and in the not too distant future. These machines must have sensibility, however, in order to do symbolic reference. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic reference. I 460 This is not about the size of neural networks, but about the special logic of the relationships between different learning processes. This is a global property of such networks, not their microstructure. We will be able to build such machines faster than nature, which used blind trial-and-error techniques. Mind/Deacon: is a physical process. And we can copy physical processes, whether we understand what is going on or not. Cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Human Level AI, >Thinking, >Computation, >Cognition. I 462 Turing-Test/Deacon: if the machine has stored enough information about the world from conversations with real people, it can pass any test. It can always fake sensibility. That is the essence of Searle's criticism. >Turing Test, >Intentionality/Searle, >Chinese Room. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Artificial Consciousness | Minsky | Minsky I 41 Soul/artificial intelligence/AI/Minsky: People ask if machines can have souls. And I ask back whether souls can learn. It does not seem a fair exchange - if souls can live for endless time and yet not use that time to learn — to trade all change for changelessness. And that's exactly what we get with inborn souls that cannot grow: a destiny the same as death, an ending in a permanence incapable of any change and, hence, devoid of intellect. >Self/AI/Minsky. What are those old and fierce beliefs in spirits, souls, and essences? They're all insinuations that we're helpless to improve ourselves. To look for our virtues in such thoughts seems just as wrongly aimed a search as seeking art in canvas cloths by scraping off the painter's works. >Mind/AI/Minsky. I 160 Artificial Consciousness/Minsky: When people ask, Could a machine ever be conscious? I'm often tempted to ask back, Could a person ever be conscious? I mean this as a serious reply, because we seem so ill-equipped to understand ourselves. Long before we became concerned with understanding how we work, our evolution had already constrained the architecture of our brains. E.g. (…) we simply aren't very good at dealing with the kinds of situations that need […] memory-stacks. This could be why we get confused when hearing sentences like this: This is the malt that the rat that the cat that the dog worried killed ate. The very same words can be rearranged to make an equivalent sentence anyone can understand: This is the dog that worried the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt. The first sentence is hard to understand because so many verb processes interrupt one another that when the end of the sentence comes, three similar processes are still active — but they have lost track of what roles should be assigned to all the remaining nouns, namely, the rat, cat, and malt. Why do visual processes so rarely encounter similar difficulties? >Seeing/Philosophical theories. I 186 Artificial consciousness/Minsky: [Must machines be logical?] What's wrong with the old arguments that lead us to believe that if machines could ever think at all, they'd have to think with perfect logic? We're told that by their nature, all machines must work according to rules. We're also told that they can only do exactly what they're told to do. Besides that, we also hear that machines can only handle quantities and therefore cannot deal with qualities or anything like analogies. >Intelligence, >Superintelligence, >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Consciousness, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Neural Networks, >Artificial General Intelligence, >AI Research, >ChatGPT. I 165 Most such arguments are based upon a mistake that is like confusing an agent with an agency. When we design and build a machine, we know a good deal about how it works. When our design is based on neat, logical principles, we are likely to make the mistake of expecting the machine to behave in a similarly neat and logical fashion. But that confuses what the machine does inside itself — that is, how it works — with our expectations of how it will appear to behave in the outer world. Being able to explain in logical terms how a machine's parts work does not automatically enable us to explain its subsequent activities in simple, logical terms. Logic/Minsky: We use it to simplify and summarize our thoughts. We use it to explain arguments to other people and to persuade them that those arguments are right. We use it to reformulate our own ideas. But I doubt that we often use logic actually to solve problems or to get new ideas. >Reasoning/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Chalmers | I 185 Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Suppose we had an artificial system that rationally reflects what it perceives. Would this system have a concept of consciousness? It would certainly have a concept of the self, it could differ from the rest of the world, and have a more direct access to its own cognitive contents than to that of others. So it would have a certain kind of self-awareness. This system will not say about itself, that it would have no idea how it is to see a red triangle. Nor does it need access to its elements on a deeper level (Hofstadter 1979 1, Winograd 1972 2). N.B.: such a system would have a similar attitude to its inner life as we do to ours. Cf. >Artificial consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how. I 186 Behavioral explanation/Chalmers: to explain the behavior of such systems, we never need to attribute consciousness. Perhaps such systems have consciousness, or not, but the explanation of their behavior is independent of this. >Behavior, >Explanation. I 313 Artificial Intelligence/VsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: DreyfusVsArtificial Intelligence: (Dreyfus 1972 7): Machines cannot achieve the flexible and creative behavior of humans. LucasVsArtificial Intelligence/PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Lucas 1961 3, Penrose, 1989 4): Computers can never reach the mathematical understanding of humans because they are limited by Goedel's Theorem in a way in which humans are not. Chalmers: these are external objections. The internal objections are more interesting: VsArtificial intelligence: internal argument: conscious machines cannot develop a mind. >Mind/Chalmers. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: > Chinese Room Argument. (Searle 1980 5). According to that, a computer is at best a simulation of consciousness, a zombie. >Chinese Room, >Zombies, >Intentionality/Searle. Artificial Intelligence/ChalmersVsSearle/ChalmersVsPenrose/ChalmersVsDreyfus: it is not obvious that certain physical structures in the computer lead to consciousness, the same applies to the structures in the brain. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any compuation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. I 315 Implementation/Chalmers: this term is needed as a bridge for the connection between abstract computations and concrete physical systems in the world. We also sometimes say that our brain implements calculations. Cf. >Thinking/World, >World, >Reality, >Computation, >Computer Model. Implementation/Searle: (Searle 1990b 6): Thesis is an observational-relativistic term. If you want, you can consider every system as implementing, for example: a wall. ChalmersVsSearle: one has to specify the implementation, then this problem is avoided. I 318 For example, a combinatorial state machine has quite different implementation conditions than a finite state machine. The causal interaction between the elements is differently fine-grained. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. In addition, combinatorial automats can reflect various other automats, like... I 319 ...Turing-machines and cellular automats, as opposed to finite or infinite state automats. >Turing-machine, >Vending machine/Dennett. ChalmersVsSearle: each system implements one or the other computation. Only not every type (e.g., a combinational state machine) is implemented by each system. Observational relativity remains, but it does not threaten the possibility of artificial intelligence. I 320 This does not say much about the nature of the causal relations. >Observation, >Observer relativity. 1. D. R. Hofstadter Gödel, Escher Bach, New York 1979 2. T. Winograd, Understanding Natural Language, New York 1972 3. J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines and Gödel, Philosophy 36, 1961, p. 112-27. 4. R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford 1989 5. J. R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 417 -24 6. J. R. Searle, Is the brain an digital computer? Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical association, 1990, 64: pp. 21-37 7. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do. New York 1972. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Church | Brockman I 246 Machine Learning/artificial intelligence/energy/Church, George M.: [IBM’s] Watson, winner of Jeopardy!, used 85,000 watts realtime, while the human brains were using 20 watts each. To be fair, the human body needs 100 watts to operate and twenty years to build, hence about 6 trillion joules of energy to “manufacture” a mature human brain. The cost of manufacturing Watson-scale computing is similar. So why aren’t humans displacing computers? >Artificial Intelligence >Artificial consciousness >Artificial General Intelligence >Strong Artificial Intelligence >Machine Learning >Neural Networks >Superintelligence. Church, George M. „The Rights of Machines” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Deutsch | Brockman I 116 Artificial Intelligence/Deutsch: Misconceptions about human thinking and human origins are causing corresponding misconceptions about AGI (artificial general intelligence) and how it might be created. For example, it is generally assumed that the evolutionary pressure that produced modern humans was provided by the benefits of having an ever-greater ability to innovate. But if that were so, there would have been rapid progress as soon as thinkers existed, just as we hope will happen when we create artificial ones. >Imitation/Deutsch, >Knowledge/Popper. But instead, there were hundreds of thousands of years of near stasis. Progress happened only on timescales much longer than people’s lifetimes, so in a typical generation no one benefited from any progress. Brockman I 119 A present-day AI is not a mentally disabled AGI (artificial general intelligence), so it would not be harmed by having its mental processes directed still more narrowly to meeting some predetermined criterion. (…) all the effort that has ever increased the capabilities of AIs has gone into narrowing their range of potential “thoughts.” (E.g., Chess engines); their basic task has not changed from the outset (…). >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. For general problems with programming AI: >Thinking/Deutsch, >Obedience/Deutsch. Brockman I 123 Test for Artificial General Intelligence: (…) I expect that any testing in the process of creating an AGI risks being counterproductive, even immoral, just as in the education of humans. I share Turing’s supposition that we’ll know an AGI when we see one, but this partial ability to recognize success won’t help in creating the successful program. >Artificial General Intelligence/Deutsch. Deutsch, D. “Beyond Reward and Punishment” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Dragan | Brockman I 139 Artificial intelligence/Dragan: [The] need to understand human actions and decisions applies to physical and nonphysical robots alike. For an AI with, say, a financial or economic role, the mismatch between what it expects us to do and what we actually do could have even worse consequences. One alternative is for the robot not to predict human actions but instead just protect against the worst-case human action. Often when robots do that, though, they stop being all that useful. With cars, this results in being stuck, because it makes every move too risky. (…) robots will need accurate (or at least reasonable) predictive models of whatever people might decide to do. Our state definition can’t just include the physical position of humans in the world. Instead, we’ll also need to estimate something internal to people. What makes the problem more complicated is the fact that people don’t make decisions in isolation. Much like the robot treating human actions as clues to human internal states, people will change their beliefs about the robot as they observe its actions. Unfortunately, the giving of clues Brockman I 140 doesn’t come as naturally to robots as it does to humans; we’ve had a lot of practice communicating implicitly with people. >Value alignment problem/Dragan. >Artificial Intelligence >Artificial consciousness >Artificial General Intelligence >Strong Artificial Intelligence >Machine Learning >Neural Networks >Superintelligence. Dragan, Anca, “Putting the Human into the AI Equation” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Dyson | Brockman I 37 Artificial intelligence/Dyson, George: The emergence of intelligence gets the attention of Homo sapiens, but what we should be worried about is the emergence of control. >Neural networks/George Dyson, >Analog/digital/George Dyson, >Complexity/George Dyson. Brockman I 39 You scan every book ever printed, collect every email ever written, and gather forty-nine years of video every twenty-four hours, while tracking where people are and what they do, in real time. But how do you capture the meaning? >Meaning/George Dyson. We worry too much about machine intelligence and not enough about self-reproduction, communication, and control. The next revolution in computing will be signaled by the rise of analog systems over which digital programming no longer has control. Nature’s response to those who believe they can build machines to control everything will be to allow them to build a machine that controls them instead. >Complexity/George Dyson. Dyson, G. “The Third Law”. In: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Dyson I Esther Dyson Release 2.1: A Design for Living in the Digital Age New York 1998 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Gershenfeld | Brockman I 162 Artificial intelligence/Gershenfeld: the cycles [of AI] come in roughly decade-long waves: 1. Mainframes which by their very existence were going to automate away work. Vs: That ran into the reality that it was hard to write programs to do tasks that were simple for people to do. 2. Then came expert systems, which were going to codify and then replace the knowledge of experts. Vs: These ran into difficulty in assembling that knowledge and reasoning about cases not already covered. 3. Perceptrons sought to get around these problems by modeling how the brain learns, Vs: (…) they were unable to do much of anything. 4. Multilayer perceptrons could handle test problems that had tripped up those simpler networks, Vs: (…) their demonstrations did poorly on unstructured, real-world problems. 5. We’re now in the deep-learning era, which is delivering on many of the early AI promises but in a way that’s considered hard to understand, with consequences ranging from intellectual to existential threats. >Noise/Shannon, >Noise/Neumann, >Algorithms/Gershenfeld. Gershenfeld, Neil „Scaling”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Griffiths | Brockman I 127 Artificial intelligence/Artificial General Intelligence/values/ethics/Griffiths: Making inferences about what humans want is a prerequisite for solving the AI problem of value alignment - aligning the values of an automated intelligent system with those of a human being. Value alignment is important if we want to ensure that those automated intelligent systems have our best interests at heart. If they can’t infer what we value, there’s no way for them to act in support of those values - and they may well act in ways that contravene them. Value alignment is the subject of a small but growing literature in artificial-intelligence research. One of the tools used for solving this problem is inverse-reinforcement learning. >Reinforcement Learning/Griffiths. Griffiths, Tom, “The Artificial Use of Human Beings” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Pentland | Brockman I 200 Artificial intelligence/Pentland: On the horizon is a vision of how we can make humanity more intelligent by building a human AI. It’s a vision composed of two threads. One is data that we can all trust- data that have been vetted by a broad community, data where the algorithms are known and monitored, much like the census data we all automatically rely on as at least approximately correct. The other is a fair, data-driven assessment of public norms, policy, and government, based on trusted data about current conditions. >Cybernetics/Pentland, >Ecosystems/Pentland, >Decision-making Processes/Pentland, >Data/Pentland. Brockman I 204 One thing people often fail to mention is that all the worries about AI are the same as the worries about today’s government. For most parts of the government - the justice system, etc. - there’s no reliable data about what they’re doing and in what situation. VsArtificial intelligence/Pentland: Current AI is doing descriptive statistics in a way that’s not science and would be almost impossible to make into science. To build robust systems, we need to know the science behind data. Solution/Pentland: The systems I view as next-generation Als result from this science- based approach: If you’re going to create an AI to deal with something physical, then you should build the laws of physics into it as your descriptive functions, in place of those stupid little neurons. >Ecosystem/Pentland. ing algorithms. When you replace the stupid neurons with ones that capture the basics of human behavior, then you can identify trends with very little data, and you can deal with huge levels of noise. The fact that humans have a “commonsense” understanding that they bring to most Brockman I 205 problems suggests what I call the human strategy: Human society is a network just like the neural nets trained for deep learning, but the “neurons” in human society are a lot smarter. Pentland, A. “The Human strategy” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Russell | Brockman I 22 Artificial Intelligence/Stuart Russell: The goal of AI research has been to understand the principles underlying intelligent behavior and to build those principles into machines that can then exhibit such behavior. Brockman I 23 In the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing theoretical notion of intelligence was the capacity for logical reasoning (…). More recently, a consensus has emerged around the idea of a rational agent that perceives, and acts in order to maximize, its expected utility. AI has incorporated probability theory to handle uncertainty, utility theory to define objectives, and statistical learning to allow machines to adapt to new circumstances. These developments have created strong connections to other disciplines that build on similar concepts, including control theory, economics, operations research, and statistics. Purpose: For example, a self-driving car should accept a destination as input instead of having one fixed destination. However, some aspects of the car’s “driving purpose” are fixed, such as that it shouldn’t hit pedestrians. Putting a purpose into a machine (…) seems an admirable approach to ensuring that the machine’s “conduct will be carried out on principles acceptable to us!” Brockman I 24 Problem: neither AI nor other disciplines (economics, statistics, control theory, operations research) built around the optimization of objectives have much to say about how to identify the purposes “we really desire.” >Artificial Intelligence/Omohundro, >Superintelligence/Stuart Russell. Brockman I 29 Solution/Stuart Russell: The optimal solution to this problem is not, as one might hope, to behave well, but instead to take control of the human and force him or her to provide a stream of maximal rewards. This is known as the wireheading problem, based on observations that humans themselves are susceptible to the same problem if given a means to electronically stimulate their own pleasure centers. Problem: This idealization ignores the possibility that our minds are composed of subsystems with incompatible preferences; if true, that would limit a machine’s ability to optimally satisfy our preferences, but it doesn’t seem to prevent us from designing machines that avoid catastrophic outcomes. Solution/Stuart Russell: A more precise definition is given by the framework of cooperative inverse-reinforcement learning, or CIRL. A CIRL problem involves two agents, one human and the other a robot. Because there are two agents, the problem is what economists call a game. It is a game of partial information, because while the human knows the reward function, the robot doesn’t—even though the robot’s job is to maximize it. Brockman I 30 Off-switch Problem: Within the CIRL framework, one can formulate and solve the off-switch problem - that is, the problem of how to prevent a robot from disabling its off switch. A robot that’s uncertain about human preferences actually benefits from being switched off, Brockman I 31 because it understands that the human will press the off switch to prevent the robot from doing something counter to those preferences. Thus the robot is incentivized to preserve the off switch, and this incentive derives directly from its uncertainty about human preferences.(1) Behavioral learning/preferences/Problems: There are obvious difficulties, however, with an approach that expects a robot to learn underlying preferences from human behavior. Humans are irrational, inconsistent, weak willed, and computationally limited, so their actions don’t always reflect their true preferences. 1. Cf. Hadfield-Menell et al., “The Off-Switch Game,” https:/Jarxiv.orglpdf/ 1611.0821 9.pdf. Russell, Stuart J. „The Purpose put into the Machine”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. Norvig I 27 Artificial general intelligence/Norvig/Russell: Artificial General Intelligence or AGI (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007)(1), (…) held its first conference and organized the Journal of Artificial General Intelligence in 2008. AGI looks for a universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment, and has its roots in the work of Ray Solomonoff (1964)(2), one of the attendees of the original 1956 Dartmouth conference. Guaranteeing that what we create is really Friendly AI is also a concern (Yudkowsky, 2008(3); Omohundro, 2008)(4). >Human Level AI/Minsky; >Artificial general intelligence. 1. Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. (2007). Artificial General Intelligence. Springer 2. Solomonoff, R. J. (1964). A formal theory of inductive inference. Information and Control, 7, 1–22, 224–254. 3. Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. In Bostrom, N. and Cirkovic, M. (Eds.), Global Catastrophic Risk. Oxford University Press 4. Omohundro, S. (2008). The basic AI drives. In AGI-08 Workshop on the Sociocultural, Ethical and Futurological Implications of Artificial Intelligence |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Weizenbaum | I 22 Artificial Intelligence/Weizenbaum: thesis: human intelligence and that of machines must be separated. Human beings: in order to be able to deal with digital machines, humans have to internalize certain aspects of these machines in the form of kinesthetic and perception habits. >Robots, >Human-machine communication, >Humans, >Formalization. I 23 The human relies on autonomous machines, i.e. machines that work entirely on the basis of their own inner reality for a longer period of time. I 24 When we talk about bureaucracy today, we have the idea of an independent, machine-like process. >Bureaucracy. I 262 Artificial Intelligence/Weizenbaum: Problem: there are thoughts that no machine will ever understand, because they relate to goals that are not appropriate for machines. >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Thought. I 269 Existence/Life/Human/World/Reality/Weizenbaum: Thesis: an organism is largely defined by the problems it faces. Human beings have to cope with problems that no machine built by human hands ever has to deal with. >Artificial consciousness, >Problems, >Problem solving, >Reality, >World. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Artificial Intelligence | Wolfram | Brockman I 268 Artificial intelligence/Wolfram: When we consider the future of AI, we need to think about the goals. That’s what humans contribute; that’s what our civilization contributes. The execution of those goals is what we can increasingly automate. >Purposes/Wolfram, >Neural networks/Wolfram. Brockman I 271 Expert systems/Wolfram: (…) there was a trend toward devices called expert systems, which arose in the late seventies and early eighties. The idea was to have a machine learn the rules that an expert uses and thereby figure out what to do. That petered out. After that, AI became little more than a crazy pursuit. My original belief had been that in order to make a serious computational knowledge system, you first had to build a brainlike device and then feed it knowledge—just as humans learn in standard education. Now I realized that there wasn’t a bright line between what is intelligent and what is simply computational. Wolfram Alpha: I had assumed that there was some magic mechanism that made us vastly more capable than anything that was just computational. But that assumption was wrong. What I discovered is that you can take a large collection of the world’s knowledge and automatically answer questions on the basis of it, using what are essentially merely computational techniques. Data mining/Wolfram: (…) what you normally do when you build a program is build it step-by-step. But you can also explore the computational universe and mine technology from that universe. Brockman I 272 There are all kinds of programs out there, even tiny programs that do complicated things. Computer language/Wolfram: You need a computer language that can represent sophisticated concepts in a way that can be progressively built up and isn’t possible in natural language. Traditional approach: creating a computer language is to make a language that represents operations that computers intrinsically know how to do: allocating memory, setting values of variables, iterating things, changing program counters, etc. Solution/WolframVsTradition: make a language that panders not to the computers but to the humans, to take whatever a human thinks of and convert it into some form that the computer can understand. Brockman I 275 Artificial intelligence/Wolfram. Basic components: physiological recognition, language translation, voice-to-text. These are essentially some of the links to how we make machines that are humanlike in what they do. >Computer language/Wolfram, >Formalization/Wolfram, >Turing Test/Wolfram, >Human machine communication/Wolfram. Brockman I 277 The AI will know what you intend, and it will be good at figuring out how to get there. More to the point is that there will be an AI that knows your history, and knows that when you’re ordering dinner online you’ll probably want such-and-such, or when you email this person, you should talk to them about such-and-such. More and more, the Als will suggest to us what we should do, and I suspect most of the time people will just go along with that. >Software/Wolfram. Brockman I 283 The problem of abstract AI is similar to the problem of recognizing extraterrestrial intelligence: How do you determine whether or not it has a purpose? We’ll say things like, «Weil, AI will be intelligent when it can do blah-blah-blah.” But there are many other ways to get to those results. Again, there is no bright line between intelligence and mere computation. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Artificial Neural Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 728 Artificial Neural Networks/Norvig/Russell: Neural networks are composed of nodes or units (…) connected by directed links. A link from unit i to unit j serves to propagate the activation ai from i to j. Each link also has a numeric weight wi,j associated with it, which determines the strength and sign of the connection. Just as in linear regression models, each unit has a dummy input a0 =1 with an associated weight w0,j . Norvig I 729 Perceptrons: The activation function g is typically either a hard threshold (…), in which case the unit is called a perceptron, or a logistic function (…), in which case the term sigmoid perceptron is sometimes used. Both of these nonlinear activation function ensure the important property that the entire network of units can represent a nonlinear function (…). Forms of a network: a) A feed-forward network has connections only in one direction—that is, it forms a directed acyclic graph. Every node receives input from “upstream” nodes and delivers output to “downstream” nodes; there are no loops. A feed-forward network represents a function of its current input; thus, it has no internal state other than the weights themselves. b) A recurrent network, on the other hand, feeds its outputs back into its own inputs. This means that the activation levels of the network form a dynamical system that may reach a stable state or exhibit oscillations or even chaotic behavior. Layers: a) Feed-forward networks are usually arranged in layers, such that each unit receives input only from units in the immediately preceding layer. b) Multilayer networks, which have one or more layers of hidden units that are not connected to the outputs of the network. Training/Learning: For example, if we want to train a network to add two input bits, each a 0 or a 1, we will need one output for the sum bit and one for the carry bit. Also, when the learning problem involves classification into more than two classes—for example, when learning to categorize images of handwritten digits—it is common to use one output unit for each class. Norvig I 731 Any desired functionality can be obtained by connecting large numbers of units into (possibly recurrent) networks of arbitrary depth. The problem was that nobody knew how to train such networks. This turns out to be an easy problem if we think of a network the right way: as a function hw(x) parameterized by the weights w. Norvig I 732 (…) we have the output expressed as a function of the inputs and the weights. (…) because the function represented by a network can be highly nonlinear—composed, as it is, of nested nonlinear soft threshold functions—we can see neural networks as a tool for doing nonlinear regression. Norvig I 736 Learning in neural networks: just as with >Bayesian networks, we also need to understand how to find the best network structure. If we choose a network that is too big, it will be able to memorize all the examples by forming a large lookup table, but will not necessarily generalize well to inputs that have not been seen before. Norvig I 737 Optimal brain damage: The optimal brain damage algorithm begins with a fully connected network and removes connections from it. After the network is trained for the first time, an information-theoretic approach identifies an optimal selection of connections that can be dropped. The network is then retrained, and if its performance has not decreased then the process is repeated. In addition to removing connections, it is also possible to remove units that are not contributing much to the result. Parametric models: A learning model that summarizes data with a set of parameters of fixed size (independent of the number of training examples) is called a parametric model. No matter how much data you throw at a parametric model, it won’t change its mind about how many parameters it needs. Nonparametric models: A nonparametric model is one that cannot be characterized by a bounded set of parameters. For example, suppose that each hypothesis we generate simply retains within itself all of the training examples and uses all of them to predict the next example. Such a hypothesis family would be nonparametric because the effective number of parameters is unbounded- it grows with the number of examples. This approach is called instance-based learning or memory-based learning. The simplest instance-based learning method is table lookup: take all the training examples, put them in a lookup table, and then when asked for h(x), see if x is in the table; (…). Norvig I 738 We can improve on table lookup with a slight variation: given a query xq, find the k examples that are nearest to xq. This is called k-nearest neighbors lookup. ((s) Cf. >Local/global/Philosophical theories.) Norvig I 744 Support vector machines/SVM: The support vector machine or SVM framework is currently the most popular approach for “off-the-shelf” supervised learning: if you don’t have any specialized prior knowledge about a domain, then the SVM is an excellent method to try first. Properties of SVMs: 1. SVMs construct a maximum margin separator - a decision boundary with the largest possible distance to example points. This helps them generalize well. 2. SVMs create a linear separating hyperplane, but they have the ability to embed the data into a higher-dimensional space, using the so-called kernel trick. 3. SVMs are a nonparametric method - they retain training examples and potentially need to store them all. On the other hand, in practice they often end up retaining only a small fraction of the number of examples - sometimes as few as a small constant times the number of dimensions. Norvig I 745 Instead of minimizing expected empirical loss on the training data, SVMs attempt to minimize expected generalization loss. We don’t know where the as-yet-unseen points may fall, but under the probabilistic assumption that they are drawn from the same distribution as the previously seen examples, there are some arguments from computational learning theory (…) suggesting that we minimize generalization loss by choosing the separator that is farthest away from the examples we have seen so far. Norvig I 748 Ensemble Learning: > Norvig I 757 Linear regression is a widely used model. The optimal parameters of a linear regression model can be found by gradient descent search, or computed exactly. A linear classifier with a hard threshold—also known as a perceptron—can be trained by a simple weight update rule to fit data that are linearly separable. In other cases, the rule fails to converge. Norvig I 758 Logistic regression replaces the perceptron’s hard threshold with a soft threshold defined by a logistic function. Gradient descent works well even for noisy data that are not linearly separable. Norvig I 760 History: The term logistic function comes from Pierre-Francois Verhulst (1804–1849), a statistician who used the curve to model population growth with limited resources, a more realistic model than the unconstrained geometric growth proposed by Thomas Malthus. Verhulst called it the courbe logistique, because of its relation to the logarithmic curve. The term regression is due to Francis Galton, nineteenth century statistician, cousin of Charles Darwin, and initiator of the fields of meteorology, fingerprint analysis, and statistical correlation, who used it in the sense of regression to the mean. The term curse of dimensionality comes from Richard Bellman (1961)(1). Logistic regression can be solved with gradient descent, or with the Newton-Raphson method (Newton, 1671(2); Raphson, 1690(3)). A variant of the Newton method called L-BFGS is sometimes used for large-dimensional problems; the L stands for “limited memory,” meaning that it avoids creating the full matrices all at once, and instead creates parts of them on the fly. BFGS are authors’ initials (Byrd et al., 1995)(4). The ideas behind kernel machines come from Aizerman et al. (1964)(5) (who also introduced the kernel trick), but the full development of the theory is due to Vapnik and his colleagues (Boser et al., 1992)(6). SVMs were made practical with the introduction of the soft-margin classifier for handling noisy data in a paper that won the 2008 ACM Theory and Practice Award (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995)(7), and of the Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) algorithm for efficiently solving SVM problems using quadratic programming (Platt, 1999)(8). SVMs have proven to be very popular and effective for tasks such as text categorization (Joachims, 2001)(9), computational genomics (Cristianini and Hahn, 2007)(10), and natural language processing, such as the handwritten digit recognition of DeCoste and Schölkopf (2002)(11). As part of this process, many new kernels have been designed that work with strings, trees, and other non-numerical data types. A related technique that also uses the kernel trick to implicitly represent an exponential feature space is the voted perceptron (Freund and Schapire, 1999(12); Collins and Duffy, 2002(13)). Textbooks on SVMs include Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor (2000)(14) and Schölkopf and Smola (2002)(15). A friendlier exposition appears in the AI Magazine article by Cristianini and Schölkopf (2002)(16). Bengio and LeCun (2007)(17) show some of the limitations of SVMs and other local, nonparametric methods for learning functions that have a global structure but do not have local smoothness. Ensemble learning is an increasingly popular technique for improving the performance of learning algorithms. Bagging (Breiman, 1996)(18), the first effective method, combines hypotheses learned from multiple bootstrap data sets, each generated by subsampling the original data set. The boosting method described in this chapter originated with theoretical work by Schapire (1990)(19). The ADABOOST algorithm was developed by Freund and Schapire Norvig I 761 (1996) (20)and analyzed theoretically by Schapire (2003)(21). Friedman et al. (2000)(22) explain boosting from a statistician’s viewpoint. Online learning is covered in a survey by Blum (1996)(23) and a book by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006)(24). Dredze et al. (2008)(25) introduce the idea of confidence-weighted online learning for classification: in addition to keeping a weight for each parameter, they also maintain a measure of confidence, so that a new example can have a large effect on features that were rarely seen before (and thus had low confidence) and a small effect on common features that have already been well-estimated. 1. Bellman, R. E. (1961). Adaptive Control Processes: A Guided Tour. Princeton University Press. 2. Newton, I. (1664-1671). Methodus fluxionum et serierum infinitarum. Unpublished notes 3. Raphson, J. (1690). Analysis aequationum universalis. Apud Abelem Swalle, London. 4. Byrd, R. H., Lu, P., Nocedal, J., and Zhu, C. (1995). A limited memory algorithm for bound constrained optimization. SIAM Journal on Scientific and Statistical Computing, 16(5), 1190-1208. 5. Aizerman, M., Braverman, E., and Rozonoer, L. (1964). Theoretical foundations of the potential function method in pattern recognition learning. Automation and Remote Control, 25, 821-837. 6. Boser, B., Guyon, I., and Vapnik, V. N. (1992). A training algorithm for optimal margin classifiers. In COLT-92. 7. Cortes, C. and Vapnik, V. N. (1995). Support vector networks. Machine Learning, 20, 273-297. 8. Platt, J. (1999). Fast training of support vector machines using sequential minimal optimization. In Advances in Kernel Methods: Support Vector Learning, pp. 185-208. MIT Press. 9. Joachims, T. (2001). A statistical learning model of text classification with support vector machines. In SIGIR-01, pp. 128-136. 10. Cristianini, N. and Hahn, M. (2007). Introduction to Computational Genomics: A Case Studies Approach. Cambridge University Press. 11. DeCoste, D. and Schölkopf, B. (2002). Training invariant support vector machines. Machine Learning, 46(1), 161–190. 12. Freund, Y. and Schapire, R. E. (1996). Experiments with a new boosting algorithm. In ICML-96. 13. Collins, M. and Duffy, K. (2002). New ranking algorithms for parsing and tagging: Kernels over discrete structures, and the voted perceptron. In ACL-02. 14. Cristianini, N. and Shawe-Taylor, J. (2000). An introduction to support vector machines and other kernel-based learning methods. Cambridge University Press. 15. Schölkopf, B. and Smola, A. J. (2002). Learning with Kernels. MIT Press. 16. Cristianini, N. and Schölkopf, B. (2002). Support vector machines and kernel methods: The new generation of learning machines. AIMag, 23(3), 31–41. 17. Bengio, Y. and LeCun, Y. (2007). Scaling learning algorithms towards AI. In Bottou, L., Chapelle, O., DeCoste, D., and Weston, J. (Eds.), Large-Scale Kernel Machines. MIT Press. 18. Breiman, L. (1996). Bagging predictors. Machine Learning, 24(2), 123–140. 19. Schapire, R. E. (1990). The strength of weak learnability. Machine Learning, 5(2), 197–227. 20. Freund, Y. and Schapire, R. E. (1996). Experiments with a new boosting algorithm. In ICML-96. 21. Schapire, R. E. (2003). The boosting approach to machine learning: An overview. In Denison, D. D., Hansen, M. H., Holmes, C., Mallick, B., and Yu, B. (Eds.), Nonlinear Estimation and Classification. Springer. 22. Friedman, J., Hastie, T., and Tibshirani, R. (2000). Additive logistic regression: A statistical view of boosting. Annals of Statistics, 28(2), 337–374. 23. Blum, A. L. (1996). On-line algorithms in machine learning. In Proc.Workshop on On-Line Algorithms, Dagstuhl, pp. 306–325. 24. Cesa-Bianchi, N. and Lugosi, G. (2006). Prediction, learning, and Games. Cambridge University Press. 25. Dredze, M., Crammer, K., and Pereira, F. (2008). Confidence-weighted linear classification. In ICML- 08, pp. 264–271. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Artworks | Eco | I 11 Artwork/Eco: an artwork is at the same time a trace of what it wanted to be and what it actually is. I 12 "Open work of art"/Eco: an "open work of art" is what A. Riegl called "artful" and Panofsky described it (securing it from idealistic suspicions) as the final and definitive sense. I 16 The model of the open work of art is independent of the actual existence as "openly" definable works of art. It is about a relationship with the recipient. I 36 Open work of art/Eco: only after the Romantic period did symbolism appear in the second half of the 19th century as a conscious poetics of the "open" work of art. This leads to an aura of the indefinite. I 60 Open work of art: every work of art, starting with rock paintings, is open to an infinite number of forms of reception. I 84 Openness/Eco: the impression of openness and totality does not have its reason in the objective stimulus, which is materially determined in itself. Not even in the subject, which is on its own accord disposed for all and no openness: I 85 It lies in the cognitive relationship in which possibilities are realized that are stimulated and directed by stimuli organized according to an aesthetic intention. There is also openness even if the artist does not strive for ambiguity but unambiguousness. I 89 Definition Openness/Eco: openness is an increase in information. >Art, >Information. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Artworks | Kant | Gadamer I 57 Artworks/Work of Art/Kant/Gadamer: difference to nature: With regard to the idea of an intelligible destiny of mankind, nature as beautiful nature gains a language that leads it to us.(1) Of course, the significance of art is also based on the fact that it appeals to us, that it presents man himself in his morally determined existence. But the products of art are only to appeal to us in this way - natural objects, on the other hand, are not to appeal to us in this way. It is precisely in this that the significant interest of natural beauty lies, that it is nevertheless able to make us aware of our moral destiny. >Interest/Kant. Art cannot convey to us this finding of the human being in unintentional reality. The fact that man meets himself in art is not a confirmation from another of his own self. GadamerVsKant: (...) [Kant] does not place the phenomenon of art below its appropriate standard. The advantage of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only the other side of the lack of a certain statement by natural beauty. Conversely, the advantage of art over natural beauty can be seen in the fact that the language of art is a demanding language that does not present itself freely and indefinitely to atmospheric interpretation, but addresses us in a meaningful and definite way. And it is the wonderful and mysterious thing about art that this particular claim is nevertheless not a shackle for our mind, but rather just opens up the scope of freedom in the play of our powers of cognition. KantVsVs: Kant does justice to this when he says(2) that art must be "regarded as nature", i.e. pleasing without betraying the compulsion of rules. Kant/Gadamer: We do not pay attention to the intentional correspondence of the portrayed person with known reality. We do not look at it to see who it resembles. We do not measure its sense of claim against a measure that is already well known to us, but on the contrary, this measure, which is "aesthetically extended" in an unlimited way, becomes "aesthetically extended".(3) Gadamer I 99 Artworks/Work of Art/Kant/Gadamer: If one is to take into account [the] criticism of the doctrine of unconscious productivity of the genius (>Artist/Gadamer), one is confronted anew with the problem which Kant had solved through the assignment of the transcendental function to the concept of genius. (>Genius/Kant, >Genius/Gadamer). What is a work of art, and how does it differ from a handcrafted product or even from a "concoction" (German: "Machwerk"), i.e. from something aesthetically inferior? For Kant and idealism the work of art defined itself as the work of genius. His distinction of being the perfectly successful and exemplary proved itself in that it offered pleasure and contemplation as well as an inexhaustible object of dwelling and interpretation. That the genius of creation corresponds to the genius of enjoyment can already be found in Kant's teaching of taste and genius, and even more explicitly in the teachings of K. Ph. Moritz and Goethe. >Taste/Kant, >Taste/Gadamer. 1. I.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1799, § 42 2. Ebenda, S. 179f. 3. Ebenda. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aspects | Searle | VI 169 Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true. Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make. There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect. VI 169/170 Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there. >Champagne example. The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions. For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer. For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect). Searle: this statement can also be true. II 75 Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.) Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus. If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect! II 76 ff Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Assertibility | Dummett | III (a) 35 Assertibility/Dummett: when dealing with variables, where a certain value is ignored it cannot be about truth but assertibility. - ((s) no proposition is uttered). III (c) 109 Justified Assertibility/Gettier: not any valid justification is sufficient, there must also be an appropriate relationship with the object. >Justification, >Assertibility conditions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Assertibility | Putnam | Rorty I 307 Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless (> de re / de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Putnam follows 3 trains of thought: 1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism. 3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers". Wright/truth/justified assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVsEquating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons: 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not. 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. E.g. idealization: an idealization is not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them. >Idealisation, >Meanging change, >Realism, >Internal realism, >Observation, >Obervation language, >Truth. --- Rorty VI 30 Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. >Pragmatism, >Dewey. PutnamVsRorty et al.: Rorty et al. ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". >Intentionality. Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed. --- Putnam I (c) 96 Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science (PutnamVsKuhn). >Truth/Peirce. If you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. >Incommensurability/Kuhn. I (e) 141 Truth/assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from Tarski's his truth-definition also follows assertibility. The probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. >Truth definition/Tarski, >Object language, >Meta language. I (i) 246 Truth/justified assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective". >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Assertibility | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 85 Language/Kripke's Wittgenstein: Tractatus: Meaning = truth condition. >Meaning, >Truth conditions, >Kripkes Wittgenstein. Problem: if we do not have a fact, we have no meanings anymore! >Facts, >States of affairs, >Nonfactualism. Wittgenstein, late(1): skeptical solution: assertibility conditions instead of truth conditions. >Truth conditions. IV 119f Kripke: the skeptical solution is logically independent of the hyper-skeptical thesis (of the impossibility of language in general) Stegmüller IV 96 Assertibility Conditions/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: this is about assertibility conditions of statements regarding obedience of rules. - But it would be wrong to set as right what seems right. Solution: compliance (namely prior to the rule, not rule prior to agreement). >Rules, >Rule following. 1. L. Wittgenstein. Philosophische Untersuchungen § 138-242. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Assertibility | Wright | I 26ff It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T. This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker. >Asymmetry, >Equivalence, >Implication. I 26 Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation. >Negation, >Justification. Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here. I 51 Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility. >Truth, cf. >Redundancy theory. A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa. >Conventions, cf. >Language use, >Language community. --- Field II 120 Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper. Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either. I 52ff Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless. >Timelessness. I 68ff Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Cf. >Justified assertibility. Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless. Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is metaphysically neutral. I 81ff Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.) I 102f Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor. >Morals. I 115ff Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this. >Mathematics, >Truth, >Discourse. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Assertibility Conditions | Soames | I 468 T-Def/Logical Constants/Tarski/Soames: Tarski himself said that his concept of truth cannot be used to give the meanings of the logical constants. >Logical constants, >Meaning, >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory, >Truth definition. Circumstances: the T-Definition says nothing about the assertibility conditions under which a sentence can be claimed. >Assertions, >Assertibility, >Sentences, >Circumstances. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Assertions | Brandom | I 472 Fact/Assertion/Brandom: if claim is understood as an act, then stronger sense in which true statement equals a fact - in the same sense, false statements express their assertible content. >Content, >Facts. I 477 Representation/Assertion/Brandom: Asserting means talking about objects and saying how they are - therefore definitely representational dimension. >Predication, >Representation. I 751 Assertion/Saying/Asserting/Brandom: one can infer "asserts" from "says" - but not vice versa - ((s) "says" must be verbatim but not defining) - "asserts" must not be reproduced verbatim, it is defining at the same time. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Assertions | Geach | I 256 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code style": misleading that p does not have to be asserted! - E.g. "if p, then q; but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: Thesis: antecedent and consequent are no assertions. >Antecedent/consequent. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. >Conditional, >Statement. Ryle: here, the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p" as the "code style" suggests, but rather an "inference ticket", a "license for the inference": "p, therefore q". >Logical connectives, >Inference, cf. >Implication, >Conclusion. Solution/Geach: it is about propositions, not assertions. >Propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Assertions | McDowell | II 52 Assertion/McDowell: what is said with the assertion, cannot deviate from what is said about it in a systematic theory of language that includes it. >Expression, >Assertion, >Meta language, >Object language, >Statement, cf. >Redundancy theory. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Assertions | Tugendhat | I 244 Assertion/Asymmetry/Tugendhat: the affirmation or negation both times refer to something on the part of the speaker, not on the part of the listener. Therefore, the situation does not correspond to the stimulus-reaction scheme. >Situations, >Stimuli, >Communication, >Negation. I 273 Game/Profit/Tugendhat: is important because it is about the motivation to take over one or the other side in the game - mixing of assertion and responsibility. >Scorekeeping, >Robert Brandom, >Attribution, >Predication, cf. >Game-theoretical semantics. I 279 Assertion/Object/Truth//Tugendhat: what is characteristic about the assertoric speech is that it is based on truth and therefore it is object-based - we can call these objects "facts" or "thoughts" or "propositions" - unlike Frege : not truth as an object >Meaning/Frege, >Judgments. I 281ff Assertion is a necessary part of meaning, because the truth conditions are part of the meaning. >assertion stroke, judgment stroke/Frege. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Assertive Force | Assertive force: potential of an assertion for changing inferences in which an assertion appears. This is not primarily about truth. See also speech act theory, speech acts, force. |
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| Assertive Force | Brandom | I 142 Force/Brandom: assertive force is important because the word "true" is not important, but the assertive force with which the sentence is pronounced - difference: whether one refers to an object, or says something about it, i.e. states a fact. >Facts, >Judgments. I 142 Assertive force instead of the word "true" - reason: assertive force has inferential power - derivation scheme, not substantive fact - force: pragmatic significance. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Asymmetry | Arrow | Mause I 166 Asymmetry/Information Markets/Arrow: Market participants are often confronted not only with a lack of information of the type incomplete information, but also with a lack of information of the type asymmetric information. (1)(2) Example: A buyer is less informed about a used car than the seller. Terminology: this is described in the literature with the terms "principal" (seller, superior; holds more information) and "agent" (buyer, employee; holds less information). Problem: a) a buyer who is not aware of his information deficit will be disadvantaged, b) a buyer who is aware of this deficit may not enter into a contractual relationship. See Information/Arrow. 1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53, (5) , 1963, p. 941– 973. 2. G. A. Akerlof, The market for ‚Lemons‘: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3) 1970 p. 488– 500. |
EconArrow I Kenneth J. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Asymmetry | Chalmers | I 101 Asymmetry/epistemic asymmetry/Chalmers: if we had all the physical facts about the world, the existence of consciousness would not follow from them. >Facts, >Consciousness. I 102 The fact that there is consciousness at all comes first-hand from my experience in the first person, not from any external observation. All that could be inferred from the known physical and biological facts is that there are people who claim to have a consciousness. Eliminativism/Chalmers: is an irrational position for us only because of our own personal experience. Epistemic asymmetry/Chalmers: is that we have insights about our consciousness only from our own consciousness. This asymmetry does not apply to other economies, other lives, etc. Reason: these are supervening logically on the physical. >Supervenience, >Epistemology. Consciousness: If it were logically supervenient on the physical, the epistemic asymmetry would not exist. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Asymmetry | Habermas | IV 405 Asymmetry/Legitimation/Power/Money/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons ignores the asymmetry, which is that trust in the power system must be secured at a higher level than trust in the monetary system. The institutions of private civil law should ensure the functioning of money transactions conducted via markets in the same way as the office organisation should ensure the exercise of power. >Power, >Money, >T. Parsons. However, this also requires an advance of trust, which means not only "compliance" (actual compliance with the law) but "obligation" (obligation based on recognition of normative validity claims). This asymmetry has always been linked to socialist concerns about the organisational power of capital owners, which is only secured under private law. The explanation of this asymmetry leads to the question of the conditions for the institutionalisation capacity of media. >Institutionalisation/Parsons. Solution: The disadvantage of one side in standard situations, which is reflected in the power code, can be compensated by the reference to collectively desired goals. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Atomism | Russell | I 129 Atomism/Logic/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: cannot work with atomic propositions alone, because the truth can only be known empirically. >Atomic sentence, >Foudation, >Truth value. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 127 Existence/Russell: what things exist in Russell's view? Atomic facts and absolutely simple individuals. (>Logical Atomism). >Atomism. Logical Atomism: an atomic fact consists of one or more simple individuals of a certain quality, or individuals who are part of a certain relation. >Relation, >Individuals, >Individual constant. Atomism/Russell: a statement about an atomic fact does not contain bound variables or propositional connectives. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atoms | Quine | IX 7f Atomic schemas: E.g. "Fxy", "Gx" etc: can represent any number of complex statements. I 218 Atomic Facts/Quine/Cresswell: "Quine has no interest in a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of all others. Quine: correct. See also >Atomism/Quine. XIII 12 Atom/Atoms/Quine: Worlds/Possible Worlds/Best World/Leibniz/Quine: according to Leibniz we are blessed with the "best of the worlds". But "the best" according to what criteria? He gives a hint: Def Perfection/perfect/Leibniz/Quine: wealth of purposes and economy of means. The number of components and forces with which the observed wealth of the world is attainable must be as small as possible. Science: similar procedure. Theory/Quine: is always more complicated than you want, but the scientist is committed to his/her stubborn data and does what he/she can. Leibniz/Quine: was himself a scientist, so he came up with it. Atomism/Atom/Democritus/Leukipp/Quine: also their atomism was motivated by the pursuit of economy. They limited the possible variability of the building blocks of nature. The atoms differed only in shape and size. XIII 13 Point event/four-dimensionalism/space-time points/Quine: pro: 1. because it turned out that the basic building blocks (quarks, etc.) are not as uniform as one had hoped from the atoms. 2. because there are problems identifying a particle from one moment to another (identity in time, temporal identity, elementary particles). Individuality/Particle Physics/Quine: the statistical interchangeability of particles threatens their individuality. Atom/Atomism/Quine: but which decisive move should make a theory atomistic anyway? XIII 14 Solution/Quine: Thesis: there are an infinite number of particles, but not an infinite number of types of particles. Identity/elementary particles/species/Quine: particles of the same species play an identical role within the laws of theory. Only this allows the theory to be suitable for measuring information. Def point event/Quine: are atoms whose types are the different states in which a point can be, according to prevailing physics. The atoms are the minimal space-time localizations and the species are the few things that can happen in such a place. Point/Linguistics/Atom/Quine: for linguists the point is the phoneme. Not the phonemes themselves, (their sound is individual to each speaker) but their classifiability! Def Phonem/Quine: is not a single sound, but a type of sound. They are then equivalent for all purposes in the particular language, even if they are not phonetically identical! Atoms/Speeche/Quine: Atoms fall under phonemes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Attachment Theory | Cultural Psychology | Upton I 58 Attachment Theory/Cultural Psychology/Upton: cross-cultural research has highlighted variations in attachment classifications, even in Western cultures (van Ijzendoorn and Kroonenberg, 1988)(1). >Strange Situation/Attachment Theory. Ratios of Secure (%)/ Insecure-avoidant (%) / Insecure-resistant (%) – patterns of attachment: USA: 65 – 21 - 14 Germany: 57 – 35 - 8 Japan: 68 – 26 - 27 UK: 75 – 22 – 3(1) Upton I 59 However, in each country the majority of attachments are rated secure and this has been demonstrated in other studies (e.g. Thompson, 2006)(2). This is often taken as evidence that the meaning of attachment relationships is universal and cultural variations simply illustrate how different caregiving patterns lead to varying percentages of secure and insecure attachments. Secure/insecure attachment/Interpretation: another interpretation of this data is that what qualifies as secure or insecure attachment varies across cultures. Japan: In Japan, for example, mothers respond differently to their babies when compared to Western mothers (Rothbaum et al., 2000)(3). Japanese mothers usually have much closer contact with their infants and strive to anticipate their infants’ needs rather than react to their infants’ cries as Western mothers tend to do. Social routines and independent exploration are given less emphasis than in the West. VsAinsworth: The Strange Situation has been criticised for being ethnocentric in its approach and assumptions, as it does not take into account the Upton I 60 diversity of socialising contexts that exist in the world. Cultural values influence the nature on attachment. (Cole and Tan, 2007)(4). Africa: in Nigeria, for example, Hausa infants are traditionally cared for by the grandmother and siblings as well as the mother and tend to develop attachments to a large number of carers (Harkness and Super, 1995)(5). Western countries: In Western cultures, increasing numbers of children spend time being looked after by someone other than the mother – either with relatives or in day care (Hochschild and Machong, 1989)(6). Might this influence their response to maternal separation? What does this then suggest about all those children classified as insecurely attached? 1. van Ijzendoorn, M. and Kroonenberg, P. (1988) Cross cultural patterns of attachment: a meta-analysis of the Strange Situation. Child Development, 59: 147—56. 2. Thompson, R.A. (2006) The development of the person, in Eisenberg, N (ed.) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development (6th edn). New York: Wiley. 3. Rothbaum, F, Weisz, J, Pott, M, Miyake, K and Morelli, G (2000) Attachment and culture: security in the United States and Japan. American Psychologist, 55: 1093—1104. 4. Cole, P.M. and Tan, P.Z. (2007) Emotion socialization from a cultural perspective, in Grusec, J.E. and Hastings, P.D. (eds) Handbook of Socialization. New York: Guilford. 5. Harkness, S and Super, CM (1995) Culture and parenting, in Bornstein, MH (ed.) Handbook of Parenting, Vol. 3. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 6. Hochschild, A and Machong, A (1989) The Second Shift: Working parents and the revolution at home. New York: Viking Penguin. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Attention | Gifford | Haslam I 233 Attention/Gifford/Hamilton: Thesis: things that are most likely to grab attention are the things that stand out or are distinctive, and the most distinctive things of all are not those that are old and common (and that have thus been seen before) but rather those that stand out by virtue of being novel and rare. (Hamilton and Gifford 1976(1)). Minorities/Gifford/Hamilton:When we think of groups whose members are encountered infrequently, for most people, those are minority groups. And if this is the case, then, as they go about their lives, those people should pay extra attention to minority group members. >Simplification/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology, >Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton. 1. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Attention | Hamilton | Haslam I 233 Attention/Gifford/Hamilton: Thesis: things that are most likely to grab attention are the things that stand out or are distinctive, and the most distinctive things of all are not those that are old and common (and that have thus been seen before) but rather those that stand out by virtue of being novel and rare. (Hamilton and Gifford 1976(1)). Minorities/Gifford/Hamilton:When we think of groups whose members are encountered infrequently, for most people, those are minority groups. And if this is the case, then, as they go about their lives, those people should pay extra attention to minority group members. >Simplification/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology, >Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton. 1. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in intergroup perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407. Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Attitudes | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 36 Attitudes/psychological theories: Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)(1), and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes and Behavior/psychological theories, >Dispositions, >Measurements, >Method. Problem: verbally expressed attitudes may not be an accurate representation of people’s genuine feelings. The recommended solution is to try to measure implicit attitudes. >Self-description. Unlike explicit attitudes, such as those that individuals are aware of consciously and that are assessed by asking individuals to express their attitudes overtly in a questionnaire, implicit attitudes are assumed to be activated automatically in response to an attitude object and to guide behaviour unless overridden by controlled processes. In other words, implicit attitudes exist outside of conscious awareness or outside of conscious control. Solution: Indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)(2) and evaluative priming (Fazio et al., 1995)(3) rely on response times to measure evaluative biases in relation to different attitude objects. These measures rest on the idea that exposure to a concept or stimulus (e.g., a picture of members of your own racial group) activates concepts in memory (e.g., a feeling that members of my group are generally positive), and then facilitates a positive response to related concepts (e.g., a positive word such as ‘good’) while simultaneously inhibiting responses to unrelated concepts (e.g., a negative word such as ‘bad’). Haslam I 37 (…) the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes raises interesting questions about the relationship between these constructs. Are implicit and explicit attitudes tapping distinct concepts such that people can hold opposing implicit and explicit attitudes towards the same attitude object (e.g., as suggested by Devine, 1989)(4)? Or do implicit and explicit attitudes reflect a single underlying evaluation, such that the only difference between them is the extent to which they are affected by conscious processes (e.g., Fazio, 2001)(5)? (…) reviews of the relations between implicit and explicit attitudes have typically found only modest correlations (e.g., r = .24; Hoffman et al., 2005)(6). However, there is considerable variability in the strength of this relationship (with some rs > .40 and others < .10) suggesting that additional factors, such as the desire to present the self positively and the strength of one’s attitudes, are important (Nosek, 2005)(7). Expression of attitudes: “Verbal expressions of liking are subject to social desirability biases … , physiological reactions may reflect arousal or other reactions instead of evaluation … , and response latencies may be indicative not of personal attitudes but of cultural stereotypes.” (Ajzen and Gilbert Cote 2008(8): p. 289) >Culture, >Stereotypes. Haslam I 38 (…) other research points to the importance of attitude accessibility (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is frequently invoked or expressed; Fazio, 1990)(9) and social identity (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is associated with a salient group membership; Terry and Hogg, 1996)(10). Measuring attitudes: (…) there is now widespread use of tasks, such as the IAT (see above) , to measure implicit attitudes. However, just as Wicker (1969) did in his review of the literature on explicit attitudes, it is important to ask whether implicit attitudes actually predict behaviour and, if they do, do they predict it any better than explicit attitudes? See the review by Greenwald et al. (2009)(11). 1. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. 2. Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E. and Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998) ‘Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1464–80. 3. Fazio, R.H., Jackson, J.R., Dunton, B.C. and Williams, C.J. (1995) ‘Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 1013–27. 4. Devine, P.G. (1989) ‘Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 754–65. 5. Fazio, R.H. (2001) ‘On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview’, Cognition and Emotion, 15: 115–41. 6. Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H. and Schmitt, M. (2005) ‘A meta-analysis on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-report measures’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 1369–85. 7. Nosek, B.A. (2005) ‘Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134: 565–84. 8. Ajzen, I. and Gilbert Cote, N. (2008) ‘Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour’, in W.D. Crano and R. Prislin (eds), Attitudes and Attitude Change. London: Psychology Press. pp. 289–311. 9. Fazio, R.H. (1990) ‘Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behaviour: The MODE model as an integrative framework’, in M.P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 23. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 75–109. 10. Terry, D.J. and Hogg, M.A. (1996) ‘Group norms and the attitude–behaviour relationship: A role for group identification’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22: 776–93. 11. Greenwald, A.G., Poehlman, A.T., Uhlmann, E.L. and Banaji, M.R. (2009) ‘Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97: 17–41. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Attitudes and Behavior | LaPiere | Haslam I 27 Attitudes and behavior/hospitality study/LaPiere: Initially, researchers simply assumed that there would be a strong correspondence between attitudes and action. Indeed, one of the reasons that individuals are interested in knowing the attitudes of others is precisely because of this assumption: if you know how a person feels about an issue, then this should be a good basis for predicting (and perhaps understanding) how they are going to behave in relation to that issue. (…) a single piece of research (…) produced a particularly dramatic disconfirmation of the attitude–behaviour link: Richard LaPiere’s (1934)(1) hospitality study. LaPiere found a strong divergence in the rejection of strangers depending on whether he asked hotels for rooms in writing or spoke in person at hotels accompanied by Chinese. Def Attitude/LaPiere: ‘a social attitude is a behaviour pattern [exhibited in response to] … designated social situations’ (1934(1): p. 230). In other words, he reasoned that one can only determine how an individual feels about a particular attitude object by observing the individual’s response in relevant social situations. Haslam I 28 [LaPiere’s] rationale for looking at hotel policies was that, for economic reasons, hotel proprietors might be motivated to reflect the broader attitudes of society at the time – in particular, wanting to ensure that their White clientele were not offended by the hotel’s policy of admitting or rejecting non-White guests. >Attitudes and Behavior/psychological theories, >Attitudes/psychological theories. 1. LaPiere, R.T. (1934) ‘Attitudes versus actions’, Social Forces, 13: 230–7. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Attributes | Quine | VII (d) 75ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute may eventually be introduced in a second step: e.g. "squareness" according to geometrical definition, but then the name also requires substitutability, i.e. an abstract entity > Universals. X 7ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute corresponds to properties, predicates are not the same as attributes. >Predicates/Quine. IX 178ff Attribute/(s): an attribute corresponds to the quantity of those x for which a particular condition applies: {x: x ε a} all objects that are mortal. Predicate: "x is mortal", is not a quantity, but a propositional function. The denomination forms refer "φx", "φ(x,y)" to the attribution. >Propositional Function/Quine. XII 38 Attributary Attitude/Quine: E.g. hunting, needing, catching, fearing, missing. Important to note here is that e.g. "lion hunt" does not require lions as individuals but as a species - > Introduction of properties. IX 177 Attributes/Ontology/Russell: for Russell, the universe consisted of individuals, attributes and relations of them, attributes and relations of such attributes and relations, etc. IX 178f Extensionality/Quine: extensionality is what distinguishes attributes and classes. >Extensionality/Quine So Russell has more to do with attributes than with classes. Two attributes can be of different order and are therefore certainly different, and yet the things that each have one or the other attribute are the same. For example the attribute "φ(φ^x <> φy) where "φ" has the order 1, an attribute only from y. For example the attribute ∀χ(χ^x <> χy), where "χ" has order 2, again one attribute only from y, but one attribute has order 2, the other has order 3. (> Classes/ >Quantities/ >Properties). XIII 22 Class/set/property/Quine: whatever you say about a thing seems to attribute a property to it. Property/Attribute/Tradition/Quine: in earlier times one used to say that an attribute is only called a property if it is specific to that thing. (a peculiarity of this object is...). New: today these two expressions (attribute, property) are interchangeable. "Attribute"/Quine: I do not use this term. Instead I use "property". Identity/equality/difference/properties/Quine: if it makes sense to speak of properties, then it also makes sense to speak of their equality or difference. Problem: but it does not make sense! Problem: if everything that has this one property, also has the other. Shall we say that it is simply the same quality? Very well. But people do not talk like that. For example to have a heart/kidney: is not the same, even if it also applies to the same living beings. Coextensivity/Quine: two properties are not sufficient for their identity. Identity/properties/possible solution: is there a necessary coextensiveness? >Coextensive/Quine Vs: Necessity is too unclear as a term. Properties/Quine: We only get along so well with the term property because identity is not so important for their identification or differentiation. XIII 23 Solution/Quine: we are talking about classes instead of properties, then we have also solved the problem e.g. heart/kidneys. Classes/Quine: are defined by their elements. That is the way of saying it, but unwisely, because the misunderstanding might arise that the elements cause the classes in a different way than objects cause their. Def Singleton/Singleton/Single Class: class with only one element. Def Class/Quine: (in useful use of the word): is simply a property in the everyday sense, without distinguishing coextensive cases. XIII 24 Class/Russell/Quine: it struck like a bomb when Russell discovered the platitude that each containment condition (condition of containment, element relationship) establishes a class. (see paradoxes, see impredictiveness). Russell's Paradox/Quine: applies to classes as well as to properties. It also shatters the platitude that anything said about a thing attributes a property. Properties/Classes/Quine: all restrictions we impose on classes to avoid paradoxes must also be imposed on properties. Property/Quine: we have to tolerate the term in everyday language. Mathematics: here we can talk about classes instead, because coextensiveness is not the problem. (see Definition, > Numbers). Properties/Science/Quine: in the sciences we do not talk about properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Attributes | Saucier | Corr I 380 Attributes/Person/Saucier: Attributes [of a person] are labelled variously as traits, or characteristics, or qualities – whether of personality, of character, or of temperament. In English usage the term ‘personality’ is the broader concept; character attributes tend to be those associated with volition and morality, whereas temperament attributes tend to be associated with emotional, attentional and motor activity and reactivity (Rothbart and Bates 1998)(1). >Personality, >Personality traits, >Temperament. One approach to defining personality focuses on attributes. In this approach, personality is a particular set of predications, that is, statements about a subject or entity. Person-description is predication where the entity is a person, and both trait descriptors and situation descriptors are predicates. [There is a] continuum of predicate types ranging from the most static to the most dynamic. Corr I 381 As properties, personality attributes are qualities of a human entity, more mutable than category memberships, yet less transitory and dynamic than states, processes and actions. Personality attributes are usefully compared to the physical properties of colour. Colours likewise denote attributes without indicating the essential category-defining nature of an entity. >Personality/Saucier, >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. 1. Rothbart, M. K. and Bates, J. E. 1998. Temperament, in W. Damon (Series ed.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional and personality development, 5th edn, pp. 105–76. New York: Wiley Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Attribution | Chisholm | I 15/16 Chisholm: Direct Attribution/Direct Ascription: self-ascription, only security, basis of any reference - indirect attribution: to someone or something else. >Self-ascription. I 50 Chisholm: direct attribution: instead of self-attribution (exception E.g. Mach) - P1 self-identity from direct attribution - P2 what is being attributed is a property - D1 Meaning: direct attribution - indirect attribution: to someone else, derived from direct attribution. - basic concept: the property of being-F so that x attributes it directly to y - ((s) from this should follow: x = y). >Self-identification. I 51 Any kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-ascription - 1) The meaning person must be able to turn themselves into an object, 2) He must understand propositions and facts - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attributions. >Reference. I 133 But not yet self-awareness: this also requires the knowledge that it is the subject itself to which the properties are attributed. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 53 Indirect Attribution/Chisholm: about identifying relations: there is a certain Rel R which is so that you are the thing to which I stand in R - (irreversible) - in that, I directly attribute a specific two-sided property to myself: that the thing to which I stand in R, is a thing that is F (E.g. wears a hat) - but this second part does not need to be right. Confusion/Forgery/Chisholm: attributes properties to one of which it is thought that they belong to the other. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Attribution | Cresswell | I 129 Attribution/Variables/Constants/Possible Worlds/Stalnaker/Cresswell: Stalnaker uses a value attribution which is world-dependent. I.e. a term t can be attributed to an individual in a world and a different individual in another possible world. Variables/Stalnaker: refer to the same thing in all possible worlds. Variables/constants/Hintikka: also Hintikka treats variables and constants differently: because of his restriction of quantifiers we can talk about the same thing in different possible worlds. >Cross world identity. (Camps: LewisVsHintikka). II 159 Propositional attitudes/attribution/that-Sentence/truth Conditions/content/Cresswell: thesis: the truth conditions of sentences with propositional attitudes are determined by the content of the that-clauses - that all it is about for me. >That-clause, >That/Cresswell, >Propositional attitudes, >Propositions, >Truth conditions. II 160 More than merely the truth conditions of the complementary sentences are involved in the attribution of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Attribution | Field | II 44 Behavior/attribution/ascription/Field: a claim about behavior is not simply a statement about behavior, but how behavior is caused. >Behaviorism. Belief ascription/Martians/Field: to alien beings, we cannot attribute sentences. Problem: we cannot decide whether a functional theory of their beliefs requires internal representations as well. >Other minds, >Representation, >Inner states, >Mental states, >Causation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Attribution | Millikan | Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 II 212 Animal/Thinking/Belief/propositional content/Millikan: what would really be necessary would not be a translation into Englisch, but an explicit description of the different representation systems that animals actually use. There are numerous possibilities between the propositional thinking of the human and the absence of any thought. >World/thinking, >Language and thought, >Animal language, >Representation. --- Millikan I 219 Indefinite Description/Belief Attribution/Millikan: E.g.: "Ralph believes that someone is a spy": this is, of course, ambiguous. A) directly as indicative by its own type on the belief type that "someone is a spy". That is, Ralph says this in his inner. B) the dependent sentence "someone is a spy" can be read as a form of belief, with a gap. "___ is a spy". N.B.: in this reading, Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy ((s) de re). Moved function: this moves the "someone" to the outside of the sentence. "He": its moved function is referential in this context. >Reference, >de re, >de dicto. I 220 Both readings are about a relation between Ralph and a belief type. In case (b), this type is not completely determined. >The Ralph case/Quine. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Attribution | Prior | I 135 Attribution/Prior: an attribution really constitutes a relationship. But not: to believe that ... : This is no relation! >Relations theory, >Relations. Otherwise to believe something of Cicero would simultaneously have to be to also believe something of Tullius! >Beliefs, >Intensions, >"About", >Reference, >Names, >Intentionality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Attributive/referential | Brandom | I 681 Attributive/Referential/Brandom: It is about the listener, not the speaker. - That is a matter of the significance which is assigned to a Tokening, not the significance based on its type. - Champagne e.g.: there must be an expression from the perspective of the listener, which the speaker might have used as well. - > de re / de dicto. --- II 52/53 Verb: e.g. "to march": semantic interpretant: Function of object on possible worlds - adverb: E.g. "slow" function of (functions of objects on possible worlds) to (functions of objects on possible worlds) - then attributive: here the inference from "aF!" to "aF slow" is alright - not attributive: not alright e.g. "in someone's imagination". |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Attributive/referential | Burge | Frank I 702/703 Content/BurgeVsDonellan/intentionality/intentional Content/Reference/referential/attributive/Burge: E.g. If the person I regard as amiable is not my aunt, then I am not mistaken in what I think about the person, no mistake with regard to the intentional act and content. >Actions, >Content, >Intentions. The authority [of the first person] concerns those aspects of thought which have intentional qualities. For me, this is the only aspect of the content of a thought. Cf. >Incorrigibility. >First Person. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Attributive/referential | Chisholm | I 89 Attributive Meaning/Chisholm: the property of being-F is the attributive meaning of the expression T in a language L if it is true for every object that 1) it is only designated with it if it has that property, 2) every speaker then assumes the property. I 90 Name: Important Argument: not valid for names. >Proper names, >Reference, >Meaning. I 108 Annemary has no attributive meaning, therefore there is no property of "loving Annemary." >Ontology/Chisholm. II 112 Referential/Attributive/Brandl: based on reports: only attributive - in addition, there are still the cases of "whoever it is" - according to this, both, ref and att, are based on a de-re belief - i.e. we cannot say that att only covers one area that is only possible with de-dicto use. II 112 Attributive/Brandl: works only with de dicto-use, not if the speaker knows the object - whoever it is: "area" does not work: neither seen object nor from report - distinction ref/att is to be made within de-re statements - but we must always know what role the reference plays in the concrete case. II 120 Referential/Donnellan/Brandl: here, the speaker must not only know what the object designated by him is, but he must also know it - only then belief de-re "of the smallest spy" possible. II 123 Contradiction to the above: only ref. if the speaker can take from reports of others who it is about. II 126 Referential is the basic form of every reference - BrandlVs: this is the reductionist variant. II 125 Attributive/Brandl: here, the "directedness" of the description function depends on the expressions - (borderline case) - with that, the speaker refers to an object, because he knows that he is also the only one to fulfill another description - ( "epistemically close": "epistemic familiarity": even without acquaintance, by source of information - then knowledge possible that it is one and the same, from acquaintance and from description.) >Description. II Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Attributive/referential | Donnellan | I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Attributive/referential | Searle | IV 101 Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: attributive includes relative expressions such as "large" or "hot". Searle: we require background. All tall women are similar in terms of height. Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. IV 161 Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F. You can then also report with other expressions than "the F". Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed. Attributive: the statement can then not be true. IV 164 Donnellan: E.g. "The winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about. Referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. IV 165ff Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object. Primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination). Secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions. >">Truth condition, >Aspects/Searle. The Champagne example even works if water is in the glass. Searle: then the statement may also be true. The meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. IV 175 Referential/Searle: the referential brings the secondary aspect. Attributive: brings the primary aspect. IV 176 Both readings can be intensional and extensional. >Intension, >Extension. IV 175 What is meant is decisive. Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, a sentence is not (what was said literally). >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Speaker intention. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Authority | Hart | Gaus I 201 Authority/Hart/Morris: What is crucial to note about these rationales is that they implicitly understand sanctions to be secondary. Coercion and force are thus rationalized but only as supplementary measures. And this is as it should be: the law's primary appeal is to its authority. Hart: Hart notes this early in his discussion of command theories of law: 'To command is characteristically to exercise authority over men, not power to inflict harm, and though it may be combined with threats of harm a command is primarily an appeal not to fear but to respect for authority' (1994(1): 20). Authorities guide behaviour by providing reasons for action to their subjects. Something is an authority in this sense only if its directives are meant to be reasons for action (see: Raz, 1979; 1986(2); Green, 1988(3)). One does not understand law and, more generally, states if one does not see coercion and force as supplementary to authority. Coercion and force are needed when the state's authority is unappreciated, defective, or absent. >Sanctions/Morris, >State/Morris, >Coercion/Morris. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Raz, Joseph (1979) The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon. 3. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Authority | Rawls | I 462 Authority/Morality/Rawls: Rawls derives the social justification of authority from the structure of the family. He assumes that the sense of justice is gradually acquired by the younger members of society. >Family, >Customs/Morality. I 463 Additional assumption: the basic structure of a well-ordered society contains the family in some way. Children are the first recipients of the legitimate authority of their parents. At first, the child does not have the knowledge or understanding to challenge authority. Therefore, there can be no reasonable doubt about the parental disposition. Parents: we further assume that the parents love the child and the child comes to trust the parents. >Society/Rawls. Child love/Rousseau: Thesis: the child starts to love the parents only when they show love towards him(1). Child/Rawls: his behaviour is ultimately determined by certain instincts and needs. >Stages of development. I 464 The love of the child cannot be explained rationally and instrumentally: it does not serve the child as a means of achieving purposes. Otherwise, it could behave as if it loved the parents, but then its behavior would not cause its original needs to be transformed. Rawls: There are intermediate stages on the way to reflecting parental feelings: the child becomes aware of its own value as a person, it feels gratitude for what more powerful persons impose on it, it experiences parental care as unconditional; the parents' pleasure in his spontaneous expressions is not dependent on disciplined following of instructions. This is how trust is formed. In this way, the child is able to train and test additional skills. This increases its self-confidence. During this process, the child's affection for his or her parents also grows. It connects the persons of the parents with its successes. Love: how does the love of the child show? In doing so, we must take account of the situation in which it is confronted with authority. It cannot protest rationally. I 465 Feelings of guilt/child/Rawls: while the child tries to expand its sphere of action, it encounters resistance from the parents who accept it, first of all, because it assumes that they are based on unconditional parental love. I assume that feelings of guilt are distinguished from fear and anger(2). I 466 Authority/Child/Development/Rawls: The child's sense of authority then consists of being dispositioned to certain behaviors, without orientation towards rewards or punishments, following certain principles that may seem arbitrary to it. It then wants to act in accordance with the powerful people it loves and trusts. It concludes that they show a behavior that characterizes a person who wants to become itself. >Person, >Intersubjectivity. 1. Cf. J. J. Rousseau, Emile, (London, 1908) p. 174. 2. Cf. E. E. Maccoby, „Moral Values and Behavior in Childhood“, in Socialization and Society, ed. J. A. Clausen (Boston, 1968), M. L. Hoffman, (1970) „Moral Development, pp. 282-319. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Autism | Baron-Cohen | Slater I 150 Autism/ToM/Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen: In order to test their hypothesis that children with autism lack a theory of mind (>Theory of Mind/Dennett, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories), Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)(1) presented this task to 20 children with autism, 14 children with Down’s syndrome (DS), and 27 typically developing (TD) children. In line with their predictions, they found that as many as 16 of the 20 children with autism failed the task whereas children with Down’s syndrome and TD children passed it 86% and 85% of the time, respectively. The results were all the more striking given that average intelligence levels in the autism group exceeded both that of the DS and of the TD group and that every participant in the autism group succeeded in answering both control questions. The authors interpreted these results as evidence for a selective impairment in mentalistic reasoning in autism, independently of general intelligence or general reasoning abilities. In other words, the reason why participants in the autism group fail the belief question is that they are unable to grasp that Sally’s belief about where the marble is hidden is different from their own knowledge of where the marble really is: they lack the ability to represent other people’s mental states. >False-Belief Task/Happé. Slater I 152 VsBaron-Cohen: 1) The ToM account does not provide a full account auf autism. 2) ToM deficits are not specific to autism, 3) ToM deficits are not universal in autism. There are now theories about the non-social features of autism, including restricted repertoire of interests, insistence on sameness, and peaks of abilities (e.g., enhanced rote memory, higher prevalence of savant skills, increased perception of pitch etc.). >Autism/psychological theories. It is important to note, however, that these first two criticisms are problematic only If one considers that there ought to be a single explanation for all the symptoms found in ASD. Slater I 153 If (…) one considers, that such a unitary explanation is unlikely to exist, absence of specificity and lack of explanatory power for non-social features of autism are no longer issues. >Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen, >Autism/psychological theories. 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Autonomy | Feyerabend | I 43 Principle of Autonomy/Feyerabend: collecting the facts for examination purposes is the only thing left for the scientist to do. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether alternatives to the theory under consideration are looked at. Principle of the relative autonomy of facts. (versus theories). >Theories, >Facts. The principle does not mean that the discovery and description of facts is entirely theory-independent, but that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether alternatives to this theory are taken into account. >Discoveries, >Empirical content. ((s) I.e. that facts are autonomous, independent of theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: this principle is far too simple a point of view. Facts and theories are much more closely linked than the principle of autonomy wants to admit. E.g. it is known today that the Brownian particles are a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the second law of thermodynamics. (Henning GenzVs: that is not true.) Could this relationship between movement and theory have been shown or directly discovered? Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been discovered in this way? 2) Could it have been shown to disprove the 2nd law of thermodynamics? ((s) Nonsense: to »observe« relevance). >Relevance. Each thermometer is subject to fluctuations which are the same as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a completely different way: with the help of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of the Brownian movement. In this refutation the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the larger framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Autonomy | Kant | Rawls I 252 Autonomy/Kant/Rawls: Kant meant, as I understand it, that a person acts autonomously when the principles of his/her actions are chosen by him/her as the most adequate expression of his/her nature as a free and rational being. These principles were not chosen on the basis of their social status or talents, or in view of a particular community or the prospect of certain results. >Principles/Kant, >Morals/Kant. Rawls: the veil of ignorance (in my theory) robs the persons in the initial situation of a society to be established anyway of all information about their future position, which at the same time guarantees that they decide as free and equally rational persons. Rawls: this adds several things to Kant's concept: e. g. that the chosen principles are applied not only to individuals, but to society as a whole. Nevertheless, I think we'll stay close to Kant. Principles/Rawls: when people act according to these principles, they express their nature as free and rational beings,... Rawls I 253 ... that are subject to the general conditions of human life. Because to reveal oneself as a being of a certain kind means to behave according to principles that would be chosen if this nature (this kind) were decisive for the choice of these principles. Rawls: one reason for people to behave like this is to express their nature. Autonomy/Kant/Rawls: our condition of a fundamental mutual disinterest in the goals of others is also compatible with Kant's concept of autonomy. Rawls I 254 Instead of altruism, benevolence or conflicting goals, only rationality is accepted by the actors. >Rationality. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Autonomy | Weizenbaum | I 27 Autonomy/Weizenbaum: the autonomy of humans and its responsibility derived from it is an essential characteristic of all religious systems. >Autonomy, >Responsibility, >Religion. In contrast, the spiritual cosmologies that modern science has produced are all infected with the bacillus of logical necessity. >Necessity. Theories claim to be able to make statements about what reality is and how it should be. In short, they turn truth into provability. >Truth, >Proofs, >Provability, >Theories, >Reality. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Availability Heuristic | Economic Theories | Parisi I 67 Availability heuristic/Economic theories/Jolls: Building on Schwartz and Wilde’s (1983)(1) observation about the role of the “availability heuristic” in risk estimation, a potentially effective response to optimistically biased individuals’ tendency to underestimate risk is to harness the availability heuristic. >Bounded rationality/Simon, >Optimism bias/Bibas. The availability heuristic refers to the tendency to estimate the probability of an event in part based on how easily instances of the event can be called to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973)(2). Individuals who are asked how many words in a 2000-word section of a novel end in “ing,” for instance, give much larger estimates than individuals who are asked how many words in the same-sized segment have “n” as the second-to-last letter, yet the latter is a superset of the former (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983)(3). As with optimism bias, use of the availability heuristic can lead to systematic mistakes in the assessment of probabilities. Parisi I 68 Example: (...) a series of studies of smoking behavior found that smokers were more likely to believe that smoking would harm their health if they were aware of specific instances of such harm (Sloan, Smith, and Taylor, 2003(4), pp. 157–179). More generally, people tend to respond to concrete, narrative information even when they do not respond, or respond far less, to general statistical information (Nisbett et al., 1982)(5). Optimism bias: As an illustration of the basic idea of debiasing through the availability heuristic in response to optimism bias, consider the finding of Weinstein (1980)(6) that many people substantially underestimate their risk of cancer. Parisi I 69 Legal solution: (...) [an example is] Congress’s decision in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 to require multiple “warning labels to be rotated on cigarette packages” (Keighley, 2012(7), p. 576). >Risk perception/Economic theories, >Optimism bias/Economic theories. 1. Schwartz, Alan and Louis L. Wilde (1983). “Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests.” Virginia Law Review 69: 1387–1485. 2. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1973). “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability.” Cognitive Psychology 5: 207–232. 3. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1983). “Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.” Psychological Review 90: 293–315. 4. Sloan, Frank A., V. Kerry Smith, and Donald H. Taylor, Jr. (2003). The Smoking Puzzle: Information, Risk Perception, and Choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Nisbett, Richard E., Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall, and Harvey Reed (1982). “Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative,” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 101–116. New York: Cambridge University Press. 6. Weinstein, Neil D. (1980). “Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39: 806–820. 7. Keighley, Jennifer M. (2012). “Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 15: 539–617. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Average Utility | Rawls | I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Axioms | Bigelow | I 119 Axioms/Intuition/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, intuitions should not be allowed to throw over entire axiom systems. E.g. the principle of distribution of the disjunction can be explained as follows: Suppose that in natural languages a conditional "If A, then B" is equivalent to a quantification over situations: "In all situations where A applies, B also applies." Then you could read the distribution of the disjunction like this: Logical form: (x)((Ax v Bx) would > would Cx) (x) (Ax would > would Cx) u (x)(Bx would > would Cx)). This is indisputably logical! >Distribution, >Disjunction, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the quantified form seems to capture the everyday language better than the unquantified. E.g. "In any situation where you would eat..." This is then a logical truth. I 120 This again shows the interplay of language and ontology. Axioms/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our axioms are strengthened by a robust realistic correspondence theory. And this is an argument for a conservative, classic logic. >Correspondence theory. I 133 Theorems/Bigelow/Pargetter: Need a semantic justification because they are derived. This is the foundation (soundness). >Foundation. Question: Will the theorems also be provable? Then it is about completeness. >Proofs, >Provability, >Completeness. Axioms/Axiom/Axiom system/Axiomatic/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be understood as a method of presenting an interpretation of the logical symbols without using a meta-language (MS). >Metalanguage. That is, we have here implicit definitions of the logical symbols. This means that the truth of the axioms can be seen directly. And everyone who understands it can manifest it by simply repeating it without paraphrasing it. >Definition, >Definability. 134 Language/Bigelow/Pargetter: ultimately we need a language which we speak and understand without first establishing semantic rules. In this language, however, we can later formulate axioms for a theory: that is what we call Definition "extroverted axiomatics"/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: an axiomatics that is developed in an already existing language. Definition introverted axiomatics/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: an axiomatics with which the work begins. Extrovert Axiomatics/Bigelow/Pargetter: has no problems with "metatheorems" and no problems with the mathematical properties of the symbols used. We already know what they mean. Understanding and accepting the axioms is one thing here. That is, the implicit definition precedes the explicit definition. We must understand what we are working with. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Axioms | d’Abro | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 35 Axiomatics/d'Abro: This new science was developed mainly by the formalists Hilbert and Peano. >Formalism. 37 Hilbert/d'Abro: Examples of Hilbert's typical claims: 1. Two different points, A and B, always form a straight line. 2. Three different points, A, B, and C, which do not lie on a straight line, always form a plane. 3. Of three points lying on a straight line, there is one and only one between the other two. 4. If the segment AB is equal to the segments A'B 'and A''B'', then A'B' is equal to A''B''. The N.B. of Hilbert's postulates: points, lines, and planes are not the only quantities which satisfy these relations: with some imagination others can be found. E.g It originally refers to plane geometry and can be given a different meaning: circles as new lines, with angles as distances. All relations are fulfilled, so the new model and the old (Euclidean) model can be regarded as different models or so-called "concrete representations", both corresponding to the postulates. >Models. 38 It may seem absurd, but Hilbert warns against assigning a priori certain characteristics to the points and lines which he mentions in his postulates. We can replace the words point, straight, plane, in all postulates by letters a, b, c. If we then employ points, lines, and planes, we obtain the Euclidean geometry, if we employ others, whose relations, however, must be the same, we have a new model between point, lines and planes. They are isomorphic. >Isomorphism. For example, the new elements are expressed by a group of three of numbers and by algebraic terms which relate these numbers to one another. He had this idea when he chose cartesian coordinates instead of points, lines and planes. The fact that the new elements, here numerical, satisfied Hilbert's postulates, proves only that the simple geometrical ways of concluding and the Cartesian method are equivalent to analytical geometry. 39 This proves the logical equivalence of the geometric and arithmetic continuum. Long before Hilbert, mathematicians had realized that mathematics has to do with relationships, and not with content. With Hilbert's postulates, we can create the Euclidean geometry, even without knowing what is meant by point, line and plane. 49 The achievements of axiomatics: 1. They are of invaluable value, from the analytical as well as from the constructive point of view. 2. It has shown that mathematics is about relationships and not about content. 3. It has shown that logic itself cannot confirm the consistency. 4. It has also shown that we have to go beyond axiomatics and have to show their origin. >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Axiom systems. |
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| Axioms | Hilbert | Berka I 294 Definition/Axiom/Hilbert: the established axioms are at the same time the definitions of the elementary concepts whose relations they regulate. ((s) Hilbert speaks of relationships, not of the use of concepts). >Definitions, >Definability, >Basic concepts. Independence/Axiom/Hilbert: the question is whether certain statements of individual axioms are mutually dependent, and whether the axioms do not contain common components which must be removed so that the axioms are independent of each other(1). >Independence. 1. D. Hilbert: Mathematische Probleme, in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935), Vol. III, pp. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301). --- Thiel I 262 We consider the first three axioms of Hilbert: 1. There are exactly two straight lines at each of two distinct points P, Q, which indicate(2) with P and Q. 2. For every line g and to any point P, which does not indicate with it, there is exactly one line that is indicated with P, but with no point of g. 3. There are three points which do not indicate with one and the same straight line. In Hilbert's original text, instead of points one speaks of "objects of the first kind" instead of straight lines of "objects of the second kind" and instead of the incidence of "basic relation". Thus, the first axiom is now: For each of two different objects of the first kind, there is precisely one object of the second kind, which is in a basic relation with the first two. Thiel I 263 If the axioms are transformed quantifier-logically, then only the schematic sign "π" (for the basic relation) is free for substitutions, the others are bound by quantifiers, and can no longer be replaced by individual names of points or lines. >Quantification, >Quantifiers. They are thus "forms of statements" with "π" as an empty space. >Propositional functions. They are not statements like those before Hilbert's axioms, whose truth or falsehood is fixed by the meanings of their constituents. >Truth values. In the Hilbert axiom concept (usually used today), axioms are forms of statements or propositional schemata, the components of which must be given a meaning only by interpretation by specifying the variability domains and the basic relation. The fact that this can happen in various ways, shows that the axioms cannot determine the meaning of their components (not their characteristics, as Hilbert sometimes says) themselves by their co-operation in an axiom system. Thiel I 264 Multiple interpretations are possible: e.g. points lying on a straight line, e.g. the occurrence of characters in character strings, e.g. numbers. Thiel I 265 All three interpretations are true statements. The formed triples of education regulations are models of our axiom system. The first is an infinite, the two other finite models. >Models, >Infinity. Thiel I 266 The axioms can be combined by conjunction to form an axiom system. >Conjunction. Through the relationships, the objects lying in the subject areas are interwoven with each other in the manner determined by the combined axioms. The regions V .. are thereby "structured" (concrete and abstract structures). >Domains, >Structures (Mathematics). One and the same structure can be described by different axiom systems. Not only are logically equivalent axiom systems used, but also those whose basic concepts and relations differ, but which can be defined on the basis of two systems of explicit definitions. Thiel I 267 Already the two original axiom systems are equivalent without the assumption of reciprocal definitions, i.e. they are logically equivalent. This equivalence relation allows an abstraction step to the fine structures. In the previous sense the same structures, are now differentiated: the axiom systems describing them are not immediately logically equivalent, but their concepts prove to be mutually definable. For example, "vector space" "group" and "body" are designations not for fine structures, but for general abstract structures. However, we cannot say now that an axiom system makes a structure unambiguous. A structure has several structures, not anymore "the" structure. Thiel I 268 E.g. body: the structure Q has a body structure described by axioms in terms of addition and multiplication. E.g. group: the previous statement also implies that Q is also e.g. a group with respect to the addition. Because the group axioms for addition form part of the body axioms. Modern mathematics is more interested in the statements about structures than in their carriers. From this point of view, structures which are of the same structure are completely equivalent. >Indistinguishability. Thiel: in algebra it is probably the most common to talk of structures. Here, there is often a single set of carriers with several links, which can be regarded as a relation. Thiel I 269 E.g. relation: sum formation: x + y = z relation: s (x, y, z). In addition to link structures, the subject areas often still carry order structures or topological structures. Thiel I 270 Bourbaki speaks of a reordering of the total area of mathematics according to "mother structures". In modern mathematics, abstractions, especially structures, are understood as equivalence classes and thus as sets. >N. Bourbaki, >Equivalence classes. 2. Indicate = belong together, i.e. intersect, pass through the point, lie on it. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Axioms | Waismann | I 15 ff Axioms/Euclid/Waismann: Among the axioms of Euclid, two groups can be distinguished: A) General size axioms e.g. "Two sizes equal to a third are also equal to each other. The part is smaller than the whole, equal added to equal results in equals". B) The actual geometrical axioms 1. Each point can be connected to every point by a straight line. 2. Every straight line can be extended beyond each of its endpoints. 3. A circle can be drawn around each point with any radius. 4. All right angles are equal to each other. 5. If two straight lines are intersected by a third such that the angles on the inner side of the two lines to one side of the third give a sum less than two right angles, then the two straight lines intersect, sufficiently extended, on the mentioned side. ("Parallel Axiom") I 16 Parallel axiom/Euclid: in history, the parallel axiom (5th axiom Euclid's) was always controversial, and because of the complexity one tried to derive contradictions, without success. On the contrary, it could be proved that E.g. similar figures would be impossible if it were not true, or E.g. there should be a largest triangle in the plane. E.g. Lambert: without the parallel axiom there would be a length unit distinguished by nature. As absurd as all these results sound, they are not a logical contradiction (this time in favor of the axiom). Bolanyi and Lobatschefsky then developed consequently conclusions from the omission of the 5th axiom and did not encounter contradictions but a new geometry! Non-Euclidean Geometry. New problem: how do we know that assumptions will not lead to contradictions in the future? For the first time the problem of non-contradiction in mathematics arose. A direct proof of the consistency is obviously not an option, for this, infinite conclusion chains would have to be considered. Non-Euclidean Geometry: Felix Klein found in 1870 that the whole system of non-Euclidean geometry can be mapped to the Euclidean, so that any contradiction in the new system would lead to a contradiction in the old. According to a prescription, a concept of Euclidean geometry is assigned to each concept of non-Euclidean geometry as its image, just as every sentence of one theory corresponds to a sentence of the other,... >Geometry. I 17 ...so that both theories have the same logical form. Within the Euclidean geometry a "model" has been established for the non-Euclidean geometry. E.g. We imagine in the Euclidean plane a fixed circle k. We now make a lexicon: By a point we mean a point inside k By a straight line we understand the piece of a straight line that runs within k. Additional provisions regulate the possibility that an arbitrary distance on a straight line can be copied infinitely often without leaving the circle. This distance, measured according to the Euclidean scale, is, of course, always smaller. A being that moves from the center of the circle to the periphery becomes smaller and smaller and can never reach the circle's edge (but not Zeno). >Zeno, >About Zeno. Proof: This vivid reflection has nothing to do with the power of proof. For a geometry thus defined, all Euclidean axioms apply except for the fifth. Fig. I 17 Circle, with rays from a point in the inner of the circle to the outside, somewhere secant. The rays fall into two classes that cut the secant, and those who do not. These two classes are separated by two straight lines (also rays), which we call "parallels", because they intersect the secant (with which they at first glance form a triangle) only non-euclidically at infinity. All the theorems of Euclidean geometry, with the exception of the fifth axiom, are in the circle consistent. I 18 But this is not an absolute consistency-proof. If there was a contradiction in the Euclidean geometry, the latter would also have to be applied in the theory of the real numbers. >Proofs, >Provability. >Real numbers. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Bandura | Psychological Theories | Slater I 183 Bandura/aggression/Bobo doll study/psychological theories: Bandura’s Bobo doll studies (Bandura 1961(1)) (>Aggression/Bandura) have been criticized since for methodological and ethical reasons. 1) Some critiques have questioned whether Bandura’s study would have been approved by a 21st century IRB [Institutional Review Boards] given the explicit modeling of aggression to which the children were exposed as well as the provocation in denying them access to the attractive toys that was meant to elicit the children’s own aggressive responses. 2) Scholars have questioned the generalizability of the findings given that the child participants were all recruited from the Stanford University preschool, and, thereby, more socioeconomically advantaged than the general population. The original study does not provide information about the children’s race, ethnicity, parents’ education, or other sociodemographic variables that are typically reported in the literature today. Subsequent research has documented sociodemographic differences in children’s mean levels of aggression. For example, children with more educated parents (Nagin & Tremblay, 2001)(2), from families with fewer stressors (Sanson, Oberklaid, Pedlow, & Prior, 1991)(3), and from two-parent households (Vaden-Kiernan, Ialongno, Pearson, & Kellam, 1995)(4), on average, demonstrate lower levels of aggression than do children with less educated parents, from families with more stressors, and from single parent households, respectively. However, the lack of attention to sociodemographic characteristics of the children in the original study would only pose a problem if these characteristics moderated links between exposure to an aggressive model and one’s own imitative learning of aggression. To date, evidence of this kind of moderation does not exist. >Aggression/Bandura. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)(5). It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Nagin, D. S., & Tremblay, R. E. (2001). Parental and early childhood predictors of persistent physical aggression in boys from kindergarten to high school. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 389—394. 3. Sanson, A., Oberklaid, F., Pedlow, R., & Prior, M. (1991). Risk indicators: Assessment of infancy predictors of pre-school behavioral maladjustment. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 609— 626. 4. Vaden-Kiernan, N., Ialongno, N. S., Pearson, J., & Kellam, S. (1995). Household family structure and children’s aggressive behavior: A longitudinal study of urban elementary school children. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 553—568. 5. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology,, 53, 27- 51. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Bankruptcy | Wittman | Parisi I 436 Bankruptcy/time sequence/ex ante/ex post/Wittman: (…) let us consider a situation where the actions are identical except that they take place sequentially in time. Sometimes secured debt is owned by two different entities. For example, a homeowner may have borrowed $100,000 from lender A in 2003 and $100,000 from lender B in 2006. The homeowner may have used her $250,000 house as collateral. If the house were worth at least $200,000 at the time of bankruptcy in 2011, there would be no problem. But what if housing prices greatly deteriorated so that the house was worth only $150,000 when the homeowner declared bankruptcy? Three priority schemes are possible: (1) The first lender has priority; that is, lender A receives $100,000 and lender B receives $50,000. (2) The second lender has priority; lender A receives $50,000 and lender B receives $100,000. (3) Neither has priority; each receives $75,000. Bankruptcy law has implemented the first scheme. This reduces the need for monitoring by the first creditor, although it increases it for the second creditor, who should have a comparative advantage in monitoring since she can see more recent housing prices and salary of the borrower and update the measure of risk involved. Most important, the second lender knows about the existence of the first loan, but the first lender can only speculate about the existence and nature of a second loan. Giving the first creditor the rights to the asset first means that later creditors and the debtor cannot post-contract alter the value of the secured debt to the first creditor. If the first creditor shared instead of having priority (or was second in line), then the first creditor would probably insist on a new contract whenever the asset had a second creditor. This would raise transaction costs. When the second creditor is second in line, she always knows what the bargain is when she steps into it (see Jackson and Kronman, 1979)(1). (…) it is not surprising that unsecured debt is not prioritized by time, but by other criteria (managers will know that the firm is going into bankruptcy before workers know and therefore the latter have priority) and that all members within a class are treated equally. Time sequence: It should be observed that priority does not depend on when a party demanded to be paid. So, rushing to be first is not a problem here. >Time/Wittman. 1. Jackson, Thomas H. and Anthony T. Kronman (1979). “Secured Financing and Priority among Creditors.” Yale Law Journal 88: 1143–1182. Donald Wittman. “Ex ante vs. ex post”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Barcan-Formula | Kripke | Hughes/Cresswell I 128 Barcan formula/Kripke: the Barcan formula assumes for each possible world a different domain of individuals, thereby obtaining a semantics in which the Barcan-Formula is not valid in comparison to our domain.(> Accessibility). Accessibility/LewisVsKripke: Lewis talks about individuals, therefore the Barcan formula is valid in Lewis. >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Bayesian Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). > Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesian Networks | Russell | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). >Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesianism | Frith | I 161 Bayesian Theorem/formula/Frith: P(A I X) = P(X I A) * P(A) P(X) The Bayesian theorem says to what extent we should update our knowledge about A with respect to the new information. I 162 P(A): prior knowledge: 1% of women over 40 get breast cancer. New information: good test proving breast cancer. P(XI A): 80% of all women with breast cancer are tested positive in the test. P(X ~ A): 9.6% of women without breast cancer are tested positive in the test. P(A I X): what is the proportion of those with a positive test result who actually have breast cancer? Common mistake: most consider the proportion of women who actually have breast cancer to be very high. I 163 Solution: e.g. 10,000 women are examined Group 1: 100 with cancer Group 2: 9,900 without cancer. P(A): 1%. After the examination one has 4 groups: A: 80 women with cancer and with a positive test result B: 20 with cancer but with a false negative result In A, the 80% with a correct-positive result are: p(X I A) C: 950 without cancer but with a false-positive result D: 8950 without cancer and with a negative result. Question: What is the percentage of women with a positive outcome who actually have cancer? Solution: Group A is divided by the sum of A and C. This is 7.8% N.B.: more than 90% of positively tested women have no cancer. Although the test is a good test, the Bayesian theorem says that the new information is not particularly helpful. I 164 Bayesian Theorem/Frith: the Bayesian theorem tells us precisely how much new information should influence our ideas about the world. Def ideal Bayesian observer/Frith: the ideal Bayesian observer always uses information in an optimal way. Problem: we can classify information badly when it comes to rare events and large numbers. >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Measurement, >Method. Brain: although we as persons are not ideal observers, there is much evidence that our brain is an ideal observer. I 165 For example, if an object is very rare, an observer needs more information to believe that it is actually there. Therefore, in the case of bombs, we are not an ideal observer. Brain: has the task of combining the information from the different sensory channels. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith, >Thinking, >Cognition, >Problem solving, >Information processing. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Bayesianism | Norvig | Norvig I 503 Bayesianism/Norvig/Russell: Bayes’ rule allows unknown probabilities to be computed from known conditional probabilities, usually in the causal direction. Applying Bayes’ rule with many pieces of evidence runs into the same scaling problems as does the full joint distribution. Conditional independence brought about by direct causal relationships in the domain might allow the full joint distribution to be factored into smaller, conditional distributions. The naive Bayes model assumes the conditional independence of all effect variables, given a single cause variable, and grows linearly with the number of effects. Norvig I 505 Bayesian probabilistic reasoning has been used in AI since the 1960s, especially in medical diagnosis. It was used not only to make a diagnosis from available evidence, but also to select further questions and tests by using the theory of information value (…) when available evidence was inconclusive (Gorry, 1968(1); Gorry et al., 1973(2)). One system outperformed human experts in the diagnosis of acute abdominal illnesses (de Dombal et al., 1974)(3). Lucas et al. (2004)(4) gives an overview. These early Bayesian systems suffered from a number of problems, however. Because they lacked any theoretical model of the conditions they were diagnosing, they were vulnerable to unrepresentative data occurring in situations for which only a small sample was available (de Dombal et al., 1981)(5). Even more fundamentally, because they lacked a concise formalism (…) for representing and using conditional independence information, they depended on the acquisition, storage, and processing of enormous tables of probabilistic data. Because of these difficulties, probabilistic methods for coping with uncertainty fell out of favor in AI from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. The naive Bayes model for joint distributions has been studied extensively in the pattern recognition literature since the 1950s (Duda and Hart, 1973)(6). It has also been used, often unwittingly, in information retrieval, beginning with the work of Maron (1961)(7). The probabilistic foundations of this technique, (…) were elucidated by Robertson and Sparck Jones (1976)(8). Independence: Domingos and Pazzani (1997)(9) provide an explanation Norvig I 506 for the surprising success of naive Bayesian reasoning even in domains where the independence assumptions are clearly violated. >Bayesian Networks/Norvig. 1. Gorry, G. A. (1968). Strategies for computer-aided diagnosis. Mathematical Biosciences, 2(3-4), 293- 318. 2. Gorry, G. A., Kassirer, J. P., Essig, A., and Schwartz, W. B. (1973). Decision analysis as the basis for computer-aided management of acute renal failure. American Journal of Medicine, 55, 473-484. 3. de Dombal, F. T., Leaper, D. J., Horrocks, J. C., and Staniland, J. R. (1974). Human and omputeraided diagnosis of abdominal pain: Further report with emphasis on performance of clinicians. British Medical Journal, 1, 376–380. 4. Lucas, P., van der Gaag, L., and Abu-Hanna, A. (2004). Bayesian networks in biomedicine and health-care. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 5. de Dombal, F. T., Staniland, J. R., and Clamp, S. E. (1981). Geographical variation in disease presentation. Medical Decision Making, 1, 59–69. 6. Duda, R. O. and Hart, P. E. (1973). Pattern classification and scene analysis. Wiley. 7. Maron, M. E. (1961). Automatic indexing: An experimental inquiry. JACM, 8(3), 404-417. 8. Robertson, S. E. and Sparck Jones, K. (1976). Relevance weighting of search terms. J. American Society for Information Science, 27, 129-146. 9. Domingos, P. and Pazzani, M. (1997). On the optimality of the simple Bayesian classifier under zero–one loss. Machine Learning, 29, 103–30. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesianism | Russell | Norvig I 503 Bayesianism/Norvig/Russell: Bayes’ rule allows unknown probabilities to be computed from known conditional probabilities, usually in the causal direction. Applying Bayes’ rule with many pieces of evidence runs into the same scaling problems as does the full joint distribution. Conditional independence brought about by direct causal relationships in the domain might allow the full joint distribution to be factored into smaller, conditional distributions. The naive Bayes model assumes the conditional independence of all effect variables, given a single cause variable, and grows linearly with the number of effects. Norvig I 505 Bayesian probabilistic reasoning has been used in AI since the 1960s, especially in medical diagnosis. It was used not only to make a diagnosis from available evidence, but also to select further questions and tests by using the theory of information value (…) when available evidence was inconclusive (Gorry, 1968(1); Gorry et al., 1973(2)). One system outperformed human experts in the diagnosis of acute abdominal illnesses (de Dombal et al., 1974)(3). Lucas et al. (2004)(4) gives an overview. These early Bayesian systems suffered from a number of problems, however. Because they lacked any theoretical model of the conditions they were diagnosing, they were vulnerable to unrepresentative data occurring in situations for which only a small sample was available (de Dombal et al., 1981)(5). Even more fundamentally, because they lacked a concise formalism (…) for representing and using conditional independence information, they depended on the acquisition, storage, and processing of enormous tables of probabilistic data. Because of these difficulties, probabilistic methods for coping with uncertainty fell out of favor in AI from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. The naive Bayes model for joint distributions has been studied extensively in the pattern recognition literature since the 1950s (Duda and Hart, 1973)(6). It has also been used, often unwittingly, in information retrieval, beginning with the work of Maron (1961)(7). The probabilistic foundations of this technique, (…) were elucidated by Robertson and Sparck Jones (1976)(8). Independence: Domingos and Pazzani (1997)(9) provide an explanation Norvig I 506 for the surprising success of naive Bayesian reasoning even in domains where the independence assumptions are clearly violated. >Bayesian Networks/Norvig. 1. Gorry, G. A. (1968). Strategies for computer-aided diagnosis. Mathematical Biosciences, 2(3-4), 293- 318. 2. Gorry, G. A., Kassirer, J. P., Essig, A., and Schwartz, W. B. (1973). Decision analysis as the basis for computer-aided management of acute renal failure. American Journal of Medicine, 55, 473-484. 3. de Dombal, F. T., Leaper, D. J., Horrocks, J. C., and Staniland, J. R. (1974). Human and omputeraided diagnosis of abdominal pain: Further report with emphasis on performance of clinicians. British Medical Journal, 1, 376–380. 4. Lucas, P., van der Gaag, L., and Abu-Hanna, A. (2004). Bayesian networks in biomedicine and health-care. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 5. de Dombal, F. T., Staniland, J. R., and Clamp, S. E. (1981). Geographical variation in disease presentation. Medical Decision Making, 1, 59–69. 6. Duda, R. O. and Hart, P. E. (1973). Pattern classification and scene analysis. Wiley. 7. Maron, M. E. (1961). Automatic indexing: An experimental inquiry. JACM, 8(3), 404-417. 8. Robertson, S. E. and Sparck Jones, K. (1976). Relevance weighting of search terms. J. American Society for Information Science, 27, 129-146. 9. Domingos, P. and Pazzani, M. (1997). On the optimality of the simple Bayesian classifier under zero–one loss. Machine Learning, 29, 103–30. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Bayesianism | Spies | Spi I 39ff Bayesian Theorem/Bayesian Rule/Bayes/Spies: answers the question: how is the inference from a causal to a diagnostic probability possible? Bayes Formula: P(D l S) = P(S l D) x P(D) / P(S). P(S): probability that the symptom is present: how many patients complain about it? Def Basic Rate: P(D): probability of diagnosis without consideration of the symptom (How common is the disease?) Bayes' theorem: diagnostic probability = causal probability times base rate divided by probability of the symptom. >Probability, >Probability theory, >Statistics, >Chance, >Likelihood, >Hypotheses, >Symptoms. |
Spi M. Spies Unsicheres Wissen Heidelberg 1993 |
| Beauty | Aristotle | Gadamer I 482 Beauty/Aristotle/Gadamer: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle(1) names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order Gadamer I 483 (taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. The close connection between the mathematical orders of essence of the beautiful and the celestial order further means that the cosmos, the model of all visible well-being, is also the highest example of beauty in the visible. Dimensional adequacy, symmetry is the decisive condition of all being beautiful. >Beauty/Plato, >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy. 1. Arist. Met. M 4, 1078 a 3—6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich of Strasbourg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Beauty | Gadamer | I 481 Beauty/Gadamer: Philosophy: The concept of the beautiful, which in the eighteenth century had to share the central position within the aesthetic problem with that of the sublime and which was to be completely eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century by the aesthetic criticism of classicism, was, as is well known, once a universal metaphysical concept and had a function within metaphysics, i.e. the general doctrine of being, that was by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense. >Metaphysics, >Aesthetics, >Being. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It will be shown that this old concept of beauty can also serve a comprehensive hermeneutics, as it has grown for us from the criticism of the methodologism of the intellectual world. >Hermeneutics. Etymology: The Greek word for the German "schön" is kalon. Admittedly, there are no complete equivalents in German, even if we use the mediating pulchrum. But Greek thought has exercised a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with word combinations such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautifully intellectual/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses, the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon. Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the how of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. One cannot ask about the purpose they serve. I 483 Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any kind of contrast here, which of course means that the primacy of nature is undisputed, especially with regard to beauty. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way perfect the beautiful nature of the order of being. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. (...) it is only with the 19th century that the aesthetic problem (...) is transferred to the standpoint of art (...). (...) this [is] based on a metaphysical process (...). Such a transfer to the standpoint of art ontologically presupposes a shapelessly conceived mass of being or a mass of being governed by mechanical laws. The human artistic spirit, which forms useful things from mechanical construction, will ultimately understand all that is beautiful from the work of its own spirit. I 484 Order/Measurement/Rationality/Aesthetics/KantVsSubjectivism: As unsatisfactory as the development towards subjectivism initiated by Kant seemed to us in the newer aesthetic, Kant has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of aesthetic rationalism. >Aesthetics/Kant. GadamerVsKant: It is just not right to base the metaphysics of beauty solely on the ontology of measure and the teleological order of being, on which the classical appearance of rationalist rule aesthetics ultimately refers to. The metaphysics of the beautiful does not actually coincide with such an application of aesthetic rationalism. Rather, the decline to Plato reveals a quite different side to the phenomenon of the beautiful, and it is this side that interests us in our hermeneutical questioning. >Beauty/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Beauty | Plato | Gadamer I 482 Beauty/Plato/Gadamer: In Platonic philosophy [we] (...) find (...) a close connection and not seldom an interchange of the idea of the good with the idea of the beautiful. Cf. >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy. Both are beyond all that is conditioned and many: the beautiful in itself meets the loving soul at the end of a path leading through the manifold beauty as the one, unifying, exuberant ("Symposion"), just as the idea of the good is beyond all that is conditioned and many, which is only good in certain respects ("Politeia"). The beautiful in itself shows itself to be beyond all that exists as well as the good in itself (epekeina). Order/Being: The order of being, which consists in the order of the one good, thus agrees with the order of the beautiful. The path of love that Diotima teaches leads via the beautiful bodies to the beautiful souls and from there to the beautiful institutions, customs and laws, finally to the sciences (e.g. to the beautiful numerical relations of which the theory of numbers knows), to this "wide sea of beautiful speeches"(1) - and leads beyond all this. Gadamer: One can ask oneself whether the transgression of the sphere of the sensually visible into the real means a differentiation and enhancement of the beauty of the beautiful and not merely that of the existing, which is beautiful. But Plato obviously means that the teleological order of being is also an order of beauty, that beauty appears more pure and clearer in the intelligible realm than in the visible, which is clouded by the immoderate and imperfect. Middle Ages: In the same way, medieval philosophy closely connected the concept of beauty with that of good, bonum, so closely that a classical Aristotle passage about kalon was not understandable in the Middle Ages because the translation here simply rendered the word kalon with bonum.(2) Measure/Proportion: The basis of the close connection between the idea of the beautiful and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato defines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order. >Beauty/Aristotle. Gadamer I 484 The Good/Beauty/Plato: As closely Plato (...) linked the idea of the beautiful with that of the good he also has in mind a difference between the two, and this difference contains a peculiar advantage of the beautiful. (...) the inconceivability of the good [finds] a correspondence in the beautiful, i.e. in the moderation of the existing and the revelation that belongs to it (aletheia) (...), inasmuch as a final exuberance also belongs to it. However, Plato can also say that in the attempt to grasp the good itself, the same flees into the beautiful(1). Thus, the beautiful differs from the absolutely intangible good in that it is more easily grasped. It has to be something appearing in its own essence. In the search for goodness, beauty is manifested. This is first Gadamer I 485 a distinction of the same for the human soul. Virtue/Appearance: That which shows itself in perfect form attracts the desire for love. The beautiful immediately takes on a life of its own, whereas the models of human virtue are otherwise only darkly recognizable in the murky medium of appearances, because they possess, as it were, no light of their own, so that we often fall into the impure imitations and illusory forms of virtue. This is different with beauty. Beautiful/Plato: It has its own brightness, so that we are not seduced here by distorted images. For "beauty alone has been granted this, that it is the most luminous (ekphanestaton) and lovable thing"(3). Ontology/Rank/Order: Obviously, it is the distinction of the beautiful from the good that it presents itself from itself, makes itself immediately obvious in its being. Thus it has the most important ontological function that can exist, namely that of mediating between idea and appearance. Appearance/Idea/Mediation: There is the metaphysical crux of Platonism. It is condensed in the concept of participation (methexis) and concerns both the relationship of appearance to the idea as well as the relationship of the ideas to each other. As "Phaidros" teaches, it is no coincidence that Plato particularly likes to illustrate this controversial relationship of "participation" by the example of the beautiful. >Methexis/Plato. Beauty does not only appear in what is sensually visible, but in such a way that it is actually there, i.e. that it stands out as one out of all. The beautiful is really "most luminous" in itself (to ekphanestaton). ((s) see above ontological rank). Thus "emergence" is not only one of the qualities of what is beautiful, but constitutes its very essence. The distinction of what is beautiful, that it directly attracts the desire of the human soul, is rooted in its way of being. It is the moderation of being that does not only let it be what it is, but also lets it emerge as a harmonious whole that is measured in itself. Alethia: This is the revelation (alétheia) that Plato speaks of, which belongs to the essence of the beautiful.(4) Shine/Appearance/appear: Beauty is not simply symmetry, but the appearance itself, which is based on it. It is of the nature of appearance. Appearance, however, means: to shine on something and thus to make an appearance of that on which the appearance falls. Gadamer I 491 Aletheia/Plato: [Plato] first of all, in the beautiful, has shown the alétheia as its essential moment, and it is clear what he means by this: the beautiful, the way in which the good appears, makes itself manifest in its being, presents itself. Cf. >Beauty/Thomas Aquinas. Representation/Presentation: What presents itself in this way is not distinguished from itself in that it presents itself. It is not something for itself and something else for others. It is also not something different. It is not the glamour poured out over a figure that falls on it from outside. Rather, it is the very condition of being of the figure itself, to shine in this way, to present itself in this way. It follows from this that, with regard to being beautiful, the beautiful must always be understood ontologically as an "image". Idea and appearance: It makes no difference whether "it itself" or its image appears. As we had seen, the metaphysical distinction of beauty was that it closed the hiatus between idea and appearance. It is "idea" for sure, that is, it belongs to an order of being. 1. Symp. 210 d: Reden Verhältnisse. I Vol. „Unterwegs zur Schrift“, Ges. Werke 7.1 2. Arist. Mead. M 4, 1078 a 3-6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich von Straßburg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty. 3. Phaidr. 250 d 7. 4. Phil. 51 d. Bubner I 35 Beauty/Good/Plato/Bubner: in the beautiful, we are content to have the illusion. In the good, we cannot be content with the illusion. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Beauty | Quine | XIII 17 Beauty/Art/QuineVsKeats/Quine: Keats: (2nd law of aesthetics): "Beauty is truth, truth is beauty". QuineVsKeats: this is wrong, beauty and truth are opposite poles. (alethic/aesthetic) Keats himself proves this with his Ode. Alethic: concerns science (hard and soft) as well as history. Aesthetic/Aesthetics/Quine: concerns the fine arts (belles lettres). But this is a question of emphasis, not of borders. Scientists also seek the beauty of a theory. Yet they know where they belong. Truth/Art/Quine: to what degree does the artist pursue truth? >Truth/Quine. XIII 18 E.g. Impressionism: was on the trail of true seeing. E.g. perspective in earlier epochs Truth/Literature/Quine: to attribute truth to a novella is double-tongued. This is not about truth as perhaps in experimental painting (perception) or experimental music (also perception) but about an indirect communication of truth. Truth/Literature: a better example of a real search for truth in art is e.g. concrete poetry or e.g. Finnegan's Wake. Art/Quine: but has other goals than truth: e.g. social engagement (social action). Thus a third pole is added: the ethical pole. But these are poles in the broader sense. There is also rhetoric (>rhetoric). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Beginning | Gould | 227 ff Beginning/life/Gould: at the end of 1977, fossil prokaryotes were discovered in South Africa, which were about 3.4 billion years old. This is a much earlier beginning of life than previously assumed. Definition Prokaryotes: prokaryotes are e. g. bacteria and blue-green algae among others, and form the kingdom of the Definition Monera: monera have no organelles, no nuclei and no mitochondria. A short time later it was announced that these methane bacteria are not closely related to other monera at all. Common ancestors had to be much older! The oldest dated rocks in West Greenland are 3.8 billion years old. So there is very little time from the creation of decent living conditions to the creation of life itself. Perhaps the emergence of life (primitive life) is as inevitable as that of feldspar or quartz. If methanogens are listed separately, they're a sixth kingdom. Biologists today distinguish between eukaryotes and prokaryotes rather than between plants and animals. Because of a common RNA sequence, the prokaryotes must have had a common precursor at some point in time. I 234 The assumption of a steady evolutionary speed is probably impossible to maintain. The early methanogens may have developed much faster. >Evolution. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Behavior | Attachment Theory | Corr I 230 Behavior/Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: In the case of the attachment behavioural system, Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) focused on the fundamental need for care and protection and the innate predisposition to search for and maintain proximity to protective and caring others in times of need. The set-goal of the attachment system is the attainment of actual or perceived protection and security; hence, the system is automatically activated when a potential or actual threat to one’s sense of security is noticed. Under these conditions, a person tends automatically to turn for protection and comfort to supportive others (whom Bowlby called attachment figures), and to maintain proximity to these ‘stronger and wiser’ figures until a state of protection and security is attained. Corr I 239 Behavior/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Both anxiety and avoidance are (…) associated with negative expectations concerning a partner’s behaviour (e.g., Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian et al. 1993)(2). >Anxiety, >Fear. Similar attachment-style differences have been found when research participants are asked to explain other people’s behaviour. For example, Collins (1996)(3) asked people to explain hypothetical negative behaviours of a romantic partner and found that more anxious and avoidant people were more likely to provide explanations that implied lack of confidence in the partner’s love, attribute partner’s negative behaviours to stable and global causes, and view these behaviours as negatively motivated. >About the Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 2. Baldwin, M. W., Fehr, B., Keedian, E., Seidel, M. and Thompson, D. W. 1993. An exploration of the relational schemata underlying attachment styles: self-report and lexical decision approaches, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19: 746–54 3. Collins, N. L. 1996. Working models of attachment: implications for explanation, emotion and behaviour, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71: 810–32 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Behavioral Ecology | Corr I 277 Behavior/Behavioral Ecology/Gosling: researchers in Behavioural Ecology and Ethology are primarily interested in learning about the ecological and evolutionary implications of consistent individual differences in behaviour (e.g., Carere and Eens 2005(1); Dall, Houston and McNamara 2004(2); Dingemanse and Reale 2005(3); McElreath and Strimling 2006(4); Nettle 2006(5)). Problem: for [a property] to be identified in a species it is necessary for variation to exist, with different individuals expressing different levels of [this property]; if all individuals in a species had exactly the same levels of [this property] then that trait would be said to be characteristic of the species and would not be considered a personality trait. Problem: The necessity for individual variation raises some theoretical issues within the context of evolutionary processes because selection tends to reduce or eliminate differences. ((s) For the philosophical discussion in relation to the problems with properties, concepts and introduction of concepts for properties see >Introduction/Strawson, >Concepts/Quine, >Properties/Putnam, >Individuation, >Specification). 1. Carere, C. and Eens, M. 2005. Unravelling animal personalities: how and why individuals consistently differ, Behaviour 142: 1149–57 2. Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I. and McNamara, J. M. 2004. The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective, Ecology Letters 7: 734–9 3. Dingemanse, N. J. and Reale, D. 2005. Natural selection and animal personality, Behaviour 142: 1159–84 4. McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2006. How noisy information and individual asymmetries can make ‘personality’ an adaptation: a simple model, Animal Behaviour 72: 1135–9 5. Nettle, D. 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American Psychologist 61: 622–31 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Benkler | Benkler I 386 Behavior/Institutional Ecology/Law/Society/Equilibrium/Path Dependence/Benkler: First, law affects human behavior on a micro-motivational level and on a macro-social organizational level. This is in contradistinction to, on the one hand, the classical Marxist claim that law is epiphenomenal, and, on the other hand, the increasingly rare simple economic models that ignore transaction costs and institutional barriers and simply assume that people will act in order to maximize their welfare, irrespective of institutional arrangements. >Epiphenomenalism. Second, the causal relationship between law and human behavior is complex. Simple deterministic models of the form “if law X, then behavior Y” have been used as assumptions, but these are widely understood as, and criticized for being, oversimplifications for methodological purposes. However, they also shape social norms with regard to behaviors, psychological attitudes toward various behaviors, the cultural understanding of actions, and the politics of claims about behaviors and practices. Some push back and nullify the law, some amplify its I 387 effects; it is not always predictable which of these any legal change will be. Third, and as part of the complexity of the causal relation, the effects of law differ in different material, social, and cultural contexts. The same law introduced in different societies or at different times will have different effects. It may enable and disable a different set of practices, and trigger a different cascade of feedback and counter-effects. Fourth, the process of lawmaking is not exogenous to the effects of law on social relations and human behavior. One can look at positive political theory or at the history of social movements to see that the shape of law itself is contested in society because it makes (through its complex causal mechanisms) some behaviors less attractive, valuable, or permissible and others more so. Different societies will differ in initial conditions and their historically contingent first moves in response to similar perturbations, and variances will emerge in their actual practices (…). The term “institutional ecology” refers to this context-dependent, causally complex, feedback-ridden, path-dependent process. I 388 The possibility of multiple stable equilibria alongside each other evoked by the stories of radio and print media is a common characteristic to both ecological models and analytically tractable models of path dependency. Both methodological approaches depend on feedback effects and therefore suggest that for any given path divergence, there is a point in time where early actions that trigger feedbacks can cause large and sustained differences over time. >Path dependence. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Behavior | Ethology | Corr I 277 Behavior/Ethology/Gosling: researchers in Behavioural Ecology and Ethology are primarily interested in learning about the ecological and evolutionary implications of consistent individual differences in behaviour (e.g., Carere and Eens 2005(1); Dall, Houston and McNamara 2004(2); Dingemanse and Reale 2005(3); McElreath and Strimling 2006(4); Nettle 2006(5)). Problem: for [a property] to be identified in a species it is necessary for variation to exist, with different individuals expressing different levels of [this property]; if all individuals in a species had exactly the same levels of [this property] then that trait would be said to be characteristic of the species and would not be considered a personality trait. Problem: The necessity for individual variation raises some theoretical issues within the context of evolutionary processes because selection tends to reduce or eliminate differences. ((s) For the philosophical discussion in relation to the problems with properties, concepts and introduction of concepts for properties: >Introduction/Strawson, >Concepts/Quine, >Properties/Putnam, >Individuation, >Specification.) 1. Carere, C. and Eens, M. 2005. Unravelling animal personalities: how and why individuals consistently differ, Behaviour 142: 1149–57 2. Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I. and McNamara, J. M. 2004. The behavioural ecology of personality: consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective, Ecology Letters 7: 734–9 3. Dingemanse, N. J. and Reale, D. 2005. Natural selection and animal personality, Behaviour 142: 1159–84 4. McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2006. How noisy information and individual asymmetries can make ‘personality’ an adaptation: a simple model, Animal Behaviour 72: 1135–9 5. Nettle, D. 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American Psychologist 61: 622–31 Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, “Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Behavior | Harlow | Slater I 16 Behavior/Harlow: The finding that rearing with age-mates could compensate for the effects of maternal deprivation on developing peer relationships was the most controversial and tentative finding in the 1962 paper(1). Working with small numbers of monkeys, Harlow observed few differences between mother-raised and peer-raised monkeys on play, defensive, or sexual behavior with peers during the juvenile period of development. This finding led Harlow to conclude that play with agemates was “more necessary than mothering to the development of effective social relations” (Harlow & Harlow, 1962(1), p. 495). However, Harlow remained tentative about his conclusions noting that they were limited to outcomes only up to two years of age. Follow-up studies of peer-reared monkeys by Harlow’s former graduate student, Steve Suomi, suggested a less sanguine view of peer-raised monkeys even during the juvenile period of development (Suomi, 2008)(2). When (…) peer-raised monkeys were grouped with mother-raised monkeys, they dropped to the bottom of the peer dominance hierarchies (Bastian, Sponberg, Sponberg, Suomi, & Higley, 2002)(3). Slater I 17 VsHarlow: Research has advanced from the social deprivation paradigms in several respects. 1) Researchers have examined more subtle variations in early caregiving environments by considering the effects of temporary separations from caregivers as well as variations in the quality of maternal care provided to offspring (Suomi & Levine, 1998)(4). 2) Researchers have begun to examine individual differences in offsprings’ susceptibility to environmental influences (Lyons, Parker, & Schatzberg, 2010)(5). 3) The trends toward examining a continuum of caregiving environments and individual differences in children’s susceptibility to caregiving environments have been advanced by efforts to identify the genetic, neural, and physiological mechanisms through which early experience affects later outcomes (Weaver et al., 2004)(6). Cf. >Affectional bonds/psychological theories. 1. Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. (1962). Social deprivation in monkeys. Scientific American, 207, 137–146. 2. Suomi, S. J. (2008). Attachment in rhesus monkeys. In J. Cassidy & P. Shaver (Eds), Handbook of attachment: Theory, research and clinical applications (pp. 173–191). New York: Guilford Press. 3. Bastian, M. L., Sponberg, A. C., Suomi, S. J., & Higley, J. D. (2002). Long-term effects of infant rearing condition on the acquisition of dominance rank in juvenile and adult rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Developmental Psychobiology, 42, 44–51. 4. Suomi, S., & Levine, S. (1998). Psychobiology of intergenerational effects of trauma: Evidence from animal studies. In Y. Daneli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 623–637). New York: Plenum Press. 5. Lyons, D. M., Parker, K. J., & Schatzberg, A. F. (2010). Animal models of early life stress: Implications for understanding resilience. Developmental Psychobiology, 52, 616–624. 6. Weaver, I. C. G., Cervoni, N., Champagne, F. A., D’Alessio, A. C., Sharma, S., Seckl, J. R., Dymov, S., et al. (2004). Epigenetic programming by maternal behavior. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 847–854. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Behavior | Kelly | Morozov I 214 Behavior/Social Networks/Technology/Politics/Economy/Kelly/Morozov: Kelly thesis: Only by listening to the history of technology (...) can we hope to solve our personal puzzles.(1) >Technology, >Social networks. Kelly: we can modify our legal and economic expectations by adapting them to the (...) technological development lines.(2) I 215 MorozovVsKelly: Why should we change our economic and political assumptions if we could change those lines of development instead? Why change our notions of privacy if we could change Facebook and Google instead? Why should we accept predictive policing measure instead of restricting them to areas where they do not undermine contradiction and reason? And to what extent should we change our expectations? >Expectation. KellyVsMorozov: instead, he thinks you should try every idea immediately. And continue as long as this idea exists.(3) >E. Morozov. I 216 Behavior/KellyVsAmish/Kelly/Morozov: Kelly accuses the Amish of denying opportunities not only to their own people, but to all people. (4) MorozovVsKelly: It never dawned on Kelly that political communities may be entitled to determine their own lives, and that restrictions as far as they have been democratically created - as is not always the case with the Amish - could also be good for humanity. Kelly's all about the means. >Democracy, >Society, >Community. 1. Kevin Kelly, What Technology Wants, Kindle ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 6 2. ibid. p. 174 3. ibid., p.252. 4. ibid. p. 237 |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Behavior | Morozov | Morozov I 214 Behavior/Social Networks/Technology/Digitalization/Politics/Economy/Kelly/Morozov: Kelly's thesis: Only by listening to the history of technology (...) we can hope to solve our personal puzzles.(1) Kelly: we can modify our legal and economic expectations by adapting them to the (...) technological development lines.(2) >Technology, >Technocracy, >Progress. I 215 MorozovVsKelly: Why should we change our economic and political assumptions if we could change those lines of development instead? Why change our notions of privacy if we could change Facebook and Google instead? Why should we accept predictive policing measures instead of restricting them to areas where they do not undermine contradiction and reason? And to what extent should we change our expectations? KellyVsMorozov: instead, he thinks you should try every idea immediately. And continue as long as this idea exists.(3) I 216 Behavior/KellyVsAmish/Kelly/Morozov: Kelly accuses the Amish of denying opportunities not only to their own people, but to all people. (4) MorozovVsKelly: It never dawned on Kelly that political communities may be entitled to determine their own lives, and that restrictions as far as they have been democratically created - as is not always the case with the Amish - could also be good for humanity. Kelly's all about the means. >Democracy, >Community, >Politics, >Power, >Society, >Freedom, >Purpose/means rationality. 1. Kevin Kelly, What Technology Wants, Kindle ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 6 2. ibid. p. 174 3. ibid., p.252. 4. ibid. p. 237. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Behavioral Economics | Hirschman | Brocker I 526 Behavioural Economics/Hirschman: long before modern behavioural economics came onto the scene, Albert O. Hirschman formulated terms that can be used in discussions today. >Terminology/Hirschman: migration, conflict, loyalty. See also Conflicts/Hirschman. For example, emigration of consumers, party members, voters: loyalty delays emigration and makes return more difficult. (1) Example: from the difficult entry into an organization follows a tendency to self-deception about the true quality of the referred achievement. Homo oeconomicus/HirschmanVsTradition: this term dissolves under Hirschman's analyses. He is replaced by the actor whose behaviour is changeable. Brocker I 527 Panther: for a theory of rational action, this is hard to digest. 1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. Dt.: Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch. Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten, Tübingen 1974, S. 74-78. 2. Ibid. p. 79. Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHirschm I Albert O. Hirschman The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Behavioral Law | Economic Theories | Parisi I 70 Behavioral Law/Economic theories/Jolls: In the discussion (...) of debiasing through law, the focus is on scenarios in which optimism bias is thought to produce an overall underestimation of the risk of educational loan default. >Cognitive bias/Economic theories, >Risk perception/Economic theories, >Optimism bias/Bibas, >Bounded rationality/Jolls, >Bounded rationality/Simon, >Availability heuristics/Economic theories, >Non-omniscience/Jolls. Biases/legal policy: The legal debiasing strategies discussed here should be distinguished from alterations in the incentives facing decision-makers. In the conception of debiasing through law employed here, debiasing strategies do not involve providing people with improved incentives in the hope of reducing their bounded rationality. In some cases, providing incentives may in fact diminish various forms of bounded rationality, and a broad definition of debiasing might embrace the use of incentives to produce such reductions (for example, Fischhoff, 1982)(1). Vs: A more conservative view, however, is that if boundedly rational behavior is eliminated with the provision of financial incentives, then the apparent boundedly rational behavior was not boundedly rational at all, but instead a mere result of lazy or careless decision-making by an actor who had no reason to be other than lazy or careless. Jolls: Under the latter view, which is adopted here, debiasing occurs when bounded rationality is reduced not as a result of the provision of financial incentives, but rather as a result of intervening in and altering the situation in which the bounded rationality arose. Influence of firms: An important remaining question about debiasing through law concerns the prospects for firms’ influence over consumer perceptions under the proposed legal debiasing strategy. As Glaeser (2004(2), p. 410) writes, “One should expect to see a proliferation of misleading signals and other cues when incorrect beliefs are complements to buying sellers’ commodities.” In the present context, this influence suggests the importance of maintaining Parisi I 71 legal control over the nature and format of the accounts firms are required to provide. It is possible that such firms, influenced by market pressures, would manage to subvert attempts to achieve debiasing through the >availability heuristic. Consumer information: At the same time, with such debiasing as with any informationally oriented strategy, there are important countervailing benefits to limiting the degree of overspecification of required messaging (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981)(3),(...). 1. Fischhoff, Baruch (1982). “Debiasing,” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 422–444. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2. Glaeser, Edward (2004). “Psychology and the Market.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 94: 408–413. 3. Beales, Howard, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop (1981). “The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information.” Journal of Law and Economics 24: 491–539. Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Behaviorism | Behaviorism: presupposes observable and observed behavior and derives predictions of further behavior from them. As few assumptions as possible about a mental inner life are used for explanation. See also mentalism, behavior, consciousness. |
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| Behaviorism | Sellars | Rorty I 118 SellarsVsRyle: 1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities. >Operationalism. 2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ("built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations. >Sensations, >Experience, >Appearance. Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.) >Two Dogmas/Quine, >Empiricism/Quine, >Analyticity/Quine. Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states. >Dispositions/Ryle, >Gilbert Ryle. Just as wrong as the instrumentalistic approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...". >Instrumentalism, Cf. >Constructivism, >Sense data. --- Rorty VI 182 Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference. --- Sellars I XXIXf Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism. Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way. Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior. >Observation, >Observation language, >Mental Objects, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of Thought, >Mentalism. I 91 Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts). >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Being | Jonas | Brocker I 614 Being/Jonas: "That being is about something, at least about ourselves, is the first thing we can learn about it from the presence of purposes in it" (1). That "nature holds values because it holds purposes" (2), Jonas says, shows that there is no value neutrality of nature. "Having purpose" is a "good by itself" (3), life in itself is valuable. (JonasVsTheory of Evolution). Evolutionary Biology/Brocker: would reply that life is only a possibility of nature that chance has realized. N.B.: According to Jonas, the duty of mankind to avoid the total destruction of itself and all life can therefore be read directly from nature. See Ecological Imperative/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Teleology/Jonas, Values/Jonas. 1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, S. 156 2. Ebenda S. 150 3. Ebenda S. 1554 Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Being a Bat | Chalmers | I 236 Bat Example/Nagel/Chalmers: equipped with the approach of Crick and Koch(1), we may get even more insight into how it is to be a bat. Functional organization can tell us something about the kind of information a bat has access to. The distinctions which it is capable of making, and thus also classifications of the most prominent things in its field of perception. Bat/Chalmers: this of course shows nothing about the intrinsic nature of the experiences of bats, but Akins (1993)(2) can add something to this. Chalmers: Cheney/Seyfarth (1990)(3) How Monkeys See the World tries to answer such questions about bats by puting us into the mind of other species. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. I 295 Bat Example/Chalmers: Why should not we suppose there is a way for a thermostat of "How it is to be a thermostat"? Cf. >Thermostat example, cf. >Fuel gauge. I 296 Such an "experience" could occur like a lightning and completely without concept. >Experience, >Knowing how. I 298 For the thermostat, there is a canonical information space, and so we can say he has the canonical experiences of a thermostat. I 299 The experiences of a thermostat can be called proto-phanomenal. >Protophenomena. 1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75 2. K. Akins, What is it like to be boring and myopic? In B. Dahlbom (ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 3. D. L. Cheney and R. M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World, Chicago 1990. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Being a Bat | Nagel | Frank 138ff What Is It Like to Be a Bat/Nagel(1): the example has selected a form of life as different as possible. - Bats certainly have experiences, i.e. it is "somehow" for them. No rapprochement is possible: neither by adding nor omitting disturbing ideas. It is not about how it would be for me to be a bat, but about how it is for a bat to be a bat. NagelVsEmpathy. > 1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Being a Bat | Searle | I 137 Bat: Problem: we want to know how it is for the bat, not how it is for us! Features: it is about which features there are - not about what we know about them. Epistemology/ontology: 1st-person features are different from 3rd-Person-features. A full neurophysiological theory is not enough, it is not about sensation. >First person, >priviledged access. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Belief Degrees | Field | II 257 Belief Degree/BD/Conditional/Field: the classic laws of probability for belief degrees do not apply with conditionals. - Disquotational Truth/Conditional: refers to the complete: "If Clinton dies, Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes President. Non-disquotational: behaves like disquotational truth in simple sentences. With conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Disquotationalism, >Truth values, >Conditionals. II 295 Belief Degree/Probability/Field: the classic law of the probability of disjunctions with mutually exclusive disjuncts does not apply for degrees of belief when vagueness is allowed. >Probability, >Probablilty law. II 296 Probability Function/Belief Degree: difference: for probability functions the conditional probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional. >Probability function. II 300 Indeterminacy/Belief Degree/Field: the indeterminacy of a sentence A is determined by the amount for which its probability and its negation add up to less than 1. ((s) i.e. that there is a possibility that neither A nor ~A applies.) II 302 Indeterminacy/Belief/Field: some: E.g. "belief" in opportunities is inappropriate, because they are never actual. Solution: Acceptance of sentences about opportunities. - Also in indeterminacy. Solution: belief degrees in things other than explanation. II 310 Non-classical Belief Degrees/Indeterminacy/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary, is a good reason to assume non-classical belief degrees. Moderate non-classical logic: that some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded middle. >Excluded middle, >Non-classical logic. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Beliefs | AI Research | Norvig I 450 Beliefs/agents/AI research/Norvig/Russell: [first, agents] have beliefs and can deduce new beliefs. Yet none of them has any knowledge about beliefs or about deduction. What we need is a model of the mental objects that are in someone’s head (or something’s knowledge base) and of the mental processes that manipulate those mental objects. >Ontology/AI research, >Objects of thought/Philosophical theories, >Objects of belief/Philosophical theories, >Propositional attitudes/Philosophical theories, >Modal Logic. Norvig I 451 Modal logic/AI research/Russell/Norvig: Problem: Lois believes that Superman can fly but she doesn’t believe that Clark Kent can fly. Solution: modal logic can use special modal operators for beliefs. This leads to the introduction of possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Philosophical theories, >Accessibility relation/Philosophical theories, >Barcan Formula/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 453 Knowledge/agents: [when] we have a modal operator for knowledge, we can write axioms for it. First, we can say that agents are able to draw deductions; if an agent knows P and knows that P implies Q, then the agent knows Q. Furthermore, logical agents should be able to introspect on their own knowledge. If they know something, then they know that they know it. Omniscience: one problem with the modal logic approach is that it assumes logical omniscience on the part of agents. That is, if an agent knows a set of axioms, then it knows all consequences of those axioms. This is on shaky ground even for the somewhat abstract notion of knowledge, but it seems even worse for belief, because belief has more connotation of referring to things that are physically represented in the agent, not just potentially derivable. >Omniscience/Philosophical theories. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Beliefs | Appraisal Theory | Corr I 63 Beliefs/appraisal theory/Reisenzein/Weber: There is (…) evidence that appraisal-related, general beliefs influence emotional reactions to events. The two general beliefs that have been most extensively researched in this regard are (a) optimism (versus pessimism), defined as a generalized expectancy for positive (versus negative) outcomes (Scheier, Carver and Bridges 2001)(1); and (b) general self-efficacy, defined as a person’s generalized belief in her ability to reach her goals and to master difficult or stressful situations (Bandura 1997(2); Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1995(3)). >Optimism, >Self-efficacy. General self-efficacy has been found, for example, to be associated with lower state anxiety during a stressful cognitive task (Endler, Speer, Johnson and Flett 2001)(4) and lower levels of depression and anxiety in medical patients (e.g., Luszczynska, Gutiérrez-Doña and Schwarzer 2005)(5). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that optimism and general self-efficacy affect emotional states at least partly by influencing the appraisals of events; it should be noted, however, that direct evidence for this mediating path is so far scarce (e.g., Kaiser, Major and McCoy 2004(6); Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1999)(7). >Emotion, >Behavior. 1. Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S. and Bridges, M. W. 2001. Optimism, pessimism, and psychological well-being, in E. C. Chang (ed.), Optimism and pessimism: implications for theory, research, and practice, pp. 189–216. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Bandura, A. 1997. Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: Freeman 3. Schwarzer, R. and Jerusalem, M. 1995. Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale, in J. Weinman, S. Wright and M. Johnston (eds.), Measures in health psychology: a user’s portfolio. Causal and control beliefs, pp. 35–7. Windsor: NFER-Nelson 4. Endler, N. S., Speer, R. L., Johnson, J. M. and Flett, G. L. 2001. General self-efficacy and control in relation to anxiety and cognitive performance, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social 20: 36–52 5. Luszczynska, A., Gutiérrez-Doña, B. and Schwarzer, R. 2005. General self-efficacy in various domains of human functioning: evidence from five countries, International Journal of Psychology 40: 80–9 6. Kaiser, C. R., Major, B. and McCoy, S. K. 2004. Expectations about the future and the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 173–84 7. Schwarzer, R., and Jerusalem, M. 1999. Skalen zur Erfassung von Lehrer- und Schülermerkmalen [Scales for the assessment of teacher and student characteristics]. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Beliefs | Avramides | I 122 Concept/Instantiation/Davidson: a concept can be instantiated. (Realize, E.g. swimming) without having the concept. Davidson: but not with convictions. >Instantiation. I 122f Conviction/Belief/Davidson: Condition: Awareness of the distinction subjective/objective (because of the necessary ability to be surprised). >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. I 123 Bennett/AvramidesVsDavidson: in animals there is also learning ability (= distinction subjective/objective) instead of language ability. >Animals. DavidsonVsVs: this is about properties of concepts, not beings. Davidson: per conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. Therefore, there is no thinking without language. >Thinking without language. I125 Reductionism/Antireductionism/Avramides: both are not separated by the dispute over ontological asymmetry, both could accept ontological symmetry like asymmetry. - It is really about deep epistemic asymmetry. >Terminology/Avramides. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Beliefs | Boer | I 20 Believe/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existening-distinction. Thought content: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: If we assume that ideas can be equated with propositions, states, or properties, and that they would be accepted as platonic in existence, without having to participate in the world, we would not have to assume the believe relation as existence-independent. But we need a proper theory of the nature of belief contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5): it would be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q to z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Belief/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representation-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Beliefs | Brandom | I 788 You can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings. But if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. Cf. >stronger/weaker. I 759f Belief de re/Quine/Brandom: aroused interest in de re by distinguishing between the conceptual and relational meanings of belief - you do not have relational beliefs about an object by simply knowing the singular word - definition of weak de re: someone who only believes that the smallest spy is a spy does not know much about spies - not yet de re of any objects - epistemically strong: Example of Rosa Kleb who believes that she is the smallest spy (de re). >de re, >de dicto. I 790 Definition strong/weak/belief/Brandom: you can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings - but if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. --- II 226 Belief/Brandom: 1. you only believe what you believe to believe - 2. and also everything that one is more or less tied to by hione's s believes - e.g. if I believe that Kant revered Hamann and I believe that Hamann was the Magus of the North, I also believe that Kant worshiped the Magus of the North. I 764 Belief/de dicto/Davidson/Brandom: Davidson only allows de dicto beliefs. I 962 Belief/Def weak relation/Dennett/Brandom: what is expressed by de re attributions. I 765 but strong de re convictions would have little meaning, if useful at all. Belief/cnviction/Dretske: (widely spread thesis): de re convictions are understandable regardless of de dicto convictions. I 765 Conviction/belief/Brandom: demonstrative, indexical de re convctions are conceptual, but not independent - they cannot stand alone - decisive are the weak ones - and not a special kind of contact with the object. I 965 Belief/Brandom: Each conviction, be it strong or weak, can be attributed de re or de dicto. II 48 Belief/BrandomVsDavidson: Definition via wish. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Beliefs | Davidson | Glüer II 44 Def Belief/Davidson: is a sentence plus interpretation considered to be true. Belief/Davidson/McDowell: we cannot get out of our beliefs. Rorty VI 36 Davidson/Rorty: most of our beliefs must be true. But not congruence subject/object, but: the pattern formed by truth is the same as the pattern formed by the justification that justifies it in our opinion. Rorty VI 166 Brains in a Vat/Davidson/Rorty: if they have always been in the vat, they have many beliefs about their actual vat-plus-computer environment, no matter what kind of input they receive. >Brains in a vat. Rorty VI 187 Davidson/Rorty: Most of our beliefs must be true. Beliefs are not more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. >Representation, >Causal theory of knowledge. Rorty VI 205 Davidson/Sellars: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: beliefs can only be justified by beliefs. (McDowellVs). Davidson I (b) 25 Belief/Davidson: is not language-dependent - DavidsonVsRussell: the objects used for identification of a belief do not need to belong to the realm of knowledge of the believer. I 68 Belief/Deception/Error/Davidson: for identification each depends on other beliefs being in the background - the concept of chair or mouse cannot remain the same independent of its occurrence in different beliefs - you can have beliefs about guanacos from books and correctly identify them when you see one - but: despite knowing that a guanaco is not a lama, he could say "guanaco" to every lama - then, in both cases, the content is not determined by the sight of guanacos, but by the fact that you have appropriated other concepts such as "animal" "lama", "camel", "pet", etc. Glüer II 127 Belief/Error/Deception/Davidson: beliefs have no objects that might correspond to reality (representations), but causes - these are publicly accessible (inter-subjective) objects - ((s) the meanings that play a role in beliefs, are individuated through the public objects - (through causes)). Frank I 649 Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong: a speaker who wants to be understood, makes sure to be interpretable - the interpreter has no other material than the sounds the speaker emits in conjunction with other events. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 680 Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong, because the use of our words (in relation to the objects) regularly gives them meaning. - >Use theory. Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-458 V 107 Belief/Davidson: most must be correct: reason: the beliefs are identified by their place in the system of beliefs - there must be an endless number of true beliefs regarding this subject area - false beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter. Thus they undermine the validity of the description of a belief as one which deals with its subject matter. Thus false beliefs in turn undermine the assertion that a linked belief is wrong. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Beliefs | Lycan | Cresswell I 112 Lycan/Belief/Conviction/Cresswell: Lycan's solution is quite different, Lycan thesis the sentence to which the belief is related, is not an entity of public language - rather, it is a kind of brain configuration. Cf. > |