Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambiguity | Lyons | I 252 Ambiguity/transformational/grammar/Lyons: there are many more types here, in addition to the various parentheses. E.g. amor dei: the love of God: a) from God, b) to God. Subjective or objective genitive. I 253 Chomsky: famous example: Flying planes can be dangerous a) Planes can be dangerous b) Flying can be dangerous Tradition: would explain this by the difference between participle and gerund: Def Participle/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as an adjective. Def Gerund/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as a noun. Solution: a) Flying planes are dangerous. b) Flying planes is dangerous. I 254 Lexeme/Lyons: a certain word (here in the abstract sense) can be verbal in a sentence and nominal in a transformationally related sentence. (Participle/Gerund). >Lexeme, >Words, >Terminology/Lyons. Solution/Transformation/Lyons: then we can say that for example the syntagma Flying planes is derived by a rule that transforms the structure underlying the sentence Flying planes can be dangerous. >Transformational grammar. I 255 Ambiguity/grammatical/Lyons: new: here we are dealing with ambiguity, which is no longer only semantic but also grammatical. Chomsky: Example the shooting of the hunters. Subject/object/Chomsky/Lyons: the difference becomes clear here by the fact that "of" i, subject-case possessive pronoun, is a preposition in the object-case. Solution: by convention: we introduce indices: NP1, NP2 ((s) Instead of subject/object). >Subject, >Object. ing-form: is often grammatically ambiguous, i.e. a syntagma of the form the V + ing of NP, but not necessarily also semantically ambiguous. I 256 Solution: the grammar should provide the following forms: (5) NP1 V tr NP2 (6) NP1 V intr and further, that a) the V of the V + ing of NP is identical with an element of V tr in (5) and an element of V intr in (6), and b) the NP of the V + ing of NP can occur both as NP2 in (5) and as NP1 in (6). >Cf. >Unambiguity, >Grammar, >Generative Grammar, >Universal grammar, >Categorial grammar, >Transformational grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Explanation | Ricoeur | II 71 Understanding/explanation/Ricoeur: (...) it may be said, at least in an introductory fashion, that - understanding: is to reading what the event of discourse is to the utterance of discourse and that - explanation: is to reading what the verbal and textual autonomy is to the objective. meaning of discourse. >Discourse/Ricoeur. II 72 Explanation/tradition: finds its paradigmatic field of application in the natural sciences. When there are external facts to observe, hypotheses to be submitted to empirical verification, general laws for covering such facts, theories to encompass the scattered laws in a systematic whole, and subordination of empirical generalizations to hypothetic-deductive procedures, then we may say that we "explain." Understanding/tradition: Understanding, in contrast, finds its originary field of application in the human sciences (the German Geisteswissenschaften), where science has to do with the experience of other subjects or other minds similar to our own. It relies on the meaningfulness of such forms of expression as physiognomic, gestural, vocal, or written signs, and upon documents II 73 and monuments, which share with writing the general character of inscription. The immediate types of expression are meaningful because they refer directly to the experience of the other mind which they convey. Tradition/Ricoeur: The dichotomy between understanding and explanation in Romanticist hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It opposes two methodologies and two spheres of reality, nature and mind. II 75 Understanding/Ricoeur: (...) we have to guess the meaning of the text because the author's intention is beyond our reach. II 79 Interpretation: (...) if it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal. The text presents a limited field of possible constructions. The logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and scepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our immediate reach. II 81 Structural Linguistics/interpretation/understanding/Ricoeur: [the approach of the structural schools of literary criticism] proceeds from the acknowledgement of what I have called the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference. (>Reference/Ricoeur). The text intercepts the "worldly" dimension of the discourse - the relation to a world which could be shown - in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the discourse to the subjective intention of the author. According to this choice, the text no longer has an exterior, it only has an interior. To repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of the literary object into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind of closed system that phonology discovered underlying all discourse, and which Saussure called langue. Literature, according to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of langue. >Langue/Ricoeur. II 86 Explanation/literature/texts/Ricoeur: [The] transposition of a linguistic model to the theory of narrative perfectly corroborates my initial remark regarding the contemporary understanding of explanation. Today ((s) 1976) the concept of explanation is no longer borrowed from the natural sciences and transferred into a different field, that of written documents. It proceeds from the common sphere of language thanks to the analogical transference from the small units of language (phonemes and lexemes) to the large units beyond the sentence, including narrative, folklore, and myth. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Repetition | Burks | I 145 Anaphora/Burks: problem of identification when substitution of names by "er" -> therefore proper names would be impossible at Nietzsche’s "eternal return". >Anaphora, >Names, >Morphemes, >Lexemes, >Insertion, >Analysis, >Syntax. |
Burks I Arthur W. Burks "A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Burks II A. W. Burks Chance, Cause, Reason 1977 |
| Semiotics | Ricoeur | II 7 Semiotics/Ricoeur: (...) [the] two sciences [semiotics and semantics] are not just distinct, but also reflect a hierarchical order. The object of semiotics - the sign — is merely virtual. Only the sentence is actual as the very event of speaking. This is why there is no way of passing from the word as a lexical sign to the sentence by mere extension of the same methodology to a more complex entity. The sentence is not a larger or more complex word, it is a new entity. There is therefore no linear progression from the phoneme to the lexeme and then on to the sentence and to linguistic wholes larger than the sentence. Each stage requires new structures and a new description. II 8 The distinction between two kinds of linguistics - semiotics and semantics - reflects this network of relations. Semiotics, the science of signs, is formal to the extent that it relies on the dissociation of language into constitutive parts. Semantics, the science of the sentence, is immediately concerned with the concept of sense (...). Ricoeur: For me, the distinction between semantics and semiotics is the key to the whole problem of language (...). II 21 If language were not fundamentally referential, would or could it be meaningful? (>Dialogue/Ricoeur). How could we know that a sign stands for something, if it did not receive its direction towards something for which it stands from its use in discourse? Finally, semiotics appears as a mere abstraction of semantics. And the semiotic definition of the sign as an inner difference between signifier and signified presupposes its semantic definition as reference to the thing for which it stands. >Utterer’s Meaning/Ricoeur, ((s) Cf. >Semantics, >Speaker Meaning). |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Situations | Eco | Eco II 118 Situation/semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components must not depend on the situation or circumstance to be interpreted (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... II 119 ...how and why the phrase has to be used in one sense or another. Clarity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meanings, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. If you stop at the distinguishers, you do not consider all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are signs or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial signs. (>Problem of interpretation: Situations/Eco, Situations/Katz). 3. The lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be... II 120 ...considered, neither the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Situations | Katz | Eco II 118 Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... --- II 119 ...how and why the sentence has to be used in one sense or another. Unambiguity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meaning, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. if you stop at the distinguishers, you do not measure all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are sings or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial sign. (>Problem of interpretation). 3. the family tree of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be... --- II 120 ...taken into account, nor the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Transformational Grammar | Lyons | I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: The grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is "intuitively" (unconsciously) mastered by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "uncertainty of grammar"/ChomskyVsUncertainty of grammar). Lyons: the differences here are exaggerated. Not all grammar is indefinite. I 252 Transformational grammar/transformational/Lyons: any grammar that claims to provide an analysis of deep and surface structure is a transformational grammar. I 252 Ambiguity/transformational/Gammar/Lyons: there are many more types here, in addition to the various parentheses. E.g. amor dei: the love of God: a) from God, b) to God. Subjective or objective genitive. I 253 Chomsky: famous example: Flying planes can be dangerous a) Planes can be dangerous b) Flying can be dangerous. Tradition: would explain this by the difference between participle and gerund: Def Participle/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as an adjective. Def Gerund/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as a noun. Solution: a) Flying planes are dangerous b) Flying planes is dangerous. I 254 Lexeme/Lyons: a certain word (here in the abstract sense) can be verbal in a sentence and nominal in a transformationally related sentence. (Participle/Gerund). Solution/Transformation/Lyons: then we can say that for example the syntagma Flying planes is derived by a rule that transforms the structure underlying the sentence Flying planes can be dangerous. I 256 Subject/Object/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Lyons: e.g. John eats the apples, John is eating: then The eating of the apples has an object meaning. Problem: whether s also has a subject meaning depends on whether a sentence like The apples are eating can be generated. ((s) Grammatical, not semantic!). Solution: whether it works then depends on whether the noun apple and the verb eat can be subclassified in the lexicon (by grammatical features) in such a way that the grammatical rules allow the assignment of a feature (e.g. inanimate) to a noun as subject of the verb class to which eat belongs to or not. I 258 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: although subject and object are reversed, identity or similarity prevails between the two corresponding sentences in the deep structure. But this is also the prerequisite that the interchange of subject and object can be determined at all. Problem: there is disagreement as to whether there is dissimilation or not. For example, assuming that the shooting of the hunters is not ambiguous. Problem: then we would still require the grammar to establish relations a) between the shooting of the hunters and the transitive theorem NP1 shoot the hunters as well as b) between the hunters shooting and the intransitive the hunters shoot. I 270 Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: does not actually connect sentences, but the structures on which the sentences are based. Conjunction transformation: connects sentences within a larger sentence. However, no sentence is subordinate but both retain their sentence status. The P-marker for the larger sentence will therefore contain two (or more) ∑ coordinated with each other at the topmost ∑. >Terminology/Lyons. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Unambiguity | Eco | Eco II 118 Situation/semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... II 119 ...how and why the phrase has to be used in one sense or another. Clarity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meaning, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. >Circumstances, >Situations, >Sense, >Interpretation. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. If you stop at the distinguishers, you do not consider all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are signs or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial signs. (Problem of interpretation). 3. The lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be... II 120 ...considered, neither the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. (Problem of interpretation: Situations/Eco, Situations/Katz). |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Unambiguity | Katz | Eco II 118 Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible interpretations, but the theory does not want to define,... --- II 119 ....how and why the phrase must be used in one sense or another. >Sense, >Ambiguity. Unambiguity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meanings, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. If you stop at the distinguishers, you do not measure all connotation possibilities of the lexem. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are characters or character groups that are used to interpret the initial character. (>Problem of interpretation). 3. The lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branchings, will not... --- II 120 ...be taken into account, nor the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Words | Bloomfield | Lyons I 200 Lexeme/Linguistics/Lyons: in this (abstract) use we determined above that e. g."singing" is only a form of another word, while "singer" is a word of its own. >Lexemes. Modern LinguisticsVs: neglects this abstract form. e.g.: BloomfieldVsTradition: the school grammar is inaccurate because it describes units such as e.g. book, books, or e.g. do, does, did, as different forms of the same word. I 201 LyonsVsBloomfield: however, is inaccurate in that it is still up to us how we define "word". Lexeme/Lyons: let's introduce the lexeme here as the more abstract form of the word (neither phonological, nor grammatical). These abstract units, according to the syntactic rules, are present in different forms of flexion. Cf. >Morphemes, >Phonemes, >Phonology, cf. >Signs, Lexeme/Spelling/Lyons: with capital letters e.g. CUT. Lyons I 204 Def Word/Bloomfield/Lyons: (most famous modern definition): the word is the "smallest free form". Def Bound Form/Bloomfield/Lyons: Shapes that never appear alone as whole utterances. Def Free Form: a form that can occur alone as an expression. Def Smallest Free Form/Bloomfield: any free form that does not contain any part of its own. (= word). ((s)Vs: Problem: then unacceptable is not a word, because acceptable is a word). LyonsVsBloomfield: this applies to phonological rather than grammatical words. I 205 Bloomfield: did not distinguish clearly between grammatical and phonological words. BloomfieldVsBloomfield/Lyons: he himself recognised that some words are not covered by his definition, such as "the" and "a" (indefinite article). This is because they hardly ever appear as independent utterances. Solution/Bloomfield: additional criterion: treat "the" and "a" as "this" and "that". These occur sometimes freely ((s) in answers) and are in the same environment within the sentence. LyonsVsBloomfield: the definition has been accepted by many, but it does not serve the main purpose of the grammatical description to create sentences ((s) rules?) from which actual and possible expressions can be derived. All questions of classification must be subordinated to this objective. |
LingBloom I Leonard Bloomfield Language New York 1945 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Words | Lyons | I 71 Word/Linguistics/Lyons: is ambiguous (which we can now make clear as a) a composition of expressive elements (sounds) (realisation). b) completely abstract as a grammatical function. (formal). c) a graphic substance (irrelevant here). >Ambiguity, >Phonemes, >Morphemes, >Sentences, >Syntax, >Grammar. I 197 Word/Linguistics/Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: in traditional grammar the word is the unity par excellence. It is the basis for distinguishing between morphology and syntax and at the same time the most important unit of lexicography. (encyclopedia). I 198 Def Morphology/Tradition/Lyons: deals with the structure of words. Def Syntax: deals with the rules for joining words into sentences. Contrary to the syntax: Flexion. Flexion/Linguistics/Tradition/Lyons: = Theory of Form. I 200 Word/Linguistics/Lyons: the term "word" is ambiguous: a) phonological word that represents b) grammatical word that is represented phonologically (or orthographically). >Representation. For example, the phonological word [säng] represents the grammatical preterite of singular There are now cases where 1. one phonological word represents several grammatical [postmen]: postman and post men 2. several phonological words represent a grammatical word: Example[räd]: Preterite of read or adjective red. c) Third, abstract form of "word": lexeme. I 203 Def Word/Lyons: it was proposed to define "word" as "any section of a sentence", "at the ends of which a pause is possible". Lyons: this is of course not a definition, but a description of the material with which linguistics works. It is a help for its work. Def Word/Linguistics/Semantic Definition/Lyons: (well known definition): "a word can be defined as the connection of a certain meaning with a certain sound complex which has a certain grammatical use". Lyons: this implies that the word is simultaneously a semantic, phonological and grammatical unit. Problem: it may be that all units meet these three conditions, I 204 but they're not the only units they need. For example, whole syntagmas such as "the new book" have a fixed meaning, form and use. The same applies to distributionally limited segments, even of higher rankings. Wrong solution: to consider words as the smallest segments of expressions that meet the three conditions. Vs: that is still not enough: e.g. the "un" and "acceptable" of "unacceptable" satisfy all three conditions. Moreover, the word "unacceptable" is more or less synonymous with the syntagma "not acceptable". >Synonymy. Word/sound/criterion/phonology/Lyons: the phonological characteristic for the delimitation of the word is never more than a side effect. We define the word exclusively grammatically. Word/Definition/Lyons: Problem: how to define a unit that occupies a middle rank between morpheme and sentence, so that it somewhat corresponds to our intuitions, whereby this intuition is rather guided by the non-essential orthographic convention? I 207 Word/phonological/Lyons: in many languages words are phonologically marked, usually with an accent. Word accent/Lyons: there are fixed and rigid word accents and also "restricted free". E.g. Latin: Accent position is generally determined by the length of the penultimate syllable. Polish: always on the second to last Turkish: generally on the last Czech: on the initial syllable Vocal harmony: exists in Turkish and Hungarian within the word boundaries. I 208 Word accents/Lyons: for all languages with word accents applies that a sentence has as many accents as words. Different: e.g. Russian: here the word "ne" ("not") never has an accent. Accents/Lyons: cannot be the primary characteristic for the delimitation of words. E.g. French: here a congruence between phonological and grammatical structure can be found, if at all, for units of higher rank than the word. Word/Criteria/Lyons: the two criteria above are not only independent of each other, but also independent of the criteria for defining morphemes as smallest grammatical units. The result is that the same units in certain languages I 210 can be words and morphemes at the same time. For example the morphs /nais/, ,/boi/, /wont/ (nice, boy, want) simultaneously the morphemes "nice", "boy" and "want" and grammatical words, each consisting of a morpheme. >Morphemes. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bloomfield, L. | Lyons, J. Vs Bloomfield, L. | Lyons I 201 Lexem/Linguistics/Lyons: in this (more abstract) use we have stated above that e.g. "singing" is only a form of another word, while "singer" is a word of its own. Modern LinguisticsVs: neglects this abstract form. E.g.: BloomfieldVsTradition: the school grammar is inaccurate because it designates units such as e.g. book, books, or e.g. do, does, did as different forms of the same word. I 201 LyonsVsBloomfield: but is inaccurate in that it is still up to us how we define "word". Lexem/Lyons: here we introduce the more abstract form of word (neither phonological nor grammatical). It is these abstract units that occur in different flexion forms according to the syntactic rules. Lexem/Writing/Lyons: with capital letters e.g. CUT. Word/Definition/Lyons: Problem: how to define a unit that occupies a middle rank between morpheme and proposition, so that it corresponds to some extent to our intuitions, whereby these intuitions are rather guided by the non-essential orthographic convention? Def Word/Bloomfield/Lyons: (best known modern definition): the word is the "smallest free form" ((s) in the language). Def bound form/Bloomfield/Lyons: forms that never occur alone as whole utterances. Def free form: a form that can occur alone as an utterance. Def smallest free form/Bloomfield: any free form that does not contain a part itself. (= word). LyonsVsBloomfield: this applies more to phonological than to grammatical words. I 205 Bloomfield: did not clearly distinguish between grammatical and phonological words. BloomfieldVsBloomfield/Lyons: Bloomfield himself realized that some words are not covered by his definition like "the" and "a" (indefinite article). This is because they hardly ever occur as independent utterances. Solution/Bloomfield: additional criterion: to treat "the" and "a" like "this" and "that". These sometimes occur freely ((s) in answers) and stand within the sentence in the same environment. LyonsVsBloomfield: the definition has been accepted by many, but it does not serve the main purpose of grammatical description to generate sentences from which actual and possible utterances can be derived. All questions of classification must be subordinated to this goal. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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