Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 24 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average Utility | Rawls | I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Contingency | Leibniz | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: Every thing is contingent - if another thing were different, it would not be thus - all things are causally connected. Causes/Leibniz: their number can be unlimited - there is not necessarily a temporal beginning. Sufficient reason: must then lie outside the world. >Inside/outside/Leibniz. Therefore there must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof of God is based on the implicit (disproved) ontological argument. >Proof of God's existence, >World/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Existence | Leibniz | Holz I 48/49 Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason. Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum). >Inside/outside/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means: Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one." Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason. Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle. >Totality/Leibniz. Holz I 70 Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it. Holz I 71 "We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self). >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole). Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. >Necessity/Leibniz. In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Holz I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" are in a very specific follow-up ratio: The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. Holz I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. Holz I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Holz I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. Holz I 91 Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason. 2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause. 3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought. 4. So there is a cause! Holz I 92 5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving). 7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible. 8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others. 9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities. 10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content. 11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world). 12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety. Holz I 93 13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory). Holz I 120 World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself. Holz I 12 Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well. Then we can reformulate the question: Why does this world exist and not another? >Possible world/Leibniz, >Possibility/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Explanation | Railton | Lewis V 233 Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws. 2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place. If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability. >Deductive-nomological. Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining: 1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws) 2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions. >Sufficiency. LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach. But that is not available! >Covering laws. V 233/234 Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered. Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted! 2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events. 3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause! 4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause. 5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. >Explanation/Lewis. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model. Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it? Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws. If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments. But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little. But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions. "Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient. Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of. Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused. Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs. >Causal dependence, >Causality, >Causes, >Causal explanation. |
Railt P. Railton Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Government Failure | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 49 Government Failure/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Government failure arises from two problems. 1) First, in many cases the information necessary to allocate resources efficiently is not available to policy-makers. 2) Second, even if the information necessary to implement optimal policies is available, policy-makers often do not have strong enough incentives to implement such policies. Buchanan’s discussion of externalities provides an example of a situation in which sufficient information is not available to implement the theoretically optimal policy. Taxation: In theory, there is an optimal corrective tax that could be placed on an externality to produce an efficient outcome. In practice, though, the information necessary to discover this optimal tax is unavailable. Boudreaux I 50 Even if policy-makers want to implement an optimal tax, they lack the information necessary to do so. >Optimal tax, >Taxation. Buchanan, however, placed special emphasis on the fact that even if all the necessary information were available, policy-makers often have poor incentives to implement optimal policies. >Incentives. Elected officials and government employees act to further their own interests, just like everyone else. Elected officials often undertake actions designed to boost their popularity leading up to an election, and government bureaucrats often make decisions motivated by what would give them pay increases or would increase their agencies’ budgets. >Democracy/Buchanan, >Bureaucracy, >Political elections. Market failure: Traditional public-expenditure theory focuses on market failures - that is, on why the market does not allocate resources as efficiently as is theoretically possible - and develops theoretical models to explain how, in theory, resources could be allocated more efficiently. BuchananVsTradition: Buchanan takes a different approach to public-expenditure theory. 1) First, he divides government’s functions into two conceptual categories: a) the protective state and b) the productive state. The first justification Buchanan offers for public expenditures is to protect its citizens. Beyond that, the productive state can provide collectively consumed goods in situations in which the market might perform inadequately. >Market failure, >Government policies, >Government spending, >Public finance. Two big areas in traditional public finance that cite market failure as a reason for government action are externalities and public goods, and in both of these areas, Buchanan offers a distinctive approach in which he analyzes how individuals can cooperate with each other to allocate resources more efficiently. >Cooperation, >Public goods, >Collective goods. His theory of clubs analyzes public goods by looking at the groups that consume them rather than by analyzing the goods themselves. >Clubs/Buchanan. This approach depicts public goods more realistically - as existing on a continuum between public and private goods rather than being at one extreme or the other. It also shows how individuals can cooperate to produce public goods. Boudreaux I 51 Buchanan also analyzes externalities by examining the ways in which individuals can cooperate to allocate resources more efficiently rather than relying on government-imposed solutions. >Externalities/Buchanan. In drawing a parallel between market failure and government failure, Buchanan’s insight is that democratic political systems create their own inevitable externalities. Some people can use the system to impose costs on others. This reality is a sufficient reason to raise questions about any government action ostensibly meant to “correct” a market failure. Such action unavoidably carries the risk of government failure. Buchanan concluded that when evaluating public policy, any imperfections in market activity must be compared against the inevitable imperfections inherent in government action. Such a comparison does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that government action is never warranted, but it does avoid the bias in favour of government action created by the standard assumption that government officials are fully informed and always act apolitically and exclusively in the public interest. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Ideology | Foucault | II 262 Science: Once it is constituted, it does not absorb all that the discursive practice formed in which it appears. It also does not dissolve the knowledge that surrounds it in order to evade errors. Ideology/Foucault: does not lie outside of science. There is no sufficient reason to turn the totality of their statements into error, in contradiction, and in the absence of objectivity. No question of the application of knowledge, but the question of the existence of discursive practice and its functioning alongside other practices. A discourse that corrects errors cannot be separated from ideology. Science can work ideologically. Science is a practice alongside other practices. >Science, >Practise, >Contradiction. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Infinity | Hegel | Holz I 87 Infinity/scholasticism/Holz: infinity allows a syncategorematic but not a categorematic infinite ((s) that is, that "infinite" can always occur together with the idea of a unity.) >Syncategorematic. The truly infinite is not a modification but the absolute. >Absoluteness, >Absoluteness/Hegel. Holz I 87 Poor infinity/Hegel: poor infinity is the mere progress of addition. Holz: this must be metaphysically founded by the principle of the sufficient ground, according to which the multiplicity is traced back to the unity of the origin. >Foundation, >Sufficient reason, >Metaphysics, >Beginning/Hegel, >Unity and multiplicity. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Justification | Leibniz | Holz I 68 Truths of facts/Leibniz: here, too, the proposition of the sufficient reason should apply, although truths of reason do not come into play here. Here the "also" is important: it states something about the logical status of truths of facts as a kind of truth of reason. Truths of facts/Leibniz: are now distinguished from truths of reason as their opposite! (Namely, as not logically justifiable). >Sufficiency/Leibniz, -> Reasons/Leibniz,> Truth/Leibniz,> Principles/Leibniz. Holz I 69 Definition "Golden Chain" of the links/Holz: metaphor of the baroque. "Aura catena": if one is defined by its relation to another, then the totality of the elements is the reason of this one. Chain/Leibniz: more than temporal: one is respectively more determined by its closer neighbor. Sufficient justification/Leibniz: something can be adequately justified by its connection with its nearest neighbors, but not completely. Holz I 70 Complete justification/reason/determination/Leibniz: only through the whole chain. (infinite, only to be seen by God). The individual terms would have to be given by identical sentences. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Many-Worlds Interpretation | Kanitscheider | II 122 Many-worlds-interpretation/coincidence/existence/life/Kanitscheider: Brandon Carter 1974(1) Suggestion: to accept an ensemble of worlds in which a real subset has a life-favorable tuning of the constants. The fact that our world belongs to the knowable subset is then logically necessary, otherwise we could not make such a consideration. ((s) Reversal: many worlds instead of a one-off coincidence. The anthropic principle works in reverse). Kanitscheider: This reduces the astonishment that we exist. Cf. >Anthropic principle. Many worlds/Epicurus(2): There are countless worlds, some similar to ours, some dissimilar. After all, atoms are not built for one world, nor for a limited number of worlds. Nothing stands in the way of the assumption of an infinite number of worlds. II 123 Many worlds/Giordano Bruno(3): It is a general, empty, immeasurable space in which countless globes float like this one. Space is infinite because there is no reason or possibility to limit it. Many worlds/Huygens(4): (1629 - 1695): "Principle of Plenitudo" as justification. Nature harbors unlimited potential, one would restrict its creative power too much if one only assumed one world. Many worlds/tradition/Kanitscheider: In traditional theses, very different ideas are assumed, some of these worlds are presented as alien planets, but always with a causal connection among these "worlds". Many worlds/modern cosmology/Kanitscheider: causal decoupling is assumed here. Among other things, because of infinite distances. >Causality. Many worlds/laws of nature/George Gamov(5): One could assume that the fundamental laws of relativity, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics apply to all worlds, but the natural constants have different values. >Natural constants. II 124 Some of these worlds are perfectly imaginable, while others, which are logically possible simply because they contain no internal contradictions, elude our imagination. Many worlds/Kanitscheider: Which processes take place in worlds with any but constant legal structure can hardly be determined. But you can override individual laws in a thought experiment. Eg second law suspended: anti-entropic worlds already have such bizarre properties that we probably cannot understand them properly. Empiricism/observation/Kanitscheider: Even in very close areas there are zones that are inaccessible to measuring devices for physical reasons. E.g. the interior of the sun. We will never observe it directly. >Quantum mechanics, >Measuring. II 125 Many worlds/Kanitscheider: If there was a proof from the principles of physics that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity are the only ones that make our world possible, the matter would have been superfluous. But there is no such proof whatsoever. Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: Whether the one-world hypothesis is the simplest depends on the respective theoretical situation. For example, in chaotic inflation, where quantum fluctuations in high-dimensional superspace represent the natural state of reality, a single world would be a difficult assumption. Many Worlds Interpretation/EWG/Everett(6)(9)/Wheeler/Graham: here the wave function contains all possibilities of states in superposition. Quantum cosmology/Kanitscheider: The traditional separation of measuring device, observer and object cannot be maintained here, since there is no outside. >Quantum mechanics. Everett/Wheeler/Graham/EWG: This thesis now proposes that the state vector (the geometric counterpart of the wave function in Hilbert space) never collapses. Instead, splitting up into parallel worlds. >Wave function. II 126 Simplicity/Theory/Kanitscheider: In view of the many-worlds interpretation, one can ask which quantum mechanics of measurement should be considered simpler: 1. The one that works with an acausal, discontinuous, untimely, indeterministic collapse process, or 2. The one that is based on a more comprehensive reality, but also on a deterministic, causal, continuous, dynamically describable measurement process. >Simplicity. Elementary particle physics/today/Kanitscheider: Everything that is not forbidden actually occurs. So decays that do not violate the conservation laws. >Conservation laws. Many Worlds/Sciama(7): The theory means no violation of Occam's razor if one interprets this as the lowest number of restrictions that are compatible with the observational material. Cf. >Conservativity. II 127 Einzigigkeit/Leibniz(8): Metaphysical justification: there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God. >Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Cf. >Possible Worlds. 1. Brandon Carter (1974). Large Number Coincidence amd the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology. In: M.S. Longair (Ed): Cosmological Theories in Confrontation with Cosmological Data. In: International Astronomical Union Symposium Nr. 63. Dordrecht. pp.291-298. 2. Diogenes Laertius: LEben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Buch X, 45, 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner. 1967. S. 243f. 3. Giordano Bruno: De L'infinito universo et mondi. Zitiert nach: A. Koyré: Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 1969. 4. Ch. Huyghens;: The Celestial Worlds discovered: or, Conjectures concerning the inhabitants, planets and productions of the worlds in the planets. London 1698. 5. George Gamov: Mr. Tompkins seltsame Reisen durch Kosmos und Mikrokosmos. Braunschweig: Vieweg 1980. 6. B. S. DeWitt: The Everett-Wheeler-Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In: C. DeWitt/J.A. Wheeler (eds.): Bettelle Rencontres, 1967, Lectures in Mathematics and Physics. New York: W.A. Benjamin 1968, S. 318-332 7. D.W. Sciama: The Anthropic Principle and the non-uniqueness of the Universe. In: F. Bertola/U. CUri (eds.): The Anthropic Principle. Cambridge: UP 1993, pp. 107-110. 8. G.W. Leibniz: Monadologie. Hamburg: Meiner 1976 § 53. 9. Hugh Everett (1957). “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. In: Reviews of modern physics. Vol. 29, 1957, S. 454–462 |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Principles | Leibniz | Holz I 47 Principle/Proof/Leibniz: from the principles of identity and experience (manifoldness is perceived by me) can be proved, 1. that a proof of it is impossible, 2. that all other sentences depend on it. (If they are not true, there is no knowledge at all). >Proof/Leibniz. I 47 Identity Principle/Leibniz: the identity principle is not derived from the senses, but is set with the senses. >Identity/Leibniz. I 56 Reflexive principles/Leibniz: 1. the assumption that the syllogism is valid, 2. that the contradiction is paradoxical. I 57 This is, however, formal and does not yet lead to a substantive positing of material truth. I 66 Truths of Reason/Leibniz: here there are two great principles: 1. the principle of non-contradiction 2. the principle of determining reason. (Sufficient reason). >Reason/Leibniz. I 67 "Although these determinant reasons are generally not sufficiently known, we still see that they are present." Insight into the existence of the reason is a priori, for the reason is nothing other than the inesse of the determining factor in the corresponding fact. (> Ratiocinatio: reduction to identical sentences). I 77 Axiom: Variety principle: "I perceive different things" (varia a me percipiuntur). This is undoubtedly by direct intuition. This is not provable as empiricism, but it is also not a burden of proof, since it is directly given. I 125 Perfection/existence/Leibniz: e.g. suppose A, B, C, D are equal, but D is incompatible with A and B, the others are all compatible with each other except D, then it follows that A, B, and C exist if D is excluded. This is the principle of composibility. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Probability | Rawls | I 172 Probability/philosophy/society/justice/Rawls: that probability plays a role in the theory of justice and philosophy is a consequence of the contract theory, which considers moral philosophy as part of the theory of rational choice. >Contract Theory. The veil of ignorance (the members of the initial situation of a society to be established do not know anything about their later position) leads directly to the problem of the decision under uncertainty. >Veil of ignorance, >Decisions, >Decision theory. Problem: we must not allow the principles we have chosen to depend on the willingness of individuals to take risks. >Principles/Rawls. There must be a risk assessment, but it must not depend on the individual individuals. Probability estimation/Rawls: must be based on known facts. I 173 We need objective reasons, especially because individuals want their decisions to be plausible to others. The information should, however, come from the principle of the insufficient reason (equal probability distribution for all unknown possibilities) and not from the knowledge of contingent facts. Problem: lastly, the assessment must be about the assessment of a single individual, but we only have the assessment of changing individuals. Rawls: at the moment I cannot offer a solution for this. I 174 Perspective/Rawls: Problem: we can put ourselves in another person's position, but we cannot evaluate his situation including his character and all circumstances, without any reference to the details of our own conception of what a good is. The value of the circumstances of others is not as the construction would have expected, the value of the circumstances for the other himself. >Circumstances, >Self/Rawls. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Probability Theory | Norvig | Norvig I 503 Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of Norvig I 504 results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…). The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)(1). The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)(2): “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...” Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763)(4). Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case. Kolmogorov (1950(5), first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970)(6) later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive. Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705). Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another. Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly. Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921)(7). Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963)(8), R. A. Fisher (1922)(9), and Richard von Mises (1928)(10) were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation. Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959(11), first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry. Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931)(12), Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)(14), Leonard Savage (1954)(15), Richard Jeffrey (1983)(16), and E. T. Jaynes (2003)(17) interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets. Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e. Norvig I 505 Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e. Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948(18), 1950(19)). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)(20) showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic. Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946)(14) shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)(21) describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)(22) shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)(17) has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic. Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949)(23). Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977(24), 1983(25)), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)(26) extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)(27) contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692 2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657). 3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur, Paris. 4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea. 6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability Theory. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan. 8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 25. 9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368. 10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer 11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books. 12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68. 14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14(1), 1–13. 15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press. 17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. 18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148. 19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press 20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court. 21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435. 22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34, 3–24. 23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press 24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521. 25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397. 26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92, pp. 602-608. 27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Probability Theory | Russell | Norvig I 503 Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of Norvig I 504 results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…). The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)(1). The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)(2): “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...” Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763)(4). Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case. Kolmogorov (1950(5), first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970)(6) later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive. Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705). Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another. Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly. Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921)(7). Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963)(8), R. A. Fisher (1922)(9), and Richard von Mises (1928)(10) were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation. Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959(11), first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry. Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931)(12), Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)(14), Leonard Savage (1954)(15), Richard Jeffrey (1983)(16), and E. T. Jaynes (2003)(17) interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets. Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e. Norvig I 505 Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e. Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948(18), 1950(19)). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)(20) showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic. Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946)(14) shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)(21) describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)(22) shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)(17) has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic. Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949)(23). Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977(24), 1983(25)), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)(26) extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)(27) contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692 2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657). 3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur, Paris. 4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea. 6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability Theory. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan. 8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 25. 9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368. 10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer 11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books. 12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68. 14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14(1), 1–13. 15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press. 17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. 18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148. 19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press 20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court. 21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435. 22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34, 3–24. 23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press 24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521. 25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397. 26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92, pp. 602-608. 27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Qualities | Hume | I 97 Qualities/HumeVsLocke: VsDistinction primary/secondary qualities: perception does not allow the distinction (HumeVsSubstance). >Substance. I 105 The negation of the >principle of sufficient reason corresponds to the negation of the >primary qualities. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Reason | Schopenhauer | Korfmacher Schopenhauer zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 I 28 Principle of sufficient reason/Schopenhauer: fourfold root: the four classes of ideas accordingly. 1st Empirically: causality, reason of becoming 2nd Corresponding to the terms: the basis of knowledge, justification of judgments 3rd According to the a priori forms of space and time : location, sequence in time, by pure sensuality, ground of being 4th Law of motivation, which corresponds to the subject of the will, reason for action. >Imagination, >Reason (Justification), >Justification, >Ultimate Jusification, >Causality, >Change, >Concepts, >Recognition, >Judgments, >a priori, >Space, >Time, >Being, >Motivation, >Actions. I 25 Mind (Verstand)/Schopenhauer: has only one object. Reason (Vernunft): merges objects. |
|
| Reason (Justification) | Leibniz | Holz I 66 Proposition of sufficient reason/principle/Leibniz: "nothing happens without sufficient reason, without which it is possible for the person who is sufficiently acquainted with things to state a reason why it is so and not otherwise." This is a derivative of the identity principle. Its validity is logically necessary. >Necessity/Leibniz, I 67 Reason/Leibniz: that something has a reason is that it does not exist from itself, not isolated per se. Reason is the foundation of the world, in which every individual is admitted (> chain/Leibniz). I 75 Reason/Leibniz: can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is, however, not to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! >Order/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz. Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as a depicting) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as a totality of the series) must be within the series. Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (totality of the series of things, world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all! >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Reasons | Armstrong | III 159 Principle of Sufficient Reason/explanation/ArmstrongVsRationalism /VsSchopenhauer/Armstrong: if we accept the principle then we must accept that laws can be brought under laws of a higher level - then again problem that there is no sufficient reasonfor a higher level law. >Explanation/Armstrong, >Laws/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Review | Schurz | I 128 Verification/strict case/Mill/Schurz: (not statistical): consists of two activities: 1. method of agreement: truth/falsity, verification/falsification. 2. method of difference: relevance/irrelevance. >Relevance, >Truth, >Verification, >Falsification. 1st Method of matching/Mill: A sample, "experimental group". I 129 This is a selection of individuals from a range for which just the property A is valid and not an arbitrary property, Ex "All ravens are black" should not be compared with nails, flowers, and gorillas. 2nd Method of difference/mill: to check the relevance, one chooses an A control sample (control group) to which also A applies. Representativeness/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in some qualitative property. Now, if we vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance of finding falsifying individuals in the A sample (sufficient reason). >Sufficiency. Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had considered this as metaphysical necessity. >Necessity, >Essence, >Essentialism. Principle of sufficient reason/SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to the strict scrutiny so called by Popper: one should not examine the expansion under heat only on metals. I 131 Methodical induction/law hypotheses//Schurz: a) when testing a given strict hypothesis, one first tests for truth and then for relevance. b) if one searches for an unknown cause or law hypothesis for a given effect, one proceeds in reverse. I 134 Statistical case: Check for presumptive truth/Statistics/Schurz: method of Acceptance intervals: Ex law hypothesis: p(Kx I Ax) = 80 %.AG out of 100 trees examined, 75 were diseased. How do you infer the plausibility of the population frequency hypothesis p(K I A) from the sampling frequency hn(K I A)? According to Fisher (1956)(1), one can calculate the statistical probability that the sampling frequency has a certain size, or lies in a certain size interval, given the hypothesis is true. This is based on the binomial distribution. (...). I 137 Check for presumptive relevance/statistical/Schurz: A control group: in the simplest case, consists of individuals who do not have trait A. I 141 Statistical representativeness/criterion/definition/Schurz: difference from strict case: now the representativeness requirement says not only that the accompanying circumstances should vary as much as possible, but more specifically that all other relevant factors in the A sample should be distributed as equally as possible in frequency. Bsp factors other than car exhaust that make trees sick, e.g., pest infestations. Representativeness/definition: if all relevant characteristics in the sample are equally distributed as in the population. The assumption that this is the case is of course based on induction and cannot be guaranteed by any method. Criterion: to make this possible at all, it must be ensured that the criterion of representativeness is obtained independently of the definition of representativeness. Or rather, its fulfillment must be able to be guaranteed independently of the inductive generalization step. Solution: the criteria are derived from the method of sample generation. Method: most important: random sampling. The probability distribution of deviation from the population is then statistically calculable. Random selection implies universal accessibility. narrow random selection: completely blind. wide: with equal chances of getting into the selection. I 175 Testing/Schurz: a theoretical hypothesis can be tested against not just one, but as many as possible equally plausible indicators. I 176 Indicator: for each one, it is necessary to check whether and which hidden variables are introduced by it. 1. Fisher, R.A. (1956). Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. New York: Hafner Press, (New edition Oxford Univ. Press, 1995). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Risks | Rawls | I 168 Risks/Rawls: In the initial situation of a society to be established, when members find themselves behind a veil of ignorance about their future position, it is first of all that everyone has information about their own abilities. It is therefore unlikely that everyone will have the same chances of finding out who they are later on. In any case, a newcomer has knowledge of his or her abilities and bases his or her risk assessments on this knowledge. But at the last stage of the initial situation, however, there is complete ignorance of contingent facts, the construction of individual expectations is based solely on the principle of inadequate reason (principle of insufficient reason). This principle is used to assess probabilities in the absence of any information. Def principle of insufficient reason: under the condition of lack of any information, all possible results are equally likely. I 169 Initial situation/Rawls: then we can link different types of information within a strictly probabilistic framework and draw conclusions about probabilities without further knowledge(1). Vs Principle of insufficient reason: see J. M. Keynes(2). Solution/Carnap: an alternative system of inductive logic with other theoretical means than those of the classical principle(3). Principle of insufficient reason/Rawls: excludes that initial opportunities are ignored. Solution/Rawls: in the initial situation we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice according to the theory of justice as fairness, then the imponderables can be circumvented: Cf. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. This guarantees fundamental freedoms. 1. See W. Feller, Probability and Profit, pp. 27f. 2. See J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, London, 1921, ch. IV. 3. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd. ed. Chicago, 1962. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Sufficiency | Leibniz | Holz I 66 Sentence of the sufficient reason/principle/Leibniz: "nothing is done without sufficient reason, without which it is possible for the person who is sufficiently acquainted with things to state a reason why it is so and not otherwise." This is a derivative of the identity principle. Its validity is logically necessary. >Principles/Leibniz, >Identity principle/Leibniz, >Necessity/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz, >Justification/Leibniz, >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Thinking | Leibniz | Holz I 41 Thinking/Leibniz: the contents are ultimately determined by definitions and axioms. >Definition/Leibniz, >Axiom/Leibniz. I 69 Thinking/Leibniz: means to think of relationships and connections. Def "Golden Chain" of the connections/Holz: metaphor of the baroque. "Aura catena": if one is defined by its relation to another, then the totality of the elements is the reason of this one. Chain/Leibniz: more than temporal: one is respectively more determined by its closer neighbor. Sufficient reason/Leibniz: something can be adequately substantiated by its connection with its nearest neighbor, but not completely. >Sufficiency/Leibniz, >Terminology/Leibniz. I 70 Complete justification/reason/determination/Leibniz: is only possible through the whole chain. (Infinite, only to be seen by God). The individual terms would have to be given by identical sentences. >Ultimate justification, >Identity/Leibniz. I 77 Unity/multiplicity/Leibniz: now the multiplicity of the world (manifoldness of perceptions) is given empirically. >Perception/Leibniz; cf. >Unity and multiplicity. Axiom: Variety principle: "I perceive different things" (varia a me percipiuntur). This is undoubtedly by direct intuition. This is not provable as empiricism, but it is also not a burden of proof, since it is directly given. (> Given). From this it follows that if the being of the world as a whole is necessary, "every contingent is necessary in a certain way." Holz: necessity is thus overlapping over contingency. I 78 Principle of Variety/Principles/Thinking/Leibniz: the formal principle of thinking is based on the principle of variety. ((s) Because you cannot think of a single thing without relation to anything else.) Double movement/ascent/descent/Leibniz/Holz: from the certainty of the perceived multiplicity, one can now ascend to the infinitesimal boundary concept "all beings at the same time". >Principles/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Ultimate Justification | Leibniz | Holz I 50 Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. I 50 Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. I 51 Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category. Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin. Logic/Husserl: Husserl has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content. >Content/Husserl. I 52 Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. I 75 Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! >Reason/Leibniz. Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series. Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all I 83 Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient: 1. Principle of contradiction 2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking. >Principles/Leibniz. HolzVsLeibniz/HolzVsHegel: This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form. Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted. Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate. I 123 Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles: 1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself) 2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all. One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place). I 124 But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths: Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first. According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all. >Possibility/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz. In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible). A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions). From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Ultimate Justification | Nozick | II 131 ff Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing 2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist. Richness: all possibilities are realized. Cf. >Possible Worlds/Leibniz, >Possible Worlds. Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds. >Possibility, cf. >Real world. In addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance). >Invariance, >Bare Facts, >Existence/Nozick. II 137 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. >Reflexivity, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 138 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). >Circular reasoning, >Lists. Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation. >Sufficient reason. II 278 Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. >Wholes, >Totality. A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence. >Justification, >Explanation, >Evidence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| World | Leibniz | Holz I 25 World/Leibniz/Holz: for Leibniz the world is divided in three areas: 1. Nature 2. Processuality of history 3. "res cogitans". World/world model/explanation/Philosophy/Leibniz: Leibniz was the first to recognize that a theory of the world is not a theory of qualitative statements about substances, but must be designed as a relation system in which unity is determined by multiplicity. I 29 World/Leibniz: the construction of a world model is thus directed to unity as a relation term, in which unity and multiplicity are understood as a real relation. I 47/48 World/Leibniz: Problem: how the concept of the totality of all beings and all facts can be constructed from it. >Totality/Leibniz. Since, like the number of sense-perceptions, the number of the corresponding identical propositions (and axioms) is also infinite. I 75 World/Leibniz: from the universal context, which is necessary for the determination of each individual (complete concept), it follows that, if one changes, the whole changes. I 88 Final Justification/metaphysics/Leibniz: outside of the world, there is some dominating one, not as much as the soul in me, more like my ego in my body. (?) - Although of much higher reason. The sufficient reason of existence cannot only be found in no individual, but also not in the whole aggregate and the set of things. It is different from the chain of connections. >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. I 89 This is in the sense of the logical process, a subject to which all possible predicates belong to (as far as they are composable). This subject must be external to the world because the world is its predicate! But this external to the world is also the world itself, because it is its only predicate! (But this "entelechy" must not be regarded as an existence, which is added to the world as a separate being, but as an organizing principle). Apparent paradox: the only essential being must at the same time be thought of as the world as a whole and as external to the world. >Interior/exterior/Leibniz. Dissolution: the double movement of reasoning thought: ascending and descending. I 90 1. Ascending: here the reason is external to the world because the world cannot think of a quantitatively determined end. 2. Descending: here the whole world appears as the unfolding of the One, in which it is included. >Order/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Stalnaker Vs Carnap, R. | I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/terminology/Stalnaker: I developed the liberal platonism (LP) earlier to explain the difference between reference to numbers and normal things. But it is not a defense of the MR: thesis: one starts with facts of mathematical discourse e.g. existence of a practice that contains among others assertions, inference, arguments. If we then have Tarskian semantics (and require a domain of goods we are talking about) then this explains the facts about the discourse. Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate it is not a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and the semantics really tells us what the statements say? ((s) >content, >assertion). ((s) short: LP: thesis: practice is sufficiently without immaterial realm). I 44 Problem: then the LP says carelessly, that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. FieldVsStalnaker: that is a kind of linguistic idealism. Field pro Carnap: (Carnap: "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", 1950): as an external issue what numbers are it violates Carnap's principle. Platonism/Field: two theses: 1. numbers, functions and sets exist 2. they are mind-independent. Stalnaker: if I had formulated more cautiously, I would have set up a real platonism. Empiricist sense criterion/Carnap/Stalnaker: would say as we all: if the language did not exist, the statements would not be meaningful. Stalnaker: but that is still compatible with the fact that it still could be true. Internal issues: within a frame External issues: purely practical questions of whether to accept the frame. QuineVsCarnap/Stalnaker: thesis: all questions are asked in any linguistic context, and questions such as "Is it reasonable to accept a frame of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Hempel, C. | Lewis Vs Hempel, C. | V 232 Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences: 1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all 2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue. I prefer Peter Railton's model: Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.). We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances. Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument! LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument. V 233 Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises. 2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place. If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability. Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation: 1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws) 2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach. But this cannot be achieved! V 233/234 An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones. e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded! 2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified. 3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause. 4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause. E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause. 5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model. Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them? Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.) If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments. But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough. But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions. "Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form. Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree. Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things. Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Kant | Leibniz Vs Kant | Frege III 31 Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1, one can prove it, in a way: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2, 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains. Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 Leibniz I 83 Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient. 1. Principle of contradiction 2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality). as panlogically as Hegel's system. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form. Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created. Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate. I 128 Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation". The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential. In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines": The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes). I 129 The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.) LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance. The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways. 1. as a whole but each time under another perspective 2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances, 3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference. I 130 This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes]. The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation. This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other. I 133 Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else. I 134 The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Genz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a beam scale can also be stable in an inclined position! - The equilibrium is indifferent. LeibnizVs: e.g. Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, none will occur -Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantialism: there can be no independent space - otherwise the universe in it could be shifted (senseless) - today: VsLeibniz - Solution: spontaneous symmetry calculation. Sentence of the sufficient reason/Leibniz: for example Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation to the right or left, none will occur. VIII 59 Leibniz: there is never an indifferent balance. (today: wrong! (see above)) E.g. (Leibniz) If two incompatible things are equally good, God will not create either of them. VIII 60 Space/Leibniz: so there can be no independent space, independent of things, because otherwise the world could be settled in it here and there. The same applies to the time and time of the creation of the world. Spontaneous symmetry calculation: e.g. the pencil does not stand on its tip, but falls to one side. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Schurz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 129 Representativity/strict case/Mill/Schurz: the A sample should represent the A individuals in the population as well as possible. I 130 Falsifying individuals should differ from verifying ones in a qualitative property. If we now vary the accompanying circumstances as much as possible, we maximize our chance to find falsifying individuals in the A sample. (> sufficient reason). Principle of sufficient reason/Leibniz: had regarded this as a metaphysical necessity. SchurzVsLeibniz: but it is generally valid only in deterministic universes. In indeterministic universes there are also random exceptions without any reason. However, the principle is heuristically useful. Representativity/Popper: the representativity requirement belongs to Popper's so-called strict verification: the expansion during heat should not only be investigated on metals. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent! World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning! Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world! IV 389 He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? 2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself? If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason! KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes). IV 390 Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency. Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different. The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible. Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist. IV 392 This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either: 1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them. 2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed! Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world. Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through. MackieVs: that is not true at all! IV 393 We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Putnam Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 57 Analytical/synthetical/Quine/Esfeld: quantum mechanics is a strong argument for Quine to abolish the separation between the two. One can doubt whether it is reasonable to change the law of the excluded third. N.B.: but it is not an argument against such suggestions to assert that a sentence represents an analytical truth. >Analyticity/syntheticity. Esfeld I 58 However, the simple availability of such a proposed amendment cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason for that there is no separation between analytic and synthetic. (PutnamVsQuine). --- Putnam V 117 PutnamVsQuine: I think he went too far in some respects: he claimed that "no statements are immune against revision". This is obviously wrong: because under which circumstances would it be rational to say "not every statement is true", i.e. to accept "all statements are true"? Such revisions cannot be unlimited, otherwise we would have no idea of something that we can call rationality. Apart from trivial cases (e.g. "not every statement is true"), we cannot be sure that it will never be rational and not in any connection to drop a statement (rightly in a particular context) that is a "necessary" truth. --- Rorty I 218 PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals (analytical hypotheses) that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of physics of the day, is so insignificant that "it exists merely in the eyes of the person concerned." (Subjective convenience). >Analytical hypothesis. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Mackie Vs Thomas Aquinas | Stegmüller IV 394 proof of the existence of God/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: (third argument) two stages: 1. "What can not be, is not at any one time!: VsThomas: even that is doubtful: if "ephemeral things" are meant, the premise is even analytical. But it does not follow that there would have been nothing at any time. The transience may only occur in the future. 2. VsThomas: The existence of finite objects can overlap. IV 395 VSVS: this overlap could however be regarded as a single object! but this suggests the problematic idea of an underlying carrier substance. 3. VsThomas: implicitly in Aquinas: "What does not exist, can not begin to exist unless through something that exists." Now, if the sequence would have been interrupted once, it could not have been continued by anything. HumeVsThomas: we may well form the concept of uncaused cause (uncaused commencement of existence). If what we can imagine were impossible, this would have to be proven! (> Frege: contradictory terms as possible terms: then simply nothing falls into them, Cf. Round Square/Frege). Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: Anyway, let's assume there is at least one necessary and unchangeable thing. Proof of the existence of God/Infinity/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: 2. second order: Aquinas admits that the eternity of one thing could be caused by another thing; it could remain in existence by the other. But: one can not go back endlessly in the sequence of such things. IV 396 For in this order of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the second and the second is the cause of the latest, whether many intermediate links are present, or just one! But the effect is dependent on the cause. If there is no first in the sequence, then there can be no last or second. In an infinite series there is therefore no effect and no cause. MackieVsThomas: this is not conclusive: although the second is caused by the first in a finite sequence, that does of course not apply if the order of the causes were infinite. Here, every cause is caused by a previous one. Error: if we consider an infinite instead of a finite order, then the way in which the first member (first cause) "disappears", does nt include the "disappearance" of the following causes! VsVs: Mackie admits that one could improve this to become a truly conclusive argument: in a sequence, it is assumed that a relation of '"holding" or "carrying" exists, as there is in a chain. Ex. we would be very surprised if someone claimed that an infinitely long train could go without a locomotive, because the last car would be pulled from the penultimate, this one in turn from its predecessor and so on... Ex. as if an infinitely long chain did not need hangers, because each member would be held by the neighboring member. IV 397 Thomas Aquinas: his argument is: where an order of dependency relations exists, one can not go back infinitely. Such an order can therefore be neither infinite nor circular. (This is also found in the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi). Mackie: improved version of the argument by Aquinas: ("necessary" means the same as "imperishable" here): Each necessary thing either depends on something in its imperishability or it is necessary in itself. Something whose nature does not include the existence, must others depend for its existence on anything. Mackie: thereby we actually obtain a relationship of dependency which makes it necessary to make the going back in the chain of causes come to an end. In addition, then it is certain that only a being whose essence involves existence, can conclude the going back. MackieVsThomas: however, we have no reason to accept the implicit assumption of Aquinas. IV 398 Why should there be an imperishable primordial matter, whose nature includes existence, but its existence isn't derived from anything? Unlike Leibniz: the primordial matter were simply a hard fact which would have no sufficient reason. Borrowing from Leibniz would also not save Thomas' argument. Conclusion: MackieVsThomas/MackieVsLeibniz: we understand that everything that has a chronologically previous cause depends on this (somehow). But it does not follow that everything besides God needs something else on which it depends in this way (as a cause). IV 399 "Principle of Al Farabi": in a sequence of relations of dependency (that is an order) there must be an end. MackieVsAl Farabi: why should God be the only exception? Thereby one would burden the popular argument with exactly those thoughts that led to the collapse of its philosophical correspondences. Or else one seeks refuge in a mere mystery. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Freiheit | Mill, J. St. | Stegmüller IV 269 Freedom / Mill: the only justification for an intervention in the freedom of others is the prevention of damage of others. Physical or moral well-being is not a sufficient reason to intervene. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 |
| Liberal Platonsm | Stalnaker, R. | I 43 Liberal Platonism/Stalnaker: Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate, isn't it a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and semantics really tell us what the statements say? ((s) Content, > assertion), without additional assumptions about a causal link to an immaterial realm? ((s) In short: Locke's Principle: thesis: practice is sufficient without immaterial realm). I 44 Problem: then Locke's Principle carelessly says that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. |
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