Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Putnam | III 122 Absoluteness/absolute reality/PutnamVsDescartes: the representatives of absoluteness have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with the sensation of secondary qualities. Even Williams seems to assume a picture of the world without colors. >Reality, >Quality, >Sensation, >Perception, >Sensory impression. Williams: Williams ideally assumes a "theory of knowledge and of error". >Recognition, >World/Thinking, >Bernard Williams. III 132 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality tells us, but not foreign scientists, how we understand it. Cf. >Reality/Maturana. PutnamVs: so absolute reality exists only locally. Absolute Reality/Putnam: absolute reality would also require convergence. QuineVsConvergence: convergence has an inscrutability of reference. >Inscrutability, >convergence. III 134 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality functions without normative terms. PutnamVs: precisely this leads to the problem of indeterminacy of translation. Putnam: many true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies are possible. >Vocabulary. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Accidents | Hobbes | Adorno XIII 245 Accidents/accidental property/Hobbes/Adorno: The accidental is not real in Hobbes, but it is the way in which the bodies are perceived by us. Through this moment, the materialism of Hobbes, like most modern materialist philosophies, plays into positivism or empiricism. >Positivism, >Empiricism, >Materialism. This concept of accidents is already very similar to a concept which Locke, the immediate successor and radical critic of Hobbes, has characterized: the concept of secondary qualities. >Secondary qualities, >Qualities. N.B.: the relation of essence and appearance is reversed in opposition to the Platonic tradition: what is appearance there, becomes essence, namely, the body-world. On the other hand, this becomes the appearance, which is essence there, namely, the way of mental conception, or even mental activity. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Colour | Quine | I 85 Color/Quine: colors are more vague than rabbits. In order to determine whether someone is a bachelor you need additional information. The stimulus meaning is not decisive here. There is a rising line from stimulus meaning to additional information: colors - rabbit - bachelor. ((s)> Knowledge/Quine). I 386 Disposition Terms/Quine: are assumptions from fine structure (microstructure). The color: "red" is actually also a disposition term. Irreducible general terms are only paraphrasable through subjunctive conditionals (counterfactual conditionals). >Counterfactual Conditionals/Quine. II 120 ff Colors/Smart: color differences are rarely associated with significant physical differences. Aliens probably have concepts for length and electric charge, but not for color. To see the world correctly we must avoid colors and secondary qualities. V 104 Color/Quine: is not a concept: because it is nothing definite like square and not a particular color. Instead there is the concept of a color word - i.e. "'Red' is a color word" (is language-specific). A bad way to phrase it is: "Red is a color". Because, for example, red and blue are as different as people whose phone number is a prime number. ((s) There is no designating property here. What are red and blue to have in common?) Ostension: Problem: Color is everywhere - therefore "There is color" is a bad observation sentence. Color similarity: always refers to exact similarity. Color Word/Color/General Term/Singular Term/Reference/Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. you can call snow white and blood red without "white" and "red" being general terms. Snow is a diffuse part of the world which is part of a comprehensive diffuse part of the world, the White. Similar: Example a) smiling mom, b) mom in general. N.B.: against: E.g. the fact that Fido is a dog does not lead to it being part of that broader part of the world which consists of dogs, because that would also apply to his ear. - (>Gavagai) - accordingly for square. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Epistemology | Vollmer | I XX EE/evolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: Lorenz is the father of the evolutionary epistemology. Precursor: Donald Campbell, Popper, Lorenz. >K. Popper, >K. Lorenz Two meanings: Popper: scientific theoretical: evolution of knowledge (interactionist, VsIdentity theory). Lorenz: Evolution of cognition. (Identity theory). >Identity theory. I 16 Knowledge/history/quality/primary/secondary/Vollmer: with increasing progress more and more properties were recognized as subjective. - With Locke impenetrability was still a primary quality - today even expansion is not regarded anymore as a primary quality. >Qualities, >Primary qualities, >Secondary qualities, >Properties, >J. Locke. I 59 Epistemology: is not "reflection" of the outside world - but also not purely algorithmically. In contrast Information/Lorenz embodied : E.g. hoof: "image" of the steppe soil - E.g. fin - "image" of the water. VollmerVsLorenz: this is a misleading terminology. >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Analogies. Solution : texture of the hoof indicates texture of the soil. >Evolution, cf. >Coevolution. I 73 Knowledge/Vollmer: its third level, scientific knowledge is not genetically determined - there are no "biological roots" of the space-time - we are only obliged to consistency - otherwise we are free in forming hypotheses. I 173 Epistemology/tradition/VollmerVsKant: why do we have just these forms of intuition and categories? - How are they formed? - Why are we bound to these a priori judgments and not to others? >Objectivity, >Categorization, >Classification, >a priori, >Judgements, >Consistency. I 294 Definition recognition: (1983(1),30): an adequate reconstruction and identification of external structures in the subject a) construct an internal image, b) compare the model with the stored engrams, c) determine in how far object corresponds to already known - for that memory is required - reconstruction is therefore not a reflection. Our concept of knowledge is narrower than any concept of information. Stegmüller: three-digit relation: the subject recognizes the object as image. I 296 Recognize/Kutschera: the step from ignorance to knowledge. Knowledge/Kutschera: only to explicate as true belief. - Neither truth nor subjectivity is gradable. >Truth, >Subjectivity, >Knowledge. I 310 Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: - explication of terms - investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparing different cognitive systems - distinction of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements - clarification of the conditions for recognition - demonstration of limits of knowledge. 1.Gerhard Vollmer: Mesokosmos und objektive Erkenntnis. In: Konrad Lorenz, Franz M. Wuketis (Hrsg.): Die Evolution des Denkens. München 1983, S. 29–91. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Inscrutability of reference | Putnam | III 122 Absolute Reality/PutnamVsDescartes: their representatives have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with the sensation of secondary qualities. Even Williams seems to visualize a picture of the world without colors. Williams: the ideal case would be a theory of knowledge and error. >Bernard Williams. III 132 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality explains to us, but not to foreign scientists, how we understand it. >Reference. PutnamVs: so it exists only locally. Absolute Reality/Putnam: absolute reality would also require convergence. >Convergence. QuineVsConvergence: convergence has an inscrutability of reference. >Inscrutability/Quine. III 134 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality is without normative terms. PutnamVs: that is why we have the problem of indeterminacy of translation. Putnam: thesis: there are many possible true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies. III 133 Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability (indeterminacy) of reference: we have to abide to the individual sciences or everyday linguistic causality. >Indeterminacy lf translation, >Gavagai. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kant | Putnam | VI 402ff Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game. I: but the author of the game also appears in the game itself. "Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he/she is the "empirical I". Transcendental Ego/Kant/Putnam: the transcendental ego is the "real" author of the game. (outside the game). I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I would modify the author's picture in two respects: 1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions. 2. The authors in the stories are the real authors. PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories. --- V 52 Determinism/Kant: determinism said that such a defense is component of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. >Determinism. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system. V 88 Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly. >Internalism/Putnam. V 89 I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary. >Qualities/Locke. V 90 If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things. PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking. >Noumenal world. V 118 Rationality/Putnam: rationality is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense. >Rationality, >Transcendentals. --- Putnam I (c) 93 Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly: "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system. >Conceptual scheme, >Reference system. PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? Should we use the term system of someone else? I (f) 169 Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: a noumenon is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects. E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E". Kant: in reality no judgment has come about. Putnam: this is merely an inarticulate sound, a noise. I (f) 169/170 Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense. Kant ignores this completely. The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property. The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation. Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example. I (f) 170/171 At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Def Truth/Kant: truth is "the agreement of knowledge with its object". PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth. Assets/Kant: assets are attributed to the whole noumenal world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Perception | Chisholm | I, 136ff Perception/ChisholmVsTradition: Appearance rather than feeling - adverbial speech: "feels reddish" - cannot be comparative - hallucination: here it depends on the mode of experience - appearance: divisible> sense data language is permissible. See also phenomenological language., >Sense data. - perception: it is epistemically evident to me that the object is there - transcendent evidence: judgment about the object is related to me - perceptible properties: secondary qualities - 1. primary qualities: indirect attribution of a property, 2. non-propositional: the subject takes possession of the property true, self-presenting - does not imply the object . I 150 Perception/Knowledge/Theory of Knowledge/Chisholm: Epistemic Principle 9 de re: x is such that it is evident to x that it is F (less pure) - not applicable if thing does not exist - not to reveal existence non-reflectively, not self-presenting. I 152 Negative perception: seems to demand incompatibility, but it does not have to - Russell: negative perception: empirical propositions, directly known, not developed - Chisholm: e.g. hear nothing: psychological state - negative perception/Whitehead: creates consciousness in first place. - Chisholm pro: Awareness of one's own intentional attitudes. --- II 24 Perception/Rutte: more than experience: taking an external through the senses - experience: could also be purely immanent. --- II 24 Aporia of perception/Hartmann: how is correspondence possible if the one is consciousness-immanent and the other consciousness-transcendent? - Causing of experiences has very different properties than having experiences. II ~ 25 Perception problem: not whether we perceive things as they are, but whether we can infer from our experiences a causer. - Rutte: experience-like core of the immediate given (SellarsVs) - perception/Rutte: effect of the object evokes a legal order of experience which causally determines the experiences and provokes expectations. II 27 Perception/Helmholtz: not as an image of properties but their "indications". These are interpreted on the basis of hypotheses - the mode of appearance of a thing is structurally reflected in a certain regular order of our sensory experiences. Hypothetical realism: Schlick, Kraft, Popper, Konrad Lorenz et al. II 34 Perception/Rutte: success/failure already presupposes realism. - linguistic analytical philosophy: criteria for deception - Berkeley: does not exist. VsBerkeley: then there is not even a conceptual distinction of hallucination, but this is presupposed by Berkeley himself. II 36 Realism/Truth/Rutte: whoever wants to know whether there are outside things can perhaps guess the truth about it - there is no truth-oriented way to find it out because no successes or failures can be demonstrated that might speak for or against the assumptions. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Positivism | Rorty | I 128ff Positivists/Rorty: Thesis: We should replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" with the term "language". - Then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke). >Qualities/Locke. But exactly this thesis was revived by Kripke's revolution against Wittgenstein. >Rule following/Kripke. KripkeVsLinguistic turn. >linguistic turn. II (f) 130f Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "Ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities are no longer in closer relation to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke) - but exactly this thesis was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn). >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Qualities | Berkeley | Putnam II 167f Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: Vs primary and secondary qualities. - Only Locke's "simple quality of sensation". Secondary qualities/Locke: perceptible only as an asset, in relation to us. >Qualities/Locke. KantVsLocke: this applies to everything, including primary qualities. - There is no reason to distinguish. >Qualities/Kant. Stegmüller IV 380 Primary qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: certain values of primary qualities such as distance and speed are always only relative sizes! This shows that they exist "only in our minds". |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Qualities | Esfeld | I 176 Secondary Qualities/Esfeld: in secondary qualities the answer-dependence refers not only to the acquisition, but also to the content. Acquisition: when something red, which was surrounded by darkness, comes to light, it will appear red. Contents: content is the contrast individuated by the inferential role. I 175 Def "Global response dependence" with respect to the acquisition of concepts: "Global response dependence" is (...) a necessary condition for the acquisition of the concept F, that something is F only if being F involves the disposition to appear...to the members. The careful phrase "includes" is meant to avoid implying that the property must be dispositional. This global response dependence is sufficient for a social theory of rule-following. Content/appearance: but the content need not say anything about F appear. The content is determined by the inferences. I 176 This blocks the step to noumenal realism. >Metaphysical realism, >Realism. Response dependence allows us to introduce a category of terms for secondary qualities: Def Terms for Secondary Qualities/Esfeld: Terms for secondary qualities are precisely those for which response dependence refers not only to acquisition but also to content. Ex It is part of the content of "comfortable" that persons appear comfortable. >Secondary qualities, >Primary qualities. Content/acquisition/conditions/response dependence/asfield: difference: not all things belonging to the extension have to be such that they really trigger the disposition to classify them as F (secondary quality). >Content, >Dispositions, >Behavior, >Meaning. We don't have to assume that our answers are enough to fix the extension! Ex things which are surrounded by darkness during their whole existence. Yet being red includes the disposition to appear red (if they were brought to light). Thus the content conditions are shifted to the acquisition conditions. Vs: One might object that this would merely allow us to know the effects that a thing has by appearing F to us. I 177 So we have no reason to infer nature. Esfeld: In fact, this can be understood as blocking epistemic access to the thing itself. Response dependence/appearance/Esfeld: Response dependence does not mean that F to appear involves a property in persons that mediates epistemic access. Response can be triggered very indirectly by sophisticated instruments. Response dependency/Esfeld: The biconditional sentence can be read in both directions: 1. from left to right: if something is F, then it appears so under normal conditions. 2. from right to left: If something appears so under normal conditions, then it is also F. Vs: The latter could compromise realism. >Appearance, >Appearance/Sellars. I 177/178 But that depends on how we understand circumstances (normal conditions). Circumstances/Esfeld: Circumstances are found out by judging our actions as correct or incorrect by sanctions. Thus we find out the conditions in which our dispositions to continue a given series converge. But we don't need to identify the normal conditions with the specific conditions under which we converge! Esfeld: We can figure out the conditions of our converging and thus determine the conceptual content, but at the same time view it as aiming at a determination of the conditions under which we have access to things as they are. ((s) Reversal.) Thus, this view of response dependence does not compromise realism. Truth is not determined by our practices! >World/thinking, >Practice. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Qualities | Field | IV 409 Primary qualities/Locke: E.g. length, size, shape - secondary: e.g. color. Secondary quality/Locke: do not resemble our ideas directly. Putnam thesis: Kant has that what Locke said about secondary qualities extended to primary qualities. Field: many say that today because the imaging theory is dead. FieldVsPicture theory. >Picture theory. Locke: color is a force to affect us. Putnam: this also applies to size, charge, mass,...etc. Putnam: Putnam even extends this to properties of sensations. - But this force is not a noumenon, but the world itself (= Vs correspondence theory - ((s): Forces instead of objects). >Noumenon, >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Problem/Field: if electrons do not exist as noumena, they do not exist at all. IV 410 Qualities/Locke: secondary qualities are founded in primary: the objects have the power to affect us by the length, size, mass, etc. of the corpuscles - otherwise there are bare facts. "Things for us"/Putnam/Field: according to the limits of scientific research. IV 412 I.e. shape, etc. are only dispositions; we will never represent the last properties, to appear so and so. - We will never represent the last properties. FieldVsPutnam: that can never be proven. >Representation, >Properties. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Qualities | Hume | I 97 Qualities/HumeVsLocke: VsDistinction primary/secondary qualities: perception does not allow the distinction (HumeVsSubstance). >Substance. I 105 The negation of the >principle of sufficient reason corresponds to the negation of the >primary qualities. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Qualities | Peacocke | I 43f Perception theory/tradition/primary, secondary qualities/Peacocke: the perception theory also has consequences for the explanation of the experience: I 44 e.g. that something is experienced as square, is explained by the fact that it is square. But in the perception theory, this explanation does not function in the case of red - because the question is to be kept open, if there is a primary quality as the reason for it s being red. >Perception theory/Peacocke, >Primary qualities, >Secondary qualities, >Experience, >Perception, >Knowledge, >Explanation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Qualities | Wright | I 251 Explanation/facts/secondary qualities: colors, sounds, tastes, smells show indeed the necessary explanation diversity. It is not a conceptual error to assume that (colorblind) bulls are set in rage by red cloths. Also, the colors of a negative can be explained by reference to the original colors. Secondary properties, VsLocke: E.g. the cat sits by the fire, because it is warm there. I 252 Wide cosmological role: it is not their job to sabotage all statements that are not formulated using the strict vocabulary of the primary qualities of theoretical science. Cosmological role: see content/Wright. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Terminology | Esfeld | I 174 ~ Answer Dependence/Esfeld: variants: something is exactly then an x if a) there are normal circumstances and normal observers, b) regular members, c) it does not reduce to appearance, d) the acquisition is done by disposition, e) there are secondary qualities, i.e. not only acquisition but also content and f) it does not require a special property of the members. Because of the answer dependence there is no view from nowhere in the world. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkeley, G. | Kant Vs Berkeley, G. | Putnam I 167 Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth. I 167/168 KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory". BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Berkeley, G. | Stegmüller Vs Berkeley, G. | Stegmüller IV 376 Perception/Berkeley: the elements of ideas (the real things) depend on the will of the perceiver! They run in accordance with certain rules (which we would call natural laws today). Deceptions do not work this way. This proves that the divine spirit is more powerful than ours. Reality/Berkeley: those ideas that make up what we call reality don't need to be constantly brought out again. If we do not perceive them, they remain existent because God's Spirit constantly perceives them. VsBerkeley: unclear: if an idea exists only in and through being perceived, then it seems to be an object of consciousness. But then it is impossible that more than one mind could perceive exactly the same idea! VsVs: For example, the tree I see, which is only my own idea, ceases to exist when I cease to see it. IV 377 Although the ideas are causally dependent on the perceiving minds, they are not constituted by being perceived! Ideas: would then be more than mental contents or objects of reference: the real things would be ideas directly produced by God. The tree would then be independent of me. Terminology: "Immaterial realism". Realism because for the perceiver there is a whole world of other spirits and ideas. Theism/Stegmüller: Even ordinary theism claims that the physical world is "dependent on God", but this relationship remains dark here. In contrast, Berkeley's system is a clear and understandable interpretation: the world simply consists of ideas that exist in the divine spirit. IV 382 Materialism/Idealism/Berkeley/Stegmüller: the decision for an alternative depends on the statement on Berkeley's seven arguments (IV 379 380). VsBerkeley: on (i): what kind of similarity does the materialist demand? on (ii): Locke only assumes that there are acceptable explanations for seeing, hearing, touching, etc., in which only objects with spatial properties are used as a starting point, but whose other properties need have no similarities with our ideas of secondary qualities. The question of whether this is similar for primary qualities can be left open. IV 383 on (iii): even if movement, size, etc. are relative, they can be of an objective nature! Relativity does not imply mental dependence! on (v): it could be that a theory about a mind-independent reality is confirmed by the fact that it provides a better explanation for our sensory data than any other theory. Moreover, this argument is worthless for Berkeley: it is not specifically directed against materialism as opposed to its immaterial realism. The basic problem of any theory of representation: the "veil of perception" also exists here! on (vi): this is indeed a problem for materialism, but that such a difficulty as the body soul problem occurs does not prove the untenability of all variants of this theory. on (vii): things or qualities that are similar to our ideas do not need to be passive as well! Conclusion: StegmüllerVsBerkeley: no argument from BerkeleyVsMaterialism is conclusive! |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Correspondence Theory | Putnam Vs Correspondence Theory | Field IV 409 Qualities/Primary/Secondary/KantVsLocke/Putnam/Field: (Putnam, V.W u G, p. 60 64): Thesis: Kant extended what Locke said about secondary qualities (SekQ) to primary qualities (primQ). E.g. Locke: Secondary qualities do not resemble our ideas directly. Field: many other authors have extended that also to primary qualities. (namely so, because the image theory is now dead). primary qualities: E.g. length, size, shape secondary qualities: E.g. color. IV 410 Putnam/Field: Putnam has much more in mind, however: he means that properties such as color are nothing else but the power to affect us in a certain way. The extension to primary qualities is then that even length, size, charge and mass are nothing but powers to affect us. Expansion of Locke/EwLPutnam/Field: Putnam goes even further in expanding the position of Locke: 1) he does not only want to apply it to properties of external objects, but also to properties of sensations. Vs: that might seem inconsistent: how can a property of sensations just be a force that evokes sensations? ((s) Circular). But that is not what Putnam means. He means powers that affect us. And that is coherent. 2) This position implies the assumption of a Noumenon ((Def Noumenon/Field: an object that can have no other properties but affecting an observer) for every phenomenal object. Phenomenon/Phenomenal Object/Putnam/Field: should read: object in our representation of the world. Problem: if electrons do not exist in the world (as Noumena), then they do not exist at all. The existence of our representation does not guarantee the existence of "phenomenal" electrons. EwL/Putnam: abandons this assumption altogether by not attributing the power to affect us to a "noumenon", e.g. that underlies a brown chair, but he attributes this power directly to the world. PutnamVsCorrespondence: But even if the world now has such powers, there need be no one to one correspondence between objects in the world (noumena) and objects in our representation (phenomena). Def phenomenon: object in our representation Def Noumenon: what is responsible in the world for that we experience the phenomenon. EwL/Field: we want to call this the "expanded Lockean view". Putnam offers it in two respects 1) as an interpretation of Kant 2) as the actual view of internal realism. (Field: = internalism). PutnamVsCorrespondence Theory: comes up to a rejection of the correspondence theory. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Vollmer Vs Descartes, R. | Vollmer I 14 LockeVsDescartes: no innate ideas! Soul at birth white paper, tabula rasa, wax tablet. Sensory experiences produce ideas that were not there before. Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind what was not in the senses before". (DescartesVs). Yet this is not enough to prove that some ideas do not exist at birth. Locke needs evidence for this, but it is not enough. LeibnizVsLocke: are too weak. Locke: must make sure that the ideas are the right reflection of the world: Primary qualities: inseparable from the body, constant in all changes: For example strength, expansion, shape, movement or rest and number. (objective) Secondary qualities: is nothing in the objects themselves, but only the ability to cause different sensations in us by means of their primary qualities: For example colours, tones, tastes, also warmth (!) etc. (subjective). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Eliminativism | Shoemaker Vs Eliminativism | Stalnaker I 227 Utility theory/utility/scale/calibration/von Neumann/Morgenstern/Stalnaker: E.g. someone prefers duck before salmon and salmon before oatmeal A > B > C. Refinement of the scale: one asks the person whether he prefers to have B or prefers to have a 50/50 lottery ticket for A v C. Does he select B, it means that B moves closer to the left on his scale, closer to A. This can be repeated for the things at stake in the lottery and thus ever further refinements can be concluded. General: preferences between the lottery tickets define numerical values for the utility But the scale is a conventional: every linear transformation of this scale provides an equivalent, that represents the same facts about the subjective preferences. Question: does it make sense to compare preferences interpersonally? I 228 Utility/Stalnaker: but here it is not about felt pleasure (as a "quality experience"). The numeric values do not represent facts about relations between people. Analogy/Stalnaker: the position VsInterpersonal comparisons is analogous to the question whether grams would be greater or smaller than kilometers. Pointe: that we cannot say this is not because there were facts that were hidden from us. qualitative/intentional/Stalnaker: if we oppose intentional to phenomenal (qualitative) states, it is clear that utility belongs to the intentional side. Utility/analogy/Stalnaker: the question whether one can compare utility interpersonally is complicated and interesting. It is also about whether it is more likely that apply it to social groups. I 229 Utility theory/von Neumann/Morgenstern//Stalnaker: should not be regarded as eliminativistical. According to it there are really facts about the preferences of those represented by the numbers but because the zero point and the units are arbitrary, interpersonal compare have no sense. StalnakerVsShomaker: I am afraid he takes the side of common sense VsFrege because he assumes that Frege is an eliminativist. ShoemakerVsEliminativism. Qualia/secondary qualities/Shoemaker: thesis: we need qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities. StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach is capable of this as well. RelationismVsQualia. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Instrumentalism | Rorty Vs Instrumentalism | IV 26 RortyVsInstrumentalism: once you stop hinting at a discrimination of hierarchy: e.g. to the split line, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, canonical and non-canonical nontation, etc., then instrumentalism will seem like a funny late form of Platonism. >Instrumentalism, >Platonism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kant | Putnam Vs Kant | VI 402ff Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game. I: But the author of the game also appears in the game itself (as in Pirandello). "Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he is the "empirical I". transcendental ego/Kant/Putnam: is the "real" author of the game. (Outside the game). I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I'd modify his picture in two respects: 1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions. 2. The authors in the stories are the real authors. PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories. --- V 52 Determinism/Kant: said that such a defense component is of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system. V 88 Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly. V 89 I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary. V 90 If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things. PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking. V 118 Rationality/Putnam: is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense. --- Putnam I (c) 93 Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly. "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system. PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? should we use the term system of someone else? I (f) 169 Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects. E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E".: Kant: in reality no judgment has come about. Puntam: merely an inarticulate sound, a noise. I (f) 169/170 Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/Noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense. Kant ignores this completely. The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property. The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation. Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example. I (f) 170/171 At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Definition Truth/Kant: "the agreement of knowledge with its object". PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth. Assets/Kant: is attributed to the whole noumenal world. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Locke, J. | Berkeley Vs Locke, J. | Danto2 I 211 Berkeley assumes that the world is perceived by God. BerkeleyVsLocke: he casts an externalist view on a whole inevitably internist position. Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsIdealism/BerkeleyVsLocke/Avramides: (18th century): Locke: "The mind has the power to assemble (set, grasp, conceive, "to frame") abstract ideas. Language/Berkeley: Locke's mistake lies in believing that language has no other function than to communicate our ideas and that every descriptive name stands for an idea. (cf. Berkeley 1710, Absch.10ff) This leads to the assumption that linguistic generalization is an expression of generalization (generality) in thought. But one only has to deny it in order not to have to postulate such generalizing powers of the mind anymore. Berkeley denied it: BerkeleyVsLocke: it is not necessary for individual names to provoke in us the understanding of ideas for which they should stand. Communication/Berkeley: is also not the main purpose of language, there are other purposes of language like e.g. evoking passion, stimulating or stopping actions that put the mind into a certain disposition. Avramides: but it took more than a century for the idealistic grip to be loosened and idealistic theories to be revealed as completely misguided. Stegmüller IV 379/380 Reality/World/Berkeley: there is an agreement that ideas exist only in the mind. (i) Question: Can there be things outside the mind that are similar to ideas? No: only an idea can be similar to an idea. (ii) BerkeleyVsLocke: he recognizes that there are ideas of secondary qualities (odors, colors, sounds, etc.) that are not images of something that exists outside our mind. Berkeley: but he gives no reasons why it should be different for the primary qualities (shape, extension, movement)! Moreover, we cannot even form the idea of a body that has only primary but not secondary qualities. (iii) Relation/Berkeley/Stegmüller: certain values of primary qualities like distance and speed are always only relative values! This shows that they exist "only in our mind". (iv) Substance/Substrate/BerkeleyVsLocke: he admits that they are the "unknown something". But "to carry" the word is nothing more than a metaphorical term. (v) Skepticism/Berkeley: if we can imagine a material world, skepticism is still possible. We will never know. (vi) Ideas/Berkeley: even if we accept an external world, our ideas cannot be explained because it is inexplicable how material bodies can affect our mind. (vii) Primary Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: ideas are passive and causally ineffective. If there were expansion and movement similar to our ideas, they would also be passive and could not be the cause of our ideas! |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Hume Vs Locke, J. | I 97 Mind/Hume: the mind is delirious! It is demented! Closed systems, synthesis and cosmologies are only imaginarily possible. I 98 Here, principles are not exceeded subsequently, but in principle! Ancient philosophy: would have made use of the 'substance' to secure long-term survival, HumeVsSubstance. Modern philosophy: has its own phantoms: it distinguishes primary and secondary qualities, which is no less crazy (HumeVsLocke). I 105 HumeVsLocke: perception allows us no distinctions between primary and secondary qualities. ((s) because perceptions are individual.) --- Quine I 235 'Nothing' and 'nobody' is an indefinite singular term whose ambiguity has caused a lot of confusion. HumeVsLocke: supposedly, Locke succumbed to the same confusion ('nobody overtook me'). Locke: if a process had no cause, then it would have nothing as its cause, and nothing could not be a cause. Quine: this is 'quite humorless' (also Heidegger, PlatonVsParmenides) of the indeterminate singular term. 'Nothing' has the unfortunate tendency to pose as a determinate singular term. Cause: parallelism to 'everyone', which already reminds us of the indeterminacy by sheer manifold, this reminder is absent in 'no'. --- Stegmüller IV 347 Religion/belief/theology/HumeVsLocke: (Hume, Treatise, 10th Sect.): the Christian religion cannot be believed by any rational person without seeing in this belief itself a miracle (Mackie pro). --- Vollmer I 20 Hume: (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748) (Vollmer: much more astute than Locke). HumeVsLocke: these are innate ideas. In particular, the reasoning from experience, the inferring from the past to the future, is based on a habit that cannot be equated with rational deduction. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Locke, J. | Kant Vs Locke, J. | McDowell I 126/127 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: wit with him (paralogism-chapter): it is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity! The subject does not need to make an effort to focus attention on one and the same thing! Putnam I 168 Kant Locke/Putnam: we should read Kant in such a way that he proposes what Locke said about the secondary qualities is valid for all objects, even for primary and simple objects. There is no reason to distinguish between them. All are secondary, that is, the object is such that its effect affects us in a particular way. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Smart, J. C. | Quine Vs Smart, J. C. | II 118 ff The Oxford trained philosopher today turns one ear to common sense and the other one to science. Historians who do not want to be outflanked claim that the real driving force behind development was fashion. Even quantum theorists are heard to say that they do not attribute reality so much to the tiny objects of their theory as primarily to their experimental apparatuses, i.e. to ordinary things. In refreshing contrast to that is the Australian philosopher Smart: he represents a shamelessly realistic conception of physical elementary particles. The worldview of the physicist is not only ontologically respectable, but his language gives us a truer picture of the world than common sense. (Smart mainly studies physics). There have also been materialists who believe that living beings are indeed material, but subject to biological and psychological laws, which cannot be reduced to physical laws in principle. This was the emergence materialism. Smart's materialism is more robust than that. II 119 Smart Thesis: He denies that there are any laws in the strict sense in psychology and biology at all. The statements there are site-specific generalizations about some terrestrial plants of our acquaintance. SmartVsEmergence. They are at the same level as geography or reports on consumer behavior. That even applies to statements about cell division. They will most likely be falsified at least elsewhere in outer space, if not even here with us. (Law: explanatory force) Smart admits that statements about the small processes in biology tend to have more explanatory force. (Precisely, they come indeed closer to physicochemistry.) Biology describes a site-specific outgrowth, while physics describes the nature of the world. Psychology then describes an outgrowth on this outgrowth. II 120 Colors: Smart on the color concept: Color dominates our sensory experience, with its help we distinguish objects. But, that's the point of Smart's explanations: color differences rarely have an interesting connection to the laws of physics: a mixed color can appear to us as a pure one depending on contingent mechanisms inside us. It can be assumed that extraterrestrial beings have similar concepts of distance and electric charge, but hardly similar concepts of color. To view the world sub specie aeternitatis we have to avoid the concept of color and other secondary qualities. Primary: length, weight, hardness, shape, etc. are those that are easiest to incorporate in physical laws. For Smart, physicalism wins. On the subject of "humans as machines", today's opponents of mechanistic thought refer to Godel's theorem, which states that no formal proof method can cover the entire number theory. II 121 Smart, who represents the mechanistic view, argues against this rather gloomy application of the great Gödel theorem. The place where man defies the barriers of formal proof theory is that of the informal and largely resultless maneuvers of scientific method. Determinism: Smart agrees with Hobbes that >determinism and freedom are not antithetic to one another: deterministic action is considered free if it is in a certain way mediated by the agent. Ethics: The differentiation of activities for which one can be responsible, and those for which this is not true, follows the social apparatus of rewarding and punishing. Responsibility is assigned a place where reward and punishment tended to work. Disposition/Smart: This corresponds to an important element in the use of "he could have done." Smart continues to infer on "it could have" (e.g. broken). He brings this into context with the incompleteness of information relating to causal circumstances. Quine: I welcome this thesis for modalities. These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. because of ignorance, disregard details. There is a conception mocked by Smart, according to which the present moment moves forward through time at a velocity of sixty seconds per minute. Furthermore, there is the idea that sentences about the future are neither true nor false. Otherwise fatalism would get the the reins in his hand. Such thoughts are widespread and confused and partially go back to Aristotle. They have been put right with great clarity by Donald Williams et al. As Smart puts them right again, distinctive details are added. II 122 Incredible contrast between probability and truth. Smart: "probably" is an indicator; such as "I", "you" "now" "then" "here", "there". A word that depends on the use situation. For a specific statement of fact is, if at all, true at all times, whether we know it or not, but even then it can be more or less probable, depending on the situation. So modality concept of probability finally ends in subjective ambiguity, like the modalities. Quine: Smart is an honest writer. Smart overcomes all moral dilemmas; the materialist takes the bull by the horns and effortlessly wins over the moralists! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Williams, B. | Putnam Vs Williams, B. | III 107 Ethics/relativism/Williams, Bernard: if an approximation of positions is really taking place in ethics, it is not because of a steering by the way things really are, whereas in the sciences this could actually be explained in this way. III 108 Reality/Williams/Putnam: We can select some of convictions of which one could say that they are maximally independent from our perspective. "The world as it appears to us" is interpreted as "the world as it appears to us in particular". For such a description only primary qualities should be chosen. III 263 footnote: Ex further terms can be derived therefrom: Ex "impulse" is defined by "mass" and "speed" whereas "speed" is defined by "time" and "location". III 109 How would we describe the world and imagine how it would be if there were no observers. In colloquial descriptions we could, of course, also include secondary qualities and speak of green grass and warm weather. According to Williams, we can readily be brought to the conclusion that we only describe how the grass had appeared to observers. Williams: thesis: our world (with observers) emerged from a world without observers. The laws are exactly the same. III 110 Therefore a description with primary qualities only should be possible. PutnamVsWilliams: enchanting, but it is true? Through evolution, no new laws of physics have emerged. But our predictions refer to phenomena that are described in the language of physics, not in the language of biology, psychology or economics. Once living beings and societies appear on the scene, actually new laws come to light, but they do not contradict the laws of physics. "Offer" and "demand" can not be described in terms of physics. III 128 Values/Williams/Putnam: even if it turns out that the color of a surface is an objective property of reflectivity, that does not impair the contrast between color characteristics and values, which Williams wanted to highlight. Putnam: but to demonstrate that the evaluation does not emerge from one eye from the nature of the eye, the complicated metaphysical explanations of Williams are unnecessary. Def values/Dewey: Evaluation results from the critique of various problem-solving processes. Absoluteness/Williams: contains ideally a "theory of knowledge and error"; contains both the possibility of the local views, as well as its own possibility. Is being eliminated virtually immediately by Williams: "this view of the world must enable to explain the possibility of their own existence". Later: withdrawal: "... which may be subject to the radical indeterminacy of interpretation ..." III 129 Austin: "this is the point at which the philosopher says it, and then comes the point at which s_he withdraws." III 130 PutnamVsWilliams: Problem: for the absolute conception, there is only one way to explain the possibility of local views and their own possibility: an prediction of future occurrences of characters and sounds. III 135 ff RelativismPutnamVsWilliams: the outright "truth of relativism" by Williams is not more coherent than the "absolute conception of the world". Williams/truth: rather carefree use of the term. Sometimes something that is "detected by the procedural manners of a linguistic community" (same perspective as Rorty, who Williams considers an opponent). II 136/137 Truth: According to Williams in the purely academic conflict "not really a problem." He believes that the members of other communities have ethical knowledge, and their beliefs are true, if they use their concepts carefully. PutnamVsWilliams: striking contradiction: Ex "right, her sitting together with her boss alone in the office is unchaste, but we do not consider chastity a virtue". In contradiction to Williams assertion that "true" and "false" could only be used in case of a real conflict. III 140 PutnamVsWilliams: Opposition: Williams would like to acknowledge the involvement of facts and values, and at the same time hold on to the "absoluteness" of scientific knowledge. Putnam: but that's impossible. It's not possible that science is absolute, but nothing else. I (k) 253 Norms/values/Bernard Williams: presumes the perspective of "some social world". On the other hand (according to Putnam) physics proposes an absolute metaphysical truth. PutnamVsWilliams: the talk of the "content" of a conviction that would be "perspective", is lacking any clear sense. That was grist to the mill of deconstructionism. Rorty VI 64 PutnamVsWilliams/Rorty: "approach to the big picture": purely dogmatic. The notion of absoluteness is incoherent. |
SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Objectivity | McDowell, J. | Seel III 77 Objectivity / McDowell: the concept of objectivity must be cahnged in order to equate values with colors - it must be independent of our perception and recognition. McDowell: this applies now also to the secondary qualities (colors). |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Values | McDowell, J. | Seel III 76 Ethics/Moral/McDowell: ingenious proposal to overcome the oscillation between objectivism and subjectivism: thesis: values could be seen as colors. III 76/77 Seel: not original in itself: empirical tradition, values such as colors to be regarded as projections of the human mind. (Ethical Antirealism). McDowell: would now like to establish an anti-antirealism: Objectivity/McDowell: thesis: requires a change in the concept of objectivity: as independent of our perception and recognition. McDowell: This now also applies to the secondary qualities (colours). |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 |
| Appearance | Peacocke, Chr. | I 28 appearance / to be / sensational / Peacocke: the sensation even property of the experience can solve the problem of the relation between appearing red and being red. This applies to all secondary qualities. |
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| Qualia | Shoemaker, S. | Staln I 220 Qualia/common sense/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, local but also comparable. Against: Frege/Schlick view. Qualia/Frege/Schlick-View/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are not comparable, because it is pointless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent something communicable at all. Interpersonal comparisons of phenomenal experiences are pointless. Staln I 229 Qualia/Secondary Qualities/Shoemaker: Thesis: we need Qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities. StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach can do that too. RelationismVsQualia. I 233 Interpersonal Identity/Qualia/Functionalism/Shoemaker: thesis: functionalism alone is not sufficient for interpersonal comparisons. Solution/Shoemaker: to explain identity in terms of the identity of the physical properties that realize the Qualia. ((s) So not only the causal role? ("whatever...-"). >Shoemakers Paradox. I 236 Shoemaker: Thesis: the addition of the backup system influences the qualitative character, because it changes the memory mechanisms that are constitutive for the identity conditions for Qualia. Then Alices and Bertha's qualitative experiences differ (see above). Stalnaker: corresponds to I 239 Dualism/Stalnaker: Thesis: it is part of the physical character of things that they have non-physical effects. If they didn't, they would be physically different. If that is true, the possibility of possible worlds with zombies would be ruled out from the beginning. |
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