Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colour | Jackson | McGinn II 34 Colors/Frank Jackson/E.g. Mary: the famous color researcher Mary was born and raised in a black and white room. She is a gifted physicist and learns everything physical, what there is to know about the human brain. (with a black/white monitor). One day she is released into the colored outside world. (She is not color blind). N.B.: she says: "I have learned" how it is "to perceive the color red." (How it feels). McGinn/Jackson: if true, then she did not know all about the mind, when she was in her room, although she knew everything about the brain. Jackson: Mary-example: (color researcher in the room): "know-how-it-is" - without this, there is no complete knowledge. - Mary, as a brain researcher, does not yet know all about the mind. >Knowing how, >Qualia, >Experience. --- Schwarz I 160 Color researcher Mary/Jackson: (1998c)(1): Jackson is of the opinion that the consequences of the Mary example are so implausible that a mistake must be stuck somewhere. 1. Frank Jackson [1998c]: “Postscript on Qualia”. In [Jackson 1998b], 76–80 |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Colour | McGinn | II 34 Jackson/Mary-E.g./McGinn: Mary cannot say she had only a new manifestation of old, sufficiently well known facts. What has been missing is nothing more than a piece of consciousness. (Knowing-how). >Color researcher Mary, >Knowing how. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Colour | Nida-Rümelin | Metzinger I 264 Color Researcher Mary/Terminology/Nida-Rümelin(1): non-phenomenally believe: from the use of language - e.g. the sky is blue - in that, you can believe yourself that it is about "red" - believe phenomenally: "The same color as this" or also "knowing how". >Color researcher Mary, >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia. Metzinger I 273 But she does not acquire new knowledge simply by getting to know colors from her own experience. >Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge. Color Perception/Color Words/Colors/Mary/Marianna/Nida RümelinVsJackson: we better assume two stages: 1) she finally sees colors in the house - only now can she ask if the sky looks redp, bluep, greenp or yellowp for people with normal vision - before: she could not consider the alternatives - but still no acquisition of knowledge. 2nd stage: she steps outside and sees that the sky is blue - so she knows which alternative is true - thus, her own de-se belief that the sky is redp is disproved - therefore, she corrects her mistake about the meaning of color words. >Color words. 1. Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn, München 1995 |
Nida I Martine Nida-Rümelin Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand von Überzeugungen In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Content | Chalmers | I 203 Content/experience/phenomenal belief/Chalmers: 1. What do our concepts like "consciousness" or "red experience" actually pick out (in a given world)? >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reference. 2. What constitutes the content of these concepts, is it determined by the psychological nature alone, or also by the phenomenal? >Concepts, >Phenomena. I 204 Zombie: could it have the same intensions of beliefs as I do? If it is subject to a conceptual confusion, that might be the same for me. >Zombies, >Intensions. The zombie could not make true or false judgments about consciousness in itself, but also in relation to me! For it could not use the term properly. But the concept of consciousness differs from the concept of "water" insofar as the "acquaintance" with the object is much more direct in the case of consciousness. >Acquaintance, >Knowing how, >First person, >Other minds, >Incorrigibility. I 205 Experience: is there a public language usage, e.g. for the term "red experience"? >Language use. Problem: Inverted spectra. >Inverted spectra. Solution: Standard conditions for standard observers. Moreover, we do not want to limit the term to my personal experiences, but look at every one's experiences. >Observation, >Standard conditions. I 206 Qualia: secondary intensions are not enough. We also learn something when we learn how it is to experience something red: the experience of something red could have been different, but it is so. In this way, we limit the scope of possibilities. For this, however, we need different primary intensions. Cf. >Color researcher Mary. I 207 Communication/Qualia: Only if others can have such experiences (under relevant causal conditions), my Qualia are communicable. >Understanding, >Intersubjectivity. Content/Consciousness/Conclusion/Chalmers: Beliefs about experiences are central. And these cannot be the same with my zombie twin as with me. But we do not need a causal theory of knowledge. We can even refer to experiences by assuming a property dualism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Property dualism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Facts | Lewis | Schwarz I 158 Facts/colors researcher Mary/Lewis: you can learn special items and representations even if you get information in Russian, - but there are no particular facts for Russians. - Real progress in knowledge: acquisition of new skills. - Mary/Lewis: The main thing is that there are not recent (physical) possibilities excluded, that is not possible. Explanation/(s): Example color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson: the color researcher Mary is in a closed room with a black and white monitor. She has any amount of literature about colors at her disposal. Question: is her knowledge sufficient to say that she knows everything about colors? >Color/Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson. Schwarz I 139 Moore's facts/Schwarz: For example, absences are often causes and effects. Something that only philosophers think about denying. Schwarz I 11 Moore's Facts/Lewis: are more certain than the premises of any philosophical argument that could be used to refute them. Schwarz I 15 Analysis/language/fact/Schwarz: strictly speaking, only words and sentences can be analyzed, not facts. Fact/Schwarz: nothing but true sentences: For example "the fact that it is snowing" means nothing else than "it is snowing". For example, "facts about snow are necessarily determined by facts about precipitation": is equivalent to a long conjunction of sentences like "necessary if there is no precipitation, it does not snow either", etc. Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/actuality/fact/Lewis/black: as with possible worlds, there is no actual information: For example, that 34 is the root of 1156 tells us nothing about the world. Schwarz: For example that there is nobody who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. Schwarz I 133 Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative at all, but only a terminological variant. Def Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: true propositions (1986f(1),189,Fn 15). I.e. classes of possible worlds. Then there are facts that unambiguously correspond with Lewis's classes of space-time regions, but one can no longer distinguish "right" causes and effects from wrong ones. Cause/Effect/Event/Event/Act/LewisVsBennett/Schwarz: Event as fact: Problem: To Distinguish "Right Causes": Similarity is not a solution here: Example Xanthippe's becoming a widow: here one cannot refer to similarity of regions. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Hetero-Phenomenology | Radner | I 408 Hetero-phanomenology/HP/DennettVsBrentano/VsHusserl: hetero-phenomenology works from the perspective of the 3rd person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: Thesis: hetero-phanomenology can also be operated from the first person perspective. >First person, >Perspective. I 409 Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: hetero-phenomenology deals with: 1. How things appear to a subject 2. How is the experience of the subject ("how is it for the subject ...")? Frank Jackson: treats both as equivalent: E.g Fred: for him there are two red hues, where all the others only perceive one. How is it for Fred to see Red1 and Red2? Radner: the question varies between (1) and (2). In the first sense, Jackson: "How is the new color?" In the second sense, Jackson: "if we could adapt our physiology to that of Fred, we would finally know." >Knowing how, >Qualia, >Experiences. E.g. M. Tye: instead of saying, A) The color blind Jones does not know how the different colors look, we can just as well say, B) He does not know what it is like to have the experiences characteristic of seeing the colors. Both hang together, but problems are not always the established and reversed equally well in the sense of 1. as of 2. I 410 For example, color researcher Mary/Jackson/Radner: the problem is not how red may look for Mary (probably as for us), but how her experience will be. Will it be a surprise? >Color researcher Mary, >F. Jackson. I 411 Environment/Inner world/Radner: both can be approached from the viewpoint of the 1st and the 3rd person. >Environment, >Interior world. I 412 This distinction does not correspond to that between car and hetero-phenomenology. Hetero-Phenomenology: 1., 3. Person/environment/inner world: all combinations of questions are possible. Environment/hetero-phanomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How do things appear to the subject?" 1. Person: E.g. "How would things appear to me if I had a sense device like that of the subject?" Inner world/hetero-phenomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How are the experiences of the subject?" 1. Person: E.g.: "How would my experiences be if I were in the circumstances of the subject and had certain characteristics in common with it?". >Circumstances. I 413 Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: E.g. he would like to know how a warning call sounds for another subject, e.g. for birds of prey like hawks or owls, which have a smaller head than us. I 414 How would it be if I had no auricles and the ears were only two inches apart? Problem: I may be able to imagine other ears on my brain, but not how it would be for me with a cat brain. Cf. >"What is it like to be a bat?", >Th. Nagel. |
Radner I Daisie Radner "Heterophenomenology. Learning About the Birds and the Bees", in: Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994) pp. 389-403 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Imagination | Nida-Rümelin | Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in Hügli (Ed) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 Lanz I 277 On the 1st stage Mary may willfully cause the idea of something blue, without knowing that the sky appears in this color for people with normal vision. >Color researcher Mary >Colour, >Colour words, >Qualia, >Ideas, >Reference, >Knowledge, >Knowledge how. |
Nida I Martine Nida-Rümelin Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand von Überzeugungen In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Knowledge | Chalmers | I 103 Knowledge/Consciousness/color researcher Mary/Jackson/Nagel/Chalmers: (Jackson 1982(1), Nagel 1974(2)). E.g. Color researcher Mary knows everything there is to know about colors - but she has never seen colors. >F.Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson. All neurophysical knowledge cannot explain how it is to see red. The knowledge of how it is (experience) does not follow from physical knowledge alone. >Knowledge how, >Explanation. Bat-Example/Nagel/Chalmers: boils down to the same: it remains an open question: it is compatible with all physical facts that bats or even mice have a consciousness, and it is also compatible with them that they have none. >What is it like to be a bat? I 104 Jackson/Chalmers: Jackson has presented his argument JacksonVsMaterialism, not VsReductionism, not against a reductive explanation of our conscious experience. >Reductionism, >Materialism, >VsReductionism, >VsMaterialism. See also Lewis (1990)(3), and Nemirov (1990)(4). I 141 Knowledge/intension/fact/Chalmers: every time, if one knows a fact under one way of giveness, but not under another, there will be an additional, different fact which one does not know. E.g. Morning star/Evening Star, Superman/Clark Kent, Water/H2O. >Morning Star/Evening Star, >Superman/Clark Kent. I 142 The new fact that one learns (also e.g. color researcher Mary, when she first sees a color) is a fact in relation to the way of giveness. >Way of being given, >Intension. 1. F. Jackson, Ephiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982: pp. 127-36 2. Th. Nagel What it is like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4, 1974: pp. 435-50 3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge | Lycan | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/LycanVsJackson/Lycan/Chalmers: (Lycan 1995)(1): there is a difference in intensionality between "This liquid is water" and "This liquid is H2O". In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without knowing the other. >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Twin Earth, >Implication, >Stronger/weaker. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intensions (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intension, >Secondary Intension, >Possible Worlds, >Actual World. 1. William G. Lycan (1995). A limited defense of phenomenal information". In: Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58 (1995) |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge | Tye | Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Colour Researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/TyeVsJackson/Tye/Chalmers: (Tye 1986)(1): There is a difference in the intensionality between "This fluid is water" and "This fluid is H2O". >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Reference. In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without the other being known. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intension (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intensions, >Secondary Intensions, >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia. 1. Tye, Michael (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17. |
Tye I M. Tye Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Chalmers | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia, >Knowledge, >Propositional Knowledge, >Experience, >Intentions, >Primary Intension, >Terminology/Chalmers. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. >Conceivability, >Possible worlds. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Materialism | Chalmers | Stalnaker I 242 Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996(1), 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. >Supervenience. 1. Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers I XIII Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. Chalmers I 41 Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. >Supervenience/Chalmers. I 42 Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism: Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994)(1): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364). >F. Jackson, >Possible Worlds. I 123 Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world 2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world. 3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts. 4. Therefore, materialism is wrong. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 124 The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. >Inverted spectra. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain. The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism. >Dualism, >Property dualism. I 139 MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989 (1).) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities. ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility). >Modality, >Possibility, >Necessity. E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color. I 144 Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990)(3) and Nemirov (1990)(4): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible. I 145 Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities. Loar: (1990)(5) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this." DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991)(6) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment. ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge. >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia. 1. F. Jackson, Finding the mind in the natural world. In: R. Casati, B. Smith and G. White, eds. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. 2. C. McGinn, Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98, 1989: pp.349-66 3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 5. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 6. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Phenomena | Stalnaker | I 269 Def phenomenal information/terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: phenomenal information is - beyond physical information - an irreducible other type of information. The two are independent. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information that Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It is compatible with the modest view. >Colour researcher Mary, >Colours/Jackson, >Knowledge/Jackson, >Knowledge how. Lewis: thesis: Mary is not missing phenomenal information. I 271ff Phenomenal information/self/subjectivity/Stalnaker: e.g. Mary knows in her room, that the treasure lies at a huge military cemetery in the 143rd row in the southerly direction and in the 57th row in the westerly direction. Problem: they still do not know that the treasure is "here". Problem: even if she stands in front of it, then she may have miscounted. ((s) Then she does not know what proposition the sentence expresses.) In the room: she cannot be fooled. Objective content: objective content is already in the room and possible to learn. Subjective content: subjective content cannot be expressed as a timeless proposition with "here". >Localization, >Index words, >Indexicality. I 274 Phenomenal indistinguishability, is possible in relation to colors, but not in relation to possible worlds. >Indistinguishability, >Possible worlds. Phenomenal information/self-identification/Stalnaker: e.g. person with memory loss: Rudolf Lingens does not know whether he is Lingens or Gustav Lauben. >Self-identification. Error: it is false to assume that there will be a possible world, that is just like the actual world, except that the experiences of Lingens were reversed with those of Lauben. Even if such an interpersonal comparison between worlds is understandable, it would not be compatible with the fact that self-localization is an irreducible information. >Centered worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reduction | Chalmers | I 43 Reduction/explanation/Chalmers: a reductive explanation of a phenomenon does not imply the reduction of this phenomenon to something else. >Phenomena, >Experience. Explanation: it does not mean identification with something else, especially not with something on a lower level. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Chalmers I 264 Reduceability: The fact that multiple realizability is possible is regarded by some authors as a counter-argument to a reducibility. But: BrooksVs: (Brooks 1994)(1): explains this as irrelevant. Likewise, Wilson (1985)(2) and Churchland (1986)(3); paradigmatic reducible cases such as e.g. temperature are indeed mutiple possible. Reduction: reduction should not be equated with a reduction towards a higher-level theory. Sometimes there is no such theory. >Theories. I 46 Consciousness/explanation/reduction/Chalmers: we need something like a cognitive model, that is, a model of the abstract causal organization, without having to specify the physicochemical substrates. >Models. This is very good for psychological aspects, but not for the phenomenal side. >Psychology/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 47 Explanation gap: an explanation gap exists between the psychological and the phenomenal side of consciousness (Levine 1983)(4). I 48 Reductive explanation: reductive explanation is always possible when the explanatory (for example, the natural phenomenon) supervenes globally logically on the explanatory (e.g., the physical). If supervenience is not global, the question always remains: why is this process accompanied by this phenomenon? >Supervenience. I 49 Reduction: reduction does not always eliminate a "mystery" at the resulting level, but perhaps eliminates the assumption that there must be something extra that has precedence. I 50 Consciousness/Chalmers: here logical supervenience fails in the explanation. >Explanation. I 104 Reduction/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the arguments of the inverted spectra, the bat example, the color researcher Mary does not necessarily follow that there is no reductive explanation of the consciousness. (This would be equivalent to the fact that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts). >Exchanged spectra, >To be a bat. Analysis/Analyzability/Consciousness/Chalmers: One last argument for the irreducibility is that no analysis of consciousness is available from physical facts. I 105 Problem: Arguments that rely on better distinctions or better information in the future must fail. In turn, they do not have what is important: the conscious experience! Even if conscious states can play certain causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. For example, distinguishing ability can also be explained without consciousness. >Thermostat, >Fuel gauge, >Reliability. 1. D. H. M. Brooks, How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994: pp. 803-14. 2. M . Wilson, What is the ting called "pain"? The philosophical science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985: pp.227-67. 3. P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Scinece of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge 1986. 4. Levine,J. 1983. Materialism and Qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:345-61. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Jackson, F. | Lewis Vs Jackson, F. | V 154/155 Robust/LewisVsJackson: There are two form of robustness: Def robust1: A is robust1 with regard to B, if P(A) and P(A I B) are close and both are high (like Jackson). (probability). Def robust2: A is robust2 with regard to B, if P(A) is high and remains high, even when we learn that B. (Learning!) E.g. A is robust1 with regard to B only, but not with regard to B and E together. Then A will not be robust2 with regard to B. A: "I will not believe that Reagan works for the KGB!" B: "Reagan works for the KGB". E: Not A. (I believe that Reagan works for the KGB.) ((s) robust1 on B only: even if "...I will not believe this" But only if both probabilities are high!) not robust2: (learning): When I learn that he works for the KGB, I need to believe it. Lewis: If the KGB is so successful to have one of their people on the presidential seat, then they will also control the news so that we do not learn about this. So P(A) and P(A I BE) are equally high. But naturally P(A I BE) = 0. (If I believe that Reagan works for the KGB, I will not believe that he does not work for them = 0). Learning: What I learn is what I need to believe (in order to have been able to learn). And this contrary to my initial original belief that the KGB is going to deceive me. So A is not robust2 with regard to B. Example Richmond Thomason: a man accepts: "If my wife cheats on me, I won't believe it (because she is clever)". But he doesn't mean that if he is made to believe the antecedens, he will believe the consequences. ((s) Conditional(s): the A can become more and more likely here without the speaker believing it, but if the probability function for the speaker gets higher, he/she will reject the whole conditional. Robust/Conditional/Lewis: which of the two types of robustness affects the indicative conditional? It depends on robustness2: it signals more information. V 15 On the other hand, robustness1 is much easier to determine. Both are equivalent on the assumption that the learner conditionalizes. R1 is a good guide for R2, which is really important. It is not surprising that we can signal R1, even if it clearly diverges from R2! Example I can very well say: "If Reagan works for the KGB, I'll never believe it!". Stalnaker I 269 Def Phenomenal Information/Terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: is - beyond physical information - an irreducible different kind of information. The two are independent of each other. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It must be included in a non-centered description of the world. Lewis/Stalnaker: had designed it for a possible response LewisVsJackson. But: I 270 LewisVsPhenomenal Information/LewisVsJackson: enriching our description of the world would not in itself solve the problem of what it is that Mary does not know. Lewis: For example parapsychology: is what one could call the science of non-physical things. Suppose we learn as much about parapsychology as possible. Yet we would always not know "what it is like..." Stalnaker: this is the same argument as Nagel's against the ontological view of self-localization. It is in vain to try to objectify a certain type of information, because the information "as it is..." will always be omitted. Objectification/VsVs: could then answer that this special information is only accessible to the subject. (see above: like Frege). Intentionality/Stalnaker: this requires access to intentionality, which explains how objective content can have this particular status. Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: seems to me to dampen the temptation to objectify the content. StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) 1. takes on an extravagant metaphysics. 2. requires an explanation of the special relation we should still have additionally. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Color Research | Jackson, F. | Metzinger II 259 Frank Jackson: "Knowledge argument" - "Argument of incomplete knowledge": For example, color researcher Mary grows up in a closed room, the only contact to the outside world is a black-and-white monitor. She learns everything about colors, but not "how it is" to see colors. Thesis: by being released and seeing colors for the first time, she acquires new knowledge. VsJackson: the majority of authors argue that the argument does not lead to the intended result of the existence of non-physical facts. Problem: how to describe the increase in knowledge at all. Nida-RümelinVsNagel: Thesis: the phrase "as it is" misses the point. II 265 Nida-Rümelin thesis: it cannot be inferred from all these cases or examples that a Qualia exchange would be possible with functional agreement. II 275 Knowledge/Belief/Nida-Rümelin: Thesis: Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge in the strict sense: namely, knowledge about something that is the case. II 280 Argument of incomplete knowledge/Jackson: The thesis should show in the original version that there are non-physical facts, i.e. such facts which cannot be formulated in physical vocabulary. Pauen I / V 179 Color Researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism - Thesis 1: Neurobiological knowledge is in principle incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences - 2. Monism is wrong, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neuronal characteristics! Phenomenal characteristics are causally ineffective side effects of mental states - epiphenomenalism. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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